CHAPTER LXI.

CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

Grand Review at Washington.—Mustering out of the Troops.—The two Periods of the War.—Our Generals.—Connection of Negroes with the War.—The Foreign Element in our Armies.—Confederate Conscription.—The War Department and Secretary Stanton.—The Question of Supplies with the Confederates.—Sanitary Commissions.—Treatment of Prisoners.—Irregular Warfare.—Confederate Agents in Canada.—The War upon the Sea.—Anglo-Confederate Cruisers.—The Alabama Claims.—Withdrawal of the French from Mexico.—The Political Situation at the Close of the War.

UPON the surrender of the Confederate armies the war for the Union was concluded. The battles had been all fought, and the nation was victorious. It was, by reason of its victory, secure against traitors in arms. Treason might still remain, but it was a disarmed prisoner. The reward of four years of bitter strife had been grasped by a patriotic people. Peace had come, not through conciliation or compromise, but as a conquest. For a brief period the popular enthusiasm knew no bounds, until too soon it was tempered by the death of Lincoln. No one talked of political theories; all felt that such theories had no share in the glory of this triumph. The battle had been won by blood and sacrifice. With one accord the nation turned toward its armies, and showered its blessings upon them. The successful generals, the brave soldiers—these were the heroes of that time. Four years before, regiment after regiment had marched through our cities, with new banners, bright arms, and fresh, youthful faces. They were followed by hopes and prayers. Two soldiers—Ladd and Whitney—in the van of this southward march, had been slain in the streets of Baltimore, and their death so impressed the people that they received a monument, and passed into history sacredly, and by the association of time, linked with the revolutionary heroes of Lexington. These were the first victims of the war. They led that glorious march of the dead which, ere the end, numbered among its ranks over a quarter of a million of just such heroes as they, victims, by disease or mortal wounds, of this protracted struggle for a nation's life. Closing up the rear of this procession, thousands were still gathering from many hospitals.[1] But, though so large a number had disappeared by discharge, death, or wounds, their places had been filled by others. All together a million and a half of men had entered the United States service, and at the close of the war a million still remained,[2] of whom 650,000 were available for active duty. There were as many effective soldiers in the army when the Confederate forces surrendered as when, in May, 1864, Grant and Sherman entered upon their final campaigns.

Now the record of blood was all written, and the scene of four years ago was reversed. The soldiers were returning to their homes, and as they passed through our streets were welcomed back with grateful shouts. Their banners now were tattered, and their arms and uniform battle-soiled; many an absent one was mourned; and the fresh faces which went forth from us returned worn with the hardships of war. But they had served their country, and their step was proud and triumphant.

The armies of Grant and Sherman, who had shared in the latest struggle, as they passed through Washington, were marshaled in review. Over two hundred thousand soldiers made up the grand spectacle. They were assembled in one body for the first time. They were gathered together from every battle-field of the war—from the Ohio to New Orleans, from New Orleans to Olustee, and from Olustee to the Potomac. Those who looked upon that spectacle were reminded of that first stage of the war when the national capital was threatened, and when the first recruits rushed to its rescue. They looked upon a living, moving demonstration of the fact that treason in a republic *could* be subdued, though every rebel leader, from Davis and Stephens down to the most petty demagogue of the South, had prophesied to the contrary. There were some things to mar the triumph. A general who had marched and fought his army from Chattanooga through the fortifications of Atlanta to the sea, and thence to Goldsborough and Washington, still felt the wrong which had been studiously thrust upon him by some officers of the government. Sherman could not take Halleck by the hand. The soldiers also grievously missed the presence of Lincoln, who had called them to the conflict, and to whom they had always looked as father and friend. But may we not suppose that Lincoln, though withdrawn from the earth, looked down upon the sublime spectacle? Did he not, as one of our poets has imagined, marshal another host, composed of those who, like him, had been victims of this civil war, and who now participated in this grand review?[1]

[1] It is estimated that during the war 56,000 national soldiers were killed in battle, while about 35,000 died in hospital of wounds, and 184,000 by disease. The mortal casualties of the war, if we include those dying subsequent to their discharge, probably did not fall short of 300,000. The Confederates lost less in battle, owing to the defensive character of the struggle on their part; but they lost more from wounds and disease, on account of their inferior sanitary arrangements. The total loss of life caused by the rebellion must have been over half a million, while nearly as many more were disabled.

[2] The calls made during the war amount to nearly three millions of men. The following table shows the date of the several demands, the length of the period of service required, and the number obtained:

Date of Call.	Number called for.	Periods of Service.	Number obtained.	Date of Call.	Number called for.	Periods of Service.	Number obtained.
April 15, 1861........	75,000	3 mos.	93,326	October 17, 1863	300,000	3 yrs. }	374,807
May and July, 1861 ..	582,748	3 yrs.	714,231	February 1, 1864....	200,000	3 yrs. }	
May and June, 1862..		3 mos.	15,007	March 14, 1864......	200,000	3 yrs.	284,021
July 2, 1862	300,000	3 yrs.	431,958	April 23, 1864.......	85,000	100 days.	83,652
August 4, 1862.......	300,000	9 mos.	87,588	July 18, 1864........	500,000	1, 2, & 3 yrs.	384,882
June 15, 1863	100,000	6 mos.	16,361	December 19, 1864...	300,000	1, 2, & 3 yrs.	204,568
				Total.......	2,942,748		2,690,401

The following table shows the number of men furnished by the several states, in the aggregate, and reduced to three years' standard:

States.	Aggregate.	Aggregate reduced to Three Years' Standard.	States.	Aggregate.	Aggregate reduced to Three Years' Standard.
Maine	71,745	56,595	District of Columbia....	16,872	11,506
New Hampshire	34,605	30,827	Ohio....................	317,133	239,976
Vermont...............	35,256	29,052	Indiana................	195,147	152,283
Massachusetts..........	151,785	123,844	Illinois	258,217	212,694
Rhode Island...........	23,711	17,878	Michigan	90,119	80,865
Connecticut	57,270	50,514	Wisconsin	96,118	78,985
New York..............	455,568	380,980	Minnesota..............	25,034	19,675
New Jersey	79,511	55,785	Iowa	75,860	68,182
Pennsylvania	366,326	267,558	Missouri	108,773	86,192
Delaware	13,651	10,303	Kentucky...............	78,540	70,348
West Virginia..........	30,003	27,653	Kansas	20,097	18,654
Maryland	49,730	40,692	Total........	2,653,062	2,129,041

It is impossible to give an exact estimate of the number of *different* men who entered the service. It is generally conceded, however, to have been about a million and a half. Scarcely less than three quarters of a million different men entered the Confederate armies, not including state militia. So that the number of men withdrawn from industrial pursuits by the war was over two millions.

[1] Henry Howard Brownell, in a poem originally published in the *Atlantic Monthly*—a poem which is certainly the greatest of the many called forth by the war—thus expresses this imagination:

"So, from the fields they win,
Our men are marching home—
A million are marching home!
To the cannon's thundering din,
And banners on mast and dome;
And the ships come sailing in
With all their ensigns dight,
As erst for a great sea-fight.

"Let every color fly,
Every pennon flaunt in pride;
Wave, Starry Flag, on high!
Float in the sunny sky,
Stream o'er the stormy tide!
For every stripe of stainless hue,
And every star in the field of blue,
Ten thousand of the brave and true
Have laid them down and died.

"And in all our pride to-day
We think, with a tender pain,
Of those so far away
They will not come home again.

"And our boys had fondly thought,
To-day, in marching by,
From the ground so dearly bought,
And the fields so bravely fought,
To have met their Father's eye.

"But they may not see him in place,
Nor their ranks be seen of him;
We look for the well-known face,
And the splendor is strangely dim.

"Perished?—who was it said
Our Leader had passed away?
Dead? Our President dead?
He has not died for a day!

"We mourn for a little breath
Such as, late or soon, dust yields;
But the dark flower of death
Blooms in the fadeless fields.

"We looked on a cold, still brow,
But Lincoln could yet survive;
He never was more alive,
Never nearer than now.

"For the pleasant season found him,
Guarded by faithful hands,
In the fairest of Summer Lands:
With his own brave staff around him,
There our President stands.

"There they are all at his side,
The noble hearts and true,
That did all men might do—
Then slept, with their swords, and died.

"Of little the storm has reft us
But the brave and kindly clay—
('Tis but dust where Lander left us,
And but turf where Lyon lay).

"There's Winthrop, true to the end,
And Ellsworth of long ago
(First fair young head laid low!).
There's Baker, the brave old friend,
And Douglas, the friendly foe.

"(Baker, that still stood up
When 'twas death on either hand:
'Tis a soldier's part to stoop,
But the senator must stand.')

"The heroes gather and form—
There's Cameron, with his scars,
Sedgwick, of siege and storm,
And Mitchell, that joined his stars.

"Winthrop, of sword and pen,
Wadsworth, with silver hair,
Mansfield, ruler of men,
And brave McPherson are there.

"Birney, who led so long,
Abbott, born to command,
Elliott the bold, and Strong,
Who fell on the hard-fought strand.

"Lytle, soldier and bard,
And the Ellets, sire and son;
Ransom, all grandly scarred,
And Redfield, no more on guard
(But Allatoona is won!).

"Reno, of pure desert,
Kearney, with heart of flame,
And Russell, that hid his hurt
Till the final death-bolt came;

"Terrill, dead where he fought,
Wallace, that would not yield,
And Sumner, who vainly sought
A grave on the foughten field

"(But died ere the end he saw,
With years and battles outworn).
There's Harker of Kenesaw,
And Ulric Dahlgren, and Shaw,
That slept with his hope forlorn.

"Bayard, that knew not fear
(True as the knight of yore),
And Putnam, and Paul Revere,
Worthy the names they bore.

"Allen, who died for others,
Bryan, of gentle fame,
And the brave New England brothers
That have left us Lowell's name.

"Home, at last, from the wars—
Steadman, the stanch and mild,
And Janeway, our hero-child,
Home, with his fifteen scars!

"There's Porter, ever in front,
True son of a sea-king sire,
And Christian Foote, and Dupont
(Dupont, who led his ships
Rounding the first ellipse
Of thunder and of fire).

"There's Ward, with his brave death-wounds,
And Cummings, of spotless name,
And Smith, who hurtled his rounds
When deck and hatch were aflame;

"Wainwright, steadfast and true,
Rodgers, of the brave sea-blood,
And Craven, with ship and crew
Sunk in the salt sea flood.

"And, a little later to part,
Our captain, noble and dear—
(Did they deem thee, then, austere?
Drayton! O pure and kindly heart!
Thine is the seaman's tear).

"All such, and many another
(Ah, list how long to name!),
That stood like brother by brother,
And died on the field of fame.

"And around—(for there can cease
This earthly trouble)—they throng,
The friends that had passed in peace,
The foes that have seen their wrong.

"(But, a little from the rest,
With sad eyes looking down,
And brows of softened frown,
With stern arms on the chest,
Are two, standing abreast—
Stonewall and Old John Brown.)

"But the stainless and the true,
These by their President stand,
To look on his last review,
Or march with the old command.

"And lo, from a thousand fields,
From all the old battle-haunts,
A greater army than Sherman wields,
A grander review than Grant's!

"Gathered home from the grave,
Risen from sun and rain—
Rescued from wind and wave
Out of the stormy main—
The legions of our brave
Are all in their lines again!

"Many a stout corps that went,
Full-ranked, from camp and tent,
And brought back a brigade;
Many a brave regiment,
That mustered only a squad.

"The lost battalions,
That, when the fight went wrong,
Stood and died at their guns—
The stormers steady and strong,

"With their best blood that bought
Scarp, and ravelin, and wall—
The companies that fought
Till a corporal's guard was all.

"Many a valiant crew,
That passed in battle and wreck—
Ah, so faithful and true!
They died on the bloody deck,
They sank in the soundless blue.

"All the loyal and bold
That lay on a soldier's bier—
The stretchers borne to the rear,
The hammocks lowered to the hold.

"The shattered wreck we hurried,
In death-fight, from deck and port—
The Blacks that Wagner buried—
That died in the Bloody Fort!

"Comrades of camp and mess,
Left, as they lay, to die,
In the battle's sorest stress,
When the storm of fight swept by;
They lay in the Wilderness—
Ah! where did they not lie?

"In the tangled swamp they lay,
They lay so still on the sward!—
They rolled in the sick-bay,
Moaning their lives away—
They flushed in the fevered ward.

"They rotted in Libby yonder,
They starved in the foul stockade—
Hearing afar the thunder
Of the Union cannonade!

"But the old wounds all are healed,
And the dungeoned limbs are free—
The Blue Frocks rise from the field,
The Blue Jackets out of the sea.

"They've 'scaped from the torture-den,
They've broken the bloody sod,
They're all come to life agen!—
The third of a million men
That died for thee and for God!

"A tenderer green than May
The Eternal Season wears—
The blue of our summer's day
Is dim and pallid to theirs—
The horror faded away,
And 'twas heaven all unawares!

"Tents on the Infinite Shore!
Flags in the azuline sky,
Sails on the seas once more!
To-day, in the heaven on high,
All under arms once more!

"The troops are all in their lines,
The guidons flutter and play;
But every bayonet shines,
For all must march to-day.

"What lofty pennons flaunt?
What mighty echoes haunt,
As of great guns, o'er the main?
Hark to the sound again—
The Congress is all ataunt!
The Cumberland's manned again!

"All the ships and their men
Are in line of battle to-day—
All at quarters, as when
Their last roll thundered away—
All at their guns, as then,
For the fleet salutes to-day.

"The armies have broken camp
On the vast and sunny plain,
The drums are rolling again;
With steady, measured tramp,
They're marching all again.

"With alignment firm and solemn,
Once again they form
In mighty square and column—
But never for charge and storm.

"The old flag they died under
Floats above them on the shore,
And on the great ships yonder
The ensigns dip once more—
And once again the thunder
Of the thirty guns and four!

"In solid platoons of steel,
Under heaven's triumphal arch,
The long lines break and wheel,
And the word is 'Forward, march!'

"The colors ripple o'erhead,
The drums roll up to the sky,
And with martial time and tread
The regiments all pass by—
The ranks of our faithful Dead,
Meeting their President's eye.

"With a soldier's quiet pride
They smile o'er the perished pain,
For their anguish was not vain—
'For thee, O Father, we died!
And we did not die in vain.'

"March on, your last brave mile!
Salute him, Star and Lace!
Form round him, rank and file,
And look on the kind, rough face;
But the quaint and homely smile
Has a glory and a grace
It never had known erewhile—
Never, in time and space.

"Close round him, hearts of pride!
Press near him, side by side—
Our Father is not alone!
For the Holy Right ye died,
And Christ, the Crucified,
Waits to welcome his own."

GRAND REVIEW AT WASHINGTON.—SHERMAN'S VETERANS MARCHING THROUGH PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE.

Immediately after Lee's surrender the government began to return to a peace establishment. Four days after this surrender Secretary Stanton issued orders stopping all drafting and recruiting, curtailing purchases of arms and supplies, and reducing the number of general and staff officers. Before the close of April, 1865, preparations were made for mustering out the volunteers. On November 15th, 900,000 soldiers had been discharged.[1] The stability of the republic was not more surely demonstrated by the success of the war for the Union than by the speedy and quiet return of its defenders to civil pursuits after the suspension of hostilities.

The course of the war has been traced in the pages of this history. Of the minor actions, many have been omitted because they had no bearing upon the result; but the principal campaigns have been developed as accurately and elaborately as has been possible. We who have written, while aware of the fact that many events might have been more fully developed and illustrated by private and unofficial intelligence, still feel confident that the general outlines of the war, as we have delineated them, will thus remain forever. It is unnecessary for us here to enter into a minute review of the contest. Two eras of the war are distinctly marked. The first ended in the summer of 1863, in the victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg. In this first period no distinction can be made between the martial enthusiasm or military skill displayed on the two sides of the struggle. In the peninsular campaign of 1862, it is difficult to say which general committed the most serious blunders—Lee or McClellan. At Shiloh we are no more astonished by Grant's negligence as to any preparation for the conflict which he knew was sure to come, than by the panic which two gun-boats created among the Confederates, depriving them of the victory of which they were already assured by their preponderance of numbers. If we wonder why Hooker, at Chancellorsville, outnumbering the enemy almost two to one, was compelled to recross the Rappahannock, we are not less surprised that Johnston and Pemberton did not prevent Grant from reaching the rear of Vicksburg after the latter general had placed his army at the mercy of his antagonists. But after the defeat of the Confederates at Gettysburg, involving severe losses on their side, and after the surrender of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, involving a loss of nearly 50,000 more, we find the conflict not only contracted to smaller proportions, but proceeding upon far more favorable conditions for the national armies. After this time the Confederate forces dwindle away by discouragement and desertion, and never again reach their former numbers. The decisive victories won by Grant at Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain, in November, 1863, began to illustrate the new conditions of this second era of the war. At the same time, Meade was hesitating in the East; but in May, 1864, Grant was at the head of the Army of the Potomac. Then simultaneously began the campaigns against Richmond and Atlanta, and in both the Union armies were twice as large as those which confronted them. The exhaustion of the enemy now went on rapidly, and the memorable blunder of Hood's invasion hastened the final crisis. Sherman proceeded upon his two bold marches, and in the spring of 1865 the war was terminated in Virginia and North Carolina. The crushing political defeat of the peace party in the North, while it did not create military victories, insured the ultimate success of our armies, and took away from the insurgents their last hope.

Upon a careful study of the campaigns of this war, and comparing them with those of the Old World in other times, although we find much that excites admiration, we do not find upon either side a general who could rank with the first-class generals of the world. The comparison of Lee, or Johnston, or Grant, or even of Sherman, with Napoleon or Frederick, is unwarranted, while either of the American generals named might be fitly matched with the Duke of Wellington. Republics do not, in the ordinary course of events, naturally beget Cæsars, Napoleons, nor Fredericks. Few of our generals entered the war to satisfy a personal ambition, and those who did failed utterly. Whatever success was attained was the result of a desire to faithfully serve the country. It is fortunate, on the whole, that such was the case, and that the people might claim for themselves the victory.

The fact that over one eighth of the population of the country consisted of slaves, and the relation of this servile race to the war, demands our attention. The negroes of the South expected that the war would result in their emancipation, and they were not surprised when the government broke their fetters. They waited for their freedom, but not one blow of their own motion did they strike for it. When they came within our lines, their poverty and dependence made them willing conscripts. Their sympathy with the national cause is evident from the many instances in which they furnished valuable information to our officers, and assisted our fugitive prisoners in escaping northward. Their assistance, however valuable, was not absolutely necessary, and had no important bearing upon the final result of the war. About 175,000 negroes entered the United States service, and a large portion of these were employed in garrison duty. It is a very suggestive fact, and speaks well for the peaceful disposition of the Southern negro, that while thousands of opportunities were afforded, no case of servile insurrection occurred during the war. In the early part of 1865, when every other resource had apparently been exhausted, the question of enrolling the negro as a soldier, and giving him his freedom, was quite generally discussed in the South, but it did not meet with the favor of the Confederate President. If this measure had been adopted by the Confederate government at an early stage of the war, there is no reason to doubt that the slaves would have fought for the enemies of the national government as willingly as they built their fortifications or performed other offices. The disposition by the nation of the emancipated slave after the war closed did not rest so much upon the basis of gratitude as upon general considerations affecting the common welfare.

It has been frequently asserted that the foreign element of our population was indispensable to victory, but this assertion is contradicted by the fact that over nine tenths of our soldiers were native-born citizens. The triumph of the nation would have been certain if neither foreigners nor slaves had engaged in the contest. But this fact ought not to diminish the nation's gratitude toward the negroes and foreigners who fought in its behalf, and who acquitted themselves well on the field of battle.

The two ideas upon which the Confederacy rested were those of state sovereignty and the untrammeled development of negro slavery. Scarcely, however, had the Southern States been, for these purposes, launched upon their novel voyage—scarcely had they entered upon the conflict for independence, when the necessities of war threatened the ruin of both state sovereignty and slavery. The concentration of power in the Confederate executive—more formidable and despotic than had ever before been exercised over the states of the republic—left scarcely a vestige of liberty either to states or individuals. And, on the other hand, the progress of the national arms—slow, but steady and sure—threatened the destruction of slavery. The people of the South, therefore, could not, without apprehension, look forward to either success or defeat. They had espoused a cause which, if won, placed them at the mercy of the despotism to which they had committed themselves, and the loss of which would lay them prostrate at the feet of a power whose just claim to their allegiance they had defied and resisted. To one of these evils they had committed themselves so absolutely that no release from that lay within their power; to the other evil they *would* not yield but by compulsion. They were embarked upon a ship whose pilots would surely deliver it into the jaws of Scylla, unless Fate should deliver it over to the opposite Charybdis. Fate was rapidly deciding in favor of Charybdis; but, in the mean time, they, without heart, and in their desperation, shouted their pilots on Scylla-ward. It was a pitiable situation, but they had brought it upon themselves by weakly yielding their property and their lives at the bidding of ambitious traitors. In a moment of enthusiasm, believing that no power could withstand "Southern chivalry," and that Northern enterprise, industry, and intelligence were but synonyms for cowardice, and would easily be driven from every battle-field by an effete slave aristocracy, they had dared every thing, had invoked war by an outrage upon the national flag, had pledged their estates, their honor, and their lives to treason. A few months of war exposed their mistake, both as to the character of their leaders and of the struggle in which they were engaged; but then there was no escape for a people already demoralized by rebellion.

It was only by the most arbitrary exercise of power that the Confederate armies were recruited after the first year of the war. Those who volunteered at the beginning were forcibly retained after the expiration of their terms of service. On the 16th of April, 1862, a Conscription Bill passed the Confederate Congress which placed in the service for three years all white men between the ages of 18 and 35 not legally exempted. On the 15th of July, 1863, Davis issued a proclamation which included in the service all between 18 and 45. But even this act was not sufficient. The Confederate armies did not reach their former standard. This was due largely to desertion. In February, 1864, a Conscription Bill was passed by the Confederate Congress declaring all white men between the ages of 17 and 50 "in the military service for the war." By this law, the exemption of those who had furnished substitutes was revoked. The only persons exempted were ministers of the Gospel who were in the actual performance of their duties; superintendents of deaf, dumb, and blind or insane asylums; one editor for each newspaper, and such employés as he might upon oath declare indispensable; public printers and their necessary assistants; one apothecary to each drug-store; physicians over 30 years of age of seven years' practice; presidents and teachers of colleges, academies, and schools, who had 30 or more pupils; the superintendents of public hospitals, with such physicians and nurses as were indispensable for the management of the same; and one agriculturist on each farm where there was no white male adult not liable to military duty, and which employed 15 able-bodied slaves. This act left no resource untouched. Only those were excluded from service who were absolutely necessary to the production of supplies and for the execution of the functions of government. According to an estimate published at Richmond at the close of 1864, there were in the Confederacy in 1860, between the ages of 17 and 50, 1,299,700 white men. Since that time it was estimated that 331,650 had arrived at the age of 17. And this addition would probably be balanced by the ordinary mortality added to the number of those who had advanced beyond the age of 50. But, deducting the population within the Federal lines, the losses in battle and by unusual disease, exemptions for disability, prisoners held by the Federals, and those who had left the country, there were less than half a million of soldiers left to the Confederacy, and of these full 250,000 were already in the Confederate armies. From this estimate it appears that by the close of 1864 the Confederacy was nearly exhausted of its fighting men.

The Conscription Act passed by the United States Congress did not directly increase the army to any considerable extent. But the number of substitutes obtained, and the high bounties offered under the influence of the act, increased the Federal armies to the full measure required.

It would be unjust to leave unnoticed Secretary Stanton's admirable and efficient administration of the War Department. By this department a million of men were fed, clothed, armed, and supplied with ammunition, and with all the war material necessary to organized armies; an immense

[1] Troops mustered out to August 7... 640,806
" " " August 22.. 719,338
" " " Sept. 14.... 741,107
Troops mustered out to October 15... 785,205
" " " November 15 800,963

fleet of transports moved at its bidding, laden with supplies; and under its orders thousands of miles of railroad were constructed and put in operation. Upon its prompt and efficient efforts our armies depended not only for subsistence, but also, to a great degree, for the successful issue of their marches and battles. At the head of this vast organization stood the secretary, untiring, conscientious, kind-hearted, but often brusque, as men are apt to be upon whom rest weighty responsibilities. His character was irreproachable, and his management was characterized by scrupulous economy. He had his failings, doubtless, and made many enemies; but no man probably could have been more wisely selected to move, adjust, and keep in harmonious operation the intricate machinery of a great war.

The task of supplying the national armies involved only a financial problem; with the Confederates it was a question of possibilities, and in 1863 it became a difficult and embarrassing question. The Confederate currency had depreciated until a dollar in paper was only worth six cents in coin. There were not in the South, as in the North, large capitalists to buy up the government bonds, and the banks were rapidly exhausted. The agriculturists were willing to sell their produce only at the highest market price in currency, and many refused to sell at all. The most fertile portion of the soil was devoted to the production of cotton, tobacco, and rice, and the substitution of other crops was a measure very reluctantly adopted. To add to the embarrassment of the situation, the year 1863 was remarkable for scarcity in every crop. The possession of the Mississippi cut off all supplies from the fertile states west of that river, and the occupation of East Tennessee deprived the Confederate armies of bacon. The stringency of the blockade made any extensive importation of supplies or exportation of cotton impossible; and an important consequence was the absorption of a large proportion of labor in the production of war material. The conscription of all the able-bodied men in the Confederacy between 18 and 45 left a small laboring population, if we except women, children, and slaves. It is easily seen, therefore, that the slaves of the South were already become an indispensable support of a war for the perpetuation of their own bondage. If at this crisis the Confederate government had proclaimed the emancipation of slaves, it would have stood on a high vantage-ground both as regarded foreign powers and the conduct of its struggle for independence. But such an act was, under the circumstances, a moral impossibility.

The Confederate government met the difficulty of obtaining supplies just as it had met that of obtaining soldiers. As it had forced the latter by conscription, so now it began to impress the former. If its despotic will could demand the lives of men, it could certainly demand their property. Thus the government obtained supplies at its own price. But this action created great popular discontent and much distress. The natural desire on the part of agriculturists to evade impressment led them to refuse their products to the public markets. Besides this, the extent to which impressment was carried on in the vicinity of the principal dépôts left a scanty supply of provisions for the people, and especially for women and children whose natural protectors were in the army. Famine cursed the large cities, and the instances were not a few in which women marched through the streets with arms in their hands, and compelled the satisfaction of their hunger which they had no money to appease.

What food there was in the Confederacy was not made fully available for the supply of the army or of the principal towns. The railroads were giving way, and there were no means at hand for their repair. The wooden ties rotted, the machinery was almost exhausted, the rails were worn out, and thus the speed and capacity of the trains were greatly reduced. This embarrassment in regard to supplies weakened and discouraged the Confederate armies, and produced disaffection among the people.

In another respect a great contrast is presented upon a comparison of the National and Confederate armies. We allude to sanitary arrangements. No nation ever took such care of its armies in the field as did the United States in this war. Scarcely had the President issued his first call for 75,000 men before, in our cities and rural districts, hundreds of soldiers and societies sprang up to furnish lint, bandages, hospital clothing, nurses, and delicacies for the sick and the wounded. It was at this time that the Women's American Association of Relief was organized in New York City. Associated with this organization were a number of eminent medical men, prominent among whom was Rev. Henry W. Bellows, D.D. This society united with the advisory committee of the Board of Physicians and Surgeons of New York, and the New York Medical Association for furnishing supplies in aid of the army, in sending a delegation to Washington to offer their co-operation with the medical bureau of the government. Accordingly, H. W. Bellows, and Drs. W. H. Van Buren, Elisha Harris, and Jacob Harsen, on the 18th of May, 1861, addressed a communication to the Secretary of War recommending the organization of a commission of civilians, medical men, and military officers, having for its object the regulation and development of the active benevolence of the people toward the army. With some reluctance the organization was permitted to exist under the name of a "Commission of Inquiry and Advice in respect of the Sanitary Interests of the United States Forces." Subsequently it was styled simply the United States Sanitary Commission.[1] From duties which at first were simply advisory, the commission soon advanced to such as were executive. Its representatives were found upon every transport, at every camp and every fort, in every hospital and on every battle-field. It carefully investigated the character of the original *material* of the army from a sanitary point of view. The diet and clothing of the recruits, the cleanliness of their persons, their camping-grounds, were all subjects of its care. Disease was thus, to a great degree, prevented in the incipient stages of the soldier's career. Every provision was made for the relief of the sick and the wounded. The ambulances of the commission followed the army into battle, took the soldier almost as he fell, and prompt and sufficient relief was applied where relief was possible, and the most tender care taken of the dead. When the soldiers of the hostile army fell into our hands, they also shared in these beneficent provisions.

The officers and agents of the commission received no compensation for their labors. The people generously supplied them with the necessary means for carrying out their designs, both by the contribution of money and supplies. There were other organizations formed for similar objects, prominent among which were the Christian and the Western Sanitary Commissions. It is estimated that through these channels, and other means used for the benefit of the soldier, not less than $500,000,000 were expended. At a single fair in New York City over a million of dollars was realized by the United States Sanitary Commission.

It must not be supposed that the Confederates at home did not make sacrifices for their soldiers in the field, but from the lack of extensive and well-regulated organizations like those which we have described, their armies suffered far heavier losses both from diseases in the camp, which might have been largely prevented, and from casualties in the field, which proved fatal for want of prompt relief.

In this general review of the war there is one page upon which the historian is loth to enter. Whatever instances of barbarity may have occurred in the heat of battle or in the excitement of the march on either side, and although in some sections of the West there was a prevailing disregard of the usages of civilized war, still, to the soldiers of both armies, history must yield the honor always due to bravery. But the treatment of national prisoners by the Confederate government, especially in the later stages of the war, is a disgrace which the conscientious historian can neither palliate nor gloss over, though his cheek burn with shame for his own countrymen.

The question of the exchange of prisoners was at the outset one beset with a legal difficulty. At first the prevailing opinion was in favor of hanging as traitors every prisoner captured by the government. The rebellion was regarded as an insurrection which could soon be put down by energy and severity, and it seemed derogatory to the national dignity to recognize the belligerent rights of rebels by negotiations with them of any sort. But it was soon found necessary to adopt a different view of the whole question.

The first prisoners captured by the government were the captain and crew of the privateer Savannah, who fell into the hands of the United States brig Perry on the 3d of June, 1861. These men were tried as pirates; but, while their trial was pending, the Confederate government threatened to visit upon the prisoners captured at Bull Run the precise punishment which should be inflicted upon the privateersmen. By this threat of retaliation, the national government was induced to abandon its position. There still remained an unwillingness on its part to directly sanction exchanges, and the whole matter was for a time submitted to the various commanders, to be arranged under flags of truce. But in this way only a few exchanges took place. Without instructions from the general government, our generals declined to receive communications on the subject from the other side. Thus, after the battle of Belmont, in November, 1861, General

HENRY W. BELLOWS.

[1] The commission was composed of the following gentlemen: Rev. H. W. Bellows, D.D., New York; Professor A. D. Bache, Vice-President, Washington; Elisha Harris, M.D., Corresponding Secretary, New York; George W. Cullum, U. S. A., Washington; Alexander E. Shiras, U. S. A., Washington; Robert C. Wood, M.D., U. S. A., Washington; W. H. Van Buren, M.D., New York; Wolcott Gibbs, M.D., New York; Cornelius R. Agnew, M.D., New York; George T. Strong, New York; Frederick Law Olmstead, New York; Samuel G. Howe, M.D., Boston; J. S. Newberry, M. D., Cleveland, Ohio. Others were afterward included, and there were nearly 600 associate members in all parts of the country.

GRAND REVIEW AT WASHINGTON—SHERIDAN'S CAVALRY PASSING THROUGH PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, MAY 23, 1865.

CAMP OF CONFEDERATE PRISONERS AT ELMIRA, NEW YORK.

Grant refused to treat with General Polk for a general exchange of prisoners captured in that action. The shyness of the national government in this matter was as ridiculous as it was unnecessary. The existence of the blockade was a recognition of belligerent rights as full as that involved in a cartel for the exchange of prisoners. In neither case did the recognition of belligerent rights involve a recognition of sovereignty. If the necessities of war justified the blockade, the necessities of humanity justified and demanded an arrangement in regard to prisoners.

In the latter part of December, 1861, a joint resolution was adopted by Congress, requesting the President to take immediate measures to effect a general exchange. During the following January Secretary Stanton appointed two commissioners, the Rev. Bishop Ames and the Hon. Hamilton Fish, "to visit the prisoners belonging to the army of the United States now in captivity at Richmond, in Virginia, and elsewhere, and under such regulations as may be prescribed by the authorities having custody of such prisoners, relieve their necessities and provide for their comfort at the expense of the United States." The authorities at Richmond refused to admit the commissioners, but declared their readiness to negotiate for a general exchange of prisoners. Negotiations for this purpose were accordingly opened at Norfolk, Virginia. These resulted in an agreement for an equal exchange. The Confederates at this time held 300 prisoners in excess of those captured by the national troops. These they proposed to release on parole, provided the United States would release the same number of those who might afterward be captured by them. The exchanges were commenced in the latter part of February, 1862, but were interrupted on the 18th of March by a message from President Davis to the Confederate Congress, recommending that all the Confederate prisoners who had been paroled by the United States government be released from the obligations of their parole. In the mean time, the captures made at Roanoke Island and Fort Donelson left an excess of many thousands of prisoners in the hands of the national government.

On the 22d of July a cartel was agreed upon for a general exchange, based upon that established between the United States and Great Britain in 1812. According to the provisions of this cartel, an equal exchange was to be made. All prisoners taken on either side were to be released in ten days after their capture; and those for whom no exchange could be rendered were to be bound by parole not to perform military duty until exchanged.[1]

The provisions of this cartel were carried out generally in good faith on both sides; but in some instances its perfect execution was interrupted.

[1] The following is the text of this cartel:

"Haxall's Landing, on James River, Va., July 22, 1862.

"The undersigned, having been commissioned by the authorities they respectively represent to make arrangements for a general exchange of prisoners of war, have agreed to the following articles:

"ARTICLE 1. It is hereby agreed and stipulated that all prisoners of war held by either party, including those taken on private armed vessels, known as privateers, shall be discharged upon the conditions and terms following:

"Prisoners to be exchanged man for man and officer for officer; privates to be placed on the footing of officers and men of the navy.

"Men and officers of lower grades may be exchanged for officers of a higher grade, and men and officers of different services may be exchanged according to the following scale of equivalents:

"A general commander-in-chief or an admiral shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank, or forty-six privates or common seamen.

"A flag officer or major general shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank, or for forty privates or common seamen.

"A commodore carrying a broad pennant, or a brigadier general, shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank, or twenty privates or common seamen.

"A captain in the navy, or a colonel, shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank, or for fifteen privates or common seamen.

"A lieutenant colonel, or a commander in the navy, shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank, or for ten privates or common seamen.

"A lieutenant commander or a major shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank, or eight privates or common seamen.

"A lieutenant or a master in the navy, or a captain in the army or marines, shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank, or six privates or common seamen.

"Masters' mates in the navy, or lieutenants and ensigns in the army, shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank, or four privates or common seamen.

"Midshipmen, warrant officers in the navy, masters of merchant vessels, and commanders of privateers, shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank, or three privates or common seamen; second captains, lieutenants, or mates of merchant vessels or privateers, and all petty officers in the navy, and all non-commissioned officers in the army or marines, shall be severally exchanged for persons of equal rank, or for two privates or common seamen; and private soldiers and common seamen shall be exchanged for each other, man for man.

"ART. 2. Local, state, civil, and militia rank held by persons not in actual military service will not be recognized, the basis of exchange being of a grade actually held in the naval and military service of the respective parties.

"ART. 3. If citizens held by either party on charge of disloyalty or any alleged civil offense are exchanged, it shall only be for citizens, captured sutlers, teamsters, and all civilians in the actual service of either party, to be exchanged for persons in similar position.

"ART. 4. All prisoners of war to be discharged on parole in ten days after their capture, and the prisoners now held and those hereafter taken to be transported to the points mutually agreed upon at the expense of the capturing party. The surplus prisoners not exchanged shall not be permitted to take up arms again, nor to serve as military police or constabulary force in any fort, garrison, or field-work held by either of the respective parties, nor as guards of prisoners, dépôts, or stores, nor to discharge any duty usually performed by soldiers, until exchanged under the provisions of this cartel. The exchange is not to be considered complete until the officer or soldier exchanged for has been actually restored to the lines to which he belongs.

"ART. 5. Each party, upon the discharge of prisoners of the other party, is authorized to discharge an equal number of their own officers or men from parole, furnishing at the same time to the other party a list of their prisoners discharged and of their own officers and men relieved from parole, enabling each party to relieve from parole such of their own officers and men as the party may choose. The lists thus mutually furnished will keep both parties advised of the true condition of the exchanges of prisoners.

"ART. 6. The stipulations and provisions above mentioned to be of binding obligation during the continuance of the war, it matters not which party may have the surplus of prisoners, the great principle involved being,

"1. An equitable exchange of prisoners, man for man, officer for officer, or officers of higher grade exchanged for officers of lower grade or for privates, according to the scale of equivalents.

"2. That privates and officers and men of different services may be exchanged according to the same rule of equivalents.

"3. That all prisoners, of whatsoever arm of service, are to be exchanged or paroled in ten days from the time of their capture, if it be practicable to transfer them to their own lines in that time; if not, as soon thereafter as practicable.

"4. That no officer, soldier, or employé in the service of either party is to be considered as exchanged and absolved from his parole until his equivalent has actually reached the line of his friends.

"5. That the parole forbids the performance of field, garrison, police, or guard or constabulary duty.

JOHN A. DIX, Major General.

"D. H. HILL, Major General C. S. Army"

Supplementary Articles.

"ART. 7. All prisoners of war now held on either side, and all prisoners hereafter taken, shall be sent with all reasonable dispatch to A. H. Aikens, below Dutch Gap, on the James River, in Virginia, or to Vicksburg, on the Mississippi River, in the State of Mississippi, and there exchanged, or paroled until such exchange can be effected, notice being previously given by each party of the number of prisoners it will send, and the time when they will be delivered at those points respectively; and in case the vicissitudes of war shall change the military relations of the places designated in this article to the contending parties, so as to render the same inconvenient for the delivery and exchange of prisoners, other places, bearing as nearly as may be the present local relations of said places to the lines of said parties, shall be, by mutual agreement, substituted. But nothing

The execution of William B. Mumford by order of General Butler at New Orleans; the measures taken by Federal generals to prevent private citizens not in the regular service of the Confederates from engaging in acts of war; the orders of General Pope for the impressment of property required for the use of his army in Virginia; and the action of Generals Hunter and Phelps in regard to slaves, led to a series of retaliatory orders from Richmond, issued partly for popular effect, but which were only partially executed. They contributed, however, to exaggerate the animosity of the war. Still the exchanges went on regularly at City Point during the year, and the excess of prisoners on either side was not sufficient to occasion apprehension as to the good faith of the other.

But, in the mean time, President Lincoln had issued his Emancipation Proclamation, and measures had been taken by the United States government for the employment of negroes in its military service. These measures produced consternation and fear in the minds of the Southern people. President Davis, in his message (January 14, 1863), declared his determination to deliver over to the state authorities all commissioned officers of the United States thereafter captured in any of the states embraced in the Emancipation Proclamation, to be punished as criminals engaged in exciting servile insurrection. This determination was supported by the Confederate Congress.[1]

The cartel remained in operation until July, 1863. On the third of that month, an order was issued by the Adjutant General at Washington requiring all prisoners to be delivered at City Point and Vicksburg, there to be exchanged, or paroled until exchange could be effected. The only exception allowed was in the case of the two opposing commanders, who were authorized to exchange prisoners or to release them on parole at other points agreed upon. This order was issued to prevent unauthorized paroles, and in order that the balance of exchanges might be accurately kept. The very next day General Lee was defeated at Gettysburg, and released a number of prisoners which he was unable to take with him into Virginia. He therefore paroled them, and the parole was not recognized by the United States, as it had not been made in strict accordance with the cartel, nor by the mutual agreement of the opposing commanders. At the same time, a large number of Confederate prisoners fell into the hands of the Federals by the captures of Vicksburg and Port Hudson. These were paroled by mutual agreement between the Federal and Confederate commanders. The Confederate government, without any plausible reason, declared these prisoners released from their parole, and thousands of them fought under Bragg in the battles about Chattanooga in November. But this violation of good faith did not permanently interrupt the exchange of prisoners.

The real difficulty, however, soon presented itself in the refusal of the Confederate government to recognize negro soldiers captured as prisoners of war. That government refused to exchange negro prisoners or the commissioned officers of negro regiments. The United States could not honorably make any distinction between its soldiers on the ground of color. When, therefore, the Confederate government adopted the policy of reducing to slavery all negro prisoners, and of delivering over to the state governments for punishment the commissioned officers of negro regiments, President Lincoln issued a proclamation ordering that for every national soldier killed a Confederate soldier should be executed, and for every negro in the national service sold into slavery, a Confederate prisoner should be placed at hard labor on the public works.[1] This proclamation prevented the Confederate government from carrying out its inhuman policy; but it persisted in refusing to exchange negro prisoners. This refusal interrupted the execution of the cartel of exchange. At the close of 1863 there had been captured from the Confederates one hundred and fifty thousand prisoners, of whom about 30,000 remained in the hands of the government.

In 1864 the situation in regard to prisoners remained unchanged. The positions occupied by the two governments were so antagonistic that agreement was impossible. The national government refused to exchange white for white, because the enemy would thus be relieved of the burden of maintaining his white prisoners, and, getting back his soldiers, he would dispose of the negro as he chose, since there would be left no means of retaliation. Finally, the excess of prisoners in the hands of the government became so large that the discussion ceased. It was certainly the policy of the Confederate government to yield the point in dispute. The prisoners which it held, if returned, would not, in most cases, resume their places in the field, their terms of service having expired. The Confederate prisoners, on the other hand, were soldiers for the war, and could be made immediately available. Their presence in the field was, moreover, a necessity which became every day more pressing.

What it could not accomplish by negotiation the Confederate government sought to extort by cruelty. The prison camps at Belle Isle, Andersonville, Millen, and Salisbury were each transformed into human shambles. Thousands of men were huddled together within narrow limits. In the midst of a country abounding in timber, they were deprived of all means of shelter. Exposure to rains, dews, and frost generated disease, and there was neither medical relief at hand nor suitable food. No opportunities were afforded for cleanliness, and the prisoners were covered with vermin, which, in many cases, they were too weak to remove. They were shot by those guarding them for offenses the most trivial; they were plundered of every thing which was deemed valuable by their captors; supplies sent for their relief were in many cases appropriated by Confederate officers in charge; and the charities of Southern citizens excited in their behalf were repelled. Thousands died in those prison Golgothas, and many, from weakness induced by starvation, became idiots.[2] These barbarities were not only known to the Confederate authorities, but seem to have been encouraged by them. The officers placed over the prison appear to have been selected for their brutal capacity to carry out this system of cruelty. Among these was the notorious Captain Henry Wirz, the Anderson jailer, who was after the war tried by a military commission, and executed on the 10th of November, 1865.[3]

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in this article contained shall prevent the commanders of two opposing armies from exchanging prisoners or releasing them on parole at other points mutually agreed on by said commanders.

"ART. 8. For the purpose of carrying into effect the foregoing articles of agreement, each party will appoint two agents, to be called Agents for the Exchange of Prisoners of War, whose duty it shall be to communicate with each other by correspondence and otherwise, to prepare the list of prisoners, to attend to the delivery of the prisoners at the places agreed on, and to carry out promptly, effectually, and in good faith, all the details and provisions of the said articles of agreement.

"ART. 9. And in case any misunderstanding shall arise in regard to any clause or stipulation in the foregoing articles, it is mutually agreed that such misunderstanding shall not interrupt the release of prisoners on parole, as herein provided, but shall be made the subject of friendly explanations, in order that the object of this agreement may neither be defeated nor postponed.

"JOHN A. DIX, Major General.

"D. H. HILL, Major General C. S. A."

[1] The following joint resolutions were adopted by the Confederate Congress:

"*Resolved*, by the Congress of the Confederate States of America, in response to the message of the President, transmitted to Congress at the commencement of the present session, That, in the opinion of Congress, the commissioned officers of the enemy ought not to be delivered to the authorities of the respective states, as suggested in the said message; but all captives taken by the Confederate forces ought to be dealt with and disposed of by the Confederate government.

"*Sec.* 2. That, in the judgment of Congress, the proclamations of the President of the United States, dated respectively September 22d, 1862, and January 1st, 1863, and the other measures of the government of the United States and of its authorities, commanders, and forces, designed or tending to emancipate slaves in the Confederate States, or to abduct such slaves, or to incite them to insurrection, or to employ negroes in war against the Confederate States, or to overthrow the institution of African slavery and bring on a servile war in these states, would, if successful, produce atrocious consequences, and they are inconsistent with the spirit of those usages which in modern warfare prevail among civilized nations; they may, therefore, be properly and lawfully repressed by retaliation.

"*Sec.* 3. That in every case wherein, during the present war, any violation of the laws and usages of war among civilized nations shall be, or has been, done and perpetrated by those acting under the authority of the government of the United States, on the persons or property of the citizens of the Confederate States, or of those under the protection of the land or naval service of the Confederate States, or of any state of the Confederacy, the President of the Confederate States is hereby authorized to cause full and complete retaliation to be made for every such violation, in such manner and to such extent as he may think proper.

"*Sec.* 4. That every white person, being a commissioned officer, or acting as such, who, during the present war, shall command negroes or mulattoes in arms against the Confederate States, or who shall arm, train, organize, or prepare negroes or mulattoes for military service against the Confederate States, or who shall voluntarily aid negroes or mulattoes in any military enterprise, attack, or conflict in such service, shall be deemed as inciting servile insurrection, and shall, if captured, be put to death, or be otherwise punished at the discretion of the court.

"*Sec.* 5. Every person, being a commissioned officer, or acting as such in the service of the enemy, who shall, during the present war, excite, attempt to excite, or cause to be excited servile insurrection, or who shall incite or cause to be incited a slave to rebel, shall, if captured, be put to death, or be otherwise punished, at the discretion of the court.

"*Sec.* 6. Every person charged with an offense punishable under the preceding resolutions shall, during the present war, be tried before the military court attached to the army or corps by the troops of which he shall have been captured, or by such other military court as the President may direct, and in such manner and under such regulations as the President shall prescribe, and, after conviction, the President may commute the punishment in such manner and on such terms as he may deem proper.

"*Sec.* 7. All negroes or mulattoes who shall be engaged in war or be taken in arms against the Confederate States, or shall give aid or comfort to the enemies of the Confederate States, shall, when captured in the Confederate States, be delivered to the authorities of the state or states in which they shall be captured, to be dealt with according to the present or future laws of such state or states."

"Executive Mansion, Washington, July 30th.

[1] "It is the duty of every government to give protection to its citizens, of whatever class, color, or condition, and especially to those who are duly organized as soldiers in the public service. The law of nations, and the usages and customs of war, as carried on by civilized powers, permit no distinction as to color in the treatment of prisoners of war as public enemies. To sell or enslave any captured person on account of his color, and for no offense against the laws of war, is a relapse into barbarism and a crime against the civilization of the age. The government of the United States will give the same protection to all its soldiers; and if the enemy shall sell or enslave any one because of his color, the offense shall be punished by retaliation upon the enemy's prisoners in our hands.

"It is therefore ordered that for every soldier of the United States killed in violation of the laws of war, a rebel soldier shall be executed, and for every one enslaved by the enemy or sold into slavery, a rebel soldier shall be placed at hard labor on the public works, and continue at such labor until the other shall be released and receive the treatment due a prisoner of war.

"ABRAHAM LINCOLN."

[2] A letter of the Confederate Inspector General Chandler, dated July 5, 1864, and addressed to Colonel Chilton, of Richmond, thus describes Andersonville:

"No shelter whatever, nor materials for constructing any, had been provided by the prison authorities, and the ground being entirely bare of trees, none is within reach of the prisoners, nor has it been possible, from the overcrowded state of the inclosure, to arrange the camp with any system. Each man has been permitted to protect himself as best he can by stretching his blanket, or whatever he may have about him, on such sticks as he can procure. Of other shelter there has been none. There is no medical attendance within the stockade. Many (twenty yesterday) are carted out daily who have died from unknown causes, and whom the medical officers have never seen. The dead are hauled out daily by the wagon-load, being first mutilated with an axe in the removal of any finger-rings they may have. Raw rations have to be issued to a very large portion, who are entirely unprovided with proper utensils, and furnished with so limited a supply of fuel that they are compelled to dig with their hands in the filthy marsh before mentioned for roots, etc. No soap or clothing has ever been issued. After inquiry, the writer is confident that, with slight exertions, green corn and other antiscorbutics could readily be obtained. The present hospital arrangements were only intended for the accommodation of ten thousand men, and are totally insufficient, both in character and extent, for the present needs, the number of prisoners being now more than three times as great. The number of cases requiring medical treatment is in an increased ratio. It is impossible to state the numbers of sick, many dying within the stockade whom the medical officers have never seen or heard of till their remains are brought out for interment. The transportation of the post is also represented to be entirely insufficient, and authority is needed by the quartermaster to impress wagons and teams, and saw-mills when not employed by the government, and kept diligently occupied, and instructions given to the quartermaster in charge of transportation to afford every facility practicable for transporting lumber and supplies necessary for prisoners."

[3] The following testimony, given before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, January 30, 1865, by Albert D. Richardson, a *Tribune* correspondent, describes the situation of our prisoners at Salisbury, North Carolina:

"I am a *Tribune* correspondent, and was captured by the rebels May 3, 1863, at midnight, on a hay-bale in the Mississippi River, opposite Vicksburg. After confinement in six different prisons I was sent to Salisbury, N. C., February 3, 1864, and kept there until December 18, when I escaped. For several months Salisbury was the most endurable rebel prison I had seen. The six hundred inmates exercised in the open air were comparatively well fed and kindly treated. But early in October 10,000 regular prisoners of war arrived there, and it immediately changed into a scene of cruelty and horrors. It was densely crowded; rations were cut down and issued very irregularly; friends outside could not even send in a plate of food. The prisoners suffered constantly and often intensely for want of water, bread, and shelter. The rebel authorities placed all the prison hospitals under charge of my two journalistic comrades (Messrs. Brown and Davis) and myself. Our positions enabled us to obtain exact and minute information. Those who had to live or die on the prison rations always suffered from hunger. Very frequently one or more divisions of a thousand men would receive no rations for twenty-four hours; sometimes they were without a morsel of food for forty-eight hours. The few who had money would pay from five to twenty dollars, rebel currency, for a little loaf of bread. Most of the prisoners traded the buttons from their blowses for food. Many, though the weather was very inclement and snows frequent, sold coats from their backs and shoes from their feet. Yet I was assured, on authority entirely trustworthy, that the great commissary warehouse near the prison was filled with provisions; that the commissary found it difficult to obtain storage for his flour and meal; that when a subordinate asked the post commandant, Major John H. Gee, 'Shall I give the prisoners full rations?' he replied, 'No, God damn them, give them quarter rations.' I know, from personal observation, that



THE ANDERSONVILLE BURIAL-GROUNDS WHERE WERE INTERRED 14,000 UNION PRISONERS.

In the latter part of 1864, Lieutenant General Grant made an arrangement for an exchange of prisoners man for man, according to the old cartel, until on one side or the other the number of prisoners held was exhausted. The war seemed so near its close that the exchange could afford no substantial aid to the Confederacy, and every motive on the score of humanity demanded that the government, under these circumstances, should waive the old dispute respecting negro prisoners.[1]

During the last few months of the war, when the prospects of Confederate success through regularly conducted warfare seemed desperate, a series of attempts were made to paralyze and subvert the national government by means which desperation naturally suggested to bold and unscrupulous men. The capture of the Confederate archives at the close of the war disclosed letters which showed that propositions for the destruction of officers connected with the government had not only, at various stages of the war, been received by the Confederate executive, but had been subjects of consideration. As early as June 19th, 1861, one C. L. V. De Kalb, representing himself to be the grandson of Baron De Kalb, of Revolutionary fame, addressed a letter to L. P. Walker, the Confederate Secretary of War, reminding the latter that the Federal Congress would assemble on the 4th of July, and that the Capitol and public buildings at Washington were undermined. In regard to this matter, he begged "the honor of a few moments' private audience." The letter is indorsed "About blowing up the Capitol at Washington." Another letter, dated the next day, was also found, from which it appears that De Kalb had been granted an audience on the 19th, but that Walker had hesitated to consent to the diabolical scheme proposed, not on account of its nature, but because De Kalb was a stranger to him. In this letter of the 20th De Kalb discloses his antecedents, his relation to Baron De Kalb, his service in the Crimean War as second lieutenant of Engineers, his arrival at Quebec in November, 1860, and at Washington three weeks ago. "Does the Southern Confederacy," he adds, "consider the explosion of the Federal Capitol, at a time when Abe, his myrmidons, and the Northern Congress members are all assembled together, of sufficient importance as to grant me, in case of success, a commission as colonel of Topographical Engineers, and the sum of one million of dollars?" Walker, instead of spurning the proposition, indorsed the letter with the following phrase: "See this man with Benjamin." He proposed to make the matter a subject of consideration at an interview between himself, this murderous villain, and the Confederate Secretary of State. In the Confederate archives was also found a letter addressed to Jefferson Davis, September 12th, 1861, by J. S. Parramore, in which the writer offers "to dispose of the leading characters of the North," and upon the letter was Davis's indorsement indicating the object of the communication, and referring it to the Secretary of War. After due consideration, both De Kalb's and Parramore's schemes appear to have been rejected as unadvisable.

On the 17th of August, 1863, we find another letter written to Davis by H. C. Dunham, of Georgia, a volunteer in the Confederate service, in which the writer states that the evidences of Davis's Christian humility encourage him to propose the organization of from 300 to 500 men, "to go into the United States, and assassinate the most prominent leaders of our enemies—for instance, Seward, Lincoln, Greeley, Prentice, etc." This communication was also referred to the Secretary of War.

Still later, Lieutenant W. Alston, in November, 1864, offered to rid the Confederacy "of some of her deadliest enemies," and his communication is referred to the Confederate Secretary of War. These various propositions for the assassination of the prominent officers of the Federal government appear to have been considered and rejected for prudential reasons. The time for such desperate measures had not yet arrived. But still they were matters of deliberate consideration.

Other schemes also were proposed. In February, 1865, W. S. Oldham, of Texas, in company with Senator Johnson, of Missouri, conferred with Davis "in relation to the prospect of annoying and harassing the enemy by burning their shipping, towns, etc." The Confederate President interposed objections as to the practicability of the scheme proposed. These objections were subsequently rebutted by Oldham. "I have seen enough," says the latter, "of the effects that can be produced to satisfy me that in most cases, without any danger to the parties engaged, and in others but very slight, we can, first, burn every vessel that leaves a foreign port for the United States; second, we can burn every transport that leaves the harbor of New York, or other Northern port, with supplies for the armies of the enemy in the South; third, burn every transport or gun-boat on the Mississippi River, as well as devastate the country of the enemy, and fill his people with terror and consternation. I am not alone of this opinion, but many other gentlemen are as fully and thoroughly impressed with the conviction as I am. I believe we have the means at our command, if promptly appropriated and energetically applied, to demoralize the Northern people in a very short time. For the purpose of satisfying your mind upon the subject, I respectfully but earnestly request that you will have an interview with General Harris, formerly a member of Congress from Missouri, who, I think, is able, from conclusive proof, to convince you that what I have suggested is perfectly feasible and practicable." Davis requested the Secretary of War to confer with Harris, "and learn what plan he has for overcoming the difficulty heretofore experienced."

What was the "difficulty heretofore experienced?" A number of Confederates—George N. Sanders, Beverly Tucker, Jacob Thompson, William C. Cleary, and Clement C. Clay—had been sent to Canada as agents of the Confederate government. Jacob Thompson appears to have been the treasurer of this special organization, the objects of which were the terror and consternation of the North through the destruction of shipping, the burning of hotels, the introduction of pestilence, and the assassination of the prominent officers of the national government. In the latter part of 1864 the attempt at arson had been tried without success, and the principals engaged were executed. John Y. Beall, detected in the act of destroying Federal vessels in the Northwest, was tried and condemned as a spy, and suffered death. One Kennedy, on the night of November 25th, 1864, with his confederates, attempted to set fire to four hotels in New York City. The attempt did not succeed, but Kennedy was apprehended and hung on the 19th of October. Three days later, Lieutenant Bennet H. Young, with from 30 to 40 Confederate associates, made a raid upon St. Albans, Vermont, 15 miles from the Canadian border. Over $200,000 was captured from the banks, horses were seized, and several citizens were wantonly murdered. An unsuccessful attempt was also made to fire the town. The raiders were pursued, but escaped into Canada. Here they were arrested and brought before the Court of Quarter Sessions at Montreal. The judge, Mr. Coursol, released them from custody on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the case. Judge Coursol was afterward suspended for this action, and the raiders were rearrested, but the prisoners finally were again released without punishment.

These expeditions all originated in Canada, and proceeded under Confed-

corn and pork are very abundant in the region about Salisbury. For several weeks the prisoners had no shelter whatever. They were all thinly clad; thousands were barefooted; not one in twenty had either overcoat or blanket; many hundreds were without shirts, and hundreds were without blowses. At last one Sibley tent and one 'A' tent were furnished to each squad of one hundred. With the closest crowding these sheltered about one half the prisoners. The rest burrowed in the ground, crept under buildings, or shivered through the nights in the open air upon the frozen, muddy, or snowy soil. If the rebels, at the time of their capture, had not stolen their shelter-tents, blankets, clothing, and money, they would have suffered little from cold. If the prison authorities had permitted a few hundred of them, either upon parole or under guard, to cut logs within two miles of the garrison, the prisoners would gladly have built comfortable and ample barracks in one week. But the commandant would never, in a densely wooded region, with the cars which brought it passing by the wall of the prison, even furnish half the fuel which was needed.

"The hospitals were in a horrible condition. By crowding the patients thick as they could lie upon the floor they would contain six hundred inmates. They were always full to overflowing, with thousands seeking admission in vain. In the two largest wards, containing jointly about two hundred and fifty patients, there was no fire whatever. The others had small fireplaces, but were always cold. One ward, which held forty patients, was comparatively well furnished. In the other eight the sick and dying men lay upon the cold and usually naked floor, for the scanty straw furnished us soon became too filthy and full of vermin for use. The authorities never supplied a single blanket, or quilt, or pillow, or bed, for those eight wards. We could not procure even brooms to keep them clean, or cold water to wash the faces of the inmates. Pneumonia, catarrh, and diarrhœa were the prevailing diseases, but they were directly the result of hunger and exposure. More than half who entered the hospitals died in a very few days. The deceased, always without coffins, were loaded in a dead-cart, piled upon each other like logs of wood, and so driven out to be thrown into a trench and covered with earth.

"The rebel surgeons were generally humane and attentive. They endeavored to improve the shocking condition of the hospitals, but the Salisbury and Richmond authorities both disregarded their complaints and protests.

"On November 25 many of the prisoners had been without food for forty-eight hours. Desperate from hunger, without any matured plan, a few of them said, 'We may as well die in one way as another; let us break out of this horrible place.' Some of them wrested the guns from a relief of fifteen rebel soldiers just entering the yard, killing two who resisted and wounding five or six. Others attempted to open the fence, but they had neither adequate tools nor concert of action. Before they could effect a breach every gun in the garrison was turned upon them, two field-pieces operated with grape and canister, and they dispersed to their quarters. Five minutes from the beginning the attempt was quelled, and hardly a prisoner was to be seen in the yard. My own quarters were a hundred and fifty yards from the scene of the insurrection. In our vicinity there had been no participation at all in it, and yet for twenty minutes after it was ended the guards upon the fence on each side of us, with deliberate aim, fired into the tents upon helpless and innocent men. They killed, in all, fifteen, and wounded about sixty, not one tenth of whom had taken part in the attempt, many of whom were ignorant of it until they heard the guns.

"Deliberate cold-blooded murders of peaceable men, where there was no pretense that they were breaking any prison regulation, were very frequent. On October 16, Lieutenant Davis, of the 155th New York Infantry, was thus shot dead by a guard, who the day before had been openly swearing that he would 'kill some damned Yankee yet.' November 6, Luther Conrod, of the 45th Pennsylvania Infantry, a delirious patient from one of the hospitals, was similarly murdered. November 30, a chimney in one of the hospitals fell down, crushing several men under it. Orders were immediately given to the guard to let no one approach the building, on the pretext that there might be another insurrection. Two patients from that hospital had not heard the order, and were returning to their quarters, when I saw a sentinel on the fence, within twenty feet of them, without challenging them, raise his piece and fire, killing one and wounding the other. Major Gee, at the time, was standing immediately beside the sentinel, who must have acted under his direct orders. December 16, Moses Smith, of 7th Maryland (colored) Infantry, while standing beside my quarters, searching for scraps of food from the sweepings of the cook-house, was shot through the head. There were very many similar murders. I never knew any pretense, even, made of investigation or punishing them. Our lives were never safe for one moment; any sentinel, at any hour of the day or night, could deliberately shoot down any prisoner, or into any group of prisoners, black or white, and he would not even be taken off his post for it.

"Nearly every week an officer came into the prison to recruit for the rebel army. Sometimes he offered bounties; always he promised good clothing and abundant food. Between 1200 and 1800 of our men enlisted in two months. I was repeatedly asked by prisoners, sometimes with tears in their eyes, 'What shall I do? I don't want to starve to death. I am growing weaker daily; if I stay here I shall follow my comrades to the hospital and dead-house; if I enlist I may live until I can escape.'

"I had charge of the clothing left by the dead, and reissued it to the living. I distributed articles of clothing to more than 2000 prisoners; but when I escaped there were fully 500 without a shoe or a stocking, and more yet with no garment above the waist except one blouse or one shirt. Men came to me frequently upon whom the rebels, when they captured them, had left nothing whatever except a light cotton shirt and a pair of light ragged cotton pantaloons.

"The books of all the hospitals were kept, and the daily consolidated reports made up, under my supervision. During the two months between October 18 and December 18, the average number of prisoners was about 7500. The deaths for that period were fully 1500, or twenty per cent. of the whole. I brought away the names of more than 1200 of the dead; some of the remainder were never reported; the others I could not procure on the day of my escape without exciting suspicion. As the men grew more and more debilitated, the percentage of deaths increased. I left 6500 remaining in the garrison, December 18, and they were dying then at the average rate of 28 a day, or thirteen per cent. a month.

"The simple truth is, that the rebel authorities are murdering our soldiers at Salisbury by cold and hunger, while they might easily supply them with ample food and fuel. They are doing this systematically, and, I believe, intentionally, for the purpose of either forcing our government to an exchange, or forcing our prisoners into the rebel army."

[1] General Grant's testimony (February 11, 1865) before the Committee on the Conduct of the War fully answers the charge which has been made against the government that it refused to consent to an exchange of prisoners because we found ours starved, diseased, and unserviceable when we received them. "There never," testifies General Grant, "has been any such reason as that for making exchanges. I will confess that if our men who are prisoners in the South were really well taken care of, suffering nothing except a little privation of liberty, then, in a military point of view, it would not be good policy for us to exchange, because every man they get back is forced right into the army at once, while that is not the case with our prisoners when we receive them. In fact, the half of our returned prisoners will never go into the army again, and none of them will until after they have had a furlough of thirty or sixty days. Still, the fact of their suffering as they do is a reason for making this exchange as rapidly as possible. . . . . Exchanges having been suspended by reason of disagreement on the part of agents of exchange on both sides before I came in command of the armies of the United States, and it then being near the opening of the spring campaign, I did not deem it advisable or just to the men who had to fight our battles to re-enforce the enemy with thirty or forty thousand disciplined troops at that time. An immediate resumption of exchanges would have had that effect, without giving us corresponding benefits. The suffering said to exist among our prisoners South was a powerful argument against the course pursued, and I so felt it."

erate authority. None of them had succeeded in accomplishing what they had attempted. Some difficulties had been experienced, and the Confederate government was now considering how these difficulties might be overcome. Soon, however, other and more desperate plans were found necessary. The old scheme of assassination, formerly laid aside, was reconsidered. Ready agents were found for its accomplishment. President Lincoln was murdered, but the conspirators did not succeed in subverting the government.

The war carried on by sea against the United States by the Confederates presents many novel features. Over 200 of the officers registered in 1864 as belonging to the Confederate navy were formerly United States naval officers. Although President Davis at the outset had issued letters of marque, a Confederate navy was impossible. There were many iron-clads and rams on the Southern rivers; the defenses of the Southern harbors by means of forts, ships, torpedoes, and obstructions were very formidable; but upon the sea the Confederacy had no chance, in so far as it depended upon its own resources. But what the Confederates lacked the people of Great Britain furnished, and thus it happened that while the United States was threatened with dissolution by intestine civil war, it was compelled also, at the same time, to contend on the ocean against a British fleet—British in every sense except that it did not receive its commissions from the English government—built at Liverpool and Glasgow, sailing from those ports by the connivance of the British government, armed with British guns, and manned, for the most part, with British crews.

In the early part of the war a number of strictly Confederate privateers were fitted out. Most of these, however, did not venture far from the coast. The Sumter and Nashville, who were bolder, had a short career, which has already been traced in these pages. The only vessels which materially injured the commerce of the United States were those built in British ports, and some of which were never in a port belonging to the Confederacy.

The history of the Alabama and the Florida has already been given. In 1864, three new British vessels—the Tallahassee, Olustee, and Chickamauga—were furnished to the Confederates by the British ship-builders, and contributed each its full share in the work of destruction and plunder. By their depredations American merchantmen were almost entirely driven from the seas.

The Georgia commenced her career in 1863. She was built at Glasgow, and left Greenock as the Japan. Off the French coast she received her armament and set out upon her cruise. After a short raid upon our commerce she was sold to a Liverpool merchant. Setting out again for Lisbon, she was captured twenty miles out from that port by Captain Craven, of the Niagara, who landed her crew at Dover, in England.

Early in 1865 two new vessels—the Stonewall and Shenandoah—were added to this British tribe of corsairs. The iron-clad ram Stonewall, Captain Page, was originally built for the Danish government, and afterward purchased by the Confederates. She arrived at Ferrol, in Spain, February 4th, closely followed by the United States steamers Niagara and Sacramento. The Stonewall shifted quarters to Lisbon in March, and the Federal vessels again followed her. The Portuguese government ordered the privateer to leave, and by maritime law the national vessels were required to remain for 24 hours before entering upon the pursuit. While changing their anchorage in the Tagus, these vessels were fired upon from Belem Tower under the supposition that they were about to leave the port. No injury was done, and ample apology was rendered by the Portuguese government. On the 11th of May the Stonewall arrived at Havana. Here she was closely blockaded by Admiral Godon, with several iron-clads, and soon surrendered herself to the Spanish authorities, by whom she was given over to the United States.

The Shenandoah was built at Glasgow in 1863, and was called the Sea King. In September, 1864, she was sold to Richard Wright, of Liverpool, and thus passed into the hands of the Confederacy. She cleared at London for Bombay ostensibly as a merchant vessel. On the same day that she left London, another vessel, the Laurel, left Liverpool with armament, stores, Confederate officers, and several men enlisted in the Confederate service. At Madeira the two vessels met; the Laurel fitted out the Sea King, which then became the Shenandoah, and set forth on her piratical cruise. She destroyed a few vessels in the neighborhood of St. Helena, and on February 8th, 1865, sailed for the North Pacific from Melbourne, Australia. Between April 1st and July 1st she destroyed or bonded 29 vessels, thus breaking up the whaling season in that locality. Waddell, her captain, although aware of the surrender of the Confederate armies, continued his cruise until four months after the fall of Richmond. He then returned to England, never having been in a Confederate port, and surrendered his vessel to the English government, and by the latter was given up to the American consul at Liverpool.

It is estimated that during the war 30 vessels of all descriptions were employed by the enemy as privateers. Only seven of these were very formidable, and of these seven five were British vessels. 275 vessels were captured, comprising four steamers, 78 ships, 43 brigs, 82 barks, and 68 schooners. On the other hand, 1143 vessels were captured by blockading squadrons, valued at $24,500,000, and 355 destroyed, worth about $7,000,000.[1]

In regard to one at least of the privateers issuing from British ports, the circumstances appeared to justify the United States in claiming redress by way of compensation for the injurious consequences to American commerce. This was the case of the Alabama. The facts of the case were briefly these: The Oreto had already been permitted to sail from a British port, notwithstanding the protest of Mr. Francis Adams, the United States minister in England. Afterward Mr. Adams and the American consul at Liverpool were satisfied, upon competent evidence, that a vessel known as the 290 had been built for the Confederate service in the dock-yard of persons, one of whom was then sitting as a member of the House of Commons. This evidence was laid before the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, but the latter decided that nothing had yet transpired which appeared to demand a special report. Farther evidence was procured and submitted, which, in the opinion of the queen's solicitor, was sufficient to justify the Liverpool collector in seizing the vessel. But, while the Lords Commissioners were deliberating upon the matter, the 290 sailed from Liverpool without register or clearance. Earl Russell explained to Mr. Adams that the delay in determining upon the case had been caused by the sudden illness of Sir John D. Harding, the Queen's Advocate.

It was apparent, therefore, that the fault, with its responsibility, rested upon the British government. Mr. Adams was therefore directed "to solicit redress for the national and private injuries already thus sustained, as well as a more effective prevention of any repetition of such lawless and injurious proceedings in her majesty's ports hereafter." Earl Russell replied to this demand that her majesty's government could not admit that they were under any obligation to render compensation to United States citizens for the depredations of the Alabama. There has since been a voluminous correspondence upon the subject, but the matter still stands just where it stood in 1863. Certainly it is a case in which the interests of the British government are more jeopardized by its refusal to grant compensation than its treasury could suffer by payment; and it is equally true that the United States government can well afford to waive its claim, and let the whole matter rest just as it lies.

The foreign complications with the French government arising out of the ill-advised Mexican expedition, and which at one period of the war threatened serious danger to the United States, were, soon after the suspension of hostilities, removed by the withdrawal of the French troops from Mexico. From that moment the Mexican empire which had been established rapidly waned until early in 1867, when it fell, and the Emperor Maximilian became a martyr to the cause of imperialism, which he had fought out to the bitter end.

At the close of the civil war our political sky was bright with promise. The defeated Confederates seemed disposed to accept the situation in good faith, and, on the other hand, the victorious party exhibited signs of still noble magnanimity. It is true that there were in the South those who still retained the spirit which had brought on the war. Such a one was that old man Edmund Ruffin, of South Carolina, who fired the first gun against his country's flag, and who, when the national triumph was fully consummated, committed suicide. So also, on the other side, there were those who nursed a vindictive spirit against a conquered people. But, notwithstanding these exceptions, a glorious future seemed about to dawn upon the republic. How this situation was changed, and a political strife engendered which agitated the country for a series of years, and postponed the restoration and harmony which ought to have followed immediately upon the close of the war, will form the subject of the concluding chapter of this history.

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[1] The number of vessels captured and sent to the United States Admiralty Courts for adjudication from May 1, 1861, to the close of the war, was 1143, of which there were—steamers, 210; schooners, 569; sloops, 139; ships, 13; brigs and brigantines, 29; barks, 25; yachts, 2; small boats, 139; rams and iron-clads, 6; gun-boats, torpedo-boats, and armed schooners and sloops, 10; class unknown, 7—making a total of 1149. The number of vessels burned, wrecked, sunk, and otherwise destroyed during the same time were—steamers, 85; schooners, 114; sloops, 32; ships, 2; brigs, 2; barks, 4; small boats, 96; rams, 5; iron-clads, 4; gun-boats, torpedo-boats, and armed schooners and sloops, 11; total, 355—making the whole number of vessels captured and destroyed 1504. During the war of 1812, the naval vessels, of which there were 301 in service at the close, made 291 captures. There were 517 commissioned privateers, and their captures numbered 1428. Nearly all the captures of value in the recent war were vessels built in so-called neutral ports, and fitted out and freighted for the purpose of running the blockade. The gross proceeds of property captured since the blockade was instituted, and condemned as prize prior to the 1st of November, 1865, amount to $21,829,543 96; costs and expenses, $1,616,223 96; net proceeds for distribution, $20,501,927 69. At the close of the year there were a number of important cases still before the courts, which will largely increase these amounts. The Secretary of the Navy estimates that the value of the 1143 captured vessels will not be less than $24,500,000, and of the 355 vessels destroyed at least $7,000,000, making a total valuation of not less than $31,500,000, much of which was British property.—*American Cyclopædia*, 1865.