

they showed themselves in the trenches. For ten days the army remained nearly in the same position, only gradually extending its lines to the south, and approaching the Chickahominy, covering itself with intrenchments as it moved. Lee, presuming that the purpose of Grant was to effect a crossing at Bottom's Bridge, made correspondent movements, extending his right farther and farther down the stream, likewise intrenching at every step, so that the whole arid plain was dug over until it resembled an immense prairie-dog town. General officers had their tents pitched in deep excavations fronted by high embankments. Pickets and outposts excavated burrows, in which they lay unsheltered under the fierce sun. High breastworks were thrown up, and deep trenches dug at every conceivable angle, under shelter of which the men passed to and fro, from front to rear, without being observed. The intricate system of mounds and trenches, which still scar the plain upon the north bank of the Chickahominy, were the work of these days. The Confederates made several sallies upon portions of the line, but were invariably repulsed, and after the third day ceased from formal offensive operations; yet the lines were within rifle range, and a continual fire of sharpshooters was kept up. Not an hour passed without its quota of dead and wounded. This was interrupted only for two hours on the 7th, when a truce was entered into for removing the wounded and burying the dead.

Grant, while making preparations to transfer his army to the south bank of the James, still hoped that the enemy would make some movement which would give a favorable opportunity for a renewed attack. But Lee remained immovable in his intrenchments, which the experience of Cold Harbor had shown to be inexpugnable. On the evening of the 12th the movement for the passage of the James began. Warren, preceded by Wilson's cavalry, marched six miles down to the Long Bridge over the Chickahominy, where he crossed, masking the movements of the other corps. Hancock followed, and then, taking the advance, marched down to the James, which it struck a little below the point where McClellan had lain after the battle of Malvern Hill. Wright and Burnside moved by an exterior and longer route, crossing the Chickahominy at Jones's Bridge, six miles below the Long Bridge. The trains, making a wide detour to the south, crossed at a ferry twelve miles below. The columns moved rapidly over the sandy road, hardly stopping for a moment until the night of the 13th, when the wearied troops bivouacked upon the high lands from which they could behold the James lying broad before them, bordered by fields now ripening for the harvest. Smith's corps had in the mean while marched to the White House, whence, embarking on transports, it sailed down the York and up the James, rejoining Butler at Bermuda Hundred on the 14th, while the Army of the Potomac was crossing the James fifteen miles below.

Lee, of course, could not be for many hours ignorant of the general movement, but he was in no position to offer any resistance. He had already extended his line so far that it was as weak as he dared make it. He evidently supposed that it was Grant's purpose to march toward Richmond by the north bank of the James instead of crossing and transferring operations to the south bank. Warren, indeed, was so posted for two days near White Oak Swamp as to give color to this supposition. Lee, therefore, hastily abandoned his position, and, crossing the Chickahominy, fell back to Richmond.

The cavalry under Sheridan, 10,000 strong, had in the mean while been active. No sooner had Grant taken his position near Spottsylvania, than, on the 9th of May, Sheridan was sent toward Richmond to operate upon the enemy's lines of communication. The design was masked by a movement eastward toward Fredericksburg, which drew Stuart's Confederate cavalry in that direction. Sheridan, then turning sharply southward, struck straight for the railroad between Lee's army and Richmond. Stuart followed for a space, and ineffectually assailed Sheridan's rear. Then, imagining that Richmond was the aim of the enemy, he urged his horsemen to their utmost speed, and gained Sheridan's front, placing himself between him and Richmond. Sheridan meanwhile moved leisurely, destroying the railroad as he advanced. At Ashland Station he fell upon Lee's provision trains, which had been brought down from Orange Court-house, and destroyed a million and a half of rations, and most of the medical stores. On the 11th a sharp encounter took place between the opposing cavalry forces at Yellow Stone Tavern, a few miles north of Richmond; the Confederates were repulsed, and in the mêlée, Stuart, their ablest cavalry leader, was mortally wounded. The loss was irreparable. The Union cavalry had by this time been raised to a higher state of efficiency than that of the enemy, and, now that their ablest commander was gone, the disparity became marked. From this time forth the Union cavalry always went into action with the prestige of success. Pursuing his advantage, Sheridan crossed the Chickahominy, passed the exterior line of the defenses of Richmond, but, reaching the inner line, he found it unassailable by a cavalry force. Turning back, he crossed the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge, skirted down its northern bank, and recrossed at a lower passage. He had been misinformed by negroes, who told him that Butler had taken up a position on the north side of the James. Then, after communicating with Butler on the James, he again recrossed the Chickahominy, made a wide detour across the Peninsula, and at length, on the 25th of May, rejoined the Army of the Potomac, and aided in its forcing the passage of the Pamunkey, and in the earlier operations at Cold Harbor.

Hunter was now supposed to be moving down the Valley of the Shenandoah toward Lynchburg, and on the 7th of June, Sheridan, with two of his three divisions, was sent in that direction to join him, and, after breaking up the Virginia Central Railroad, to unite with Hunter, when both were to join the Army of the Potomac. Sheridan did some damage to the road, and

had several sharp encounters with the Confederate cavalry, the severest being on the 12th of June, at Trevillian Station, where each side lost wellnigh a thousand men, of whom a third were prisoners. Sheridan here found that Hunter, instead of coming by way of Charlottesville, as was supposed, had turned off westward toward Lexington, and, moreover, Lee had dispatched a large force toward Lynchburg, which lay right in his way. The ammunition which he had brought with him was nearly expended; his horses were fast becoming exhausted, for the region was destitute of forage. He turned eastward, passed over the battle-field of Spottsylvania, thence down the Pamunkey to the White House. The Confederate cavalry were just then about to attack the dépôt, which had not been wholly withdrawn. Sheridan drove them off after a sharp conflict, and then, crossing the James, on the 25th of June rejoined the Army of the Potomac. In these two raids he had lost 5000 men, but had inflicted a loss quite as great.

During the thirty-seven days from the Battle of the Wilderness, May 5, to the close of the fighting on the Chickahominy, Grant had lost 54,551, of whom 7289 were killed, 37,406 wounded, 9856 missing. Of the killed, 539 were officers, and 6750 privates; of the wounded, 1764 were officers, 35,642 privates; of the missing, 262 were officers, 9594 privates. This does not include the losses of the Army of the James at Bermuda Hundred. The Confederate losses, exclusive of those of Beauregard at Bermuda Hundred, were about 32,000, of whom about 8500 were prisoners, 4000 having been captured at Spottsylvania, and 2000 by Sheridan's cavalry.

CHAPTER XLIII.

THE INVESTMENT OF PETERSBURG.

Richmond to be besieged.—Prospects for its Defense.—Napoleon on the Defense of fortified Cities.—Forces of Lee and Grant.—Character of the Fortifications.—Butler's unsuccessful Attempt upon Petersburg.—Importance of Petersburg in relation to Richmond.—Smith ordered to assail Petersburg, June 15.—Delays and Misapprehensions.—The Attack suspended.—Renewed on the 16th.—The Confederates re-enforced by Beauregard.—The Confederates driven from their Lines.—Beauregard checks the Flight.—Withdraws to an inner Line, where he intrenches.—Butler advances from Bermuda Hundred, and is driven back.—Actions of June 17 and 18.—The Confederates hold their new Line.—Forces and Losses from May 5 to June 20.

EVENTS had now so shaped themselves that it was apparent that, instead of a conflict in the open field, the campaign was to resolve itself into a siege of Richmond, held by the entire Army of Northern Virginia, with such re-enforcements as could be gathered from the Carolinas and Georgia. The Confederate authorities had good right to believe, upon the soundest military reasons, that, provided they could supply their army, Richmond could hold out against any besieging force. "Empires," said Napoleon, "frequently stand in need of soldiers, but men are never wanting for internal defense if a place be provided where their energies can be brought into action. Fifty thousand National Guards, with three thousand gunners, will defend a fortified capital against an army of three hundred thousand men. The same fifty thousand men in the open field, if they are not experienced soldiers, commanded by skilled officers, will be thrown into confusion by the charge of a few thousand horse." When Lee fell back within the lines of Richmond, he had about 70,000¹ men, nearly half more than the great master of war pronounced sufficient to hold a fortified capital against 300,000; Grant had, including the Army of the James, about 150,000, half the number which Napoleon judged could be foiled by 50,000. The fortifications, indeed, bore little resemblance to the formidable works constituting the defenses of the fortified cities of Europe, which Napoleon had probably in mind. They consisted of redoubts of low profile, with ditches, parapets, and abatis, and forts at all salient points from which the lines could be swept by artillery. But Todleben had demonstrated at Sebastopol, and Lee was to demonstrate at Petersburg, that the defensive power of such works, resolutely held by an adequate force, is fully equal to the elaborate masonry of Vauban and Cohorn. Indeed, with modern artillery, of which Napoleon never dreamed, it is doubtful whether any system of fortifications of extent sufficient to protect a great capital can be constructed on any other plan. At all events, Lee's works were never pierced until, constrained by the menaces upon his lines of supply, he virtually abandoned them.

Strangely enough, the vital importance of Petersburg seems not to have been at all appreciated on either side. While McClellan lay at Harrison's Landing, some works had been commenced on the northern and eastern sides, but upon his retreat nothing farther was done. Again, a year later, about the time of the battle of Chancellorsville, when an advance from Suffolk was threatened by Peck, a trench, not unlike the first parallel of a siege, had been dug upon the south; but there were then no works over which even cavalry could not pass. There was now here scarcely the semblance of a garrison. Butler could easily have taken it from the east at any time up to three days before he settled himself at Bermuda Hundred. On the 10th of May he made such an attempt. He had—Smith being yet with Grant—barely 7000 men in the "bottle," which was tightly enough corked at the mouth, but had no bottom. Gillmore, with 3500 men, was sent across

¹ The Confederate muster-roll of the Army of Northern Virginia, on the 30th of June, showed 51,833 "present for duty." In the Department of Richmond, that is, the proper garrison of the city, now commanded by Ewell, who had for some time been disabled from acting in the field, were 6176. In the Department of South Virginia and North Carolina, under Beauregard, were 12,592 at Richmond and Petersburg. It will be borne in mind that Lee was at this time merely commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, Davis, with Bragg for his "military adviser," keeping in his own hands the direction of all the other forces. Some months later, Lee having been appointed general-in-chief of all the armies, all of the troops at Richmond excepting the garrison proper, which was still a separate organization, was consolidated into the Army of Northern Virginia. In November this numbered 69,290 "present for duty," about 20,000 more being returned as "present," the aggregate "present and absent" being 181,826.



PETERSBURG.

the Appomattox to attack from the north, while Kautz, with 1500 cavalry, was to dash in from the south. Gillmore advanced to within two miles of the city, driving the enemy's skirmishers before him until he came to their works. These, though feeble and feebly manned, he thought yet too strong to be assailed by his small force; so he retreated. Kautz, meanwhile, had rode straight over the ditch on the south, and penetrated the town; but the retreat of Gillmore permitted the enemy to return, and Kautz was easily forced back. The whole assailing force was too weak to effect anything unless by sheer surprise; and even if it had succeeded, they could not have held Petersburg, and Butler could spare no more to re-enforce them.

Grant now went in person to Bermuda Hundred, and saw at a glance the vital importance of Petersburg, and the ease with which it could be taken by an adequate force, provided only the attempt were made in time. Hence it was that he directed Smith's corps to be sent by water so as to reach the scene at the earliest moment, before, it was hoped, it could be re-enforced from Richmond.

Petersburg was a quiet town of 18,000 inhabitants, on the southern bank of the Appomattox. In itself it was of little consequence to either army. Its military importance arose solely from its relations to the system of railroads which connected Richmond with the region from which its supplies were almost wholly to be drawn. Had the Confederate capital been provisioned for a siege, Petersburg might safely have been abandoned. But at no time were full rations for a fortnight in advance ever accumulated—often there was not three days' supply in dépôt. Northward from Richmond runs the Virginia Central Railroad, which, crossing the Orange Road at Gordonsville, penetrates the fertile region known by way of eminence as "The Valley," the granary of Virginia. The Orange Road, running southwestward through Lynchburg, merges into the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, which, with its connections, penetrates into the extreme southwest. It is the great artery of communication between the Atlantic and the Mississippi. From Lynchburg, following the windings of the James, is the James River Canal. This place, therefore, became one of the natural dépôts of the Confederacy. Next, starting from Richmond, and running southwestward, is the Danville Road, passing through North Carolina, and uniting with all the railways branching through the Carolinas and Georgia. Next, running south, is the railway to Petersburg. From Petersburg, running southward to Lynchburg, where it connects with the Tennessee Road, is the Southside Railroad. Then, running south to Wilmington, where it joins with the southern system, is the Weldon Railroad. Now the occupation of Petersburg by the Federals would not only give them the control of the Weldon and Southside Roads, but would place them in a position to strike the Danville Road at any point south of Richmond. The possession of Petersburg would insure the capture of Richmond by giving to the assailants the absolute control of the Weldon and Southside, and rendering almost certain that of the Danville railways; two certainly, and almost inevitably a third, of the five avenues of supply for the Confederate army. Moreover, Grant hoped, by means of his cavalry, and Hunter's expedition, to destroy the Central Road and the James River Canal. But, even should these latter

fail, the Danville and Central roads and the canal would be inadequate to transport supplies to the army of the capital.

Smith's corps reached Bermuda Hundred on the 14th of June, crossed the Appomattox that night, and next day were pushed forward toward Petersburg, seven miles distant. By noon, having been somewhat delayed by carrying an advanced line of rifle trenches covered with a light battery, he came upon the works, two and a half miles from the town.¹ These works were not strong, and were only feebly held. In and around Petersburg, apart from a few militia, there were but two infantry and two cavalry regiments.² There was, however, a considerable quantity of artillery, which was briskly served, and it was assumed that there must be a strong infantry support. Smith wore away the whole afternoon in reconnoitring and making his dispositions, and then, at sundown, instead of attacking in force, threw forward a heavy line of skirmishers. Even these were successful, and the feebly-manned lines were fairly carried at every point where they were assailed, fifteen guns and three hundred prisoners being taken. Hancock, with two divisions of his corps, now came up. He had been marching since ten o'clock, but, owing to an incorrect map, in a direction quite different from that which was intended. By some strange misadventure, also, he had not even been notified that he was to assist Smith in an attack upon Petersburg; this notice only reached him between five and six o'clock. He reached Smith's position just as the attack had been suspended. Waiving his superior rank to Smith, whom he naturally supposed must be the best judge of what should be done, he placed his troops at the disposal of that officer. Smith, instead of taking these troops and pushing straight into Petersburg, merely requested Hancock to occupy a part of the captured works.³

Grant came on the ground next morning. Burnside's corps was advancing, and, to give them time to aid, the attack was postponed until six in the afternoon. Another unaccountable delay;⁴ for, although some slight re-en-

¹ Grant says in his Report that Smith "confronted the enemy's pickets near Petersburg before daylight." He seems to have fallen into an error as to time, for the march from the Appomattox did not begin until after daylight. He had ordered Butler to send Smith forward the night before, and probably assumed that he had marched straight on; Grant himself returned to the Army of the Potomac to hurry it on, division by division, as rapidly as possible, assuring Butler that "we could re-enforce our armies more rapidly than the enemy could bring troops against us." But this discrepancy as to time is of no real importance. There was, even after noon, as will be seen, abundant time to have assailed Petersburg with a force fourfold the number by which it was that day defended.

² For the details of the actions of this and the ensuing days on the Confederate side, I am indebted to Fletcher's *History of the American War*. The author, a colonel in the British service, derived his information mainly from General Beauregard, and officers of his staff.

³ Grant's Report, and Hancock's, the latter as yet unpublished, but quoted in Swinton, *Army of the Potomac*, 502, 503.

⁴ To whom this delay is to be attributed is not clear. Swinton says (p. 508, 509) that "Hancock, to whom, in the absence of Grant and Meade, the command of the field fell, was fully alive to the importance of securing all the commanding ground before heavy Confederate re-enforcements should arrive," and had the night before instructed Birney and Gibbon to attack and take all these positions before daylight, and that these instructions were not complied with. For authority he refers to, but does not quote, Hancock's Report. He also states that "Hancock was admonished by General Meade to refrain from attack until the remaining corps of the army, the Fifth and the Ninth, should arrive. Of these, the Ninth reached the front at noon, and an assault was ordered to be made about 4 P.M. by Hancock and Burnside—Smith to demonstrate merely." Grant places the time of the attack at six o'clock. From a comparison with Fletcher (p. 261), I judge the attack must have been made not later than four. Grant seems to imply that

forcements had arrived, the Federals were in overwhelming force, and had full possession of all the defensive works. Beauregard had hastened down from Richmond. By withdrawing every thing from the intrenchments at Bermuda Hundred, he had gathered 8000 men at Petersburg. In vain he telegraphed to Richmond for re-enforcements, or at least for orders. Should he abandon Petersburg or Bermuda Hundred? he could not hold both. He received neither help or orders; so, acting on his own responsibility, he evacuated the intrenchments at Bermuda Hundred, leaving only a few sentries—took the cork out of the broken bottle—and during the day concentrated his command before Petersburg. The attack on the afternoon of the 16th was made with great vigor. The Confederates held their ground stoutly, but at length began to give way. Late in the day Beauregard had left the front to snatch a hasty meal. All at once a horseman, galloping at full speed, dashed through the streets, announcing that all was lost; the enemy had broken through the defenses, and were now entering the city. Beauregard, ordering the man to be arrested and shot if his report should prove false, mounted and galloped to the front. He soon met crowds of fugitives, unarmed, hatless, panic-stricken, swarming along all the roads. In vain he essayed to check the wild rout. The fugitives poured onward, and the day seemed hopelessly lost. Just then Gracie's single brigade from Bermuda Hundred came on. Beauregard formed these and his escort across the road, with orders to shoot down every man who refused to come into line. At length order was restored; the Confederates regained their abandoned line, from which, indeed, they had not been pursued. The fighting was by no means over, but continued long after dark. It died away by midnight, and under cover of the thrice-welcome darkness Beauregard withdrew his weary troops to an inner and shorter line, which he had chosen with the quick eye of an engineer. This line was as yet wholly unfortified, and must be intrenched in the brief hours before morning should most likely renew the conflict. With bayonets, split canteens, and hands—for they had no intrenching tools—the men dug in the darkness and through the hours of the early morning. By noon of the 17th the intrenchments had assumed a defensive character, and, moreover, their defenders had been largely re-enforced. These intrenchments, so hastily flung up, were the beginning of those great works which for so long a time held in check the Union army before Petersburg.¹

Butler meanwhile, perceiving that the lines in his front were abandoned, moved out a force upon the railroad from Petersburg to Richmond. But he had hardly touched it when he was forced back by a heavy column coming down from Richmond; for Lee, fully alive to the necessity of holding Petersburg, had sent Longstreet's corps, now commanded by Anderson, to the aid of the sorely-pressed Beauregard. Butler returned to his old position. Anderson, leaving as he passed a force to hold the lines from which Gracie had been withdrawn, hurried on his remaining troops to the defense of Petersburg.

The morning of the 17th had begun to wear away before the fighting was renewed. It was fierce but undecided. The contest was mainly for some portion of the original Confederate line, which had not as yet been abandoned, and which, as events proved, was of great value. At heavy cost, hardly less than 4000 men, Hancock and Burnside, upon whom the brunt fell, succeeded in winning and holding these points. "The advantages of position gained," says Grant, "were very great." Next day, the 18th, a general assault was to be made early in the morning; but when the skirmishers moved forward it was found that the enemy had abandoned every point which was to be assailed, and had firmly taken up their new and interior position, from which, says Grant, "they could not be dislodged."

These attempts upon Petersburg, lasting four days, had cost fully 9000 men.² The result was, as expressed by Grant, that while "the advantages of position gained by us were very great, yet the enemy were merely forced into an interior position from which he could not be dislodged," and, consequently, "the army proceeded to envelop Petersburg, as far as possible without attacking fortifications."

Petersburg, which on the 10th of June had been an easy prey, which, in effect, was already taken by Smith, who needed only to have pushed on to have marched straight into the town, defended by only a mere handful of men, was now garrisoned by almost the whole of the Confederate army. Two days of heavy fighting, in which Grant employed fully three fourths of his army, had demonstrated, at a cost of wellnigh 10,000 men, that Beauregard's intrenchments, hastily flung up, but growing stronger hour by hour, could not be taken by assault, and that nothing now remained but to lay regular siege to them. The siege of Petersburg, upon which was soon concentrated the interest of the war in the East, fairly began on the 19th of June.

NOTE ON FORCES AND LOSSES FROM MAY 5 TO JUNE 20.

The numbers of the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia during the whole of this campaign, down to its final close in April, 1865, have been studiously and persistently understated. The Confederate authorities after 1862 never made public their force or losses. Pollard, the only formal historian upon the Confederate side, had no accurate means of information. Writing after the close of the war, he had every motive to understate. He says:

he was on the ground, and that the delay for Burnside's arrival was by his order. His words are: "By the time I arrived next morning [the 16th] the enemy was in force. An attack was ordered to be made at six o'clock that evening by the troops under Smith and the Second and Ninth Corps. It required until that time for the Ninth Corps to get up and into position."

¹ Fletcher, p. 260-263.

² Losses from June 10 to 20: killed, 1198; wounded, 6853; missing, 1614—in all, 9665. Of these, all except a few hundred were during the days from the 15th to the 18th.

"The Confederate Army on the Rapidan, at the beginning of the campaign, consisted of two divisions of Longstreet's corps, Ewell's corps, A. P. Hill's corps, three divisions of cavalry, and the artillery. Ewell's corps did not exceed 14,000 muskets at the beginning of the campaign. On the 8th of May the effective strength of Hill's corps was less than 13,000 muskets, and it could not have exceeded 18,000 in the beginning of the month. Longstreet's corps was the weakest of the three when all the divisions were present, and the two with him had just returned from an arduous and exhausting winter campaign in East Tennessee. His effective strength could not have exceeded 8000 muskets. General Lee's whole effective infantry, therefore, did not exceed 40,000 muskets, if it reached that number. The cavalry divisions were weak, neither of them exceeding the strength of a good brigade. General Lee's whole effective strength at the opening of the campaign was not over 50,000 men of all arms. There were no means of recruiting the ranks of the army, and no re-enforcements were received until the 23d of May."

The captured Confederate returns (cited *ante*, p. 383, as far as relate to this army) enable us to fix the number far more accurately. On the 10th of April the returns of the Army of Northern Virginia show a nominal force of 97,576, of whom 61,218 were "present," and 52,626 "present for duty." The conscription was in operation, and was still rigorously enforced. During the preceding month Lee's army was augmented by 12,000, sent in from the various camps of instruction, and, according to their judicious system, incorporated at once into regiments already in the field. It is not at all probable that these accessions during the three weeks preceding the opening of the campaign could have been less than 10,000 or 15,000, which would raise Lee's strength at the beginning of May to between 60,000 and 70,000. This continual access went on all through the summer, quite compensating for the losses in action and from sickness. Thus, on the 30th of June, his army had present for duty 51,863—within eight hundred as many as on the 10th of April—while its nominal strength was 92,685, which includes those absent from all causes—sick, disabled, and deserters. This was after a series of sharp actions, including those of June 15 to 18, and those which, from June 23 to 28, hereafter to be described, resulting from the first attempts made upon the Weldon, Southside, and Danville Railroads. On the 10th of July the nominal force, present and absent, was 135,803, so that within ten days 43,000 were added to the muster-rolls of the army; but of these only 68,844 were present, and 57,097 present for duty, showing an actual increase of effective men only about 6000, to which should be added some small losses suffered in the interval. At the close of August the nominal strength was 146,838, of whom there were present for duty but 44,247. But at this time Early, with some 15,000 of this army, was on detached service in the Valley of the Shenandoah, and this body is not counted among those "present for duty" with the Army of Northern Virginia. Owing to a clerical error in copying the returns, this number, 44,247, is given in our table (p. 383) as the force for May instead of August. This is of some importance, as it vitiates an estimate by Mr. Swinton of Confederate losses, which will presently be referred to. The considerable apparent excess of the Army of Northern Virginia after October is owing to the return of the remnants of Early's force, and the incorporation of the troops heretofore formally under Beauregard at Petersburg.

Of the losses of the Confederates during this period (May 5 to June 10) there is no report even approximating to an official character. The "impression" of General Lee's adjutant general (Swinton, 492) was that it was about 18,000. Mr. Swinton finds corroboration of this estimate in a comparison of figures. He says, in substance, that Lee opened the campaign with 52,626; that he received re-enforcements (7000 under Pickett and 2000 under Breckinridge) of 9000, making in all 61,626; that on the 31st of May he had 44,248; the difference showing a loss, up to the battle of Cold Harbor, of 17,478. To this he adds less than 1000 for Cold Harbor, making 18,000. He, however, is dubious as to the correctness of these figures, and estimates the entire loss at 20,000. This estimate is worthless, from the fact that each one of the elementary data upon which it is based is erroneous. The original force (52,626), as shown by the returns which he cites, was that of April 10 instead of May 5, during which interval it must have been considerably augmented. The re-enforcements are considerably understated. Pollard says that Breckinridge brought "2000 muskets with a battalion of artillery." Certainly not less than 3000, and probably more, for in April he had present for duty 6500, and after the defeat of Sigel at Newmarket there was no immediate necessity for retaining a man of these in the Valley. The re-enforcements brought from North Carolina were certainly more than 7000. They consisted, according to Pollard (*Lost Cause*, 505), of "Pickett's division of Longstreet's corps, and one small brigade of Early's division of Ewell's corps, which had been in North Carolina with Hoke"—Pickett being ill, and not then in actual command. Now we find that in February Pickett and Whiting had in North Carolina about 18,500; at the close of April Whiting had there about 5000; Hoke must then have brought to Richmond early in May some 12,000 or 15,000. They lost considerably in the action of May 16, which resulted in the shutting up of Butler at Bermuda Hundred; but the bulk of the command, which could hardly have been less than 10,000, were thereby at liberty to join Lee, which they did during the last week in May, simultaneously with the arrival of Breckinridge from the Valley. These conjoined re-enforcements must have been fully 15,000 instead of 9000, as stated. Finally, the number (44,247) given by Mr. Swinton as Lee's effective strength on the 31st of May should be put down as the number of the army of Northern Virginia on the 31st of August, when a quarter or more of its force was with Early in the Valley of the Shenandoah. I, as well as Mr. Swinton, was misled by a clerical error in copying these returns, whereby "May" appeared in place of "August," which error will be found in the table heretofore given.

All statements of the Confederate losses, whether based upon the impressions of officers, or upon assumed calculation of forces, being wholly unreliable, are driven to a consideration of the character of the fighting for an approximate estimate of the loss. There can be no doubt that in the two days' battles in the Wilderness, and in the five days which followed (May 5 to 11), the Confederate loss was far less than the Federal. During these days the Federal loss, including wellnigh 7000 missing, was 29,410, of which 20,000—12,000 killed and wounded—were lost on the 5th and 6th; the Confederate loss was probably about 10,000, of whom not more than 1000 were prisoners. At Spottsylvania, previous to the great battle of the 12th, the Federal loss was about 10,000; that of the Confederates not more than 5000. In the battle of the 12th the Federals lost about 8000, and in the operations which followed up to the 20th about 2000, of whom not 300 were prisoners. The Confederate loss must have been quite equal, including the 3000 prisoners. At the North Anna, and in the turning operation which followed (May 21 to 31), the losses were about equal, not far from 2000 upon each side. At Cold Harbor, including the sharp engagement of June 1, the main action of June 3, and the subsequent skirmishing up to the 10th, the Federal loss was 13,000, of whom 2400 were captured. The Confederate loss during this time could hardly have exceeded 5000, including 2000 prisoners brought in by Sheridan on his cavalry raid. In the main assault on the 3d, where the Federals lost 8000 in less than an hour, the Confederates lost hardly 1000. On the 2d, when the Federals lost 2000, the Confederates suffered far less, probably not more than 1000, of whom 500 were prisoners. In the subsequent skirmishing and sharp-shooting from the 4th to the 10th, the losses were about equal. The entire Confederate loss from May 5 to June 10, thus approximately estimated, is 33,000. There is no statement of the Confederate losses in the actions before Petersburg from June 15 to 18, in which the Union loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners was 9665, there being 1600 prisoners. The Confederates, fighting mainly behind slight intrenchments, certainly suffered far less—probably not more than 5000, of whom about 1000 were prisoners.

The Union force at the opening of the campaign is officially given. The Army of the Potomac, including Burnside's corps, numbered, according to the Report of the Secretary of War, 141,164, of whom 10,000 were cavalry. While resting at Spottsylvania, re-enforcements were received from Washington fully equaling the losses which had been sustained. At Cold Harbor, the accession of Smith's command raised the Union force to fully 150,000; after the battles there, other re-enforcements arrived, so that when the crossing of the James was effected, Grant had still, including Butler's command, at least 140,000.

The losses in the Army of the Potomac during this period are accurately given. The following statement was furnished Mr. Coppée (*Grant and his Campaigns*, 399) by a member of Grant's staff, the report being subsequently officially indorsed. We place with it our approximate estimate of Confederate losses, merely attempting to discriminate between the killed and wounded and the prisoners. Meade, in his congratulatory address, issued May 13, claims 8000 prisoners—considerably in excess of the true numbers captured up to that time. The number actually reported from May 4 to 12 is 7000, of whom many were taken by Sheridan, of whom, at that time, Meade could know nothing. In the 2500 put down as taken at Cold Harbor are included the captures by the cavalry during the whole series of operations. With these explanations, we think that the summation in the following table gives very closely the respective losses during the period therein embraced.

LOSSES FROM MAY 5 TO JUNE 18.

Battles.	UNION.				CONFEDERATE.		
	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.	Killed and Wounded.	Missing.	Total.
Wilderness, May 5-11	3288	19,278	6,844	29,410	13,000	2,000	15,000
Spottsylvania, May 12-20	2146	7,956	279	10,381	7,000	4,000	11,000
North Anna, May 21-31	150	1,130	327	1,607	1,000	1,000	2,000
Cold Harbor, June 1-10	1705	9,042	2,406	13,153	2,500	2,500	5,000
Petersburg, June 15-18	1198	6,853	2,217	9,665	4,000	1,000	5,000
	8487	44,259	12,073	64,216	27,500	10,500	38,000