Secular History and Teleology

Introduction

Hegel's influence has been and still is determinent for the philosophy of history. The apotheosis of the State as definite incarnation of man's conscious idea of himself, as summing up of all progress, was rejected by Kierkegaard, that valiant defender of the faith, by Schopenhauer, aesthete and man of volition, and by Marx, the apocalyptic visionary. But Marx is in that same 'explicative axis' as Hegel when he tries to discover a meaning (intrinsic rationality) in the march of history. Borrowing from the Iena sage a dialectic in intention universal, Marx conceives of history as a necessary advance towards new syntheses perpetually being born into time, due to a series of confrontations of theses and antitheses. The fact that Feuerbachs' static and mechanistic materialism turned into a dynamic autocreative impulse does not appreciably alter what Marx set out to do, which was to discover the laws governing the 'trajectory of history'. The method followed is Hegelian, the 'moments' of the trajectory correspond to those fixed by the great Idealist. Marx set a term to this movement - a term situated beyond Dialectics; as Dawson, Ward and Calvez have observed, Max could not escape from the 'messianic-apocalyptic' impulse, and in this respect he proved to be more faithful to the religious heritage of his race than to the implications of his 'scientific' philosophy. Nevertheless the teleological view of history bequeathed by Marx has become one of the most potent of guiding principles in a world on the march to progress and development.

Theoretical marxists (and a fortiori those political sooth-sayers known as 'Kremlinologists') are perfectly free to discuss the degree of loyalty or deviation that communism enjoys in relation to pure marxist doctrine. Whatever conclusion they reach, the marxist 'myth' of an ineluctable urge towards an affluent society, whithout

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class or alienation, remains the supreme justification of all communist policy, while constituting history's 'ultimate principle of intelligibility'. It sometimes happens that even the opponents of Marxism are 'contaminated' by its optimistic view of the future; they thus come to believe that the world is inexorably on the march to socialism. In their view destiny and communism are forever wed. Numbers of intellectual élites in under-developed countries yield to marxist dogma as well as to marxist politics so as to 'advance along the line of history'. Georges Sorel pointed out (in Réflexions sur la Violence) that people who participate in a great social movement always picture their future activity as a battle from which their cause is bound to emerge victorious. Quoting Renan (Histoire du Peuple d'Israël), Sorel adds that ultimately 'the future is in the hands of those who have no illusions'. This explains the powerful attraction exercised by the marxist doctrine of history. Marxism is convinced that the future belongs to it, for (a) it is sure it will win, and (b) it thinks it has no illusions. What we wrote elsewhere of the convergence of conflicting systems and their relativity shows up the dogmatic rigidity at the root of convictions of this sort. But in its 'philosophy of history' Marxism is still undeniably a powerful and effective catalytic, rousing men and prompting the necessary decisions for achieving development.

There is no point in minimizing the attraction of the marxist doctrine of history. However there does exist another view of secular history, just as evocative and stimulating as the marxist view. It frankly admits that if the marxist critique of multiple alienations is accepted, and also the 'scientific and objective' nature of the law of the creation of ideological super-structures by economic dynamisms, there is nothing left but to await the messianic millenium proclaimed by orthodoxy (1). Then Marxism will 'explain' delays and counteractions as being due to the persistance of counter-revolutionary and reactionary attacks by the ennemy, known by different names according to circumstances: 'capitalism', 'imperialism', 'colonialism', 'decadent bourgeois morality'. Thanks to these rationalizations, or

⁽¹⁾ Though it is possible to doubt whether the dialectical movement as foretold can reach an ultimate term. For in that case the posited finality would appear gratuitous.

rather, thanks to a faith that renders rationalization superfluous, it will be possible to maintain, and even reinforce, adhesion to a 'teleology' of secular history guaranteeing eventual success and making present commitment to the tasks of progress obligatory.

Now, outside Marxism, does there exist any other form of prophetizing equally capable (a) of inciting faith in the future and (b) offering equally pressing reasons for commitment in the present? The question is all the more dramatic for the fact that Marxism's strength resides precisely in having unmasked the utopic trends of concurrent 'ideologies' engaged in defining the trajectory (cyclical, geometric, apocalyptic) of secular history. Neither in Marx's time nor now have economic, sociological or physical doctrines proposed to fix the culminating 'term' of human history (*). Only the religious and philosophical ideologies were concerned with such questions. Marx's intention was to suppress their relevance by abolishing the 'religious alienation' that turned men away from the tasks of the earth, furnishing their minds with dreams of celestial bliss. According to Marx, religious doctrines abolish history because they make its ultimate significance reside in something a-historical; such doctrines have an emasculating effect and perpetuate injustice because they 'offer happiness' to people who remain alienated. This happiness is in consequence merely pseudo-happiness, an 'opium' to send the masses to sleep and keep them away from the revolutionary tasks that have to be accomplished. Furthermore, doctrines such as these lend plausibility to the exploiters (2). In short, religion is brought down to the level of an anti-value which prevents the dispossessed from achieving freedom and confirms the well-endowed in

⁽²⁾ In our day, astrophysics is endeavouring to discover whether our cosmos will last forever, or whether on the contrary, continuing to expand, it will not one day scatter into smithereens. But here the point is not speculations on the philosophy of history but on the cosmic future of the planet, Auman organization is not concerned.

⁽³⁾ We find eloquent contemporary expression of this complaint in Nikos Kazantzakis, The Odyssey, A Modern Sequal (Book X, 11, 390-5):

^{&#}x27;Cursed be all those on land and see who eat their fill, cursed be all those who starve yet raise no hand in protest, cursed be the bread, the wine, the meat which day by day descends deep into the entrails of the exploited man and turns not into freedom's cry, the murderer's ruthless knife!'

their unjust privileges. For Marx on the collective plane as for Nietzsche at the individual phase, man cannot become fully man nor 'superman' so long as religion teaches him passive, resigned, humble, obedient 'virtues'. These taunts contain an implicit question of capital importance for development: Can a conception of secular history with a teleology based on a transcendent theology, fully commit a man to his terrestrial future, and do it with a force equal or superior to that of Marxism? This is the question that challenges any religious doctrine aiming at being universal and actual. If it cannot take up the challenge, it is doomed to be inoperative in the world.

Obviously the question is one for philosophers and theologians. For while the economist relies on the sociologist for information as to the attitudes conditioning even the economic behaviour of populations, the sociologist, when he comes to examine empirically the motive forces of a given society, is bound to take into account the capital role played by religious beliefs (4). To that extent Marx was justified in wanting to eliminate them, for their hold on minds is such that no scientific dialectic would have any chance of success unless this 'opium of the masses' were suppressed. Now it happens that most under-developed countries are societies still to a large extent governed by a religious view of human destiny and the meaning of history. Likewise 'developed' countries have in great part been induced to face their 'responsibilities' towards the under-developed ones, under pressure of moral motives forming part of their religious tradition, though they were undoubtedly spurred on by political and military events too. Seeing that deficient structures will not be rectified and innovations needed for development will never be set on foot unless people have a reason for desiring them, it is surely essential to determine whether or no there exists in the present situation a conception of secular history of spiritual and humanist inspiration, with a teleology as favourable to development as the marxist view of the world.

To avoid abstraction and remain true to the principles we enounced in discussing the pluralist dialogue of values, we shall tackle the problem

⁽⁴⁾ Cf. K. Fleibleman, The Institutions of Society (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1959) pp. 61, 228-45.

in terms of a single 'religious belief' - christianity. Thus we shall hope to throw light on the 'coefficient of secular commitment' implied in each of these 'two ways of the spirit' which we find at the heart of christianity (3).

The two ways of the Spirit

Many christians still turn regretfully if not nostalgically to mediaeval christianity as the inspiration and social foundation of a 'sacral' theocentric civilization, with its two characteristic attitudes: humility and magnanimity (6). Humility bore fruit principally in a conception of the importance for the fulfilment of man's destiny of God's offer of the gifts of grace, happiness and wisdom. Man's progressive ascent by making the most of his opportunities was not minimized, but the emphasis was on the response to a divine challenge rather than self-motivated steps to human fulfilment. Humanism existed but it was 'sacral' - the things of this world and its activities were appreciated less on their own account than for their value as 'signs', symbols of what was heavenly, divine. Creatures were above all 'means', instruments to be used on the way to our eternal destiny. Powerful as it was in St. Bernard, Albertus Magnus and Richard of Saint-Victor alike, this view was by no means inoperative even in the mental world of humanists like Abélard and Roger Bacon. almost ontological humility accompanied a magnanimity only to be measured with the divine impulses that shot through the human landscape. Grand adventures, great self-sacrifice, splendid gestures how frequent they were and with what justification, acceptation and approbation were they acclaimed in the minds and social environment of a large majority of men.

Such a conception of history was not lacking in grandeur, but it had two main faults, a) it distracted men's minds from certain of their historical tasks, presenting these not as relative ultimate ends but

⁽⁵⁾ It would be immensely rewarding to bring together analogous trains of thought from other spiritual allegiances. The dialogue on values should bring in Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, Israelites and Animists, on the same footing as christians, marxists and existentialists.

⁽⁶⁾ Cf. Jacques Maritain, The Range of Reason, Scribner's, 1953, p. 92.

as means destined to serve the absolute ultimate end; b) it fostered a static attitude to social, political and economic problems. Thus certain christian beliefs were thrown into strong relief while others, though equally part of the christian faith, were left in the shade. The Renaissance overthrew this sucral theocentrism in favour of an anthropocentric humanism that was however more concerned with the golden age of the past than drawn to the future and the tasks awaiting accomplishment. The Reformation dissociated the secular human world from the supernatural and divine even more than the christianity formerly in vogue had done, and gave the Renaissance a free hand to impose itself on the secular world. Human enterprize gradually superseded the divine challenge and there grew up a humanism more and more drained of all sense of need for deity, not even requiring it as radical prop for the 'laws of nature', or personal foundation of a 'human ethic'. The naïve optimism of the ninetcenth century, which believed in an inexorably rising curve of human progress, crumbled before the brutal realities of our century - wars, revolutions, tyrannics, ideological conflicts, and the disturbing emergence of under-development as a goad to conscience. So-called scientific positivist humanism has turned out to be an illusion, insisting as it did on treating men as though they were reducible to mere things biological, physiological, economic or physical functions; whereas the motives affecting human choices are discovered to be complex and intimately bound up with the meaning they impart to a proposed action. Moreover a development ethic based on the primacy of being rather than having, and on the necessity of establishing universal solidarity among men, could find no support in a positivist epistemology ever tempted by eclectic or dogmatic relativism. So it is hardly realistic to expect a widening of the boundaries of the mind except in the light of a religious vision, or a para-religious one (like Marxism), of the final phase of human history. By definition, teleology is outside the sphere of the positivist as of the pure specialist in economics, sociology, political science and education.

Among all the many families of christianity, does there exist a single teleological outlook (7) as likely to foster secular commitment as

^(?) Let me say here that there is no question of reducing the teleological value of a religion to its 'coefficient of secular commitment', but rather of bringing this coefficient

Marxism? Indeed one does exist, owing much to the bold explorations of Teilhard de Chardin, though it is also held by people who are not followers of him. The corner-stones of this view of the world are, first, the connection that exists between human enterprize and its dependence on divine grace; then, a certain conception of the cosmic apocalypse. The choice made at those two points will determine whether christians will regard secular history as having a finality of its own, and whether the most urgent task of the present is not wholeheartedly to devote ourselves to development, for the purpose of preparing the coming of history's 'term' and of 'saving' man.

The two ways for the christian spirit arc, then, a) detachment from our terrestrial destiny by renunciation, because this destiny is meant to be surpassed and replaced by a supra-terrestrial apocalyptical situation, and this implies limited commitment in the natural world, conditioned by an attitude of partial withdrawal; b) detachment from our terrestrial destiny by a traversing of creatures, by virtue of which we work towards a cosmic term regarded as the preparation (non-causal but conditional) of the saving 'parousia', which means profound commitment (a) to history, seen as a task with a relative

to light, Roné Voillaume's warning in Au Coeur des Masses (Paris, CERF, 1965) p. 532, rutains its full force : Christianity is at the moment exposed to two temptations, faced as it is with a world drawn almost in spite of itself into the ever more rapid and impetuous advance of a civilization based on technical achievement, which tends to enslave humanity and shut it up within the bounds of a purely terrestral kingdom; first there is the temptation to separate the destiny of christendom from that of the world by a movement of withdrawal, christians retreating into a 'small residue' living in expectation of the advent of the spiritual reign of Jesus in their souls and in the life to come. This goes with a desire to extend the contemplative's way of life, set apart by vocation, to the whole community of the faithful. And on the other hand there is the temptation for the christian to commit himself with his whole being to all sorts of scientific, economic, social and political activities, so as to bring christian influence to bear on the structure of tomorrow's world, at the possible cost of reducing christianity to being no more than the best solution to worldly problems, de facto if not do jure, and losing the sense of a spiritual kingdom, of the transcendent nature of Christ's mission, of worship, and of the divine supernatural destiny of all humanity.

A christian must not succumb to either of these temptations, but must overcome them by transcending both, in a full realization of his vocation as man and son of God s.

^(*) This second attitude is an ascess of integration instead of being an ascess of rupture.

ultimate finality. The attitude the christian adopts (*) towards any other given current inherent in his own doctrine will have consequences of determinant bearing on the quality of his secular commitment to the tasks of history. Either he will always maintain some reserve in his action of fostering the establishment of more justice, more progress, more well-being in the world, fearful of achieving too formidable a success which might deter men from their true finality of eternal supra-terrestrial happiness - which might induce them to treat those aims either as mere means or as circumstantial conditions that cannot be changed. Or else, the christian will embark on the scientific conquest of the cosmos and the organization of human welfare with total zeal, in order to obey the Creator's injunction to make himself master of creation and prepare a completed, perfected terrestrial world, making it ready to receive the transforming grace that the christian 'parousia' will bring in abundance. In this second case, religion would be the most powerful stimulus inciting men to work for 'development', i.e. a universal human upward surge; whereas the former attitude, both to the marxist and to the humanist who is fully man and wholly integrated in his secular destiny, will always appear as something timid, over-cautious, over-conservative, not to say negative and given to distorting human realities.

In this outline of an ethic of development there is no occasion to elaborate the second christian viewpoint nor to examine in detail the properly religious significance of the two ways of the christian spirit. Such a scrutiny would be better done by theology and the 'philosophy' of history. We are not unaware of the enquiries now being pursued as to whether a true philosophy of history can exist at all, or whether we must of necessity plunge into theology or pure historicity. Toynbee, like Spengler, Dawson, Gilson and Maritain, have but launched the debate. That second 'way of the spirit' we alluded to is largely inspired (as far as the christian tradition is concerned) by Teilhard de Chardin, Ricœur and Maritain. It aims at creating a new civilization of theocentric humanism and promoting 'infravalent'

^(*) Or any other believer, or equally 'non-believer'; the latters teleological attitude will vary according to whether his philosophy is rooted in the absurd or in an ultimate intelligibility.

secular and historical ends, that is, constructing a common good once political, cultural, educational, economic and familial. He who follows this way regards his 'natural' task not as a mere lesser inevitably linked to his condition of a creature of passage on planet, but as a relative ultimate aim (10), such that unless he pursually it he partly renounces his manhood. The value of his scientific political, professional, recreative and familial acts will not so depend on the rectitude of his intentions but on his own ontologics: weight as valid in itself, for itself and by itself, in its own order or scale of being. So from this wiewpoint a christian will work for more rational and equitable economic structure not because that the condition in which the Gospel can triumph; but because it is sa urgent human task, humanly worth-while in itself, and any scorning of its value amounts to an affront to the profound significance of life with its right to sollicit man's adhesion. In some way a christian of this road will find an additional motive for adhering to the world or more precisely, an internal driving power, richly transfigure towards that end. For as Teilhard put it, he will have 'pre-adhered to God', and that is how he will triumph over the world (11). Here

⁽¹⁰⁾ In a determinate order, an object can constitute something more than a meaner, more than an intermediate or subordinate end. It may be an ultimate or final end, a veritable term. However, if the given order is itself directed to another, the ultimate or final character of the ends contained within it becomes conditioned and must be regarded as relative. That one and the same reality can take on the aspect of ultimate in a given order and of a relative in relation to another, will surprise no who has glimpsed the complexity of being. As Raymond Aron said, "The plurality meanings which we ascribe to an act reveals not our incapacity but the limits of knowledge and the complexity of reality. Only when we recognize that the world is sentially equivocal have we any chance of reaching the truth. Our understanding is not incomplete because we lack omniscience, but because the plurality of meanings implicit in the object of our understanding. In The Opium of the Intellectuals (Eng. 1997), p. 157) (italics mine).

⁽¹¹⁾ Cf. original sources quoted and commented by Henri de Lubac, La Pensie ligieuse du Père Teilhard de Chardin (Aubier 1962) p. 317 ff. The reader is also refers to Teilhard's complete works, Edition du Seuil, six volumes already published, ot to follow. Also Claude Cuénot, Teilhard de Chardin, Collection 'Ecrivains de Toujous' (Seuil 1962); also Essais sur Teilhard de Chardin, a collection of essays published Recherches et Débats du Centre Catholique des Intellectuels Français (Fayard 1963 specially pp. 99-151, for an exhaustive bibliography.

Teilhard contrasts the 'pantheist', the neo-pagan, the neo-humanist or terrenist, with the true christian humanist. The former love the earth 'in order to enjoy it'; the latter, loving it no less, does so 'to make it purer and draw from it the strength to escape from it'. This escape is, however, no flight but an opening, an 'issue' which alone gives final meaning to the cosmos (12). Teilhard considers that his co-religionaries stuck too long to the 'sacral' view of the world left over from the middle ages, for human tasks must be given value not by 'sanctifying' them through integrity of intention, nor accomplishing them with a view to participating in the city it is intended to convert; but for their own sake and because their completion by the action of grace is to crown and transfigure a work humanly completed.

In a letter to a friend, Teilhard shows how a religion faithful to transcendence while at the same time fully 'human' can elude any temptation to constitute an alienation or a bolt-hole. He writes of the reconciliation of progress and detachment - of passionate and legitimate love of the greater Earth and the unique quest for the Kingdom of Heaven. How to be as christian as any, while being man more than any? It is all very well to carry on with science and philosophy and sociology to please God and perform the task assigned to us. But it is not enough, so long as in my studies or labours I do not see the need for dedication, so that it will be by means of work accomplished (and not solely because of the moral value of my endeavours) that I shall make progress and get myself organized in an Absolute; so long as the world appears to me merely as an opportunity for gaining merit, and not a Kripa es dei (12) to build up and bring to

⁽¹²⁾ Madeleine Barthelemy Madaule, in 'La Personne dans la Perspective Teilhardienne', Essais sur Teilhard de Chardin, op.cit. p. 76, sums up Chardin's ideas as follows: con the plane of concrete phenomena, the present situation weighing on the individual threatened by collective encroachments - a dramatic situation - is one of the most frequent topics in Teilhard's works. It is behind all his reflections on Marxism and the diverse forms of democracy. Above all it is operative in his desire to open up a road for humanity to set forth upon. Two conditions are necessary to open access to this road of progress: the need for a personal religion to assume the world (the means are there if the reality of Christ is given its all-embracing stature); and the need for humanism to reach beyond itself to a divine person, whithout whom the universe is closed ahead and has no guarantee upon which to base its personalizing upsurges.

^{(18) &#}x27;an enduring monument', 'a final work'.

perfection, - I shall be but one of the lukewarm, and judging me by my religion men will regard me as below standard, and a turncoat. And who would dare to say they were utterly wrong (14)? So Teilhard refuses to relegate the world and its secular tasks to a level of secondary importance or treat them as a mere spring-board from which to save

(14) Letter of 15 March 1916, quoted in De Lubac, op. cit. p. 349 (my italica). De Lubac often refers to Teilhard's insistance ou regarding the 'valorization of the terrestrial' as of major importance. Cf.e.g. p. 28: «At the very time he (man) has discovered how much more rooted he was in universal becoming than he had ever realized, he has become more acutely aware of his strength, possibilities, responsibilities, and the value of his action. This action can no longer appear to him as 'entirely satisfying, unless it is accomplished in union with a finalizing of all coamic perfection'; he has in fact begun to understand that in the immense process of Evolution he is not and cannot be a mere spectator; he sees henceforth that he has a collective task to perform in this world and upon this world; he knows this world has, as such, a future, and that this future is being constructed by him s.

P. 32: e In 1918, he set out to explain to all and sundry 'that in regard to the World, in regard to Truth, there is an absolute obligation to go on seeking'. In Mon Univers he saluted the ideal of a future on earth when men would unanimously engage in the search for Truth.

P.127: e By means of his natural activity, each of us collaborates in a wast opus infinitely exceeding the scope of our personal successes, which are kept under strict control: this is, the completion of the world... Whatever man produces, in whatever order of life, that has real and transmissible value, constitutes as it were an expansion of his being, an extension of his organism, that wast collective body woven by successive human generations and no less called to resurrection than each of our individual organisms.

P.134: e Now this technical fact 'represents a separate order, basically new in relation not only to the civilization of the tool, but also to that of the first machine... This collective work is governed by a secret intention animated by a vital impulse that aims at Cosmic conquest. It is no longer a matter of harnessing the earth in man's service and on his behalf, but of performing an entire re-casting of nature, at the demand of an imperative reason'. It has become a question of loyalty and conscience to work at extraoting from the World all the truth and energy it may contain; 'nothing must remain usattempted if it is conducive to an increase of being's.

P. 284: In 1916 Teilhard wrote, e Then what will the ideal christian be like, a christian both new and old, who will solve in his mind the problem of vital equilibrium by harnessing the whole Sap of the World to this effort to reach the divine Trinity? At the precise moments, wrote de Lubso quoting Teilhard, e when humanity became aware of its collective destiny, conceivable only as terrestrial or transcendents, he (Teilhard) came and took up his stance 'at the cross roads' to point out the only possible directions.

one's soul. Such an attitude, he holds, is unworthy of a man who is fully man, and can be justified by no pretext at all, not even a religious one. He declares that it betrays both scorn for mankind and incomprehension of an authentic part of the christian religion the part that dwells on the wonder of the cosmos (as in so many passages of St. John and St. Paul). Consequently no pretext, however subtle or 'spiritual' it might appear, could justify inertia in a christian faced with the secular work to be done. We have to admit that the religious alienation (15) rejected by Marx has nothing to do with a mature and interiorized religion, but solely with a counterfeit of a true religious attitude. Teilhardian eschatology even goes so far as to wonder whether the erection of this 'ktêma es aei' (this 'enduring monument') might not be the necessary condition for the new earth, proclaimed by Scripture and awaited in the eschatological era, to take shape. No need to adopt Chardin's views (16) to appreciate to what an extent such an outlook would determine the behaviour of a christian engaged in the tasks of development - supremely secular and historical ones.

These reflections on the two ways of the spirits within a cosmic vision of reality open to supra-historical transcendence, acquire most relevance when dealing with the marxist dialectic of history (17). As we pointed out, Marxism offers a powerful stimulant to total commitment in development, precisely because it sees in human secular progress the profound meaning behind history and duration in time, and because its humanism (18) admits of no 'non-commitment'

⁽¹⁵⁾ This alienation is described by Calvez, La Pensle de Karl Marx (Paris, Souil 1956) as follows: A religion which cannot come to terms with the earth, an earth lacking in self-sufficiency and inevitably projecting beyond itself a heaven - one as much as the other is a sign that man has not found himself.

⁽¹⁴⁾ It is evident that even at the heart of Catholic christianity the eschatalogical problem is susceptible of approach from several points of view (the reader is referred to the ex professo works of Danielou, Bouyer, Guardini, Gleason and others).

⁽¹⁷⁾ For an analysis of the markast dialect of history, cf. Calvez, op. cit. p. 532 ff. The author discovers an internal contradiction in Markism: it claims to be wholly inside history but expects to solve the enigma of all history (thus ceasing to be purely historical).

⁽¹⁸⁾ This 'humanism' is not easy to define. Sartre knew it when he raised the question, Is Marxism a Humanism? To those who might be tempted to dissociate Marx's

as regards secular responsibilities. With its ideological power and motivating impulses, Marxism found itself in a strong position to denounce all reticence before the historical finalities (10) and all encouragement of resigned and passive virtues such as might characterize a religious cosmic view. This is indeed what gave plausibility to his explanation of alienation in terms of religion. But what oversimplification. There are several ways open to the theistic spirit and marxist criticism is not applicable to all of them. There is no need to be a materialist - dealectic or otherwise - to play a full part in the task of governing matter, nor is it necessary to dream up a terrestrial classless millenium to situate our action in history, in relation to a 'term' of history itself destined to be 'assumed' by energies, transfigurations and perfectibilities of another order. For the 'millenium' proclaimed by marxism is not a perfect age; as early as 1946, the marxist Pierre Hervé put his fellow marxists on their guard against a mistaken view: 'Communist society will be a society where it will

humanism both from his materialism and his atheism, it is useful to recall Calvez' warnings op. cit. p. 316: «Interpretations have been drawn by which it would be possible to dissociate Marx's economic and social doctrine from his atheism, or conversely retain the humanism of his youthful works and reject the economic materialism supposed to characterize his Kapital.».

Following Marx's reasoning step by step in the preceding paragraphs, we have reached conclusion that rigorously counters any attempt at this sort of dissociation. The whole of Marx's reasoning depends on the connecting link between the different alienations. Cfr. Chambre, op. cit., p. 326, c Clearly it is impossible to retain only the economic ideas of Marxiam-Leninism, cutting them off from atheism, without betraying at the same time Karl Marx's thought and intention. Marxiam-Leninism is based on the assertion that man is self-sufficient and rooted in a history which is no more than the history of his own production by himselfs.

(19) In his view Christ is, in André Breton's words, 'the eternal robber of energies'. Cf. Paul Tillich in a Freedom and the Ultimate Concerns, Religion in America, p. 277. The example of religious socialism in Germany is also interesting. I was myself a member of this movement in the twenties. We were often accused of weakening the dynamic power of the socialist movement because we emphasized the spiritual concerns which were completely overlooked by the socialist parties and their leaders. It was hard for us to answer. If you don't believe that the classless society or the Kingdes of God on earth is just around the corner, is your dynamic power as great as those who do believe it? But if you believe it, you are in for a great metaphysical disappointment, for you expect something ultimate which is not ultimate.

still be necessary to fight; where problems will arise and there will be contradictions - because otherwise it would be a dead society and in some sort the end of humanity' (10). To counter this, what was needed was the witness of a Teilhard and others to show that the christian conception of an 'end to history' is itself no simplification. It acknowledges no validity to the idea that the natural task is radically valueless because history must be swallowed up in a supernatural apocalypse - in fact the authentic christian message professes that history is intended by the same God who will come in Parousia to fulfil history by transforming it into a higher order. Thus there can be no valid reason for a christian not to adhere fully to the world, pre-adhering as he does to God, and this first adhesion provides him with reinforced motives for carrying on his collaboration in the continuous creation that history is.

Development as we see it, a universal human upsurge - a coherent series of passages for a population, and the fractions of population composing it, from a less human to a more human phase of life, as rapidly as possible, at the lowest possible expenditure, in a prospect of human solidarity linking together all those populations and fractions of population at all levels - this at the present moment is the great task to which history summons every humanist. The different traditions of religious humanism will have to re-formulate the meaning and scope of their insertion in the secular world, on the analogy of the 'two ways of the spirit' we have described for christianity. Without this renewal, the marxist way will remain the only one whose basic ideology will justify an unreserved plunge into the task of valorizing the earth, and will reprove attitudes of inaction and noncommitment. As we said, one of the major obstacles to development is inertia: henceforth it is condemned and deprived of pretexts. (Transl. R.M. BETHELL)

WORLD JUSTICE

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