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- Permanent Link:
- http://dpanther.fiu.edu/dpService/dpPurlService/purl/FI13042120/00001
Notes
- Summary:
- This report outlines critical aspects of the Japanese earthquake, tsunami, and associated Fukushima nuclear plant disaster incident and prescribes lessons to be learned in order to improve the safety standards and regulatory system of the UK’s nuclear industry. On March 11, 2011, Japan’s east coast experienced a magnitude-9 earthquake, followed by a massive tsunami that left the country’s Fukushima-1 nuclear facility seriously damaged. The earthquake triggered automatic shut down of all three operating reactors, and began cooling processes. Unfortunately this was disrupted once the tsunami struck, knocking out all electrical power. Inability to return power to cool the reactors led to massive explosions, producing a breach of the facilities and release of radioactive material into the environment. In the next week or so, site operators engaged in a number of untested and unplanned actions in attempts to lower the temperature of the reactors and fuel ponds, further contaminating areas around the disaster site. The document outlines significant differences between Japan’s and the UK’s nuclear industries, regulatory regimes, and emergency management arrangements. It incorporates accounts from the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) fact-finding mission to Japan, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and information released by the Japanese government. The document identifies a number of issues regarding Japan’s nuclear regulatory framework and response to the disaster. First, the existence of multiple regulatory agencies made establishing accountability rather difficult. Second, there may be a serious case of regulatory capture, as senior personnel circulate between regulatory institutions, the Ministry of Economic, Trade and Industry, which promotes nuclear power, and TEPCO, the country’s largest power company. Third, tsunami risks were underestimated, with regulators failing to require protections against likely natural hazards. One account found that safety margins for protection against tsunamis were not adequate, since the 14-meter tsunami was in no way improbable for Japan. Other factors highlighted were the Fukushima plants use 40-year-old technology, and lack of clearly established emergency response guidelines. In contrast, the UK’s regulatory system is based on the principle of continuous improvement, requiring nuclear designers and operators to reduce risks ‘so far as is reasonably practicable,’ which is ensured through detailed periodic safety reviews that identify areas for further improvements. ( English,English, )
- Subject:
- Disaster Response
- Citation/Reference:
- Weightman, M., Booth, G. (2011). Japanese earthquake and tsunami: implications for the UK nuclear industry. House of Commons Energy and Climate Change Committee, United Kingdom
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