

Development Experts: The One-Eyed Giants

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Summary. — 'One-eyed giants' lack wisdom: they consider non-scientific modes of rationality retrograde.

Exceptions: For Lebret development is cultural and spiritual as well as economic and political. Gandhi favours 'production by the masses' over mass-production. *Secularism* (reducing all value to earthly ones) is bad but *secularization* (taking earthly values as decisive) is good.

Non-instrumental treatment derives development goals from within latent dynamisms in religion. *Instrumental treatment* treats tradition as means to 'modernity'.

The '*coefficient of secular commitment*' describes the varying religious rationales for working in history. Religions should reinforce secular commitment by linking morality to ultimate meanings.

Authentic development summons persons and societies to 'make history while witnessing to transcendence'.

The white man, says Laurens Van Der Post, came into Africa (and Asia and America for that matter) like a one-eyed giant, bringing with him the characteristic split and blindness which were at once his strength, his torment, and his ruin. . . . The one-eyed giant had science without wisdom, and he broke in upon ancient civilizations which (like the medieval West) had wisdom without science: wisdom which transcends and unites, wisdom which dwells in body and soul together and which, more by means of myth, or rite, of contemplation, than by scientific experiment, opens the door to a life in which the individual is not lost in the cosmos and in society but found in them. Wisdom which made all life sacred and meaningful — even that which later ages came to call secular and profane.¹

1. INTRODUCTION

In a recent essay Godfrey Gunatilleke, Director of Sri Lanka's Centre for Development Studies (Marga Institute), pleads for a comprehensive view of development which recognizes the importance of religious values. He laments that 'political and religio-cultural components are not kept in the field of vision' of experts and are left outside 'the development strategy itself'. Why this monumental omission?

The reluctance of current development thinking to engage in a discussion of these issues ultimately has its roots in a system of cognition, a structure of knowledge which is partial and incomplete. In

the development strategies that are propagated it is always the pursuit of material well-being, it is the socio-economic component of development which has primacy. Underlying this bias are the European ideologies of social change and the cognitive systems which grew out of the industrial revolution and enthroned the economistic view of society and man.²

This reductionist approach to knowledge leads most development specialists to become one-eyed giants: scientists lacking wisdom. They analyse, prescribe and act *as if* man could live by bread alone, *as if* human destiny could be stripped to its material dimensions alone. Small wonder, then, that developers have, in society after society, made 'things fall apart' (to cite the title of Achebe's novel) or launched fragile communities on what Kane calls the 'Ambiguous Adventure'. Yet, as I have noted elsewhere:

High indices of suicide in 'developed' countries have often blinded observers to the truth that material sufficiency, or abundance, may be less essential — even for survival — than is the presence of *meaning*. In order to survive one must want to survive, but how can one want to survive unless life has a meaning? Accordingly, having a meaningful existence may well be the most basic of all human needs.³

Falk judges that 'awe and mystery are as integral to human experience as bread and reason'.⁴ After evaluating most approaches to

global and national problem-solving, Falk concludes that '[N]o amount of tinkering can fix up the present international system. . . . the future prospects of the human species depend upon internalizing an essentially religious perspective, sufficient to transform secular outlooks that now dominate the destiny of the planet'.⁵

Most persons in developing countries still find in religious beliefs, symbols, practices and mysteries their primary source of meaning. Moreover, they instinctively sense that neither the promise of material paradise, nor the glorification of political processes can abolish life's tragic dimensions -- suffering, death, wasted talents and hopelessness.⁶

Within advanced industrial countries one also detects a thirst for something more than purely material happiness. The editorial writers of London's *The Economist* evoked these aspirations while commenting on the conclave that elected Pope John Paul I (the present pontiff's short-lived predecessor) on 26 August 1978. These worldly-wise and politically hard-headed writers noted that the church ought to stand out 'as a Christian beacon in a secular world which may be starting to re-examine its wish to be secular'.⁷ Three weeks later they added that the:

. . . late-twentieth century world, with its urge to openness and equality, is also a world which is starting to think that its recent preoccupation with the material aspects of life may be incomplete. It therefore needs a church, Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant or whatever, prepared to carry the banner for the non-material aspects, and to insist that some kinds of truth -- the non-political kinds -- are objective and permanent.⁸

Growing pleas for a richer and less homogeneous universe of values provide a context for the present article, whose aims are threefold: (1) to recall exceptions to the general neglect of religion by development writers; (2) to distinguish two modes (instrumental and non-instrumental) of handling values in social change theory and practice; and (3) to examine how religious belief systems are vectors of different 'coefficients of insertion in time and history'.

2. EXCEPTIONS

As early as 1942 Lebrét and his associates published their *Manifesto for a Human Economy*⁹ calling for patterns of development that would satisfy the needs of 'all in man and all men' ('tout l'homme et tous les hommes', to

use Perroux's phrase). Their vision of the human needs to be satisfied by authentic development embraced recreational, aesthetic and religious needs -- including societal openness to the deepest levels of mystery and transcendence. Material welfare, effective social institutions, political modernity and technical problem-solving should all be subordinated to what Lebrét called 'the human ascent',¹⁰ the conquest by every person and community, via successive approximations, of a more human and more humane form of life. Such a conquest, Lebrét argues, can only result from a 'revolution in solidarity'¹¹ binding local groups to the world community in patterns of interdependence founded on mutuality and cooperation, not on domination and exploitation.¹² From its inception Economy and Humanism raised the banner of a comprehensive view of development. In 1971 I paraphrased that movement's view of authentic development in the following terms:

What is conventionally termed development -- dynamic economic performance, modern institutions, the availability of abundant goods and services -- is simply one possibility, among many, of development in a broader, more critical, sense. Authentic development aims at the full realization of human capabilities: men and women become makers of their own histories, personal and societal. They free themselves from every servitude imposed by nature or by oppressive systems, they achieve wisdom in their mastery over nature and over their own wants, they create new webs of solidarity based not on domination but on reciprocity among themselves, they achieve a rich symbiosis between contemplation and transforming action, between efficiency and free expression. This total concept of development can perhaps best be expressed as the 'human ascent' -- the ascent of all men in their integral humanity, including the economic, biological, psychological, social, cultural, ideological, spiritual, mystical, and transcendental dimensions.

It follows from this view of authentic development that innovation can be good only if it is judged by the concerned populace to be compatible with its image of the good life and the good society.¹³

Although most development scholars have neglected the role of religion in development processes, other noteworthy exceptions are also to be found. One recalls such books as Banfield's *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (1959); French economist Jacques Austry's *L'Islam Face au Développement Economique* (1961); that edited by the late Kalman Silvert, a political scientist, *Churches and States, the Religious Institution and Modernization* (1967); the work edited by Smith on *Religion and*

Political Modernization (1974); and that same author's *Religion and Political Development* (1970); Bruneau's *The Political Transformation of the Brazilian Catholic Church* (1974); Gamer's *The Developing Nations, A Comparative Perspective* (1976). Also important were the numerous productions emanating from the pen of sociologists like Bellah or anthropologists like Geertz. Notwithstanding these significant exceptions, however, it remains true that the vast majority of development authors have paid scant attention to religious values in their writings. In short, they deserve Gunatilleke's condemnation.

Most development authors and practitioners have simply assumed that religious beliefs incarnate a superstitious or retrograde approach to knowledge and reflect an uncritical cast of mind incompatible with the demands of modern rationality. For them, progress has meant not only secularization but secularism as well.¹⁴

Marxist revolutionary theorists, in turn, understandably brand religion as the ally of reaction, the enemy of radical power shifts. Nevertheless, the overt social commitment of Latin American 'theologians of liberation' (Gutierrez, Perez, Assmann, Segundo, Emilio Castro, Bonino, Arroyo, Dussel *et al.*), allied to the resounding testimony given by revolutionary priests such as Torres or Lain, undermine such simplistic judgements. While dedicating a school in Cuba honouring the memory of the slain Camilo Torres, Fidel Castro declared that if the Christian Church ever threw its support to the Latin American revolutionary movement, that movement would prove invincible.

Even non-revolutionary development experts have recently had their complacent bias toward secularism overthrown by two forces. The first is the powerful anti-elitist thrust now emerging in development discourse: 'experts' find it increasingly difficult to justify imposing their solutions and values on people who must pay the price of their prescriptions.¹⁵ As greater legitimacy is assigned to self-reliant strategies which build from within traditional values, planners, administrators and politicians have had to acknowledge that it is their own intellectual elitism and cognitive arrogance which nurture a sustained bias against the religiosity of the people in whose benefit they allegedly decide, prescribe or act. Indeed, the very bankruptcy of conventional development models propels even conservative development experts into the search for alternative development strategies. Such explorations have usually led

them to confess, at least implicitly, the truth of the admonition issued in 1962 by the late econometrician, Max Millikan. Millikan insisted that good planning ought to be 'the presentation of certain key alternatives to the community in ways which will help shape the evolution of the community's value system'.¹⁶ But how can agronomists, demographers, or educators 'help shape the evolution of the community's value system' if they ignore or disparage the religious dimensions of those values?

Within 'developed' countries as well, social commentators and politicians have likewise grown uneasy over the failure of purely secular images of happiness and the good life to satisfy people. During his year-end interview with *New York Times* columnist James Reston in 1978, Zbigniew Brzezinski, the US president's national security adviser, explained that:

The crisis of contemporary democracy associated with inflation is a product of a culture in which 5 per cent more of material goods per annum is the definition of happiness. People are discovering that it isn't. . . . Ultimately, every human being, once he reaches the stage of self-consciousness, wants to feel that there is some inner and deeper meaning to his existence than just being and consuming, and once he begins to feel that way, he wants his social organization to correspond to that feeling; whereas some aspects of our social organization, the vulgar and crass commercialism, correspond largely only to the desires of the stomach, in a figurative sense, to the consumptive (sic!) ethic. I think modern man is discovering this isn't enough.¹⁷

The American sociologist, Daniel Bell, author of the well-known *The Post-Industrial Society*, states that 'The real problem of *modernity* is the problem of belief. To use an unfashionable term, it is a spiritual crisis, since the new anchorages have proved illusory and the old ones have become submerged'.¹⁸

The year 1979 brought shock waves even to the staunchest secular political observers, obliging them to revise their views as to the importance of religion in social change. When Iran's Shah was overthrown and replaced by a theocratic ruler, everyone suddenly wanted instant understanding of Islam and of its impact on political and economic affairs.¹⁹

When interviewed by the Iranian *Communications and Development Review*,²⁰ Lerner was asked to assess his earlier work, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (1958). He noted a sharp difference between attitudes found in Iran in 1958 and 1977. Earlier it was 'psychic mobility' — the capacity of peasants, shopkeepers and housewives to imagine new roles, futures and lives for themselves — which acted as the motor

force galvanizing their energies to pursue development, which they equated with progress. Twenty years later, Lerner informs us the prevailing attitude is not psychic mobility but ambivalence, a profound sense of conflict regarding the benefits and evils accompanying development. Lerner now prefers to use the neutral term 'change' to 'development': his reason is that change can be either good or bad, whereas 'development' implies the progressive unfolding of something which is good or better than what came before.

Now that conventional development wisdoms are being radically questioned even by their former adepts, it is essential to look more closely at the role played by traditions and indigenous values in development. The large majority of Third-World populations, especially peasants who are economically and technologically underprivileged, cling to traditional values anchored in religious meaning systems. Even traditional Chinese philosophy long regarded as non-theistic and secular, carries quasi-religious overtones, with its injunctions to observe filial piety and respect the 'celestial' order. Therefore, to study the interaction between religion and social change is no idle endeavour. On the contrary, the new regard for values bears directly on the formulation of strategies by which suitable developmental changes can be proposed. In the process, however, one must avoid a purely instrumental treatment of values.

3. HOW TO TREAT VALUES?

What does it mean to say that religious and other indigenous values must not be treated by change agents in a purely *instrumental* fashion? The answer is that such values are not to be viewed *primarily* as mere means – aids or obstacles – to the achievement of goals derived from sources outside the value systems in question. Even development agents who are sensitive to local values usually derive their goals from outside these values: from development models or the common assumptions of their respective scientific disciplines. Thus, a demographer will strive to 'harness' local values to his objective of promoting contraception or achieving zero population growth. Similarly, the agronomist will search for a traditional practice upon which to 'graft' his recommendation to use chemical pesticides. Similarly, the community organizer will 'mobilize' a population for political ends around traditionally cherished symbols. All three cases illustrate an

'instrumental' treatment of local values. Obviously, this approach is also frequently used by national leaders, politicians or technocrats.

The anthropologist Louis Dupree describes the instrumental use of Islamic beliefs and practices made by Afghanistan's Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud Khan in the 1950s. The example he gives constitutes an almost 'pure case' of the politically 'instrumental' use of religion in the quest for development.

During the Afghan national holidays (Jeshn) in August of 1959, the government of Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud Khan, who had seized power from his uncle in a bloodless 1953 coup, informally ended *pardah* (the isolation of women) and the *chowdry* of *burqa* (Afghan version of the veil). The king, cabinet, high-ranking military officers, and members of the royal family stood before the march past of the army and the fly past of the air force as they had in past years – but with a radical difference. Their wives stood beside them unveiled. The thousands of villagers and tribesmen (including many religious leaders) in the crowd were stunned, some genuinely shocked. Amanullah [the ruler of Afghanistan, 1919–1929] had tried the same thing, but without the support of the army. In addition, he had issued a royal *firman* (proclamation) which made unveiling obligatory. The 1959 unveiling, however, was technically voluntary. The king did not issue a *firman*, and only high government officials were actually forced to display their unveiled wives in public, to set an example for the masses.

The immediate result of the voluntary unveiling could have been easily predicted. A delegation of leading religious leaders in the country demanded and received an audience with Prime Minister Daoud, whom they accused of being anti-Islamic, of having succumbed to the influence of the *Isai'ites* (American Christians) and *Kafirs* (heathen Russians).

Prime Minister Daoud, normally not a patient man, waited until the mullahs vented their spleens, and then calmly informed the delegation that the removal of the veil was not anti-Islamic, and that if the venerable religious leaders could find anything in the *Qur'an* which definitely demanded that women be kept in *pardah*, he would be the first to return his wife and daughters to the harem. Daoud knew he stood on firm theological ground, for several young Afghan lawyers had carefully checked the *Qur'an*.²¹

Daoud had unmistakably drawn his goals from his vision of modernity; he was, in effect, 'using' religion to engineer popular compliance with his modernization programme. It is precisely such an instrumental approach which must be avoided by sensitive national leaders and external change agents alike.

The more justifiable stance, I submit, is the *non-instrumental* one whose initial postulate

holds that traditional values (including religious beliefs and practices) harbour within them a latent dynamism which, when properly respected, can serve as the springboard for modes of development which are more humane than those drawn from outside paradigms. When development builds from indigenous values it exacts lower social costs and imposes less human suffering and cultural destruction than when it copies outside models. This is so because indigenously-rooted values are the matrix whence people derive meaning in their lives, a sense of identity and cultural integrity, and the experience of continuity with their environment and their past even in the midst of change.²² A non-instrumental treatment of values draws its development goals from within the value system to which living communities still adhere. A sound development strategy doubtless requires that these values be critically re-examined in the light of modern diagnoses of human needs to have improved nutrition or greater security against the ravages of nature or the uncertainties of unplanned production. This re-examination of old values leads to the formulation of goals for a development appropriate to the populace in question. The Overseas Development Council, a non-governmental research institute located in Washington, D.C., will soon publish a book on *Traditions and Indigenous Values in Development*. The work contains theoretical essays and case studies prepared by commissioned authors from Sri Lanka, India, Peru, Paraguay, Colombia, Tanzania and the United States. The book's culturally diverse authors concur in the view that traditional value systems contain within them both strengths and weaknesses. Therefore, a proper strategy presupposes a collective debate around how these strengths, whether visible or latent, can best be harnessed to achieve humane developmental goals consonant with what is best in those values. The first task is to define development goals themselves; only afterwards does one instrumentally 'use' local institutions or traditional strengths found in the value system to galvanize people into action. Such a normatively sequential procedure is the one advocated by Gandhi when he promoted a form of village development founded on traditional Hindu values. Nevertheless, he was discerning in his appraisal of ancient values, not hesitating to reject untouchability and, at least implicitly, the caste system as a whole. Although Gandhi is often portrayed by Westerners as a traditionalist, he introduced modern rational critique to Hindu consciousness, insisting that his countrymen reject the Brahmins' claim to be the sole

valid interpreters of the sacred writings. Instead, Gandhi taught, they should employ their reasoning powers to discover whether logical consistency and correspondance could be found between the Brahmins' teachings and reality critically observed. What Gandhi sought was a harmonious blend between traditional belief and modern rationality.

Parallel efforts have more recently been made by Islamic theorists and practitioners in their search for dynamic approaches to developmental problem-solving within the boundaries of their own religious traditions. Western politicians, investors, consultants, lawyers and journalists are now displaying a keen interest in the workings of so-called 'Islamic banks' in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other countries.²³ Because the Koran condemns interest as sinful usury, Islamic banks neither pay interest to depositors nor charge it to borrowers. Nevertheless, the banks need to operate as viable economic enterprises; therefore, the banks spread the risks flowing from their borrowing and lending. They receive a share of the profits realized by their borrowers and, in turn, proportionate shares of these profits are then distributed to their depositors. Technically and ethically speaking, such payments do not constitute interest (that is, an automatic fee charged for the use of money). Islamic bankers claim that they are simply facilitating the institutional circulation of money in ways which generate productive activities. Their example shows how a religious norm can alter a 'modern' practice, instead of itself being shaped by the dictates of modernity.

Students of comparative development know, of course, that religions, like traditional and indigenous values, come in all varieties and shapes. For this reason it becomes essential to identify the coefficient of insertion in secular matters inherent in any religious value system.

4. THE COEFFICIENT OF SECULAR COMMITMENT

By stigmatizing religion as 'the opium of the masses' Marx sought to hasten the demise of 'religious alienation' which turned men away from the tasks of building history on earth. Other-worldly Gods and paradises, Marx complained, poisoned men's minds by adorning them with dreams of celestial bliss. He denounced religion for abolishing history by making human destiny reside outside history. Religious doctrines, he thundered, negate true humanism and perpetuate injustice by offering

promises of happiness to people who remain alienated. With the same passion Breton, the French surrealist poet, branded Jesus Christ as 'that eternal thief of human energies'. No contemporary religious believers can ignore the challenge to their values posed, not only by Marx or Breton, but by secularization and secularism everywhere. The central question they must answer is whether any religion can supply men and women of our day with a convincing rationale for building up history even as they strive to bear witness to transcendence?²⁴ Stated differently, can any religion preach a humanistic philosophy of history which, no less compellingly than does Marxism, incites faith in the future of the world while making of commitment to today's historical tasks an inescapable duty?

The key to the answer is suggested by comparing the 'coefficient of secular commitment' contained in Marxism with that contained in de Chardin's exegesis of Christianity. Limitations of space rule out a repetition here of the argument I have presented in an earlier essay.²⁵ But two points are worth noting: (1) that the coefficient of insertion can be applied to *all* religions; and (2) that a few key arenas of religion can be examined with a view to determining how 'serious' about historical commitment any religion (more precisely, any interpretative stream within a religion) is.

The first vital arena is the way in which religious doctrine views earthly life itself: is human life simply a means to some paradise beyond this world, or is it rather an end endowed with its own dignity and worth? The Christian philosopher Jacques Maritain (in *Integral Humanism*, first published in 1936), struggled to define, on behalf of pluralistic and secular twentieth-century societies, a paradigm of humanism which considered art, political advance, cultural progress, scientific achievement and ethical maturation as 'infravalent' ends. By infravalent ends, he understood not mere means to some other-worldly ends, but rather goals having their own terminal value although they rank on a lower order of dignity than the supreme ultimate goals (eternal union with a loving God together with all other creatures). Accordingly, Maritain distinguished between humanisms which were anthropocentric (man-centred) and theocentric (God-centred). Both philosophies were humanistic because they took human values and human achievements as worthy in themselves and not simply because they served higher purposes. Value was assigned to material existence for its own sake, and not simply as a stepping-stone to moral

virtue or to some celestial reward. Given such a perspective, the ethical 'goodness' of persons is to be judged, not primarily in terms of their subjective intentions, but rather according to their objective contributions toward the betterment of human life. Religious believers - Hindu, Buddhist, Christian or Muslim - are summoned to work on behalf of more rational and equitable economic structures, not because involvement in these arenas is the precondition for religion or God to triumph, but because that involvement is an urgent human duty bearing on tasks which are precious in their own right. To scorn creatures, in short, is to despise their Creator.

De Chardin once compared a contemporary pagan with a 'true Christian humanist'. The former, he says, loves the earth in order to enjoy it; the latter, *loving it no less*, does so to make it purer and draw from it the strength to escape from it. For de Chardin, however, this escape is not a flight from reality but the opening, or the 'issue', which alone confers final meaning on the cosmos.²⁶ De Chardin held that no pretext, however subtle or 'spiritual' it may appear, justifies inertia in religious believers faced with an array of pressing secular tasks to accomplish: knowledge and wisdom to be gained, greater justice to be forged, creativity and creation to be unleashed, political fraternity to be instituted and comprehensive human development to be progressively achieved.

A second arena in which a religion's coefficient in secular affairs may be judged is eschatology - the 'last things' or the final destiny of human effort. If gods are thought of as dramatic saviours who 'bail out humanity' in spite of its sins and errors, humans will be powerfully motivated to 'sin by omission' in the face of their ecological responsibilities, their duty to reduce armaments, their summons to abolish misery and exploitation everywhere. What is crucial, therefore, is the connection between religiously inspired commitment to human tasks and the 'final redemption', 'nirvana', 'bliss', or 'absorption into Brahman-Atman'. If a religion is to possess a high coefficient of insertion in history, that connection must be intrinsic and essential, not extrinsic or accidental. This means that, as the poet and novelist Nikos Kazantzakis put it, we humans must help God save us. And by helping Him save us, we thereby also save Him.

The new breed of Latin American 'theologians of liberation'²⁷ have repudiated all purely spiritualistic conceptions of religion which justify passivity in the presence of oppressive structures. Their writings and the

inspired by, them are especially important to students of development. Liberation theologians embrace the creative tensions which exist between fidelity to the demands of religious mystery, and the exigencies of full involvement in the creation of history – scientific and artistic work, political struggle, building a just and prosperous economy, changing social structures to meet human needs, and evolving moral norms in the face of rapidly changing circumstances. Building history and witnessing to transcendence, as these theologians understand the terms, are co-extensive with that sound and comprehensive view of development called for by Gunatilleke in earlier pages.

No less than other traditional meaning systems can religions turn away from the challenges posed to them by secularization and, more particularly, by the requirements of instituting just forms of national and global development. Therefore, a key strategic question emerges, namely: HOW are change strategies aimed at development to be *proposed* (and not *imposed*) to a populace whose traditional interpretation of its own religious value system may display a lower coefficient of insertion in history than might otherwise be possible without violating the essential tenets of that religion itself? The answer lies in what elsewhere I have called 'existence rationality'.²⁸ Existence rationality is the process by which any human society applies a conscious strategy for realizing its goals (survival, the defence of its identity and cultural integrity, the protection of possibilities for its members to attain what they understand to be the 'good life' etc.), given that society's ability to process information, and given the effective access it has to resources. All existence rationalities contain an inner core of values which must not be sacrificed, along with an outer periphery where, at least on principle, alteration is admissible. Even the narrow existence rationalities of 'traditional' societies offer considerable scope for change, on condition that proposed alterations reinforce the dominant strategy adopted by the society in question to assure its life-sustenance, minimum esteem (self-esteem and out-group esteem), freedom from unwanted constraints and modes of fulfilment of its own choosing (all of these are core values). As several authors note,²⁹ traditional value systems – which usually include a rich religious content – harbour a latent dynamism for change. If this dynamism is respected and activated by sound strategies of proposed social change or problem-solving, traditional values themselves can become the driving force of desired development. It is essential that change

strategies respect the inner core of a value system's existence rationality: frontal attacks must not be mounted against the values contained in that core. Instead, efforts at transformation should concentrate on the latent flexibilities located at the outer margins of the existence rationality in question.

Independently of the strategy adopted, however, the *legitimacy* of change agents is vital. Although time is lacking here for a full discussion of the question, the central point is that most (all?) religions harbour within them, at least latently, a relatively high coefficient of commitment to human tasks, even those which require great changes in symbols, social organization and normative values. Hence, it is a mistake to assume that development is incompatible with religion. On the contrary, mutually respectful encounters between religious values and sound plans usually prove beneficial to both sides. In the process alienating interpretations of religion lose their legitimacy and development models are challenged to become more humane and to open themselves to a fuller gamut of values, not excluding those which thrust human endeavours into domains of mystery and transcendental meaning.

Recent experience in Catholic Latin America suggests that, notwithstanding initial misgivings, no basic resistance is offered to well-designed population control programmes, if these are part of a broader strategy to bring economic and social improvement and a wider range of personal choices to poor populations. More importantly, all traces of upper-class manipulation of lower-class-peoples' need to find social security and joy in numerous progeny must be purged.

I have evoked the duty of building history in ways which leave history itself open to transcendence. In a world of plural religions, philosophies and modes of knowledge, there exists no single predetermined channel to transcendence.³⁰ The late Herbert Marcuse took transcendence to mean the refusal to be satisfied with what is an ineradicable faith in the capacity, and the duty, of humans to go beyond the limitations of their present conditions. For millions of religious believers – Christians, Muslims, Hindus and others – transcendence points to a life after this life, a universe beneath and beyond this material world, which alone confers full and final meaning to all human efforts deployed in time. Whether historical life be viewed as a testing ground for separating the virtuous from the wicked, or simply as a tragic confirmation of the finiteness of all material things, what matters most are the

precise links postulated between this-worldly existence and the transcendent reality which is the object of religious faith. Is transcendence something so qualitatively *other* that nothing accomplished in historical time has any direct or proportionate relationship to the higher values? Or, on the contrary, does one's image of transcendence make of collective human effort in time the very prerequisite of triumphant divine intervention as the final crowning of history? In the second 'way of the spirit', human effort is not alienated from human tasks by pointing toward transcendence; on the contrary, it draws from its orientation to values beyond itself a new dignity, urgency and depth. To this extent, therefore, it is a powerfully developmental force: for it is the vector of a high coefficient of secular commitment.

5. CONCLUSION

Development specialists no less than spiritual teachers would do well to heed the warning issued by the contemporary French spiritual writer, René Voillaume:

Christianity is at the moment exposed to two temptations, faced as it is with a world drawn almost in spite of itself into the ever more rapid and impetuous advance of a civilization based on technical achievement, which tends to enslave humanity and shut it up within the bounds of a purely earthly kingdom; first there is the temptation to separate the destiny of Christendom from that of the world by a movement of withdrawal, Christians retreating into a 'small residue' living in expectation of the advent of the spiritual reign of

Jesus in their souls and in the life to come. This goes with a desire to extend the contemplative's way of life, set apart by vocation, to the whole community of the faithful. And on the other hand there is the temptation for the Christian to commit himself with his whole being to all sorts of scientific, economic, social and political activities, so as to bring Christian influence to bear on the structure of tomorrow's world, at the possible cost of reducing Christianity to being no more than the best solution to worldly problems, *de facto* if not *de jure*, and losing the sense of a spiritual kingdom, of the transcendent nature of Christ's mission, of worship, and of the divine supernatural destiny of all humanity.

A Christian must not succumb to either of these temptations, but must overcome them by transcending both, in a full realization of his vocation as man and son of God.³¹

A growing chorus of voices, in rich and poor countries alike, proclaim that full human development is not possible without regard for essential religious values. These voices assert that achievements in political, social, economic, technical, artistic and scientific realms do not exhaust the creativity, beauty or triumphs of which human beings are capable. Development's pressing imperatives will doubtless oblige religious practitioners to change many of their ancient symbols and practices. And conversely, it is to be hoped, the resiliency of critically tested religious value systems will invite development experts to enrich their own diagnoses and prescriptions for action. Both categories of one-eyed giants may perhaps come to acknowledge that they need each other if they are, jointly, to gain a wisdom to match modern sciences.

NOTES

1. T. Merton, *Gandhi on Non-Violence* (New York: New Directions, 1965), p. 1. His reference is to Van Der Post's *The Dark Eye in Africa* (New York: William Morrow, 1955), pp. 118-124.

2. G. Gunatilleke, 'The interior dimension', *International Development Review*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1979/1), p. 4.

3. D. Goulet, 'Strategies for meeting human needs', in M. E. Jegen and C. K. Wilber (eds.), *Growth with Equity* (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), p. 49.

4. R. Falk, 'Satisfying human needs in a world of sovereign states: rhetoric, reality and vision', in J. Gremillion and W. Ryan (eds.), *World Faiths and the New World Order* (Washington, D.C.: Interreligious Peace Colloquium, 1978), p. 136.

5. *ibid.*, pp. 134, 136.

6. Cf. J.-M. Domenach, *Le Retour du Tragique* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1963).

7. Editorial, 'The keys to Rome', *The Economist* (12 August 1978), p. 9.

8. Editorial, 'John Paul's agenda', *The Economist* (2 September 1978), p. 13.


9. L. J. Lebreton and R. Moreux, *Manifeste d'Economie et Humanisme* (Marseille: Economie et Humanisme, 1942).

10. L. J. Lebreton, *Montée Humaine* (Paris: Les Editions Ouvrières, 1951).

11. L. J. Lebreton, *Développement = Révolution Solidaire* (Paris: Les Editions Ouvrières, 1967).

12. Cf. K. Kumar (ed.), *Bonds Without Bondage:*

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 14. *Secularization* is the process whereby this-worldly values are increasingly taken as decisive in human affairs and as meriting the full energies and attentions of societies' members. *Secularism*, in contrast, is a philosophical stance - whether theoretical or practical - which reduces the world of values or of worthwhile pursuits to secular matters. Not surprisingly, many religious figures - including Gandhi, Archbishop Camara of north-east Brazil or the late philosopher-scientist Teilhard de Chardin - endorse the secularization process while rejecting secularism. On this see A. T. van Leeuwen, *Prophecy in a Technocratic Era* (New York: Charles Scribner's, 1968), pp. 56-67.
 15. Human pain and value destruction in development are central themes in P. L. Berger's *Pyramids of Sacrifice* (New York: Basic Books, 1974).
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 19. For an introduction to these issues see E. W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon, 1978); also M. Abdul-Rauf, *The Islamic Doctrine of Economics and Contemporary Economic Thought* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1979).
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