

latter movement was adopted. The result was successful. On the 19th of February Fort Anderson was abandoned, and the enemy retreated behind Town Creek, where he again intrenched. Terry meanwhile occupied the force on the peninsula. The next day, the 20th, General Cox crossed Town Creek, gained the enemy's flank, attacked and routed him, taking two guns and 375 prisoners. Cox continued his advance, and threatened to cross the Cape Fear above Wilmington. General Hoke then gave up the struggle, set fire to his steamers, cotton, and other stores, and abandoned Wilmington on the night of the 21st. The next morning Cox entered the town without opposition. In these operations the Federal loss was very slight, amounting to about 200 in killed and wounded. That of the enemy is estimated at 1000 men, besides 30 guns. Goldsborough was occupied by General Schofield on the 21st of March, where he effected a junction with Sherman's army.



FORT SUMTER.

CHAPTER LIII.

RECOVERY OF THE ATLANTIC COAST.

II. CHARLESTON.

Defenses of Charleston.—Its Approaches.—The Department of the South.—Hunter's Operations against Charleston.—Federal Repulse at Secessionville, May, 1862.—Attack on the Blockading Fleet by the Palmetto State and Chicora.—Beauregard's *Ruse de Guerre*.—Admiral Dupont's Bombardment, April, 1863.—The Obstructions in the Harbor defeat the Undertaking.—Results of the Bombardment.—Sinking of the Keokuk.—How the Monitors came out of the Fight.—Dupont succeeded by Dahlgren, and Hunter by Gillmore.—The Situation when Gillmore assumed Command.—Capture of Morris's Island.—Terry's co-operative Movement on James's Island.—The First Assault on Fort Wagner.—Second Assault.—Death of Strong and Shaw.—Siege of the Fort.—Operations of the Fleet.—The "Swamp Angel."—Correspondence between Gillmore and Beauregard.—Demolition of Fort Sumter.—Dahlgren's Error in not immediately advancing upon Charleston.—Fort Johnson strengthened by the Confederates during the delay.—Confederate Evacuation of Forts Wagner and Gregg.—Williams's Night Attack on Fort Sumter.—Result of the Conquest of Morris's Island.—General Foster's Operations in 1865.—He is relieved by Gillmore.—Charleston is turned by Sherman's Movement.—Capture of the City by Gillmore.—Raising of the old Flag over Fort Sumter.

FORT Sumter was captured by the Confederates on the 13th of April, 1861. The defenses of Charleston at that time consisted of the following works, which had been constructed by the United States government:

1. Fort Sumter, a strong casemated brick work of five faces, with three tiers of guns, two in embrasure and one *en barbette*. This fort is distant a little more than three miles from the city, and is on the south side of the channel, about midway between Morris's Island on the south, and Sullivan's Island on the north. Its full armament would comprise 135 guns. At the time of its capture by the Confederates the fort mounted 78 guns.
2. Fort Moultrie, 1700 yards from Fort Sumter, on Sullivan's Island. This also is a brick work, with one tier of guns *en barbette*. In 1860 it mounted 52 guns.
3. Castle Pinckney, a brick work on Shute's Folly Island, distant one mile east of the lower end of the city, and mounting, at the beginning of the war, 28 guns.

The city of Charleston is situated at the head of Charleston Harbor, on the point of the narrow peninsula formed by Ashley and Cooper Rivers. Across the entrance of the harbor—between Sullivan's and Morris's Islands—stretches a bar, seven miles below the city. The islands on either side are each about three and a half miles in length, low, narrow, and sandy, and separated from the main land by deep and impenetrable marshes, which are submerged by the spring tides. The distance from their nearest point to Charleston is between three and four miles. Charleston Harbor itself is bounded by James's Island on the south, and on the north by the main land. Its entrance is 2700 yards in width. James's Island, south of the city, is limited on the west by Stono River, which separates it from John's Island. Stono River is connected with the Ashley, south of Charleston, by Wappoo Creek. South of James's Island is Cole's Island, which is for the most part marsh, with Folly River on the south separating it from Folly Island. Light-house Inlet, at its mouth, separates Morris's and Folly Islands. The formation of all these islands is thin quartz sand.

The fortifications of Charleston at the opening of the war were only adapted to resist a naval attack. To these, other works were rapidly added. On Sullivan's Island were erected, in addition to Fort Moultrie, the following works: Marion, Beauregard, Marshall, and Battery Bee. On Morris's

Island a battery had been constructed at Cummings's Point, and a mile farther south Fort Wagner. Forts Sumter and Moultrie were strengthened, and their armament increased. Old Fort Johnson, on James's Island, was rebuilt and armed with heavy guns, and north of it was constructed Fort Ripley. The preparations against a land attack were formidable. On the James a line of works was built fronting Stone River, with Fort Pemberton near its northern extremity. An inclosed work on Cole's Island covered the Stono Inlet and harbor. Heavy guns were mounted on the wharves of Charleston, and in the rear of the city formidable works were erected. Such and so extensive were the defenses of Charleston under the command of the Confederate General Beauregard.

On the 15th of March, 1862, the Department of the South was created, embracing South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, and was assigned to General Hunter. Port Royal had been occupied by a military force under General T. W. Sherman and Dupont's squadron late in 1861. Edisto Island, farther north, was taken possession of by Sherman in February, 1862. The expeditionary force commanded by General Sherman in March became subject to General Hunter's control. During the month which followed, General Q. A. Gillmore captured Fort Pulaski.

In December, 1861, a Federal fleet of sixteen vessels, heavily laden with granite, was sunk on the bar in Charleston Harbor to obstruct the channel and obviate the necessity of a blockade. This operation excited a great degree of indignation on the part of foreign governments. The elements of nature expressed their dissent in a more quiet way, but with much more effect. In a few weeks the Ashley and Cooper Rivers made for themselves a new channel, better than the previous one.

Shortly after General Hunter assumed command of the Department of the South, operations were commenced against Charleston by way of Stono River and James's Island. The Confederates had made a great mistake in abandoning Cole's Island, which commanded the entrance of the Stono. Admiral Dupont, with three gun-boats—the Unadilla, Pembina, and Ottawa—entered the river on the 29th of May, 1862. At the approach of the gun-boats all the works of the enemy along the Stono up to the Wappoo were abandoned. Early in June Generals Hunter and Benham arrived with a considerable detachment of troops—too weak, however, for operations on James's Island, where the enemy was not only strongly intrenched from Secessionville to Fort Johnson, but had an easy and open communication with the rear, and could bring up re-enforcements at his pleasure. On the 16th of June an attack was made on Secessionville by General I. I. Stevens's and General H. G. Wright's divisions of General Benham's command—some 6000 strong—but was repulsed by the enemy, the Federal loss amounting to over 500 men.

After this action for nearly a year the operations against Charleston were suspended. The Charleston campaign from the beginning of 1863 till the close of the war may be treated under three heads:

I. Admiral Dupont's bombardment, April 7, 1863.


II. General Gillmore's operations on Morris's Island during the summer of 1863.

III. General Foster's and Gillmore's movements co-operative with Sherman's Carolina campaign, resulting in the occupation of Charleston, February 21, 1865.

I. Admiral Dupont's expedition was an experiment, in which the offensive and defensive power of monitors was to be put to the severest test. The original Monitor—whose name came to be applied to all iron-clads of similar construction—had been lost on her way to join Dupont's squadron (the South Atlantic) in the autumn of 1862.¹ The popular expectation as to the omnipotence of the monitors was extravagant and unfounded. The Merrimac had been beaten by the original Monitor, and the Nashville had been sunk by another vessel of the same class. Fort Pulaski had fallen, not before the gun-boats of Dupont's fleet, but from the effect of batteries on shore.² It is true, Dupont had at that time no monitors, but the presence of these could scarcely have affected the result. The monitors, however, had undergone a pretty fair trial in the attack on Fort McAllister. The only vessel of this class engaged in the assault was the Montauk. The result seemed to prove the invulnerability of the monitor, but its offensive power as

See Chapter XIII., p. 258.

² Gillmore's Operations against Charleston, p. 240.



CITY OF CHARLESTON.



SAMUEL F. DUPONT.

against forts was not so well established. A visible impression was made upon McAllister, but not of such a character as to destroy either its offensive or defensive power. It was still a question whether a large number of monitors might not do what one alone had failed to accomplish. Indeed, it was confidently expected that the monitor fleet which Dupont commanded in April, 1863, would batter down Fort Fisher and ride up to Charleston, while a military force about 10,000 strong, under General Hunter, would occupy and hold that city under the guns of the fleet.

Previous to the attack on Charleston an event occurred which showed the insufficiency of blockading vessels against rams. Early on the morning of January 29th, 1863, the *Princess Royal* was captured while attempting to pass through the blockading squadron into Charleston Harbor. Her cargo would have been of great value to the enemy, consisting of two engines intended for iron-clads, with rifled guns, arms, ammunition, and medicines. Her loss was a severe blow to the Confederates, who, ascertaining that she was still at anchor off the harbor, organized an expedition for her recapture. Before light on the morning of the 31st two Confederate iron-clad steam rams—the *Palmetto State*, commanded by Lieutenant Rutledge, and the *Chicora*, Commander Tucker—ran out by the main ship channel from Charleston, and attacked the blockading squadron with great vigor. The latter consisted of 10 vessels—the *Housatonic*, *Mercedita*, *Ottawa*, *Unadilla*,

Keystone State, *Quaker City*, *Memphis*, *Augusta*, *Stettin*, and *Flag*—most of them being light vessels, and incompetent to resist such an onslaught. The iron-clads and two of the heaviest men of war, the *Powhatan* and *Cannadaigua*, were off at Port Royal. The *Palmetto State*, with Flag-officer D. N. Ingraham on board, almost immediately disabled the *Mercedita* with a 7-inch shell, which entered her side, exploded in one of her boilers, and in its exit killed and wounded several men. One blow from the ram settled the case of this ship, which, as it seemed to be sinking, was surrendered. Both the *Palmetto* and *Chicora* then attacked the *Keystone State*. The latter bore down rapidly upon the *Palmetto*, intending to sink her. But a shot from the ram passed through both her steam chests; 10 rifle shells struck her near and below water mark, and almost simultaneously a fire broke out in her forehold. Commander Le Roy hauled down his flag. The enemy still continued to fire, and the flag was again hoisted and the battle renewed. The *Augusta*, *Memphis*, and *Quaker City* came up and relieved the suffering vessel, one fourth of whose crew had been killed or wounded. Together with the *Mercedita*, whose leak had been stopped and who had not been secured by the enemy, the *Keystone State* went to Port Royal. The other vessels of the squadron kept at a prudent distance from the rams. Soon, however, the *Housatonic* came up, and the rams, refusing battle, fled back into the harbor.



COMMERCE MEN ENGAGING THE SHIPBOARDING FLEET OF CHARLESTON.



DEPARTURE OF DEPOSIT'S EXPEDITION FROM BEAUFORT.



BOMBARDMENT OF FORT SUMTER.

Upon the return of his rams a bright idea occurred to Beauregard. He knew that the reports of Admiral Dupont could not reach the North for some three days at least. His own communication by telegraph with Richmond was uninterrupted, and the Richmond papers soon found their way to New York. Here, then, was a splendid opportunity for a *ruse de guerre*, which, if it involved considerable lying, might—so thought the chivalrous, honor-loving general—be excused on the maxim that “all is fair in war.” Accordingly, over his own signature and that of Flag-officer Ingraham, he dispatched to Richmond an official proclamation, stating that the Confederate naval force at Charleston had attacked the blockading fleet off the harbor, and had sunk, dispersed, and drove off the same, and declaring the blockade of Charleston to be raised from and after the 31st of January, 1863. This proclamation, with Beauregard’s account of the affair, asserting that, as a result of the naval engagement on the 31st, two Federal vessels were sunk, four set on fire, and the rest driven away, was published in the Richmond papers of February 2d. As if this were not enough in the way of falsification, another dispatch was added, declaring that on the afternoon of the 31st the British consul, on board the British war steamer *Petrel*, had gone five miles beyond the usual anchorage of the blockaders, and could see nothing of them with glasses.

Now, without characterizing these declarations by the plain English term that is applicable to them, it is sufficient to say that they are false in every particular. And they were recognized as false by every European government. The raid with the rams had not succeeded in the object for which it was undertaken—the recovery of the *Princess Royal*; they had retreated on the appearance of the *Housatonic*, and did not venture out again. Not a single Federal steamer was sunk, not one was burned, and only two were in any way disabled. The position of the blockading squadron was not shifted, and no vessel advanced from Charleston, after the affair, beyond the bar of the harbor.¹

By the 7th of April the preparations for the bombardment of Fort Sumter were completed. At noon of that day the vessels of Dupont’s fleet, having crossed the bar by the new channel formed since the sinking of the stone fleet, proceeded to the attack. The attacking fleet consisted of nine vessels, all of which were monitors except the *New Ironsides* and *Keokuk*, which were iron-clad and turreted. The five strongest vessels of the blockading squadron were held in reserve.² The orders issued by the admiral were that the fleet should pass up the main ship channel, open fire upon Fort Sumter when within range of that work, disregarding the batteries on Morris’s Island, advance to a position northwest of Sumter in order to attack its weakest face, fire upon the work with precision rather than rapidity, and, having reduced the fort, turn against the Morris’s Island batteries. The advance had been delayed till noon, waiting for the tide, and from the fleet, in the mean while, could be seen the steeples and roofs of Charleston crowded with spectators, just as they had been two years before, when Fort Sumter was attacked by its present defender. It is a novel conflict whose spectacle is now anxiously awaited—that of a fleet mounting 32 guns arrayed against forts which mount 300. The forts know little of the monitors, but stand defiant. The monitors know little of the forts, or the obstructions to their progress, but defiantly they advance.

The reserve fleet lies outside the bar, while the monitors approach Sumter. The *Weehawken* has the lead, and as she advances, a raft attached to her prow looks out for torpedoes. Scarcely has she started, however, before the grappling irons attached to this raft become fouled in the anchor cable, and an hour’s delay is occasioned. Then the movement is resumed. The entire fleet passes Morris’s Island, but no gun opens upon her. Now (3 P.M.) she rounds to enter the harbor, and comes within range of Fort Sumter and the batteries on Sullivan’s Island. A broadside from the upper tier of guns (*en barbette*) greets the *Weehawken*, who is seeking, according to orders, to reach the left face of the fort. Suddenly she halts midway between Sumter and Moultrie. Her progress has been stopped by an unforeseen obstacle—a stout hawser stretches between the two forts, strung with torpedoes. The fleet has been proceeding along the right channel thus far, and, meeting this obstruction in the way of reaching its desired position, it changes its course,

and tries the left channel, between Fort Sumter and Cummings’s Point. This also is blockaded, and more effectually than the other, by a row of piles stretching across the channel. Beyond is seen another row extending between Forts Johnson and Ripley, and more careful scrutiny discloses a third row, beyond which lie three Confederate rams.

Thus the original design of reaching Fort Sumter’s weakest face is frustrated at the outset. And there is no help for it. The fort could probably be reduced but for these obstructions which cover its weakness: the obstructions might be removed but for the thundering guns of the fort.

To make matters worse, the *New Ironsides*—the flag-ship—caught by the tide, refuses to obey her rudder, and becomes unmanageable. The *Catskill* and the *Nantucket* fall foul of her, and thus remain a full quarter of an hour. While, in the midst of these difficulties, the vessels are taking such positions as they can gain, they are in a circle of fire, which concentrates upon them from Cummings’s Point Battery, Battery Bee, and Forts Beauregard, Moultrie, and Sumter. The range is less than 800 yards, and the fire is from guns of the heaviest calibre that could be obtained from the Tredegar works of Richmond or from the armories of Europe. This fire has been going on from the time of its first opening by Sumter; but now for thirty minutes it pours upon the fleet the white heat of its fury. One hundred and sixty shots are counted in a single minute; they strike the iron plates of the monitors as rapidly as the ticking of a watch. It is estimated that from all the forts, in this brief engagement, not less than 3500 rounds have been fired. In reply, only 139 shots have been delivered by the fleet.

And what is the result to the fort? What to the fleet? A few marks are visible on Fort Sumter, and the parapet near the eastern angle shows a huge crater.³ If the monitors could remain where they are, time would solve the problem of the reduction of the fort. But they can not. Apart from the embarrassments under which they are working as regards effective offense—their confined space; their tendency to drift against the obstructions or upon submerged batteries; and the clouds of smoke which hang over the water, obscuring their range—they have sustained injuries which compel their withdrawal, and at 5 P.M. the signal is given for their retreat. Already the *Keokuk*, which advanced to within 570 yards of Fort Sumter, has left the field in a sinking condition, having been completely riddled with shots. It is her last fight. The *Ironsides* also has lost one of her port-shutters, her gun-deck is thus exposed, and her bows have been penetrated with red-hot shot. But these are not monitors. How is it with the latter? The *Nahant* has received thirty wounds, her turret has been jammed so that it will not turn, and her pilot-house is in such a rickety condition that every bolt in it flies about when it is struck, killing and wounding its tenants. The turret of the *Passaic* is broken and unmanageable. The *Nantucket*’s turret is jarred so that the cover of the port can not be opened, and consequently her 15-inch gun can not be used. The other four monitors are essentially uninjured.³

After the withdrawal of the fleet, Admiral Dupont having been informed as to the conditions of his vessels, decided not to renew the conflict, and the next day returned to Port Royal. The *Keokuk* sank on the morning of the 8th abreast of Morris’s Island, and her armament was thus left in the hands of the enemy. In the action of the 7th only one man was mortally wounded. The entire casualties were twenty-six.

Within the short space of about two hours had been decided the question of monitors against forts. The result was decisive on two points: first, that the defensive powers of these vessels was not sufficient to withstand the concentrated fire of half a dozen forts heavily armed; and, secondly, that while the reduction of brick forts might result from a long-continued bombardment, yet the limits of endurance on the part of the monitors were such as to render this impracticable.³

II. The War Department was not satisfied with the result of the experiment, and determined to renew the attack, but upon a somewhat different plan. Admiral Dupont was relieved of the command, and would have been succeeded by Admiral Foote but for the death of the latter on the way to Port Royal. The command of the South Atlantic squadron was therefore, on the

¹ Mr. William Swinton gives the following graphic description of the inside of a monitor during the engagement:

“Could you look through the smoke, and through the flame-lit ports, into one of those revolving towers, a spectacle would meet your eye such as Vulcan’s stithy might present. Here are the two huge guns which form the armament of each monitor—the one eleven, and the other fifteen inches in diameter of bore. The gunners, begrimed with powder and stripped to the waist, are loading the gun. The charge of powder—thirty-five pounds to each charge—is passed up rapidly from below; the shot, weighing four hundred and twenty pounds, is hoisted up by mechanical appliances to the muzzle of the gun, and rammed home, the gun is run out to the port, and tightly “compressed;” the port is open for an instant, the captain of the gun stands behind, lanyard in hand—“Ready, fire!” and the enormous projectile rushes through its huge parabola, with the weight of 10,000 tons, home to its mark.”

² The following estimate was made of the shots received by each vessel:

<i>New Ironsides</i>	65	<i>Nantucket</i>	51
<i>Keokuk</i>	90	<i>Catskill</i>	51
<i>Weehawken</i>	60	<i>Patapsco</i>	45
<i>Montauk</i>	20	<i>Nahant</i>	50
<i>Passaic</i>	53	Total.....	515

³ A year after the attack on Charleston Admiral Dupont thus alludes to the affair:

“I am well aware,” he says, “that the results at Charleston were not all that were wished for, and I quite agree with the department that there was, nevertheless, much in them that was gratifying, particularly that the loss of life was so small, and that the capacity of the iron-clads for enduring the hot and heavy fire brought to bear upon them, which would have destroyed any vessels of wood heretofore used in warfare, was made so evident. But I must take leave to remind the department that ability to endure is not a sufficient element wherewith to gain victories; that endurance must be accompanied with a corresponding power to inflict injury on the enemy; and I will improve the present occasion to repeat the expression of a conviction which I have already conveyed to the department in former letters, that the weakness of the monitor class of vessels, in this important particular, is fatal to their attempts against fortifications having outlying obstructions, as at the Ogeechee and at Charleston, or against other fortifications upon elevations, as at Fort Darling, or against any modern fortifications before which they must anchor or lie at rest, and receive much more than they can return. With even their dismantled surface they are not invulnerable, and their various mechanical contrivances for working their turrets and guns are so liable to immediate derangement, that, in the brief though fierce engagement at Charleston, five out of eight were disabled, and, as I mentioned in my detailed report to the department, half an hour more fighting would, in my judgment, have placed them all *hors de combat*.”

¹ Beauregard’s statements are fully refuted by that subsequently made by Admiral Dupont, and signed by nearly all the commanding officers of the fleet lying off Charleston Harbor on the 31st. We make the following extract from this statement:

“We deem it our duty to state that the so-called results are false in every particular—no vessels were sunk, none were set on fire seriously. . . . So hasty was the retreat of the rams that, although they might have perceived that the Keystone State had received serious damage, no attempt was ever made to approach her. The *Stettin* and *Ottawa*, at the extreme end of the line, did not get under way from their position till after the firing had ceased, and the *Stettin* merely saw the black smoke as the rams disappeared over the bar. The rams withdrew hastily toward the harbor, and on their way were fired at by the *Housatonic* and *Augusta* until both had got beyond reach of their guns. They anchored under the protection of their forts, and remained there. No vessel, iron-clad or other, passed out over the bar after the return of the rams inshore. The *Unadilla* was not aware of the attack until the *Housatonic* commenced firing, when she moved out toward that vessel from her anchorage. The *Housatonic* was never beyond the usual line of the blockade. We do not hesitate to state that no vessel came out beyond the bar after the return of the rams, at between 7 and 8 A.M., to the cover of the forts. We believe the statement that any vessel came any where near the usual anchorage of any of the blockaders, or up to the bar, after the withdrawal of the rams, to be deliberately and knowingly false. If the statement from the papers, as now before us, has the sanction of the captain of the *Petrel* and the foreign consuls, we can only deplore that foreign officers can lend their official positions to the spreading before the world, for unworthy objects, untruths patent to every officer of this squadron.”

² The vessels of the monitor fleet, including the *New Ironsides* and *Keokuk*, advanced in the following order:

1. *Weehawken*, Captain John Rodgers.
2. *Passaic*, Captain Percival Drayton.
3. *Montauk*, Commander John L. Worden.
4. *Patapsco*, Commander Daniel Ammen.
5. *New Ironsides*, Commodore Thomas Turner.
6. *Catskill*, Commander George W. Rodgers.
7. *Nantucket*, Commander Daniel McN. Fairfax.
8. *Nahant*, Commander John Downes.
9. *Keokuk*, Lieutenant Commander A. C. Rhind.

The reserve squadron consisted of the *Canandaigua*, *Unadilla*, *Housatonic*, *Wissahickon*, and *Huron*, under the command of Captain Joseph H. Green.



SINKING OF THE KEARSGARDE.

6th of July, assigned to Admiral Dahlgren, and General Q. A. Gillmore succeeded Hunter in the command of the Department of the South. Toward the close of May, 1863, Gillmore had received orders to repair to Washington, to consult with General Halleck and Secretary Welles as to future operations against Charleston. No more troops could be spared for the Department of the South. Gillmore did not ask for more, although he knew that his operations must, on account of his small military force, be restricted to Morris's Island. With this force he proposed to occupy that island, capture Forts Wagner and Gregg, and demolish Fort Sumter by means of shore batteries. The way would thus be open for Dahlgren to advance with his fleet, remove the obstructions in the harbor, and command Charleston. Even if the city was not captured, the full possession of Morris's Island would effectually blockade the harbor.

General Gillmore assumed command of the department on the 12th of June. At that time the coast from Light-house Inlet to St. Augustine, Florida—a distance of 250 miles—was in possession of the national forces. The positions actually occupied by troops were Folly Island, Seabrook Island, on the North Edisto, St. Helena Island, Port Royal Island, Hilton Head Island, the Tybee Islands, Fort Pulaski, Ossibaw Island, Fort Clinch and Amelia Island, and the city of St. Augustine. Off or inside the principal inlets lay the blockading squadron.¹

Folly Island was occupied by a brigade under General Vogdes, strongly intrenched, with heavy guns mounted on the south end of the island to control the entrance of the Stono River. Vogdes had also constructed a road, practicable for artillery, and affording a means of concealed communication between the several parts of the island. In Stono and Folly Rivers a naval force was stationed, consisting of two gun-boats and a mortar schooner, to secure Folly Island against attack, and to hold the Stono against the light-draught gun-boats of the enemy. Folly Island was necessarily the base of operations against Morris's Island.² The dense undergrowth with which it

¹ Gillmore's Operations against Charleston, p. 42.

² "The question has been asked why the route across James's Island from Stono River, the same that Brigadier General Benham attempted, was not selected to operate upon.

"The answer is simple. The enemy had more troops available for the defense of Charleston than we had for the attack. The general-in-chief, in the preliminary discussions of the project, had mentioned 10,000 men as the approximate number that could be collected in the Department of the South for this operation. The force actually got together there did not vary much from 11,500 men, including engineers and artillerymen. Upon Morris's Island, on account of its narrowness, this force was ample, and it was not until the command had been reduced one third by sickness and casualties that re-enforcements were asked for. But James's Island presents a different case. There our progress would soon have been arrested by the concentration of a superior force in our front. Upon Morris's Island both parties had all the force that could be applied with advantage. Our superiority in artillery, ashore and afloat—particularly in the use of mortars in the trenches—the successful application of new devices, the energy and skill of our engineers, and a strictly maintained initiative, gave us the controlling elements of success. Moreover, according to the programme of joint operations, the demolition of Fort Sumter was what the land forces had to accomplish, and that could be done with more ease and certainty from Morris's Island than from any other position. James's Island was too wide to operate upon, with a fair promise of success, with our small force."—Gillmore's Operations, p. 22.

was covered afforded cover for batteries on the north end, within musket range of the enemy's picket on the opposite side of Light-house Inlet.

The forces in Ossibaw Sound and on the North Edisto were withdrawn. Gillmore's entire command available for offensive operations then consisted of 11,500 men and 66 guns, besides about 30 mortars.

The descent upon Morris's Island was made July 10th, 1863. It was an operation which required boldness and great skill, as it involved the storming of a fortified position, not by the regular approaches of a siege, but by an advance covered by a few batteries, and made in small boats exposed to the enemy's fire. There were two co-operative expeditions—one conducted by General A. H. Terry, with 3800 men, on James's Island, which was eminently successful, diverting a portion of the garrison from Morris's Island; and a second, sent from General Saxton's command at Beaufort to cut the Charleston and Savannah Railroad at Jacksborough, in order to delay re-enforcements from Savannah. This latter expedition proved a signal failure, involving the loss of two guns and a small steamer, which was burned to prevent its capture.

The main column engaged in the attack on Morris's Island—about 2000 men of General Strong's brigade—was embarked in Folly River, and passed by night during high tide through the shallow creeks into Light-house Inlet. This movement was first fixed for the night of the 8th of July, but had been postponed until the night of the 9th. At daybreak on the 10th the column halted, having reached Light-house Inlet, the boats keeping close to the east shore of the creek, where they were screened by the marsh grass from hostile observation. Shortly after daybreak the batteries on the north end of Folly Island—10 in number, and mounting 47 guns—opened against the opposite shore, the undergrowth having been previously cleared away in their front to give them an unobstructed view. Four monitors joined their fire to that of the batteries. For two hours this bombardment continued, and then Strong's brigade moved across the inlet to the assault.

The movement had been planned with much skill and secrecy, and was a surprise to the enemy. At Oyster Point, and on the firm land lower down, the Federal troops were landed under a hot fire of musketry and artillery. But the column never faltered, and by 9 o'clock A.M. all the hostile batteries south of Fort Wagner were overrun and captured. This success closed the operations of that day. The troops were within musket range of Fort Wagner, and were exhausted by the intense heat and three hours' hard fighting. Throughout the day the bombardment from the monitors was kept up, directed chiefly at Fort Wagner.

On the morning of the 11th an assault was made upon Fort Wagner. The advance, led by General Strong in person, reached and gained the parapet of the fort. But the supports could not be brought up in face of a fire from which they had no protection, and the attack failed. In the actions



1. Charleston and Savannah Railroad.—2. Ashley River.—3. Charleston.—4. Cooper River.—5. Wando River.—6. Middle Pinckney.—7. Fort Mifflin.—8. Fort Johnson (James' Island).—9. Stono River.—10. Fort Sumter.—11. Fort Moultrie.—12. Battery Gregg (Quinn's Point).—13. Fort Wagner.—14. General Gillmore's advanced Batteries.—15. Captured Works (Florida's Island).—16. Light-house inlet.—17. Union Battery (City Island).—18. Iron-clads and Wooden Ships.—19. Hotel.—20. Sullivan's Island and Rebel Batteries.—21. Moultrieville.—22. Mount Pleasant.—23. Broad Inlet.—24. Rebel Batteries on James' Island.—25. Shem Creek.—26. 0. Rebel Batteries on James' Island.

CHARLESTON AND ITS ENVIRONS.




Q. A. GILLMORE.

on the 10th and 11th the Federal loss was about 150. General Beauregard admits a loss of 300, including 16 commissioned officers.¹ He had also lost 11 heavy guns.

In the mean time, General Terry, on James's Island, had followed the route taken by Benham's two divisions on the 16th of June, and demonstrated against Secessionville. On the 16th of July he was attacked by a largely superior force of the enemy; but with the assistance of the gun-boat Pawnee in the Stono, and two smaller vessels, the attack was easily repulsed. Terry's command was the next day withdrawn from James's Island.

On the 18th, just one week after the failure of the first assault on Fort Wagner, a second was undertaken. In the interim, four batteries—Reynolds, Weed, Hays, and O'Rourke—mounting twenty-nine guns and fourteen mortars, had been erected on Morris's Island bearing upon Fort Wagner, and at a distance from that work of from 1330 to 1920 yards. In addition to the four monitors (the Catskill, Montauk, Nahant, and Weehawken), which

¹ Gillmore's Operations, p. 75.



GEORGE C. STRONG.



ROBERT G. SHAW.

were across the bar on the 10th, two other vessels—the Patapsco and the New Ironsides—now lay abreast of Morris's Island. The guns of this fleet and of the shore batteries bombarded the fort all day. At twilight, in the midst of a thunder-storm, the assaulting columns, commanded by Brigadier General T. Seymour, advanced. Strong's brigade—consisting of Colonel Shaw's Fifty-fourth Massachusetts (colored) Regiment; the Sixth Connecticut, Colonel Chatfield; a battalion of the Seventh Connecticut; the Forty-eighth New York, Colonel Barton; the Third New Hampshire, Colonel Jackson; the Ninth Maine, Colonel Emery; and the Seventy-sixth Pennsylvania, Colonel Strawbridge—was in the advance, and was supported by Colonel H.S. Putnam's brigade. The whole force engaged in the attack numbered about 6000 men. The approach of darkness, hastened by the storm, made it impossible for the fleet to discern friend from foe, so that the advance was exposed to the fire of Forts Wagner, Gregg (on Cummings's Point), and Sumter, assisted by the works on James's and Sullivan's Island. Never, during the war, was an assault made in the face of such opposition. As soon as the columns approached the fort, and the Federal guns in the batteries and on the monitors were silent, the garrison of Wagner, 1000 strong, sprang to its guns and muskets. Notwithstanding this tremendous fire from four different quarters, and although the leading regiment was thrown into such disorder that Putnam's supporting brigade had to be sent in, still the troops went forward, and the southeast bastion of Fort Wagner was gained and held for nearly three hours. The darkness was so great an advantage to the garrison that it more than compensated for the partial success of the assailants, and a retreat was ordered. The Federal loss was very



RUINS OF LIGHT-HOUSE ON MORRIS'S ISLAND.

severe, especially in officers. General Strong, and Colonels Chatfield, Putnam, and Shaw, were either killed on the spot, or died subsequently of their wounds. Colonel Shaw was killed upon the parapet of the fort. If, as was reported at the time, he was buried with the fallen negroes of his gallant regiment, it can only be said that what was intended for a disgrace will in the light of history be regarded as a monumental honor. General Seymour and several regimental commanders were severely wounded. The entire loss sustained in the assault must have amounted to 1200 killed and wounded.

This repulse revived the faltering hopes of the citizens of Charleston, who regarded Fort Wagner as the key to the city. They had looked upon the conflict with anxiety and doubt. They remembered that this same General Gillmore had once demolished Fort Pulaski—which they considered in impregnability next to Sumter—as easily as if it had been a house built of cards.¹ They had trembled, therefore, for the fate of Wagner and Sumter, but now they breathed more freely.

But General Gillmore had as yet scarcely commenced operations. His principal object was the demolition of Fort Sumter, in order to allow the iron-clads an entrance to the harbor. Failing in this, there was still left a secondary object to be accomplished—namely, to secure a perfect blockade of the port. This could be effected by the reduction of Forts Wagner and Gregg.

Fort Wagner was an inclosed work, one fourth of a mile in width, extending from high-water mark on the east, to Vincent's Creek and the impassable marshes on the west. It had an excellent garrison, and was constructed of sand, upon which the heaviest bombardment could make little impression, with a ditch in front. Its bomb-proof shelter was capacious and secure, and its armament consisted of between fifteen and twenty guns, covering the solitary approach to it on the south. This approach was in many places scarcely half a company front in width, and was swept by Fort Sumter, the batteries on James's Island, and that at Cummings's Point. Its communication with the rear was secure, thus giving opportunity for the increase of its armament or garrison.²

¹ See the *Augusta Sentinel* of July 15, 1863.

² Gillmore's Operations, p. 105.



SHARPSHOOTERS BEFORE WAGNER.

Fort Wagner was neared by regular approaches. Immediately after the repulse of the 18th, the first parallel was established about 1300 yards from Fort Wagner.¹ On the night of the 23d the second parallel was established 600 yards in advance of the first, on a line running diagonally across the island northwest and southeast. In the creek on the left two booms of floating timber were stretched across, to resist the approach of the enemy's boats. It must be remembered that these approaches to Fort Wagner were chiefly *defensive* as to that work, and were preliminary to offensive operations against Fort Sumter. The third parallel was established within less than 400 yards of Fort Wagner. The fire from the fort now became so severe that it was determined to operate against Sumter before another advance.

Breaching batteries had been constructed for this purpose in rear of the several parallels. By the 11th of August 12 of these batteries were ready

¹ "A row of inclined palisading, reaching entirely across the island, was planted about 200 yards in advance of the line, with a return of fifty yards on the right. This return was well flanked by two guns on the right of the parallel. The parallel was arranged for infantry defense; a bomb-proof magazine was constructed, and the armament of the line modified and increased, so that the parallel contained eight siege and field guns, ten siege mortars, and three Requa rifle batteries."—Gillmore's Operations, p. 114.



THE "SWAMP ANGEL."



FORTION OF CHARLESTON EXPOSED TO THE FIRE OF THE FEDERAL FLEET.

for operation, mounting 28 heavy guns and 12 mortars. Their distance from Fort Sumter ranged from 3516 to 4290 yards. The bombardment commenced on the morning of the 17th, and the guns were served steadily and deliberately for several days, until Fort Sumter was literally knocked out of all shape and deprived of its offensive power. During this time the fleet also bombarded Fort Wagner, whose fire, unless silenced, would interfere with the operations of the batteries on shore.

On the 21st of August a demand was made upon General Beauregard for the surrender of Morris's Island and Fort Sumter, accompanied by the assurance that, if the demand was not complied with during the four hours following its delivery, fire would be opened upon Charleston from batteries already established within range of the city. For three weeks Gillmore had been locating a battery, commonly known among the troops as the "Swamp Angel," mounted with an 8-inch Parrott rifle, and within range of Charleston, on the marsh between Morris's and James's Islands. He waited ten hours beyond the time specified in his notice to the Confederate general, and, receiving no reply, opened fire on the city.¹

¹ The following is a copy of the correspondence which passed between Generals Gillmore and Beauregard:

No. 1.

"Headquarters Department of the South, Morris's Island, S. C., August 21, 1863.

"General G. T. BEAUREGARD, Commanding Confederate Forces about Charleston, S. C.:
"GENERAL.—I have the honor to demand of you the immediate evacuation of Morris's Island and Fort Sumter by the Confederate forces.

"The present condition of Fort Sumter, and the rapid and progressive destruction which it is undergoing from my batteries, seem to render its complete demolition within a few hours a matter of certainty. All my heaviest guns have not yet opened. Should you refuse compliance with that demand, or should I receive no reply thereto within four hours after it is delivered into the hands of your subordinate at Fort Wagner for transmission, I shall open fire on the city of Charleston from batteries already established within easy and effective range of the heart of the city.

"I am, general, your obedient servant,

"Q. A. GILLMORE, Brigadier General Commanding."

No. 2.

"Headquarters South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, Charleston, S. C., August 22, 1863.

"SIR.—Last night, at 15 minutes before 11 o'clock, during my absence on a reconnaissance of my fortifications, a communication was received at these headquarters, dated 'Headquarters Department of the South, Morris's Island, S. C., August 21, 1863,' demanding the immediate evacuation of Morris's Island and Fort Sumter by the Confederate forces on the alleged ground that 'the present condition of Fort Sumter, and the rapid and progressive destruction which it is undergoing from my batteries, seem to render its complete demolition within a few hours a matter of certainty,' and if this letter was not complied with, or no reply was received within four hours after it was delivered into the hands of my subordinate commander at Fort Wagner for transmission, a fire would be opened on the city of Charleston from batteries already established within easy and effective range of the heart of the city. This communication to my address was without signature, and, of course, returned. About half past one o'clock one of your batteries did actually open fire and throw a number of heavy shells into the city, the inhabitants of which, of course, were asleep and unwarned.

"About 9 o'clock the next morning the communication alluded to was returned to these headquarters, bearing your recognized official signature, and it can now be noticed as your deliberate official act. Among nations not barbarous, the usages of war prescribe that where a city is about to be attacked, timely notice shall be given by the attacking commander, in order that non-combatants shall have an opportunity of withdrawing beyond its limits. Generally the time allowed is from one to three days; that is, time for the withdrawal in good faith of at least the women and children. You, sir, gave only four hours, knowing that your notice, under existing circumstances, could not reach me in less than two hours, and not less than that time would be required for an answer to be conveyed from this city to Battery Wagner.

"With this knowledge you threaten to open fire on this city, not to oblige its surrender, but to force me to evacuate those works which you, assisted by a great naval force, have been attacking in vain for more than 40 days. Batteries Wagner and Gregg and Fort Sumter are nearly due north from your batteries on Morris's Island, and in distance therefrom ranging from half a mile to two and a quarter miles. This city, on the other hand, is to the northwest, and quite five miles distant from the battery which opened against it this morning. It would appear, sir, that, despairing of reducing these works, you now resort to the novel measure of turning your guns against the old men, women, and the hospitals of a sleeping city—an act of inexcusable barbarity, from your own confessed point of sight, inasmuch as you allege that the complete demolition of Fort Sumter within a few hours by your guns seems a matter of certainty. Your omission to attach your signature to such a grave paper must show the recklessness of the course upon which you have adventured. While the facts that you knowingly fixed a limit for receiving an answer to your demand, which made it almost beyond the possibility of receiving any reply within that time, and that you actually did open one, and threw a number of the most destructive missiles ever used in war into the midst of a city taken unawares and filled with sleeping women and children, will give you a bad eminence in history—even in the history of this war. I am only surprised, sir, at the limits you have set to your demand. If, in order to obtain the abandonment of Morris's Island and Fort Sumter, you feel authorized to fire on this city, why did you not include the works on Sullivan's and James's Islands, nay, even the city of Charleston, in the same demand? Since you have felt warranted in inaugurating this method of reducing batteries in your immediate front which were otherwise found to be impregnable, and a mode of warfare which I confidently declare to be atrocious and unworthy of a soldier, I now solemnly warn you that, if you fire again on the city from your Morris's Island batteries, without giving a somewhat more reasonable time to remove the non-combatants, I shall feel impelled to employ such stringent means of retaliation as may be available during the continuance of this attack. Finally, I reply that neither the works on Morris's Island nor Fort Sumter will be evacuated on the demand you have been pleased to make. Already, however, I am taking measures to remove all non-combatants, who are now fully aware and alive to what they may expect at your hands. Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, General Commanding.

"To Brigadier General Q. A. GILLMORE, Commanding U. S. Forces, Morris's Island."

No. 3.

"Headquarters Department of the South, Morris's Island, S. C., August 22, 1864—9 P. M.

"General G. T. BEAUREGARD, Commanding Confederate Forces, Charleston, S. C.:
"SIR.—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date, complaining that one of my batteries has opened upon the city of Charleston, and thrown 'a number of heavy rifled shells into the city, the inhabitants of which, of course, were asleep and unwarned.'

"My letter to you demanding the surrender of Fort Sumter and Morris's Island, and threatening, in default thereof, to open fire upon Charleston, was delivered near Fort Wagner at 11 15 o'clock A. M. on the 28th instant, and should have arrived at your headquarters in time to have permitted your answer to reach me within the limit assigned, viz., four hours. The fact that you were absent from your headquarters at the time of its arrival may be regarded as an unfortunate cir-

On the 24th of August the military force operating against Charleston had accomplished its primary object—the elimination of Fort Sumter. This fort was not obliterated, and its offensive power was only temporarily removed.¹ For at least ten or fifteen days it could oppose to the monitors no serious resistance. Fort Wagner still remained in the hands of the enemy, but could be easily avoided by the fleet. But Admiral Dahlgren did not embrace the opportunity, and in the mean time the enemy strengthened Fort Johnson, converting it into an earth-work. This work is on the north end of James's Island, and commands the channel.

Gillmore continued his parallel approaches up to within 150 yards of Fort Wagner, and on the 5th of September commenced a bombardment of that work, which was continued for forty-two consecutive hours. Seventeen siege and Coehorn mortars dropped their shells into the work, thirteen heavy Parrott rifles pounded away at the southwest angle of the bomb-proof, while by day the New Ironsides poured an uninterrupted stream of eleven-inch shells from her eight-gun broadside against the parapet. An assault would have been made on the morning of the 7th upon the now silent fort; but during the night of the 6th the Confederates, convinced of their inability to maintain their position on Morris's Island, slipped away from Forts Wagner and Gregg, and all but seventy men effected their escape. Eighteen guns were captured in Fort Wagner, and seven in Fort Gregg.

This success concluded General Gillmore's work. From Cummings's Point an irregular bombardment was commenced upon the city, and continued till the evacuation of the latter in 1865. The "Swamp Angel" battery had long discontinued its fire upon Charleston. At the thirty-sixth round its gun—a 100-lb. Parrott—had exploded, and the guns mounted afterward were directed against the James's Island batteries.

Admiral Dahlgren was unwilling to attempt the entrance to the harbor until Fort Sumter was in possession of the national forces. This possession could only be effected by an open assault, involving great sacrifice of life; and after the acquisition of the fort, Gillmore could not expect to hold it against the formidable works of the enemy which bore upon its weakest points. Gillmore, on the 27th of September, offered to remove the obstruc-

tion for the city of Charleston, but one for which I clearly am not responsible. This letter bore date at my headquarters, and was officially delivered by an officer of my staff.

"The inadvertent omission of my signature doubtless affords ground for special pleading, but is not the argument of a commander solicitous only for the safety of sleeping women and children, and unarmed men. Your threats of retaliation for acts of mine, which you do not allege to be in violation of the usages of civilized warfare except as regards the length of time allowed as notice of my intentions, are passed by without comment. I will, however, call your attention to the well-established principle, that the commander of a place attacked, but not invested, having its avenues of escape open and practicable, has no right to expect any notice of an intended bombardment other than that which is given by the threatening attitude of his adversary. Even had this letter not been written, the city of Charleston has had, according to your own computation, forty days' notice of her danger.

"During that time my attack on her defenses has steadily progressed; the ultimate object of that attack has at no time been doubtful. If, under the circumstances, the life of a single non-combatant is exposed to peril by the bombardment of the city, the responsibility rests with those who have first failed to remove the non-combatants or secure the safety of the city, after having held control of all its approaches for a period of nearly two years and a half, in the presence of a threatening force, and who afterward refused to accept the terms upon which the bombardment might have been postponed.

"From various sources, official and otherwise, I am led to believe that most of the women and children of Charleston were long since removed from the city; but upon your assurance that the city is still 'full' of them, I shall suspend the bombardment until 11 o'clock P. M. to-morrow, thus giving you two days from the time you acknowledge to have received my communication on the 21st instant. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"Q. A. GILLMORE, Brigadier General Commanding."

"The barrette fire of the work was entirely destroyed. [It was this plunging fire from the barrette tier from which the monitors had most to fear.] A few unserviceable guns still remaining on their carriages were dismantled a week later. The casemates of the channel fronts were more or less thoroughly searched by our fire, and we had trustworthy information that but one serviceable gun remained in the work, and that pointed up the harbor toward the city. The fort was reduced to the condition of a mere infantry outpost, alike incapable of annoying our approaches to Fort Wagner, or of inflicting injury upon the iron-clads.

"The enemy soon after commenced removing the dismantled guns by night, and not many weeks elapsed before several of them were mounted in other parts of the harbor. The period during which the weakness of the enemy's interior defenses was most palpable was during the ten or fifteen days subsequent to the 23d of August, and that was the time when success could have been most easily achieved by the fleet. The concurrent testimony of prisoners, refugees, and deserters represented the obstacles in the way as by no means insurmountable."—Gillmore's Operations, p. 149, 150.

General Gillmore gives the following tabular statement of the firing from seven of his batteries on Fort Sumter, August 17-23:

NAME OF BATTERY.	No. and Calibre of Parrott Rifles.	Distance from base of George Wall in yards.	Whole No. of Projectiles thrown.	Total Weight of Metal thrown.	No. of Projectiles which struck Fort.	No. which struck but failed to form breach.	Weight of Metal which formed breach.
Strong	One 300-pr.	4290	76	19,142	46	22	6,500
Brown	Two 300-prs.	3516	542	82,070	249	193	32,670
Hays	One 200-pr.	4172	531	86,129	225	196	33,320
Reno	One 200-pr.	4272	333	115,171	480	316	38,940
	Two 100-prs.	4272	784				
Rosecrans	Three 100-prs.	3447	1173	105,807	537	392	37,240
Meade	Two 100-prs.	3428	1004	98,282	502	336	98,302
Stevens	Two 100-prs.	4273	566	46,082	340	208	43,924
Total			6009	592,683	2479	1665	289,986



CONFEDERATE EVACUATION OF MORRIS'S ISLAND.