CHAPTER XXXVI.
THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN.

VI. DEFEAT OF BRAGG.

General Grant after the Vicksburg Campaign.—He assumed Command of the Military District of the Mississippi, and of the Army under Sherman, Thomas, Burnside, and Hooker.—His available Force for the final struggle of the Chattanooga Campaign.—The Condition of his four Armies.—Hooker's Arrival in the West.—Chattanooga besieged by Bragg's Army.—Sherman's Plan for the Recovery of Lookout Valley executed by Grant.—LeGrand's Signals from Lookout Mountain interpreted by General Grant.—The Battle of Wabash.—Importance of this Success.—Chattanooga relieved.—The Understanding between Grant and Burnside.—Longstreet sent against Knoxville.—Position of Bragg's Army.—Confidence of the Confederate Commanders.—Grant's Plan of Attack.—Waiting for Sherman.—March of the Army of the Tennessee.—Sherman enters with Grant at Chattanooga.—Rumor of Bragg's intended Retreat.—Thomas's Reconnaissance, November 3rd.—Orchard Knob carried.—Bragg strengthens his Right.—Operations on the 24th.—Bragg's attack on Tunnel Hill.—Hooker captures Lookout Mountain; the "Battle above the Clouds."—Operations on the 26th.—Bragg's abodeFurther.—General Corse's assault on Chabotia's Position.—Waiting for Hood.—Thomas storms Missionary Ridge.—The Confederate Centre broken.—Hooker drives the Left.—Hood and Forrest.—A decisive Victory.

We will now turn from the siege of Knoxville—an important episode in the Chattanooga campaign—to the movements of Grant's army at Chattanooga, which terminated on November 29th in the expulsion of Bragg's forces from Missionary Ridge.

Immediately after the reduction of Vicksburg, Grant dispatched expeditions in various directions in the State of Mississippi. In one of these, sent to Natchez, under General Ransom, 6000 head of cattle, which were being crossed over the Mississippi at that point for the enemy's supply, were captured. His army now became dispersed. Ord and Herren were sent to the Department of the Gulf. Steele was dispatched to Helena, to re-enforce Schofield in the Department of the Missouri. Toward the last of August General Grant proceeded upon a tour of inspection through his department. He reached New Orleans on the 2d of September. As he was returning to his hotel in that city from a review of Ord's corps, on the 4th, his horse became frightened, and, violently striking a carriage, General Grant was thrown into the street, and so severely injured in the hip that he was unable either to walk, or mount his horse without assistance, until his arrival at Chattanooga, toward the close of October. Secretary Stanton met him at Indianapolis, and both together proceeded to Louisville. Here, on the 18th, the Secretary handed him the order of the President, giving him the command of the "Military District of the Mississippi," comprising the departments of the Tennessee, the Ohio, and the Cumberland. By the same order Rosecrans was relieved of his command, being superseded by General Thomas.

This order gave Grant the military control of all the territory in possession of the government from the Mississippi River to the Alleghany Mountains, and of four large armies under Sherman (who succeeded Grant in the command of the Department and Army of the Tennessee), Thomas, Burnside, and Hooker. These armies, together, numbered probably 150,000 effective men. Two thirds of this force, or about 100,000 men, was available for the Chattanooga campaign. Denying 20,000 for Burnside's effective command, and we have left a force 80,000 strong, which could be used directly against General Bragg. General Hooker's army was 25,000 strong, and consisted of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps. The Army of the Cumberland, now reduced to a little over 40,000 men, had been reorganized. McCook and Crittenden had been sent to Cincinnati, and their two commands, consolidated with the reserves, now constituted the Fourth Corps, under Gordon Granger. General Palmer commanded the Fourteenth, Thomas's old corps. The remaining portion of the forces brought against Bragg were to come from the Army of the Tennessee. Of this latter army, McPherson's corps remained at Vicksburg, and, by demonstrations along the Big Black, prevented Johnston from sending further re-enforcements to Bragg. Hurlbut's corps was retained at Memphis. Upon Sherman's taking command of the Army of the Tennessee, General Blair had been assigned to that of the Fifteenth Corps.

The transfer of General Hooker's army westward to the Tennessee was
accomplished with marvelous expedition. Although accompanied by its arti-
tillery, trains, baggage, and animals, this army moved from the Rapidan, in
Virginia, to Stevenson, in Alabama, a distance of 1192 miles, in seven days,
ever crossing the Ohio twice. General Hooker reached Cincinnati in person on
the 9th of October. During the first week in October his army was
on Rosecrans's right flank at Stevenson. At the time of, and for a long
period subsequent to Hooker's arrival, Rosecrans's army was in a state of
partial siege. Bragg commanded the river road to Bridgeport, and his cavalry
interrupted the communications with Bridgeport by way of Walden's Ridge, and
even assailed the Nashville Railroad. Rosecrans feared that the
enemy would cross above Chattanooga, on his left, separating him from
Burraside; but this was not his greatest danger. What Rosecrans had most
reason to be apprehensive about was the subsistence of his army. To re-
cover Lookout Valley, and the command of the river road to Bridgeport,
was the important necessity of the moment. Rosecrans had already planned
the movement which was to secure this road when he was relieved.

Grant met Rosecrans and Hooker at Nashville October 21st. He imme-
diately put into execution the plan which had been adopted, and there could
be no delay. The route from Stevenson over Walden's Ridge was from 60
to 70 miles in length, and the supply trains were shelled from Lookout
Mountain from the very day that Rosecrans had abandoned that important
position to the enemy. The roads were so bad that Wheeler's cavalry did
not venture upon a raid. The animals were walking skeletons, and were
dying by thousands for want of forage, and the wagons were worn out by
the difficult roads. The troops were reduced to half rations. On the 19th,
immediately after assuming his new command, Grant telegraphed to
Thomas to hold on to Chattanooga. Thomas replied: "I will hold the town
till we starve." And, as matters stood, his chance of starving was very
good. Two weeks longer, and without relief from its embarrasment, the
Federal army must have abandoned its position.

Grant reached Chattanooga on the 26th of October. The next day, with
General Thomas and W. F. ("Baldy") Smith, chief engineer, he made a re-
connoissance of Brown's Ferry (below the mouth of Lookout Creek) and
of the country lying southward. It was then decided that, in accordance with
the plans already formed by Rosecrans, Bridgeport, and advance to Wahashatchie in Lookout Valley, threatening the enemy's
flank. This movement was open to the observation of the enemy. So also
was the movement of one of Palmer's divisions down the river to a point
opposite Whiteside (11 miles west of Wahashatchie), where he was to cross
and move up to Hooker's support. While attention was fixed on these
movements, General Smith, with 4000 men, was to move secretly, under
cover of the night, across Brown's Ferry, and seize the range of steep hills
at the head of Lookout Valley, three miles below Lookout Mountain. A pontoon
bridge was then to be thrown across the river at Brown's Ferry, and a
line of communication being thus opened between Thomas and Hooker,
the latter would be enabled to advance without danger of an attack on
his left flank.

This plan was successfully carried out. The position to be gained
was held by a portion of Longstreet's command, which had not yet been de-
tached from Bragg's army. The enemy's line stretched from Lookout Mountain to Missionary Ridge. But a single brigade was posted in Lookout
Valley, though the Confederate pickets lined the river down to Bridgeport.
The position, from the occupation of which there was especial appre-
hension on the part of the Federal army, was the most feebly defended
of any on the Confederate line. Hooker sent Geary's division, of Second's
corps, across on the 26th, and by the 28th this force had reached Wahashatchie.
Hooker, with the Eleventh Corps, held Geary's left toward Brown's Ferry.
Palmer, with the Fourteenth Corps, was moving up in the rear. Smith also
had accomplished the duty assigned to his command. Of the 4000 men
detailed to this command, 1800, under Hazen, embarked on sixty pontoon
boats, had floated down the river from Chattanooga on the night of the 27th.
past the Confederate pickets lining the left bank, and, landing at Brown's
Ferry, had taken their appointed post with a loss of only four or five men
wounded. The rest of Smith's force was ferried across and joined Hazen
before morning. By 10 A.M. on the 28th a pontoon bridge had been
thrown across the river at Brown's Ferry, and before night Howard had
connected with Smith.

This movement was, however, not accomplished without a struggle.
Longstreet had a signal-station on the top of Lookout Mountain, overlooking
the whole field over which Howard and Geary moved. When, on the
evening of the 28th, he saw, too late, the vital importance to the Federal army
of the position seized by Howard's command, he at once communicated with
Bragg, explaining the altered situation, and was directed to attack and drive
back Geary and Howard at all hazards. Longstreet had already seen enough
from "Signal Rock" to convince him that it was useless to attack the super-
or numbers on his flank directly or by daylight; but, noting the situation
his purpose, the Legislature November 3, 1865. The model of is gold, is three inches in diam-
er, and was wrought by Tiffany and Co., of New York City.
of Geary's weak division at Wauhatchie, holding the road leading from Kelly's Ferry up Lookout Valley, he conceived the plan of striking this force by surprise during the night. If he succeeded in routing this force—Hooker's right flank—an easy matter as it seemed to him then—he would pursue the advantage thus gained by extending his attack against Hooker's centre and left. It was an admirable conception. But there was an important element involved in its execution which Longstreet was not, and could not be aware of, namely, Geary's precise knowledge of every movement which he might order from "Signal Rock." For some months the Federal officers had been in possession of the signal code of the enemy, and every flourish of Longstreet's signal torches on the top of Lookout, directing the assault, was at the same moment as significant to Geary as it was to Longstreet's commanders.

Thus, when, a little after midnight on the morning of the 29th, Law's division attacked Geary, the latter was fully prepared. Between the force at Wauhatchie and Howard's right was an interval of three miles. For three hours Geary defended his position without assistance, and repulsed every charge of the enemy, finally driving him from the field. The success of the enemy at this point might have easily defeated the entire movement of Hooker. Of the two roads leading to Kelly's Ferry from Lookout Valley, Howard held one and Geary the other; the abandonment of one of these roads would have seriously imperiled the force holding the other.

A portion of Howard's command had in the mean time been engaged on Geary's left with equal success, and Longstreet was compelled to withdraw his command east of Lookout Creek. He still continued, however, to hold Lookout Mountain. Hooker's success, gained at the expense of only 437 men, recovered Lookout Valley, and gave Grant two good roads to Bridgeport from Brown's Ferry—one thirty-five miles long, running through Wauhatchie, Whiteside, and Shellmound; the other, from Brown's to Kelly's Ferry, a distance of eight miles by wagon, and nine by boat to Bridgeport. The enemy's position on Lookout commanded these roads, but the batteries which had been posted on Mission Point, north of the river, prevented the Confederate artillerists from inflicting any serious damage to the supply trains.

The siege of Chattanooga had been raised, and Bragg from this time was put upon the defensive. The only aggressive movement possible to him was that which he now attempted against Burnside with Longstreet's column; and this movement, unsuccessful in its special object, only accelerated his ruin. Longstreet's campaign against Knoxville was probably the result of President Davis' visit to Bragg's army, October 13.

When Grant first heard of the proposed movement against Knoxville, he seems to have regarded it as unfavorable to the development of his own plans, and intended to immediately attack Missionary Ridge in order to detain Longstreet. But after a reconnaissance he found that such an assault did not promise success, and determined to await the arrival of Sherman's troops, now well on their way from Memphis. In the mean time he established between himself and Burnside a good understanding as to the plan.
of operations which he was now about to adopt. He confined to him the whole scheme of his movements against Bragg, and promised to send a force to the relief of Knoxville as soon as he had carried it out. Two things still were to be done before he could join with Burnside; first, the execution of his plans, which read more like a history of a brief campaign, rather than a scheme of movements contemplated; and secondly, his confidence as to their success. He almost seems to look regretfully after Longstreet's force on the right, and yet the withdrawal of it was a share of the destruction which he was preparing for Bragg's entire army.

The Confederate army was intrenched upon the western slopes of Missionary Ridge, and stretched across Chattanooga Valley to the western slopes of Lookout Mountain, and Sherman's division, under Major General Oostewaay, M. Tuttle, and Hugh Ewing. Oostewaay's division had occupied Lookout Mount from the 13th, and the other divisions from the 23d. The other divisions followed a day later. The last of the fleet reached Missionary Ridge on the 4th of October. As soon as he reached Missionary Ridge, Sherman was ordered to proceed with all speed to Chattanooga, and as many troops as could be spared from the line of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, to Athens, Alabama. He was to look out for his own supplies. Oostewaay by this had got as far as Corinth, and J. E. Smith was ordered to follow up his line of communications, against Chickamauga, with eight guns, under General Chalmers. Sherman's escort joined Anthony, and the Confederates were required. Sherman reached Corinth on the 12th, and sent Blair forward with the divisions of Oostewaay and Morgan L. Smith. The railroad was the repaired as was 6000 strong, kept in Sherman's front. Under these circumstances, his progress was necessarily slow. Anticipating that

Grants plan of attack was brilliant, but exceedingly simple in its general features. It involved an assault upon the strongest points in the enemy's line by two extremes—by Hooker and Sherman, to be followed by a crushing blow from Thomas.

But Sherman's army was not yet upon the field. It was now nearly two months since, just after the battle of Chickamauga, Sherman had been ordered to reinforce Rosecrans. His corps, the Fifteenth, about 10,000 strong, was in two divisions, under Generals Oostewaay, M. Tuttle, and Hugh Ewing. Oostewaay's division had occupied Lookout Mount and Missionary Ridge, must be seen followed by an entire withdrawal of his army from Chattanooga. Yet, so confident was he of the strength of his position, that when Grant moved upon his works he was just on the point of sending Cleburne's and Buckner's divisions to re-enforce Longstreet.

Grant's plan of attack was brilliant, but exceedingly simple in its general features. It involved an assault upon the strongest points in the enemy's line by two extremes—by Hooker and Sherman, to be followed by a crushing blow from Thomas.

It was expected that Sherman would be in position on the 15th, but difficult roads delayed his movements. J. E. Smith's division was the right, and Thomas reached the railroad near Albertville. By 8 a.m. on the 16th, Sherman's army was on the road, and the front and the line advanced. The advance on the 18th, however, to the northward; and we were engaged in a series of engagements, which continued for several days, until the Confederates were driven back and the Union troops occupied the railroad.

Sherman's corps was to make a direct attack on Chattanooga, and to drive the Confederates out of the city. Sherman did not attempt to capture the Ciudad, but he forced the Confederates to withdraw before the Union troops could enter the city. West Point remained in Confederate hands, but Sherman's forces occupied the railroad junction, and controlled the whole of the railway line from Chattanooga to Lookout Mountain.

In the meantime, Sherman organized his troops, and prepared to make a frontal assault on the Confederate positions. He planned to attack the Confederate line in three places, and to drive the Confederates back into the city. The attack was to be launched from the railroad junction, and the troops were to advance in three columns, with the objective of capturing the city.

Sherman's attack was a brilliant success, and the Confederate line was broken in two places. The Confederates surrendered without a fight, and Sherman occupied the city.

Sherman's Army Report:

"The plan of attack was brilliant, but exceedingly simple in its general features. It involved an assault upon the strongest points in the enemy's line by two extremes—by Hooker and Sherman, to be followed by a crushing blow from Thomas."
It now became evident to Bragg that an attempt would be made against his right flank, with a view of severing his communication with Longstreet. To strengthen this portion of his line, Walker's division was withdrawn from the western slope of Lookout Mountain, leaving Stevens and Chest- ham to hold the high ground.

The enemy had thrown the 28th, Giles A. Smith's, brigade of Morgan L. Smith's division, consisting of about 3000 men, manned the boats of which the pontoon bridge was to be constructed, and, dropping down the river at midnight, captured the ferry boats just above the North- river, and landed below the mouth of the creek. By means of these boats and the steamer Dunbar, the rest of the division, together with John E. Smith's, were ferried across before daylight, so that on the morning of the 24th Sherman had a force of 12,000 men, ready to advance against the right. The whole valley between Catoia and Chickamaugus Creeks was an immense corn-field. Through this valley Howard moved on the forenoon of the 24th to connect with Sherman. The pontoon bridge had in the mean time been thrown "Wally" by his immediate supervision, and had not been completed. "He had supposed," say Sherman, "that work done so quickly, so well, and I doubt if the history of the war can show a bridge of that extent (nearly, 1500 feet) laid down so noiselessly and well in so short a time. I attribute it to the genius and intelligence of General W. F. Smith." By 1 o'clock P.M. the whole corps had crossed, and Davis's division was prepared to co-operate, as a reserve force, in the attack on Missionary Ridge.

Sherman's three divisions were now ordered to advance, M. L. Smith on the left, J. E. Smith in the centre, and Ewing on the right. A division began to fall, and the clouds resting upon the river, and falling down upon the mountain sides, cloaked Sherman's movement. By 3 o'clock the northern spurs of the ridge were gained without loss. The enemy had occupied those hills (north of the railroad tunnel) with any considerable force. The enemy had not occupied them, and it seemed probable that the position which had been gained would hold the Confederates by a deep gorge. The rounds of musketry were heard, but the enemy was separated from the railroad by the river, and the smoke was thick. The rounds of musketry were heard, but the enemy was separated from the railroad by the river, and the smoke was thick.

While Sherman was thus confronting the enemy across the railroad, Hooker had moved his corps across Lookout Mountain. The idea of an attacking force, under Chetnham, was encamped in a hollow midway up the slope of the mountain. The summit east of the palisaded crest was held by three divisions of Stevenson's division. The Confederate position was protected by batteries and rifle-pits against an attack from the Tennessee or from the railroad on either side, and in the valley also were strong lines of earthworks.

Geary, who had ascended Lookout Creek, supported by Whittaker's brigade of Cruft's division, crossed near Washatchie at 8 A.M. on the 24th, surprised the Confederates on the right, and drove them from their works. As soon as these divisions were driven, the enemy turned upon it and retired, taking advantage of the cover and the clouds, resting upon the river, and low down upon which had been abandoned. While Geary was thus confronting the enemy across the railroad, Howard, when he was ordered to remain and make a demonstration against his flank, had gradually settled into the valley, vailing it completely from view. Thus the battle of the afternoon was literally "a Battle above the Clouds."

The Confederates had been ordered in order to give it greater strength, so that there was a considerable interval between the plateau and the enemy. Unloading a siege train, taking advantage of this interval, got in upon the enemy's left flank, and an advance was made by Cruft and Osterhaus in front, the entire line was carried. But it was not held by the Federals undisturbed. No sooner had it been occupied than the enemy turned upon it and made an assault. In the continued skirmishing which had been going on, Geary's troops had gradually exhausted their ammunition, and unless a fresh supply could be had from some source it seemed probable that the position which had been gained would have to be abandoned. Hooker had sent for ammunition, but it had been delayed. Ewing, at this time, had advanced, accompanied by General Thomas, having crossed Chattanooga Creek, and brought with it 120,000 rounds strapped on the backs of the men. This fresh brigade relieved Geary's exhausted troops. The enemy was repulsed, driven back from the front of the position, where he could not make a stand, and halted on the high ground, in an attempt to gain some little advantage over the enemy's position, and to attempt to take advantage of the cover of the clouds. The enemy now became evident to Bragg, with the point of Longstreet's division, which had been so far away from the main body of the army, as to be beyond Bragg's control.

Bragg, in the evening, ordered his troops to join his command, and ordered Ewing's division to advance. During the night of the 22d, Hooker on the 12th, had received the force of 12,000 men, under Hooker, to direct the attacking of the enemy from the point, which had been gained by his division. This division had been sent for ammunition, but it had been delayed. Ewing, at this time, had advanced, accompanied by General Thomas, having crossed Chattanooga Creek, and brought with it 120,000 rounds strapped on the backs of the men. This fresh brigade relieved Geary's exhausted troops. The enemy was repulsed, driven back from the front of the position, where he could not make a stand, and halted on the high ground, in an attempt to gain some little advantage over the enemy's position, and to attempt to take advantage of the cover of the clouds. The enemy now became evident to Bragg, with the point of Longstreet's division, which had been so far away from the main body of the army, as to be beyond Bragg's control.

Bragg, in the evening, ordered his troops to join his command, and ordered Ewing's division to advance. During the night of the 22d, Hooker on the 12th, had received the force of 12,000 men, under Hooker, to direct the attacking of the enemy from the point, which had been gained by his division. This division had been sent for ammunition, but it had been delayed. Ewing, at this time, had advanced, accompanied by General Thomas, having crossed Chattanooga Creek, and brought with it 120,000 rounds strapped on the backs of the men. This fresh brigade relieved Geary's exhausted troops. The enemy was repulsed, driven back from the front of the position, where he could not make a stand, and halted on the high ground, in an attempt to gain some little advantage over the enemy's position, and to attempt to take advantage of the cover of the clouds. The enemy now became evident to Bragg, with the point of Longstreet's division, which had been so far away from the main body of the army, as to be beyond Bragg's control.
The real causes were the weakness of his time—a weakness not of position, but of numbers—and the demoralization which had resulted from the defeat on South Mountain.

The Federal losses in the battles of the 23d, 24th, 29th, and 26th were 707 killed, 4629 wounded, and 893 missing: total, 56.46. The Confederate losses on the 23d alone amounted to 22,000, but Bragg's loss in prisoners alone amounted to 6142, of whom 230 were commissioned officers; 7000 stand of small arms had also been captured by Grant's army. By these battles Bragg's army must have been diminished by at least 10,000 men, and Bragg between 40,000 and 45,000.

General Bragg's defeat terminated the contest for Chattanooga and East Tennessee. The generous offers of Grant's victory electrified the loyal portion of the country, and President Lincoln's annual message of December 1, 1863, Recommendation of the people to assemble at their places of worship, and render special homage and gratitude to Almighty God for this great deliverance, came to his ears. From this time the prospects of the Southern Confederacy were indeed desperate. The recruits of the Confederate States were rapidly being exhausted, while the national armies were being recruited by immense numbers, at whose hands thousands more refused to take the field the moment their services should become necessary. Thus closed the year 1863. It had begun with the disaster at Fredericksburg, followed soon by the defeat at Chancellorsville; but the victories of Gettysburg, Vicksburg, and the Eastern Campaign rolled with imperishable glory over the country, and the loyal portion of the population were encouraged by the faith that this great war would in God's good time end in a final and avenging victory.

The Federal losses at Chickamauga were 25,740, including 2927 killed, 16,128 wounded, and 6785 missing the battle, and 1533 missing the siege. The casualties on the 19th alone were 10,240, including 784 killed. The Confederates lost about 20,000 men in the entire battle. The total Federal losses in three engagements with Bragg's army were 70,657, including 13,829 killed, 46,799 wounded, and 19,039 missing. The total Confederate losses in the same period were 55,300, including 15,300 killed and 40,000 captured. The total Federal losses in the Union army of the Cumberland were 92,317, including 18,020 killed, 63,147 wounded, and 11,150 missing, and the total Confederate losses in the Confederate army of the Tennessee were 55,300.

On October 12, 1863, Secretary of War Stanton telegraphed to General Grant that the work of advancing the army to the rear of Chattanooga was done, and that the enemy had crossed the ridge. Assistant Secretary of War Wilson telegraphed to General Grant that the enemy had crossed the ridge at 9 p.m., and that my position was almost surrounded. Bate's entire command was ready for the attack upon the enemy's left by 2:30 p.m. Hooker advanced upon the ridge, Osterhaus at the east of it, and Grant, with the artillery, along the valley, against the western slope.

The general order of the Federal army was broken on my right, and the enemy had crossed the ridge. Assistant Secretary of War Wilson telegraphed to General Grant that the enemy had crossed the ridge at 9 p.m., and that my position was almost surrounded. Bate's entire command was ready for the attack upon the enemy's left by 2:30 p.m. Hooker advanced upon the ridge, Osterhaus at the east of it, and Grant, with the artillery, along the valley, against the western slope.

The general order of the Federal army was broken on my right, and the enemy had crossed the ridge. Assistant Secretary of War Wilson telegraphed to General Grant that the enemy had crossed the ridge at 9 p.m., and that my position was almost surrounded. Bate's entire command was ready for the attack upon the enemy's left by 2:30 p.m. Hooker advanced upon the ridge, Osterhaus at the east of it, and Grant, with the artillery, along the valley, against the western slope.

The general order of the Federal army was broken on my right, and the enemy had crossed the ridge. Assistant Secretary of War Wilson telegraphed to General Grant that the enemy had crossed the ridge at 9 p.m., and that my position was almost surrounded. Bate's entire command was ready for the attack upon the enemy's left by 2:30 p.m. Hooker advanced upon the ridge, Osterhaus at the east of it, and Grant, with the artillery, along the valley, against the western slope.

The general order of the Federal army was broken on my right, and the enemy had crossed the ridge. Assistant Secretary of War Wilson telegraphed to General Grant that the enemy had crossed the ridge at 9 p.m., and that my position was almost surrounded. Bate's entire command was ready for the attack upon the enemy's left by 2:30 p.m. Hooker advanced upon the ridge, Osterhaus at the east of it, and Grant, with the artillery, along the valley, against the western slope.

The general order of the Federal army was broken on my right, and the enemy had crossed the ridge. Assistant Secretary of War Wilson telegraphed to General Grant that the enemy had crossed the ridge at 9 p.m., and that my position was almost surrounded. Bate's entire command was ready for the attack upon the enemy's left by 2:30 p.m. Hooker advanced upon the ridge, Osterhaus at the east of it, and Grant, with the artillery, along the valley, against the western slope.

The general order of the Federal army was broken on my right, and the enemy had crossed the ridge. Assistant Secretary of War Wilson telegraphed to General Grant that the enemy had crossed the ridge at 9 p.m., and that my position was almost surrounded. Bate's entire command was ready for the attack upon the enemy's left by 2:30 p.m. Hooker advanced upon the ridge, Osterhaus at the east of it, and Grant, with the artillery, along the valley, against the western slope.

The general order of the Federal army was broken on my right, and the enemy had crossed the ridge. Assistant Secretary of War Wilson telegraphed to General Grant that the enemy had crossed the ridge at 9 p.m., and that my position was almost surrounded. Bate's entire command was ready for the attack upon the enemy's left by 2:30 p.m. Hooker advanced upon the ridge, Osterhaus at the east of it, and Grant, with the artillery, along the valley, against the western slope.

The general order of the Federal army was broken on my right, and the enemy had crossed the ridge. Assistant Secretary of War Wilson telegraphed to General Grant that the enemy had crossed the ridge at 9 p.m., and that my position was almost surrounded. Bate's entire command was ready for the attack upon the enemy's left by 2:30 p.m. Hooker advanced upon the ridge, Osterhaus at the east of it, and Grant, with the artillery, along the valley, against the western slope.