

APPROACHES TO SAVANNAH.

CHAPTER LI.

SHERMAN'S CAMPAIGN.—THE CAROLINA MARCH.

Correspondence between Grant and Sherman.—The Idea of transporting Sherman's Army to Virginia by Sea abandoned.—Sherman's Preparations for a March through the Carolinas.—Civil Administration at Savannah.—Trade Regulations.—Sherman's Orders respecting Freedmen.—Regulations for the Government of Savannah.—Cotton taken as a Prize of War.—Howard's Movement on Pocomtogo.—A Flood in the Savannah River impedes Slocum's Operations.—Comparison of the Carolina March with that from Atlanta to Savannah.—Sherman's Acquaintance with the Country.—Feint Movement on Charleston.—Crossing of the Salkehatchie.—Destruction of the Railroad connecting Augusta with Charleston.—Crossing of the South Edisto.—Sherman declines Wheeler's Cotton Compromise.—Union of the two Wings south of the Congaree.—Capture of Columbia.—Explanation of the Burning of Columbia.—Occupation of Winnsborough.—Crossing of the Catawba.—Sherman retaliates for the Murder of his Foragers.—Correspondence with Wheeler on this Subject.—Occupation of Cheraw.—Charleston Evacuated.—Affair between Kilpatrick and Wade Hampton.—Sherman's Army at Fayetteville, on the Cape Fear River.—Concentration of the Enemy's Forces under Johnston.—Sherman communicates with Terry and Schofield.—Crossing of the Cape Fear.—Battle of Aversyborough.—Battle of Bentonville.—Sherman, re-enforced by Terry and Schofield, concentrates his Army at Goldsborough, and establishes Communications with Newbern and Morehead City.

WHEN General Sherman, after the capture of Fort McAllister, passed down the Ogeechee into Ossibaw Sound, and to the flag-ship of Admiral Dahlgren, he found two communications waiting him from Lieutenant General Grant. When these were written Sherman was still marching through Georgia, and had not "struck bottom." But they express no fear as to the ultimate success of the extraordinary campaign which Sherman had undertaken. The second of these communications, of date December 6th, indicated Grant's intention to transport Sherman's army, after it had established a base on the coast, to the James River, to co-operate in the campaign against Lee.¹

Sherman, although his original plan had contemplated a continuation of his march through the Carolinas to Virginia,² immediately set out to obey General Grant's instructions. In the delay incident to the transportation of his army he determined to capture Savannah. As we have seen, he ac-

complished that object on the 21st. The next day he announced his success to the lieutenant general.

In the mean time General Sherman had heard of Hood's defeat at Nashville, which was at once a vindication of his march and the indispensable seal of its success. The tidings of the capture of Savannah following close upon Hood's defeat illustrated to the outside world what had all along been present to the prophetic eye of Sherman—the tremendous significance of the March to the Sea. In a twinkling, the doubts of the loyal, and the rash confidence of the rebellious and of their sympathizers, were dispersed. It was to the Northern people the breaking of a glorious dawn after terribly dark hours of anxiety and apprehension. A period of suspense had passed, during which few opened their mouths to judge General Sherman or to predict the issue of a movement which was almost universally believed too bold to rank among the legitimate ventures of war; and now, suddenly, out of this ominous silence arose a universal shout at once of triumph and of praise to the victor, who had been no less signally crowned by his own success at Savannah than by that of his subordinate at Nashville, 657 miles away.¹ General Grant, even before the capture of Savannah, congratulated General Sherman and his army upon the successful termination of his "brilliant campaign." It is true, he had heard of Hood's defeat; but he says, "I never had a doubt of the result. When apprehensions for your safety were expressed by the President, I assured him, with the army you had, and you in command of it, there was no danger but you would strike bottom on salt water some place; that I would not feel the same security, in fact would not have intrusted the expedition to any other living commander." On the 26th, in answer to Sherman's note presenting him with Savannah as a Christmas gift, President Lincoln replied:

"MY DEAR GENERAL SHERMAN,—Many, many thanks for your Christmas gift. When you were about leaving Atlanta for the Atlantic coast, I was anxious, if not fearful; but, feeling that you were the better judge, and remembering that 'nothing risked, nothing gained,' I did not interfere. Now, the undertaking being a success, the honor is all yours; for I believe none of us went farther than to acquiesce. And, taking the work of General Thomas into the count, as it should be taken, it is indeed a great success. Not only does it afford the obvious and immediate military advantages, but, in showing the world that your army could be divided, putting the stronger part to an immediate new service, and yet leaving enough to vanquish the old opposing force of the whole—Hood's army—it brings those who sat in darkness to see a great light. But what next? I suppose it will be safer to leave General Grant and yourself to decide."²

General Grant, after Thomas's victory at Nashville, was shaken in his determination to transport Sherman's army by sea to the James River. It would be impossible to effect this in less than two months, and in that time Sherman could make the march by land, and in doing so strike the enemy a far heavier blow. He writes on the 18th of December: "If you capture the garrison of Savannah, it will certainly compel Lee to detach from Richmond, or give us nearly the whole South. My own opinion is, Lee is averse to going out of Virginia; and, if the cause of the South is lost, he wants Richmond to be the last place surrendered. If he has such views, it may be well to indulge him until we get every thing else in our hands." General Sherman was delighted at the modification of Grant's plan, as he would thus be permitted to carry out his original scheme of a march through the Carolinas.³

¹ The following are copies of both these letters. The first, from City Point, Virginia, December 3, reads thus:

"The little information gleaned from the Southern press indicating no great obstacle to your progress, I have directed your mails, which previously had been collected in Baltimore by Colonel Markland, special agent of the Post-office Department, to be sent as far as the blockading squadron off Savannah, to be forwarded to you as soon as heard from on the coast. Not liking to rejoice before the victory is assured, I abstain from congratulating you and those under your command until bottom has been struck. I have never had a fear, however, as to the result.

"Since you left Atlanta no great progress has been made here. The enemy has been closely watched, though, and prevented from detaching against you. I think not one man has gone from here except some 1200 or 1500 dismounted cavalry. Bragg has gone from Wilmington. I am trying to take advantage of his absence to get possession of that place. Owing to some preparations Admiral Porter and General Butler are making to blow up Fort Fisher, and which, while I hope for the best, do not believe a particle in, there is a delay in getting this expedition off. I hope they will be ready to start by the 7th, and that Bragg will not have started back by that time.

"In this letter I do not intend to give you any thing like directions for future action, but will state a general idea I have, and will get your views after you have established yourself on the sea-coast. With your veteran army I hope to get control of the only two through routes, from east to west, possessed by the enemy, before the fall of Atlanta. This condition will be filled by holding Savannah and Augusta, or by holding any other post to the east of Savannah and Branchville. If Wilmington falls, a force from there can co-operate with you.

"Thomas has got back into the defenses of Nashville, with Hood close upon him. Decatur has been abandoned, and so have all the roads, except the main one leading to Chattanooga. I hope Hood will be badly crippled or destroyed. After all becomes quiet, and the roads up here are so bad that there is likely to be a week or two that nothing can be done, I will run down the coast and see you."

On the 6th he writes again:

"On reflection, since sending my letter by Lieutenant Dunn, I have concluded that the most important operation toward closing out the rebellion will be to close out Lee and his army. You have now destroyed the roads of the South so that it will probably take them months, without interruption, to establish a through line from east to west. In that time, I think, the job here will be effectually completed. My idea now is, that you establish a base on the coast, fortify, and leave in it all your artillery and cavalry, and enough infantry to protect them, and, at the same time, so in it all your artillery and cavalry, and enough infantry to protect them, and, at the same time, so threaten the interior that the militia of the South will have to be kept at home. With the balance of your command, come here with all dispatch. Select yourself the officer to leave in command, but you I want in person. Unless you see objections to this plan which I can not see, use every vessel going to you for the purpose of transportation."

² In reply to Grant's communications of the 3d and 6th, Sherman incidentally remarks that with his army he "had expected, after reducing Savannah, instantly to march to Columbia, South Carolina, thence to Raleigh," etc.

On the 18th he again writes to Grant, as a sort of postscript to a letter dealing with other matters: "I do sincerely believe that the whole United States, North and South, would rejoice to have this army turned loose on South Carolina, to devastate that state in the manner we have done in Georgia, and it would have a direct and immediate bearing on your campaign in Virginia."

Again, on the 22d, at the close of his letter announcing the capture of Savannah, he says: "I have now completed my first step, and should like to go on to you via Columbia and Raleigh, but will prepare to embark as soon as vessels come. Colonel Babcock will have told you all, and you know better than any body else how much better troops arrive by a land march than when carried by transports. . . . The capture of Savannah, with the incidental use of the rivers, gives us a magnificent position in this quarter, and if you can hold Lee, and if Thomas can continue as he did on the 18th, I could go on and smash South Carolina all to pieces, and also break up roads as far as the Roanoke. But, as I before remarked, I will now look to coming to you as soon as transports are ready."

¹ That General Sherman looked upon the defeat of Hood by Thomas as necessary to justify his march is evident from the following letter, written by him to General J. D. Webster (at Nashville), December 23:

"Major Dixon arrived last night, bringing your letter of the 10th of December, for which I am very much obliged, as it gives me a clear and distinct view of the situation of affairs at Nashville up to that date. I have also from the War Department a copy of General Thomas's dispatch, giving an account of the attack on Hood on the 15th, which was successful, but not complete. I await farther accounts with anxiety, as Thomas's complete success is necessary to vindicate my plans for this campaign, and I have no doubt that my calculations that Thomas had in hand (including A. J. Smith's troops) a force large enough to whip Hood in fair fight were correct. I approve of Thomas's allowing Hood to come north far enough to enable him to concentrate his own men, though I would have preferred that Hood should have been checked about Columbia. Still, if Thomas followed up his success on the 15th, and gave Hood a good whaling, and is at this moment following him closely, the whole campaign in my division will be even more perfect than the Atlanta campaign, for at this end of the line I have realized all I had reason to hope for except in the release of our prisoners, which was simply an impossibility."

² General Sherman's reply to this is equally characteristic. Writing January 6th, he says: "I am gratified at the receipt of your letter of December 26th at the hands of General Logan, especially to observe that you appreciate the division I made of my army, and that each part was duly proportioned to its work."

"The motto, 'Nothing venture, nothing win,' which you refer to, is appropriate; and, should I venture too much and happen to lose, I shall bespeak your charitable inference."

"I am ready for the 'great next' as soon as I can complete certain preliminaries, and learn our General Grant his and your preferences of intermediate 'objectives.'"

³ He replies to General Grant, December 24: "I am gratified that you have modified your former orders, as I feared that the transportation by sea would very much disturb the unity and morale of my army, now so perfect."

"The occupation of Savannah . . . completes the first part of our game, and fulfills a great part of your instructions; and I am now engaged in dismantling the rebel forts which bear upon the sea and channels, and transporting the heavy ordnance and ammunition to Fort Pulaski and Hilton Head, where they can be more easily guarded than if left in the city."

"The rebel inner lines are well adapted to our purpose, and, with slight modifications, can be held by a comparatively small force, and in about ten days expect to be ready to sail forth again. I feel no doubt whatever as to our future plans. I have thought them over so long and well that they appear as clear as daylight. I left Augusta untouched on purpose, because the enemy will be in doubt as to my objective point after crossing the Savannah River, whether it be Augusta and Charleston, and will naturally divide his forces. I will then move either on Branchville or Columbia by any curved line that gives me the best supplies, breaking up in my course as much railroad as possible, then ignoring Charleston and Augusta both. I would occupy Columbia and Camden, pausing there long enough to observe the effect. I would then strike for the Charleston and Wilmington Railroad, somewhere between the Santee and Cape Fear Rivers, and, if possible, communicate with the fleet under Admiral Dahlgren (whom I find a most agreeable gentleman, in every way accommodating himself to our wishes and plans). Then I would favor Wilmington, in the belief that Porter and Butler will fail in their present undertaking. Charleston is now a mere desolated wreck, and is hardly worth the time it would take to starve it out. Still I am aware that historically and politically, much importance is attached to the place, and it may be that, apart from its military importance, both you and the administration would prefer I should give it more attention; and it would be well for you to give me some general idea on that subject, as otherwise I would treat it, as I have expressed, as a point of little importance, after all its railroads leading into the interior are destroyed or occupied by us. But on the hypothesis of ignoring

General Grant fully sanctioned Sherman's scheme before the close of 1864. There was nearly a month's delay at Savannah. This time was occupied in gathering supplies, in disposing of captured property, and in local administration. The march through Georgia had already led to some important political results in that state. In Liberty and Tatnall counties, south of Savannah, Union meetings were held by the citizens, and patriotic resolutions were adopted. Sherman recognized the movement, and promised his aid, encouragement, and defense to all citizens who would "stay quietly at home, and call back their sons and neighbors to resume their peaceful pursuits." He invited all such to bring their produce to Savannah, to be sold to the highest bidder or to his commissary. Merchants and attorneys in Savannah were required to acknowledge the national supremacy in order to the continuance of their avocations. But, in Sherman's judgment, all matters relating to reconstruction in Georgia were of secondary importance until the final victory of the nation should be secured.

Sherman caused a thorough examination to be made of the defenses of Savannah, which city was now to become an important *dépôt* of supplies. New lines of fortification were constructed, "embracing the city proper, Forts Jackson, Thunderbolt, and Pulaski, with slight modifications in their



FORT THUNDERBOLT, SAVANNAH.

armament and rear defenses." The other forts were dismantled, and their heavy ordnance transferred to Hilton Head. The obstructions in the river were with great difficulty removed, as also the torpedoes in the channels

Charleston and taking Wilmington, I would then favor a movement direct on Raleigh. The game is then up with Lee, unless he comes out of Richmond, avoids you and fights me, in which case I should reckon on your being on his heels.

"Now that Hood is used up by Thomas, I feel disposed to bring the matter to an issue as quick as possible. I feel confident that I can break up the whole railroad system of South Carolina and North Carolina, and be on the Roanoke, either at Raleigh or Weldon, by the time spring fairly opens; and if you feel confident that you can whip Lee outside of his intrenchments, I feel equally confident that I can handle him in the open country.

"One reason why I should ignore Charleston is this: That I believe they will reduce the garrison to a small force, with plenty of provisions, and I know that the neck back of Charleston can be made impregnable to assault, and we will hardly have time for siege operations.

"I will have to leave in Savannah a garrison, and, if Thomas can spare them, I would like to have all detachments, convalescents, etc., belonging to these four corps, sent forward at once. I don't want to cripple Thomas, because I regard his operations as all-important, and I have ordered him to pursue Hood down into Alabama, trusting to the country for supplies.

"I reviewed one of my corps to-day, and shall continue to review the whole army. I don't like to boast, but I believe this army has a confidence in itself that makes it almost invincible."

Grant replied on the 27th of December, giving Sherman permission to follow out his plan, and making some suggestions. He says:

"Your confidence in being able to march up and join this army pleases me, and I believe it can be done. The effect of such a campaign will be to disorganize the South, and prevent the organization of new armies from their broken fragments. Hood is now retreating, with his army broken and demoralized. His loss in men has probably not been far from 20,000, besides deserters. If time is given, the fragments may be collected together, and many of the deserters reassembled. If we can we should act to prevent this. Your spare army, as it were, moving as proposed, will do this.

"In addition to holding Savannah, it looks to me that an intrenched camp ought to be held on the railroad between Savannah and Charleston. Your movements toward Branchville will probably enable Foster to reach this with his own force. This will give us a position in the South from which we can threaten the interior without marching over long, narrow causeways, easily defended, as we have heretofore been compelled to do. Could not such a camp be established about Pocatigo or Coosawatchie?

"I have thought that, Hood being so completely wiped out for all present harm, I might bring A. J. Smith with from 10,000 to 15,000. With this increase I could hold my lines, and move out with greater force than Lee has. It would compel him to retain all his present force in the defenses of Richmond, or abandon them entirely. The latter contingency is probably the only danger to the easy success of your expedition. In the event you should meet Lee's army, you would be compelled to beat it or find the sea-coast. Of course I shall not let Lee's army escape if I can help it, and will not let it go without following it to the best of my ability.

"Without waiting farther directions, then, you may make preparations to start on your Northern expedition without delay. Break up the railroads in South and North Carolina, and join the armies operating against Richmond as soon as you can.

"I will leave out all suggestions about the route you should take, knowing that your information, gained daily in the progress of events, will be better than any that can be obtained now. It may not be possible for you to march to the rear of Petersburg; but, failing in this, you could strike either of the sea-coast ports in North Carolina held by us. From there you could easily take shipping. It would be decidedly preferable, however, if you could march the whole distance. From the best information I have, you will find no difficulty in supplying your army until you cross the Roanoke. From there here is but a few days' march, and supplies could be collected south of the river to bring you through. I shall establish communication with you there by steam-boat and gun-boat. By this means your wants can be partially supplied."

below the city. General Geary was assigned to the command of the city. His policy, just but conciliatory, had a good effect upon the citizens. Mayor R. D. Arnold, continued in the exercise of his functions, advised the citizens to yield a ready obedience to the Federal government and its military representative. A public meeting was held, in which the mayor's views were adopted, and Governor Brown was called upon to take measures for the restoration of Georgia to the Union. A national bank was established, and the city enjoyed undisturbed tranquillity. On the 14th of January, 1865, General Sherman issued orders regulating the internal trade of the state, inviting the citizens to bring their produce to Savannah, and to hold meetings for the discussion of their present situation, and promising them the protection of the national army.¹

Nor did General Sherman forget the freedmen. With the approval of Secretary Stanton, who visited Savannah shortly after its capture, he issued orders devoting the abandoned sea islands south of Charleston, and rice-fields along the rivers of Georgia for thirty miles back from the sea, to their exclusive use and management, subject only to the United States military authority and the acts of Congress.² He had, on the 26th of December, promulgated regulations for the military control of Savannah.³ In his or-

¹ The following is a copy of these orders:

"It being represented that the Confederate army and armed bands of robbers, acting professedly under the authority of the Confederate government, are harassing the people of Georgia and endeavoring to intimidate them in the efforts they are making to secure themselves provisions, clothing, security to life and property, and the restoration of law and good government in the state, it is hereby ordered and made public:

"I. That the farmers of Georgia may bring into Savannah, Fernandina or Jacksonville, Florida, marketing, such as beef, pork, mutton, vegetables of any kind, fish, etc., as well as cotton in small quantities, and sell the same in open market, except the cotton, which must be sold by or through the treasury agents, and may invest the proceeds in family stores, such as bacon and flour, in any reasonable quantities, groceries, shoes, and clothing, and articles not contraband of war, and carry the same back to their families. No trade-stores will be attempted in the interior, or stocks of goods sold for them, but families may club together for mutual assistance and protection in coming and going.

"II. The people are encouraged to meet together in peaceful assemblages to discuss measures looking to their safety and good government, and the restoration of state and national authority, and will be protected by the national army when so doing; and all peaceable inhabitants who satisfy the commanding officers that they are earnestly laboring to that end must not only be left undisturbed in property and person, but must be protected as far as possible consistent with the military operations. If any farmer or peaceful inhabitant is molested by the enemy, viz., the Confederate army of guerrillas, because of his friendship to the national government, the perpetrator, if caught, will be summarily punished, or his family made to suffer for the outrage; but if the crime can not be traced to the actual party, then retaliation will be made on the adherents to the cause of the rebellion. Should a Union man be murdered, then a rebel selected by lot will be shot; or if a Union family be persecuted on account of the cause, a rebel family will be banished to a foreign land. In aggravated cases, retaliation will extend as high as five for one. All commanding officers will act promptly in such cases, and report their action after the retaliation is done."

² The following are the orders:

"I. The islands from Charleston south, the abandoned rice-fields along the rivers for thirty miles back from the sea, and the country bordering the St. John's River, Florida, are reserved and set apart for the settlement of the negroes now made free by the acts of war and the proclamation of the President of the United States.

"II. At Beaufort, Hilton Head, Savannah, Fernandina, St. Augustine, and Jacksonville, the blacks may remain in their chosen or accustomed vocations; but on the islands, and in the settlements hereafter to be established, no white person whatever, unless military officers and soldiers detailed for duty, will be permitted to reside, and the sole and exclusive management of affairs will be left to the freed people themselves, subject only to the United States military authority and the acts of Congress. By the laws of war and orders of the President of the United States, the negro is free, and must be dealt with as such. He can not be subjected to conscription, or forced into military service, save by the written orders of the highest military authority of the department, under such regulations as the President or Congress may prescribe; domestic servants, blacksmiths, carpenters, and other mechanics will be free to select their own work and residence; but the young and able-bodied negroes must be encouraged to enlist as soldiers in the service of the United States, to contribute their share toward maintaining their own freedom, and securing their rights as citizens of the United States.

"Negroes so enlisted will be organized into companies, battalions, and regiments, under the orders of the United States military authorities, and will be paid, fed, and clothed according to law. The bounties paid on enlistment may, with the consent of the recruit, go to assist his family and settlement in procuring agricultural implements, seed, tools, boats, clothing, and other articles necessary for their livelihood.

"III. Whenever three respectable negroes, heads of families, shall desire to settle on lands, and shall have selected for that purpose an island or a locality clearly defined within the limits above designated, the inspector of settlements and plantations will himself, or by such subordinate officer as he may appoint, give them a license to settle such island or district, and afford them such assistance as he can to enable them to establish a peaceable agricultural settlement. The three parties named will subdivide the land, under the supervision of the inspector, among themselves and such others as may choose to settle near them, so that each family shall have a plot of not more than forty acres of tillable ground, and, when it borders on some water-channel, with not more than eight hundred feet water-front, in the possession of which land the military authorities will afford them protection until such time as they can protect themselves, or until Congress shall regulate their title.

"The quartermaster may, on the requisition of the inspector of settlements and plantations, place at the disposal of the inspector one or more of the captured steamers to ply between the settlements and one or more of the commercial points heretofore named in orders, to afford the settlers the opportunity to supply their necessary wants, and to sell the products of their land and labor.

"IV. Whenever a negro has enlisted in the military service of the United States, he may locate his family in any one of the settlements at pleasure, and acquire a homestead and all other rights and privileges of a settler as though present in person.

"In like manner, negroes may settle their families and engage on board the gun-boats, or in fishing, or in the navigation of the inland waters, without losing any claim to land or other advantages derived from this system. But no one, unless an actual settler as above defined, or unless absent on government service, will be entitled to claim any right to land or property in any settlement by virtue of these orders.

"V. In order to carry out this system of settlement, a general officer will be detailed as inspector of settlements and plantations, whose duty it shall be to visit the settlements to regulate their police and general management, and who will furnish personally to each head of a family, subject to the approval of the President of the United States, a possessory title in writing, giving, as near as possible, the description of boundaries, and who shall adjust all claims or conflicts that may arise under the same, subject to the like approval, treating such titles altogether as possessory. The same general officer will also be charged with the enlistment and organization of the negro recruits, and protecting their interests while absent from their settlements, and will be governed by the rules and regulations prescribed by the War Department for such purposes."

³ Of which the following is a copy:

"The city of Savannah and surrounding country will be held as a military post and adapted to future military uses, but, as it contains a population of some twenty thousand people who must be provided for, and as other citizens may come, it is proper to lay down certain general principles, that all within its military jurisdiction may understand their relative duties and obligations.

"I. During war, the military is superior to civil authority, and where interests clash the civil must give way; yet, where there is no conflict, every encouragement should be given to well-disposed and peaceful inhabitants to resume their usual pursuits. Families should be disturbed as little as possible in their residences, and tradesmen allowed the full use of their shops, tools, etc. Churches, schools, all places of amusement and recreation, should be encouraged, and streets and roads made perfectly safe to persons in their usual pursuits. Passes should not be exacted within the line of outer pickets; but if any person shall abuse these privileges by communicating with the enemy, or doing any act of hostility to the government of the United States, he or she will be punished with the utmost rigor of the law.

"Commerce with the outer world will be resumed to an extent commensurate with the wants of the citizens, governed by the restrictions and rules of the Treasury Department.

"II. The chief quartermaster and commissary of the army may give suitable employment to the people, white and black, or transport them to such points as they choose, where employment may

ders regulating trade he had excluded cotton from ordinary commerce, holding this staple to be a legitimate prize of war, and the property of the United States.¹ These trade regulations included within their scope the whole Department of the South, which, though still under the immediate command of General Foster, was now subordinate to General Sherman.

By the 19th of January Sherman was ready to move. Grover's division of the Nineteenth Corps had been withdrawn from Sheridan's Army of the Shenandoah to Savannah, relieving Geary's division, and forming thereafter a part of General Foster's command. General Schofield, with the Twenty-third Corps, had been transferred from the West to re-enforce Generals Terry

be had, and may extend temporary relief in the way of provisions and vacant houses to the worthy and needy, until such time as they can help themselves. They will select, first, the buildings for the necessary uses of the army; next, a sufficient number of stores to be turned over to the treasury agent for trade-stores. All vacant store-houses or dwellings, and all buildings belonging to absent rebels, will be construed and used as belonging to the United States until such times as their titles can be settled by the courts of the United States.

"III. The mayor and city council of Savannah will continue and exercise their functions as such, and will, in concert with the commanding officer of the post and chief quartermaster, see that the fire-companies are kept in organization, the streets cleaned and lighted, and keep up a good understanding between the citizens and soldiers. They will ascertain and report to the chief commissary of subsistence, as soon as possible, the names and number of worthy families that need assistance and support.

"The mayor will forthwith give public notice that the time has come when all must choose their course, namely, to remain within our lines and conduct themselves as good citizens, or depart in peace. He will ascertain the names of all who choose to leave Savannah, and report their names and residence to the chief quartermaster, that measures may be taken to transport them beyond the lines.

"IV. Not more than two newspapers will be published in Savannah, and their editors and proprietors will be held to the strictest accountability, and will be punished severely, in person and property, for any libelous publication, mischievous matter, premature news, exaggerated statements, or any comments whatever upon the acts of the constituted authorities: they will be held accountable even for such articles though copied from other papers."

This led to some dissatisfaction on the part of the citizens of Savannah and of foreign consuls. On the 2d of January Sherman writes to Secretary Stanton in regard to this matter as follows:

"I have just received from Lieutenant General Grant a copy of that part of your telegram to him of 26th December relating to cotton, a copy of which has been immediately furnished to General Eaton, my chief quartermaster, who will be strictly governed by it.

"I had already been approached by all the consuls and half the people of Savannah on this cotton question, and my invariable answer has been that all the cotton in Savannah was prize of war, and belonged to the United States, and nobody should recover a bale of it with my consent; and that as cotton had been one of the chief causes of this war, it should help pay its expenses; that all cotton became tainted with treason from the hour the first act of hostility was committed against the United States, some time in December, 1860, and that no bill of sale subsequent to that date could convey title.

"My orders were that an officer of the quartermaster's department, United States army, might furnish the holder, agent, or attorney a mere certificate of the fact of seizure, with description of the bales, marks, etc.; the cotton then to be turned over to the agent of the Treasury Department, to be shipped to New York for sale. But since the receipt of your dispatch I have ordered General Eaton to make the shipment himself to the quartermaster at New York, where you can dispose of it at pleasure. I do not think the Treasury Department ought to bother itself with the prizes or captures of war.

"Mr. Barclay, former consul at New York—representing Mr. Molyneux, former consul, but absent since a long time—called on me in person with reference to cotton claims by English subjects. He seemed amazed when I told him I should pay no respect to consular certificates, and that in no event would I treat an English subject with more favor than one of our own deluded citizens; and that, for my part, I was unwilling to fight for cotton for the benefit of Englishmen openly engaged in smuggling arms and munitions of war to kill us; that, on the contrary, it would afford me great satisfaction to conduct my army to Nassau and wipe out that nest of pirates. I explained to him, however, that I was not a diplomatic agent of the general government of the United States; but that my opinion, so frankly expressed, was that of a soldier, which it would be well for him to heed. It appeared also that he owned a plantation on the line of investment to Savannah, which, of course, is destroyed, and for which he expected me to give him some certificate entitling him to indemnification, which I declined emphatically.

"I have adopted in Savannah rules concerning property, severe but just, founded upon the laws of nations and the practice of civilized governments; and am clearly of opinion that we should claim all the belligerent rights over conquered countries, that the people may realize the truth that war is no child's play."



SLOCUM'S ARMY CROSSING THE SAVANNAH AT RISTER'S FERRY.

and Palmer, who were operating on the coast of North Carolina, and preparing the way for General Sherman's arrival. On the 24th of December an unsuccessful attack had been made on Fort Fisher, at the mouth of Cape Fear River, by Admiral Porter. The failure of the expedition was due to a want of proper management on the part of General Butler, the military commander. On the 15th of January the attack was renewed, General Butler being replaced by General Terry, and was successful. The remaining works of the enemy at the mouth of the Cape Fear soon followed the fate of Fort Fisher. This victory was auspicious for Sherman, who was then setting out upon his northward march.

General Howard was ordered to effect a lodgment on the Savannah and Charleston Railroad, at Pocotaligo. He embarked with the Seventeenth Corps at Thunderbolt, and proceeded to Beaufort, and there landing his troops, succeeded in reaching Pocotaligo Station. Leggett's division dislodged the enemy, and a secure dépôt for supplies was established at the mouth of Pocotaligo Creek, within easy communication by Broad River with Hilton Head. Three divisions of Logan's corps (the Fifteenth) followed Blair; but Corse's division was cut off by the freshets, and compelled to move with the left wing.

Slocum, with the left wing and Kilpatrick's cavalry, was ordered to move directly across the Savannah River up to Coosawatchie, on the Charleston Road, and to Robertsville, on the road to Columbia. He had established a good pontoon bridge across the river opposite the city, and the Union causeway, over which Hardee had retreated a month before, had been repaired and corduroyed; but before the time appointed for his march the heavy rains of January had swollen the river, swept away the bridge, and overflowed the whole bottom, so that the causeway was four feet under



POCOTALIGO DEPÔT.



MARCHING THROUGH THE SWAMPS.

water. Driven thus from the route originally determined upon, Slocum, on the 26th of January, ascended the river to Sister's Ferry. But even there the river was three miles wide, and his command was prevented from crossing until the 7th of February. Two divisions of the Twentieth Corps—Jackson's and Geary's—had crossed the river at Pureysburg, and, proceeding to Hardeeville, on the Charleston Road, secured communication with Howard at Pocotaligo.

Sherman, in the mean time, on the 22d, embarked for Hilton Head, where he conferred with Admiral Dahlgren and General Foster in regard to their co-operative movements. General Foster was to follow Sherman's army inland, and occupy in succession Charleston and such other points on the seacoast as would be of any military value. Thus Sherman's army was free to move directly upon Goldsborough.

In all its general features, the march through the Carolinas was a repetition of that through Georgia, already accomplished. No important stronghold of the enemy was attacked. As Sherman in the Georgia promenade had feigned on Macon and Augusta, and passed between without striking either, so now he purposed to demonstrate against Augusta and Charleston, avoiding both, and make the quickest possible march to Goldsborough. In boldness, his present scheme exceeded the one already executed. The country to be traversed was more difficult, and the enemy had been given time to concentrate his fragmentary forces in Sherman's front. But Sherman had

no doubts. "I think," he says,¹ "the time has come now when we should attempt the boldest moves, and my experience is that they are easier of execution than more timid ones, because the enemy is disconcerted by them."² He was as familiar with the country over which he was about to march as with Georgia. "I have hunted it over many a time," he says, "from Santee

¹ Letter to General Halleck, December 24th, 1864.

² He adds in the same letter: "I also doubt the wisdom of concentration beyond a certain point, as the roads of this country limit the amount of men that can be brought to bear in any one battle; and I don't believe that any one general can handle more than 60,000 men in battle. I think any campaign of the last month, as well as every step I take from this point northward, is as much a direct attack upon Lee's army as though I were operating within the sound of his artillery. . . . I attach more importance to these deep incursions into the enemy's country, because this war differs from European wars in this particular—we are not only fighting hostile armies, but a hostile people, and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war, as well as their organized armies. I know that this recent movement of mine through Georgia has had a wonderful effect in this respect. Thousands who had been deceived by their lying papers into the belief that we were being whipped all the time, realized the truth, and have no appetite for a repetition of the same experience. To be sure Jeff. Davis has his people under a pretty good shape of discipline, but I think faith in him is much shaken in Georgia, and I think before we are done South Carolina will not be so tempestuous. . . . I felt somewhat disappointed at Hardee's escape from me. . . . Still, I know that the men that were in Savannah will be lost, in a measure, to Jeff. Davis, for the Georgia troops, under G. W. Smith, declared they would not fight in South Carolina, and they have gone north *en route* for Augusta; and I have reason to believe the North Carolina troops have gone to Wilmington."



ENTERING BLACKVILLE, SOUTH CAROLINA.



CROSSING THE SOUTH EDISTO.



SHERMAN'S ARMY ENTERING COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA.

to Mount Pleasant." His army did not lack enthusiasm, and the prospect of a march through South Carolina was one which it relished exceedingly. The general feeling of the North toward Charleston may be inferred from General Halleck's suggestion to Sherman: "Should you capture Charleston, I hope that by some accident the place may be destroyed; and if a little salt should be sown upon its site, it may prevent the growth of future crops of nullification and secession."¹ Poor South Carolina! she was sandwiched between two states who looked upon her as the original source of their past madness and their present woes.

Perhaps if Sherman had had Johnston as an antagonist in his immediate front he would not have been so confident. He calculated on the same Confederate scheme for the defense of the Carolinas which he had baffled in Georgia. He knew that they would hold on to Augusta and Charleston as they had, six weeks before, to Augusta and Macon, leaving him the route between, molested only by Wheeler's cavalry and a mob of disorganized militia, which would be swept like chaff before his march.

General Sherman accompanied the right wing of his army. On the 25th of January, with a small force, he demonstrated against the Combahee Ferry and the railroad bridge across the Salkehatchie, which river the enemy had adopted as his line of defense covering Charleston. After amusing the enemy at this point for nearly a week, the real march of Howard's army began on the 1st of February. Still keeping up the feint on Charleston, the main body of the army moved westward up the Salkehatchie. All the roads northward had been held for weeks by Wheeler's cavalry; the bridges

had been burned and trees had been felled to obstruct Sherman's movements. But the pioneer battalions soon cleared the way and rebuilt the bridges. On the 2d the Fifteenth Corps was well advanced at Loper's Cross-roads, while the Seventeenth had reached River's Bridge, and was ready to cross the Salkehatchie.

Slocum's army in the mean time, as we have seen, was still struggling with the Savannah floods. Kilpatrick, however, and two of Williams's divisions, had crossed on pontoons. The latter were ordered to Beaufort's Bridge, and Kilpatrick to Blackville. Howard crossed the Salkehatchie in the face of the enemy at River's and Beaufort's bridges. The position of the enemy at River's Bridge was on the 3d carried by Mower's and G. A. Smith's divisions of the Seventeenth Corps, who crossed the swamp, nearly three miles wide, through water reaching from knee to shoulder, and in bitter cold weather, and making a lodgment below the bridge, turned on the Confederate brigade posted there, driving it in confusion toward Branchville. The Confederate killed and wounded, numbering eighty-eight, were sent back to Pocotaligo. The Fifteenth Corps, with less resistance, but with equal success, effected the crossing at Beaufort's Bridge, a short distance above.

The line of the Salkehatchie being broken, the enemy fell back behind the Edisto River to Branchville, and Sherman occupied the South Carolina Railroad connecting Augusta with Charleston. While waiting for the remainder of Slocum's army, this road was thoroughly destroyed from the Edisto to Blackville, Kilpatrick in the mean time being dispatched eastward to Aiken to threaten Augusta. Slocum reached Blackville on the 10th. The destruction of the railroad was continued to Windon. The whole army was on the 11th well concentrated about midway between Augusta and Charleston, thus dividing the forces of the enemy covering those two points.


Crossing the South Edisto, the right wing appeared in front of Orangeburg on the 12th, swept away a detachment of the enemy intrenched at that

¹ Sherman, in the letter already quoted, replies to this: "I will bear in mind your suggestion as to Charleston, and don't think 'salt' will be necessary. . . . The whole army is burning with an insatiable desire to wreak vengeance on South Carolina. I almost tremble at her fate, but feel that she deserves all that seems in store for her. Many and many a person in Georgia asked me why we did not go to South Carolina, and when I answered that I was *en route* for that state, the invariable reply was, 'Well, if you will make those people feel the severities of war, we will pardon you for your desolation of Georgia.'"



MAP OF SHERMAN'S CAROLINA MARCH.

point, and followed, pushing him across the north branch of the Edisto, where he took refuge behind a rampart, supported by a battery, and, having partially burned the bridge, threatened to dispute the crossing. From this position he was soon flanked, and Blair's corps, having crossed, began the de-



STATE CAPITOL AND PALMETTO MEMORIAL TO THE S. CAROLINA REG'TS IN THE MEXICAN WAR.

PLAN OF COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA.

struction of the railroad to Columbia. Slocum's army moved by roads farther to the west, covered by Kilpatrick on its left. On the morning of February 16th the advance of Sherman's army beheld Columbia from the south bank of the Congaree.

In the mean time Sherman had received a communication from Wheeler, in which the latter promised not to burn cotton if Sherman would not burn houses. Sherman replied, "I hope you will burn all the cotton and save us the trouble. We don't want it, and it has proved a curse to our country. All you don't burn I will. As to private houses occupied by peaceful families, my orders are not to molest or disturb them, and I think my orders are obeyed. Vacant houses, being of no use to any body, I care little about, as the owners have thought them of no use to themselves."

On the south bank of the Congaree the two wings of the army were again united, but forthwith began to diverge again. Slocum was ordered to cross the Saluda at Zion Church, above Columbia, and proceed direct to Winnsborough, destroying the bridges and railroads about Alston. Howard crossed at the same time a little below the point selected for Slocum, and, turning the enemy's position at Columbia, moved upon the town from the north. The next morning, February 17th, under cover of Stone's brigade of Wood's division (Logan's corps), a pontoon bridge was thrown across Broad River, and, while the remainder of the corps was crossing, the Mayor of Columbia rode out and formally surrendered the city to General Stone, who marched his brigade directly into the town. Sherman, crossing the pontoon bridge accompanied by General Howard, rode into the capital of South Carolina. They found perfect quiet in the city, the citizens and soldiers mingling together in the streets. General Wade Hampton, commanding the rear guard of the Confederate cavalry, had, before leaving, ordered all the cotton in the town to be burned. The bales had been piled in the streets, the ropes and bagging cut, and tufts of cotton were thrown about by the wind, which was blowing a perfect gale, lodging in the trees and upon the houses. As this threatened the destruction of the entire town, the soldiers assisted the citizens in putting out the flames. Sherman had ordered the destruction of the arsenals, of all public property not needed for the use of the army, and of the railroads, depôts, and such machinery as could assist the enemy in carrying on war. But, before this order began to be executed, the smouldering fires of the morning had been rekindled by the wind and communicated to the surrounding buildings. By night they had spread into a conflagration that baffled the efforts of both citizens and soldiers to allay its fury. It was not until about 4 A.M. on the 18th that the fire was got under control. It was due to the assistance of Sherman's soldiers that any portion of the city was left standing. After this matter had been

attended to, during the 18th and 19th, Sherman's orders for the destruction of the arsenals, railroads, etc., were properly carried out.¹

¹ The origin of the destructive conflagration in Columbia has been the subject of much discussion, which we can not give here in full. The statements of General Sherman, Major G. W. Nichols, a member of Sherman's staff, General Wade Hampton, and James McCarter (a Confederate citizen who was in Columbia when the event took place), form the body of evidence so far as published. The statements made in Confederate journals at the time are of no value, except in their details as to the exact time the conflagration commenced, the direction of the wind, etc. In regard to the four principal authorities above mentioned, it is assumed that each is reliable so far as he states facts within the scope of his own personal observation.

Sherman, in his official report, says: "Without hesitation, I charge General Wade Hampton with having burned his own city of Columbia, not with a malicious intent, or as the manifestation of a silly 'Roman stoicism,' but from folly and want of sense in filling it with lint, cotton, and tinder. Our officers and men on duty worked well to extinguish the flames; but others not on duty, including the officers who had long been imprisoned there, rescued by us, may



WADE HAMPTON.



COLUMBIA ON FIRE.

Slocum reached Winnsborough on the 21st of February, and the Twentieth Corps crossed the Catawba River on the 23d, Kilpatrick following the

have assisted in spreading the fire after it once had begun, and have indulged in unconcealed joy to see the ruin of the capital of South Carolina." In regard to the origin and progress of the flames he says, "Before one single public building had been fired by [my] order, the smouldering fires set by Hampton's order were rekindled by the wind, and communicated to the buildings around. About dark they began to spread, and got beyond the control of the brigade on duty within the city. The whole of Wood's division was brought in, but it was found impossible to check the flames, which by midnight had become unmanageable, and raged until about 4 A.M., when, the wind subsiding, they were got under control. I was up nearly all night, and saw Generals Howard, Logan, and Wood, and others laboring to save the houses, and to protect families thus suddenly deprived of shelter, and of bedding and wearing apparel. I disclaim on the part of my army any agency in this fire, but, on the contrary, claim that we saved what of Columbia remains unconsumed." It must be remembered in this connection that the only soldiers of Sherman's army in Columbia were those of Wood's division.

General Wade Hampton, in a letter to Hon. Reverdy Johnson, of Georgia, says: "I pledge myself to prove . . . that he [General Sherman] promised protection to the city, and that, in spite of his solemn promise, he burned the city to the ground, deliberately, systematically, and atrociously." He also asserts in the same letter, "I gave a positive order, by direction of General Beauregard, that no cotton should be fired." Of course Hampton's testimony in regard to Sherman's conduct is unreliable, as he had no means of knowing that which he affirmed. We accept his statement that he gave the order against the destruction of cotton; but the only mode of reconciling this statement with the fact that his soldiers really *did* set the cotton on fire, is to suppose either that the order against the burning came too late, and subsequent to a former order directing the cotton to be burned, or that the burning was against orders.

Major Nichols came with Sherman into Columbia about noon on the 17th. He notices the prevalence of a strong wind, and that it came from the south. It was in the southern portion of the city that the cotton was burning. "It seemed to me," he says, "I had never experienced a more powerful gale of wind." Both he and Sherman testify that the air was filled with smoking tufts of cotton, catching in trees and falling on the shingled roofs of houses. Nichols admits that, apart from the fires occasioned by the burning cotton, "there were fires which must have started independent of the above-mentioned cause. The source of these is ascribed to the desire for revenge from some 200 of our prisoners who had escaped from the cars as they were being conveyed from this city to Charlotte. Again it is said that the soldiers who first entered the town, intoxicated with bad liquor, which was freely distributed among them by designing citizens, in an insanity of exhilaration, set fire to unoccupied houses." Nichols testifies to the efforts made by officers and soldiers to put out the fire which broke out in the afternoon. He says: "I saw Sherman, Howard, Logan, Woods, and other general officers, with their staffs, working with heart and hand to stay the progress of the flames. . . . During the progress of the fire, and afterward, while the army was in the city, every effort was made for the relief of the sufferers. They were furnished with bedding and food, and were quartered in the houses which had been deserted by their owners who had fled the city the day before. General Sherman gave up his own quarters to a family of ladies, with their children, who were fed from his table; I know from personal observation that he and the officers and men of his army could not have made greater exertions to alleviate the sufferings of these homeless ones if they had been their own kith and kin."

Mr. James McCarter entirely exonerates General Sherman from any responsibility for the conflagration, and states his belief that "Sherman intended to protect the persons and private property of the citizens." Still, he charges the burning and plundering of Columbia upon the soldiers of Sherman's army. He adduces as an argument leading to this conclusion that the wind was from the north. Here Mr. McCarter not only contradicts Major Nichols's testimony, but that of the *Columbia Daily Phoenix*, which asserts that the wind throughout the day "had steadily prevailed from southwest by west, and bore the flames eastward." This is the main argument adduced by McCarter to prove his sweeping assertion; and this, as we have seen, is based upon false premises. The only other argument presented by him is the fact that Wade Hampton's men left Columbia ten hours before the conflagration which so desolated the city. This is true; but it is also true that Sherman's soldiers, on entering the city, found the cotton burning, and assisted the soldiers in putting out the flames. But, as Sherman states in his report, the fire which had been subdued still smoldered in the cotton, and was rekindled by the wind in the afternoon, baffling every effort made by his army to resist its progress.

same night, and then demonstrating against Charlotte, in North Carolina, to which place Beauregard and the Confederate cavalry had retreated. There also might soon be expected Cheatham's corps, of Hood's old army, which had been cut off by Sherman's rapid movement on Columbia and Winnsborough. On the 26th the Twentieth Corps reached Hanging Rock, where it waited for the Fourteenth to cross the Catawba, now swollen by recent heavy rains. As soon as Davis came up with the Fourteenth Corps, Slocum moved direct to Cheraw, North Carolina, nearly 70 miles south of west from Charlotte.

On the 22d Kilpatrick reported to Sherman that 18 of his men had been murdered by Wade Hampton's cavalry, and left in the road with labels upon them threatening a similar fate to all foragers. Sherman replied that this conduct left Kilpatrick no alternative; he must retaliate man for man. "Let it be done at once," ordered Sherman. "We have a perfect war right to the products of the country we overrun, and may collect them by foragers or otherwise. Let the whole people know the war is now against them because their armies flee before us, and do not defend their country or frontier as they should. It is pretty nonsense for Wheeler and Beauregard, and such vain heroes, to talk of our warring against women

and children. If they claim to be men they should defend their women and children, and prevent us reaching their homes. Instead of maintaining their armies, let them turn their attention to their families, or we will follow them to the death; they should know that we will use the produce of the country as we please. I want the foragers to be regulated and systematized, so as not to degenerate into common robbers; but foragers, as such, to collect corn, bacon, beef, and such other products as we need, are as much entitled to our protection as skirmishers and flankers. . . . If our foragers commit excesses, punish them yourself, but never let an enemy judge between our men and the law."¹

The above is the testimony bearing upon the case, from which it is clear,

First, that the burning of Columbia was due to two causes, the carelessness of Hampton's men in their manner of destroying the cotton, and the incendiarism of a number of prisoners burning with a desire to wreak vengeance upon the people whom they held responsible for the cruelties which they had experienced in confinement.

Secondly, that Sherman and his army proper not only had no agency in producing the conflagration, but worked heartily and persistently to subdue it, and made every exertion to alleviate the sufferings which followed it.

We have given this matter of the burning of Columbia so much space simply for the purpose of presenting the facts of the case before the reader. We are making no apology—that is not the business of the historian. It is worthy of note, however, that, though Sherman and his army *felt* that South Carolina deserved destruction, after they entered that state they marched through it like an army, and not like a mob of marauders and incendiaries. Although Sherman, in his letter of December 24th, 1864, had said to General Halleck, "I look upon Columbia as quite as bad as Charleston, and I doubt if we shall spare the public buildings there as we did at Milledgeville," still, upon entering Columbia, he found his pity larger than his wrath, and did his best to protect the citizens against a destruction of their property for which he was in no way responsible; just as at Savannah, notwithstanding his menace of punishment in case the city was not surrendered, when he entered the city he saved it from devastation by a mob of its own citizens.

¹ Sherman writes thus to Wade Hampton in regard to this matter, February 24:

"It is officially reported to me that our foraging parties are murdered after being captured, and labeled 'death to all foragers'; one instance of a lieutenant and seven men near Chesterfield, and another of twenty 'near a ravine eighty rods from the main road,' about three miles from Feasterville. I have ordered a similar number of prisoners in our hands to be disposed of in like manner.

"I hold about 1000 prisoners captured in various ways, and can stand it about as long as you, but I hardly think these murders are committed with your knowledge, and would suggest that you give notice to the people at large that every life taken by them results in the death of one of your confederates.

"Of course you can not question my right to 'forage on the country.' It is a war right as old as history. The manner of exercising it varies with circumstances, and if the civil authorities will supply my requisitions, I will forbid all foraging. But I find no civil authorities who can respond to calls for forage and provisions, therefore must collect directly from the people. I have no doubt this is the occasion of much misbehavior on the part of our men, but I can not permit an enemy to judge, and punish with wholesale murder.

"Personally I regret the bitter feelings engendered by this war, but they are to be expected, and I simply allege that those who struck the first blow and made war inevitable, ought not in



WINNSBOROUGH, SOUTH CAROLINA.



HANGING ROCK, SOUTH CAROLINA.



FORAGERS STARTING OUT.




FORAGERS RETURNING TO CAMP.

The right wing, after destroying the railroad to Winstonsborough, crossed the Catawba at Peay's Ferry. Detachments were sent from the Fifteenth Corps to Camden to burn the bridge over the Wateree, a tributary of the Santee River, and to break up the railroad between Florence and Charleston. The latter object was not accomplished, as Captain Duncan, commanding the expedition, met Butler's division of Confederate cavalry, and was forced to return.

On the 3d of March Sherman's army had reached Cheraw. Charleston

fairness to reproach us for the natural consequences. I merely assert our 'war right' to forage, and my resolve to protect my foragers to the extent of life for life."

had in the mean time been evacuated by the Confederates, and at Cheraw were found many of the guns which had been brought from that city. From this point the weather was unfavorable and the roads bad; but, crossing the Great Pedee, the Fourteenth and Seventeenth corps entered Fayetteville on the 11th. During the night of the 9th, Kilpatrick's three brigades guarding the roads east of the Pedee were divided. General Wade Hampton, detecting this, dashed in at daylight, got possession of the camp of Colonel Spencer's brigade, and the house in which Kilpatrick and Spencer had their quarters. Notwithstanding the completeness of the surprise and the temporary confusion which followed, Kilpatrick succeeded in rallying his



UNITED STATES ARSENAL AT FAYETTEVILLE.



THE TUG-BOAT DONALDSON MOVING UP THE CAPE FEAR.

men, and by a prompt attack regained the artillery which he had lost and the camp from which he had been so suddenly ousted.

The 12th, 13th, and 14th of March were passed by Sherman's army at Fayetteville. The Arsenal and the machinery which had formerly belonged to the Harper's Ferry Arsenal were completely destroyed. "Every building was knocked down and burned," General Sherman reports, "and every piece of machinery utterly broken up and ruined."

Sherman's army was now on the Cape Fear River. Up to this point he had, by admirable strategy, succeeded in dividing the enemy's forces. But now Cheatham's corps had joined Beauregard, and Hardee had got across Cape Fear River in advance of Sherman; and these forces were all on their way to join the Confederate troops in North Carolina, and were under the command of General Joseph E. Johnston, Sherman's old antagonist. In cavalry Johnston's command had somewhat the advantage of Sherman's, and, taking into consideration the military genius of its leader, its artillery and infantry were sufficiently formidable to justify extreme caution on the part of the Federal commander. Before reaching Fayetteville, Sherman had dispatched from Laurel Hill to Wilmington—then in possession of the national troops—two of his best scouts. These men succeeded in their somewhat difficult adventure, and on the morning of the 12th of March Sherman beheld the army tug Donaldson approaching Fayetteville, "bringing me," he says, "full intelligence of the outer world." This tug-boat returned the same day, conveying to General Terry at Wilmington, and to General Schofield at Newbern, intelligence that on the 15th Sherman would move upon Goldsborough. Both Terry and Schofield were ordered to the same point.

In the mean time pontoon bridges had been thrown across the Cape Fear River. Kilpatrick was ordered to move to Averysborough and beyond, in advance of the left wing. Four of Slocum's divisions were to follow, while his two remaining divisions moved as an escort to the trains. Howard moved by a more eastward route to Goldsborough. The idea of this march was to feign on Raleigh and make Goldsborough. But four of Howard's divisions were to preserve communication with Slocum, ready to support the latter in the event of a battle. These movements commenced on the 15th of March. General Sherman went with Slocum's army.

Before reaching Averysborough, Slocum encountered General Hardee's force¹ on the 16th, at a point where the road branches off toward Goldsborough through Bentonville. The enemy must be dislodged both in order to gain the Goldsborough Road and to continue the feint on Raleigh. Hardee's position was difficult to carry, not by reason of its intrinsic strength, but on account of the difficult nature of the ground, which was so soft as to swamp the horses, and even the infantry could scarcely make its way over the pine barren. The Twentieth Corps had the lead, Ward's division in the advance. The latter was deployed, and a skirmish developed the position of a brigade of Charleston heavy artillery, armed as infantry, and commanded by Rhett, posted across the road behind a light parapet, enfilading the approach across a cleared field. Williams dispatched Casey's brigade to the left, turning this position, and Rhett's line was broken, and three guns were captured, with 217 prisoners. Besides these, 108 Confederate dead were afterward buried by Sherman's men.

Ward's division, advancing, developed a second and stronger line, and Jackson's came up on his right, and the Fourteenth Corps on his left, well toward Cape Fear River. Kilpatrick at the same time was ordered to mass his cavalry on the right, and to feel forward for the road to Goldsborough. A brigade of the cavalry gained this road, but was driven back by McLaws's Confederate division. Late in the afternoon the whole Federal line advanced, drove the enemy within his intrenchments, from which, during the stormy night of the 16th, he retreated over the wretched road in his rear. Ward's division followed the next day, beyond Averysborough, and found that Hardee had fallen back on Smithfield. General Slocum's loss in the action at Averysborough was 12 officers and 65 men killed, and 477 wounded.

The Goldsborough Road was now open to the left wing, which, on the night of the 18th, encamped five miles from Bentonville and 27 from Golds-

borough. Howard was two miles farther south, and as no farther resistance was expected from the enemy, was directed to move to Goldsborough via Tulling Creek Church. Sherman joined this wing of the army. But he had not got six miles away from Slocum when he heard artillery to the left. His apprehensions were aroused, but were soon quieted by information conveyed through Slocum's staff officers that the leading division (Carlin's) had encountered Dobbrell's cavalry, which he was driving easily. Shortly after this pleasant intelligence, other staff officers from Slocum reported that the latter had developed the whole of Johnston's army near Bentonville.¹

Turning, therefore, to the left wing, we find that it has been attacked by the enemy, who has gained a temporary advantage, capturing three of Carlin's guns and driving back his two advanced brigades. General Williams, however, is aware of the danger which threatens him in its full extent, and promptly brings up his whole force, with which, behind hastily-constructed barricades, he assumes the defensive, knowing that Sherman will bring the whole right wing, if necessary, to his assistance.

While Hardee had been fighting Sherman near Averysborough, Johnston was concentrating his medley army at Smithfield, and immediately after that action moved forward with great rapidity, intending to strike and overwhelm Slocum's army before it could be relieved by re-enforcements from Howard. "But," says Sherman, "he 'reckoned without his host.' I had expected just such a movement all the way from Fayetteville, and was prepared for it." During the night of the 19th Slocum got up his wagon train, with the two divisions guarding it, and Hazen's division of the Fifteenth Corps, and made his position impregnable. Johnston could only effect his purpose by placing his whole army between Sherman's two wings, which would, under the circumstances, have proved his ruin. His cavalry, of course, was unable to cut off communication with Howard. Logan's corps, therefore, approached Bentonville without serious resistance, compelling Johnston to refuse his left flank and intrench. Thus the Confederate army was put upon the defensive on the 20th, having three corps of Sherman's army in his front, and unassailable. Johnston's flanks were well protected by swamps, and as it was not Sherman's purpose to fight a battle here, unless forced to do so, the Federal army simply continued to hold its position in the enemy's front. The next day, March 21st, Schofield entered Goldsborough with little opposition, and Terry connected with Blair's corps at Cox's Bridge, on the Neuse, so that, stretching from Goldsborough around to Bentonville, Sherman had now under his command an army of 100,000 men in an impregnable position. Johnston very sensibly, therefore, retreated to Smithfield before his retreat could be cut off by a portion of this immense army. The Federal loss at Bentonville amounted in the aggregate to 1646. Johnston's loss must have been at least 3000 men, including the prisoners which he left to be captured when he abandoned his intrenchments.

The objects of the Carolina campaign had been accomplished in the full possession of Goldsborough, with its two railroads leading to Beaufort and Wilmington. By the 25th of March Sherman's army was concentrated at Goldsborough, and his line of communication with Newbern and Morehead City was firmly established. The co-operative movements which had been conducted while Sherman was marching, by Generals Terry, Foster, and Schofield, next invite our attention.

¹ Johnston's army had not yet been joined by Hoke's command, some 9000 strong. The Confederate force at Bentonville consisted of Stewart's and Cheatham's corps from Hood's old army, together amounting to about 10,000 men; of Hardee's force from Charleston, 9000 strong, and of Wade Hampton's cavalry, numbering about 5000. This made up an army of about 24,000 men.



A. S. WILLIAMS.

¹ Sherman reports this force as 20,000, but this is an exaggeration.