

and the Seventh New Hampshire is brought up to its support, and this becoming confused, the Eighth United States colored regiment comes into action, some of the men with empty guns, standing its ground with heavy loss for nearly two hours. Barton's brigade of New York troops has at length formed on the right of the line, and Colonel Montgomery, with the Fifty-fourth Massachusetts and First North Carolina (colored), has got into position on the left. All the troops, black and white, fight nobly; but their loss had already been heavy, particularly in officers. Along the railroad an uninterrupted stream of wounded men flows to the rear, and hundreds more of wounded are left behind upon the field, as the line now is driven back, having lost nearly thirteen hundred men in this brief battle. The enemy has lost little over half that number, and nothing but the exhaustion of his ammunition holds him back from pursuit.

Such was the battle of Olustee, fought against orders, and upon the enemy's chosen field. General Seymour was present in the hottest of the fight, but neither his bravery nor that of his troops could avert the disaster which followed inevitably from the very conditions of the conflict. With this defeat active operations in Florida terminated, though the Federal troops continued to hold their position upon the coast.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

THE RED RIVER CAMPAIGN.

Another semi-Political Expedition.—Diplomatic Considerations.—Apprehensions of French Intervention.—Every military Motive in favor of a Campaign against Mobile.—The Government decides in favor of a Campaign in Texas.—The Sabine Pass Expedition; its Failure.—Coast Operations.—Occupation of Brazos Santiago, November 2, 1863; of Brownsville, November 6th; of Point Isabel, November 8th; of Aransas Pass, November 17th; and of Cavallo Pass, November 19th.—Mistake made in continuing a trans-Mississippi offensive Campaign.—Halleck advises a Movement on Shreveport.—Banks's Opinion of the Conditions necessary to a successful Red River Campaign.—These Requirements not met.—Halleck leaves the whole Affair to be settled between Banks, Sherman, and Steele.—Banks ought to have decided against the Movement.—Extent of his Responsibility.—Sherman meets Banks at New Orleans.—He sends A. J. Smith's Command to General Banks.—Steele not prepared.—Kirby Smith's Command.—Banks being detained at New Orleans, General Franklin is intrusted with the immediate command of the Expedition.—Franklin reaches Alexandria March 25th, 1864.—Admiral Porter's Co-operation.—Capture of Fort De Russy.—Difficulty in getting the Gun-boats over the Rapids at Alexandria.—Dépôt established at Alexandria, and Grover's Division detached to guard it.—Ellet's Marine Brigade recalled to Vicksburg.—T. K. Smith's division used for the Protection of Transports.—The Military Branch reduced by 8500 men on account of these Detachments.—Cotton Seizures.—The Army reaches Natchitoches April 2d and 3d, while the Navy proceeds to Grand Ecore.—The Difficulty of Navigation increases.—The Advance toward Mansfield.—Skirmishing with Confederate Cavalry.—The Enemy encountered beyond Pleasant Hill.—Banks arrives at the Front and ventures an Engagement.—He makes a great Mistake.—Federal Defeat at Sabine Cross-roads.—Causes of the Disaster.—A Stand made at Pleasant Grove.—Emory repulses the Enemy and covers the Retreat.—The Retreat continued to Pleasant Hill.—Battle of Pleasant Hill, April 9th.—Importance of this Conflict.—It is decided against the Confederates.—Retreat continued to Grand Ecore.—Admiral Porter's Troubles.—The Confederate Infantry charge upon the Gun-boats, and are worsted.—The Army and Fleet return to Alexandria.—On the way General Banks defeats the Enemy at Cane River.—The Fleet can not pass the Rapids, and is relieved by Lieutenant Colonel Bailey's Dams.—The Army retreats to Simmsport.—Operations of General Steele's Co-operative Column.—Review of the military Operations in Arkansas in 1863.—Quantrell's Raid.—Capture of Little Rock by General Steele.—Steele advances upon Shreveport from the North.—A Slow March.—Fight at Prairie d'Anne.—Steele hears of Banks's Reverse, and retreats to Little Rock.—The Political Situation in Arkansas as affected by the Campaign.

FROM the Florida expedition we turn naturally to the Red River campaign. This latter was also urged by the government without much regard to its military importance. The motives which led to its inception were more complex than those which led to the Florida expedition. In addition to political reasons, there were diplomatic considerations of still greater importance. In defiance of the Monroe Doctrine—a doctrine first promulgated in President Monroe's message of December 2, 1823, and indorsed by the whole American people, and which pronounced any interference with the affairs or destiny of any portion of the New World by the powers of the Old a hostile measure to this country, "dangerous to our peace and safety"—three European nations, France, England, and Spain, had in 1861 embarked upon an expedition against Mexico. The originally declared purposes of this joint expedition had appeared to be perfectly legitimate. The civil commotions in Mexico had endangered the liberties of foreign residents in that country, and undermined the security for its large liabilities by debt to foreign powers. The expedition proposed simply to remedy these abuses. The United States government, although its grievances were greater than those of either of the allied powers, except Great Britain, had refused to participate in the expedition, but acceded the legitimacy of its objects as openly declared. Afterward, however, the character of the movement against Mexico was essentially changed. England and Spain withdrew from the alliance, and the Emperor Napoleon entered upon the execution of a scheme which was intended to revolutionize the Mexican government, and to erect an empire upon the ruins of the republic. This was a policy hostile to this country, and, taken in connection with Louis Napoleon's expressed desire to unite with the British government in the recognition of the Confederacy, excited serious apprehension. It was deemed necessary, therefore, that the Federal government should occupy and strongly hold some point in Texas, in order to meet any emergency which might arise out of this foreign complication.

Both General Banks and General Grant, after the capture of Port Hudson and Vicksburg, were in favor of an immediate expedition against Mobile. There were good military reasons for such a movement. The full reward for the sacrifice of the army which had purchased the Mississippi could only be realized by leaving the entire trans-Mississippi region—at least all below

the Arkansas River—out of the field of active military operations. The navy, with the co-operation of a few small garrisons, not amounting in the aggregate to more than 20,000 men, would have held the Mississippi against any operations of the enemy. The coast of Texas should have been occupied, and held by about 10,000 men. There should also have been an army of 20,000 men to keep down guerrillas in Missouri and Arkansas, and to prevent the enemy from advancing north of the Arkansas. Thus a Federal army, amounting in all to 50,000 men, would have maintained the defensive on and west of the Mississippi, and 50,000 men¹ would thus have been liberated for the more important, because more decisive operations in Tennessee, Georgia, and Alabama. The campaign against Mobile, if it had been undertaken immediately after the opening of the Mississippi, would have accomplished four important results:

1. It would have relieved Rosecrans—then operating against Chattanooga—more effectively than any other movement could have done.
2. It would have forestalled Sherman's Meridian raid.
3. It would have resulted in the possession of Mobile and of the fertile valleys of the Alabama and Tombigbee Rivers, upon which the Confederate Army of the West mainly relied for corn, and would have secured the Mississippi River against hostile operations from the east.
4. It would have acquired the best possible base for co-operative movements in the event either of an advance of the Federal armies southward upon Atlanta, or westward from South Carolina and Florida. Its success would have justified more formidable expeditions in the two latter states in the winter of 1863-1864, and these would in turn have materially weakened Lee's army in Virginia.

These advantages were fully appreciated by General Grant. But the government decided in favor of a trans-Mississippi campaign, the motives for which were purely of a diplomatic and political character.² The earliest

¹ The entire Federal force west of the Mississippi numbered at least 100,000 men.

² For farther illustration, we copy the correspondence on this subject between Generals Banks, Halleck, and Grant.

On the 18th of July, 1863, Banks writes to Grant:

"It is my belief that Johnston, when defeated by you . . . will fall back upon Mobile. Such is also the expectation of the rebels. The capture of Mobile is of importance, second only in the history of the war to the opening of the Mississippi. I hope you will be able to follow him. I can aid you somewhat by land and by sea, if that should be your destination. Mobile is the last strong-hold in the West and Southwest. No pains should be spared to effect its reduction."

On the 26th of July he writes to Halleck:

"There is still strength in Mobile and in Texas which will constantly threaten Louisiana, and which ought to be destroyed without delay. The possession of Mobile and the occupation of Texas would quiet the whole of the Southwest, and every effort should be made to accomplish this. Its importance can hardly be overestimated."

And again, July 30:

"Information from Mobile leads us to believe that the force at that point is now about 5000, which is engaged industriously on the land side in strengthening the position. My belief is that Johnston's forces are moving to the East, and that the garrison of Mobile will not be strengthened, unless it be by paroled men from Vicksburg and Port Hudson; while the rebel army of the East is occupied at Charleston and at Richmond by our forces, it would be impossible for them to strengthen Mobile to any great extent. It seems to be a favorable opportunity for a movement in that direction. An attack should be made by land. Troops can be transported by the river to Mobile, with the intervention of a march of 25 miles from Portersville, on the west side of the bay and the rear of the city. We have outlines of their works, and I can estimate very well their strength. I am confident that a sudden movement, such as can be made with 15,000 or 20,000 men on this line, will reduce that position with certainty and without delay. The troops of the West need rest, and are incapable of long or rapid marches. It is therefore impracticable to attack Mobile except by the river and Mississippi Sound. A portion of General Grant's forces could be transported there with but little labor to themselves, and the place could be invested before the enemy could anticipate our movement."

On August 1 he writes:

"The possession of Mobile gives the government the control of the Alabama River and the line of railways east and west from Charleston and Savannah to Vicksburg, *via* Montgomery, and places the whole of the State of Mississippi and Southern Alabama in position to return to the Union. If the rebel government loses this position, it has no outlet to the Gulf except Galveston. The operation need not last more than 30 days, and can scarcely interfere with any other movements East or West. I understand it to meet with General Grant's approval, if it be consistent with the general plans of the government, upon which condition only I urge it."

August 10, Banks writes to Grant:

"I have the honor to inclose you some memoranda concerning Mobile. I still think it of the utmost moment that that post should be in our hands. Except for Johnston's army, we should have no difficulty. He seems to occupy a position intended to cover Mobile, and if he is in force 30,000 or 40,000 strong, as I suppose, he could embarrass the operations against that point very seriously. I am unable, however, to see how he can hold his position in the Southwest with Rosecrans's army pressing down upon the rebel centre. A line extending from Mobile to Richmond, in the present shattered condition of the rebel armies—the right, centre, and left having been disastrously defeated—it seems to me impossible that they can maintain their positions if Rosecrans, with a heavy force, pushes down upon their centre, or if Charleston shall fall into our hands through the operations of the fleet and army combined. A successful movement in either direction, from Charleston or by Rosecrans, will cut their centre, and place Bragg and Johnston with their forces between the troops under Rosecrans, your troops, and mine at New Orleans. I do not believe that that condition of things can be maintained."

Halleck, on the 12th of August, replies to Banks's dispatches in regard to Mobile:

"I fully appreciate the importance of the operation proposed by you in these dispatches, but there are reasons other than military why those heretofore directed should be undertaken first. On this matter we have no choice, but must carry out the views of the government."

The operations "heretofore directed" were against Texas.

On the 8th of January, 1864, Halleck writes to Grant:

"In regard to General Banks's campaign against Texas, it is proper to remark that it was undertaken less for military reasons than as a matter of state policy. As a military measure simply, it perhaps presented less advantage than a movement on Mobile and the Alabama River, so as to threaten the enemy's interior lines, and effect a diversion in favor of our armies at Chattanooga and in East Tennessee. But, however this may have been, it was deemed necessary, as a matter of political or state policy connected with our foreign relations, and especially with France and Mexico, that our troops should occupy and hold at least a portion of Texas. The President so considered, for reasons satisfactory to himself and to his cabinet, and it was therefore unnecessary for us to inquire whether or not the troops could have been employed elsewhere with greater military advantage."

When General Banks assumed the command of the Gulf Department, his instructions from General Halleck (dated November 9, 1862) allude to operations to be undertaken after the opening of the Mississippi in the following terms:

"The river being opened, the question arises how the troops and naval forces there can be employed to the best advantage. Two objects are suggested as worthy of your attention:

"First, on the capture of Vicksburg, to send a military force directly East to destroy the railroads at Jackson and Marion, and thus cut off all connection by rail between Northern Mississippi and Mobile and Atlanta. The latter place is now the chief military dépôt of the rebel armies in the West.

"Second, To ascend, with a naval and military force, the Red River as far as it is navigable, and thus open an outlet for the sugar and cotton of Northern Louisiana. Possibly both of these objects may be accomplished, if the circumstances should be favorable. It is also suggested that, having Red River in our possession, it would form the best base for operations in Texas."

On July 24, 1863, Halleck writes to Banks:

"I suppose the first thing done by your army, after the fall of Port Hudson, was to clean out the Teche and Atchafalaya countries. That being accomplished, your next operations must depend very much upon the then condition of affairs. Texas and Mobile will present themselves to your attention. The navy are very anxious for an attack upon the latter place, but I think Tex-



NATHANIEL P. BANKS.

instructions which General Banks received, pointing to Texas as the immediate field of operations, were issued during the last week in July, 1863, shortly after the reduction of Port Hudson. They were not definite as to

as much the most important. It is possible that Johnston may fall back toward Mobile, but I think he will unite with Bragg. While your army is engaged in cleaning out Southwestern Louisiana, every preparation should be made for an expedition into Texas. Should Johnston be driven from Mississippi, General Grant can send you considerable re-enforcements."

July 31, 1863, he writes:

"It is important that we immediately occupy some point or points in Texas. Whether the movement should be made by land or water is not yet decided. . . . If by water, Admiral Farragut will co-operate. The Navy Department recommends Indianola as the point of landing. It seems to me that this point is too distant, as it will leave the expedition isolated from New Orleans. If the landing can be made at Galveston, the country between that place and New Orleans can soon be cleared out, and the enemy be prevented from operating successively upon those places. In other words, you can venture to send a larger force to Galveston than to Indianola. I merely throw out these suggestions, without deciding upon any definite plan till I receive your answer to the former dispatch" [that of July 24].

On the 6th of August Halleck sends the following dispatch to Banks, *via* Vicksburg:

"There are important reasons why our flag should be restored in some point of Texas with the least possible delay. Do this by land, at Galveston, at Indianola, or at any other point you may deem preferable. If by sea, Admiral Farragut will co-operate. There are reasons why the movement should be as prompt as possible."

On the 10th, four days later, Halleck explains this order thus:

"That order, as I understood it at the time, was of a diplomatic rather than of a military char-

acter, and resulted from some European complications, or, more properly speaking, was intended to prevent such complications."

Perhaps the following from General Banks to Halleck, August 17, 1863, will throw some light upon the nature of these "foreign" complications:

"I think it my duty to represent that among the French residents of this city [New Orleans] there is evidently an expectation of some assistance from the government of France. This comes informally from the conversation of the French residents here, but too frequently to leave room for doubt that they have some grounds upon which to ground the remarks that are commonly made. This is undoubtedly the conversation of the officers of the French frigate *Catinet*, which has recently arrived at this port. I do not think it is more than mere surmise on their part, but have thought it worth while to direct the provost-marshal general of the department to investigate the subject and to report the facts as they are, of which I shall give you due notice."

August 20, Halleck writes:

"Mexican and French complications render it exceedingly important that the movement ordered against Texas should be undertaken without delay."

On the 28th he writes:

"Your note in regard to reports in New Orleans respecting French intervention only confirms what we have already received from other sources. While observing every caution to give no cause of offense to that government, it will be necessary to carefully observe the movements of its fleets, and to be continually on your guard. You will readily perceive the object of our immediately occupying some part of Texas."

August 6th, and Admiral Farragut's co-operation was promised, if the attack should be upon the coast. General Banks immediately made preparations for a movement against Houston by way of Sabine Pass. Grant, in obedience to orders from Washington, now sent the Thirteenth Corps to the Department of the Gulf. Including these re-enforcements, Banks had by the first of September an army of 30,000 men.¹

If the reader will examine the map of Texas, he will find that state intersected by rivers—the Neches, Trinidad, San Jacinto, Brazos, Colorado, Guadalupe, San Antonio, and Nueces—which run from the elevated region of Northern Texas into the Gulf. The Red River, forming the northern boundary of the state, runs through Louisiana into the Mississippi; while the Rio Grande, separating Texas from Mexico, flows into the Gulf. On the eastern or Louisiana border runs the Sabine River, emptying, as does also the Neches, into Lake Sabine, which, by a narrow pass of the same name, communicates with the Gulf. From Sabine Pass, at the eastern extremity of the Texas coast, to Brazos Santiago, near the mouth of the Rio Grande, is about 375 miles. About 70 miles west of Sabine Pass is the entrance to Galveston Bay, which receives the waters of the Trinidad. Galveston Island stretches from the entrance of the harbor some 30 miles southwesterly. Houston lies west of Galveston Bay, about 40 miles inland, and by its central position as the junction of all the roads between the bay and the Rio Brazos, commands Galveston and the large and fertile district south of Montgomery. From the entrance to Galveston Bay to Velasco, the mouth of the Rio Brazos, is about 40 miles; following down the coast from this point, we reach Cavallo Pass, the entrance to Matagorda Bay, with which Aransas Bay communicates, the inlet to the latter being distant about 50

miles from Cavallo Pass. Into Aransas Bay flows the Guadalupe and San Antonio Rivers. Corpus Christi Bay, shut out from the gulf by Mustang Island, joins Aransas. From its inlet to Brazos Santiago is about 90 miles. Forty miles up the Rio Grande lies Brownsville, opposite Matamoras. The population and the commerce of the state is concentrated in a belt of counties along the Red and Sabine Rivers and the coast. This belt is narrow on the north and east as far as Shelbyville, where it widens, and from the coast stretches inland from 150 to 200 miles. It will readily be seen that the occupation of this coast by the Federal forces would command the most valuable portion of Texas, while it would also fully meet the peculiar diplomatic emergency which then confronted the government.¹

The expedition sailed from New Orleans on the 5th of September, under the command of Major General W. B. Franklin. The military force consisted of 5000 men of the Nineteenth Corps, the number being limited to suit the means of transportation at hand. The naval force consisted of four light-draught gun-boats—the Clifton, Arizona, Sachem, and Granite City—under the command of Lieutenant Crocker. The aim of the expedition was to secure Sabine City at the mouth of Sabine River. The Pass was strongly protected by works, and the only chance of piercing or capturing these works consisted of two 34-pounders, a battery of field-pieces, and two boats converted into rams. The arrangement made between the naval and military commanders contemplated an attack at early dawn on the morning of

¹ "The occupation of Houston would place in our hands the control of all the railway communications with Texas; give us command of the most populous and productive part of the state; enable us to move at any moment into the interior in any direction, or to fall back upon the island of Galveston, which could be maintained with a very small force, holding the enemy upon the coast of Texas, and leaving the Army of the Gulf free to move upon Mobile, in accordance with my original plan, or wherever it should be required."—Banks's Report.

¹ Report on the Conduct of the War, Red River Campaign, p. 3.



September 7th by the gun-boats, assisted by about 180 sharpshooters from the army. After driving the enemy from the works, and repulsing the rams, the troops were to land under cover of the gun-boats, and capture the town. The gun-boats, originally lightly-built merchant vessels, were mere shells as against a well-defended fortress, and it was not expected that they would have any such encounter. If resistance was offered, General Franklin was instructed to land his troops ten or twelve miles below the Pass, and advance by land against the fortifications.¹

The plan proposed was not carried out, and the expedition proved an utter failure. There was over a day's delay in getting into position, and for 28 hours the fleet was open to the observation of the enemy, who was thus given abundant time for preparation. Captain Crocker, with foolhardy daring, ventured upon a direct attack at 3 P.M. on the 8th. Of course the gun-boats were unable to make any impression upon the works. At 6 A.M. the Clifton stood in the bay, and opened upon the fort, which deigned no reply. The other boats soon followed, and in the afternoon the Sachem, followed by the Arizona, advanced upon the eastern channel of the Pass to draw the fire of the fort, while the Clifton and Granite City moved up the western channel to cover the landing of a division under General Weitzel. The fort was silent until the gun-boats were clean abreast of it, when a fire was opened upon them from eight guns. The Clifton on one side, and the Sachem on the other, ran aground in the shallow water under the enemy's guns, and, being disabled, were compelled to surrender. The garrison of the fort consisted only of 47 men—not more than sufficient to man the guns—but it did its work as efficiently as if it had numbered a thousand. It was with great difficulty that the Arizona and Granite City escaped. With these vessels Franklin probably might still have landed the expedition below the pass, but no such attempt was made, and the troops returned on the 11th to New Orleans.²

The concentration of the enemy forbade any attempt to repeat the movement. Banks now directed his attention to the chances for a movement overland into Texas, either across Southern Louisiana to the Sabine, or up the Red River to Shreveport. For this purpose his troops were rapidly transferred to the Bayou Teche region. But neither of the movements in view were found practicable. That from the Teche to the Sabine proceeded over a barren country, with little water, for a distance of 300 miles from New Orleans. The route to Shreveport was 200 miles longer, through a country equally destitute of supplies, having been repeatedly overrun by both armies, and occupied by a hostile population. In either movement the army must depend entirely upon wagon transportation.

In the mean time General Herron had been sent to Morganza, on the Mississippi, above Port Hudson, but on the opposite side. He had established a post several miles inland, garrisoned with about 700 men, under command of Major Montgomery. On the night of September 30th this force was surprised by a detachment of the enemy, who crossed the bayou, surrounded the Federal camp, and captured the artillery and 400 infantry.

The government urged the prompt occupation "of some point in Texas." If it could not be by land, it must be by sea. Accordingly, General Banks again turned to the coast, and organized a small expedition, to be under the command of Major General N. J. T. Dana, for the occupation of the lower Rio Grande. The concentration of the enemy in the southeastern part of Texas seemed to favor this movement.

Dana's expedition, consisting of 4000 men and three gun-boats—the Monongahela, Virginia, and Owaseo—and accompanied by General Banks, left New Orleans October 26th. The all-important affair of raising the flag on some portion of the soil of Texas was at length accomplished on the 2d of November. On that day Brazos Santiago was occupied, and on the next the enemy was driven from his position, and the troops ordered up the Rio Grande to Brownsville, which was occupied without resistance on the 6th. The establishment of communications with the mouth of the river was assisted by the friendly offices of the Mexican government, who furnished boats for this purpose. General Dana was left in command of Brownsville, and Banks began to operate against the coast adjacent to Brazos. Point Isabel was occupied on the 8th, and by means of boats troops were transported to Mustang Island, off Corpus Christi Bay. Aransas Pass, east of this island, was occupied on the 17th by a detachment under General T. E. G. Ransom, the works defending the point having been taken by assault, with 100 prisoners and three guns. On the 19th General C. C. Washburne, of the Thirtieth Corps, moved upon Pass Cavallo, commanding the entrance to Matagorda Bay, and defended by strong works and a force of about 2000 men. Fort Esperanza was invested, and, after a brief but gallant resistance, the enemy blew up his magazines, partially dismantled the works, and evacuated the position, retreating to the main land by way of the peninsula near the mouth of Rio Brazos.

Thus, in about three weeks from the occupation of the mouth of the Rio Grande, General Banks was in possession of the whole coast of Texas, with the exception of the works at the mouth of Rio Brazos and the island of Galveston, which were still firmly held by the enemy, who would not abandon them without a desperate struggle. In order to gain possession of these remaining points on the coast—more important than all the others combined—it would be necessary to move inland, and attack them from the rear. In this case the enemy must be encountered in full force. At this point the misfortune of Franklin's failure to obtain Sabine City was painfully evident

¹ Banks's Report. These instructions must have been verbal. The written orders allude to no other than a direct attack.

² Had a landing been effected, even after the loss of the boats, in accordance with the original plan, the success of the movement would have been complete, both as it regarded the occupation of Sabine Pass, and operations against Houston and Galveston. The enemy had at this time all his forces in that quarter, and less than a hundred men on the Sabine.—Banks's Report.

in its full extent, and the regret which it occasioned General Banks was intense and lasting. Still he felt confident that, by withdrawing the forces which he had left in the Teche region to the coast, he might succeed in his cherished plans against Houston and Galveston. He asked Halleck for reinforcements to secure this object, which he deemed of the utmost importance.³

All the diplomatic or political measures involved in General Banks's Texas campaign had been successfully carried out. Henceforth the problem was purely military. Unquestionably the best solution of this problem would have been upon the theory of a defensive trans-Mississippi campaign. Upon this theory General Banks would have been allowed to complete his operations against Galveston, and after that would have simply held the coast of Texas with a few small garrisons, and so much of the Teche country as would suffice for the protection of New Orleans on the western side. The remainder of his army, with as many troops from the armies north of the Arkansas as could be spared after guarding against Kirby Smith's advance north of that river, would have been withdrawn to the east of the Mississippi, where they would have been occupied in offensive operations: first, during the winter, in conjunction with Sherman's troops, against Mobile, and the railroads connecting Atlanta with Montgomery in Alabama, and with Tallahassee in Florida; and, secondly, in the spring of 1864 against Atlanta, co-operating with the army advancing upon that point from Chattanooga. No greater military mistake could have been made than that which was involved in an offensive trans-Mississippi campaign. By such a campaign all that had been gained strategically by the possession of the Mississippi River would be thrown away. For what was the real strategic importance of this possession except in so far as it made the trans-Mississippi region, then in the hands of the enemy, and also the trans-Mississippi armies of the Confederacy, of as little worth to the Confederacy as if they had not existed? But to send large Federal armies into this region for offensive operations was to neutralize the vast advantage gained by this isolation—was to give the trans-Mississippi territory all the value to the Confederacy which it could possibly have had if the great river had still remained within Confederate control.

It was precisely this mistake which the government now insisted upon making. While General Banks was perfecting his plans for the capture of Galveston, he was diverted from that movement by the urgency with which preparations for an advance up the Red River were recommended by Halleck and other officers.⁴ As we have seen, the political designs of the cam-

³ "I intended to withdraw my troops to the island of Galveston, which could have been held with perfect security by less than 1000 men, which would have left me free to resume operations, suggested in August and September, against Mobile. The Rio Grande and the island of Galveston could have been held with 2000 or 3000 men. This would have cut off the contraband trade of the enemy at Matamoros and on the Texas coast. The forces occupying the island of Galveston could have been strengthened by sea at any moment from Berwick's Bay, connecting with New Orleans by railway or by the river, compelling the enemy to maintain an army near Houston, and preventing his concentrating his forces for the invasion of Louisiana, Arkansas, or Missouri. The occupation of the Rio Grande, Galveston, and Mobile would have led to the capture or destruction of all the enemy's river and sea transportation on the Gulf coast, and left the Western Gulf blockading squadron, numbering 150 vessels, and mounting 450 guns, free to pursue the pirates that infested our coast and preyed upon our commerce. The army would have been at liberty to operate on the Mississippi, or to co-operate with the Army of the Tennessee by the Alabama River and Montgomery in the campaign against Atlanta. . . . It would have enabled the government to concentrate the entire forces of the Department of the Gulf, as occasion might require, at any point on the river or coast, against an enemy without water transportation or other means of operation than by heavy land marches, or to move by land into the rebel states east or west of the Mississippi. The winter months offered a favorable opportunity for such enterprise."—Banks's Report.

⁴ In order to illustrate the details of the inception of the Red River campaign more fully than is possible in the text, we give the substance of the correspondence submitted as evidence before the Committee on the Conduct of the War. General Halleck, from the beginning, was partial to operations on the line of the Red River as preferable to movements on the Texan coast.

August 10, 1863, he writes:

"In my opinion, neither Indianola nor Galveston is the proper point of attack. If it is necessary, as urged by Mr. Seward, that the flag be restored to some one point in Texas, that can be best and most safely effected by a combined military and naval movement up the Red River to Alexandria, Natchitoches, or Shreveport, and the military occupation of Northern Texas. This would be merely carrying out the plan proposed by you at the beginning of the campaign [the beginning of the Louisiana campaign, in the spring of 1863], and, in my opinion, far superior in its military character to the occupation of Galveston or Indianola. Nevertheless, your choice is left unrestricted. In the first place, by adopting the line of the Red River you retain your connection with your own base, and separate still more the two points of the rebel confederacy. Moreover, you cut Northern Louisiana and Southern Arkansas entirely off from supplies and re-enforcements from Texas. They are already cut off from the rebel states east of the Mississippi. If you occupy Galveston or Indianola you divide your own troops, and enable the enemy to concentrate all his forces upon either of these points, or on New Orleans."

To this Banks replies, August 26:

"To enter Texas from Alexandria or Shreveport would bring us at the nearest point to Heronville, in Sabine county, or Marshall, in Harrison, due west of Alexandria and Shreveport respectively. These points are accessible only by heavy marches, for which the troops are hardly prepared at this season of the year; and the points occupied would attract but little attention; and if our purpose was to penetrate farther into the interior, they would become exposed to sudden attacks of the enemy, and defensible only by a strong and permanent force of troops."

"The serious objection to moving on this line in the present condition of the forces of this department is the distance it carries us from New Orleans—our base of operations necessarily—and the great difficulty and the length of time required to return, if the exigencies of the service should demand, which is quite possible. In the event of long absence, Johnston threatens us from the East. The enemy will concentrate between Alexandria and Franklin, on the Teche, until our purpose is developed. As soon as we move any distance, they will operate against the river and New Orleans. It is true we could follow up such a movement by falling on their rear, but that would compel us to abandon the position in Texas, or leave it exposed with but slender defenses and garrison. This view is based, as you will see, upon the impossibility of moving even to Alexandria, at the present low stage of the rivers, by water, and the inability of the troops to accomplish extended marches."

September 30, after the failure of the Sabine Pass Expedition, General Halleck writes:

"The failure of the attempt to land at Sabine is only another of the numerous examples of the uncertain and unreliable character of maritime descents. The chances are against their success."


General Banks writes, October 16:

"The movement upon Shreveport and Marshall is impracticable at present. It would require a march from Brashear City of between four hundred and five hundred miles. The enemy destroying all supplies in the country as he retreats, and the low stage of the water making it impossible for us to avail ourselves of any water communications, except upon the Teche as far as Vermillionville, it requires communication for this distance by wagon trains. Later in the season this can be done, making Alexandria the base of operations; but it could not be done now. The rivers and bayous have not been so low in this state for fifty years, and Admiral Porter informs me that the mouth of the Red River, and also the mouth of the Atchafalaya, are both hermetically sealed by their vessels by almost dry sand-bars, so that he can not get any vessels into any of the streams. It is supposed that the first rise of the season will occur early in the next month."

The following, from General Halleck to Banks, December 7, 1863, could only be construed by the latter as a censure of his coast operations:



THE ATTACK ON SABINE PASS.



LANDING OF BANKS'S EXPEDITION ON BRAZOS SANTIAGO.



CONFEDERATE EVACUATION OF BROWNSVILLE.

paign had been effected. Both General Grant and General Banks would then have preferred, after securing Galveston, that all the troops which

"In regard to your 'Sabine' and 'Rio Grande' expeditions, no notices of your intention to make them were received here till they were actually undertaken. The danger, however, of dividing your army, with the enemy between the two posts, ready to fall upon either with his entire force, was pointed out from the first, and I have continually urged that you must not expect any considerable re-enforcements from other departments."

To this Banks replies, December 23:
 "My orders from the department were to establish the flag of the government in Texas at the earliest possible moment. I understood that the point and the means were left at my discretion. It was implied, if not stated, that time was an element of great importance in this matter, and that the object should be accomplished as speedily as possible. In addition to the instructions received from your department upon this subject, the President addressed me a letter, borne by Brigadier General Hamilton, military governor of Texas, dated September 19, 1863, in which he expressed the hope that I had already accomplished the object so much desired. In the execution of this order, my first desire was to obtain possession of Houston; and the expedition which failed to effect a landing at the Sabine was designed to secure that object. The failure of that expedition made it impossible to secure a landing at that point. I immediately concentrated all my disposable force upon the Teche, with a view to enter Texas by the way of Niblett's Bluff, on the Sabine, or by Alexandria, at some more northern point. The low stage of water in all the rivers, and the exhaustion of supplies in that country, made it apparent that this route was impracticable at this season of the year—I might say impossible within any reasonable time—and it would be accomplished by imminent peril, owing to the condition of the country, the length of marches, and the strength of the enemy, making this certain by thorough reconnaissance of the country; but, without withdrawing my troops, I concluded to make another effort to effect a landing at some point upon the coast of Texas, in the execution of what I understood to be imperative orders. For this purpose I withdrew a small force stationed at Morganza, on the Mississippi, which had been under command of General Herron, and was then under Major General Dana, and put them in a state of preparation for this movement."

"Assisted by the commander of the naval forces, Commodore Bell, I directed a reconnaissance of the coast of Texas as far as Brazos Santiago, making my movements entirely dependent upon that report. A return from this reconnaissance was made October 16, and my troops being in readiness for movement somewhere, without the delay of a single day, except that the state of the weather made necessary, I moved for the Brazos. You will see from these facts that it was impossible for me to give you sufficient notice of this intention to receive instructions from you upon this subject; but as soon as I had received the information necessary, or arrived at the determination to land at the Brazos, I gave you full information of all the facts in the case. It is my purpose always to keep you informed of all movements that are contemplated in this department, but it did not seem to me to be possible to do more in this instance; and, upon a review of the circumstances, I can not now see where or when I could have given you more complete and satisfactory information than my dispatches conveyed."

"I repeat my suggestion that the best line of defense for Louisiana, as well as for operations against Texas, is by Berwick's Bay and the Atchafalaya, and I also recall the suggestions made by you upon the same subject. But that line was impracticable at the time when I received your orders upon the subject of Texas. I ought to add that the line of the Atchafalaya is available for offensive or defensive purposes only when the state of the water admits the operations of a strong naval force. At the time when I made this suggestion to you it was impossible to get a boat into the Atchafalaya, either from Red River or from the Gulf, owing to the low stage of the water, and there were very few, if any, boats on the Mississippi or in this department that could have navigated these waters at that time. It was therefore impossible to avail myself of this natural line—first, for the reason that we had not sufficient naval force for this purpose, and that the navigation was impossible. As soon as the Mississippi and Red Rivers shall rise, the government can make available the advantages presented by this line of water communication."

A week later Banks again writes, urging the importance of the capture of Galveston before entering upon the Red River campaign:

"It is my desire, if possible, to get possession of Galveston. This, if effected, will give us control of the entire coast of Texas, and require but two small garrisons, one on the Rio Grande, and the other on Galveston Island, unless it be the wish of the Department of War that extensive operations should be made in the State of Texas. A sufficient number of men can probably be recruited in that state for the permanent occupation of these two posts. It will relieve a very large number of naval vessels, whose service is now indispensable to us, on the Mississippi and in the Gulf. This can occupy but a short time, and, if executed, will leave my whole force in hand to move to any other point on the Red River, or wherever the government may direct. Once possessed of Galveston, and my command ready for operation in any other direction, I shall await the orders of the government; but I trust that this may be accomplished before undertaking any other enterprise. It is impossible, at this time, to move as far north as Alexandria by water. The Red River is not open to the navigation of our gun-boats, and it is commanded by Fort De Russy, which has been remounted since our occupation of Alexandria. This position must be turned by means of a large force on land before the gun-boats can pass. To co-operate with General Steele in Arkansas, or north of the Red River, will bring nearly the whole rebel force of Texas and Louisiana between New Orleans and my command, without the possibility of dispersing or defeating them, as their movement would be directed south, and mine to the north. It is necessary that this force should first be dispersed or destroyed before I can safely operate in conjunction with General Steele. Once possessed of the coast of Texas, and the naval and land forces relieved, I can then operate against the forces in Louisiana or Texas, and I can disperse or destroy the land forces in Louisiana, and safely co-operate with General Steele, or with any other portion of the army of the United States. It was in this manner that we captured Port Hudson. It would have been impracticable to proceed against Port Hudson from the Mississippi without having first dispersed the army of Texas and Louisiana on the west of that river."

"I bear in mind the danger consequent upon the division of forces, but must suggest to you that my department is extended, and many posts must be occupied; and while I would be very glad to keep my forces concentrated, it is impossible to do so. The orders of the government seemed to be peremptory that I was to occupy a position in Texas, and those which I have in view, Brownsville and Galveston, required as little force as any other positions in that state. To this fact it may be added that there were supplies and recruits which can not be found in any other portion of this department. In all my operations you may rely upon the bulk of my forces being kept together, and prepared for any movements of the enemy. It is possible, but not probable, that they may make a successful assault upon some of the isolated positions. We shall endeavor to prevent this by all possible means. I repeat, that in any movements in which I engage I shall concentrate the available forces of my command, and peril nothing by an unnecessary division."

"The true line of occupation, in my judgment, offensive and defensive, for this department is the Atchafalaya and the Mississippi. The Teche country, and that between the Atchafalaya and the Mississippi, can be defended only by the assistance of the navy. It is impossible for land forces to operate on that line successfully without the assistance of gun-boats. The best position that we could occupy will be to defend this line by the aid of a strong naval force of light and heavy draught gun-boats for the different waters in which they may operate, and the disposable land forces so held as to be able to move from one point to another in a body. We should then have one complete line of water navigation from the Rio Grande to Alexandria or Shreveport during the winter and spring, and from the mouth of the Mississippi to Key West, in the Gulf, and could throw our entire force against any point of the territory occupied by the enemy, without the possibility of their anticipating our movements or purposes. I am endeavoring constantly to secure means for offensive and defensive war upon this plan, and am confident that it can be very speedily accomplished."

Halleck, in his reply to Banks, January 11, 1864, makes no allusion to Galveston. He says:
 "I am assured by the Navy Department that Admiral Porter will be prepared to co-operate with you as soon as the stage of the water in the Southwest will admit of the use of his flotilla there. General Steele's command is now under the general orders of General Grant, and it is hoped that he and General Sherman may also be able to co-operate with you at an early day. General Sherman is now on the Mississippi River, and General Grant expects to soon be able to re-enforce him. . . . It has never been expected that your troops would operate north of the Red River, unless the rebel forces in Texas should be withdrawn into Arkansas; but it was proposed that General Steele should advance to Red River if he could rely upon your co-operation, and he could be certain of receiving supplies upon that line. Being uncertain on these points, he determined not to attempt an advance, but to occupy the Arkansas River as his line of defense."

"The best military opinions of the generals in the West seem to favor operations on the Red River, provided the stage of water will enable gun-boats to co-operate. I presume General Sherman will communicate with you on this subject. If the rebels could be driven south of that river, it would serve as a shorter and better line of defense for Arkansas and Missouri than that now occupied by General Steele; moreover, it would open to us the cotton and slaves of Northeastern Louisiana and Southern Arkansas. I am inclined to think that this opens a better field of operations than any other for such troops as General Grant can spare during the winter. I have written to him and also to General Steele upon the subject."

General Banks, it will be remembered, has all along conceded that the line of the Red River was the best base of operations against Texas, but it was only practicable at high water. There were also some important difficulties connected with an advance by this route which he considered it his duty to lay before General Halleck. Hence the following correspondence. Jan. 23 he writes:

could be spared from the Department of the Gulf should be withdrawn to the east side of the Mississippi for operations against Mobile. General

"With the forces you propose, I concur in your opinion, and with Generals Sherman and Steele, 'that the Red River is the shortest and best line of defense for Louisiana and Arkansas, and as a base of operations against Texas,' but it would be too much for General Steele or myself to undertake separately. With our united forces, and the assistance of General Sherman, the success of movements on that line will be certain and important. I shall most cordially co-operate with them in executing your orders. With my own command I can operate with safety only on the coast of Texas, but from the coast I could not penetrate far into the interior, nor secure control of more than the country west of San Antonio. On the other line, with commensurate forces, the whole state, as well as Arkansas and Louisiana, will be ours, and their people will gladly renew allegiance to the government. The occupation of Shreveport will be to the country west of the Mississippi what that of Chattanooga is to the east, and as soon as this can be accomplished the country west of Shreveport will be in condition for a movement into Texas. I have written to General Sherman and General Steele in accordance with these views, and shall be ready to act with them as soon as the Atchafalaya and Red River will admit the navigation of our gun-boats. Our supplies can be transported by the Red River until April, at least. In the mean time, the railway from Vicksburg to Shreveport ought to be completed, which would furnish communication very comfortably for the whole of Eastern Texas. I do not mean that operations should be deferred for this purpose, but, as an ultimate advantage in the occupation of these states and the establishment of governments, it would be of great importance."

"I inclose to you with this communication a very complete map of the Red River country and Texas, which embraces all the information we have been able to obtain up to this time. It has been prepared by Major D. C. Houston, of the Engineer Corps, and will show that we have not overlooked the importance of this line. Accompanying this map is a memorial which exhibits the difficulties that are to be overcome. To this I respectfully invite your attention. I have sent to General Sherman and General Steele copies of this map."

"I shall be ready to move on Alexandria as soon as the rivers are up, most probably marching by Opelousas. This will be necessary to turn the forts on the Red River and open the way for the gun-boats. From that point I can operate with General Steele, north or south of Red River, in the direction of Shreveport, or from thence await your instruction. I do not think operations will be delayed on my account. I have received a dispatch from General Sherman, in which he expresses a wish to enter upon the campaign, but had not at that time received orders upon the subject. . . . I can concentrate on Red River all my force available for active service, except the garrisons at Matagorda and Brownsville, which will be small."

He adds, January 29:
 "I shall be ready to operate with General Sherman and General Steele as soon as I receive definite information of the time when they will be ready to move. I can take possession of Alexandria at any time, but could not maintain the position without the support of the forces on the upper river. . . . Pending information and orders in regard to the movement on Red River, but little change has occurred in the position of troops. . . . Anxiously waiting information and instructions in regard to operations on Red River, I have done nothing in Texas except provide for the security of the positions held."

The following is a copy of Major Houston's memorial, dated January 22, 1864:
 "I have the honor to submit the following information concerning the routes from the Mississippi to the interior of Texas:

"Table of Distances.

Miles.		Miles.	
Brashear City to Alexandria	174	Little Rock to Shreveport	255
Brashear City to Shreveport	344	Fort Smith to Shreveport	260
Natchez to Alexandria (via Harrisonburg)	80	Alexandria to Shreveport	170
Natchez to Natchitoches	120	Alexandria to Houston	270
Vicksburg to Shreveport	148	Shreveport to Houston	275

"The water via Red River commences falling about the 1st of May, and the navigation of the river for most of our gun-boats and transports is not reliable after that time. The months of March and April are unfavorable for operations in Northern and Eastern Texas, owing to the high stage of water in the Sabine, Nueces [meant for Neches], and Trinity [Trinidad] Rivers and their tributaries, and the overflow to which their banks are subject. The concentration of all the forces available for operations west of the Mississippi, in the vicinity of Shreveport, requires that the line of supply with the Mississippi be kept up. It would not be practicable to abandon the base with so large a force, with a line of operations of three hundred miles through a country occupied by the enemy to be overcome before communication could possibly be effected with points held by us on the coast. The water communication to Alexandria can not be depended on after the 1st of May, and it would be necessary to depend on the road from Natchez, a distance of eighty miles, and possibly from Harrisonburg, a distance of fifty miles."

"Boats of a very light draught, say three or three and a half feet of water, may go to Alexandria during low water at ordinary seasons, but the larger majority of our boats and gun-boats are of greater draught than this."

"The most reliable route would be by railroad from Vicksburg to Shreveport. The track is now laid from Vicksburg to Monroe. The road is graded from Monroe to Shreveport, and mostly bridged; the distance is ninety-six miles. There is a good wagon-road from Monroe to Shreveport, crossing the Washita River and other streams. It would require at least three months to rebuild this railroad, which is indispensable to the supply of our army in Northeastern Texas."

"To insure success and permanent results to the operations of a force to operate against Texas, or rather against the rebel forces west of the Mississippi, it is essential that the forces available for this purpose, viz., those now west of the Mississippi, and any additional forces that may be assigned, should be placed under the command of a single general. The rebel forces west of the Mississippi have a single head, and so should the force operating against them."

"Preparations should be made to establish a line of supply independent of the water-courses, otherwise, by the time the forces are concentrated and ready to move forward, they will be compelled to halt until a new line of supply is established, thus giving the enemy a breathing spell, and an opportunity to harass our communications with their mounted troops. It is of vital importance in operations of this kind, where the distances traveled are so great, that there should be no delays, for our main security against raids on our communications consists in keeping the enemy so well occupied in taking care of himself that he will have no time or opportunity to trouble us. Hence the importance of thorough preparation and perfect concert of action among the different corps."

"Suppose it is determined to concentrate the forces near Shreveport preliminary to a movement into Texas. This point is the principal depot of the enemy west of the Mississippi. There are some machine-shops and dock-yards there, and the place is fortified by a line of works with a radius of two or three miles. The position is a strong one, being on a bluff, and commanding the eastern bank. This point suggests itself at once as the proper one for such a concentration. The most direct and only reliable line of supply to this point would be the road from Vicksburg to Monroe—railroad as far as Monroe, fifty-two miles, and a graded road the rest of the way, ninety-six miles. It would be necessary to put the road in running order, and procure materials for completing the road. The security of this road requires that the enemy be driven out of Northern Louisiana and Southern Arkansas. This line could be held more easily than the Red River, which is very narrow and crooked, and has in many places high bluff banks, where field artillery could be placed to enfilade the channels, and have no fear of gun-boats. Such a point is Grand Ecore, where the bluff is one hundred and twenty feet high. This point, I have been informed by spies, is fortified. Concerning the mode of uniting the forces near Shreveport, I will mention no details, as it will depend much upon the enemy's movements and the character of the routes in Southern Arkansas, which I have not had time to examine fully. Our forces there have doubtless the information necessary to arrange this matter. These movements, however, should be so arranged as to drive the enemy out of Arkansas and Northern Louisiana."

"I anticipate no danger from any large force moving on New Orleans, Louisiana, from Texas. In case of this movement, our forces would immediately come in on the rear of this force and cut it off."

"The enemy will, I think, be unable to interfere seriously with our concentration of troops, and will then mass his whole force, except that at Galveston, near Shreveport, where he will fight, or retire on the line he may select."

"Suppose our force to be united at Shreveport, which would probably be effected during the season of high water, and that arrangements have been perfected to supply the army by the road from Vicksburg via Monroe, Arkansas and Louisiana clear of rebels, and the enemy in retreat. I assume that he will do this, as our forces should be much larger than his, and that he will continue to retreat, knowing that we will be weakened thereby, while he can select a defensive position far from our base. Whatever way he takes we must follow, and expect to have our path disputed at every point, as he will be driven to desperate efforts. The numerous streams with high banks will afford him a favorable opportunity to retard our progress and effect a secure retreat to any point he may select."

"Our subsequent movements can not well be foreseen. It does not seem probable that the enemy will retire to Houston unless his force is large, and he should propose to draw us into a trap. It is more probable that he will retire farther west, and use his cavalry to harass our flanks and rear, a species of war peculiarly adapted to Central and Western Texas. We should then be prepared for a most active campaign, and our force of cavalry should be especially large and efficient."

"Again recurring to the line of supply, it will be seen that the Vicksburg and Shreveport Road extends to Marshall, where there is an interval of 40 miles to Henderson, whence the road is completed to Galveston. The road from Marshall to Henderson, however, is graded, and could

Banks was by no means averse to an offensive campaign west of the Mississippi. In his evidence before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, he says: "If you cripple or scatter the enemy's army of the James, he will take refuge first in the Appalachian range of mountains, and ultimately in the country west of the Mississippi, and there reorganize. Therefore it was wise and expedient for us first to have cleared that country and held it, so that they could not cross the Mississippi. The enemy should be held on

be completed in a short time. In case the enemy should abandon the coast, this road will fall into our possession, and supplies could be obtained from two directions. Our colored troops, who are especially qualified for fighting guerrillas, would be usefully employed in guarding the entire line of the road from Vicksburg to Galveston. Texas is said to be full of blacks, who will be a valuable auxiliary in our operations in that state.

"The campaign above sketched would, I believe, be a long one. Much preparation and labor will be required to insure the army against vexatious delays, which permit the enemy constantly to elude us.

"I should estimate roughly that it would require until some time in May to effect the union of forces and be prepared with transportation for a movement into the interior. This would be about the commencement of the season most favorable for active operations in Texas. I suppose that by that time wagon trains will be provided to haul supplies from Monroe to Shreveport, that the railroad will be in running order to Monroe, and the work of completing the road well under way. The time required for subsequent operations can not be well estimated. It is highly probable that the rebel army will suffer greatly from desertion—an easy matter in active campaigning. The Arkansians will probably leave in the greatest numbers. Should their army, however, hold together, they will be able to prolong the contest some time.

"The results of this campaign will be very great. As long as we are able to keep the enemy actively engaged in Texas, Arkansas and Louisiana will be safe, and the process of reconstruction can be carried on without interruption; and should those states establish loyal state governments, there can be no doubt that desertions would be very numerous.

"This plan of operations has these advantages over that of operations from the coast of Texas. It also has the advantage of enabling us to bring a much larger force of cavalry into the field.

"It is, however, a much more difficult plan to execute, requires much more time, and is much more uncertain as to the time it will require to accomplish any of the objects undertaken.

"The movement by the coast of Texas possesses the great advantage of enabling us to deceive the enemy as to our intentions, which is not the case with the other plan. Our troops and supplies can be quickly moved by steamers to any point on the coast, landing can be threatened at different points, and the enemy kept in ignorance of our intentions. We now hold the harbor of Matagorda, the best on the coast next to Galveston. We have a secure point for the debarkation of troops and supplies. The distance by land to Houston is 150 miles, over good roads, three in number; one *via* Texana and Wharton; one *via* Matagorda and Columbia; the third along the beach to the mouth of Brazos River. Very little baggage need be required on the march, as the point of supply can be transferred to Brazos River and Sabine Pass in succession. A much less force would be required for this operation than the other. The rebel forces now in Arkansas will remain there as long as our forces are opposed to them, and we would only have to meet the force in Lower Texas. To direct and draw off this force as much as possible, the following plan could be adopted: Every preparation should be made for debarking the troops at Matagorda and transferring them to the main land. The troops intended to be sent should be designated and collected at New Orleans, so as to go aboard at a moment's notice. The steamers should be got ready and the troops assigned. All the heavy material, artillery, horses, etc., should be placed on board the light-draught vessels, having only men and light stores to be lightened. A demonstration of gun-boats, and troops in transports, could then be made at Alexandria in moderate forces, the effect of which would be to withdraw the enemy from Lower Texas. This having been effected, the force at New Orleans should be sent with all dispatch to Texas, the forces marched to Houston without delay, and Galveston be invested, and the garrison captured unless they hurriedly evacuated. This would give us entire control of the coast of Texas in a comparatively short time.

"For subsequent operations we would not be as well prepared as we would be at Shreveport with our forces concentrated. The object we started out with would have been accomplished, *viz.*, the possession of the coast. The object proposed by the movement *via* Shreveport is much greater than the other, and hence requires more time and means. That direct object is no less than the complete destruction or scattering of the rebel forces west of the Mississippi, and it will be impracticable to stop short of this result.

"To attempt simply to hold Shreveport as a post would subject us to continued annoyance as long as an organized force remains in Texas. They would make continued raids on our flank and rear, and our resources would be gradually frittered away. The rebel army must be pursued till it is broken up, and then we can occupy the country and restore order.

"I have written the above in some haste necessarily, and have endeavored to make my ideas clear, though they may be somewhat boldly expressed. A strict comparison between the two plans of operations can hardly be made, as their objects are different. The only question is, which can be most successfully carried out. The results provided by the first plan are much more satisfactory, and they include those of the second. I do not believe, with some, in the impossibility of long land marches *with a large force*, but I am fully aware of the difficulties to be overcome, and the uncertainty of foreseeing results."

On the receipt of this memorial, General Halleck writes February 1:

"Your dispatches of January 23, transmitting report and map of Major Houston, are received. This report and map contain very important and valuable information.

"The geographical theatre of the war west of the Mississippi indicates Shreveport as the most important objective point of the operations of a campaign for troops moving from the Teche, the Mississippi, and Arkansas Rivers.

"Of course, the strategic advantages of this point may be more than counterbalanced by disadvantages of communications and supplies. General Steele reports that he can not advance to Shreveport this month unless certain of finding supplies on the Red River, and of having there the co-operation of your forces or those of General Sherman.

"If the Red River is not navigable, and it will require months to open any other communication to Shreveport, there seems very little prospect of the requisite co-operation or transportation of supplies. It has, therefore, been left entirely to your discretion, after fully investigating the question, to adopt this line or substitute any other. It was proper, however, that you should have an understanding with Generals Steele and Sherman, as it would probably be hazardous for either of those officers to attempt the movement without the co-operation of other troops.

"If the country between the Arkansas and Red Rivers is impassable during the winter, as has been represented, it was thought that a portion of General Steele's command might be temporarily spared to operate with Sherman from the Mississippi. The Department of Arkansas was therefore made subject to the orders of General Grant.

"It is quite probable that the condition of affairs in East Tennessee, so different from what General Grant anticipated when he detached General Sherman, may have caused him to modify his plans, or, at least, to postpone their execution. This may also prevent your receiving the expected aid from Sherman. Communications by the Mississippi River are so often interrupted, and dispatches delayed, that I am not advised where General Sherman now is, or what are his present plans.

"So many delays have already occurred, and the winter is now so far advanced, that I greatly fear no important operations west of the Mississippi will be concluded in time for General Grant's proposed campaign in the spring. This is greatly to be regretted, but perhaps is unavoidable, as all our armies are greatly reduced by furloughs, and the raising of new troops progresses very slowly. Re-enforcements, however, are being sent to you as rapidly as we can possibly get them ready for the field.

"Have you not over-estimated the strength of the enemy west of the Mississippi River? All the information we can get makes the whole rebel force under Magruder, Smith, and Price much less than ours under you and General Steele. Of course you have better sources of information than we have here."

On the 11th of February General Halleck writes:

"Your dispatches of January 29 and February 2 are received. In the former you speak of awaiting "orders" and "instructions" in regard to operations on Red River. If by this is meant that you are waiting for orders from Washington, there must be some misapprehension. The substance of my dispatches to you on this subject was communicated to the President and Secretary of War, and it was understood that, while stating my own views in regard to operations, I should leave you free to adopt such lines and plans of campaign as you might, after a full consideration of the subject, deem best. Such, I am confident, is the purport of my dispatches, and it certainly was not intended that any of your movements should be delayed to await instructions from here. It was to avoid any delay of this kind that you were requested to communicate directly with Generals Sherman and Steele, and concert with them such plans of co-operation as you might deem best, under all the circumstances of the case.

"My last communication from General Sherman is dated January 29, 1863, and received here to-day. He says the stage of water in Red River is such that he can not operate in that direction earlier than March or April, and that in the mean time he would operate on the east side of the Mississippi River. I think he had not then communicated with you."

Turning now for a moment from the correspondence between Halleck and Banks, we find that

this side of the Mississippi, between the mountains and the Atlantic and the Gulf coasts." Nor was he opposed to the line of the Red River as a base of operations against Texas. He repeatedly admitted that this was the shortest and best line for that purpose. But he did insist upon certain conditions as necessary to operations from this base.

1. In the first place, the Red River campaign could not be undertaken until the waters of the river were high enough to admit Porter's gun-boats and heavy-draught transports.

the former, in his dispatches to General Grant on the subject of the trans-Mississippi campaign, clearly intimates that Banks's operations west of the river must continue during the winter, and that, while he partially recommends the Red River campaign, he leaves it to General Grant's discretion as to how far or in what manner he will allow Generals Steele and Sherman to co-operate. On January 8th he writes to Grant:

"Keeping in mind that General Banks's operations in Texas, either on the Gulf coast or by the Louisiana frontier, must be continued during the winter, it is to be considered whether it will not be better to direct our efforts, for the present, to the entire breaking up of the rebel forces west of the Mississippi River, rather than divide them by operating against Mobile and the Alabama. If the forces of Smith, Pierce, and Magruder could be so scattered or broken as to enable Steele and Banks to occupy Red River as a line of defense, a part of their armies would probably become available for operations elsewhere. General Banks reports his present force as inadequate for the defense of his position and for operations in the interior; and General Steele is of the opinion that he can not advance beyond the Arkansas or Sabine unless he can be certain of co-operation and supplies on Red River. Under these circumstances, it is worth considering whether such forces as Sherman can move down the Mississippi River should not co-operate with the armies of Steele and Banks on the west side. Of course, operations of any of your troops in that direction must be subordinate, and subsequent to those which you have proposed for East and West Tennessee. I therefore present these views at this time merely that they may receive your attention and consideration in determining upon your ulterior movements."

Again, on the 17th of January:

"General Banks represents the condition of affairs in his department to be such as to require all the re-enforcements that we can possibly send him. As soon as I found that he had divided his forces by operating upon the Gulf coast, I urged that troops should be sent him from South Carolina, and that the attack on Charleston should be abandoned. It was decided otherwise. My opinion has been, and still is, that all troops not required to hold our position in Virginia and on the Atlantic coast should be sent to you and to General Banks for operations this winter, and as preparatory to a spring campaign. I hoped that by this means Tennessee, Arkansas, Mississippi, and Louisiana would be secured, and the rebel force in Texas be so reduced and hemmed in as to give us but little trouble hereafter. Our armies in the west and south could then have been so concentrated, or at least could have so co-operated as to inflict some terrible blows upon the rebels. But I fear that the unexpected condition of affairs in East Tennessee will prevent the accomplishment of these objects, or at least a part of them, this winter, and that we must soon prepare for a spring campaign. The furloughing of so many troops has greatly reduced our forces in the North, but I hope to send some more to General Banks. There is, however, much difficulty and delay in obtaining transportation by sea. This makes it still more important that the navigation of the Mississippi should be well protected, and that Sherman and Steele should so operate as to assist General Banks as much as possible. I leave it entirely to your judgment to determine how and to what extent such assistance can be rendered."

Grant appears to have been willing that Sherman, after his Meridian campaign, should co-operate with General Banks in the movement on Shreveport, provided the time occupied in this operation would not interfere with the spring campaign against Atlanta. Sherman was himself very partial to the project. On the 31st of January he writes to General Banks:

"The Mississippi, though low for the season, is free from ice and in good boating order, but I understand Red River is still low. I had a man from Alexandria yesterday, who reported the falls or rapids at that place impassable save to the smallest boats.

"My inland expedition is now working, and will be off for Jackson, etc., to-morrow. The only fear I have is in the weather. . . . My orders from General Grant will not, as yet, justify me in embarking for Red River, though I am very anxious to operate in that direction. The moment I learned that you were preparing for it, I sent communication to Admiral Porter, and dispatched to General Grant at Chattanooga, asking if he wanted me and Steele to co-operate with you against Shreveport, and I will have his answer in time, for you can not do any thing till Red River has twelve feet of water on the rapids of Alexandria. That will be from March to June. I have lived on Red River, and know somewhat of the phases of that stream. The expedition on Shreveport should be made rapidly, by simultaneous movements from Little Rock on Shreveport, from Opelousas on Alexandria, and a combined force of gun-boats and transports directly up Red River. Admiral Porter will be able to have a splendid fleet by March 1. I think Steele could move with 10,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry. I could take about 10,000, and you could, I suppose, the same. Your movement from Opelousas simultaneous with mine up the river would compel Dick Taylor to leave Fort De Russy, near Marksville, and the whole could appear at Shreveport about a day appointed. I doubt if the enemy would risk a siege, although they are, I am informed, fortifying, and placing many heavy guns. It would be better for us that they should stand at Shreveport, as we might make large and important captures.

"But I do not believe the enemy would fight a force of 30,000 men with gun-boats. I will be most happy to take part in the proposed expedition, and hope, before you have made up your dispositions, I will have the necessary permission. . . . I think by March 1 I could put afloat for Shreveport 10,000 men, provided I succeed in my present plan of clearing the Mississippi, and breaking up the railroad about Meridian."

By the 1st of March it is clear that the Red River campaign had been fully decided upon, so far as Generals Grant, Sherman, and Banks, and Admiral Porter were concerned. Banks writes to Halleck March 6th:

"Major General Sherman, of General Grant's department, arrived in this city [New Orleans] on the evening of the 1st instant, having completed his expedition to Meridian to his entire satisfaction. He returned to Vicksburg on the evening of the 3d, to arrange for his co-operation in the Red River movement. Unless delayed by want of steam transportation, of which we have put every thing we have at his command, he will be ready to join me on the Red River by the 17th, where I hope to be at that date. He expects to furnish 10,000 men for that purpose.

"Captain Dunham, of my staff, returned from the headquarters of General Steele yesterday, bearing communications from him, copies of which will be forwarded to you. General Steele appears to have changed the plan entertained when he last communicated with me. Copies of his dispatches at that time have been forwarded to you. He then proposed to move by the way of Monroe for the Red River. He is now apprehensive, in consequence of the reduction of his force, that he can only enter upon a movement for the diversion of the enemy in the direction of Arkadelphia, without any expectation of joining us at Shreveport, or any other position on the river. General Sherman and myself have earnestly urged him to abandon this idea, that, in any event, the three forces in the course of thirty days would meet at Shreveport. General Steele represents that he will have about 6000 men at his command. I respectfully request that orders may be given to him to co-operate with us upon the point named, in accordance with the plans originally proposed by you. I see nothing to defeat its success. Admiral Porter is ready to move up the river in co-operation with us as soon as his vessels can be admitted. General McClelland has been assigned to the command of the troops in Texas, and will leave for an examination of the posts at Matagorda Bay and Brownsville to-morrow. Brigadier General Ransom will have command of the Thirteenth Army Corps, which participates in the movement on the Red River."

General Steele said the movement was earlier than he had anticipated. A large number of his troops were on furlough, and the presence of the remainder was necessary in order to secure the success of an election to be held March 14th. He writes to General Halleck March 12:

"General Banks with 17,000, and 10,000 of Sherman's, will be at Alexandria on the 17th instant. This is more than equal for any thing Kirby Smith can bring against them. Smith will run. By holding the line of the Arkansas secure, I can soon free this state from armed rebels. Sherman insists upon my moving upon Shreveport to co-operate with the above-mentioned forces with all my effective force. I have prepared to do so against my own judgment and that of the best-informed people here. The roads are most, if not quite impracticable; the country is destitute of provisions on the route we should be obliged to take. I made a proposition to General Banks to threaten the enemy's flank and rear with all my cavalry, and to make a feint with infantry on the Washington Road. I yielded to Sherman, so far as this plan is concerned. Blunt wished me to move by Monroe to Red River; Sherman wants me to go by Camden and Overton to Shreveport. The latter is impracticable, and the former would expose the line of the Arkansas and Missouri to cavalry raids. Holmes has a large mounted force. I agreed to move by Arkadelphia or Hot Springs and Washington to Shreveport. I can move with 7000, including the frontier. Our scouting-parties frequently have skirmishes with detached parties all over the state, and if they should form in my rear in considerable force I should be obliged to fall back to save my dépôts, etc."

On the 13th of March Halleck advised Steele to co-operate with the movement of Banks and Sherman on Shreveport. The appointment of Grant as lieutenant general rendered Sherman's presence necessary at Chattanooga, so that he did not in person direct the movements of his troops in the Red River campaign.

2. It should be undertaken with a commensurate force.
3. Time must be given sufficient for the accomplishment of its great object—the defeat of Kirby Smith's armies.
4. And as this prolongation of the campaign would compel the army, after the 1st of May at least, to depend upon some line of supply independent of the water-courses, it was necessary that the railroad from Vicksburg to Shreveport should be put in running order.
5. Finally, as forces from other departments must participate in the campaign, Banks urged the necessity that the operations of all should be under the control of a single general.

All these conditions were distinctly insisted upon by General Banks, and the importance of each was fully explained. If they had all been met; if the campaign had been in season, undertaken with adequate forces, free from any arbitrary limitations in regard to time, supported by land communication with Vicksburg, and controlled by a single head, even then the difficulties encountered would have been as great as in any other campaign of the war. The requirements of the campaign could not be answered—at least not in the spring of 1864.

1. The time at which the movement might commence could not be calculated with certainty. It would have been safe ordinarily to have predicted a sufficient rise of the Red River in March. But in 1864 it was not safe. The Mississippi and Red Rivers, during the winter, had been lower than they had been for years. It was reasonable, therefore, not only to anticipate unusual delay in the spring flood, but also to doubt whether, when it came, it would answer the purpose. And, if the river had been left out of view; if the possibility of efficient naval support had been left to depend upon circumstances, and reliance had been placed only upon the railroad from Shreveport, in that case not only must three months be occupied in putting the railroad in running order, but expeditions, which would occupy considerable time, must be undertaken to clear Southern Arkansas of all such hostile forces as might, if left there, interrupt this land line of supply. It was impossible, therefore, to count upon an early commencement of the campaign. And if not commenced early, it could not be undertaken at all, without interfering with the progress of the war east of the Mississippi.¹

2. And this leads us to the second requirement—a sufficient force. No period of the war could have been more inopportune in this respect. The term of three years, for which the greater portion of the army had enlisted, was now expiring. It could not be safely asserted as certain that the majority of the veteran soldiers would re-enlist, though that was a probable event. The solution of the important problem thus arising ought to have been anticipated by proper measures on the part of the government. Such measures had been tried, but the result was exceedingly unsatisfactory. The conscription of 1863 had furnished only a meagre re-enforcement to the national armies. Thus, although General Halleck was partial to operations in the West, and especially partial in his estimate of the importance of the trans-Mississippi campaign, he found it extremely difficult to increase General Banks's command. He advised that operations in South Carolina be postponed for this purpose; but the government took a different view. In North Carolina the defensive could hardly be maintained, and no troops could be withdrawn from that state. To farther deplete the Army of the Potomac was also impossible. General Longstreet, after abandoning the siege of Knoxville, had occupied a position which seriously threatened East Tennessee, and from General Grant's department only about 10,000 men of Sherman's army could be detached for operations elsewhere. This small corps, and a few regiments, chiefly of cavalry, which, with great difficulty, had been secured from the East by General Halleck, were all that could be sent to the Department of the Gulf, and Sherman's troops could not co-operate with Banks until the conclusion of the Meridian expedition. The only other possible source of aid in the proposed Red River campaign must come from General Steele's department. At the most, Steele could not bring to bear upon the campaign more than 10,000 men, and his column must be independent of the direct movement on Shreveport. Advancing from Little Rock, his route to Shreveport was, at this season of the year, so difficult, and almost impracticable, that it might reasonably be apprehended that he would not be able to strike an effective blow. General Banks's own force, which could be made available for the campaign, amounted to 15,000 or 17,000 men.² Thus less than 40,000 troops could engage in the campaign, and only about 28,000 could be certainly counted upon in the event of an encounter with the enemy, should the latter determine to fight a battle below Shreveport.

3. The time allowed for the campaign was limited to thirty days. It was for this period, and no longer, that Sherman's troops were "loaned" to General Banks. This force was indispensable to the continuance of the campaign after reaching Shreveport. The difficulties incident to Steele's advance from Little Rock were so great that no absolute reliance could be placed upon that movement. The main dependence was upon A. J. Smith's

¹ General Grant's idea of the Red River expedition is shown in the following extract from a letter, written by him to Sherman, dated Nashville, February 18, 1864:

"While I look upon such an expedition as is proposed as of the greatest importance, I regret that any force has to be taken from east of the Mississippi for it. Your troops will want rest for the purpose of preparing for a spring campaign, and all the veterans should be got off on furlough at the very earliest moment."

² Unless you go in command of the proposed expedition, I fear any troops you may send with it will be entirely lost from farther service in this command. This, however, is not the reason for my suggestion that you be sent. Your acquaintance with the country, and otherwise fitness, were the reasons. I can give no positive orders that you send no troops up Red River, but what I do want is their speedy return, if they do go, and that the minimum number necessary be sent. . . ."

³ A large portion of his force, including all of his colored troops, was occupied in garrisoning posts, distributed as follows:

Rio Grande.....	3000	Key West.....	791	Plaquemine (colored)....	620
Pass Cavallo.....	3277	New Orleans.....	1125	Port Hudson (colored)....	9409
Flensicola.....	900	Baton Rouge.....	6566	Total.....	20,657

command—that portion of Sherman's troops which was loaned to Banks for a month. If the campaign was not concluded within that time, it must evidently be abandoned, except in the very improbable event of Steele's prompt arrival at Shreveport. The uncertainty of Steele's success in advancing, and the limited time allowed for the co-operation of Sherman's troops, made General Banks's command the only one to be relied upon as a permanent force.

4. This limitation as regards time of course made it out of the question to occupy several months in the establishment of communications between Vicksburg and Shreveport. For this reason, if for no other, the campaign must be concluded before the fall of the Red River, or be then abandoned.

5. No attention whatever seems to have been given to General Banks's suggestion that all the operations of the campaign should be under a single general. Four distinct commands were thus allowed to participate in the campaign—Porter's, Steele's, A. J. Smith's, and Banks's—each independent of the others. That this was the case was, in great part, General Banks's fault. In accordance with military usage, he ought to have assumed the command of Smith's troops. But he did not do so, and there was, therefore, no unity of command.¹

The whole affair seems rather to have happened than to have been ordered. General Halleck had been recommending the campaign for months, but he would not assume the responsibility of ordering it. He left the decision entirely with Banks, Sherman, and Steele. The two former, in spite of circumstances which made failure almost certain, while success was a bare possibility, seem to have been confident of a fortunate issue. Partly from this confidence, and probably still more from the urgency with which Halleck had formerly pressed the matter, they entered upon the campaign. It is difficult to conceive what objects they expected to attain within the space of a single month. It is conceded on all hands that, even if Shreveport were reached, nothing beyond that could be accomplished, and a speedy retreat to the Mississippi was inevitable.² To march to Shreveport—the Richmond of the trans-Mississippi territory—to capture that place, possibly, and destroy its manufactories, and then to march back again—this certainly was no object commensurate with the risk or expense of the campaign, or with the forces employed. Halleck certainly dissuaded Banks from undertaking the movement unless, within the period allowed for its accomplishment, it promised an important success.

That the campaign ought not, under the circumstances, to have been undertaken, is evident. But upon whom rests the responsibility? This must lie between Halleck and Banks. Neither of them would have assumed the responsibility of ordering the movement. Banks very clearly stated the conditions upon which he could enter upon the campaign, and, upon consideration of this statement, Halleck ought to have abandoned the affair as impracticable. But he did not. He communicated with General Sherman, and the latter seemed to favor the undertaking. He reported this opinion to Banks, and advised him to communicate with Generals Steele and Sherman upon the subject. General Banks knew that his own decision was absolute in regard to the matter. He ought to have decided promptly against the movement. But, with the re-enforcements from Sherman, and General Steele's co-operation, he seems to have thought success possible. Besides, General Halleck's scarcely disguised censure of his coast operations, and the urgency with which the latter had pressed the Red River route upon his attention from the beginning, seemed to render farther opposition on his part indecorous. The matter being left to his discretion, any such consideration ought not to have influenced him. He ought to have followed his better judgment. To do otherwise was an inexcusable exhibition of weakness. We are compelled, therefore, to assume that he either weakly yielded his consent, or that his judgment had been altered in view of the co-operation which he would receive, and by "the best military opinions of the generals in the West," which Halleck urged as favorable to operations on the Red River.³ Whichever way we may determine, he certainly consented to the campaign, and is, in so far, responsible for its results.

¹ General Sherman's orders, issued to General Smith March 4, 1864, certainly contemplated that the latter would be under General Banks's command. Sherman writes to Smith to join Banks at Alexandria. He says: "You will meet him there, report to him, and act under his orders."—*Sherman's Report to the Committee on the Conduct of the War*, p. 7.

² The evidence before the Committee on the Conduct of the War is conclusive on this point. General Banks says (p. 20): "I believe, if any of our forces had taken Shreveport, they could not have held it for one month. . . . We might have gone there, destroyed the place, and then come back again; but I think if the enemy had allowed us to go up there, we should never have got back with the army to the fleet." The question was asked, "How could that have been supposed to conform to the idea of going into Texas with an army?" To which Banks replied: "That is not for me to say. It was the purpose of the expedition to occupy Shreveport, and hold it. General Steele's forces were to hold it if we occupied it. But without some communication on that line, independent of river navigation, . . . General Steele could not have got his supplies. It would have taken at least 10,000 men to hold Shreveport against the concentrated forces of the enemy. There was nothing in the country upon which he could subsist. They would have cut off his communications, and he would have been compelled to surrender. But there is another view of operations west of the Mississippi which, if I had had command of the forces, I should have been disposed to adopt. There were about 100,000 men west of the Mississippi, in Louisiana, Arkansas, and Missouri. If a campaign without limit of time had been set on foot, with the purpose of concentrating all disposable forces in these states, with means of supply independent of the river, and orders to follow up the enemy wherever he could be found, and then destroy him, we would have cleared the country west of the Mississippi of any organized force of the enemy; then, by constructing a railroad from the Mississippi River to Shreveport, fortifying that place, and getting supplies there sufficient for a year, and leaving troops enough there to hold it, we could cover Louisiana, Arkansas, and Missouri. The occupation of Shreveport at the conclusion of such a campaign would have been an important achievement."

³ General Banks says in his report: "Having made known my plan of operations on the coast, and fully stated, at different times, the difficulties to be encountered in movements by land in the direction of Alexandria and Shreveport, I did not feel at liberty to decline participation in the campaign, which had been pressed upon my attention from the time I was assigned to the command of this department, and which was now supported by the concurrent opinions of the general officers in the West, on account of difficulties which might be obviated by personal conference with commanders, or by orders from the general-in-chief. It was not, however, without well-founded apprehensions of the result of the campaign, and a clear view of the measures (which I suggested) indispensable to success, that I entered upon this new campaign. . . . In the instructions I received from government, it was left to my discretion whether or not I would join in this expedition, but I was directed to communicate with General

at the extreme front at 1 P.M. He found there an unexpected force of the enemy. He felt, he says, instinctively that "we were in presence of the whole force of the enemy." He then saw with his own eyes the disadvantageous position of the cavalry train, which was stretched along for a distance of two or three miles in the rear. Skirmishing with the enemy had already commenced; a battle was imminent, and could not be avoided. There had been mismanagement, the injurious results of which it was now too late to avert entirely. The extent of the injury must depend upon the decision made at this critical moment by General Banks. If he fell back, declining a general battle, it was at some risk to the train; but if he determined upon a battle at that point, bringing up his infantry to Lee's support, the risk was much greater. Indeed, it was, under the circumstances, almost certain that he would be defeated if he ventured battle. General Banks determined to take the greater risk. He hurried up the infantry in the rear, and brought up fourteen pieces of artillery in addition to the twelve already with General Lee. Notwithstanding his own admission that he felt himself to be confronted by the full force of the enemy, Banks does not seem to have appreciated the risk which he was running. In his dispatch to Franklin half an hour after he reached Lee, he advises him that the enemy seems prepared to make a strong stand, and that he had better make arrangements to bring up his infantry, and concludes: "You had better send back and push up the trains, as manifestly we shall be able to rest here."

General Franklin, on receipt of this order, was at the point where Banks had passed him in the morning, where he had the remainder of the Thirtieth Corps under General Cameron, and Emory's division of the Nineteenth. The order to move forward quickly followed the dispatch above mentioned, and before 5 o'clock P.M. Franklin was on the field with Cameron's command. The battle had been going on then for half an hour. Ransom had reached the field at 1 30 P.M., and found that the enemy had been driven across an open field. Landrum, with the brigade sent in the morning, was advancing to a ridge which the Confederates had abandoned, and which he now occupied (at 2 P.M.), the other brigade brought up by Ransom going in to his support. Landrum's third brigade arrived soon afterward, making the infantry force under Ransom 2413 strong. This, with Lee's cavalry, made the entire force between 6000 and 7000 men. The position taken was about four miles from Mansfield, at a place called Sabine Cross-roads. It was about fifty miles south of Shreveport, and twenty miles west of Red River. Nims's battery, posted on a hill near the road, was near the left of the line, supported on either side by the Twenty-third Wisconsin and Sixty-seventh Indiana regiments. Then came the Seventy-seventh Illinois, reaching to a belt of timber 200 yards to the right of the hill. The right of the line consisted of the One Hundred and Thirtieth Illinois, the Forty-eighth Ohio, the Nineteenth Kentucky, the Ninety-sixth and Eighty-third Ohio, with a section of artillery. The Chicago Mercantile and the First Indiana batteries, brought up at a later period, were posted on a ridge in the rear, near Banks's headquarters. The cavalry was posted on the two flanks. The ground in front was open, and descended in the rear to a creek, from which it again ascended to a covered ridge.

The Confederate force was under the command of General Dick Taylor, and consisted of Walker's and Mouton's divisions, and Green's cavalry, in all probably amounting to 12,000 men. Taylor had been ordered to retreat steadily before the advance of the Federal army, leading it on to Shreveport. Two circumstances led him to disobey this order. In the first place, he saw that it would be giving Banks a great advantage to leave him in possession of the roads in the open country near Mansfield, since these would enable him to communicate with the advancing fleet. In the second place, the opportunity offered for defeating General Banks was too tempting to be rejected. Taylor had already retreated beyond Mansfield, when, acting upon these considerations, he directed Walker and Mouton to retrace their steps through the town, and take up a position three miles beyond. Thus Green, who had been skirmishing and retreating steadily, found himself, on the 8th, supported by two infantry divisions. Taylor was still undecided whether to fight the battle, when Mouton, occupying the left, advanced without orders, and gained such a decisive advantage that Walker also was ordered forward.

The attack commenced about 4 P.M. The Federal right maintained its position, but the left was soon turned, and Nims's battery was captured. The hill was now occupied by the enemy, and the position first taken by the Federals was no longer tenable. The routed cavalry, galloping to the rear, rushed through the infantry line, throwing it into confusion, and some of the regiments were cut off from retreat and surrounded. The arrival of Franklin with Cameron's command was too late to retrieve the misfortune. Out of 26 pieces of artillery engaged, all but eight had been captured. To make a stand with Cameron's fresh division, and so many of the routed troops as might be rallied, would have resulted in fresh disaster. The Thirtieth Corps and the cavalry abandoned the field in as good order as was possible under the circumstances, leaving the train in possession of the enemy. But for the position of this train fewer prisoners would have been taken by the enemy, and probably a much larger portion of the artillery would have been saved. General Banks's loss in this unfortunate battle was over 3000 men, killed, wounded, and prisoners.¹ The enemy lost

¹ The responsibility for this disaster lies between Generals Banks and Franklin. The majority of the Committee on the Conduct of the War throw the weight of responsibility upon Banks. They claim that it was his duty to be cognizant of the details of the march; that if he did not know these details on the 7th, he certainly did on the 8th, before the affair at Sabine Cross-roads; and that with this knowledge he assumed the responsibility of the position by remaining where he was and sending for the troops in the rear to re-enforce him.

D. W. Gooch submits a separate report, in which he takes a different view of General Banks's connection with the disaster. He claims that both Lee and Ransom "regarded the position held by our forces as a good one; that, in addition to the cavalry and artillery which had composed

about 1000. The disaster at Sabine Cross-roads must be attributed to several causes: 1st. The failure of the cavalry to obtain prompt and full infor-

Lee's advance, there were on the field, also, at that time, two brigades of infantry, and that the balance of the Thirtieth and Nineteenth Corps were respectively about five and seven miles in the rear, and probably at that time advancing." "Under these circumstances," says Gooch, "General Banks, when he arrived upon the field, was obliged to decide to abandon this favorable position, over which he would be compelled to pass in order to establish his proposed communication with the transports at Loggy Bayou, and to reach Shreveport; withdraw his artillery and the large baggage train of the cavalry, in the presence of a superior force of the enemy, on the narrow and difficult road which has been described, or remain upon the field and order up to his assistance the troops of the Thirtieth and Nineteenth Army Corps from the points heretofore mentioned. He decided to remain upon the field and take the chances of a battle. Had the enemy deferred the attack one hour longer, or had it been possible for our troops to reach the field one hour earlier, the result of that battle would undoubtedly have been reversed."

But the attack was not deferred, and Banks had no reason to suppose that it would be; nor could Cameron and the Nineteenth Corps have been up in time. Banks admits that he thought the enemy in full force in his front. But his dispatch to Franklin (received by the latter at 3 P.M. on the 8th) only ordered him to make arrangements to bring up the infantry, and to await instructions before advancing. He also ordered Franklin to push up his trains (over seven hundred wagons), "as manifestly," says Banks, "we shall be able to rest here." Ten minutes later the order came to move, and Franklin promptly advanced with Cameron's division, coming upon the field too late to prevent disaster. The Nineteenth Corps, which was also ordered forward, being still farther in the rear, could not have been brought up in time to effect any thing. It is plain, therefore, that in venturing a battle instead of withdrawing the train under cover of the troops already in front, General Banks made himself responsible for the consequences. There is no testimony to the effect that the cavalry could not have fallen back.

The responsibility for the order of march rests with General Franklin. General Banks testifies: "The order of march was perfectly proper, but it was not compact enough. The different parts of the column were not within supporting distance of each other; they were extended for from twenty to thirty miles. . . . It was certainly a great fault that the advance-guard, with a possible chance of meeting the enemy, should have had its train close upon its rear. That was inexcusable. . . . The order in which the divisions should move was the established order which had continued from our movement from Alexandria. The only addition was that General Smith's forces brought up the rear. Every thing in that respect was perfectly right. It was approved by me, and it may be said to have been changed by me somewhat, because, when the enemy in our front was found to be increasing in strength, I gave directions to General Franklin to send a brigade to the assistance of the cavalry. But the fact that this force was stretched out more than twenty miles was necessarily without my knowledge, and I am not responsible for it in any way. The responsibility rests with General Franklin. General Lee, who is responsible for the advance, received written instructions from General Franklin, which are stated in General Lee's report. My own staff officers took written instructions to General Lee from General Franklin to keep his trains close up, the theory probably being that they would not meet the enemy. When I passed General Franklin on the morning of the 8th of April, he said, 'There will be no battle.' Besides, in his instructions to General Lee he evidently supposes that the enemy was not there; for he says, 'General Banks and General Ransom have gone to the front; but it is not expected that they will remain there.'"

In answer to the question, "At what point in your advance were you expecting to meet the enemy?" Banks replies:

"My expectation was that we should meet the enemy between Mansfield and Shreveport; but it was never certain whether we should or not. . . . I had information, upon which I relied implicitly, from a man who had been through that country, that we would have to fight at some point between Mansfield and Shreveport, at some point near Mansfield. My belief is that the plans of the enemy were changed as we approached Mansfield. [This belief is confirmed by the Confederate reports.] And it has been stated that the rebel General Taylor was suspended from his command for having attacked us at Sabine Cross-roads, General Kirby Smith being confident that if his orders had been complied with, and we had been allowed to reach Shreveport, we would have been unable to return. And of that I am assured myself. If General Taylor had not attacked us, I do not know what we would have done. But he was tempted by our position, knowing that we were in a condition where we could not get our forces together, and he knew he could gain an advantage over us. He was thereby induced to attack us against orders."

General Franklin testifies that he differed with Banks and Lee as to the policy of making the advance-guard include infantry. "If any fighting occurs, it is most likely that the infantry will do it, while the cavalry looks on; and if there be merely a march, the cavalry exhausts the infantry, or it must regulate its march by the infantry rate." He claims that the trains "had nothing to do with the defeating of the infantry and cavalry. But when the rout began, then the trains were in the way, and nothing could be got away, because the train was jammed up to where the infantry was driven back; and when the time came to turn the artillery back, there was no place for it to get through. . . . I suppose that to a certain extent I am responsible thus far. The cavalry general had always been asking me to put his train behind the infantry troops, and let it march in front of the infantry train. I had always refused to do that; I told him it was his business to take care of his own train. The reasons which actuated me in this were these: I had about seven hundred wagons with me, which the infantry had to take care of. If it had taken the two hundred and fifty which the cavalry had, and put them in front of my infantry train, my infantry wagons would never have got into camp the day of my march. The consequence would have been that the cavalry would have had their wagons up, but at the expense of the infantry. I therefore told General Lee that he must take care of his own wagons. To that extent I am responsible for his wagons being where they were. But he writes me, at 7 30 A.M. on the 8th, 'I am keeping my train back in order that I may see the thing settled before I bring it up to the front.' That relieved my mind entirely about the train, and I had no idea that I would find it where I did find it. I was so anxious about the trains that I ordered them to close up during the day, finding that the wagons straggled badly as they passed my camp. I understand that General Lee has interpreted that to mean that I ordered his train forward, which I did not. I gave no orders to General Lee's train that day except to close up. There were several open places, between the point where the infantry was to encamp and the battle-ground, where a train much larger than the cavalry train could have been parked. The general in command at the front should, I think, have ordered the train in park at one of these places when he saw that a general battle was imminent. I could not, because I was with my immediate command."

But could not Franklin, when he received Lee's report that the train was a great annoyance to him, have issued this order to park the artillery? He could have done so but for his impression that there would be no battle at this stage of the march. It seems, therefore, that while General Franklin must be held exclusively responsible for the detached order of march, a large share of the blame attached to the position of the cavalry train should be attributed to Generals Lee and Banks, either of whom ought to have seen the necessity of parking the trains before engaging an enemy which Banks believed to be from 15,000 to 18,000 strong. If they failed to attend to this, it was the business of Brigadier General C. P. Stone, General Banks's chief of staff, to do so. He was on the field, and this was one of his special duties.

Brigadier General Dwight, who, a week after the battle, succeeded General Stone as chief of staff, corroborates General Franklin's testimony as to the feasibility of parking the train. He testifies: "There was no objection to the train being on the road, provided the cavalry was not so heavily engaged with the enemy as to endanger it. There were a great many places on the road where the train could have been parked." He denies that the wagons in any way impeded the march of the Nineteenth Corps. General Lee, he says, "should by no means have permitted his train to be between the infantry of the army and the cavalry of the army when he was going to fight a battle. But he ought to have known whether there was danger of a battle; he ought to have known the enemy's force in front of him; for he had a very large force. But it is to be remarked here that he did not seem to know well; that he did not manage as if he knew the whole force of the enemy was in his front. The moment that he found the enemy was in his front in force, he should have parked the train where it would be safe; and if he found that he had got it too far in the front, he should have turned it to the rear. That is a matter of his own responsibility, of which he ought to be a competent judge." Dwight evidently thinks that Lee mismanaged the entire conduct of the advance-guard. He says the cavalry ought to have been still farther in advance of the infantry than it was; that Lee had too large a train; but that, large as it was, it could have been parked in three hours; that it was Lee's business to know that he was likely to be attacked, and thus have gained time for preparation; "it was the easiest country in the world in which to tell when you are going to be attacked, or when there was a liability to attack, because it was comparatively a narrow country. A strong advance-guard of cavalry, much less than the main body, of good cavalry scouts, could have always told where the main body of the enemy was, so that no battle should have occurred until the army was prepared for it." He thus describes Lee's command:

"This cavalry force, as it was called, of General Lee consisted of cavalry proper, of mounted infantry, and a very large proportion of artillery for such a force. It was really more infantry than it was cavalry. For the work of cavalry proper it was utterly unfit. The men were not good riders, and did not understand how to take care of their horses properly. They were infantry soldiers who had been put on horseback; they were not properly cavalry. General Lee's force, therefore, consisted of some of the very best infantry regiments that were ever in the Department of the Gulf, with cavalry proper, and a large amount of artillery. Considering the character of that force, it was an eminently proper disposition to place the whole of it, or so much of it as was in advance, in advance. The whole of it was not in advance; one brigade of it, at least, was in



T. E. G. BANSOM.

mation concerning the enemy. 2d. General Lee's neglect to park his trains before fighting. 3d. The detached order of march, the column of infantry with its head fronting the enemy on a field over twenty miles distant from its rear. And, 4th. The decision of General Banks to venture a battle under these unfavorable circumstances. This last was the great mistake, and gave each of the disadvantages mentioned its operative force; but for this decision there need have been no defeat, at least not at this point. It would probably have been better if Banks had staid behind at Grand Ecore, or any where else, as in that case the battle, if fought at all, would have been fought with a concentrated command. For, notwithstanding General Franklin's conviction that there would be no fighting, it is clear that on the morning of the 8th his plan was to concentrate his whole command before marching beyond St. Patrick's Bayou. Had this been done, the advance would have continued to Shreveport without fighting a battle, and there it would have confronted a force of the enemy superior in numbers—Price's command united with Dick Taylor's. Still, even in that event, a far greater disaster would have befallen General Banks's army, with its immense baggage trains, and 400 miles from its base. Most certainly, in that event, the fleet—so much of it as could wriggle its way up to Shreveport—together with the transports, would have been exposed to utter destruction.

While the Thirteenth Corps and Lee's cavalry were falling back in a disorganized mass from Sabine Cross-roads, General Emory's division of the Nineteenth Corps was advancing to the field of battle. At Pleasant Grove, three miles back of where the fighting had been, this division met the fugitives, who passed through their ranks to the rear. Following these came the pursuing enemy, who just at nightfall fell upon Emory's unbroken wall of bayonets, and were repulsed after an engagement of an hour and a half. General Mouton was killed in the first onset. "The first division of the Nineteenth Corps," says General Banks, "by its great bravery in this action,

rear. . . . I consider our force of cavalry, mounted infantry, etc., was badly commanded; that the officer commanding it did not well understand the manner of leading an advance, of obtaining proper information concerning the enemy, or of penetrating any little curtain of troops which the enemy might throw in front of him to prevent his obtaining information which he ought to have had. Our force, or that portion of the force which, on the 8th of April, advanced to the position in which it was attacked by the enemy, stood dormant in the presence of the enemy until the enemy completely enveloped it. There can be but one solution of such a conduct of affairs, and that is, that whoever directed that on our part was incapable."

"Question. Then, if I understand you, it is your opinion that that disaster occurred in consequence of the failure of the cavalry and its officers to do that which they should have done?"

"Answer. I consider that was the cause of our not having proper information. I consider that the cause of the disaster of that day was that the infantry of the army was in three detachments, one near the scene of action, and the other two respectively nine and twenty-four miles from it, and that a battle never ought to have occurred under those circumstances. The infantry of the army was not concentrated; it was in exactly the proper position to be beaten in detail, which, in fact, was what occurred."

General Dwight's opinion of General Lee's inefficiency seems to have been concurred in by a majority of the general officers of the army. General Banks says in his testimony: "General Lee was relieved from the command of the cavalry subsequent to this affair at Sabine Cross-roads, but it was not on account of this action. It was because the general officers expressed to me so positively their want of confidence in the organization and condition of the cavalry, and advised so earnestly a change. This was an act which I afterward regretted. It was done because of the demoralized condition in which the cavalry found itself after this affair, and the very important part it must have in subsequent movements. I have no complaint to make of General Lee's general conduct. He was active, willing, and brave, and suffered more or less unjustly, as all of us did, for being connected with that affair." General Arnold, formerly Chief of Artillery, succeeded General Lee.

saved the army and navy." The enemy now retreated to Mansfield, so that during the night the Federal forces occupied both battle-fields.

It was then decided to fall back to Pleasant Hill. A renewal of the attack was expected on the morning of the 9th, and it was not likely that General Smith's command would be able to reach Pleasant Grove in time to participate in the action; without his presence it would be impossible for Banks, with the Nineteenth Corps and the demoralized troops who had been driven from Sabine Cross-roads, to maintain his position. The movement to Pleasant Hill began before daylight, Emory's division covering the rear, burying the dead, and bringing off the wounded. At 8 30 A.M. the retreat had been completed, and a junction effected with Smith's command.

In the mean time the enemy had been re-enforced by Churchill's division of infantry from Arkansas—there being no immediate apprehension as to Steele's advance—so that he was able to bring into the field upward of 20,000 men. Kirby Smith had ordered Taylor to follow up Banks's force. To meet this force Banks had only 15,000 men. But a battle for the safety of the fleet would have to be fought somewhere, and General Banks concluded that it might as well take place at Pleasant Hill as farther back. A strong position was taken, and this time the trains were sent to the rear under a strong cavalry guard. The forenoon passed quietly by. The Confederates, wearied by their previous battles, and—in the case of Churchill's command—by a long march, advanced slowly, and it was not until 4 o'clock P.M. that Green's cavalry encountered the Nineteenth Corps, guarding the approaches to the open ground surrounding Pleasant Hill. The army under Banks now consisted of the Nineteenth Corps and the Western troops under A. J. Smith. The remainder had been sent to the rear with the baggage and wounded. The greater part of A. J. Smith's command was held in reserve. The troops most advanced were soon driven in, and so easily that Taylor was led to believe that he was about to fight only the rear-guard of a retreating army. Walker was ordered to attack in front. Polignac—a French gentleman of aristocratic birth who had espoused the Confederate cause—having succeeded to General Mouton's command, was held in reserve. Churchill was ordered to make a detour and strike the Federal left flank. The conflict that followed was desperate, and for a long time doubtful. The Federals held rising ground, and presented a stubborn front to every attack. Churchill found the resistance so strong in his front that he had to be supported by a brigade from Walker's division. Even with this reinforcement he was roughly handled, and driven back across the open to the cover of the woods. Walker, supported by Polignac (who was sheltered by woods), in the mean time had advanced across the valley under a galling fire, from which he suffered severe loss, against the Federal right flank. Re-enforced by Polignac, he kept advancing, and, toward night, seemed to be gaining a decisive advantage, having driven back the force in his front. But Smith's reserves were then brought up, and the Confederates were driven from the field, fairly beaten. Some guns which had been taken by the enemy in the early stage of the action were afterward recaptured. The battle had been fought by Banks for the existence of his army and of Porter's fleet, and had resulted in victory.

But what then? Should the army advance or continue its retreat? Smith, with his Western soldiers, cried out for an advance. Banks's judgment was in favor of advance; but Franklin, more wisely, advised retreat. Indeed, no folly could have been greater than to renew the attempt against Shreveport. For the army to remain where it was involved peril. A single day could add to the enemy's force sufficient re-enforcements to give him a decided advantage against Banks. With this increased force, and with proper management on Kirby Smith's part, the defeat of the Union



A. J. SMITH.



CONFEDERATE LAND ATTACK ON PORTER'S FLEET.

army was inevitable, and, following this, the capture of the gun-boats, and possibly the repossession of the Mississippi by the Confederates. Besides this, there were also other reasons for a retreat. It would consume much valuable time to turn the train back again toward Shreveport and to reorganize the army. And the enemy would certainly have attacked before Banks was fully prepared to meet him. There was no water at Pleasant Hill for man or beast. All the horses with the army had been without food for 36 hours. Without rations and without water, without tidings of the fleet with which was the supply of ammunition, General Banks, reluctantly following Franklin's advice, determined to fall back to Grand Ecore, where he could reorganize his army and be sure of communication with Porter. The losses in the campaign thus far amounted to nearly 4000 men, besides artillery, mules, and wagons. Grant was now lieutenant general, and in

March had ordered General Banks to send back Smith's command if the expedition could not be terminated successfully by the 1st of May, saying that if it should be continued beyond that date he would much rather it had never been begun. This was an additional reason for retreat. How General Banks or General A. J. Smith could have for a moment contemplated an advance under these circumstances it is difficult to imagine. But orders for such an advance had been given, and the train had been ordered to return, and it was only after consultation with his general officers that Banks countermanded these orders, and at midnight on the 9th directed preparations to be made for the return of the army to Grand Ecore. It was an unfortunate circumstance that, although this withdrawal was accomplished at leisure, a large number of the wounded were left behind for want of transportation.¹

¹ The following is the testimony of Surgeon Eugene F. Sanger on this point:

Question. "What is your position in the army?"

Answer. "Surgeon of United States Volunteers."

Question. "Did you accompany the Red River expedition under General Banks?"

Answer. "I did."

Question. "Were you present at the battles of Sabine Cross-roads and Pleasant Hill?"

Answer. "I was."

Question. "What was the condition of our wounded there?"

Answer. "We brought off about half our wounded in the first battle, and in the second battle we brought off all that could walk off."

Question. "It has been said that at Pleasant Hill we won a victory; how happened it that we left our wounded in the hands of the enemy?"

The fleet had reached Loggy Bayou on the 10th, when, learning of the disaster which had happened to the army, it began to return down the narrow, snaggy channel which it had with great difficulty just ascended. Removed from the military force (except that of T. K. Smith's command, which accompanied the transports), the fleet was peculiarly exposed to attack from the bluffs on either side. Failing to destroy the army, the Confederates turned their attention to the gun-boats and transports. The river was falling, and the progress of the fleet was slow—about thirty miles per day—so that the enemy easily followed him down, continually increasing in numbers. The first attack was made at Coushatta, and a second, with 1900 of Green's cavalry and four guns, at Harrison. Both these attacks were easily met and repulsed. On the 12th of April a more determined onset was made by 2000 infantry, infuriated by Louisiana rum, from the right bank. It was a novel conflict, this, in which these reckless Texans charged upon Porter's gun-boats with the assistance of two guns! The crazy attempt was persisted in for two hours. Detachment after detachment, they were brought to the river's edge and mown down by the guns of the fleet, until at length their leader, General Tom Green, lost his head, blown off by a shell, when the enemy withdrew, leaving the river bank strewn with his killed and wounded, whose bodies, says Admiral Porter, "actually smelled" of the rum which had bedeviled them. This affair seems to have satisfied the enemy as to the chances of success in an attack by infantry upon gun-boats. On the 15th the fleet reached Grand Ecore. Here Porter found most of his larger gun-boats aground, drawing a foot more water than there was on the bar. While he was extricating them, the Eastport, eight miles below, was sunk, and was with great difficulty got afloat again.

The retreat of the army was continued on the 22d to Alexandria. The fleet followed soon, but was delayed by Porter's anxious and persistent efforts to get away the Eastport, which, finally, he was obliged to destroy. When the fleet reached Cane River, ninety miles below Grand Ecore, it was attacked by eighteen Confederate guns. Every shot from these struck the Cricket, the admiral's flag-ship, whose decks were rapidly cleared. The after gun was disabled, and every man in attendance killed or wounded. Another shell exploded her forward gun, sweeping away the crew from it, and, passing into the fire-room, left but one man there unwounded. Admiral Porter made up a crew from contrabands for the after gun, put an assistant in the place of the chief engineer, who had been killed, and ordered the

Answer. "That is a great mystery to me. I was at that time medical director of the Nineteenth Army Corps. I saw General Franklin immediately after our victory, as we assume it to be. I told him that in the hurry of sending off the supply trains in the morning, they had sent off my medical supply train. He said at that time that it should be ordered to return at once. To make sure of this matter, I went to see Major Drake, General Banks's adjutant general. He told me to give myself no uneasiness about the matter, as he would send off a courier at once and order up the medical supply train. I saw General Franklin, and told him that I should be busy all night, and in case the army moved off in any direction he must apprise me. I was told that I should be informed. That was the last I knew of the matter until between 6 and 7 o'clock the next morning, when, observing a little squad of cavalry drawn up in front of my hospital, I went out and inquired, and found that the army had retired during the night, and that this cavalry was the rearguard about leaving the place. They said they had seen the enemy approaching in the distance, whereupon I left one or two assistant surgeons with instructions, mounted my horse, and rode off."

Question. "Did you see any real necessity for leaving our wounded in the hands of the enemy there?"

Answer. "Yes, sir; we had no transportation at that time of any kind. There was not a wagon of any kind there."

vessel to run by the battery, "which was done," says the admiral, "under the heaviest fire I have ever witnessed." Driving around the point on which were posted the enemy's guns, he shelled the latter in the rear, and by this diversion the light-draught Juliet and pump-boat Champion, lashed together, escaped from under the bank where they had drifted. The Hindman from above co-operated with the Cricket by pouring an enfilading fire into the Confederate batteries, but dared not pass them. Porter therefore went down to obtain the assistance of some of the iron-clads below, but in the trip he got aground, and was delayed for three hours. After proceeding three miles he found the Osage and Lexington engaging another Confederate battery, the latter having been hulled fifteen times, with only one man killed. It was now night, and impossible to return to the Hindman, yet the latter vessel succeeded in running the battery, but, having her wheel-ropes cut away by the enemy's fire, got badly cut up in drifting down. Three of her men were killed and four wounded. The Juliet also passed, sustaining severe injuries. The Champion was disabled and set on fire. During these operations the Cricket was hulled thirty-eight times, and fifteen of her crew were killed or wounded. After such difficulties as we have described, the fleet at length arrived at Alexandria. Admiral Porter estimates that on his way down he killed and wounded at least 500 Confederates, his own loss being less than 100.

General Banks had also met with formidable resistance on his way to Alexandria, at the crossing of Cane River, where he met a Confederate force of 8000 men, with 16 guns, under General Bee. This force, flanked by the river on one side and an impenetrable swamp on the other, was confident of checking Banks until the rest of the Confederate army could come up in his rear. Banks's only safety was in rapidity of movement. Aware of the enemy's designs, he commenced his march from Grand Ecore on the morning of the 22d, and that day and night marched 40 miles, moving upon the enemy at Monet's Bluff, on Cane River, before daybreak of the 23d. General Emory, with his own division of the Nineteenth Corps, one of the Thirteenth, and Arnold's cavalry, was ordered to attack the enemy in front. The position was found too strong to be carried by a direct attack. Therefore General H. W. Birge, with a command consisting of his own brigade (the Third of Emory's division) and Cameron's division, was dispatched across the river, three miles above, to strike the enemy's flank. Birge, after a difficult march through swamps and dense woods, reached his destination late in the afternoon. Fessenden, commanding Birge's brigade, assaulted and carried two strong positions, whose occupation forced the enemy to retreat southwestwardly into Texas. Kilby Smith, covering Banks's rear, was on the next morning unsuccessfully attacked by the Confederate force which was co-operating with Bee. The Federal loss in these engagements was 250 men. General Banks, by his promptness, had prevented the enemy from concentrating his forces and fortifying his position, otherwise the Federal army would have been compelled to cross Red River above the bluff in the presence of the enemy on both sides of both Cane and Red Rivers. The army reached Alexandria on the 25th and 26th of April, precisely a month after its occupation of the town in March.

Here, also, it was impossible to remain without the support of A. J. Smith,



GENERAL BANKS CROSSING CANE RIVER.



PORTER'S FLEET PASSING THE DAM AT ALEXANDRIA.

whose time for co-operation with Banks had already expired. But, before retreating farther, it was necessary to rescue the fleet from its perilous situation by getting it below the falls. The difficulty had been foreseen by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Bailey, engineer of the Nineteenth Corps, who, as early as the battle of Pleasant Hill, had suggested to General Franklin a plan for its removal by means of dams. Franklin approved the project. Admiral Porter does not seem to have had much faith in it. He remarked, when the plan was first proposed to him, that "if damming would get the fleet off, he would have been afloat long before."

The plan was carried out by the army under Bailey's supervision. Between two and three thousand men were engaged in the work of damming the river, which was commenced on the 2d and completed on the 8th of May. The rapids, or falls at Alexandria, are over a mile long. At the foot of these the main dam was constructed, the river at this point being 758 feet wide, and the depth of water from four to six feet, with a swift current of about ten miles per hour. Two wing-dams were also constructed at the head of the rapids. By means of these dams the depth of water was increased by 6½ feet, and eight valuable gun-boats were thus saved from destruction. Four of the gun-boats passed immediately upon the completion of the work. The rest might have passed at the same time if Porter had been prepared to avail himself of the advantage. The pressure of the water upon the dam was very great, as might have been expected, and before the admiral was ready to get down his other boats, the works gave way. Additional wing-dams were then constructed, and on the 13th the entire fleet was safe below the falls.

Before the relief of the fleet Banks had received a dispatch from Lieutenant General Grant directing that no troops should be withdrawn from the operations against Shreveport, which were to be continued until farther orders.

But the continuance of the campaign was, of course, impracticable. As soon as the fleet had been relieved Banks evacuated Alexandria, moving from that point to Simmsport, on the Atchafalaya. On the morning of his departure a fire broke out in a building on the levee, and, under a high wind, extended to a large portion of the town.

Previous to the evacuation of Alexandria, the light gun-boats Signal and Covington, passing down the river with the transport Warner, were fired on by a large Confederate force. The Covington was burned, and the Signal, with the transport, were surrendered, with 150 soldiers. Soon afterward the transport City Belle was captured, with 225 men, who were being conveyed up to Alexandria.

The march to Simmsport was interrupted for a few hours at Mansura, near Marksville, by a Confederate cavalry force, which, after a spirited skirmish, was driven away. Simmsport was reached on the evening of May 16th. Here the army crossed the Atchafalaya by a bridge built of steam-boats on the 20th. While the wagon train was crossing the bridge, a Confederate force under Polignac attacked the rear of the army, but was repulsed by A. J. Smith's command. Having crossed the river, Banks met General E. R. S. Canby, who had been sent to relieve him of the command of the Department of the Gulf, and to whom General Banks turned over the army, proceeding himself to New Orleans. General A. J. Smith now returned to his own department. Admiral Porter descended the Red River and resumed his patrol of the Mississippi.

Before tracing the progress of Steele's co-operative column from Little Rock, let us rapidly review the military events which had taken place in Missouri and Arkansas up to the inception of the Red River campaign.

Shortly after Hindman's defeat at Prairie Grove in the latter part of 1863, a Confederate force of about 4000 men, under General Marmaduke, moved around General Blunt's command in Northern Arkansas, and marched on Springfield, in Missouri. This important station, the dépôt of munitions and supplies for the Federal troops operating in Arkansas, was partially fortified, and was held by a garrison of 1200 men under Brigadier General

E. B. Brown, consisting of state militia, a small portion of the Eighteenth Iowa, and about 300 convalescent soldiers known as the "Quinine Brigade." The main body of the Federal army under General Blunt was in the vicinity of Fayetteville, on the Arkansas border, too distant to furnish assistance, and yet dependent for its own safety upon the secure possession of Springfield. Marmaduke attacked Brown on the 8th of January, 1863, and after fighting from 10 A.M. till dark, losing some 200 men, withdrew without gaining any other advantage than the capture of a single gun. The loss of the garrison was 164 men, of whom 14 were killed. Among the wounded was General Brown, who had managed the defense of his post with great skill and bravery.


At Hartsville, 40 miles east of Springfield, Marmaduke encountered on the 10th a small detachment of Federal troops under Colonel Merrill, consisting of the Twenty-first Iowa and Ninety-ninth Illinois, with portions of the Third Missouri and Third Iowa cavalry, and a battery of artillery. Here, after a sharp skirmish, he was repulsed with a loss of 800 men; Merrill's loss amounting to 78, including 7 killed. While the Federal forces were being concentrated to intercept his retreat, Marmaduke retreated into Arkansas. At Batesville, on the 4th of February, a part of his force was attacked by Colonel Waring, who, with the Fourth Missouri cavalry, drove him across the White River.

General Curtis on the 9th of March, 1863, was relieved of the command of the Missouri Department, which about a month later was assigned to General Schofield.


In the latter part of April, Marmaduke, with a considerable force, again entered Missouri, and made an attempt on Cape Girardeau, the capture of which would have very much disturbed Grant's Vicksburg campaign, but the timely appearance of the Federal gun-boats frightened him off, sending him back to Arkansas. A month later an engagement occurred at Fort Blunt, in Indian Territory, which was occupied by the Federal Colonel Phillips with 800 cavalry and an Indian regiment. A Confederate force about 3000 strong was led by Colonel Coffey against this fort. The defense was successfully maintained, and the enemy driven south of the Arkansas.

During the summer of 1863, the more important military operations in Mississippi and Tennessee reduced both the Federal and Confederate forces in the trans-Mississippi territory to such an extent that there were no hostilities in that region of any moment. Blunt had an encounter in July with a force of the enemy under General Cooper, which was menacing Fort Blunt. The fight took place on Elk River. Cooper had about 6000 men, and Blunt 3000 infantry, 250 cavalry, and 4 guns. General Blunt crossed the river, and, after a fight of two hours, drove the enemy, who left on the field 150 killed and 77 prisoners, besides 400 wounded, which were removed. The Federal loss was 17 killed and 60 wounded. Immediately after Cooper's defeat, 3000 Texans arrived under Cabell to re-enforce the enemy, but retired during the night without a battle.

In August, 1863, the Confederate partisan "Quantrell" made his notorious raid through Western Missouri into Kansas. With a force of 300 bandits, gathered together in Western Missouri, he crossed the Kansas border, and on the morning of August 22 entered Lawrence and commenced a sack of that town. The citizens were murdered without discrimination. For a citizen to appear in the street with a defensive weapon of any sort, or to be a German or a negro, were deemed sufficient reasons why he should be shot. The finest dwellings and the public buildings were committed to the flames. The banks and stores were pillaged. Many private citizens, after surrendering to these merciless fiends all their money, were killed. Eighteen recruits found without arms in their hands were cowardly butchered. J. H. Lane, a United States senator, was at Lawrence, but, with Colonel Deitzler and others, managed to escape. General Collamore, taking refuge in a well, was suffocated, and two men in an attempt to rescue him suffered a similar fate. By 10 o'clock A.M. 140 men had been killed and nearly 200 buildings burned, when the savage monsters left the scene of their cruelties. As



RUINS OF LAWRENCE, KANSAS



LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS.

they were leaving three of them were killed by the fire of some soldiers who had just reached the opposite bank of the Kansas River. The band was pursued by a small force of cavalry, but, with the loss of a few men, effected its escape.

The day after this event, Colonel Woodson, with 600 men from Pilot Knob, captured at Pocahontas, Arkansas, General Jeff. Thompson and about 50 of his men.

At the close of July, 1863, General Steele was sent to Helena to organize an expedition for the capture of Little Rock, Arkansas. The force assigned to him for this purpose consisted of 6000 men, including 500 cavalry and 22 guns. He was afterward re-enforced by General Davidson with nearly 6000 more men, most of them mounted, and 18 guns. He advanced from Helena on the 10th of August, crossing the White River at Clarendon, 60 miles east of Little Rock, on the 17th, with Davidson's cavalry in the advance. His sick at this time numbered about 1000. These were sent to Duvall's Bluff, which was made the *dépôt* of supplies. On the 25th Davidson reached Brownsville, 25 miles distant from Little Rock, driving Marmaduke before him to his intrenchments at Bayou Metea, from which he was dislodged and driven across the bayou. Meanwhile Steele had concentrated his forces—re-enforced by General True's brigade from Memphis—at Brownsville. Shut off from an advance north of Bayou Metea by the nature of the country, which, on account of swamps, was impracticable, he determined to advance to the Arkansas, and threaten with his cavalry the enemy's communications southward. Davidson crossed the Arkansas to carry out this plan. Marmaduke, sent out by General Holmes to resist him, was completely routed. General Price, the Confederate commander in Arkansas, then evacuated Little Rock, which was occupied by Steele on the 10th of September. Price, in some disorder and in great haste, fell back to Arkadelphia, eluding pursuit. Steele had started out on his campaign with 12,000 men, and entered Little Rock with only 7000. Of this loss less than one fiftieth was caused in battle, the remainder arising from sickness.

On the 4th of October we again hear from Quantrell, who, with 600 guerrillas disguised in Federal uniform, attacks General Blunt on his way to Fort Smith (captured by a Union force a month previous) with an escort of about 100 cavalry. General Blunt, with about 15 men, fortunately escaped. The remainder were captured, and then murdered in cold blood.

Pine Bluff, fifty miles below Little Rock, on the south bank of the Arkansas, was occupied early in October by Colonel Clayton with 350 men of the Fifth Kansas Cavalry and four guns. Marmaduke advanced against this point on the 25th of October with 12 guns and a cavalry force of between 2000 and 3000 men. In the mean time Clayton had been re-enforced by the First Indiana Cavalry and five guns. Marmaduke's attack failed. His loss was 150 killed and wounded, and 33 captured. Clayton lost 17 killed and 40 wounded.

The Confederate General Shelby, of Cabell's command, having failed in a series of unimportant attempts in Indian Territory, about this time undertook a raid into Missouri. Crossing the Arkansas between Fort Smith and Little Rock, he was joined in Southwestern Missouri by a force under General Coffey, their combined command numbering possibly 2500 men. This expedition advanced as far north as Booneville, on the Missouri River, when it commenced to retreat, pursued by General E. B. Brown with a detachment of state militia. The enemy was brought to a stand near Arrow Rock on the 13th of October. Here there was an engagement which lasted five hours, resulting finally in the defeat of the Confederates, who, besides all their artillery and baggage, lost 300 men, killed, wounded, and prisoners. On the 18th of December General McNeil superseded General Blunt as commander of the Army of the Frontier.

General Steele commenced his movement southward from Little Rock to co-operate with Banks's advance to Shreveport on the 23d of March, 1864, or about the time of Franklin's arrival at Alexandria. His army was 7000 strong. General Thayer at the same time marched from Fort Smith with 5000 men, intending to unite with Steele at Arkadelphia, while Colonel Clayton, with a small force, advanced from Pine Bluff on Steele's left. Steele reached Arkadelphia on the 29th of March; but Thayer, owing to heavy rains and almost impracticable roads, was delayed, and after waiting for him two days, the main column continued its advance. The Confederate cavalry under Shelby and Marmaduke had skirmished with its front all the way from the Sabine River, and farther down the Washita was a considerable force of infantry under General Price. Two days after Banks's defeat at Sabine Cross-roads this latter force was encountered at Prairie d'Anne, and a sharp fight, chiefly with artillery, followed. A charge of the enemy upon Steele's artillery was repulsed, and Price fell back to Washington, near the Upper Red River. From prisoners and spies, intelligence was now received of Banks's defeat. This report turned Steele from his pursuit of Price eastward to Camden. The Confederates then became bolder, attacking on the 23d of April a train of 240 wagons, which had arrived from Pine Bluff three days before, and was then returning, guarded by one of General Salomon's brigades. The attack was made 12 miles from Camden by Shelby's cavalry, and was easily repulsed. The train proceeded six miles farther, and was then parked for the night. The road was bad, and much of the distance had to be corduroyed; thus, on the 24th, only 22 miles had been made. The next morning, while crawling through a long swamp, the guard was again attacked at Marks's Mills by General Fagan's command, reported 6000 strong. The advance being cut off from the rear after a gallant resistance, which cost the Federals 250 killed and wounded—one fourth of the entire brigade—both columns surrendered, and the wagons were either captured or destroyed. According to custom, all negroes found in the command were shot after the surrender.