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- Permanent Link:
- http://dpanther.fiu.edu/dpService/dpPurlService/purl/FI13102403/00001
Notes
- Summary:
- This document analyzes the particular constraints and enticements which impacted whether or not the Sebastián Piñera administration actively supported disaster risk reduction (DRR) following the tragic February 2010 Chilean earthquake and tsunami. Though it seems sufficient political space for governments to pursue a DRR agenda in the aftermath of disaster exists, very few have done so effectively. Somehow the political incentives, particularly with regard to public perception, simply do not exist. In this document, this seemingly intractable issue is analyzed through the lens of political economy. The study uses content analysis of print media produced across Chile following the disaster to determine whether the Piñera government went beyond superficial actions such as retrofitting to push for a comprehensive DRR agenda that would fundamentally impact the political economy of the country. The government’s actions were assessed across three significant periods and associated agendas: (1) the emergency period where emphasis was on restoring basic services, public safety, and assisting victims; (2) the “winter emergency” period, where the government focused on making 200,000 emergency shelters available to disaster affected families before the winter season; and, (3) the final period, where efforts were concentrated on addressing the restoration of the private health sector system and 79 damaged or destroyed hospitals. The first period was complicated initially by the failure of the early warning system, but also the political transition occurring at the time, as President Michelle Bachelet’s administration transferred power to President-elect Piñera. In the second period, many groups challenged the government’s subsidies for emergency shelters as failing to move the country towards safe permanent housing, focusing on speed rather than sustainability. Issues emerged regarding the government’s failures to enforce and regulate building codes and land use management during the reconstruction; to restructure Chile’s early warning system; and to reform the Office of National Emergencies in any meaningful way. Some have also accused the government of administering resources for reconstruction inequitably. Much of this process has been highly centralized and has thus lacked mechanisms for local participation. A place where the government has been positively judged is in terms of its response to reestablishing the country’s health system. Also, the seismic insurance system has been deemed strong, whereby one-fifth of homes are insured for earthquake damage, with all new mortgages requiring seismic insurance. ( English,English )
- Subject:
- Disaster Response and Recovery
- Preferred Citation:
- Hoberman, G. (2010). Political calculus in the engagement with a disaster risk reduction agenda: the case of the post-2010 earthquake and tsunami in Chile. Disaster Risk Reduction in the Americas Program, Florida International University.
- General Note:
- Presented at the annual meeting of the 70th MPSA Annual National Conference, Palmer House Hotel, Hilton, Chicago, Il, April 12-15, 2012.
Record Information
- Source Institution:
- Florida International University
- Rights Management:
- This work is brought to yu for free and open access by the Disaster Risk Reduction at FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact dcc@fiu.edu
- Resource Identifier:
- FI13102403
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