## CHAPTER XLVI.

## after atlanta.

Sherman's Position after the Capture of Atlanta. - What to do next ?-Hood's Army in his Front, and the Railroad to Chattanooga untenable.-Hood gets out of Sherman's Way.-President Davis makes another Western Tour.-His Speech at Macon.-He discloses his Plans to the
Enemy.-An Advance northward determined on.-Forrest's prelusive Invasion of Tennessee. Enemy.-An Advance northward determined on.-Forrest's prelusive Invasion of Tennessee.
-Thomas is sent to Nashville.-Hood shifts to the West Point Road, and at length crosses the -Thomas is sent to Nashville.-Hood shifts to the West Point Road, and at length crosses the
Chattahoochee.-Sherman follows to Kenesaw.- Slocum left at Atlanta.-The Battle of Alla-Chattahoochee.-Sherman follows to Kenesaw.-Slocum left at Atlanta.- The Battle of Alla-
toona is fought, and the Confederates are repulsed.-Hood across the Coosa, followed by Sherman through Allatoona Pass.-Resaca held, but Hood takes Dalton, and, avoiding a Battle, retreats to Gadsden. - Is joined there by Beauregard. - The Confederate Plan of a Campaign against Nashville.-Sherman, tired of chasing Hōod, prepares for his March to the Sea.-He
sends the Fourth and Twenty-third Corps to Thomas.-His Theory of the grand March.-He sends the Fourth and Twenty
puts his Plan into Operation.

THE period immediately following the campaign which had closed with the capture of Atlanta was full of contingencies and uncertainties. What shall I do next? was the question which occupied the minds both of Hood and Sherman. It was a brief period; for Hood could not wait long, and Sherman would not. The Federal commander, while he was compelling the exodus of citizens from Atlanta, reorganizing his army, protecting his rear, and making arrangements with General Hood for an exchange of prisoners, and for the relief of some of the inconveniences suffered by Union prisoners in the South,? '. Was revolving great schemes in his mind. He must secure the position which he had already gained in the heart of the en mny's country. But when secured, Atlanta was of no consequence to him except as a point from which to strike. Of one thing he was well satisfied. Hood would not divide his army ; it would remain, therefore, a compact organization, whether in his front or moved against his rear. Sherman's desire was to march through Georgia to the Atlantic coast. While guarding the railroad to Chattanooga, his eyes were fixed upon Savannah. But, so long as Hood's army remained in his front, no such scheme could be ventured, at least not until the Savannah River was in the possession of the Federal navy. ${ }^{2}$ The Confederate cavalry swarmed about his army, and he could not advance far from Atlanta eastward or southward and protect the railroad in his rear without detaching forces which were necessary to his advance. If Canby should be heavily re-enforced and advance to Columbus, Georgia, and establish a new base for Sherman by way of the Alabama

## ${ }^{1}$ The relief which was propos him to Hood, September, 1864 : " My latest information fiom

"My latest information fiom Andersonville is to the 12 th, and from what I learn, our prisoners
war confined there, and being removed to Savannah, Charleston, and Millen, need many of war confined there, and being removed to Savanneah, Charleston, and Millen, need many arti-
cles which we possess in superfluity, and can easily supply with your consent and assistance, such cles which we possess in superfluity, and can easily supply with your
as shirts and drawers, socks, shoes, soap, candles, combs, scissors, etc.
"If you will permit me to send a train of wagons, with a single offic
"I you will permit me to send a train of wagons, with a single officer to go along under a flag of truce, I will send to Lovejoy's or Palmetto a train of wagons loaded exclusively with 10,000 or
15,000 of each of these articles, and a due proportion of soap, candles, etc., under such restrictions 15,
as you may think prudent to name. Ine pould like to have my onfficer go along to to issue restre thictions
but will have no hesitation in sending them if you will simply promise to have them conveyed to as you may think prudent to name. I would iike to have my otficer go along to issue these things,
but will have no hesitation in sending them if you will simply promise to have them conveyed to the places where our priseners are, and have them fairly distributed."
Sherman expected a refusal. He writes to James G. Yeatman Promer
Sherman expected a refusal. He writes to James G. Yeatman, President of the Western Sani-
tary Commission (date same as above): "I doubt if he [Hood] will consent. These Confederates tary Commission (date same as above): "I doubt if he [Hood] will consent. These Confederates
are as proud as the devil, and hate to confess poverty, but I know they are unable to supply socks, are as proud as the devil, and hate to confess poverty, but I know they are unable to supply socks,
drawers, undershirts, scissors, combs, etc., which our men need more than any thing else to predrawers, undershirts, scissors,
serve cleanliness and health.",
In the same letter he says.

In the same letter he says: "The condition of the prisoners at Andersonville has always been present to my mind, and, could I have released them, I would have felt more real satisfaction than
to have won another battle." General Hood aceeded to Sherman's request, and the articles were sent. We see clearly what Sherman's designs were from his dispatches during the month of Septem-
ner to Generals Halleck, Canby, and Grant. He writes to Halleck on the 4th (before he had in
ber ber to Generals Halleck, Canby, and Grant. He writes to Halleck on the 4 th (befo
person entered Atlanta), evidently on the supposition that Hood would cover Macon:
person entered Antur I Ipopose that of the drapted men I receive my due share, say $50,000 \mathrm{men}$; that an equal or greater number go to General Canby, who should now proceed with all energy to
get Montgomery and the reach of the Alabama River above Selma; that when I know he can get Montgomery and the reach of the Alabama River above Selma; that when I know he can
move on Columbus, Georgia, I move on La Grange and West Point, keeping to the coast of the move on Columbus, Georgia, I move on La Grange and West Point, keeping to the coast of the
Chattahoochee ; that we form a junction, repair roads to Montgomery, and open up the Appalachi-
cola and Chattahoochee Rivers to Columbus, and move from it as a base straight on Macon." On the 10th he writes to Canby:
"We must have the Alabama River now, and also the Appalachicola at the old arsenal, and up to Columbus. My line is so long now that it is impossible to protect it against cavalry raids; but
if we can get Montgomery and Columbus, Georgia, as bases in connection with Atlanta, we have
Georgia and Alabman at our feet." Georgia and Alabama at our feet."
The same day he writes to Grant

The same day he writes to Grant;
"I do not think we can afford to
I do not think we can afford to operate farther, dependent on the railroad, it takes so many
an to guard $i t$, and even then it is nightly broken by the enemy's cavalry that swarms about us. men to guard it, and even then it is nightly broken by the enemy's cavalry that tswarms about us.
Macon is distant 103 miles, and Augusta 175 miles. If I could be sure of finding provisions and Macon is distant 103 miles, and Augusta 175 miles. If I could be sure of finding provisions and
ammunition at Augusta or Columbus, Georgia, I can march to Milledgeville, and compel Hood to
give up Augusta or Macon, and could then turn on the other ammunition at Augusta or Columbus, Georgia, I can march to Milledgeville, and compel Hood to
give up Augusta or Macon, and could then turn on the other. The country will afford forage and
many supplies, but not enough in any one place to admit of delay. ... If you can manage to take many supplies, but not enough in any one place to admit of delay.... If you can manage to take
the Savannah River as high as Augusta, or the Chattahoochee as far up as Columbus, I can sweep the Savannah River as high as Augusta, or the Chattahoochee as far up as Columbus, I can sweep,
the whole state of Goergia, othervisi I would risk the whole army by going too far from Atlanta." The above was in reply to Grant's suggestion that Canby should operate against Savannah and Sherman against Augusta.
On the 12th he writes to

In the 12th he writes to Grant
Idon't understand whether you propose to act against Savannah direct from Fort Pulaski, or
by way of Florida, or from the direction of Mobile. If you take Savannah by a sudden coup de by way of Florida, or from the direction of Mobile. If you take Savannah by a sudden coup de
main, it would be valuable."
On the 20th again : "It [Savannah] once in our possession, I would not hesitate to cross the State of Georgia with 60,000 men, hauling some stores, and depending on the country for the balance. Where a million of people, find subsistence my army won't starve, but, as you know, in a
country like Georgia, with few roads and innumerable streams, an inferior force could so delay an army and harass it that it would not be a formidable streect; but in inferior force could so delay an our boats on the Savannah, I could rapidly move to Milledgeville, where there is abundance of
corn and meat, and I could so threaten Macon and Augusta that he would give up Macon for Augusta; then I would move to interpose betwen Augusta and Savannah, and force him to give me
Augusta, with the only powder-mils and factories remaining in the South, or let us have the Sa-
vannah River. Either horn of the dilemma would be worth Augusta, as the probabilities are, for then, with the Savannah River in our possession, the taking of Augusta would be a mere matter of time. This campaign would be made in the winter. But
the more I study the game, the more am I convinced that it would be much farther into Georgia without an objective beyond. It would not be productive of much good. I can start east, and make a circuit south, and back, doing rast damage to the state, but
resulting in no permanent good; but by merely threatening to do so I hold a rod over the Georgians, who are not over loyal to the South. I will therefore give my opinion that your army and vannah and the river; that General Canby be instructed to hold the Mississippi River, and send a force to get Columbus, Georgia, either by way of the Alabama or A ppalachicola ; and that I keep
Hood employed, and put my army in fine order for a march on Augnsta Colvebus, and Charleston. dependence. Thesses of the Savannah River is more than fatal to the possibility of an Southern in-
itand the fall of Richmond, but not of all Georgia. . If you can whip Lee, and I can march to the Atlantic, I think Uncle Abe will give us twenty days' leave of absence
to see the young folks."

River, the difficulty would be obviated. Under all the circumstances, Sher man had little expectation that this would be accomplished.
But General Hood speedily relieved Sherman of all his difficulties by removing the Confederate army out of his way. Hood was the most accommodating general that we have ever heard or read of. No sooner was the truce which had been agreed upon concluded, than he proceeded to shift his entire army to Sherman's rear. ${ }^{1}$ If he had not already determined upon this movement he would yet have been forced to make it by the Confederate President, who proceeded from Richmond about three weeks after the fall of Atlanta to urge its execution. On his way to Hood's army, Davis, on the 23d of September, reached Macon, and addressed the citizens of that town. Among the many impolitic acts of President Davis during his administration, this speech stands prominent. In the first place, it informed General Sherman of plans which, if adopted at all, should never have been discovered till the latest possible moment. And the abusive denunciation of Governor Brown, of Georgia, and of General Johnston, were so undignified, that the reported address was at once pronounced a forgery in the Richmond papers. Even the enemies of Davis refused to credit its authenticity. Governor Brown was denominated "a scoundrel" by Davis, and contempt was thrown upon Johnston's retreat from Dalton to the Chattahoochee. His speech was not, on the whole, very encouraging. He reported two thirds of the Contederate army as absent, most of them without leave. He said it was impossible to lend Georgia any aid from Virginia, where the disparity of forees was just as great as it was in Georgia. He disclosed to his hearers, to Georgia, to the world, the extremities to which the Confederacy had been reduced. He told of mothers who had given their last son for the war, and informed Georgians that Macon, and of course the whole route eastward to the Atlantic, if threatened, must not call upon Hood's army for protection, but that their old men must stand in the breach, reminding them that they had not many men left between the ages of 18 and 45. But that which must have seemed most ominous to his audience was the declaration that he was going to the army to confer with General Hond and his subordinates. In view of evident facts, and of the situation of the Confederacy which he had so fully disclosed, his predictions were ludicrous. The burden of his prophecy was that Sherman must retreat, like Napoleon from the deserts of Russia, escaping only with a body-guard ! ${ }^{2}$
'Hood's explanation of this movement is a weak apology for his folly. He says:
"A serious question was now presented to me. The enemy would not certainly long remain idle.
 for subsistence. I I could not hope to hold my position. The country, being a plain, had no natural
strength, nor was there any ydvantageous position upon which I could retire. Besides, the morale
of the army strength, nor was there any advantageous position upon which 1 could retire. Beides, thie morale
of the army, roeatly improved during the operations around Atlanta, , adad again become impiaird in
consequence of the recurrence of retreat, and the army itself was decreasing in strength day by day consequence of the reecurrence of retreat, and the army itself was decreasing in strength day by day
Something was absolutely demanded, and I rightly judged that any advance, at all promising sucSomething was absolutely demanded, and I rightly judged that any advance, at al promising suc-
cess, would go far to restore its fighting spirit. Thus I determined, in consultation with the corps
commanders, to turn the enemy's right flank, and attempt to destrov his communications and force commanders, to turn the enemy's right flank, and attempt to destroy his communiceations and force him to retire from Atlanta. The operations of the cavalry under Wheeler in Georgia, and under
Forrest in Tennessee, proved to me conclusively, and beyond $a$ doubt, that all the cavalry in the Forrest in Tennessee, proved to me conclusively, and beyond a doubt, that all the cavalry in the
service could not permanently interrupt the railroad communications in the enemy's rear suffiservice could not permanently interrupt the railroad communications in the enemy's rear suffi-
ciently to cause him to abandon his position. To accomplish any thing, therefore, it became necesciently to cause him to abandon his position.
sary for me to move with my entire force.;"
Instead of having any hope of forcing Ho
Instead of having any hope of forcing Hood to fall back upon Alabama for subssistence, Sherman
was in doubt as to the possibility of his advance, so long as Hood was in his front, until he could was in doubt as to the possibility of his advance, so long as Hood was in his front, until he could
dispense with dependence upon his present line of communications. As to the morale of Hood's dispense with dependence upon his present line of communications. As th the morale of Hood
army , he was not likely to improve it by eaving Georgia open to Sherman's destructive march. army, he was not likely to improve it by leaving Georgia open to Sherman's destrective march
2 The following is a copy of Davis's Macon speech as reported in the Macon Telegraph:
Ladies and Gentlemen, Friends and Fellow-Citizens, - It would have gladdened my to have met you in prosperity instead of adversity. But friends are drawn together in adiersity. The son of a Georgian, who fought through the first revolution, I would be untrue to myself if I should forget the state in her day of peril. What though misfortune has befallen our arms from Decatur to Jonesboro', our cause is not lost. Sherman can not keep up his long line of commumi-
cation and retreat sooner or later he must ; and when that day comes, the fate that befell the army cation, and retreat sooner or later he must; and when that day comes, the fate that befell the army
of the French empire in its retreat from Moscow will be reacted. Our cavalry and our people will of the French empire in its retreat from Moscow will be reacted. Our cavalry and our people wil
harass and destroy his army as did the Cossacks that of Napoleon; and the Yankee general, like harass and destroy his army as did the Cossacks that of Napoleon; and the Yankee general, like
him, will escape with only a body-guard. How can this be the most speedily effected? By the abhim, will escape with only a body-guard. How can this be the most speedily effected? By the ab
sentees of Hood's army returning to their posts; and will they not? Can they see the banished iles; can they hear the wail of their suffering countrywomen and children and not come? By wh influences they are made to stay away it is not necessary to speak. If there is one who will stay
away at this hour, he is unworthy of the name of Georgian. To the women no appeal is necessary. away at this hour, he is unworthy of the name of Georgian. To the women no appeal is necessary.
They are like the Spartan mothers of old. I know of one who has lost all her sons except one of They are like the Spartan mothers of old. I know of one who has lost all her sons except one of
eight years. She wrote that she wanted me to reserve a place for him in the ranks. The venerable General Polk, to whom I read the letter, knew that woman well, and said it was characteristic of her; but I will not weary you by turning aside to relate the various incidents of giving up
the last son to the cause of our country known to me. Wherever we go we find the hearts and hands of our noble women enlisted. They are seen wherever the eye may fall or the step turn. hands of our noble women enlisted. They are seen wherever the eye may fall or the step turn. felt by Georgia at our army falling back from Dalton to the interior of the state. But I was not
of those who considered Atlanta lost when our army crossed the Chattahoochee. I resolved that of should not be, and I then put a man in command who I knew would strike a manly blow for the
city, and many a Yankee's blood was made to nourish the soil before the prize was won. It does city, and many a Yankee's blood was made to nourish the soil before the prize was won. It does not become us to revert to disaster. Let the dead bury the dead. Let us, with one arm and one
effort, endeavor to crush Sherman. I am going to the army to confer with our generals. The end must be the defeat of our enemy. It has been said that I abandoned Georgia to her fate
Shame upon such falsehood. Where could the author have been when Walker, when Polk, Shame upon such falsehood. Where could the author have been when Walker, when Polk, and
when General Stephen D. Lee were sent to her assistance. Miserable man. The man who uttered when General Stephen D. Lee were sent to her assistance. Miserable man. The man who uttered
this was a scoundrel. He was not a man to save our country. If I knew that a general did not possess the right qualities to command, would I not be wrong if he was not removed? Why, when our army was falling back from Northern Georgia, I even heard that I had sent Bragg with pon-
toons to cross it to Cuba. But we must he charite made to take up his musket. When the war is over, and our independence won-and we will es-
tablish our independence - who will be our aristocracy? I hope the limping soldier. To the young tablish our independence-who will be our aristocracy? I hope the limping soldier. To the young
ladies I would say that, when choosing between an empty sleeve and the man who had remained at home and grown rich, always take the empty sleeve. Let the old men remain at home and make bread. But should they know of any young man keeping away from the service, who can not be
made to go any other way, let them write to the executive. I read all letters sent me from the people, but have not the time to reply to them. You have not many men between eighteen and
forty-five left. The boys-God bless the boys!-are, as rapidly as they become old enough, going to the field. The city of Macon is filled with stores, sick and wounded. It must not be abandoned
when threatened; but when the enemy comes, instead of calling upon Hood's army for defense, the old men must fight, and when the enemy is driven beyond Chattanooga, they too can join in th general rejoicing. Your prisoners are kept as a sort of Yankee capital. I have heard that one of
their generals said that their exchange would defeat Sherman. I have tried every means, conceded their generals said that their exchange would defeat Sherman. I have tried every means, conceded
every thing to effect an exchange, but to no purpose. Butler, the Beast, with whom no commisevery thing to effect an exchange, but to no purpose. Butler, the Beast, with whom io conl con-
sioner of exchange would hold intercourse, had published in the newspapers that if we would sent to the exchange of negroes all difficulties might be removed. This is reported as an effort of
his to get himself whitewashed, by holding intercourse with gentlemen. If an exchange could b effected, I don't know but I might be induced to recognize Butler. But in the future every effor the sick and wounded to return home. It is not proper for me to
the field, but this I will say, that two thirds of our men are absent


A new problem was now presented to General Sherman. He was astonished at Hood's withdrawal from the Macon Road. It was true the Confederate army was at West Point, in a position to move on his flank; but Davis's Macon speech, which he had read in full in the Southern papers, left him no room for doubt that an attempt would be made by the enemy, moving in full force to his rear, to compel him to release his hold upon Georgia. He could not decide at once as to his future movements. It was still a question with him whether, while protecting Tennessee against Hood's invasion, he would have men enough left for the execution of his favorite project-the march eastward to Georgia. This question was soon settied by General Grant's generous co-operation ${ }^{1}$ and encouragement, and by the patriotism of the loyal states. Every day increased Sherman's confidence. In the mean time he carefully watched the enemy's movements. Tennessee must be protected at all hazards. The devastation of Georgia and the capture of Savannah would not compensate for the surrender of Nashville and Chattanooga to the Confederates.
Hood had already sent Forrest with a cavalry force 7000 strong into Middle Tennessee as a prelude to the march of his whole army. Forrest, on the 20th of September, crossed the Tennessee near Waterloo, Alabama, and destroyed a portion of the railroad between Decatur and Athens. On the 23d he appeared before the latter place, and drove the garrison of 600 men into their fort. The commander of this post was Colonel Campbell, who, in a personal interview with Forrest on the 24th, was persuaded that it was useless to resist the odds against him, and induced to surrender. In half an hour two regiments of Michigan and Ohio troops came to his assistance, and were driven back. Before Forrest reached Pulaski, General Rousseau had collected a force sufficient to defend that place, and the Confederate cavalry on the 29th swung around upon the Nashville and Chattanooga Road, and began to break it up between Tullahoma and Decherd. Rousseau had also moved promptly eastward, and at Tullahoma again barred the progress of Forrest northward. Steadman also, with 5000 men from Chattanooga, had crossed the Tennessee, and put his force in front of the enemy, compelling the latter to fall back through Fayetteville. The injuries done to the road were repaired in the course of a single day. Forrest now divided his force into two columns, commanded by Buford and himself, his own consisting of 3000 men. Buford demanded the surrender of Huntsville on the 30 th, and being refused, proceeded against Athens, which General R. S. Granger had ordered to be reoccupied by the Seventy-third Indiana, and, attacking the untarily appeals strongly to executive clemency. But suppose he stays away until the war is over,
and his comrades return home, and when every man's history will be told, where will he shield himand his comrades return home, and when every man's history will be told, where will he shield him-
self? II is upon these reflections that I rely to make men return to their duty; but, after conferring with our generals st headquarters, if there be any other remedy it shall be applied. 1 Ilove my
friends friends and I forgive my enemies. I have been asked to send re-enforcements from Virginia to Georgia. In Virginia the disparity in numbers is just as great as it is is Gieorgin. Then I have
been asked why the army sent to the Shenandoah $\begin{aligned} & \text { Valley }\end{aligned}$ was not sent here. It was because an been asked why the army sent to the Shenandoah Valley was not sent here. It was because an
army of the enemy had penetrated that valley to the very gates of Lynchburg, and General Early was sent to drive them beck. This he not only successfully did, but, crossing the Potomac, came well-nigh capturing Washington itself, and forced Grant to send two corps of his army to protect
it This the it. This capturing washington itself, and doreed Grant to send two corps of his army to protect
wonld prevent them denated a raid. If so, Sherman's march into Georgia is a raid. What would prevent them now, if Early were withdrawn from taking Lynchburg, and putting a complete cordon of men around Richmond? I counseled with that great and grave soldier, General Lee,
upon all these points. My mind roamed over the whole field. With this we can succeed. If upon all these points. My mind roamed over the whole field. With this we can succeed. If
one half the men now absent without leave will return to duty, we can defeat the enemy. With that hope I am going to the front. I may not realize this hope; but I know there are men there who have Iooked death in the face too ofien to despond now. Let no one despond. Let no one distrust, and remember that if genius is the beau ideal, hope is the reality.

Grant writes him September 27:
"It is evident from the tone of the Richmond press, and all other sources, that the enemy intend making a desperate effort to drive you from where you are. I have directed all new troops from
the West, and from the East too, if necessary, if none are ready in the West, to be sent to you."
garrison, was repulsed, without having effected any thing of any consequence. Forrest's command recrossed the Tennessee southward about the 3d of October.

Forrest retreated just in time; for before the end of September, Newton's (now Wagner's) division of Stanley's corps had relieved Steadman's command at Chattanooga; Morgan's division of Jeff C. Davis's corps was on the way to Stevenson; and Rousseau was in pursuit of Forrest with 4000 cavalry and mounted infantry, and was soon to be joined by General C. C. Washburne with 3000 cavalry and 1500 infantry from Memphis. On the 29th, General Thomas had been sent to Nashville to take command of the forces covering Tennessee. Thomas reached Nashville on the 3 d of October, and had made such a disposition of his command that, but for the rise of the Elk River, Forrest would have had great difficulty in effecting his escape. Corse's division had been dispatched to Rome, and all the new recruits and such detachments of troops as could be spared from the more northern posts of the West had been ordered to Nashville as reserves.
In the mean time Hood was moving to accomplish his daring scheme of Northern invasion. Removing the rails from the Augusta and Macon Roads for forty miles out from Atlanta, he repaired the West Point Road, toward which he began to shift his army on the 18th of September. Here he remained in the vicinity of Palmetto, with his left touching the Chattahoochee, and, having accumulated provisions for his march, began to cross the river on the 29th. By the 3d of October his army reached the neighborhood of Lost Mountain, with his cavalry on his front and right. The next day he dispatched Stewart's corps with orders to strike the railroad at Ackworth and Big Shanty. The garrisons at both these stations, numbering about 400 men, were captured. Hood's three corps d'armee were at this time commanded by Stewart, Cheatham, and Lee.

The entire Confederate army having crossed the Chattahoochee, Sherman, leaving Slocum's corps to occupy Atlanta and guard the crossing of the Chattahoochee, moved the rest of his army-the Fourth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Twenty-third Corps-north ward, reaching Kenesaw on the 5th of October. The position of the Confederate army threatened Allatoona, where a million of rations were stored. This post was held by three regiments ( 890 men ) under Colonel Tourtellotte, and was well protected by redoubts. General Sherman had anticipated an attack upon Allatoona, and had, by means of signals, ordered General Corse to re-enforce that post from Rome. The enemy had already got upon the railroad, as we have seen, by the 4th, destroying the railroad and cutting the telegraph; and on the night of that day, General Corse, with Rowett's brigade and 165,000 rounds of ammunition, reached Allatoona just in time to meet the attack made on the morning of the 5 th by French's division of Stewart's corps. Sherman reached the top of Kenesaw Mountain at 10 A.M., and from that point-a distance of 18 miles-he could see the smoke of the battle and hear faintly the sound of the artillery. He could not reach the scene of conflict in time, nor was it probable that he could afford any assistance from his main army; but he sent General J. D. Cox, with the Twenty-third Corps, to attack the assailants in the rear, on the Dallas and Allatoona Road. Signals were exchanged between Sherman and General Corse, and as soon as the Federal commander learned that the latter was at the point of danger, all his anxiety vanished. Corse's arrival increased the number of the garrison to 1944 men. By 830 A.M. French had turned Allatoona, reaching the railroad north, and cutting off communication with Cartersville and Rome. At this time he sent a flag of truce summoning the garrison to surrender, "to avoid needless effusion of blood." Corse promptly replied that he was prepared for "the needless effusion of blood," whenever it would be agreeable to General French. The enemy then attacked with great fury, the first assault falling upon Colonel Rowett, who held the western spur of the ridge. This onset was successfully resisted, but the assault was repeated over and again, and as often repulsed. On the north side, a brigade of the enemy under General Sears made an attack in flank with better success. "The enemy's line of battle," reports General Corse, "swept us like so much chaff." But Tourtellotte from the eastern spur poured on Sears's advancing troops a fire which caught them in flank and broke their ranks. The battle thus far had been going on outside of the fort, into which, by the volume and impetuosity of the enemy's assaults, the garrison was driven before noon. But, notwith


standing the odds against them, they had inflicted sufficient injury upon French's division to make it pause, and consider whether it was worth the while to attack the fort, held by men who, outside of its walls, had fought with such obstinacy. The delay gave Corse time to dispose his force in the trenches and behind the parapet. From noon till almost night the enemy closed around the fort, enfilading its trenches, and making death almost certain to those who ventured to expose themselves. The unyielding temper of the garrison baffled the enemy, who, learning that a hostile force was almost upon his rear, gave up the contest. In this action General Corse was wounded in the face. ${ }^{1}$ The loss of the garrison was about 700 men-over one third of the entire command. Corse reports that he buried 231 of the enemy's dead and captured 411 prisoners, one of whom, Brigadier General Young, estimated the Confederate loss at 2000. In no instance during the war was the value of the Signal Corps more fully illustrated than in the affair at Allatoona. The service which it rendered here, General Sherman afterward said, more than paid its entire expense from the time of its origination.
The army with which Hood had crossed the Chattahoochee, if we include Wheeler's command which subsequently joined him, numbered about 36,000 , of which one fourth was cavalry. After his failure at Allatoona, Hood moved northwestwardly across the Coosa. Sherman followed by the railroad, marching through Allatoona Pass on the 8th, and reaching Kingston on the 10th. Here he found that, making a feint on Rome, the enemy had crossed the river about 11 miles below that place. The next day, therefore, he advanced to Rome, pushing forward Garrard's cavalry and the Twentythird Corps, with instructions to cross the Oostenaula and threaten Hood's right flank, if the latter continued his movement northward. But the Confederates, by reason of their superior cavalry force, moved more rapidly, and on the 12 th Hood summoned the garrison of Resaca to surrender, threatening to take no prisoners if the surrender was refused. Colonel Weaver, the commander at Resaca, saw no cause for alarm, and bluntly refused. He had been re-enforced by Sherman, and the enemy, deeming it prudent to avoid a battle, pushed on toward Dalton, destroying the railroad in his progress. Capturing the garrison at Dalton, he moved through Tunnel Hill to Villanow.

Sherman reached Resaca on the 15th, and endeavored to force Hood to a battle by moving upon his flank and rear. Howard's army was ordered to Snake Oreek Gap, where the enemy was found occupying the former Federal defenses. Here Howard tried to hold Hood until Stanley, with the Fourth Corps, could come up in his rear at Villanow. But the Confederate commander did not intend to fight Sherman's army; he was well content with being chased. Covering his rear with Wheeler's cavalry, he fell back to Gadsden, Alabama. Sherman followed as far as Gaylesville. Here there was a pause on the part of both armies. At Gadsden, General Beauregard, commanding the military division of the West, joined Hood. The latter had anticipated that Sherman would divide his forces, and give him a chance but he had been disappointed. To venture a general engagement in the open field with an enemy whom he had been unable to oppose behind the

[^0]fortifications of Atlanta was a step too reckless for even General Hond to take. To retreat utterly at this stage of affairs would be the ruin of his own not-too-well-established reputation, and would demoralize his army. It was therefore finally determined between him and General Beauregard that Sherman should be drawn north of the Tennessee.
But Sherman had long been growing weary of chasing an army that would not, and could not be made to fight. He had now a splendid posi tion for defense, covering Bridgeport, Rome, Chattanooga, and the railroad thence to Atlanta. It was necessary that he should hold this position for a time, until his plans were matured. The strategy to which Hood was about to tempt him was not the strategy suited to his nature. If Hood would only cross the Tennessee, he would soon gratify him by a division of the Federal army. The railroads were speedily repaired, and Atlanta was being supplied with an abundance of provisions. Sherman was urging upon Grant his project of the march through Georgia to Savannah, and anxiously watching the accumulation of an army under Thomas sufficient to oppose Hood, leaving himself free to use his main army for offensive operations. ${ }^{1}$
${ }^{1}$ Sherman says in his report: "Hood's movements and strategy had demonstrated that he had an army capable of endangering at all times my communications, but unable to meet me in open fight. To follow him would simply amount to being decoyed away from Georgia, with little prospect of overtaking and overwhelming him. To remain on the defensive woold have been bad pol-
icy for an army of so great value as I then commanded, and I was forced to adopt a course more icy for an army of so great value as I then commanded, and I was forced to adopt a course more
fruitful in results than the naked one of following him to the southwest. I had previously submitted to the commander-in-chief a general plan, which amounted substantially to the destruction of Atlanta and the railroad back to Chattanooga, and sallying forth from Atlanta, through the hear of Georgia, to capture one or more of the great Atlantic sea-ports. This I renewed from Gayles-
ville, modified somewhat by the ce ville, modified somewhat by the change of events."
Sherman's dispatches during this period contai
favorite scheme of the March to the Sea. They are so characteristic that we here pive all of them which have a direct bearing upon the subject
September 29, 1864. To General HusLLEcck:; "I prefer for the future to make the movement
on Milledgeville, Millen, and Savannah River." on Milledgeville, Millen, and Savannah River."
September 30. To General Cox : "I may have to make some quick counter-moves east and
southeast. Keep your folks ready to send bagat into theast. Keep your folks ready to send baggage into Allanta, and to start on short notice. . if
. There are fine corn and potato fields about Covington and the Ocml gee bottoms.
 we make a counter-move I will go out myself with a large force, and take such,
ply us, and at the same time make Hood recall the whole or part of his army."
September 30. To Genereal THoMA: "IIf he [Hood] moves his whole force to Blue Mountan,
you watch him from the direction of Stevenson, and I will do the same from Rome ; and as soon as all things are ready, I will take advantage of his opening to me all of Georgia."
October 30. To General Grant: "Hood is evidently on the west side of Chattanooga, below Sweetwater. If he tries to get on my rood this side of the Etowah, I shall attack him; but if he goes on to the Selma and Talladega Road, why would it not do for me to leave Tennessee to the forces which Thomas has, and the reserves soon to come to Nashville, and for me to destroy At-
lanta, and then march across Georgin lanta, and then march across Georgia to Savannah or Charleston, breaking roads, and doing irre-
parable damage? We can not remain on the defensive." parable damage? We can not remain on the defens
There is no immediate reply to this from Grant.
October 1 . To Generals Howar hnd Cox: "It is well for you to bear in mind that if Hood
Ond swings over to the Alabama Road, and thence tries to get into Tennessee, I may throw back to
Chattanooga all of General Thomas's men as far down as Kingston, and draw forward all else Chattanooga all of General Thomas's men as far down as Kingston, and draw forward all else,
send back all cars and locomotives, destroy Atlanta send back all cars and locomotives, destroy Atlanta, and make for Savannah or Charleston via Mil-
ledgeville and Millen. If Hood aims at our road this side of Kingston, and in no manner threatledgeville and Millen. If Hood aims at our road this side of Kingston, and in no manner threat
ens Tennessee, I will have to turn on him. Keep these things to yourselves. The march I pro-
隹 pose is less by 200 miles than I made last fall, and less than I accomplished in February, and we
could make Georgia a break in the Confederacy by ruining both east and west roads, and not running against a single fort until we get to the sea-shore, and in communication with our ships." Octooer 1. To General Thomas: "Use your own discretion as to the matters north of the Tenstart for Milledgeville, Millen, and Savannah or Charleston, absolutely destroying all Georgia, and taking either Savannah or Charleston. In that event, I will order back to Chattanooga every
thing the other side of Kingston, and bring forward all else, destrov Atlanta and the bridge, and absolutely scour the Southern Confederacy. In that event, Hood would be puzzled, and would
follow me ; or, if he entered Tennessee he could the road this side of Kingston or Rome $r_{r}$ I will turn against him."

Sherman had already submitted to Grant the general outlines of his scheme of a march to the Atlantic. But at that time Hood was in his front, on the October 7. To General Corsse : "Keep me well advised, for I now think Hood will rather
swing against Atlanta and the Chattahoochee Bridge than against Kingston and the Etowah
 was a sensible man, and onen in yet.
worse snap than he has belt October 9 . To General Thouns: Atlanta. Hood reached our road and broke it between Big Shanty and Ackworth, and Corps at Adanta. Hood but was repulsed. .a.... I want to destroy ail the road below Chattanooga, including Atlanta, and make for the sea-coost. We can not defend this long line of road." October 9 . To General Grant; "It will be a physical impossibility to protect the road, now
that Hood, Forrest, and Wheeler, and the whole batch of devils, are turned loose, without home or
 habitation Miledgeville, Millen, and Savannah. Until we can repopulate Georgia it is useless to
wagons for Mile
occupy it, but the utter destruction of its roads, houses, and people will cripple their military occupy it, but the utter destruction of its roads, houses, and people will cripple their military re-
sources.
By attempting to hold the roads we will lose a a thousand men monthly, and will gain no result. I can make the march, and make Georgia howl. We have over s000
rations of bread, but no corn; but we can forage in the interior of the state."
rations of bread, but no corn; ;ut we can forage is the interior or the state.
October 10. To General GRiv: " Hood is now crossing the Coosa, twelve miles below Rome, October 1. To General GRaNT: Hood is now crossing the Coosa, twelve miles below Rome,
bound West. If he passes over to the Mooile and Ohio Road, had I Inot better execute the plan of
my letter sent by Colonel Porter, and leave General Thomas, with the troops now in Tennessee, to my letter sent by Colonel Porter, and leave General Thomas, with the troops now in Tennessee, to
defend the state. He will have an ample force when the re-enforcements ordered reach Nashrill ",
 the present force I have and the re-enforcements expected, because I do not know how many re--
enforcements are coming. I will do my best, however, and, as you direct, will concentrate the inenforcements are coming. I will do my best, hovever, and, as you direct, will concentrate the in-
fantry force about Stevenson and Huntsville, leaving a portion of the cavalry to watch the river befween Decatur and Eastport," "
 las and Ackworth, and I was forced to follow. I hold Atlanta with the Twentieth Corps, and
road at
have strong detachments along my line. These reduce my active force to a comparatively small army. We can not remain now on the defensive. With 25,000 men, and the bold cavalry
he has, he [Hood] can constantly break my road. I would infinitely prefer to make a wreck he has, he [Hood] can constantly break my road. I would infinitely prefer to make a wreck
of the road, and of the country from Chattanooga to Atlanta, including the latter city, send back of the road, and of the country from Chattanooga to Atlanta, including the latter city, send back
all my wounded and worthless, and with my effective army move through Georgia, smashing all my wounded and worthless, and with my effective army move through Georgia, smashing
things to the sem. Hood may turn into Tennesce and Kentuck, but I believe he will be
forced to foliov: me. Instead of being on the defensive, I would be on the offensive. Instead of guessing at hat he means to do, he would have to guess at my y lans. The difference in war
is fill 25 per cent. I can make Savannah, Charleston, or the mouth of the Cliattahoochee ( 4 .
 October 16. To General Schorien: I want the first positive fact that Hood contemplates
an invasion of Tennessee. Invite him to do so. Send him a free pass in.," Beauregard is with Hood, and that the army is going to cross the Tennessee.
Octorning Wilson loose rather than undertake the plan of a march with the whole force through Georgia to the sea." see, unless you and the authorities in Washington deem it absolutely necessary. October 19. To General Hatleck : "The enemy will not venture into Tennessee except around
by Decatur. I propose to send the Fourth Corps to General Thomas, and leave him with that corps, the garrisons, and new troops, to defend the line of the Tennessee, and with the rest to push into the erart of Georgia Trome out at savannah, destroying all the railroads of the state." now have in Tennessee, what are expected, and how disposed. I I proposes, with the armeses of
the Tennessee and the Ohio, and two cors of yours, to sally forth, and make a hole in Geo of the Tennessee and the be hard to mend. Hood has little or no baggage, and will escape me. He can not invade Tennessee except to the west of Huntsvilie. .... I will send back into Tennessee the Fourth Corps, all dismounted cavalry, all sick and wounded, and ail encumbrances whatever, except what I can haul in our wagons, and will probably, about November, break up the rail-
road and bridges, destroy Atlanta, and make a break for Mobile, Savannah, or Charleston. I road and bridges, destroy Atlanta, and make a break for Mobile, Savannah, or Charlesten. want you to remain in Tennessee, and take command of all my division not actually present with
me Hood's army may be set down at 40,000 of all arms fit for duty; he may follow me or turn me. Hood's army may be set down at 40,000 of all arms tit for duty; he may follow me or turn
against you. If you can defend the line of the Tennessee in my absence of three months is all I ${ }^{\text {ask.". }}$ October 19. To Colonel Beckwith (Act'g Q. M. at Atlanta): "Hood will escape me. I want to prepare for my big raid. On the 1st of November I want nothing in, Atlanta but what is necessary to war. Send all trash to the rear, and hark on hand thirty days' food and but little forage.
I propose to abandon Atlanta and the railroad back to Chattanooga, and sally forth to ruin GeorI propose to abandon Atlanta and the railroad back to Chattanooga, and sally forth to ruin Geor-
gia and bring up on the sea-shore." gia and bring up on the sea-shore.
October 19. To General HALLECR: "We must no be on the defensive, and I now consider myself authorized to execute my plan, toto strike out into theart of Georgia, and make for Charleston, Savannah, or the mouth of the Appalachicola. General Grant prefers the middle one, Savannah, and I understand you to prefer Selma and the Alabama. I must have alternatives, else, being confined to one route, the enemy might so oppose that delay and want would trouble me; but, having alternatives, I can take so eccentric a course that no general can guess at my objective. Therefore, when you hear 1 am off, have look-outs at Morris 1 sland, south Caroina, Ossabaw sound, Georgia,
Pensacola, and Mobile Bays. I will turn up somewhere, and believe I can take Macon, Milledgeville, Augusta, and Savannah, Georgia, and wind up with closing the neck back of Charleston, so that they will starve out. This mo-ement is not purely military or strategic, but it will illustrate the vilnerability of the South. They don't know what war means; but when the rich planters of the Oconee and Savannah see their fences, and corn, and hogs, and sheep vanish before their eyes, they will have something more than a mean opinion of the 'Yanks. Even now our poo mules laugh at the fine corn-fields, and our soldiers riot on chestnuts, sweet potatoes, pigs, chickens, etc. The poor people come to me and beg us for their lives; but my customary answer is, soldiers will suffer when there is abundance within reach. down the Coosa [Sherman, when writing this, was at Summerville, Georgial, and then will rapidly put into execation 'the plan.' In the mean time I ask that you will give General Thomas all the
troops you sence of, say, ninety days."
October 19. To General WiLson: "General Garrard has about 2500 cavalry, General Kilpat rick 1500 , General McCook 600 ; there may be about 1000 other cavalry with my army. These embrace all the cavarry ready for battle. 1 wish you would $\ldots$ bring to me about 2500 new
cavalry, and then go to work to make up three divisions, each of 2500 , for the hardest fighting of the war. I am going into the very bowels of the Confederacy, and propose to leave a trail that will the war. 1 am going into the vecol
October 20. To General THowas: "I think I have thought over the whole field of the future.
and, being now authorized to act, I want all things bent to the following general plan of action for the nexx three months.
65,000 men, with whieh I here and at Atlanta I propose to organize an efficient army of 60,000 to 65,000 men, with which I propose to destroy Macon, Augusta, and, it may be, Savannah and Charles
ton; but I will also keep open the alternatives of the mouth of the Appalachicola and Mobile. By ton; but I will also keep open the alternatives of the mouth of the Appalachicola and Mobile. By
this $I$ propose to demonstrate the vulnerability of the South, and make its inhabitants feel that war and individual ruin are synonymous terms. To pursue Hood is folly, for he can twist and turn like a fox, and wear out any army in pursuit; to continue to occupy long lines of railroads simply ex-
poses our small detachments to be picked up in detail, and forces me to make countermarches to protect lines of communication. I Know $I$ ap right in this, and shall proceed to its maturity. As
to details, I propose to take General Howard and his army, General Schofield and his, and tw to details, I propose to take General Howard and his army, General Schoield and his, and
corps of yours, vize, Generals Davis's and Slocum's.
Ing Hood until all surplus men and material, and stripped for the work. Then I will send General Stanley, with the Fourth Corps, across by Will's Valley and Caperton's to Stevenson, to report to you. If you send me 5000 or 6000 new conscripts, I may also send be2k one of General Slocum's or Davis's divisions, but I prefer to maintain organizations, I want yer to retain command in Tennessee, and before there will be unity of action belind me. I will want yout to hold Chattanooga and Decatur in force and on the occasion of my departure, of which you will have ample notice, to watch Hood close. I Decatur and the head of the Tennessee for Columbus, Mississippi, and Selma to push soustutely to reach those points, but to divert or pursue, according to the state of facts. If, however, Hood turns on you, you must act defensively on the line of the Tennessee. I will ask, and you may also urge, at at the same time General Canby act vigorously up the Alabama River.
"I do not fear that the Southern army will again make a lod events demonstrate how rapidy armies can be raised in the Northwest on that question, and how

Macon Road. He was not, under these circumstances, willing to make the venture unless he could be sure of some objective point, like Savannah, alof access. We have now a good entering wedge, and should dirive it home. It will take some
time to complete these details, and I hope to hear from you in the mean time. We must preserve a
a large ampunt of secrecy, and I may actually change the ultimate point of arrival, but not the main object." October 20. To General SLocus: "Use all your energies to send to the rear every thing not
needed for the grand march. I will take your corps along. We will nee needed for the grand march. I will take your corps along. We will need $1,500,000$ rations of
bread, coffee, sugar, and salt, so0,000 rations of salt meat, and all else should be shipped away. Iober 22. To General GraxT: "I feel perfectly master of the situation here. I still hold Atlanta, and the road with all bridges and vital points well gaarded, and I bave in hand an army before which Hood has retreated precipitately down the Coosa. It is hard to divine his future
plans; but by abandoning Georgia, and taking position with his rear to Selma, he threatens the plans; fut by abandoning Georgia, and taking position with his rear to selma, he threatens the
road from Chattanooga to Allanta, and may move up to Tennessee by Deactur. He can not cross the Tennessee except at Muscle Shoals, for all other points are patroled by our gun-boats.
" 1 am now perfecting arrangements to put into Tennessee a force able to hold the lin Tennessee while 1 break up the railroad in front of Dalton, including the city of Atlanta, and push
into Georgia and break up all its railroads and depôts capture its horses and negroes make deso into Georgia and break up all its railroads and dépots, capture its horses and negroes, make deso
lation every where, destroy the factories at Macon, Milledgerille, and Augusta, and bring up witl 60,000 men on the sea-shore about Sevannah or Charleston. Ithink this far better than defend-
ing a long line of railroad. I will leave General George H. Thomas to command all my military division belind me, and take with me only the best fighting material. Of course I will subsist on
the bountiful corn-fields and potato-patches, the bountiful corn-1ielss and potato-patces, as ; aile up the forage, corn, and potatoes, and kee October 23 . To General stoccm: "Go on ; pile up the forage, corn, and potatoes, and keep
your artillery horses fat ; send back all unserviceable artillery, and, at the last moment, we can count up oury horses, and sen what we can haun, and send back all else. One ongn per thousand men
will be plenty to take along. Hood is doubtless now at Blue Mountain, and Forrest over about Corinth and Tuscumbia, hoping by threatening Tennessee to make me quit Georgia. We piling up men in Tennessee enough to attend to them, and to leave me free to go ahead. The
railroad will be done in a day or two. We find abundance of corn and potatoes out here, and ws enjoy them much; they cost nothing a bushel. If Georgia can afford to break our railroads, she October 23. To General Thomas : "Hood is now at Blue Mountain, and Forrest evidently over about Tuscumbia. No doubt they will endeavor conjointly to make me come out of Georgia, but
I don't want them to succeed. All Georgia is now open to me, and I do believe you are the man
best qualified to manage the affairs of Tennessee and North Mississippi. spare yont the Fourth Corps and about 5000 men not fit yor orders, and. as I wrote you, I cair spare you the Fourth Corps and about 5000 men not fit for my purrososes, but which will be well
enounh for garrison at Chattanooga, Murfreesborough, and Nashhille. What you need is a few
points fortified and stocked with provisions, and a movable column of 25,000 men that can strike in any direction." stocked with provisions, and a movable column of 25,000 men that can strik Uctober 24. To General Halleck: "Beauregard announces his theorem to be to drive Sher-
man out of Atlanta, which he still holds defiantly, and dares him to the encounter, but is not will
ing to chase him all over creation." the fact that the rebel army is not there, and the chances are it has moved West. If it turns up at Gunterssile $I$ will be after it, but if it it and the chances as $I$ believe, to Decatur and beyond, I I must leave it to you at present, and push or the heart of Georgia.
Wauhatechee to-morrow; use it freely, and if I see that Hood crosses the Thennessee I w will send
Schofied. On these two corps you can ingraft all the new troops; with the balance I will go Schofie
south.
October 29. To General Thomas: "Ingraft on Stanley and Schofield all the new troops. Gie Schonield a division of new troops. Give General Tower all the men you,
forts at Nashille, and urge on the navy to pile up gun-boats in the Tennessee."
Uctober 29. To General Roskecrass: "I have pushed Beauregard to the west of Decatur, but I know he is pledged to invade Tennessee and Kentucky, having his base on the old Mobile and Ohio Road. I have put Thomas in Tennessee, and given him as many troops as he thinks neces-
sary, but I don't want to leave it to chance, and therefore would like to have Smith's and Mower's divisions up the Tennessee River as soon as possible. . ., . I propose myself to push straight down into the heart of Georgia, smashing things generally.
November 1. To General Grant: "As you foresaw, and as Jeff. Davis threatened, the enemy is
now in the fall tide of execution of his grand plan to destren
 t will. Forrest seems to be scattered from Eastport to Jackson, Paris, and the Lower Tennesat will. Forrest seems to be scattered from Eastport to Jackson, Paris, and the Lower Tennessee, and General Thomas reports the capture by him of a gun-boat and five transports. General
Thomas has near Athens and Pulaski Stanleys corps, about 15, oon strong, and Schofield's corps, 10,000 , en route by rail, and has at least 20,000 to 2 ,, 000 men, with new regiments and conscripts alriving al the time also. General Rosecrans promises the two divisions of Smith and Mower,
belonging to me, but I doubt if they can reach Tennessee in less than ten days. If I were to let go Atlanta and North Georgia and make for Hood, he would, as he did here, retreat to the south-
west, leaving his militia, now assembling at Macon and Grifin, to occupy our conquests, and the work of last summer would be lost. I have retained about 50,000 good troops, and have sent back catur, all strongly fortified and provisioned for a long siege. I will destroy the railroads of Georgia, catur, all strongly fortiticed and provisioned for a long siege. and do as much substantial damage as is possible, reaching the sea-coast near one of the infux troops promised, will be bable in a very feve dams to assume the oftessive. Hood's cavalry may do a good
deal of damage, and I have sent Wilson back with all dismounted cavalry, retaining only about deal of damage, and I have sent Wilson back with all dismounted cavary, retaining only youout
4500 . This is the best I can do, and shall, therefore, when I get to Atlanta the necessary stores, more south as soon as possible."
yone same day Grant writes to Sherman: "Do you not think it advisable, now that Hood has gone so far north, to entirely ruin him before starting on your proposed campaign? With
army destroyed, you can go where you please with impunity. I believed, and still believe, if you had started south while Hood was in the neighborhood of you, he would have been forced to go after you. Now that heis is so far away, he might look upon the chase as useless, and he will go in
one direction while you are pushing the other. If you can see the chance for destroying Hood's army, attend to that first, and make the other move secondary."
November 2. To General TroMAs: "A Acoording to Wilson's account, you will have, in ten days,
full 12,000 cavalry, and I estimate your infantry force, independent of railroad guards, full 40,000 , which is a force superior to the eneny " If I could hope to overhaul Hood, I would turn against him
November 2. To General GraxT: with my whole force; then he would retreat to thr southwest, drawing me as a decoy from Georgia, Which ts his chief object. If he ventures north of the he has not gone above the Tennessee. Thomas will have a force strong enough to prevent hi reaching any country in which we have an interest, and he has orders, if Hood turns to follow me, to push for Selma. No single army can catch im,
and I am convinced the best results will follow from our defeating Jeff. Davi's cherished plan of and $I$ am convinced the best results will follow from our defeating Jeff. Davis's cherished plar of makng me leave Georgia baga mage so that I can pick up and start in any direction; but I would plans, and have reduchod my bagease so sill, if he attempts to invade Middle Tennessee, I will hold regard a pursuit of Hood as useless. Sthat direction ; but, unless I let go Atlanta, my force will not be equal to his.
To this Grant replies the same day: "Your dispatch of 9 A.M. yesterday is just received. I
dispatehed you the same date, advising that Hoods army, now that it had worked so far north dispatched you the same date, advising that Hoods army, now that it had worked so far norrn, ought to be looked upon more as the obect. Wnd destroy him. I really do not see that you can Thithdraw from where you are to follow Hood, without giving up all we have gained in territory." November 2. To General Grant: "General Thomas reports to-day that his cavary reconnoitred within three miles of Florence yesterday, and found Beauregard intrenching. I thave ordered him to hold Nashrille, Chattanooga, and Decatur, all well supplied for a siege ; all the rest of his army to assemble about Pulaski, and to fight Beauregard cautionsly and csume a bold offensive, time, for A. J. Smith and all re-enforcements to get up to enabie Jeff. Davis will change his tune and to enable Wilson to get a good amount of cavarry. Iten ink Jetr. Davis and I think it will have
when he finds me advancing into the heart of Georgia instead of retreatigg, when he inds me act on your operations at Richmond."
an November 3. To General Halleck: "The situation of affairs now is as follows: Beauregard, with Hood's army, is at Florence, with a pontoon bridge protected from our gun-boats from below
by the by the Colbert Shoals, from above by the Muscle Shoals. He has wintry round about Florence hias
cavalry. Forrest's cavalry is down about Fort Heiman. The country been again and again devastated during the past three years, and patched up in its whole extent. on the Mobile and Ohio Rairroa, which aso has
He purposes and promises his men to invade Midle Tennessee for the purpose of making me let He purposes and promises his men to invade Midae Ten Gassdeo , dhispatched the Fourth Corps, General Stanley, 15,000 strong, who is now at Pulaski, and susbequenty the Twenty-dird Corps,
General Schofield, 10,000 , who is now on cars moving to Nashville. This gives General Thomas
ready in possession of the national armies. But, as soon as Hood moved from his front, the way seemed open for an advance through Georgia to the two full corps and about 8000 cavalry, besides 10,000 dismounted cavalry and all the new troops recently sent to Tennessee, with the railroad guards, with which to encounter Beauregard, should
he advance farther. Besides which, General Thomas will have the active co-operation of the gunhe advance farther. Besides which, General the two divisions of Smith and Mower, en route from Missouri. I therefore feel no uneasiness as to Temnessee, and have ordered General Thomas to assume the offensive in the direction of Selma, Alabama. With myself I have the Twentieth Corps at Atlanta, the Fifteenth and Seventeenth near Kenesaw, and the Fourteenth here [near Kingston].
I am sending to the rear, as fast as cars will move, the vast accumulation of stuff that, in spite of my endeavors, has been got over the road, and am sending forward just enough bread and meat to enable me to load my wagons, destroy every thing of value to the enemy, and start on my contem-
plated trip. I can be ready in five days, but am waiting to be more certain that Thomas will be
prepared for any contingency that may arise. It is now raining, which is favorable to us and unfavorable to the enemy. Davis has utterly failed in his threat to force me to leave in thirty days, favorable to the enemy. Davis has uttery faille to Atlanta, and his army is farther from my com-
for my railroad is in good order from Nashaile
munications now than it was twenty days ago. . . . . I propose to adhere, as near as possible, munications now than it was twenty days ago. . . . . . I propose to adhere, as near as possible,
to my original plan, and, on reaching the sea-coast, will be available for re-enforcing the army in
Virginia, leaving behind a track of desolation, as well as a sufficient force to hold fast all that is of permanent value to our cause."
November 6. To General Grant :
"Dear General, -I have heretofore telegraphed and written you pretty fully, but I still have some thoughts in my busy brain that should be confided to you as a key to future developments.
"The taking of Atlanta broke on Jeff. Davis so suddenly as to disturb the equilibrium of his
usually well-balanced temper, so that at Augusta, Macon, and Columbia, South Carolina, he let "The taking of Atlanta broke on Jeff. Davis so suddenly as to disturb the equilibrium of his
asually well-balanced temper, so that at Augusta, Macon, and Columbia, South Carolina, he let
out some of his thoughts, which otherwise he would have kept to himself. As he is not only the
President of the Southern Confederacy, but also its commander-in-chief, we are bound to attach out some of his thoughts, which otherwise he would have kept to himself. As he is not only the
President of the Southern Confederacy, but also its commander-in-chief, we are bound to attach
more importance to his words than we would to those of a mere civil chief magistrate more importance to his words than we would to those of a mere civil chief magistrate.
"The whole burden of his song consists in the statement that Sherman's communi "The whole burden of his song consists in the statement that Sherman's communications must
be broken and his army destroyed. Now it is a well-settled principle that, if we prevent his suc-
ceeding in his threat, we defeat him, and derive all the moral advantages of a victory. Thus far ceeding in his threat, we defeat him, and derive all the moral advantages of a victory. Thus far
Hood and Beauregard conjointly have utterly failed to interrupt my supplies or communications.
My railroad and telegraph are now in good order from Atlanta back to the Ohio River. His loss-
es in men at Allatoona, Resaca, Ship's Gap, and Decatur exceed in number es in men at Allatoona, Resaca, Ship's Gap, and Decatur exceed in number ours at the block-
houses at Big Shanty, Allatoona Creek, and Dalton; and the rapidity of his flight from Dalton to Gadsden takes from him all the merit or advantage claimed for his skillful and rapid lodgment on my railroad. The only question in my mind is whether I ought not to have dogged him far over
into Mississippi, trusting to some happy accident to bring him to bay and to battle; but I then
thought that by so doing I would play into his hands, by being drawn or decoyed too far away
from our

Rom A have before informed you, 1 sent Stanleg back directly from Gaylesville, and Schofield from
Rome, boti of which have reached their destination; and thus far Hood, who has brought up at
 forece numerically freater than his, well commanded and well
ness on the score of Hood reaching my main communications.

 were arriving at Johnsonville, and a fleet of gun-boats was reported coming up from below, able to
repair that trouble. You know that line of supplies was only opened for summer's use, when the Cumberland is not to be depended upon. We now have abundant supplies at Atlanta, Chattanooga, and Nashville, with the Louisville and Nashville Railroad and the Cumberland River unmolested, so that I regard Davis's threat to get his army on my rear, or on my communications, as a miserable failure
Now as to the second branch of my proposition. I admit that the first object should be the
destruction of that army; and if Beauregard moves his infantry and artillery up into the pocket destruction of that army; and if Beauregard moves his infantry and artillery up into the pocket
about Jackson and Paris, I will feel strongly tempted to move Thomas directly against him, and about Jackson and Paris, I will feel strongly tempted to move Thomas directly against him, and
myself move rapidly by Decatur and Purdy to cut off his retreat. But this would involve the myself move rapidly by Decatur and Purdy to cut off his retreat. But this would involve the
abandonment of Atlanta, and a retrograde movement, which would be very doubtful of expediency abr success; for, as a matter of course, Beauregard, who watches me with his cavalry and his friendly citizens, would have timely notice, and slip out and escape, to regain what we have earned at so much cost. I I am more than satisfied that Beauregard has not the nerve to attack fortifications, or it would be a great achievement for him to make me abandon Atlanta by mere threats and ma-
nceuvres. nceuvres.

These are the reasons which have determined my former movements, and all the vast amount of stores accumulated by our army in the advance, wounded, and worthless, and all the vast amount of stores accumulated by our army in the advance, aiming to organize this
branch of my army into four well-commanded corps, encumbered by only one gun to a thousand men, and provisions and ammunition which can be loaded up in our mule-wagous, so that we can pick up and start on the shortest notice. I reckon that by the 10 th instant this end will be reach pick and by that date I also will have the troops all paid ; the presidential election over and out of the way ; and I hope the early storms of November, now prevailing, will also give us the chance of a long period of fine healthy weather for campaigning. Then the question presents itself, 'What shall be done?' On the supposition always that Thomas can hold the line of the Tennessee, and
very shortly be able to assume the offensive as a very shortly be able to assume the offensive as against Beauregard, I propose to act in such a man-
ner against the material resources of the South as utterly to negative Davis's boasted threat and ner against the material resources of the South as utterly to negative Davis's boasted threat and
promises of protection. If we can march a well-appointed army right through his territory, it is a promises of protection. If we can march a well-appointed army right through his territory, it is a sist. This may not be war, but rather statesmanship' nevertheless it is overwhelming to my mind that there are thousands of people abroad and in the South who will reason thus: If the North can mareh an army right through the South, it is proof positive that the North can prevail in this contest, leaving only open the question of its willingness to use that power. Now Mr. Lincoln's election (which is assured), coupled with the conclusion thus reached, makes a complete logical whole. Even without a battle, the results, operating upon the minds of sensible men, would produce fruits more than compensating for the expense, trouble, and risk.
"Admitting this reasoning to be good, that such a movement per se be right, still there may be reasons why one route should be better than another. There are three from
south, and southwest-all open, with no serious enemy to oppose at present. south, and southwest-all open, with no serious enemy to oppose at present.
"The first would carry me across the only east and west railroad remaini
which would be destroyed, and thereby the communication tailroad remaining to the Confederacy, which would be destroyed, and thereby the communication between the armies of Lee and Beau-
regard severed. Incidentally I might destroy the enemy's dépôts at Macon and Augusta, and reach the sea-shore at Charleston and Savannah, from either of which points I could re-enforce our armies in Virginia.
"The second and easiest route would be due south, following substantially the valley of Flint River, which is very fertile and well supplied, and fetching up on the navigable waters of the Appalachicola, destroying en route the same railroad, taking up the prisoners of war still at Andersouville, and destroying about 400,000 bales of cotton near Albany and Fort Gaines. This, however,
"The third, down the Chattahoochee to Opelika mements.
Beyou, in communication with Fort Morgan. This latter route would to Pensacola or Tensas Bayou, in commumication with Fort Morgan. This latter route would enable me at once to
co-operate with General Canby in the reduction of Mobile, and occupation of the line of the Alabama.
my judgment, the first would have a material effect upon your campaign in Virginia; the
would be the safest of execution; but the third would more properly fall within the second would be the safest of execution; but the third would more properly fall within the sphere
of my own command, and have a direet bearing upon my own enemy, 'Beauregard, If, therefore, I should start before I hear farther from you, or before farther developments turn my course you may take it for granted that I have moved via Griffin to Barnsville ; that I break up the road Millen to Savannah, or, if I feign on Macon, you may take it for granted I have shot off toward Opelika, Montgomery, and Mobile Bay or Pensacola.
advised. To this Grant replies, November 7: "I see no present reason for changing your plan; should any arise, you will see to it, or if I do, I will inform you. I think every thing here favorable now. Great good fortune attend you. I believe you will be
make a march less fruitful of results than hoped

November 8. To G. W. Tyler, Louisville, Ky. : "Dispatch me to-morrow night and the next at Milledgeville, where I expect a friendly interview in a few days. Keep this very secret fror the world will lose sight of me shortly, and you will hear worse stories than when I went to Merid-
ian. Jeff. Davis's thirty days are up for wiping us out, and we are not wiped out yet by a good ${ }^{2}$
publish information too near the trath, counteract its effect by publishing other paragraphs calcupublish information too near the truth, counteract its effect by publishing other paragraphs calcu
sea-coast. He had then to consider whether he could make the march, and at the same time protect Chattanooga and Nashville. This was a question which could only be answered when it was certainly ascertained what reenforcements would be received. By the middle of October Hood had been driven off from the Chattanooga and Atlanta Railroad. About the 1st of November he threatened to cross the Tennessee in the ne:ghborhood of Decatur. This, indeed, was the only point at which he could effect a crossing, the rest of the river-from Muscle Shoals above and Colbert Shoals below -being guarded by gun-boats. Sherman had, by this time, dispatched Stanley's Fourth and Schofield's Twenty-third Corps-about 25,000 infantryto General Thomas. Brevet Major General James Wilson had arrived from the Army of the Potomac, to take command of Sherman's cavalry, and it seemed probable that in the course of a few days he would be able to mount 12,000 men. New regiments of recruits were continually coming into Nashville, and Sherman ordered these to be ingrafted into the veteran corps of Stanley and Schofield. Hood would be delayed for some days in the ac cumulation of supplies, and in the mean time A. J. Smith's and Mower's divisions could be brought over from Missouri. With these divisions added to his other forces, Sherman thought Thomas would have a force sufficient to attend to Hood. He thought, however, that Hood, learning of his march eastward, would follow him, at least with his cavalry In any event, he had no uneasiness in regard to Tennessee.
But Thomas was not so confident. He thought it would be better to send Wilson's cavalry through Georgia, and fight Hood with the whole of Sherman's army. Grant also urged this at first; but Sherman's arguments final ly convinced him that Thomas could take care of Tennessee, and that it was better that Sherman should carry out his project. Thomas also, in the end, reached the same conclusion

Sherman's perfect confidence in his own scheme excites our admiration. He had no doubts. He had carefully balanced the forces on both sides, and knew that Thomas would be a match for Hood. To protect his long line of railroad, garrison Atlanta, and pursue Hood "all over creation" involved, in his judgment, the waste of 60,000 men. To make a wreek of Atlanta and Rome, and of the railroad from Atlanta to Dalton, left nothing for the enemy to occupy, nothing for himself to guard. The four army corps which he still retained - 60,000 strong - contained the best fighting material of his command. North of Atlanta they were not needed. If they should operate with Thomas against Hood, the latter, "turning and twisting like a fox," would slip out of their hands, and thus time, energy, and opportunity would be wasted, without any adequate results. In the strict economy of war, therefore, Sherman was justified in using this superfluous army elsewhere, striking instead of waiting, marching, and countermarching. It is true there were no armies in his front to strike, southward or eastward. Still, there were several important ends to be attained by his march.

In the first place, the march of an organized army, as strong in numbers as that with which Sherman proposed to move through the interior of the enemy's country, from its easternmost to its westernmost limit, would at the same time illustrate the inherent weakness of the Confederacy and the strength of the national armies. Such a march, with such an army, would demonstrate to the world that the ultimate triumph of the nation over the rebellion was an assured fact. In connection with President Lincoln's re election, it would ruin the hopes of the peace party in the loyal states. I would also destroy all confidence on the part of the Southern people tha their usurped government could afford them protection. Well might Sher man say that, "even without a battle, the results, operating upon the minds of sensible men, would produce fruits more than compensating for the ex pense, trouble, and risk.
But it would not be simply a political demonstration. The military concavalry, and he will soon move in several columns in a circuit, so as to catch Hood's army. Sherman's destination is not Charleston, but Selma, where he will meet an army from the Guif, etc.
November. 11. To General HALLEGK : "My arrangements are now all complete. Last night we burned all founderies, mills, and shops of every kind in Rome, and to-morrow I leave Kings ton, with the rear-guard, for Atlanta, which I propose to dispose of in a similar manner, and to start on the 16 th on the projected grand ras i hope he will enjoy it. my army prefers to enjoy the gone back to his old hold at the Ocmulgee. I have balanced all the figures well, and am satisfied that General Thomas has in Tennessee a force sufficient for all probabilities, and I have urged him, the moment Beauregard turns south, to cross the Tennessee at Decatur and push straight for Selma. To-morrow our wires will be broken, and this is probably my last dispatch. I would
like to have Foster break the Savannah and Charleston Road about Pocotaligo about the 1 st of De cember. All other preparations are to my entire satisfaction.
The same day Colonel Beckwith reports to Sherman
The same day Colonel Beckwith reports to Sherman as follows: "The Army of the Tennessee Iwentieth Aive got in their wagons all they can haul and all they want, same of the Fourteenth Army Corps may want a little more bread, and perhaps a little more sugar. I have about 100,000 rations of bread for the Fourteenth Army Corps; 22,000 rations sugar. I do not know how much General Davis may have on hand, but presume he has 200,000 rations of bread at least 11,200,000 rations of the principal rations in hands of troops and available.
November 11. To General Thomas: "All right. I can hardly believe Beauregard would at tempt to work against Nashville from Corinth as a base at this stage of the war, but all information points that way; if he does, you will whip him out of his boots. But I rather think you will find commotion in his camp in a day or two. Last night we burned Rome, and in two days more
will burn Atlanta, and he must discover that I am not retreating, but, on the contrary, fighting for the very heart of Georgia. . . By using detachments of recruits and dismounted cavalr
in your fortifications, you will have Schofield, and Stanley, and A. J. Smith strengthened by eight in your fortifications, you will have Schoneld, and Stanley, and A. J. Smite Beauregard across the Tennessee, and prevent his ever returning. I still believe, however, that public clamor will foree
him to turn and follow me, in which event you should cross at Decatur, and move directly toward Selma as far as you can transport supplies. The probabilities are the wires will be broken to-mor row, and that all communication will cease between us. . . . You may act, however, on the certainty that I sally from Atlanta on the 16 th, with about 60,000 men, well provisioned, but expect
ing to live liberally on the country."
in Thomas replies the next day: "I have no fears that Beauregard can do us any harm now, and
if he attempts to follow you I will follow him as far as possible; if he does not follow you, I will
then thoronghly organize my troops, and, I believe, shall have men enough to ruin him unless he gets out of the way very rapidly. The country of Middle Alabama, I learn, is teeming with supplies this year, which will be greatly to our advantage. . . ... I am now convinced that the great-
er part of Beauregard's army in near Florence and Tuscumbia, and that you will at least have a
clear road before you for several days, and that your success will fully equal your expectations," This was the last dispatch received by Sherman from Thom


[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ The day after the battle, Corse writes to Sherman: "I am short a cheek-bone and one ear,
    but am able to whip all hell yet."

