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|a Earthquake propensity and the politics of mortality prevention |h [electronic resource] |y English. |
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|a Washington, D.C. : |b The World Bank, |c 2009-11. |
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|a International government publication |
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|a Refer to main document/publisher for use rights. |
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|a Keefer, P., Neumayer, E., Plümper, T. (2009). Earthquake propensity and the politics of mortality prevention. The World Bank, London School of Economics, University of Essex. |
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|a This document sets out to determine why more states have not invested in the implementation and enforcement of quakeproof construction regulations even though they are known to reduce mortality considerably. The authors found that there are two main factors that determine whether or not a state will implement and enforce such regulations: “country income and the political incentives of governments to provide public goods to citizens” (p. ii). The frequency and intensity of past earthquakes are also additional determinants. Through the use of negative binomial statistical analysis that focused on states in earthquake prone areas from the period 1960 to 2008, the authors found that poorer countries invested less than richer countries in earthquake mortality prevention measures. Furthermore, they found that newly democratic states, less institutionalized autocratic states, and states plagued by corruption, which tend to have less incentive to provide public goods to citizens than non-corrupt established democracies and more institutionalized autocracies, also invested less in the implementation and enforcement of quake-proof construction regulations. Thus, they concluded that these categories of states would and have experienced the greatest death tolls associated with any magnitude earthquake. The authors noted that there were limitations in their choice of variables for analysis. However, it is likely that their argument would have been strengthened if they were able to include blended variables of income and political incentives (income x and type of government/state) in their varied combinations as part of their analysis. |
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|a General Disaster Risk Reduction |
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|a Electronic reproduction. |c Florida International University, |d 2013. |f (dpSobek) |n Mode of access: World Wide Web. |n System requirements: Internet connectivity; Web browser software. |
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|a Natural hazards and disasters |x Earthquake. |
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|a Political economy and development. |
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|a Keefer, Philip |u The World Bank. |
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|a Neumayer, Eric |u London School of Economics. |
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|a Plümper, Thomas |u University of Essex. |
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|a Disaster Risk Reduction Program, Florida International University (DRR/FIU), |e summary contributor. |
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|c Original |w (OCoLC)778847160 |
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|u http://dpanther.fiu.edu/dpService/dpPurlService/purl/FI13042692/00001 |y Click here for full text |
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|a http://dpanther.fiu.edu/sobek/content/FI/13/04/26/92/00001/FI13042692thm.jpg |
