THE CHURCH, CONCIENTIZATION

AND PROTEST?

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ABSTRACT

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Comparative literature hypothesizes that a macro relationship exists between the Church and national economic growth rates and distributional inequality. This paper examines one aspect of this macro-micro linkage by investigating the relationship between participation in the Church and its associated religiosity and the consciousness and protest behavior of the most strategic sector of the Peruvian labor force. Two ideal models of church influence are proposed: traditional and liberation. The traditional model best fits the aggregate impact of the Church on mineworkers. Church acculturation increases fatalism, retards *concientizacion*, reduces protest participation, and integrates workers into the hierarchy and discipline of the industrial enterprise. Church acculturation may indeed affect growth rate by reducing worker-management and worker-state conflict. It seems equally likely that the conservative effect of church acculturation increases distributional inequality.

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The Church, Macro-Analysis

Military organization and such dependency relationships as vertical trade, partner concentration, state strength and multinational corporate penetration all have been examined as predictors of economic growth and distributional inequality (Weede and Tiefenbach, 1981a, 1981b; Bornschier, 1981). Some scholars suggest that religious organization in general, and the Catholic Church specifically, could be added to the list of predictors. (Adelman and Morris, 1966, 1980; Novak, 1980; Wilber, 1980; Bruneau, 1980; Weber, 1930; Tawney, 1926; Cutright, Hout, Johnson, 1976; Huntington, 1968; Finn, 1981). The rationale for the hypothesized relationship between the Church and growth and inequality has not received sufficient attention.

Micro-Analysis

The relationship between the Church and growth or distribution is usually seen as a macro-micro linkage. One view is that the Church contributes to economic growth (in the short term) and distributional inequality. There is a compelling analogy here between the Church and military institutions. Paraphrasing Weede and Tiefenbach's hypothesis regarding the influence of military service, there should be better economic performance in societies with "widespread [participation in the Church because this] may enforce societal discipline and provide some incentive for productive and co-operative relations among classes instead of an impoverishing class struggle." (1981b: 394; Lijphart, 1979, p. 453).[1] Huntington (1968) argued that the Church and the military were two institutions in third world countries that had the national organization and penetration necessary to promote development. However, the Church lacked the technological expertise and capacity to generate order and the military the necessary ideology. Huntington's observations notwithstanding, one is struck by the potential similarity in learning experience that military and church clients encounter. For example, classical conditioning is invoked when unconditioned stimuli such as God, church, religious and patriotic symbols are paired with neutral stimuli (demonstrations, conflict, system-self blame, rich-poor, income distribution, inalterability of the environment) so the latter gradually became conditioned stimuli capable of guiding

day-to-day thoughts and behavior outside the Church. Operant learning (direct reward and punishment) is invoked when the recruit or parishioner is threatened with retribution when he disobeys state or religious authority or moral laws. Vicarious learning occurs when the subject sees or hears about what happened to others in the organization who trespassed institutional norms (disobeyed an order, had an abortion, joined a condemned political party or movement, engaged in class conflict, or married across religious lines). Vicarious learning also occurs when the new recruit or parishioner observes again that the "natural" order of social relations includes rank and hierarchical organization: from God, to Pope, Cardenal, Bishop, Priest to parishioner, or from General, Colonel, Major, etc. to private.[2]

Others contrast the traditional church of obedience with another ideal type: the church of liberation.[3] Although the learning processes may be the same, what is learned is quite different. The institution is increasingly engaged in inner self-liberation. This *concientizacion* will lead its adherents to perceive social and economic contradictions and to act against the oppressive forces in society (Freire, 1970, Ruether, 1972; Gutierrez, 1973). This should decrease distributional inequality and could increase economic performance in the long run, although growth rate may slow in the short term.

The Church can influence society in at least two ways. It can attempt to impose its policies externally on political institutions, market relations, communication, education, and modes of participation. There is a rich but as yet inconclusive literature on the relation between Church and social order in Latin America (Bruneau, 1982; Levine, 1981; Smith, 1982; Berryman, 1984).

The Church may also affect distribution and economic growth by structuring the attitudes and behavior of its participants. If participation in church ritual and inculcation of its dogma were to increase fatalism, discourage the attitudinal militancy of future workers and illuminate the moral and real-life risks of labor-management or labor-state conflict, this might promote economic growth. By the same token, exposure to the hierarchical organization of the Church may later ease the integration of workers into the discipline and hierarchical decision structure of corporate enterprises. Moreover, socialization experiences which reduce workers' willingness to protest or threaten the use of violence as a form of "political bargaining" (Woy-Hazelton, 1983; Becker, 1980, Payne, 1965) to force management or the state to meet their demands in countries that lack collective bargaining mechanisms for resolving these conflicts

could increase distributional inequality. Acculturation in the liberation church might lead in the opposite direction towards less fatalism, higher social conscienceness and more protest.

A macro-analysis of the presumed link between labor militancy and growth rate and distribution requires time series data and it is beyond the scope of this paper. For the purposes of this analysis I shall assume these links exist to some degree as do many macro-analysts (Weede and Tiefenbach, 1981b; Cutright, 1965, 1967; Adelman and Morris, 1971; Huntington and Nelson, 1976; Sunshine, 1972).[4]

In this paper I shall address one aspect of the macro-micro linkage and examine the relationship between participation in the Church and its associated religiosity, on one-hand, and the subsequent 1) fatalism, 2) social conciousness, 3) willingness to engage in labor and political conflict, and 4) integration into the hierarchy and discipline of the industrial workplace among the most mobilized sector of the labor force in Peru. We shall see if obedience or liberation best describes the aggregate impact of the Church on protest.

THE CHURCH IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Although there is considerable speculation and research on the Church and politics, we know surprisingly little about its influence on the political attitudes and protest behavior of workers either in the United States, Europe or Latin America. Before examining the impact of the Peruvian Church it would be useful to place the Catholic Church in perspective by comparing its influence on its participants to that of other denominations.

The models presented by all church hierarchies to their parishioners and the messages delivered by all clergy are potentially important in establishing religious principles which guide everyday life. A recent national study in the United States developed a measure of "fundamentalist religiosity." The two items which had the highest factor loadings were the belief that religion was important in one's life and that "religion provides daily guidance" (Miller and Wattenberg, 1984; 306). These two items suggest a broader measure of religiosity than the beliefs of evangelical religionists towards which the study was directed. Although members of Pietistic, fundamentalist, and southern Baptist Churches were most likely to be found in the highest reaches of this religiosity scale, Catholics were about as likely as members of

other protestant sects to score high. Catholics scored significantly higher than Mormons, Jews or those with no religion. Religiosity, in turn, was associated with political conservatism, support of school prayers, and opposition to abortion and equal rights for women.

Other research has examined the relation between participation in church ritual and denomination, on one hand, and political tolerance of other groups (communists, atheists, etc.). Piereson, Sullivan and Marcus (1980) found no difference in tolerance between Catholics, Protestants and Jews. Recent national research discovered, however, that when Protestants were broken into separate denominations there was considerable variation in tolerance. Those with no religious affiliation were most tolerant followed closely by Congregationalists, Jews and Episcopalians. Catholics were in the middle of the rankings (Beatty and Walter, 1984: 332). More important to the focus of this paper, formal participation (attendance) in church ritual led to more intolerance *in every denomination*. For example, Catholics thought athiests or communists should not be allowed to do one of the following: 1) speak publicly in the community, 2) teach in a university or 3) have their books in the local library. Catholics who frequently attended church would deny between two and three of these acts. Regular participation in the church also was associated with conservative attitudes among industrial workers in Santiago, Chile (February, 1973). On the whole these workers were more opposed to the established socio-political order than non-industrial workers and more likely to believe that Chile should become a socialist country (Smith, 1982: 217–218). Those industrial workers who were regularly practicing Catholics were least supportive of this change (36%) followed by Protestants, Jews and others (44%),[5] non-practicing Catholics (55%), and those with "no religion" (77%).

A comparative study of four European nations and the United States found no significant difference between Catholics and Protestants in protest participation. Those professing no religion had the highest protest potential (March and Kaase, 1979). A subjective sense of religiosity did, however, inhibit unconventional political activity. Moreover, the link between churches and political action was suggested by the correspondence between positive affect toward the clergy and pro-establishment attitudes (Inglehart, 1979). In the United States, Britain and the Netherlands, positive attitudes toward the clergy,

big business, state officials and the police formed a common factor which was associated with support for the socio-political order (Barnes and Kaase, 1979).

This literature review suggests that although there are denominational differences in political conservatism and tolerance, Catholics are not at the extreme ends of the continua. The strongest predictors of political attitudes and behavior which cut across all sects are church attendance and religiosity.

MINERS, PROTEST, AND THE PERUVIAN STATE

If the Church influences the attitudes and behavior of mine workers, this could have important consequences for the unstable Peruvian economy as well as the fragile democratic institutions to which Peru has returned after a long period of military rule. Peru has limited industrial development and the state is dependent on the export earnings and taxes from the mining industry. Therefore, miners hold a strategic position as they do in most Third World countries that depend on mineral exports (Magill, 1974; Petras and Zeitlin, 1967; Konings, 1978; Bates, 1971; Whitehead, 1981; Luchembe, 1982; Zapata, 1982). Work stoppages in this vital export industry have in the past forced the government to revise its budget estimates and are frequently accompanied by the mobilization of the national police and the armed forces (Kruijt, 1982; *Latin American Regional Reports*, Andean Group, December 14, 1984; *El Diario*, Lima, November 8, 1984).[6]

In third world countries which do not have an institutionalized system of collective bargaining, strikes and threats of violence are a "political bargaining" strategy. This is particularly true when traditional demand channels such as the electoral system are suspended or not structured to process labors' demands in a timely manner, or, parliament or the bureaucracy are blocked or perceived to be blocked by groups opposed to labor's demands.

Strikes and demonstrations are often begun in Peru to force the state to intervene in labor-management conflicts and impose settlements which meet at least some of labors' demands (Woy-Hazelton, 1983; Stephens, 1980; Becker, 1980; Payne, 1965). It is not uncommon, for example, for thousands of miners to launch a hunger strike or to march from the central Andes to the coastal capital of

Peru to press their economic and political demands directly on the government *Latin American Regional Reports*, Andean Group, March 4, 1983; *El Diario*, Lima, October 10, 1984; *Expreso*, Lima, October 15, 1984). Conflict between the miners and the state has yet to be institutionalized and continues to alternate between periods of compromise and confrontation (Sulmont, 1981; Kruijt, 1982; Laite, 1980).

Labor protest can have an important impact on the stability of civilian (as well as military) governments, particularly in third world countries. In 1980 the military returned Peru to civilian rule and liberal parliamentary democracy. The evolution or survival of these institutions depends in part on the willingness of popular forces to use them. When these traditional demand channels are blocked or workers perceive them to be blocked, labor conflict increases. If the civilian executive does not intervene before the confrontation and disorder escalates, it risks a military coup (Huntington, 1968, p. 215).

THE TWO CHURCHES, SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND PROTEST

We shall turn now to a closer examination of the two models of the Latin American Church remembering that these are ideal types. Each national church and each diocese contains some elements of tradition and liberation.

The Traditional Church

Some observers feel that liberation theology has been more of a media event than a force for change among the bulk of believers in Latin America. The church leadership has not changed its essentially authoritarian attitudes or the structure that is necessary to stimulate change. It still exposes peasants and workers to a fatalistic world view that charges the cause of poverty either to luck or God or places the blame squarely on the individual shoulders of lazy or uneducated parishioners ("Pecado personal"). It opposes class conflict and supports a corporatist integration of the classes which reduces group awareness among workers and the poor. The leadership expects and teaches deference to religious authority. It extolls the virtue of hierarchy and the superiority of the system or the organization over that of the individual. This reduces the member's inclination to blame the system for social inequities or to advocate the participation of those at the bottom of the command hierarchy (parishioner and worker) in communal decision-making. The church's traditional opposition to militant confrontation and group

conflict spills over into the economic and political world as it dampens workers' enthusiasm for confronting their employers or the state (Morris and Adelman, 1980; Vallier, 1970; Pike, 1964; Vekemans, 1964; Smith, 1970; Mutcher, 1971; Illich, 1968; Crahan, 1975; CELAM, 1969, p. 22).

If church socialization reduces participation in protests and demonstrations, it may, on the other hand, ease the integration of citizens into the industrial labor force by acculturating them to the obedience, discipline, and hierarchy of the work place.

The Liberation Church

Although the Church may have resisted change, those elements which advocate a theology of liberation have gained in power.[7] In some dioceses the Church no longer supports established order and directly and indirectly it has both innovated and supported social change (Bruneau, 1974, 1982; Smith, 1982; Levine, 1981). Although the precise influence of the liberationists within the Church is ambiguous as is their influence on the laity (Bruneau, 1982), the major themes of liberation theology are well known.

Gustavo Gutierrez, the Peruvian priest whose seminal book *Teologia de la Liberacion* (1971) launched the current interest in liberation theology, recently described liberation as "the suppression of oppressions" in order to lift up the poor and build a free community (*Que Hacer*, February 1985, p. 24). As theology it is a "critical reflexion on praxis." It is a "way of thinking, as Christians, about what is going on" in contemporary society (Brown, 1978).

The process of lifting up the poor and creating a freer society, according to liberation theologians, engages at least five elements: 1) fatalism, 2) system-self blame, 3) group consciousness, 4) hierarchical organization of the church (eccesia vs ecclesiastical) and society, and 5) action.

Fatalism: Liberation means *concientizacion*, an understanding of history which rejects fatalism and recognizes that humans are not only acted upon but that they can act on their environment. Great wealth and poverty are not facts of nature, luck, or God's will, they are the result of peoples' greed and injustice. This is not the fatalism of the "faithful remnant" which suffers oppression while placing their trust in God and await his deliverance (Miguez Bonino, 1975). It is a church induced shift in the individual's conception of the alterability of the environment which Morris and Adelman (1980) argue is required for major social change.

Self-System Blame: Beyond the rejection of fatalism comes the recognition that people are not necessarily poor because they are lazy (or the rich personally virtuous) but because society has been structured by the rich and powerful so that the poor remain poor. They will remain poor, Gutierrez says (*Que Hacer*, February, 1985, p. 24), unless they shift their eyes from self ("pecado individual") to the system ("pecado social") and organize to change the structure of society (Brown, 1978, p. 62).

Group Consciousness: Effective organization against oppression requires awareness of "common interest."[8] Poor people and workers at the bottom of the socioeconomic hierarchy benefit the least yet their lack of group consciousness renders them powerless. Liberationists say the Church can play an important role by 1) not denying the existence of social divisions and 2) educating the oppressed regarding their common economic and social interests. Some theologians argue, however, that recognition of common interest or class identification is just the first step in a cumulative process through which social consciousness is formed. The miner who identifies with the working class may not recognize the place of his class in the social hierarchy, the differences between the lower and higher classes, or the political parties, leaders, and movements that these classes support. Class awareness helps the worker to translate common interest or class identification into a useful guide for understanding the social and political meaning of stratification (Leggett, 1968; Ossowski, 1966).

Involvement in Decision-making: Group awareness and system blame will not translate into a free and participatory society if workers do not believe that they should be involved in decisions affecting both the nature of the economic and political system and their own work place. Solidarity with the poor "must be an effort to forge a society in which the worker is not subordinated to the owner..." (Gutierrez, 1976, p. 20). The poor must be equal participants in the decisions that effect their economic and political well being. Fusfeld (1978, p. 8) proposes, in turn, that we conduct research on the external factors which affect the success of worker-managed institutions that some liberationists advocate. We need to identify the potential incompatibility between democratically managed political and economic institutions and the decision environments found in the family, school, church and other social institutions. Hierarchical organization and autocratic decision-making within the church is barren ground for forming workers' belief in democratic decision-making.

The decisions of the Second Vatican Council and the Roman Synods did encourage a greater voice for the clergy and the laity in church decision-making. However, even when new structures were adopted the actual decision process did not necessarily change (Cartaxo Rolim, n.d.). The reason may be that the creation of ecclesial religious communities within the church which decentralize decision-making, de-emphasize authority, obedience, and rank is dependent on the resources of individual dioceses and the support of their Bishops. Bruneau (1982) reports instances of decentralization in Brazil and base communities which are less hierarchically organized, encourage critical reflection on the environment and are action oriented. Smith (1982) notes the greater flexability and informality of some of the church leadership in Chile since Vatican II. Others have observed in Peru the free dialogue in the summer theology courses initiated by Gustavo Gutierrez at the Catholic University and the bottom-up participation in some of the base communities in the urban slum areas around Lima (Klaiber, 1977; Gudorf, 1984).

In the work place two types of involvement are at issue. One in which the worker cooperates with owners, union leaders, technicians, the military, the state and so forth. This involvement is closer to the reformist stance adopted by the church.[9] The other type is closer to Marx and Engels' conception of proletarian consciousness in which the worker wants exclusive control over economic decisions, particularly in the work place. One might hypothesize that workers exposed to the traditional church would be least supportive of any worker involvement in economic decision-making while those exposed to the liberation church would favor shared decision-making or even worker control.

Action: Liberation theology grew out of "social awareness and the desire to act" (Sanders, 1973, p. 168). Gutierrez said that "it became crystal clear that in order to serve the poor, one had to move into political action (cited in Brown, 1978, p. 62). "Any claim to nonintervention in politics...is nothing but a subterfuge to keep things as they are" (Gutierrez, 1973, p. 266). All the theologies "are not worth one genuine act of solidarity with the exploited social classes." (Gutierrez, 1973, p. 308, phrasing changed slightly). The world is conflict, the major forces polarized. One must take sides. One is either for the oppressed or with the oppressors.[10] "When the church rejects the class struggle, it is objectively operating as a part of the prevailing system" (Gutierrez, 1973, p. 275).

It would seem that if the poor and workers caste off their fatalism, begin to blame the system for social injustice, develop a group awareness, and believe their group should be involved in decisions affecting their economic status then they are more likely to engage in labor and political protest. This is particularly true when traditional demand channels such as the electoral system are suspended or not structured to process workers demands in a timely manner, or the agenda and viable electoral candidates are controlled by the wealthy or the military.

I have included the major elements in our discussion of the liberation and traditional church in the path diagram in Figure 1. At the left of Figure 1 is participation in church ritual and its associated religiosity (C). At the far right is protest activity (P): participation in strikes, work stoppages and political demonstrations. Although one can imagine a priest mobilizing and directly leading workers into protest activity (C → P), the linkage between church and confrontation is less often direct and more likely to be mediated by the church's influence on parishioners fatalism and social consciousness (group awareness, system blame, belief in worker participation in work place decisions). In a church dominated by liberation theology, parishioners will be socialized to a less fatalistic world view. That is, the relationship between acculturation in a liberation church (C) and fatalism (F) will be negative (Figure 1) and positive in the traditional church. Fatalism is a world view, a motivational orientation prior to the more specific cognitive beliefs included in social consciousness. Fatalistic workers who believe that people like themselves can do nothing about poverty, that what happens in their life is dictated by luck or God are least likely to be class aware, blame the system, or desire worker participation in decision-making, in other words, to have high consciousness. The relationship between fatalism and social consciousness will be negative in both types of churches. Those who have high consciousness are more likely to protest. However, this relationship (SC → P) will also be mediated by workers perception of the immediate environment at the time they are about to act. If they believe the act will be effective in the current situation (E) then they will protest. The major influence of social consciousness, however, will be to shape their perceptions of the situation (SC → E, Langton and Petrescu, 1984).

(Figure 1 about here)

One element in the model that has not been discussed is "political religiosity." This concept reflects the common notion in the literature that the models presented by all church organizations to their parishioners and the messages delivered by all clergy are potentially important in establishing religious principles that guide everyday life. I am particularly interested here in religion as a guide to political life, a yardstick by which one measures which political tendencies or movements to support (Langton and Rapoport, 1976). Presumably both the traditional and liberation church would inculcate beliefs that could be used as a measure of politics. Therefore, the relationship between church (C) and political religiosity (PR) should be positive in both cases. The difference is in the message. The religious principles and dogma of the liberation church may create a political lens which focuses positively on social consciousness (PR → SC, Figure 1). In the traditional church there should be a negative relationship.

The Peruvian Church

Up to this point I have talked generally about the influence of the traditional and liberation church. How would one characterize the Peruvian Church? Morris and Adelman (1980, p. 494) classified 107 countries by the degree to which the predominate religion encouraged or "was consistent with the concept of individual control over personal fate." Peru ranked with those "countries in which the predominant religion [Catholicism] promotes moderately fatalistic attitudes towards man's capacity to alter his destiny." Morris and Adelman's measure is admittedly general. Bruneau, Levine and Smith show how national characterizations can be deceptive. Innovation is dependent on diocese resources and the support of individual Bishops and priests who often disagree.

Historically the Peruvian church was linked through its colonial heritage to an oligarchy composed of the large land owners, merchants and top state and military officials. Its critics charged that the hierarchical structure of the church encouraged servility in the masses while church doctrine and behavior served to legitimate oligarchic interests and encourage a fatalistic and docile poor (Gorman, 1982, chapter 8; Chang-Rodriquez, 1957; Prada, 1940; Bains, 1972). Although there were instances of individual

priests denouncing injustice and aiding Indian rebellions (Klaiber, 1977), church ideology continued into the 1950s to encourage a placid acceptance of the dominant structures (Cotler, 1978, pp. 308–309).

The intensification of class conflict in Europe, the increased interest in Rome in the "worker question," the growing number of foreign priests in Peru, the integration of the Peruvian economy into the world market, the mobilization of workers and the poor by protestant sects and the left, the abortive guerrilla movement in the 1960s, and the unresponsiveness of the increasingly divided oligarchy to the pressing needs of the society alienated important sectors of the church and the military. Cardinal Landazuri responded (Episcopado Peruano, 1959) with what has become the public role of the church (Sanders, 1982, p. 157–158): 1) denunciation of injustice and the call for a better society and 2) offers to mediate between the contending forces be they guerrillas and the state or strikers and management (*Expreso*, August 31, 1984, Lima, Peru; *El Diario*, August 31, 1984, Lima, Peru). The military responded in 1968 by overthrowing the civilian government and attempting to dismantle the power base of the old oligarchy.

The Cardinal and many of the Bishops supported the social reforms instituted by the military government between 1968 and 1974 (Wils, 1979, p. 204; Werlich, 1978, p. 343–355). However the church was moving in two directions. The National Office of Social Information (ONIS) was organized by progressive priests to work in the popular sectors and diffuse liberation theology to the urban poor. At the same time a large part of the church hierarchy remained estranged from class mobilization and were open to more communitarian or corporatist political and economic arrangements (Stepan, 1978, p. 58). *Cursillos de Cristiandad* were organized by church officials and laity among military officers and professionals to promote reform from above (Cotler, 1978). The vision of society was quite different in the Cursillos, however. The emphasis was on Christian-democratic comunitarianism, class reconciliation and the integration of the classes into a corporatist whole. Not surprisingly, as Cotler (1978, p. 318) points out, cursillistas and Christian Democrats assumed important positions in the military government which imposed corporatist structures on the society.

The split in the Church between the more conservative and progressive officials has continued. Cardinal Landazuri has been attacked for his continued support of the pastoral direction of liberation

theology (*Que Hacer*, February 1985, p. 19; *New York Times*, February 1, 1985). A minority of Bishops are active supporters of this doctrine while others, such as the Archbishop of Arequipa, have publicly attacked the new theology (*Que Hacer*, October 1984, p. 17).It was reported that conservative bishops fought for a public condemnation of the theology but that the bishops were split 18–18 with 17 abstentions (*New York Times*, February 1, 1985). Finally a concensus was reached which distinguishes an acceptable liberation theology from one that uses "Marxist analyses."

The division among the bishops is reflected among priests. Mooney and Soderland (1977) surveyed priests from the northern diocese of Chiclayo and from the archdiocese of Lima. About 60% favored a progressive church which would strengthen base communities in contrast to an alternative model stressing the traditional preaching of the Gospel and administration of the sacraments as the primary clerical duties (p. 21). Much fewer (39%) were optimistic that the church would move "very far" in this direction or that it would decentralize its authority structure (20%) "very far."[11] The most pessimistic were members of ONIS, the group that had fought the hardest within the Peruvian Church for the decentralization of authority and the expansion of base communities as an expression of liberation doctrine.

The divisions within the Church make it unclear what general influence, if any, it will have on workers' attitudes. If we examined a Lima slum which had been organized into a base community by priests exposing liberation theology we might expect different results than in a conservative parish. We are interested here, however, in the aggregate effect on workers of church exposure and religiosity. Having said this it is not clear how often liberation theology moves from learned treatises or clerical debates to the grass roots. Nor is it self evident that local church organs, whether innovative or conservative, will have a significant effect on workers attitudes or behavior.

In Brazil, the innovative or traditional character of the parish was only modestly related to parishioners' "social Catholicism" (sociopolitical attitudes most reflective of liberation theology). Even in Sao Paulo where the effects were the strongest the Kendall Tau C correlation did not exceed .17 for the lower class (Bruneau, 1982, pp. 121–124).

The Church must compete with many other and often more salient institutions in the contemporary environment such as political parties, media, military, unions, work place, schools, friends and so on.[12] The reduced influence of the Church is further buttressed by the limited time that the parishioner spends in the institution. This is even true for the most frequent attenders. Compared to occupational socialization that covers most of an adult's life span, the average worker spends a short period in the church environment. If we add to limited exposure the lack of church resources and personnel, cumbersome organization, the often greater appeal of church innovations to the higher classes (*cursillos*, Christian family movement) and the continued appeal of traditional or indigenous religions (Bruneau, 1980, p. 537), then we understand why the influence of the church may lie deeply within the funnel of causality where its influence, at best, is indirect (see Figure 1).

THE DATA

Three-hour interviews were completed in 1979 with a random sample of 494 workers from three underground mines in the central Andes of Peru. The miners were adult males between 18 and 58 years of age, of Indian or Mestizo heritage, whose formal education ranged from none to secondary school. Trained Peruvian anthropologists and sociologists conducted interviews in Spanish or Quechua in the miners's homes. Eight percent of the sample was not interviewed because of refusal, illness, or absence from the work place.[13]

The mines in which the interviews were conducted are controlled by the largest Peruvian-owned mining company. It is a modern professionally managed corporation typical of the late capitalist business organization. These corporate characteristics are similar to those found in the private mines to the south and the evolving control mechanisms of the state owned mines (Centromin) of the former Cerro de Pasco Corporation (Kruijt, 1982).

THE VARIABLES

1. *Church Acculturation*: This measure was constructed from the miner's responses to two questions: 1) how often he attended church or participated in a church directed activity and 2) how religious he considered himself. The strong dependence of religiosity on church participation was

suggested by their high intercorrelation (.77). A four point index was constructed from the two items. Those who participated in church activities weekly or more often and considered themselves very or somewhat religious scored highest. Workers who never attended church and felt they were not very religious ranked lowest. Although this measure is less sensitive to the heterogeneity of religious experiences, it captures their aggregate influence.

2. *Fatalism*: This is the respondent's general belief that the environment is not alterable by people like himself. People are acted upon, they cannot change social conditions. A three point index was contructed from two questions that asked the worker to agree or disagree (5 point Likert response scale) that 1) there will always be poverty in spite of all the efforts of people like the respondent to prevent it and 2) that most people do not realize to what extent their lives are controlled by luck or God. The two indicators are strongly correlated (.92).

3. *Social Consciousness*: This is a four point index composed of four questions that assess workers' level of *concientizacion* beyond rejection of fatalism: 1) class identification, 2) awareness of the place of their class in the social hierarchy and the political parties, movements, and leaders which are associated with their group, 3) self-system blame, and 4) belief in worker control over decisions (wages and schedules) in the work place. These items and the rationale for the social consciousness measure are discussed in greater detail in Langton (1984a). Workers who identify with other workers, who recognize the relation of their group to the social hierarchy, who blame the system for the maldistribution of resources, and who believe their group should be involved in decisions affecting their economic status will be considered for the purposes of this analysis to have the highest social consciousness.

4. *Political religiosity*: This is a direct measure of the degree that people merge their confessional and political roles. Respondents were asked that when they made decisions about which political parties or candidates to support, was it important to them to know how religious the candidates were or what they thought about religion or what they thought about the relationship between church and politics? Responses were classified as high or low political religiosity.

5. *Act effectiveness*: This is a measure of the worker's perception of the situation as he is about to decide whether to participate in a protest. In six different situations we measured the worker's belief

that participation in that setting would influence the authorities in question. The six scales in the confrontation situations were aggregated into a cumulative act effectiveness index. See Langton (1984c) for a more detailed discussion.

6. ***Protest Participation***: Six types of confrontation activity were examined. They included: 1) stopping work to force the government to grant a cost-of-living wage raise, 2) striking to influence the state to intervene in support of unpaid workers in a distant mine, 3) participating in a political demonstration in Lima, 4) joining a national strike to force the state to support miners who were dismissed in a legal strike in southern Peru, 5) demonstrating in front of mine administration offices in support of greater worker participation in decisions affecting work conditions in the mines, and 6) halting work to force mine administrators to negotiate a wage increase. The different types of participation were combined into a cumulative index in which those who participated the most were scored highest (see Appendix, Langton, 1984a).

THE INFLUENCE OF THE CHURCH

Eighty-eight percent of the miners are Catholics. Only 16% participate in church activities on at least a weekly basis.[14] This is somewhat higher than weekly church attendance for the general population in Great Britain (13%), Germany (4%), or Catholic Austria (4%) but less than Catholic Italy (22%) and Venezuela (38%)[15] or the United States (30%).[16] However, male industrial workers in every country except the United States (22%) participate substantially less then Peruvian workers.[17]

Only 12% of the Peruvians consider themselves to be "very religious" while 38% are "somewhat" religious and 50% "not very." The proportion who are very or somewhat religious (50%) is comparable with the general population in Great Britain (42%), West Germany (37%) and Austria (42%) but lower than Italy (68%), the United States (74%) or Venezuela (86%).[18] Again, the religiosity of industrial workers in Great Britain (very and somewhat religious: 32%), Germany (24%) and Catholic Austria (23%) was lower while the religiosity of workers in Catholic Italy (56%) and the United States (55%) is comparable to Peruvian workers.

The most acculturated miners (higher church participation and religiosity) are 47% less likely to be in the highest reaches of the social consciousness index[19] and they are less disposed to protest (Gamma = −.45) than the least religious miners who rarely participate in church activities. These direct relationships can be deceiving, however. As is often the case in simple bivariate analysis, direct relationships are discovered which drop out when other variables are added to the model. In the multivariate path analysis which will be reported later in the paper, the direct links between Church (C, Figure 1) and social consciousness and protest are statistically insignificant. The Church's impact on consciousness and protest is indirect. Whatever influence it has is mediated by its effect on workers' fatalism and political religiosity.

The Church and Fatalism

The faithful remnant who see poverty as a natural and unchangeable featureof the environment and who place their fate in God and luck are well represented in the Peruvian culture. Fifty-three percent of one of the most mobilized sectors of the labor force have learned a world view which tells them there will always be poverty in spite of all the efforts of people like themselves and that their lives are largely controlled by luck or God. If there is a dominant ideology in Peru, fatalism is likely to be one of its salient characteristics.

Does exposure to the church induce a shift in the workers conception regarding the alterability of the environment? Apparently not. The more workers attend church activities and adopt the associated religiosity, the greater their fatalism (.44).[20]

The Church and Political Religiosity

Fatalism lies deep within the worker's cognitive structure and reflects the long term effects of church socialization. Political religiosity, his conscious use of religion as a yardstick for making political decisions, may represent shorter term forces. During some historical periods clerics carefully avoid conscious political instruction. Moreover, not all social and political issues are salient to the church. In addition, a worker does not need instruction to join religion and politics. He can establish the linkage deductively. In this case the Church's role is latent. It is more manifest when either traditional or

progressive officials use the pulpit or other church directed activities to lead the laity to the appropriate link between doctrine and praxis. The formative roll of the clergy is suggested by the strong correlation (.56) between church acculturation and political religiosity.

Fatalism, Political Religiosity and Social Consciousness

Workers who see the environment as impervious to their influence develop a social consciousness consonant with their world view. Fatalistic workers are less likely to be class aware, blame the system for the maldistribution of wealth or to believe that workers should be involved in decisions that affect their economic status (−.65).

.Although the relationship between political religiosity and fatalism is not significant (Figure 1), political religiosity does affect social consciousness. Earlier I said that both the traditional and liberation church could promote the politicization of religious beliefs, and, we saw that there is a strong positive correlation between church participation and political religiosity. The difference between the two churches is in their message. Liberation doctrine and practise is presumed to create a political consciousness which encourages group awareness, system blame, and a belief in the worker's right to participate in decisions that affect his economic status. This is not the aggregate effect of the message among miners. Those most likely to use religious beliefs as a measure of politics are least likely to have high social consciousness (−.60).

Pathways to Protest

The bivariate analysis suggests that the Peruvian Church inculcates a fatalism and political religiosity which reduces miners social consciousness. Before we turn to the path analysis and examine the effect of this acculturation on protest behavior, we should examine miners' demographic characteristics as SES is often associated with participation. Not surprisingly, Peruvian mine workers are a much more homogeneous group than heterogeneous samples of national populations. All miners are blue collar workers (obreros). Eighty-five percent have not gone beyond elementary school. Because of the rigors of mining, 80 percent are younger than 40 years and 70 percent have worked in the mine less than 11 years. Seventy-four percent come from families whose father worked in agriculture. Despite the

homogeneity I examined the relationship between the respondent's education and origin (father's occupation: agriculture — non-agriculture) and each variable in Figure 1. Education and origins were not significantly related to protest,[21] social consciousness, fatalism, or political religiosity. Education does have a slight effect on recruitment into the church culture. Those with more education attend church more often and tend to be highly religious. However, the relation is so weak (.11) that it is excluded from the path analysis.[22] There are many other factors that could influence protest participation which space does not allow us to examine.[23] We already know that military service retards workers' social consciousness and reduces their protest participation (Langton, 1984a). A more detailed analysis of the respondents' occupational history after leaving home and before entering the mine might also be rewarding. By the same token, we have rich data on the miner's occupational history within the mine as well as the autocratic or participatory climate of his family of origin, peer group, and school — all which could influence his recruitment into the church culture and alter his social consciousness or willingness to engage in protests.[24]

Figure 2 shows a path diagram of the relationships between church, fatalism, political religiosity, social consciousness, perceived effectiveness of the act and protest. I used a least squares structural equation model to identify the paths. The analysis confirms that church influence lies deep within the funnel of causality. The most direct and strongest predictor of protest is the worker's perception in the actual protest situation that the act will influence (E) the authorities in that setting (Langton and Petrescu, 1984). Social consciousness also influences protest directly but most of its effect is through (E) as it shapes the workers perceptions of the situation. Further back in the funnel are those orientations and beliefs which shape social consciousness and which, in turn, are directly influenced by the Church. The aggregate effect of the Church is to inculcate fatalism and a type of political religiosity which reduces *concientizacion* (SC) and workers participation in protest activity.

(Figure 2 about here)

Integration into the Industrial Economy

Bowles and Gintes (1976) argue that the major function of secondary and higher education in the United States is to integrate workers into the capitalist economy. Although institutions such as the school, church and the military do not exercise total control over their members, manifest and latent socialization in each organization can emphasize deference to authority and the superiority of the organization or the system over the individual which may later ease workers into the hierarchical command structure and fixed schedules of the industrial work place.

We asked workers in three open ended questions about their first impressions when they began to work in the mine. What were their reactions to the hierarchy of the work place, the fixed schedules, and the machines and technology? Some found it difficult to adjust while others saw bosses and orders as part of the "natural order."[25]

Other institutions in Peru besides the Church do integrate workers into the economy. Prior service in the military adjusts workers to the hierarchy and discipline of the corporate enterprise (Langton, 1984a).[26] Even though these experiences may delute the impact of the Church, its influence is still apparent.

Workers socialized by the Church made an easier transition into the hierarchy of the mine than those who rarely attended and were not very religious (Table 1). They also found the rigid work schedule more acceptable. Combining attendance and religiosity in Table 1, however, underestimates the influence of the Church. Workers learn more about hierarchy, obedience and deference through direct contact with the clergy rather than through their associated religiosity. When participation in Church activities was examined separately, those who attended the most were 49% more likely to adjust easily to the hierarchy of the mine than those who rarely attended. They were also 41% more likely to adapt to fixed schedules than infrequent participants. The Church had no influence on workers adjustment to mine technology.

(Table 1 about here)

The Church also integrates workers into the market economy by acculturating them to their appropriate role in economic decision-making. Workers were asked who should be involved in setting

wages and determining how fast they should work. The responses were organized in a three-point index: 1) workers only, 2) mixed (workers cooperate with owners, state, technicians, the military and so forth), and 3) no workers should be involved. Forty-three percent of those most socialized by the Church believed workers should not be involved in these decisions at all while only 11% of the miners who rarely went to Church and were not very religious would exclude workers (−.49).[27]

CONCLUSION

Scholars have long suggested a linkage between religious organization and national economic growth rates and distributional inequality. Although cross-national analysis of aggregate data is inconclusive, one possible explanation for the association is the dampening effect that church life has on the consciouness and conflict behavior of those members of the labor force who are included in its ranks. When Marx accused religion of being the opiate of the masses, he merely recognized as have others that norms often associated with traditional hierarchically organized mass organizations such as the Church or the military may suppress aspirations, foster acceptance of the status quo, and mute awareness of social divisions which direct the less privileged toward change-oriented policies and political movements which reduce inequality. What was not anticipated was the growing support among clerics and laity for new doctrine, structure and pastoral direction. Liberation theology and praxis is the most recent reflection of this ferment. Acting as a guiding catalyst, the Church would help liberate the poor by changing their fatalistic world view. Consciousness would be raised as the less privileged began to look to the system rather than themselves for the cause of injustice, to develop a group awareness, and to believe they should be involved in decisions that affect their economic status. Liberation would create the willingness to act against oppressive forces to correct the distributional inequality in society.

In this paper I examine one aspect of the macro-micro linkage by investigating the aggregate impact of acculturation in the Catholic Church on the subsequent fatalism, political religiosity, social consciousness, protest behavior, and integration into the industrial enterprise of mine workers, the most mobilized sector of the Peruvian labor force.

Research on the Church in Third World countries generally focuses on its impact on other political and social institutions or on domestic policy. But it is also important as a formal organization that touches directly the lives of the masses who are exposed to its structure and message. It is a rich source of classical, operant and vicarious conditioning. The Church, then, is a potentially important but little understood source of adult political socialization.

About 37% of the workers attend a church directed activity at least once a month and adopt a personal religiosity strongly associated with this participation. The aggregate effect of this acculturation reflects the traditional rather than the liberation church. It increases fatalism and a type of political religiosity which retards *concientizacion* and protest. It also eases workers into the hierarchy, discipline and subordination of the work place.

These findings suggest that socialization by the Church may indeed have a positive affect on national growth rate, at least in the short term, by indirectly discouraging strikes and demonstrations against management and the state while integrating workers into a passive role in the corporate hierarchy.[28]

The reduction in *concientizacion*, strikes and political protest should also contribute to income inequality. This may be particularly true in third-world countries similar to Peru that have not institutionalized a comprehensive collective bargaining system. When this is combined, as is often the case, with the absence of elections or an electoral system that is not structured to process labors' demands in a timely manner, then labor protests and threats of violence are still a necessary part of workers' political bargaining strategy to force the state to intervene in labor-management disputes and impose settlements that meet some of labors' demands.

For those elites who want political order and labor discipline the data must be reassuring. It may be even more comforting when some of the spinoffs of church acculturation are examined. For example, we found that political religiosity in Chile was negatively associated with support for the political left (Langton and Rapoport, 1976). Although space does not allow me to examine that relationship in detail here, political religiosity appears to have even a stronger negative effect on support for the left among

Peruvian workers. The policy implications may seem obvious: support religious schools and the traditional church leaders.

These policies would be on very unfirm footing, however. The patterns found in this study merely skim the surface of institutional socialization. We know little about the independent effect of curriculum, teachers or peers in religious schools. Nor are we much better informed about the systematic effect on believers' political attitudes and behavior of *cursillos*, base communities, sermons from the pulpit, clerical contact or the vicarious, operational, or classical conditioning that is part of church life. Although the conservative patterns found in this study support our impressions in the field that miners' contacts with the Church are primarily in traditional settings, this study relies on cross-sectional data. Longitudinal data would tell us if the aggregate influence of church acculturation has remained the same or changed.

The findings in this study carry a somber message for those workers who want more control over their economic status and a more equitable distribution of wealth. Most do not see the electoral process as an effective channel for expressing their demands (Langton and Petrescu, 1982). Like workers in most third world countries controlled by powerful, intrenched elites, miners consider withholding labor and support as the most effective means to force the state to intervene and resolve their economic problems. Participation in church life has an indirect but chilling effect on this bargaining strategy.

What can workers and friends of the Church who want to see it change its philosophy, structure and pastoral direction expect in the future? There is no one answer for as I pointed out earlier, theology and praxis can vary substantially from one diocese to the next. Local practise is not uneffected, however, by the policy of the international Church. What is the position of the Latin American Bishops Conference (CELAM), the Vatican and Pope John Paul II on liberation theology and its emphasis on decentralization and more democratic decision making?

The evidence is ambiguous and reflects the divisions in the Church. The highpoint of institutional sympathy (or tolerance) for liberation theology may have been between the Medellin Conference of Latin American Bishops in 1968 which has been interpreted as committing the Church to the liberation of the poor and the 1979 Puebla Conference which reaffirmed support of structural change necessary to assist the poor. Some observors argue, however, that Medellin was to some degree a "fluke." Its progressive

documents reflected, in part, the decentralization encouraged by Vatican II and the work of a minority of liberal advisors who unsupervised by their busy administrators created conference position papers which were more progressive then the views of a majority of the Bishops (Crahan, 1975). The subsequent isolation of some of the progressives and the hostility of CELAM (Andean Group, *Latin American Regional Report*, January 25, 1985, p.1) toward liberation theology lends force to these observations.

The Vatican continues to place institutional preservation before transcendent values except possibly in the area of human rights. From an institutional point of view this is not surprising for liberation theology threatens the bureaucratic power of church leaders by questioning traditional doctrine and calling for a decentralized decision structure. The recent recall to Rome of prominent liberation theologians, the unsuccessful attempt by the head of the Vatican's Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith to coax Peruvian leaders into condemning Gutierrez's writing, and the Vatican's order to the Nicaraguan priests to step down from their government posts or refrain from functioning as priests (*Central American Report*, March 15, 1985 p. 79–80) reflect the attempt by Rome to restore doctrinal orthodoxy and respect for the traditional hierarchy (*Ann Arbor News*, January 26, 1985, p. A7).

Pope John Paul II addressed many of the concerns of conservative and progressive church members in his recent trip to Peru and Latin America. He expressed clear support for the plight of the poor, denounced social injustice, and said bread and work are "rights" (*New York Times*, February 10, 1985, P. 4E; *Que Hacer*, February 1985, No. 33, pp. 13–14, Lima, Peru). On the other hand, he seemed to take issue with the central tenets of liberation doctrine and practise. His clearest message questioned the liberationists' appeal for decentralization and more democratic participation within the Church. The Pope reaffirmed that Roman Catholicism is a hierarchical organization (*New York Times*, February 10, 1985, p. 4E). He appealed to believers to submit to Church discipline and accept with docility its magisterium, or teaching authority (*New York Times*, January 29, 1985, p. 3; Hebblethwaite, 1983, p. 200). Bishops must maintain close relations with Rome, he told the Peruvians, and the faithful must work harmoneously with their Bishops and obey their directives (*Que Hacer*, February 1985, No. 33, p. 15, Lima, Peru).

Pronouncements on other aspects of liberation are more ambiguous. Liberationists argue that for the poor to lift themselves they must be aware of common interests, social divisions and blame the system

rather than themselves for the "social sins" of oppressive elites. John Paul responds that the poor must look "essentially to the Word of God and not to the straying criteria of the human sciences . . . that frequently reduce the poor to sociopolitical categories or economic abstractions." (Message in Piura, Peru, *Que Hacer*, February 1985, No. 33, p. 11). Too much emphasis has been put on the social and political causes of oppression (social sins). More attention must be given to personal sin which lies at the root of all evil. Beware of ideologies, the Pope says, which promise "an illusory, earthly liberation." (*Que Hacer*, February 1985, No. 33, p. 11; *New York Times*, December 12, 1984, p. 3).

Action against oppression is at the core of liberation theology. This often means collective action and group or class struggle. "When the Church rejects the class struggle," says Gutierrez (1973, p. 275), "it is objectively operating as a part of the prevailing system." The Pope responds that ". . . the class struggle, whoever the person that leads it or on occasion seeks to give it a theoretical justification, is a social evil" (*New York Times*, December 12, 1984, p. 3). The appropriate pastoral direction, he told Peruvians, is not collective or political action that only divides society. He appealed instead to a denunciation of injustice and the stimulation of each individual, in particular the rich and powerful, to have faith in Christ, empathy for the poor, and a willingness to work harmoniously for their improvement and that of the larger society (*Que Hacer*, February 1985, No. 33, pp. 7–16).

Hans Kung, the noted Catholic theologian said: "if we want to be Christian we cannot demand freedom and human rights for the Church externally and not grant them internally (Kung, 1983, p. 28). This speaks to the Church's dilemma. It can seek to change society in two ways. It can try to influence the policies of external institutions or groups such as the state, military, or business leaders. And, it can socialize the faithful. No matter what proclamations the hierarchy makes about poverty or injustice, no matter what battles it enters in the name of human rights, without internal reform of its hierarchy and pastoral direction, it will continue to integrate the faithful workers into a subordinate, passive role in society and an unequal share of its wealth.

Notes

[1]Others, of course, have argued or implied that Church presence or Catholicism may be negatively related to modernization via its effect on fertility (Cutright, Hout, and Johnson, 1976), by philosophy or collusion (Novak, 1980; Vallier, 1970), or in its traditional organization (Bruneau, 1980). Morris and Adelman (1980) maintain that economic modernization and social change in third world countires require a "new mentality," a major adaptation of religious values to emphasize the alterability of the environment in place of the traditional fatalism.

[2]Students of military socialization will note the similarity in some of the argument in the introduction to this paper and my article on the influence of military service on protest behavior. (Langton, 1984a).

[3]Daniel Levine (1981) contrasts the "ecclesiastical" Church which stresses rank and obedience to authority with the "ecclesial" Church which incorporates much of the theology of liberation. There has been an outpouring of books, articles and dissertations on "Liberation theology." The currents are diverse enough that the plural, "liberation theologies" may be more apt. Most approaches are philosophical or theoretical in nature. For sympathetic treatments see McGovern, 1980; chap. 5-9; Gutierrez, 1973, 1977; Bonino, 1975; Brown, 1978; Oliveros, 1977; Segundo, 1976; Boff, 1979; and Kirk, 1980. Critical analyses of liberation theology can be found in Schall, 1982; Novak, 1980, 1984; Gutierrez, 1977b; and Quade (1982). For literature on the bible and liberation see Gottwald (1983).

[4]Huntington and Nelson (1976) suggest that the relationship between political participation and distributional equality may be negative during the early stages of economic and political development.

[5]Protestants and other denominations were not distinguished by frequency of attendance.

[6]See Clutterbuck (1984: chapters 7-11) for an introduction to the cost of strikes to the workers, firm, community and state.

[7]Those advocating a more progressive role for the church were aided by the writings of theologians such as Gutierez (1971) and Segundo (1976), the educational philosophy of Freiere (1970), the encyclicals which have shifted back and forth between castigating those who use wealth selfishly to defensive admonishment about "communist threat" (Brown, 1978), the 1967 *Populorum Progresso* of Pope Paul VI, the 1968 Latin American Bishops Conference in Medellin which committed the church to the liberation of the poor (CELAM, 1970) and the Puebla Conference in Medellin which reaffirmed the Latin American Bishops' support of structural changes necessary to aid the poor (CELAM, 1979).

[8]It is perhaps here that Marx and Marxism has had its greatest impact on liberation theology. It is also a source of competing theologies. Some adopt a Marxist world view complete with economic determinism, historical materialism, inevitable class struggle, and so on. Most liberation theologians, however, use Marxism as a framework for analysis (Brown, 1978; Miguez Bonino, 1975; Gutierrez, 1973). For example, it teaches that no system of thought is neutral, it can be used to affect change or defend the status quo. Fatalism and self blame reflect such systems of thought (Kirk, 1980).

[9]Although one cannot yet speak of either an international or national church position on worker self-management, the encyclicals of Popes John XXII, John Paul II and Vatican II suggest a reformist stance which does not reject the wage system or capitalism but wishes to "humanize" it by improving work conditions and allowing some degree of employee participation (Skalicky, 1975; Hebblethwaite, 1983). It seems to suggest a form of co-determination in which employees and owners "...cooperate actively and loyally in the common enterprise..." (John XXIII, 1961, p. 91). The ambiguity of the workers' role in the enterprise was commented on by Bishop Franic of Split, Yugoslavia as he discussed the final formulation of the Vatican II text on *the Church in the Modern World*: "the text speaks so

timidly of the participation of workers in the life of the enterprise, without which all structural reforms would remain ineffective" (Caprile, 1965, p. 158, cited in Skalicky, 1975).

[10]Although the Church has generally opposed conflict or violence from any quarter, Pope Paul VI recognized in *Populorum Progresso* that violence may be necessary in some oppressive situations (Bruneau, 1980, p. 535).

[11]Mooney and Soderland (1977). These percentages were recalculated from Table 9, p. 26 and Table 8, p. 25.

[12]The relative advantage of the church compared to other social institutions in influencing political and social attitudes of workers may vary inversely with the repressive nature of the regime. Authoritarian governments generally proscribe independent parties, unions, and the media before they move against the church. Therefore, the church's comparative advantage may be at its maximum under autocratic regimes.

[13]For further discussion of sample characteristics, types of data collected, other analyses of this data and other data connected to this research project see Langton (1984a, 1984b), Langton and Petrescu (1984), Bonilla and Salazar (1983).

[14]Subsequent analysis will be for Catholics only.

[15]Enrigue Baloyra and John Martz (1979). This figure may be slightly inflated for Venezuela as it includes those who responded more than weekly (2%) plus "los domingos, varias veces al mes" (36%), p. 223, question number 81.

[16]The percentages for attendance and religiosity for the national samples in Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Austria and the United States come from the data set for the "Eight Nation Study." See Codebook (1979) for a discussion of the studies, sampling, the variable lists, and frequencies.

[17]International Labour Office codes 710–859, 870–999 (Codebook, 1979, pp. 477–479). I do not have comparative data for industrial workers in Venezuela. The percentage of male workers who attend church at least weekly in each country are: Great Britain (6%), Germany (1%), Austria (1%), Italy (12%) and the United States (22%). If we assume that most Peruvian workers only attend mass then the data are roughly comparable with the "Eight Nation Study" and the Venezuelan study which asked specifically about church attendance. The question in Peru was broader, however, and allowed other **church directed** activities such as participation in *Cursillos* and base communities. Because church influence was only one of our concerns in the Peruvian study and we were interested primarily in its aggregate effect, we aggregated the responses during the interviews. To the extent that miners were attending Cursillos and CEBES at least weekly (field observations suggest this is not the case), then the Peruvian attendance data is somewhat inflated when compared with the cross-national data.

[18]In the Venezuelan study respondents were asked: Would you say that religion is indispensable in one's life, important or not very important. The presumption is that the respondent is referring to his/her own religiosity. Eight-six percent responded indispensable (33%) or important (53%). See Baloyra and Martz (1979, p. 223).

[19]Catholics are slightly more likely than other denominations or those with no religion to blame themselves rather than the system (Gamma −.16) for social injustice and to believe that workers should not participate in work place decisions (−.18). However, the relationships could have occured by chance at p > .05.

[20]Unless noted otherwise, the correlations reported in the text are gammas and significant at p ≤ .05.

[21]Nor was age or years worked in the mine significantly associated with protest.

[22]There was also a weak relationship (.13) between higher education and perceiving protest as an effective act (Act Effectiveness, Figure 1). This is also excluded from the path analysis.

[23]Readers interested more specifically in the macro and micro determinants of strikes in the United States and Europe should consult the *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* (1982) or Hass and Stack (1983). What often distinguishes strikes in the USA and Europe from those in Peru and many third world countries is that in the latter strikes are often initiated with the express purpose of involving the state in the resolution of the conflict.

[24]Elsewhere I show that in the United States and Peru the prior participatory environments in the family, peer group and school structure the later effects of job environment (more or less participatory) on workers' political confidence (Langton, 1984b).

[25]See Langton (1984a) for a more detailed discussion of workers' responses. There is not a significant relationship between education, year the worker entered the mine, or whether he came from an agricultural background and his adjustment to the mine. This suggests the important mediating role of other institutions in integrating the miner into the work place.

[26]Military service was not a voluntary experience for most miners. Ninety percent of those who served were inducted either through the draft or a levy.

[27]There is also a modest negative relationship between church acculturation and workers' belief that they should be involved in economic sector decisions (entire mining and industrial community, $-.20$) or in the political system writ large (which social group or groups should make political and economic decisions for the society as a whole? $-.28$).

[28]If labor militancy influences wage movements independent of market conditions as will sometimes be the case in a system of "political bargaining," then discouraging confrontations can also have a crucial effect on the trade off between unemployment and wage-price inflation (Hibbs, 1976).

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Figure 1

The Relationship Between Religious Acculturation
in the Traditional and Liberation Church and Protest

Figure 2

Path Diagram of the Relations Between
Church Acculturation, Fatalism, Political Religiosity,
Social Consciousness, Act Effectiveness and Protest

All path coefficients are significant at .05 probability level.
The multiple correlations are: Social Consciousness .49, Act Effectiveness .42, and Protest .78.

TABLE 1

Association Between Church Acculturation and Adjustment
to the Hierarchy and Fixed Work Schedule of the
Mine

a. Hierarchy

Church Acculturation		Transition Easy	Transition Difficult	N
High	1 a	63	37	110
	2	55	45	112
Low	3	51	49	205

b. Fixed Schedule

		Transition Easy	Transition Difficult	N
		73	27	112
		61	39	112
		58	42	205

a. categories 1 and 2 of the church acculturation index "are" collapsed into the "high"
category.