



LONGSTREET'S SHARPSHOOTERS ATTACKING A FEDERAL TRAIN ABOVE CHATTANOOGA.

## CHAPTER XXXVI. THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN.

### VI. DEFEAT OF BRAGG.

General Grant after the Vicksburg Campaign.—He assumes Command of the Military District of the Mississippi, and of the Armies under Sherman, Thomas, Burnside, and Hooker.—His available Force for the final Struggle of the Chattanooga Campaign.—The Condition of his four Armies.—Hooker's Arrival in the West.—Chattanooga besieged by Bragg's Army.—Rosecrans's Plan for the Recovery of Lookout Valley executed by Grant.—Longstreet's Signals from Lookout Mountain interpreted by General Geary.—The Battle of Wauhatchie.—Importance of this Success.—Chattanooga relieved.—The Understanding between Grant and Burnside.—Longstreet sent against Knoxville.—Position of Bragg's Army.—Confidence of the Confederate Commander.—Grant's Plan of Attack.—Waiting for Sherman.—March of the Army of the Tennessee.—Sherman confers with Grant at Chattanooga.—Rumor of Bragg's intended Retreat.—Thomas's Reconnoissance, November 23d.—Orchard Knob carried.—Bragg strengthens his Right.—Operations on the 24th.—Sherman's attack on Tunnel Hill.—Hooker carries Lookout Mountain; the "Battle above the Clouds."—Operations on the 25th.—Bragg's altered Position.—General Corse's assault on Cleburne's Position.—Waiting for Hooker.—Thomas storms Missionary Ridge.—The Confederate Centre broken.—Hooker drives the Left.—Retreat and Pursuit.—A decisive Victory.

WE will now turn from the siege of Knoxville—an important episode in the Chattanooga campaign—to the movements of Grant's army at Chattanooga, which terminated on November 25th in the expulsion of Bragg's forces from Missionary Ridge.

Immediately after the reduction of Vicksburg, Grant dispatched expeditions in various directions in the State of Mississippi. In one of these, sent to Natchez, under General Ransom, 5000 head of cattle, which were being crossed over the Mississippi at that point for the enemy's supply, were captured. His army now became dispersed. Ord and Herron were sent to the Department of the Gulf. Steele was dispatched to Helena, to re-enforce Schofield in the Department of the Missouri. Toward the last of August General Grant proceeded upon a tour of inspection through his department. He reached New Orleans on the 2d of September. As he was returning to his hotel in that city from a review of Ord's corps, on the 4th, his horse be-

came frightened, and, violently striking a carriage, General Grant was thrown into the street, and so severely injured in the hip that he was unable either to walk, or mount his horse without assistance, until his arrival at Chattanooga, toward the close of October. Secretary Stanton met him at Indianapolis, and both together proceeded to Louisville. Here, on the 18th, the Secretary handed him the order of the President, giving him the command of the "Military District of the Mississippi," comprising the departments of the Tennessee, the Ohio, and the Cumberland. By the same order Rosecrans was relieved of his command, being superseded by General Thomas.

This order gave Grant the military control of all the territory in possession of the government from the Mississippi River to the Alleghany Mountains, and of four large armies under Sherman (who succeeded Grant in the command of the Department and Army of the Tennessee), Thomas, Burnside, and Hooker. These armies, together, numbered probably 150,000 effective men. Two thirds of this force, or about 100,000 men, was available for the Chattanooga campaign. Deducting 20,000 for Burnside's effective command, and we have left a force 80,000 strong, which could be used directly against General Bragg. General Hooker's army was 23,000 strong, and consisted of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps. The Army of the Cumberland, now reduced to a little over 40,000 men, had been reorganized. McCook and Crittenden had been sent to Cincinnati, and their two commands, consolidated with the reserves, now constituted the Fourth Corps, under Gordon Granger. General Palmer commanded the Fourteenth, Thomas's old corps. The remaining portion of the forces brought against Bragg were to come from the Army of the Tennessee. Of this latter army, McPherson's corps remained at Vicksburg, and, by demonstrations along the Big Black, prevented Johnston from sending farther re-enforcements to Bragg. Hurlbut's corps was retained at Memphis. Upon Sherman's taking command of the Army of the Tennessee, General Blair had been assigned to that of the Fifteenth Corps.

The transfer of General Hooker's army westward to the Tennessee was






VIEW OF CHATTANOOGA





AND THE FEDERAL ENCAMPMENT.





THE THOMAS MEDAL.

accomplished with marvelous expedition. Although accompanied by its artillery, trains, baggage, and animals, this army moved from the Rapidan, in Virginia, to Stevenson, in Alabama, a distance of 1192 miles, in seven days, crossing the Ohio twice.<sup>1</sup> General Hooker reached Cincinnati in person on the 29th of September, and during the first week in October his army was on Rosecrans's right flank at Stevenson. At the time of, and for a long period subsequent to Hooker's arrival, Rosecrans's army was in a state of partial siege. Bragg commanded the river road to Bridgeport, and his cavalry interrupted the communications with Bridgeport by way of Walden's Ridge, and even assailed the Nashville Railroad.<sup>2</sup> Rosecrans feared that the enemy would cross above Chattanooga, on his left, separating him from Burnside; but this was not his greatest danger. What Rosecrans had most reason to be apprehensive about was the subsistence of his army. To recover Lookout Valley, and the command of the river road to Bridgeport, was the important necessity of the moment. Rosecrans had already planned the movement which was to secure this road when he was relieved.

Grant met Rosecrans and Hooker at Nashville October 21st. He immediately put into execution the plan which had been adopted, and there could be no delay. The route from Stevenson over Walden's Ridge was from 60 to 70 miles in length, and the supply trains were shelled from Lookout Mountain from the very day that Rosecrans had abandoned that important position to the enemy. The roads were so bad that Wheeler's cavalry did not venture upon a raid. The animals were walking skeletons, and were dying by thousands for want of forage, and the wagons were worn out by the difficult roads. The troops were reduced to half rations. On the 19th, immediately after assuming his new command, Grant had telegraphed to Thomas to hold on to Chattanooga. Thomas replied, "I will hold the town till we starve."<sup>3</sup> And, as matters stood, his chance of starving was very

good. Two weeks longer, and without relief from its embarrassment, the Federal army must have abandoned its position.

Grant reached Chattanooga on the 23d of October. The next day, with General Thomas and W. F. ("Baldy") Smith, chief engineer, he made a reconnaissance of Brown's Ferry (below the mouth of Lookout Creek) and of the country lying southward. It was then decided that, in accordance with the plans already formed by Rosecrans, Hooker should cross at Bridgeport, and advance to Wauhatchie in Lookout Valley, threatening the enemy's flank. This movement was open to the observation of the enemy. So also was the movement of one of Palmer's divisions down the river to a point opposite Whiteside (11 miles west of Wauhatchie), where he was to cross and move up to Hooker's support. While attention was fixed on these movements, General Smith, with 4000 men, was to move secretly, under cover of the night, across Brown's Ferry, and seize the range of steep hills at the head of Lookout Valley, three miles below Lookout Mountain. A pontoon bridge was then to be thrown across the river at Brown's Ferry, and a line of communication being thus opened between Thomas and Hooker, the latter would be enabled to advance without danger of an attack on his left flank.

This plan was successfully carried out. The position to be gained was held by a portion of Longstreet's command, which had not yet been detached from Bragg's army. The enemy's line stretched from Lookout Mountain to Missionary Ridge. But a single brigade was posted in Lookout Valley, though the Confederate pickets lined the river down to Bridgeport. The position, from the occupation of which there was especial apprehension on the part of the Federal army, was the most feebly defended of any on the Confederate line. Hooker sent Geary's division, of Slocum's corps, across on the 26th, and by the 28th this force had reached Wauhatchie. Howard, with the Eleventh Corps, held Geary's left toward Brown's Ferry. Palmer, with the Fourteenth Corps, was moving up in the rear. Smith also had accomplished the duty assigned to his command. Of the 4000 men detailed to this command, 1800, under Hazen, embarked on sixty pontoon-boats, had floated down the river from Chattanooga on the night of the 27th, past the Confederate pickets lining the left bank, and, landing at Brown's Ferry, had taken their appointed post with a loss of only four or five men wounded. The rest of Smith's force was ferried across and joined Hazen before morning. By 10 A.M. on the 28th a pontoon bridge had been thrown across the river at Brown's Ferry, and before night Howard had connected with Smith.

This movement was, however, not accomplished without a struggle. Longstreet had a signal-station on the top of Lookout Mountain, overlooking the whole field over which Howard and Geary moved. When, on the evening of the 28th, he saw, too late, the vital importance to the Federal army of the position seized by Hooker's command, he at once communicated with Bragg, explaining the altered situation, and was directed to attack and drive back Geary and Howard at all hazards. Longstreet had already seen enough from "Signal Rock" to convince him that it was useless to attack the superior numbers on his flank directly or by daylight; but, noting the situation

ation passed the Legislature November 2, 1865. The medal is of gold, is three inches in diameter, and was wrought by Tiffany and Co., of New York City.

<sup>1</sup> Secretary Stanton's Report, November 2d, 1865.


<sup>2</sup> Rosecrans's letters to Halleck, at this time, indicate great anxiety for the safety of the Federal army. October 12th, he writes:

"Line from here to Kingston long; our side is barren mountain; rebel side has railroad. Our danger is subsistence; we can not bring up Hooker to cover our left, against a crossing above us, for want of means to transport provisions and horse-feed. Enemy's side of valley full of corn. Every exertion will be made to hold what we have, and gain more, after which we must put our trust in God, who never fails those who truly trust."

Again, on the 16th:

"Evidence increases that the enemy intend a desperate effort to destroy this army. They are bringing up troops to our front. They have prepared pontoons, and will probably operate on our left flank, either to cross the river and force us to quit this place and fight them, or lose our communication. They will thus separate us from Burnside. We can not feed Hooker's troops on our left, nor can we spare them from our right depôts and communications; nor has he transportation. The rains have raised the river, and interrupted our pontoon bridge; the roads are very heavy. Our future is not bright. Had we the railroad from here to Bridgeport, the whole of Sherman's and Hooker's troops brought up, we should not, probably, outnumber the enemy. This army, with its back to the barren mountains, roads narrow and difficult, while the enemy has the railroad and the corn in his rear, is at much disadvantage. To secure this position, at least, McMinnville should be made a strong, fortified depôt, Kingston the same, and, for ulterior operations, 20,000 or 30,000 more troops put into Tennessee, at easy points to cover the railroad, and subsist until called to the front for advance on the enemy. Additional cavalry force is indispensable to a good future for this army. Burnside must be within supporting distance of us; if we lose this point, his hold on East Tennessee is gone; if we hold it, the Rebs can not make much use of the country above, and we shall dispossess them."

<sup>3</sup> The accompanying illustration is a fac-simile of a medal presented to General Thomas by the State of Tennessee, after the defeat of Hood at Nashville. The resolution in favor of the present-



MAP ILLUSTRATING THE BATTLE OF WAUCHATIE.





GENERAL HAZEN'S BRIGADE DESCENDING THE TENNESSEE.


of Geary's weak division at Wauhatchie, holding the road leading from Kelly's Ferry up Lookout Valley, he conceived the plan of striking this force by surprise during the night. If he succeeded in routing this force—Hooker's right flank—an easy matter as it seemed to him then—he would pursue the advantage thus gained by extending his attack against Hooker's centre and left. It was an admirable conception. But there was an important element involved in its execution which Longstreet was not, and could not be aware of, namely, Geary's precise knowledge of every movement which he might order from "Signal Rock." For some months the Federal officers had been in possession of the signal code of the enemy, and every flourish of Longstreet's signal torches on the top of Lookout, directing the assault, was at the same moment as significant to Geary as it was to Longstreet's commanders.

Thus, when, a little after midnight on the morning of the 29th, Law's division attacked Geary, the latter was fully prepared. Between the force at Wauhatchie and Howard's right was an interval of three miles. For three hours Geary defended his position without assistance, and repulsed every charge of the enemy, finally driving him from the field.<sup>1</sup> The success of the enemy at this point might have easily defeated the entire movement of Hooker. Of the two roads leading to Kelly's Ferry from Lookout Valley, Howard held one and Geary the other; the abandonment of one of these roads would have seriously imperiled the force holding the other.

A portion of Howard's command had in the mean time been engaged on Geary's left with equal success, and Longstreet was compelled to withdraw his command east of Lookout Creek. He still continued, however, to hold Lookout Mountain. Hooker's success, gained at the expense of only 437 men, recovered Lookout Valley, and gave Grant two good roads to Bridgeport from Brown's Ferry—one thirty-five miles long, running through Wauhatchie, Whiteside, and Shellmound; the other, from Brown's to Kelly's Ferry, a distance of eight miles by wagon, and thence by boat to Bridgeport. The enemy's position on Lookout commanded these roads, but the batteries which had been posted on Moccasin Point, north of the river, prevented the Confederate artillery from inflicting any serious damage to the supply trains. The siege of Chattanooga had been raised, and Bragg from this time was put upon the defensive. The only aggressive movement possible to him was that which he now attempted against Burnside with Longstreet's column; and this movement, unsuccessful in its special object, only accelerated his ruin. Longstreet's campaign against Knoxville was probably the result of President Davis's visit to Bragg's army, October 12.

<sup>1</sup> "For almost three hours, without assistance, he repelled the repeated attacks of vastly superior numbers, and in the end drove them ingloriously from the field. At one time they had enveloped him on three sides, under circumstances that would have dismayed any officer endowed with an iron will and the most exalted courage. Such is the character of General Geary."—*Hooker's Report.*

When Grant first heard of the proposed movement against Knoxville, he seems to have regarded it as unfavorable to the development of his own plans, and intended to immediately attack Missionary Ridge in order to detain Longstreet. But after a reconnoissance he found that such an assault did not promise success, and determined to await the arrival of Sherman's troops, now well on their way from Memphis. In the mean time he established between himself and Burnside a good understanding as to the plan



JOHN W. GEARY.



of operations which he was now about to adopt.<sup>1</sup> He confided to him the whole scheme of his movements against Bragg, and promised to send a force to the relief of Knoxville as soon as he had carried it out. Two things strike us forcibly in his correspondence with Burnside: first, the clearness of his plans, which read more like a history of his brief campaign, rather than a scheme of movements contemplated; and, secondly, his confidence as to their success. He almost seems to look regretfully after Longstreet's force, as if, by marching northward, it was escaping its share in the destruction which he was preparing for Bragg's entire army.

The Confederate army was entrenched upon the western slopes of Missionary Ridge, and stretched across Chattanooga Valley to the western slopes of Lookout Mountain, which, since Longstreet's departure, had been held by the divisions of Walker, Stevenson, and Cheatham.<sup>2</sup> His line of works, twelve miles in length, was occupied by less than 50,000 effective troops. His army was outnumbered by Grant's in about the same proportion that it had exceeded Rosecrans's at the battle of Chickamauga Creek. Nor was this inferiority in numbers balanced by superiority of position. His line, though apparently strong, was too much extended for the number of its defenders, and was really very weak. If he held the two ridges, his centre must be left vulnerable; the exposure of either of his flanks, by the abandonment of Lookout Mountain or Missionary Ridge, must be soon followed by an entire withdrawal of his army from before Chattanooga. Yet, so confident was he of the strength of his position, that when Grant moved upon his works he was just on the point of sending Cleburne's and Buckner's divisions to re-enforce Longstreet.

Grant's plan of attack was brilliant, but exceedingly simple in its general features. It involved an assault upon the strongest points in the enemy's line—its two extremes—by Hooker and Sherman, to be followed by a crushing blow from Thomas upon its centre.

But Sherman's army was not yet upon the field. It was now nearly two months since, just after the battle of Chickamauga, Sherman had been ordered to re-enforce Rosecrans. His corps, the Fifteenth, about 16,000 strong, consisted of four divisions, under P. J. Osterhaus, Morgan L. Smith, I. M. Tuttle, and Hugh Ewing.<sup>3</sup> Osterhaus's division had embarked for Memphis on the 23d. The other divisions followed a day later. The last of the fleet reached Memphis on the 4th of October. As soon as he reached Memphis, General Sherman was ordered to proceed with his own corps, and as many troops as could be spared from the line of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, to Athens, Alabama. He was to look out for his own supplies. Osterhaus by this had got as far as Corinth, and J. E. Smith was on the way from Memphis. On the 11th of October the rear of the column was put in motion, and Sherman started in person for Corinth, escorted by the Thirteenth Regulars. At Collierville, about twenty-five miles east of Memphis, a Confederate cavalry force was encountered, and the general, with his staff, narrowly escaped capture. D. C. Anthony was defending the post with the Sixty-ninth Illinois against the enemy, who numbered about 3000 horse, with eight guns, under General Chalmers. Sherman's escort joined Anthony, and the Confederates were repulsed. Sherman reached Corinth on the 12th, and sent Blair forward with the divisions of Osterhaus and Morgan L. Smith. The railroad was repaired as the troops advanced. A Confederate cavalry force, about 5000 strong, kept in Sherman's front. Under these circumstances, his progress was necessarily slow. Anticipating that

<sup>1</sup> On the 14th of November he telegraphed to Burnside:

"Your dispatch and Dana's" [in regard to the preference for Knoxville as the point to be held] "just received. Being there, you can tell better how to resist Longstreet's attack than I can direct. With your showing, you had better give up Kingston at the last moment, and save the most productive part of your possession. Every arrangement is now made to throw Sherman's force across the river just at and below the mouth of Chickamauga Creek as soon as it arrives. Thomas will attack on his" [the enemy's] "left at the same time, and together it is expected to carry Missionary Ridge, and from there rush a force on to the railroad between Cleveland and Dalton. Hooker will at the same time attack, and, if he can, carry Lookout Mountain. The enemy now seems to be looking for an attack on his left flank. This favors us. To further confirm this, Sherman's advance division will march direct from Whiteside to Trenton. The remainder of the force will pass over a new road just made from Whiteside to Kelly's Ferry, thus being concealed from the enemy, and leave him to suppose the whole force is going up Lookout Valley. Sherman's advance has only just reached Bridgeport. The rear will only reach there on the 16th. This will bring it to the 19th as the earliest day for making the combined movement as desired. Inform me if you think you can sustain yourself till that time. I can hardly conceive of the enemy breaking through at Kingston, and pushing for Kentucky. If they should, however, a new problem would be left for solution. Thomas has ordered a division of cavalry to the vicinity of Sparta. I will ascertain if they have started, and inform you. It will be entirely out of the question to send for 10,000 men, not because they can not be spared, but how could they be fed after they got one day east of here?"

On the 15th he telegraphed again as follows:

"I do not know how to impress on you the necessity of holding on to East Tennessee in strong enough terms. According to the dispatches of Mr. Dana and Colonel Wilson, it would seem that you should, if pressed to do it, hold on to Knoxville, and that portion of the valley you will necessarily possess holding to that point. Should Longstreet move his whole force across the Little Tennessee, an effort should be made to cut his pontoons on that stream, even if it sacrificed half the cavalry of the Ohio Army. By holding on, and placing Longstreet between the Little Tennessee and Knoxville, he should not be allowed to escape with an army capable of doing any thing this winter. I can hardly conceive the necessity of retreating from East Tennessee. If I did it at all, it would be after losing most of the army, and then necessity would suggest the route. I will not attempt to lay out a line of retreat. Kingston, looking at the map, I thought of more importance than any one point in East Tennessee. But my attention being called more closely to it, I can see that it might be passed by, and Knoxville, and the rich valley about it, possessed, ignoring that place entirely. I should not think it advisable to concentrate a force near Little Tennessee to resist the crossing, if it would be in danger of capture; but I would harass and embarrass progress in every way possible, reflecting on the fact that the Army of the Ohio is not the only army to resist the onward progress of the enemy."

<sup>2</sup> FIRST DIVISION, P. T. Osterhaus:

{ First Brigade, C. K. Woods.  
{ Second Brigade, J. A. Williamson.

SECOND DIVISION, Morgan L. Smith:

{ First Brigade, Giles A. Smith.  
{ Second Brigade, J. A. D. Lightburn.

THIRD DIVISION, J. W. Tuttle:

{ First Brigade, J. A. Mower.  
{ Second Brigade, R. B. Buckland.  
{ Third Brigade, J. J. Wood.

FOURTH DIVISION, Hugh Ewing:

{ First Brigade, J. M. Corse.  
{ Second Brigade, Colonel Loomis.  
{ Third Brigade, J. R. Cockrell.

Tuttle's (Third) division was left with McPherson at Vicksburg, and its place taken by J. E. Smith's (of the Seventeenth Corps), which was also styled the Third Division. This division consisted of three brigades, commanded by General Matthias, J. B. Raum, and J. J. Alexander.

resistance would be made to his crossing of the Tennessee, he had requested Admiral Porter to send him two gun-boats, which he found ready upon his arrival at Eastport. Blair, after considerable skirmishing, drove the enemy from his front, and occupied Tusculum on the 27th.

In the mean time Sherman had been notified of his appointment to the command of Grant's former department, and had made such a disposition of the troops in his rear as would secure Mississippi and West Tennessee, leaving the former under McPherson's, and the latter under Hurlbut's control. Blair was assigned to the command of the Fifteenth Corps, and General George W. Dodge was ordered to organize from the Sixteenth a select force of 8000 men, with which he was to follow Sherman eastward. Ewing on the 27th, was ordered to cross his division at Eastport, and advance to Florence. On the same day, a messenger, having floated down the river from Chattanooga, reached Sherman with orders to stop the work on the railroad, and advance toward Bridgeport. On the 1st of November Sherman crossed the river in person, passed to the head of the column at Florence, and, leaving the rear to be brought up by Blair, marched toward the Elk River. Not having time for ferriage or bridge-building, it was necessary to advance up that stream as far as Fayetteville, where the command crossed. Here Sherman received orders to bring the Fifteenth Corps to Bridgeport, leaving Dodge's command on the railroad at Pulaski. Blair was instructed to conduct the first and second divisions, by way of Larkinsville to Bellefonte, while Sherman took a more northern route, *via* Winchester and Decherd, reaching Bridgeport by night on the 13th of November. Telegraphing to General Grant information of his arrival and of the disposition of his divisions, he was summoned to Chattanooga. Proceeding by boat to Kelly's Ferry, he reached Grant's headquarters on the 15th. Here his part in the coming drama was explained to him, and he was shown the enemy fortified position on Missionary Ridge; the point which he was to attack and the details of his march across the river at Brown's Ferry, around the mountains north of the river to the mouth of Chickamauga Creek, were here determined upon. The entire movement of his corps, after crossing Brown's Ferry till it emerged upon Bragg's right flank, was so arranged as to be concealed from the enemy by covering mountains. He saw all the arrangements which had been made for him in anticipation. "Pontoons," said Sherman, in his report, "with a full supply of bulks and chasses, had been prepared for the bridge over the Tennessee, and all things prearranged with a foresight that elicited my admiration. From the hills we looked down upon the amphitheatre of Chattanooga as on a map, and nothing remained but for me to put my troops in the desired position." To convince the enemy that his left was the especial point of attack, a division of Sherman's corps was to make a feint against Lookout Mountain from a point in the vicinity of Trenton. Sherman, from this visit to Chattanooga, was also enabled to understand the necessity of the utmost expedition on his part. The whole army he found "impatient for action, rendered almost acute by the natural apprehension felt for the safety of General Burnside in East Tennessee."<sup>1</sup>

It was expected that Sherman would be in position on the 19th, but the difficult roads delayed his movements. J. E. Smith's division was the first to cross. Morgan L. Smith's division crossed to the north bank at Brown's Ferry on the 21st. Ewing's was ready to cross, when the bridge broke, and occasioned a delay of two days. Ewing crossed on the 23d, when the bridge again broke, with Osterhaus on the south bank. It was therefore determined to leave Osterhaus to support Hooker, while Jeff C. Davis was sent to Sherman in his place. It was evident that Sherman could not participate in the battle before the 24th.

But, in the mean while, deserters reported that Bragg was about to fall back. A letter received by flag of truce from the Confederate command warning General Grant to withdraw from Chattanooga whatever non-combatants still remained, seemed to corroborate these reports. Grant had the idea of suffering Bragg to retreat without a battle, and determined to attack before Sherman's arrival.

Howard's corps had been brought to Chattanooga, and this corps, with Granger's and Palmer's, was ordered to assail the enemy's centre with such vigor as to develop his lines and detain him in front. In obedience to this order, Granger and Palmer, with Howard in support, drove in the enemy's pickets on the 23d, and carried his first line of works between Chattanooga and Citico Creeks. Although Thomas's operations had been made in front view of the Confederate pickets, no attack was expected by the enemy. The Federal troops, clad in their best uniforms, and accompanied by their bands of music, thus rapidly mustering in open view, seemed to be parading for grand review rather than for an assault upon the outposts of Missionary Ridge. The settlers occupying the advanced rifle-pits watched the display without alarm, but about noon they discovered, to their amazement, that the spectacle was one in which they were more intimately concerned as actors than as spectators. At 1 o'clock P.M. Wood's and Sheridan's divisions of Granger's corps, advanced in front and under the guns of Fort Wood, Palmer occupying at the same time a threatening position on their right while Howard was held in reserve on their left. Sheridan and Wood advanced at double-quick, and drove first the enemy's pickets, then their reserves, and, capturing about 200 men, including nine commissioned officers, carried Orchard Knob before the Confederates had fairly recovered from their surprise. Upon this important position Granger entrenched himself, and the advance of the troops on his left and right obliterated the front line of the Confederate works in Thomas's front. This success was won with the loss of 111 men. But the next day promised work of a more serious character.

<sup>1</sup> Sherman's Report.





LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN, FROM THE FEDERAL WORKS ON CHATTANOOGA CREEK.



It now became evident to Bragg that an attempt would be made against his right flank, with a view of severing his communication with Longstreet. To strengthen this portion of his line, Walker's division was withdrawn from the western slope of Lookout Mountain, leaving Stevenson and Cheatham to hold the left.

During the night of the 23d, Giles A. Smith's brigade, of Morgan L. Smith's division, consisting of about 3000 men, manned the boats of which the pontoon bridge was to be constructed, and, dropping down the river at midnight, captured the Confederate pickets above the North Chickamauga, and landed below the mouth of the creek. By means of these boats and the steamer Dunbar, the rest of the division, together with John E. Smith's, were ferried across before daylight, so that on the morning of the 24th Sherman had a force of 8000 men ready to advance against the enemy's right. The whole valley between Citico and Chickamauga Creeks was an immense corn-field. Through this valley Howard moved on the forenoon of the 24th to connect with Sherman. The pontoon bridge had in the mean time been constructed, under "Baldy" Smith's immediate supervision. "I have never," says Sherman, "beheld any work done so quickly, so well; and I doubt if the history of the war can show a bridge of that extent (namely, 1350 feet) laid down so noiselessly and well in so short a time. I attribute it to the genius and intelligence of General W. F. Smith." By 1 o'clock P.M. the whole corps had crossed, and Davis's division was prepared to co-operate, as a reserve force, in the attack on Missionary Ridge.

Sherman's three divisions were now ordered to advance, M. L. Smith on the left, J. E. Smith in the centre, and Ewing on the right. A drizzling rain began to fall, and the clouds, resting upon the river, and low down upon the mountain sides, cloaked Sherman's movement. By 3 o'clock the northern spurs of the ridge were gained without loss. The enemy had not occupied these hills (north of the railroad tunnel) with any considerable force. Sherman fortified the heights gained by his troops, and brought up his artillery. He had supposed, from the map, that the ridge was continuous, but he now found that he was separated from the enemy by a deep gorge. The enemy attempted, later in the day, to regain the hill, attacking Sherman's left. The attack was repulsed, but in the fight Giles A. Smith was severely wounded, and carried to the rear.

While Sherman was thus confronting the enemy across the railroad on Missionary Ridge, Hooker had made better progress in his movement against the Confederate left on Lookout Mountain. The idea of an advance from Lookout Valley had been abandoned when Howard's corps was withdrawn from Hooker on the 22d. Indeed, Hooker, wishing to be with that portion of his command which would be in the fight, was on the point of following Howard, when he was ordered to remain and make a demonstration against Lookout Mountain, to divert the attention of the enemy from Sherman's movements. His command consisted of Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps, Osterhaus's of the Fifteenth, and Cruft's of the Fourth, with a small detachment of cavalry, making an aggregate of about 10,000 men. It was a conglomerate organization, no one of these three divisions having ever before seen either of the others. The presence of Osterhaus's division at this point led General Grant to resume his original plan, and he ordered Hooker to make a determined attack, and to carry the mountain if possible.

The enemy's pickets lined the east bank of Lookout Creek. His main force, under Cheatham, was encamped in a hollow midway up the slope of the mountain. The summit east of the palisaded crest was held by three brigades of Stevenson's division. The Confederate position was well protected by batteries and rifle-pits against an attack from the Tennessee or from the valleys on either side, and in the valleys also were strong lines of earth-works.

Geary, who had ascended Lookout Creek, supported by Whittaker's brigade of Cruft's division, crossed near Wauhatchie at 8 A.M. on the 24th, surprising and capturing the Confederate picket of 42 men on the river bank, and moved down the valley, his right keeping close up under the palisades, and thus avoiding the batteries on the crest. Osterhaus, with Cruft's other brigade (Grose's), at the same time gained a bridge on the road just below the point where the railroad to Chattanooga crosses the creek, and began to repair it. The enemy, not aware of the force marching in its rear, filed down from his encampment and moved into his rifle-pits in Osterhaus's front, a small force taking a position behind the embankment, which enabled it to enfilade the road which the Federal troops must take if they crossed the creek at this point. Holding the enemy here, another crossing was prepared 800 yards above. Batteries were posted enfilading the route by which the Confederates had left their encampment, and also preventing their sending re-enforcements to oppose Geary.

Before noon Geary had advanced close up to the Confederate rear. Grose's brigade, with another (Wood's) of Osterhaus's division, sprang across the creek and connected with Geary's left. All the batteries opened, and those of the enemy who escaped their fury were captured by the Federals in their rear. Meanwhile Geary, winding around the palisades, passed, says Hooker, "directly under the muzzles of the enemy's guns on the summit, climbing over ledges and boulders, up hill and down, driving the enemy from his camp, and from position after position."

By noon Geary's advance rounded the peak of the mountain. Directions had been given to halt here, as it was not known to what extent the Confederates farther to the east might have been re-enforced. But there was no such thing as "halt" for troops who, fired with success, were pressing on toward the consummation of their victory! Passing around to the eastern slope of the mountain, Osterhaus on the left, Cruft in the centre, and Geary on the right, Hooker's columns met with no formidable resistance until they emerged from the woods against the enemy's intrenchments,

which ran diagonally across an open field covering the road which leads up the mountain from Chattanooga to Summertown. Here progress was for a time interrupted. Much had been already gained. Upward of 2000 prisoners had been captured, and communication was now open across Chattanooga Creek with General Thomas. But Hooker's success thus far had been mainly the result of strategy. The enemy had been surprised. But for this, Lookout Mountain could easily have been held against Hooker's 10,000 men. The main object of the battle at this point had been secured. All that remained was to make the victory decisive by breaking Cheatham's line on the eastern slope of the mountain, thus cutting off the brigades still holding the summit.

During the operations thus far the batteries on Moccasin Point, north of the Tennessee, had been engaging the enemy's artillery on the extreme point and highest peak of Lookout. The heavy clouds, which in the morning had enveloped the mountain's summit, and thus, to some extent, favored Hooker's movement, had gradually settled into the valley, veiling it completely from view. Thus the battle of the afternoon was literally "a Battle above the Clouds."

The Confederate line had been contracted in order to give it greater strength, so that there was a considerable interval between the plateau which it held and the palisades. Geary, taking advantage of this interval, got in upon the enemy's left flank, and an advance being made by Cruft and Osterhaus in front, the entire line was carried. But it was not held by the Federals undisturbed. No sooner had it been occupied by them than the enemy turned upon it and made an assault. In the continual skirmishing which had been going on, Hooker's troops had now nearly exhausted their ammunition, and unless a fresh supply could be had from some source it seemed probable that the position which had been gained would have to be abandoned. Hooker had sent for ammunition, but it had been delayed. Just in time, fortunately, Carlin's brigade of Johnson's division arrived from Thomas, having crossed Chattanooga Creek, and brought with it 120,000 rounds strapped on the backs of the men. This fresh brigade relieved Geary's exhausted troops. The enemy was repulsed, driven back from the last position where he could make a stand, and hurled over the rocky heights down into the valley.

By this time the darkness upon the mountain rendered farther progress extremely dangerous, and Hooker's troops encamped for the night on the slope which they had so gallantly won. Lookout Mountain had been captured. The only drawback to the utmost completion of the victory was the fact that a route was left open for the retreat of Stevenson's brigades from the crest above. Before daylight the colors of the Eighth Kentucky waved from the peak of Lookout. But the enemy had abandoned his encampment, leaving behind him, in the hurry of his flight, all his camp and garrison equipage.


The morning of November 25th found Bragg's entire army stretched along Missionary Ridge from Tunnel Hill to Rossville, the valley of the Chattanooga being entirely abandoned. Lieutenant General Hardee commanded the right wing, consisting of Cleburne's, Walker's, Cheatham's, and Stevenson's divisions. The left wing—consisting of Breckinridge's old division,<sup>1</sup> and those of Stewart and Anderson—was under General Breckinridge. The breastworks at the foot of the rugged slope were occupied by pickets, while the infantry and artillery stretched along the ridge. Where the ascent was easy, special fortifications had been constructed to resist an assailing force. The troops on Breckinridge's right had been beaten at Lookout Mountain, had taken their position hurriedly, and had not yet recovered from the demoralization of defeat. Breckinridge's left was refused at McFarland's Gap, occupying the breastworks in which the Federals had stood in their retreat from McLemore's Cove two months before. This point connected the old battle-field of Chickamauga with that upon which the opposing forces were now contending.

About midnight on the 24th orders came from Grant, whose headquarters were on Orchard Knob, for Sherman to attack at daylight the next morning. Sherman was early in the saddle. The clouds of the previous day had cleared away, and his own position, as well as that of the enemy, was fully revealed to him as he rode along from Lightburn's brigade on the left to the position held by Ewing's division on the right. The hill held by the enemy on his front was of steep ascent, its crest narrow and wooded. Cleburne's position was well protected by log breastworks, and a higher hill beyond was held by the enemy, commanding the disputed ground. Three brigades—Lightburn's, Alexander's, and Cockrell's—one from each division, were to hold the hill, and Corse's brigade, of Ewing's division, on the right centre, was to form the assailing column, assisted by a regiment from Lightburn, and three brigades—Loomis's, of Ewing's, and Matthias's and Raum's, of John E. Smith's divisions. Morgan L. Smith, with his remaining brigade, was to connect with Corse's left, and move around the eastern base of the ridge.


Corse moved to the attack at sunrise, and, advancing to within eighty yards of the enemy's intrenchments, established himself upon a secondary ridge. To this point the reserves were brought up. His preparations having been completed, Corse assaulted the works on Tunnel Hill. A severe conflict of more than an hour's duration followed, the issue of which was that, after gaining and losing ground, Corse made no progress beyond the

<sup>1</sup> Generals Polk and Hill had been relieved for disobedience of orders in the Chickamauga campaign. We also miss Hindman and Buckner. Walker, too, is absent, his division being commanded by General Gist. Hardee comes from Enterprise, Mississippi, where he had at the end of August taken command of "the paroled prisoners of Mississippi, Arkansas, Missouri, Texas, and Louisiana, recently forming the garrisons of Vicksburg and Port Hudson." These prisoners had not been exchanged up to the time of which we are writing. All of Stevenson's division, including its commander, must have violated their parole.





TOP OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN, SUNRISE, NOVEMBER 25 1863




REBEL BATTERY ON THE TOP OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN.



GENERAL HOOKER'S COLUMN STORMING LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN.



THE CREST OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN.




TO THE TOP OF THE MOUNTAIN.





CAPTURE OF CONFEDERATE WORKS AT THE WHITE HOUSE, ON LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN.





MAP ILLUSTRATING THE BATTLES ABOUT CHATTANOOGA.





THE STORMING OF MISSIONARY RIDGE.



position originally taken. Morgan L. Smith, in the mean time, had made considerable progress on the eastern slope. Loomis's brigade had got abreast of the tunnel, and, by diverting the enemy's attention, afforded some relief to General Corse. The two reserve brigades (those of John E. Smith) supporting Corse's movement had been repulsed, but the real attack was sustained. The enemy had brought to this part of the field extensive re-enforcements, and the most that Sherman could do was to maintain his position until the success of Thomas and Hooker, on the centre and right, should give him an opportunity to attack with advantage.

But the centre and right of the Federal army had been delayed. Thomas's attack was to depend upon the movements of Hooker. The latter was unexpectedly retarded in his movement from Lookout Mountain. Osterhaus's division began its march to Rossville at 10 o'clock, and the rest of Hooker's command followed, with the exception of two regiments left upon the summit of Lookout. On arriving at Chattanooga Creek it was found that the enemy had destroyed the bridge, and here Hooker was delayed for full three hours. Osterhaus was soon got across, and, pushing on to the gap in Missionary Ridge, flanked the enemy at this point, capturing artillery, ammunition, and wagons. Hooker's entire command was ready for the attack upon the enemy's left by 3 30 P.M. Craft advanced upon the ridge, Osterhaus to the east of it, and Geary, with the artillery, along the valley, against the western slope.

Thomas in the mean time had sent Baird's division to the support of Sherman, on Granger's left. This division got into position at 2 30 P.M. Thomas then assaulted the enemy's line with his whole force, driving the enemy from his rifle-pits at the foot of the hill on the centre of his line. The troops to the right of Wood advanced up to the crest, and gained the summit of the ridge, capturing large numbers of the enemy in their trenches.<sup>1</sup> Against Sherman, and Baird's and Wood's divisions, the enemy still held his ground; but Hooker was well up against his left, which now, attacked in front and flank, was entirely routed, leaving behind forty pieces of artillery. Here a large number of prisoners, driven by Hooker against Palmer and Johnson, were captured. Osterhaus alone took 2000 prisoners. It was not until nightfall, however, that the enemy's right was dislodged, and the entire ridge abandoned.

At daylight on the 26th Sherman and Hooker pursued the enemy's routed columns, the former by way of Chickamauga Station, the latter by Greysville and Ringgold. The rear-guard, under Gist, was overtaken and broken up, and three more guns captured. Hooker's force came upon Cleburne in a gap in Taylor's Ridge, near Ringgold, and, attacking him, was severely repulsed, losing 65 killed and 367 wounded. Finally Cleburne was flanked and driven from his strong position, leaving 130 killed and wounded on the field. There was no farther pursuit. Grose's brigade visited the battle-field of Chickamauga, and buried the remains of many of the Federal dead, which had been left by Bragg to lie mouldering where they had fallen.

Bragg attributes his defeat to a disgraceful panic on the part of his men.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> General Thomas gives the following description of this movement:

"Our troops advancing steadily in a continuous line, the enemy, seized with panic, abandoned the works at the foot of the hill and retreated precipitately to the crest, whither they were closely followed by our troops, who, apparently inspired by the impulse of victory, carried the hill simultaneously at six different points, and so closely upon the heels of the enemy that many of them were taken prisoners in the trenches. We captured all their cannon and ammunition before they could be removed or destroyed. After halting a few moments to reorganize the troops, who had become somewhat scattered in the assault of the hill, General Sherman pushed forward in pursuit, and drove those in his front who escaped capture across Chickamauga Creek. Generals Wood and Baird, being obstinately resisted by re-enforcements from the enemy's extreme right, continued fighting until darkness set in, but steadily driving the enemy before them. In moving upon Rossville, General Hooker encountered Stewart's division and other troops. Finding his left flank threatened, Stewart attempted to escape by retreating toward Greysville; but some of his force, finding their retreat threatened in that quarter, retired in disorder toward their right, along the crest of the ridge, where they were met by another portion of General Hooker's command, and were driven by these troops in the face of Johnson's division of Palmer's corps, by whom they were nearly all made prisoners."

<sup>2</sup> The following is General Bragg's report of the battle:

"Headquarters Army of Tennessee, Dalton, Georgia, 30th November, 1863.

"General S. COOPER, Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond:  
"Sir,—On Monday, the 23d, the enemy advanced in heavy force, and drove in our picket line in front of Missionary Ridge, but made no farther effort.

"On Tuesday morning early they threw over the river a heavy force opposite the north end of the ridge, and just below the mouth of the Chickamauga, at the same time displaying a heavy force in our immediate front. After visiting the right, and making dispositions there for the new development in that direction, I returned toward the left, to find a heavy cannonading going on from the enemy's batteries on our forces occupying the slope of Lookout Mountain, between the crest and the river. A very heavy force soon advanced to the assault, and was met by one brigade only, Walthall's, which made a desperate resistance, but was finally compelled to yield ground. Why this command was not sustained is yet unexplained. The commander on that part of the field, Major General Stevenson, had six brigades at his disposal. Upon his urgent appeal, another brigade was dispatched in the afternoon to his support—though it appeared his own forces had not been brought into action—and I proceeded to the scene.

"Arriving just before sunset, I found that we had lost all the advantages of the position. Orders were immediately given for the ground to be disputed until we could withdraw our forces across Chattanooga Creek, and the movement was commenced. This having been successfully accomplished, our whole forces were concentrated on the ridge, and extended to the right to meet the movement in that direction.

"On Wednesday, the 25th, I again visited the extreme right, now under Lieutenant General Hardee, and threatened by a heavy force, while strong columns could be seen marching in that direction. A very heavy force in line of battle confronted our left and centre.

"On my return to this point, about 11 A.M., the enemy's forces were being moved in heavy masses from Lookout and beyond to our front, while those in front extended to our right. They formed their lines with great deliberation, just beyond the range of our guns, and in plain view of our position.

"Though greatly outnumbered, such was the strength of our position that no doubt was entertained of our ability to hold it, and every disposition was made for that purpose. During this time they had made several attempts on our extreme right, and had been handsomely repulsed, with very heavy loss, by Major General Cleburne's command, under the immediate direction of Lieutenant General Hardee. By the road across the ridge at Rossville, far to our left, a route was open to our rear. Major General Breckinridge, commanding on the left, had occupied this with two regiments and a battery. It being reported to me that a force of the enemy had moved in that direction, the general was ordered to have it reconnoitred, and to make every disposition necessary to secure his flank, which he proceeded to do.

"About half past 3 P.M., the immense force in the front of our left and centre advanced in three lines, preceded by heavy skirmishers. Our batteries opened with fine effect, and much confusion was produced before they reached musket range. In a short time the roar of musketry became very heavy, and it was soon apparent that the enemy had been repulsed in my immediate front.

"While riding along the crest congratulating the troops, intelligence reached me that our line

The real causes were the weakness of his line—a weakness not of position, but of numbers—and the demoralization which had resulted from the defeat on Lookout Mountain.

The Federal losses in the battles of the 23d, 24th, 25th, and 26th were 757 killed, 4529 wounded, and 330 missing: total, 5616. The Confederate loss in killed and wounded was probably much less; but Bragg's loss in prisoners alone amounted to 6142, of whom 239 were commissioned officers; 7000 stand of small arms had also been captured by Grant's army. By these battles Bragg's army must have been diminished by at least 10,000 men. Grant probably had engaged about 65,000 men, and Bragg between 40,000 and 45,000.

General Bragg's defeat terminated the contest for Chattanooga and East Tennessee. The tidings of Grant's victory electrified the loyal portion of the country, and President Lincoln, on the 7th of December, issued a proclamation recommending the people "to assemble at their places of worship, and render special homage and gratitude to Almighty God for this great advancement of the national cause." From this time the prospects of the Southern Confederacy were indeed desperate. The resources of the Southern States were rapidly being exhausted, while the national armies were being recruited by immense numbers, at whose backs stood thousands more ready to take the field the moment their services should become necessary. Thus closed the year 1863. It had begun with the disaster at Fredericksburg, followed soon by the defeat at Chancellorsville; but the victories of Gettysburg, Vicksburg, and Missionary Ridge crowned it with imperishable glory.<sup>1</sup>

was broken on my right, and the enemy had crowned the ridge. Assistance was promptly dispatched to that point, under Brigadier General Bate, who had successfully maintained the ground in my front, and I proceeded to the rear of the broken line to rally our retiring troops and return them to the crest to drive the enemy back. General Bate found the disaster so great that his small force could not repair it. About this time I learned that our extreme left had also given way, and that my position was almost surrounded. Bate was immediately directed to form a second line in the rear, where, by the efforts of my staff, a nucleus of stragglers had been formed upon which to rally.

"Lieutenant General Hardee, leaving Major General Cleburne in command of the extreme right, moved toward the left when he heard the heavy firing in that direction. He reached the right of Anderson's division just in time to find it had nearly all fallen back, commencing on its right, where the enemy had first crowned the ridge. By a prompt and judicious movement, he threw a portion of Cheatham's division directly across the ridge, facing the enemy, who was now moving a strong force immediately on his left flank. By a decided stand here, the enemy was entirely checked, and that portion of our force to the right remained intact. All to the left, however, except a portion of Bate's division, was entirely routed, and in rapid flight, nearly all the artillery having been shamefully abandoned by its infantry support. Every effort which could be made by myself and staff, and by many other mounted officers, availed but little. A panic, which I had never before witnessed, seemed to have seized upon officers and men, and each seemed to be struggling for his personal safety, regardless of his duty or his character. In this distressing and alarming state of affairs, General Bate was ordered to hold his position, covering the road for the retreat of Breckinridge's command, and orders were immediately sent to Generals Hardee and Breckinridge to retire their forces upon the dépôt at Chickamauga. Fortunately, it was now near nightfall, and the country and roads in our rear were fully known to us, but equally unknown to the enemy. The routed left made its way back in great disorder, effectually covered, however, by Bate's small command, which had a sharp conflict with the enemy's advance, driving it back. After night, all being quiet, Bate retired in good order, the enemy attempting no pursuit. Lieutenant General Hardee's command, under his judicious management, retired in good order and unmolested.

"As soon as all the troops had crossed, the bridges over the Chickamauga were destroyed, to impede the enemy, though the stream was fordable in several places.

"No satisfactory excuse can possibly be given for the shameful conduct of our troops on the left in allowing their line to be penetrated. The position was one which ought to have been held by a line of skirmishers against any assaulting column; and, wherever resistance was made, the enemy fled in disorder, after suffering heavy loss. Those who reached the ridge did so in a condition of exhaustion, from the great physical exertion in climbing, which rendered them powerless, and the slightest effort would have destroyed them.

"Having secured much of our artillery, they soon availed themselves of our panic, and, turning our guns upon us, enfiladed our lines both right and left, rendering them entirely untenable. Had all parts of the line been maintained with equal gallantry and persistence, no enemy could ever have dislodged us; and but one possible reason presents itself to my mind in explanation of this bad conduct in veteran troops, who had never before failed in any duty assigned them, however difficult and hazardous. They had for two days confronted the enemy, marshaling his immense forces in plain view, and exhibiting to their sight such a superiority in numbers as may have intimidated weak minds and untried soldiers. But our veterans had so often encountered similar hosts when the strength of position was against us, and with perfect success, that not a doubt crossed my mind. As yet, I am not fully informed as to the commands which first fled, and brought this great disaster and disgrace upon our arms. Investigation will bring out the truth, however, and full justice shall be done to the good and the bad.

"After arriving at Chickamauga, and informing myself of the full condition of affairs, it was decided to put the army in motion for a point farther removed from a powerful and victorious army, that we might have some little time to replenish and recuperate for another struggle. The enemy made pursuit as far as Ringgold, but was so handsomely checked by Major General Cleburne and Brigadier General Gist, in command of their respective divisions, that he gave us but little annoyance.

"Our losses are not yet ascertained, but in killed and wounded it is known to have been very small. In prisoners and stragglers I fear it is much larger.

"The chief of artillery reports the loss of forty (40) pieces.

"I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"BRAXTON BRAGG, General Commanding."

President Davis also seems to have concurred with General Bragg in attributing the blame to the troops. In his message to Congress (December 7th, 1863) he says:

"After a long and severe battle, in which great carnage was inflicted on him, some of our troops inexplicably abandoned positions of great strength, and by a disorderly retreat compelled the commander to withdraw the forces elsewhere successful, and, finally, to retire with his whole army to a position some twenty or thirty miles to the rear. It is believed that if the troops who yielded to the assault had fought with the valor which they had displayed on previous occasions, and which was manifested in this battle on other parts of the lines, the enemy would have been repulsed with very great slaughter, and our country would have escaped the misfortune, and the army the mortification, of the first defeat that has resulted from misconduct by the troops."

<sup>1</sup> Near the close of 1863 General Grant issued the following congratulatory order to his soldiers:

"Chattanooga, December 10th, 1863.

"The general commanding takes this opportunity of returning his sincere thanks and congratulations to the brave armies of the Cumberland, the Ohio, the Tennessee, and their comrades from the Potomac, for the recent splendid and decisive successes achieved over the enemy. In a short time you have recovered from him the control of the Tennessee River from Bridgeport to Knoxville. You dislodged him from his great stronghold upon Lookout Mountain, drove him from Chattanooga Valley, wrested from his determined grasp the possession of Missionary Ridge, repelled with heavy loss to him his repeated assaults upon Knoxville, forcing him to raise the siege there, driving him at all points, utterly routed and discomfited, beyond the limits of the state. By your noble heroism and determined courage you have most effectually defeated the plans of the enemy for regaining the possession of the states of Kentucky and Tennessee. You have secured positions from which no rebellious power can drive or dislodge you. For all this the general commanding thanks you collectively and individually. The loyal people of the United States thank and bless you. Their hopes and prayers for your success against this unholy rebellion are with you daily. Their faith in you will not be in vain. Their hopes will not be blasted. Their prayers to Almighty God will be answered. You will yet go to other fields of strife; and with the invincible bravery and unflinching loyalty to justice and right which have characterized you in the past, you will prove that no enemy can withstand you, and that no defenses, however formidable, can check your onward march."





CAPTURED CONFEDERATE CANNON IN FRONT OF GENERAL THOMAS'S HEADQUARTERS.