



OCCUPATION OF CUMBERLAND GAP.

which De Courcy threatened from the north. Frazier, who occupied the Gap with four Confederate regiments, was well supplied, and confident of his ability to hold the position. But some of Shackelford's men succeeded on the 7th in creeping through the lines and burning the mill upon which the garrison depended for flour. Burnside arrived in person on the 9th, when Frazier surrendered 2000 men and 14 guns. The pursuit of a small Confederate force under Sam Jones into Virginia completed the long-sought conquest of East Tennessee. The campaign had been accomplished without a single battle.

By the Loyalists along his line of march and at Knoxville Burnside was hailed as a deliverer. His entrance into Knoxville was an ovation which might have flattered the greatest of conquerors. His wayworn troops shared the generous welcome. National flags, long concealed, came forth from the houses, and made the 3d of September seem like a 4th of July.¹ General Burnside captured at Knoxville a large quantity of ammunition, 2000 stand of small-arms, 11 guns, and 2500 prisoners.

CHAPTER XXXIV.
THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN.
IV. THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

Rosecrans crosses the Tennessee.—Movements of his three Corps.—Bragg retreats from Chattanooga.—Over-confidence of Rosecrans.—Why Burnside did not co-operate.—Bragg's Opportunity.—General Negley's Fight at Dug Gap discovers the Enemy.—Rosecrans alarmed.—Hurried Concentration and narrow Escape of his Army.—The Situation on the Evening of September 18.—Battle of the 19th.—General Thomas strikes the first Blow.—Baird's Repulse; Loss of the "Loomis" Battery.—Enemy driven, and Guns recaptured.—Confederate Attack in the Afternoon; Van Cleave driven; Hazen repulses the Enemy with Artillery.—Pat Cleburne's Night Attack.—Results of the Day's Fighting.—Council of War at the Widow Glenn's.—The

Confederate General Longstreet's Arrival.—Battle of the 20th.—Rosecrans's Dispositions.—Bragg's Plan of Attack.—Polk's Delay.—Thomas is hard pressed, but holds his Position.—Longstreet's Attack.—Hindman breaks through the Right of the Federal Line.—How the Gap was made.—Rosecrans, McCook, and Crittenden swept from the Field.—Extent of the Disorder.—Garfield goes to Thomas.—Formation of a new Line on the Slope of Mission Ridge.—General Negley's Position.—Weakness of the new Line.—Longstreet's Assault delayed.—Granger arrives in time to meet it and to save the Day.—Withdrawal of the Army by Night to Ross-ville and thence to Chattanooga.—Estimate of Losses.—Review of the Campaign.

WE left Rosecrans's army at Winchester, south of Elk River, with its left and rear toward McMinnville well guarded, and its outposts advanced to Pelham and Stevenson. If its progress thus far had been difficult, it was yet mere play when compared with a farther advance across the Cumberland Mountains and the broad Tennessee to Chattanooga, whither Bragg had retreated. A direct attack upon the enemy, strongly entrenched in Chattanooga, was out of the question, even if Rosecrans's army had been a hundred thousand strong. The campaign against Bragg, therefore, necessarily involved an attack upon the railroad running southward from Chattanooga through Dalton to Atlanta. The railroad connecting Chattanooga with the East would very soon be rendered useless to the Confederates by Burnside's advance to Knoxville. The valley through which the Atlanta Road runs could be reached in two ways: westwardly, by turning the head of Sequatchie Valley, or by crossing the valley at Dunlap or Thurman's, and then moving across Walden's Ridge, crossing the Tennessee above Chattanooga; or southwardly, by moving across the Cumberland range, crossing the Tennessee below Chattanooga, and then the four ranges south of the river—Raccoon, Lookout, Mission, and Taylor's.¹ Rosecrans chose the latter, or southward route, leaving the natural valley from East Tennessee to Northern Georgia open to the co-operative movement which he expected would be undertaken by Burnside.

Upon whatsoever route Rosecrans might advance, there could be little dependence upon the country for forage, none at all for the subsistence of his soldiers. Supplies of food and ammunition sufficient for the campaign must be accumulated before moving, and must be carried with the army, thus increasing the difficulties of the march. The necessity of a long halt after Bragg's retreat was therefore inevitable; yet, strange as it may seem, General Halleck, at Washington, not appreciating Napoleon's maxim that "an army crawls upon its belly," wondered and chafed at this delay, and finally issued a peremptory order directing Rosecrans to advance, and report his progress daily to the War Department.² Very fortunately, Rosecrans was

¹ Dr. W. H. Church, of Burnside's staff, thus describes the reception of the troops on the way to and in Knoxville:


"The East Tennessee troops, of whom General Burnside had a considerable number, were kept constantly in the advance, and were received with expressions of the profoundest gratitude by the people, who are described as the most heartily and generally loyal people in the United States. There were many thrilling scenes of the meeting of our East Tennessee soldiers with their families, from whom they had been so long separated.

"The East Tennessees were so glad to see our soldiers that they cooked every thing they had and gave it to them freely, not asking pay, and apparently not thinking of it. Women stood by the road side with pails of water, and displayed Union flags. The wonder was where all the stars and stripes came from. Knoxville was radiant with flags. At a point on the road from Kingston to Knoxville sixty women and girls stood by the road side waving Union flags, and shouting 'Hurrah for the Union!' Old ladies rushed out of their houses and wanted to see General Burnside, and shake hands with him, and cried 'Welcome, welcome, General Burnside! welcome to East Tennessee!' A meeting of the Union citizens of Knoxville was held, and addressed by General Burnside and General Carter. It was attended by about five hundred men, and a large number of women and children. The demonstrations were not boisterous, but there was intense, quiet rejoicing. Men who had been hidden for months came in, full of gratitude for their deliverance."

¹ Or, striking farther southward, after crossing the Tennessee, there would be Sand, Lookout, and Pigeon Mountains, and Taylor's Ridge.

² The order was issued early in August. On the 4th Rosecrans writes:

"Your dispatch, ordering me to move forward without farther delay, reporting the movement of each corps until I cross the Tennessee, is received. As I have been determined to cross the river as soon as practicable, and have been making all preparations, and getting such information



STEVENSON, ALABAMA.

nearly ready to move. He had completed the railroad from Murfreesborough to Stevenson, and thence to Bridgeport, by the 25th of July, and only waited for the opening of the road from Cowan to Tracy City. By straining to the utmost the capacities of the Stevenson Road, he had accumulated by the 8th of August a sufficient quantity of supplies to warrant his immediate advance. The enemy was in no condition to disturb his communications or to resist his advance to the Tennessee. So far, therefore, he was relieved of anxiety. While his own army covered the approaches to his rear and right, Burnside's was more than adequate to the protection of his left.

Sheridan's division had already occupied Stevenson and Bridgeport before Halleck's order was issued. The movement of the main army began on the morning of August 16th. Two of Crittenden's columns crossed the Cumberland Mountains—Palmer by Dunlap, and Wood by Thurman's—into the Sequatchie Valley, while a third, under Van Cleve, struck Pikeville at the head of the Valley. Crittenden's left, in this movement, was covered by Colonel Minty's cavalry. Thomas's and McCook's corps advanced southward to the Tennessee, occupying positions above and below Stevenson, preparatory to crossing the river. Three brigades of cavalry moved on the right, making a long detour by way of Fayetteville and Athens, to guard the river below as far as Whitesburg, about eighty miles from Stevenson.

Crittenden, upon reaching Sequatchie Valley, sent reconnoitring columns of infantry and cavalry across Walden's Ridge, Wagner's brigade and Wilder's cavalry advancing to a point opposite Chattanooga, and shelling the town on the 21st, silencing the Confederate artillery, and creating great consternation among the citizens. Another brigade (Hazen's) had also crossed the ridge farther north, at Poe's, and, with Wilder's cavalry, reconnoitred the country to Harrison's Landing, twelve miles above Chattanooga. The rest of Crittenden's command moved down the Sequatchie to the Tennessee, below Chattanooga.

On the 21st, the whole army, having crossed the Cumberland Mountains, lay upon the right bank of the Tennessee, extending over a line of 150 miles. Along this line the river flows in a southwest direction, forcing its passage through the Cumberland range, and entering Alabama at Bridgeport. The two brigades east of Walden's Ridge were prepared to enter Chattanooga in the event of its evacuation by Bragg; to force this evacuation, or to cut off the enemy from his southern communications, was the work of the main army. The preparations for crossing the river consumed ten days. During this time reconnoissances were made to discover the most available points for this purpose; the pontoons and trains were brought forward, and trestle-work and materials for improvised bridges were prepared with the utmost secrecy. The pontoons were sufficient for only two bridges, and twice that number were needed to secure rapidity of movement. The facility with which the enemy could, from the high spurs abutting on the river, overlook the whole length of the valley, prevented absolute secrecy; this, however, was of little consequence, as the intervening mountains made it impossible for Bragg to oppose any serious resistance to the movements on his left. The troops began to cross on the 29th of August, and by September 4th all were on the south side except a brigade of regulars of Baird's division, left to guard the railroad until it should be relieved by Gordon Granger's reserve corps. The crossing was conducted at four points—Shellmound, the mouth of Battle Creek, Bridgeport, and Caperton's Ferry, at the mouth of Big Crow Creek. The bridge at Bridgeport was the one mainly used for the crossing of trains. Thomas crossed one division at each of the points named; McCook crossed Woods's and Van Cleve's at Caperton's (the lowest crossing), and Sheridan's at Bridgeport; Crittenden (except Wagner's and Hazen's brigades) crossed at Shellmound, at the mouth of Battle Creek, and at Bridgeport. An accident to the bridge at Bridgeport delayed the crossing at that point for four days. The cavalry, under General Stanley, still keeping the left, crossed with McCook at Caperton's.

The plan of Rosecrans's campaign, after crossing the Tennessee, was very simple in its idea, though attended with many difficulties in its execution. Crittenden was to threaten Chattanooga by a direct advance; Thomas was to cross Raccoon Mountain, and seize Stevens's and Cooper's Gaps, leading through Lookout Mountain into McLemore's Cove, twenty miles south of Chattanooga; McCook and Stanley, in the mean time, were to move twenty miles farther southward across the mountains to Valley Head, turning the southern extremity of Pigeon Mountain, and threatening an advance on Rome. Except in its topographical features, this plan was very similar to that adopted by Hooker in his Chancellorsville campaign. In either case the enemy was flanked by the crossing of a river and an advance upon his left and rear. Hooker thought Lee would retreat, falling back upon Richmond or Gordonsville. Rosecrans was equally confident that Bragg, abandoning Chattanooga, would fall back to Rome. Both were alike mistaken; each, finding that the enemy had indeed abandoned his position, but was ready to meet the advance squarely in front, refusing to acknowledge defeat until after the test of battle. But there were three important points of difference between the Chickamauga and Chancellorsville campaigns. Hooker was able to encounter the enemy with nearly double the force of the latter, while Rosecrans, at a greater distance from his base of supplies, accepted battle with the advantage of numerical superiority against him and in Bragg's

as may enable me to do so without being driven back like Hooker, I wish to know if your order is intended to take away my discretion as to the time and manner of moving my troops?"

And the following is General Halleck's reply (August 5):

"The orders for the advance of your army, and that its progress be reported daily, are peremptory."

Rosecrans appears to have received all this in good feeling. He writes (August 7):

"Your dispatch received. I can only repeat the assurance given before the issue of the order. This army shall move with all the dispatch compatible with the successful execution you wish. We are preparing every thing to bring up forage for our animals; the present rolling stock of the road will hardly suffice to keep us day by day here, but I have bought fifty more freight cars, which are arriving. Will advise you daily."

favor. Again, Rosecrans had a more difficult country in which to operate, though this was in some degree compensated by the circumstance that the very obstacles in his own way afforded security to his rear. Finally, the sequel of the two campaigns was far different; for, although both Hooker and Rosecrans each succeeded in inflicting greater injury upon the enemy than he suffered himself, yet the former sustained a complete defeat as regarded the object of his campaign, while Rosecrans, retiring from the battlefield of Chickamauga, secured Chattanooga, the professed object of his advance from Murfreesborough.

But in carrying out this comparison we are anticipating our narrative. By the time the last divisions of the army had crossed the Tennessee, Thomas's and McCook's corps were already far advanced. Negley's division had crossed Sand Mountain into Lookout Valley, and was encamped at Brown's Spring; at the foot of the mountain, on the west side, and ready to begin the ascent, was Reynolds's division; Brannan's had reached the summit; Jeff Davis's division, of McCook's corps, had crossed Lookout Mountain into Wills's Valley, seizing Winston's Gap; Johnson's was across Sand Mountain, while Sheridan had just reached the left bank of the Tennessee. On the 8th all the preliminary movements of the campaign had been successfully carried out. Their effect upon the enemy was immediate. Chattanooga was evidently no longer tenable. Bragg's effective force at this time was about 45,000 men.¹ He could not well afford to divide this force by sending a detachment of his army to fight the enemy, nor could he stay in Chattanooga. The capture of Vicksburg, with its garrison, was an instance, too recent to be forgotten, of the consequence of holding a position simply because of its strength, and in defiance of starvation. The nature of the country, and the presence on his right front of Burnside's army (at Knoxville on the 3d), made a counter attack upon the Federal rear, if not impossible, extremely hazardous. Reluctantly he abandoned Chattanooga, but not the campaign for its possession. The prize must be fought for, but with Rosecrans must be left the choice of the battle-field. If the Federal army emerged from the passes of Lookout Mountain into McLemore's Cove or Wills's Valley, he would meet it there; if it drew in its left in order to occupy Chattanooga in full force, and successfully evaded battle, he would still maintain the offensive, sitting down in front of the strong-hold he had so unwillingly abandoned, with his own supplies close at hand, while those of the enemy must be brought over the mountains from Murfreesborough, a hundred miles distant. His confidence in the final result was heightened by the expectation that his army, now very little inferior to that of the enemy, would soon be nearly doubled by re-enforcements from Mississippi and Virginia. Chattanooga was evacuated on the 7th and 8th. On the morning of the 9th Crittenden was apprised of this event by General Rosecrans, and ordered to push forward his entire command, with four days' rations, and make a vigorous pursuit. Bragg had waited at Chattanooga until Rosecrans had fully developed his movements southward. He then took position from Lee and Gordon's Mill to Lafayette, on the road leading southward from Chattanooga, facing the eastern slope of Pigeon Mountain. In this position he was nearer to either of Rosecrans's three corps than they were to each other.²

And just here Rosecrans began to base the future of his campaign upon a false calculation. His impression that Bragg's army was retreating upon Rome, demoralized and conscious of defeat, amounted to a conviction, almost to an infatuation. There was some ground for the presumption. Bragg had been flanked out of Middle Tennessee. Why not out of East Tennessee and Northern Georgia? But here Rosecrans should have remembered that in the summer campaign, his strength, as compared with that of the enemy, had been much greater than it was now. Besides its additional strength from the accession of Buckner's command, Bragg's army was now within easier reach not only of abundant supplies, but also of extensive re-enforcements. Under the circumstances, the greatest peril lurked in that presumptuous confidence with which Rosecrans was now prepared to push forward his columns.³ There was really nothing in the way of Burnside's co-operation with over 20,000 effective men. There was every argument in its favor, and no good one against it. The moment Knoxville had been secured, Burnside ought to have been ordered to Chattanooga. He could have made

¹ The official returns from the Army of Tennessee for August 31, 1863, give: *Present for duty*, 45,041; *aggregate present*, 59,027; *aggregate present and absent*, 89,273. Bragg, in his official report of the battle of Chickamauga, says that at this time (September 8) his effective force, exclusive of cavalry, was a little over 35,000 men. He includes "two small divisions" just arrived from Johnston's army. The estimate given in the text is no doubt correct, as the official returns of an army are always more likely to be accurate than the numbers given in the report of a battle. It includes the cavalry force and Buckner's command.

² Thomas was twenty-six miles from Crittenden, on his left, and the distance to McCook's corps, on the right, was nearly as great. Rosecrans makes the distance "from flank to flank, by the nearest practicable roads," fifty miles.

³ The idea that Bragg's army would make no stand on Rosecrans's present front seems also to have prevailed with General Halleck. On the 6th he had telegraphed to the latter: "There is no reason now to suppose that any of his troops have been detached, except, perhaps, a small force at Charleston." On the 11th he gives the following instructions: "After holding the mountain passes on the west and Dalton, or some other point on the railroad, to prevent the return of Bragg's army, it will be decided whether your army shall move farther south into Georgia and Alabama." So far is Halleck at this time from being aware of Rosecrans's danger, that he urges the latter to find out whether Bragg's army is re-enforcing Lee! If he had himself taken some pains to ascertain whether Lee was re-enforcing Bragg, a mistake on Rosecrans's part which proved next to fatal might have been avoided. As early as September 7th Rosecrans seems to have been aware of Bragg's having received re-enforcements from Johnston's army. On that day, in reply to a dispatch from Halleck (dated September 6th), inquiring about the position of Bragg and Buckner, and suggesting that, in the event of their union, it would be necessary for him to unite with Burnside, he writes:

"Your dispatch of yesterday received with surprise. You have been often and fully advised that the nature of the country makes it impossible for this army to prevent Johnston from combining with Bragg. When orders for an advance of the army were made, it must have been known that those two rebel forces could combine against it, and to some extent choose their place of fighting us. This has doubtless been done, and Buckner, Bragg, and Johnston are all near Chattanooga. The movement on East Tennessee was independent of mine. Your apprehensions are just, and the legitimate consequences of your orders. The best that can now be done is for Burnside to close his cavalry down on our left, supporting it with his infantry, and, refusing his left, threaten the enemy without getting into his grasp, while we get him in our grip, and strangle him, or perish in the attempt."



MAP ILLUSTRATING ROSECRANS'S MOVEMENTS, SEPT. 4-12.

the march in eight days,¹ connecting with Rosecrans's left within three days after Bragg's evacuation. The very fact of Buckner's precipitate withdrawal from a country abounding in strong positions for defense was sufficient evidence that the movement was something else than a mere retreat. But neither Halleck nor Rosecrans understood its real import. The former was too far from the field of operations; the latter was over-confident of the demoralization of the enemy. Before the 14th Rosecrans never asked or seemed to expect any thing from Burnside beyond a demonstration with cavalry. His chief anxiety was lest Burnside might be withdrawn to North Carolina. Even as late as the 12th he felt sufficient for the enemy in his front, but, in the case of Bragg's retreat to the Coosa River, he apprehended an advance from the line of that river into Tennessee, and thought a force from the Army of Tennessee ought to shut up that avenue.²

After the capture of Cumberland Gap³ Burnside was ordered by General Halleck to concentrate on the Tennessee, connecting with Rosecrans. If this order had been issued when Burnside first reached Knoxville, and had been promptly executed, the two armies would have been by this time in co-operation.⁴

¹ Judging from the time occupied by Sherman in his march with 25,000 men to the relief of Knoxville: November 28th—December 6th.

² The following letter was written by Rosecrans, September 12th, to General Halleck, from Chattanooga:

"I think it would be very unwise, in the present attitude of affairs, for General Burnside to make any move in the direction of North Carolina; it would leave my left flank entirely unprotected, and open the way into Kentucky. I trust I am sufficient for the enemy now in my front; but, should he fall back to the line of the Coosa, the roads from there are short and comparatively good to the Tennessee, where it is necessary for me to cross two ranges of mountains, over very barren, rough, and difficult roads, to reach the Tennessee, and then move from thirty to fifty miles to reach the flank of a column moving from Gunter's Landing or Whitesburg on Nashville. It is desirable to have that avenue shut up. Can not you send a force from the Army of Tennessee to do it?"

³ September 9.

⁴ "The main body of General Burnside's army was now ordered to concentrate on the Tennessee River, from Loudon west, so as to connect with General Rosecrans's army, which reached Chattanooga on the 9th. . . . As the country between Dalton and the Little Tennessee was still open to the enemy, General Burnside was cautioned to move down by the north bank of the river, so as to secure its fords, and cover his own and General Rosecrans's communications from rebel raids. With our forces concentrated near Chattanooga, the enemy would be compelled to either attack us in position or to retreat farther south into Georgia. If he should attempt a flank movement on Cleveland, his own communications would be cut off and his own army destroyed. But, although repeatedly urged to effect this junction with the Army of the Cumberland, General Burnside retained most of his command in the upper valley, which was still threatened, near the Virginia line, by a small force under Sam Jones."—Halleck's Report, 1863. This is the statement made by General Halleck, which reflects upon Burnside. But the *ipsissima verba* of the dispatch sent to Burnside on the 11th do not indicate that the order to co-operate with Rosecrans was very explicit, or was based upon any definite idea of the enemy's movements. The dispatch reads:

"I congratulate you on your success. Hold the gaps of the North Carolina mountains, the line of the Holston River, or some point, if there be one, to prevent access from Virginia, and connect with General Rosecrans, at least with your cavalry. General Rosecrans will occupy Dalton, or

Rosecrans does not fairly admit the fact, but it is nevertheless beyond question that, during the three days following the occupation of Chattanooga by Crittenden's corps, he had not the shadow of a doubt either as to the enemy's retreat to Rome, or as to his own secure and full possession of the object of his campaign. His only fear was that the enemy might turn his right and advance north of the Tennessee. For Rosecrans to deny that he was conducting his army under this mistaken impression is to convict himself of a folly of which the most stupid colonel in his army could not be capable. Of course he preferred the peaceable possession of Chattanooga, if that were possible. Therefore, if he had not felt secure of the place, he would have secured himself. There was nothing, absolutely nothing, in the way of his doing so. Three days, or at the most four, would have sufficed for the concentration of his entire army at Chattanooga, the fortifications of which would in the mean while have been strengthened by Crittenden. This movement demanded not one half the strategy which he had shown on numerous occasions, nor did it expose his army to any special peril. Between him and the enemy rose Lookout Mountain, "a perpendicular wall of limestone over which no wheel could pass." No change of position, open to Bragg's observation, was necessary. With the cavalry still demonstrating on the extreme right, beyond Winston's, and a portion of Thomas's corps still holding Stevens's Gap, the main army could stealthily, rapidly, and without danger, in twenty-four hours' time, have passed beyond the reach of any possible interruption from the enemy. The only thing necessary was expedition.¹

some point on the railroad, to close all access from Atlanta, and also the mountain passes in the west. This being done, it will be determined whether the available force shall advance into Georgia and Alabama, or into the Valley of Virginia and North Carolina."

Two days after this dispatch was sent, it became apparent to General Halleck that troops were moving westward from Lee's army. He then instructed Burnside to move down his infantry "as rapidly as possible toward Chattanooga." But the reason given for the movement (namely, to secure against an advance of Bragg's army into Tennessee and Kentucky) gave Burnside no hint of Rosecrans's immediate danger. And, in any case, the order came too late to secure the arrival of Burnside before Longstreet could join Bragg.

The communications received all this time by Burnside directly from Rosecrans indicated that the latter, so far from being in embarrassment, was getting on swimmingly in Georgia, sweeping every thing before him. On the 10th Crittenden writes from Chattanooga:

"I am directed by the general commanding the Department of the Cumberland to inform you that I am in full possession of this place, having entered it yesterday, at 12 M., without resistance. The enemy has retreated in the direction of Rome, Georgia, the last of his force, cavalry, having left a few hours before my arrival. At daylight I made a rapid pursuit with my corps, and hope that he will be intercepted by the centre and right, the latter of which was at Rome. The general commanding department requests that you move down your cavalry and occupy the country recently covered by Colonel Minty, who will report particulars to you, and who has been ordered to cross the river."

¹ Rosecrans, of course, swears that this movement was impossible. He says, in his evidence before the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War (*Rep. Com., Rosecrans's Campaigns*, p. 31): "It has been a popular impression, possibly encouraged, if not believed, in high



JAMES S. NEGLEY.

Rosecrans's movements, more clearly than any thing else, indicate his misapprehension as to the situation of the Confederate army. On the evening of the 9th McCook was informed that Bragg was retreating southward, and ordered "to move rapidly upon Alpine and Summerville, Georgia, in pursuit, to intercept his line of retreat, and attack him in flank."¹ Thomas was at the same time ordered to move on Lafayette.² Crittenden was sent to Ringgold in pursuit. By this disposition of his army Rosecrans exposed each of his three corps to a separate and overwhelming attack of Bragg's army, which, instead of retreating to Rome, fronted the western slope of Pigeon Mountain, and was ready, holding a central position, to strike Thomas when he should emerge from Dug Gap on the way to Lafayette, Crittenden on his right, or McCook on his left. Rosecrans and his corps commanders had been alike misled by the reports of citizens and deserters, sent by Bragg within the Federal lines for the direct purpose of conveying an impression of his rapid retreat to Rome.³ This ruse had been successful. Bragg fully appreciated his opportunity. Even on the 9th—the very day of the occupation of Chattanooga by the national troops, and while Rosecrans was urging a "vigorous pursuit" of the enemy by Crittenden, an advance by McCook and Stanley upon his flank and rear, and of Thomas's columns through the

military quarters, that because a portion of our command, including myself, entered Chattanooga, we had possession of it, in the sense of being so established there that we could have retained it without a battle. This is an error into which no good military mind cognizant of the facts could for a moment fall. Bragg was compelled or induced to fall back from Chattanooga by the menacing attitude of Thomas's corps at Frick's and Cooper's Gaps, twenty-six miles south, and of McCook's, with the cavalry corps, at Valley Head, forty-two miles from Chattanooga. Crittenden's corps, a part of which was employed in making the demonstration above Chattanooga, and the remainder in watching and covering the pass over the extremity of Lookout, passed into Chattanooga when Bragg fell back, and repaired at once to that point to ascertain the movement of the enemy; and all that was done was done promptly, and to that end only. And the instant these movements were discovered, and the enemy was found to have retired slowly toward Lafayette, not a moment was lost in making the necessary disposition, first, to secure our troops against being cut up in detail, and, secondly, to effect a most expeditious concentration at an eligible point between the enemy and Chattanooga, the goal of our efforts."

Now this is cool. Apart from the fact that Rosecrans does not here adduce the slightest argument to show why he could not on the 9th have commenced the concentration of his army at Chattanooga, or why such a movement must be discarded by any "good military mind cognizant of the facts" as impracticable, his entire statement gives a false impression of the theory upon which he conducted the campaign immediately after Bragg's abandonment of Chattanooga. He had only just ordered Crittenden to enter Chattanooga and vigorously pursue the retreating enemy, when he telegraphed to General Halleck (from Trenton, September 9th, 8 30 P.M.): "Chattanooga is ours without a struggle, and East Tennessee is free. Our move on the enemy's flank and rear progresses, while the tail of his retreating column will not escape unmolested. Our troops from this side entered Chattanooga about noon. Those north of the river there are crossing." This dispatch, the instructions given to Burnside, through Crittenden, that he was in full possession of Chattanooga, and the tenor of all his dispatches to Halleck at this time, indicate, as clearly as words any way can, that Rosecrans believed that the campaign for Chattanooga was virtually ended, and that he did not concentrate at Chattanooga for the simple reason that he deemed it unnecessary, and hoped, through his advanced position, to prevent "the tail of Bragg's retreating column" from escaping unmolested. As to being "cognizant of the facts," it is certain that Rosecrans not only did not understand Bragg's movements, but misapprehended them, and acted upon his misapprehension. As we have said in the text, it is only under cover of his mistake that he can evade the imputation of folly. But no arguments, not even from Rosecrans himself, can make us believe that he was foolish enough to expose three corps of his army—each separated from the other by mountain barriers, and by a distance greater than that intervening between either of them and the enemy—to the danger of being cut up in detail. If we were not so compelled by all the circumstances of the case, we should still prefer to believe that it was a mistake, rather than deliberate recklessness, that led him to keep his army for even a single day in such a position. It is true that, after he found out his mistake, he succeeded in extricating his army from destruction, but, as we shall see, this was due to the dilatory movements of the enemy. And his manner of extricating it compelled him to accept the wager of a doubtful battle; whereas, if he had been less confident of the enemy's discomfiture, he might previously have evaded a battle, and, with his army strongly posted in Chattanooga, awaited re-enforcements.

¹ McCook's Report. Rosecrans does not publish this order, nor even allude to it in his report. But there is conclusive proof this order was given in the fact that, at 8 P.M. on the 9th, General Negley (commanding the advance of Thomas's corps) received instructions to move the next day to Lafayette. Negley writes to Thomas at this date, "Your order, directing me to march to Lafayette to-morrow, has been received. I will start at 8 A.M."

² "Thrown off his guard by our rapid movement, apparently in retreat, when in reality we had concentrated opposite his centre, and deceived by the information from deserters and others sent into his lines, the enemy pressed on his columns to intercept us, and thus exposed himself in detail."—Bragg's Report.

gaps of Pigeon Mountain upon Lafayette—Bragg was preparing to strike Thomas in McLemore's Cove, and by moving around his left, between him and Crittenden, to secure an easy victory over both, reserving for McCook's corps the final blow. Five hours after Rosecrans had telegraphed to Washington that Chattanooga was his "without a struggle," Bragg issued written orders to Hindman and Hill to move against Thomas.¹ The Confederate force thus ordered to move on Stevens's Gap outnumbered General Negley's division, holding that position, more than two to one.² Celerity was absolutely necessary to the accomplishment of Bragg's scheme. Either he should not disclose his position, waiting for the enemy to put himself more completely in his power before springing his trap, or, if he unmasked his force, he should strike a sudden and decisive blow. In this he was foiled by the dilatory execution or the refractoriness of his subordinate generals. Hill reported the order to move on Negley to be impracticable, "as General Cleburne was sick, and both the gaps, Dug and Catlett's, had been blocked by felling timber, which would require twenty-four hours for its removal."³ Early on the morning of the 10th Bragg ordered General Buckner to execute with his corps the order issued to General Hill. Hindman had advanced promptly, and was at Morgan's (three or four miles from Davis's Cross-roads, but east of Pigeon Mountain), ready to move forward into the cove upon the arrival of a supporting column. Buckner joined him in the afternoon. To secure promptness of action, Bragg transferred his headquarters from Lee and Gordon's Mill to Lafayette. Polk was ordered to send Cheatham's division to cover Hindman's rear, and Cleburne, at Dug Gap, was instructed to attack in front. During the night of the 10th the obstructions were removed from the gap, and Walker's reserve corps was directed to join Cleburne in the front attack. Thus more than 25,000 men, besides cavalry, were, on the morning of the 11th, ready to spring upon Negley's division.

Negley in the mean time had advanced from Stevens's Gap to Bailey's Cross-roads, and thence, on the 10th, to Davis's, one mile west of Dug Gap. Until he had reached this latter position he was in utter ignorance of the fact that only the obstructions in the passes of Pigeon Mountain separated him from an overwhelming force of the enemy on his front and left; but then, just in time to save his division, his eyes began to be opened through information received from the citizens and his scouts.⁴ He immediately urged Baird to support him, and made dispositions to meet the enemy. Baird was up by 8 A.M. on the morning of the 11th, with two brigades, and was posted in reserve at Davis's Cross-roads. Bragg's attack was fortunately delayed. At daylight on the 11th he went to Cleburne's position, and found him awaiting the opening of Hindman's guns, which were not heard until the middle of the afternoon, and Cleburne, on advancing, found that Negley had fallen back to Bailey's Cross-roads.⁵ General Negley had found

¹ The following are the orders, dated at Lee and Gordon's Mill, 11 45 P.M., September 9th:

"Major General HINDMAN, Commanding Division:
"GENERAL,—You will move with your division immediately to Davis's Cross-roads, on the road from Lafayette to Stevens's Gap. At this point you will put yourself in communication with the column of General Hill, ordered to move to the same point, and take command of the forces, or report to the officer commanding Hill's column, according to rank. If in command, you will move upon the enemy, reported to be 4000 or 5000 strong, encamped at the foot of Lookout Mountain, at Stevens's Gap. Another column of the enemy is reported to be at Cooper's Gap, number not known."

"Lieutenant General HILL, Commanding Corps:
"GENERAL,—I inclose orders given to General Hindman. General Bragg directs that you send or take, as your judgment dictates, Cleburne's division, to unite with General Hindman at Davis's Cross-roads to-morrow morning. Hindman starts at 12 o'clock to-night, and he has thirteen miles to make. The commander of the column thus united will move upon the enemy, encamped at the foot of Stevens's Gap, said to be 4000 or 5000. If unforeseen circumstances should prevent your movement, notify Hindman. A cavalry force should accompany your column. Hindman has none. Open communication with Hindman with your cavalry in advance of the junction. He marches on the road from Dr. Anderson's to Davis's Cross-roads."

² Negley's division numbered 5000 men. Baird's division, however, of nearly 6000 men, was moving up to his support. Brannan and Reynolds were still at Trenton, on the other side of Lookout. The two divisions ordered to move on Negley were Hindman's and Pat Cleburne's, numbering together over 11,000, with a large cavalry force, and with Bragg's whole army within easy supporting distance.

³ At 8 P.M. on the 9th he writes to Thomas, "All the information I have received this evening from my scouts and others induces the belief that there is no considerable rebel force this side of Dalton." Twenty-six hours later, having discovered his danger, he writes the following dispatch to General Baird:

"Widow Davis's, September 10th, 1863—10 P.M.

"Brigadier General BAIRD:
"SR,—There are indications of a superior force of the enemy in position near Dug Gap. Another column, estimated as a division, with twelve pieces of artillery, near Morgan's Mills, three miles to my left, in the direction of Catlett's Gap. Also a cavalry force, under Forrest, at Culp's Mills, near the road from Pond Spring to Cooper's Gap—there with the intention (as citizens and deserters report) of attacking our rear in the morning.

"My scouts all report the appearance of an offensive movement in this direction, and they confirm the reports I received this morning of a considerable force of the enemy being in the vicinity of Lafayette and Dug Gap.

"My position is somewhat advanced, and exposed to a flank approach by two roads leading from Catlett's Gap; but it is a favorable one to fight the enemy providing your division is within supporting distance, which I understood from General Thomas would be the case, and that your division would move up to Chickamauga Creek to-night. Please inform me if this will be the case.

"Have the kindness to send this information to General Thomas to-night.
"I have the honor to remain, yours very truly,
JAS. S. NEGLEY, Major General."

⁵ "A careful examination of the ground we occupied, which was a long, low ridge, covered with a heavy growth of small timber, descending abruptly on the north end to the Chickamauga, while the east, south, and west sides were skirted by corn-fields and commanded by high ridges, demonstrating the fact that it would be impossible to hold this or any other position south of Bailey's Cross-roads, and fight a battle, without involving the certain destruction of our trains, which, from the contour of these ridges and uneven nature of the ground, we would be obliged to park in close proximity to our position.

"The preservation of the trains, perhaps the safety of the entire command, demanded that I should retire to Bailey's Cross-roads, two miles northwest of our position, while we could get our trains under cover and fight the enemy to better advantage. I therefore directed that the trains should commence moving back slowly and in good order, and also directed General Baird to hold Widow Davis's Cross-roads until I could withdraw a portion of the second division, and take position on the north side of Chickamauga Creek, to cover the withdrawal of his two brigades and prevent the enemy from flanking us on our left.

"At 1 P.M. a heavy column of cavalry was seen moving steadily on our left flank, with the evident intention of gaining my rear. I immediately had four pieces of artillery placed in position on the ridge at John Davis's house, which commanded the valley on my left; also sent General Beatty, with one regiment and a section of artillery, to seize and hold Bailey's Cross-roads, which was reported to be in possession of the enemy's advance.

"At 2 P.M. the trains were all in motion, falling back to Bailey's Cross-roads. General Beatty and Colonel Scribner, of General Baird's division, were directed to proceed to that point without



CHATTANOOGA FROM THE NORTH BANK OF THE TENNESSEE.

his position untenable, and, after some severe fighting, retired without losing any of his artillery or transportation. His caution in observing, by means of scouts, the operations of the enemy, and his skillful disposition of his forces on the 11th, had saved his division from otherwise certain destruction. He reached Stevens's Gap with his trains at 10 o'clock P.M., and forthwith dispatched to Thomas an account of the day's operations, suggesting that the troops (Reynolds's and Brannan's divisions) moving *via* Cooper's Gap take the most direct route to Stevens's Gap, reaching that point at the earliest possible moment. He anticipated an immediate attack from the enemy; but Bragg had withdrawn his forces from the cove.

The army was still in danger. Rosecrans was as yet ignorant of the enemy's position. The weight of evidence (received through Bragg's ingenious ruse of sending deserters and citizens within the Federal lines with false information) had indicated that Bragg was moving on Rome. Information received on the 10th made it certain that the enemy had retreated by the Lafayette Road, but gave no hint of his present position. The next morning Crittenden was ordered to Ringgold, from which point he was to send a reconnaissance to Lee and Gordon's Mill. If the enemy was found in the vicinity of Lafayette, Crittenden was to support Thomas, otherwise he was to advance toward Rome.¹ In making the movement to Lee and Gordon's Mill, Crittenden drove "squads of the enemy" before him, indicating that the main body of the Confederate army was not far distant. At 3 P.M. on the 11th, Rosecrans warned Crittenden that a heavy force of the enemy was in Chattanooga Valley, and urged him to move his whole force promptly to the Rossville and Lafayette Road. This Crittenden began to do on the following morning (the 12th), moving his whole command that day to Lee and Gordon's Mill. The same day Brannan's division, of Thomas's corps, reached Negley's left, *via* Cooper's Gap, Reynolds's following close behind. In the mean while, McCook, having reached Alpine on the 10th, found "that the enemy had not retreated very far from Chattanooga."² He had been ordered (the day before) to move rapidly on Alpine and Summerville to intercept Bragg's line of retreat, and to attack him in flank. Finding that, after all, he was not on the enemy's flank, he communicated with Thomas, and was surprised to learn that the latter "had not reached Lafayette, as ordered." The movement to Summerville, therefore, was not made. Thomas informed McCook on the 10th that he could not reach Lafayette before the 13th. McCook, beginning to be alarmed on account of the isolated situation of his corps, on the 12th wisely returned his trains to the summit of Lookout Mountain, remaining with his command near Alpine to await the result of a cavalry reconnaissance sent out by General Stanley to ascertain the whereabouts of the enemy.

Bragg, having failed in his designs against Thomas, retired from McLemore's Cove, and sent Polk and Walker's corps in the direction of Lee and Gordon's Mill. It might not be too late for a movement northward against Crittenden. Learning from General Pegram, the Confederate cavalry commander in that direction, that this corps of the Federal army was divided, one division being at Ringgold, Bragg ordered Polk to attack this division on the morning of the 13th. His plan now was to crush Crittenden's divisions in detail, and then to turn again upon Thomas's corps in the Cove.³ Here again he was disappointed. Polk, with double the numbers of the enemy which lay between him and Chattanooga, dispatched to Bragg (11 P.M. on the 12th) that he had taken a strong position for defense, and requesting heavy re-enforcements. He was again ordered not to delay his attack, his force already being numerically superior to the enemy, and was promised Buckner's corps the next morning. On proceeding to the front, early on the 13th, Bragg found that his orders had not been obeyed, and that Crittenden's forces were united, and on the west side of the Chickamauga.⁴

delay, and protect the train from the attack of a large force of cavalry approaching with the view.

"At 3 o'clock the skirmishers of General Baird's division were ordered back across the creek, where they were placed in position to hold the enemy in check until I could get my artillery in position on the ridge this side. Two companies of the Nineteenth Illinois Infantry, concealed behind a stone fence, poured into the ranks of the enemy a destructive volley, killing, as I have since learned, thirty on the spot. This partially checked the enemy, who was advancing in three heavy lines. Meantime I had ten pieces of artillery planted on the ridge to the rear of Davis's house, which commanded that position, until another new line could be formed on a ridge to the rear.

"The enemy now occupied the south side of the creek with a heavy force, and opened two batteries of artillery at a distance of 400 yards. Two of his brigades were parallel to our position on the right. Buckner's corps was deployed, and moving up steadily on our left, within short range. Colonel Stanley's and a portion of General Starkweather's brigades sustained here a well-directed and terrific fire, which our troops returned with spirit and marked effect. The firing increased, and indicated an immediate general engagement along our entire front, and would have terminated in an assault from the enemy in a few moments, which would have been disastrous to us, considering the overwhelming force of the enemy and our very unfavorable position.

"By direction, General Baird deployed General Starkweather's brigade to our right, which checked the enemy's advance in that direction, and enabled Colonel Stanley to withdraw his brigade, which being done, we retired slowly and in good order to Bailey's Cross-roads, where a strong position of defense was assumed, and the troops were bivouacked for the night, with trains parked at Stevens's Gap. During the night the enemy withdrew to Dug Gap."—General Negley's Report.

¹ Crittenden's Report.

² His orders to Polk were explicit, and were thrice repeated, as follows:

³ Lieutenant General Polk:

"GENERAL.—I inclose you a dispatch from General Pegram. This presents you a fine opportunity of striking Crittenden in detail, and I hope you will avail yourself of it at daylight to-morrow. This division crushed, and the others are yours. We can then turn on the force in the Cove. Wheeler's cavalry will move on Wilder so as to cover your right. I shall be delighted to hear of your success.

"To attack at daylight on the 13th."

Very truly yours, BRAXTON BRAGG.

⁴ Lieutenant General Polk, Commanding Corps:

"GENERAL.—I inclose you a dispatch marked 'A,' and I now give you the orders of the commanding general, viz., to attack at daylight to-morrow the infantry column reported in said dispatch at three quarters of a mile beyond Peavine Church, on the road to Graysville from Lafayette. I am, general, etc., GEORGE W. BRENT, A. A. G."

⁵ Lafayette, Georgia, September 12th, 1863.

⁶ Lieutenant General Polk, Commanding Corps:

"GENERAL.—The enemy is approaching from the south, and it is highly important that your attack in the morning should be quick and decided. Let no time be lost.

"I am, general, etc., GEORGE W. BRENT, A. A. G."

⁷ Bragg's Report. It appears, however, from Crittenden's own report, that his corps had already

Rosecrans was at length assured from every possible source that his army was in peril, and that the theory of his movements since the occupation of Chattanooga had been founded upon a gigantic mistake.¹ He had already (on the 11th and 12th) ordered Crittenden to Lee and Gordon's Mill, bringing in his detached forces from the east side of Chickamauga Creek,² and directed Thomas to bring McCook and Stanley within supporting distance of his own corps. On the 13th, fully aware of his exposed situation, and that, to use his own words, "it was a matter of life and death to effect a concentration of his army," he began to hurry up his columns with the idea of shutting off the enemy from an advance on Chattanooga by the Lafayette Road. Instead of getting on the rear and flank of the enemy, his task was now to get in his front.

General Thomas, when he received, during the night of September 12th-13th, the order brought by General Mitchell from Rosecrans to bring McCook and Stanley up to his support, understood more perfectly than his commander the nature of the emergency which confronted the Union army. He immediately directed McCook to move two divisions of the Twentieth Corps over the mountain to the left of the Fourteenth, leaving the other divisions to guard the trains. Crittenden, under instructions from Rosecrans, on the 14th, leaving Wood's division at Lee and Gordon's Mill, moved the remainder of his command to Mission Ridge, and sent Wilder's cavalry up Chickamauga Creek to connect with Thomas, whose extreme left under Reynolds then touched Pond Spring.

McCook in the mean time was moving in execution of the orders which he had received; but, unfortunately, instead of taking the mountain road direct to Stevens's Gap, he crossed Lookout Mountain, and, moving down the valley, was obliged to recross at Cooper's Gap, thus losing at least a whole day at the most critical stage of the campaign.³ This delay came near being fatal to the army.⁴ By the night of the 17th McCook's command was in McLemore's Cove, and the three corps of the command were within supporting distance for the first time since the crossing of the Tennessee. The day previous Rosecrans was satisfied that Bragg was receiving re-enforcements from Lee's army. He had been advised by General Halleck to that effect on the 15th.⁵ He now calls stoutly for Burnside's assistance. But it is already far too late for that to reach him.

From the morning of the 13th to the night of the 17th Bragg has now had five days since he abandoned his attempt against the detached corps of Rosecrans's army. During this time he has been contemplating an advance around the Federal left to secure the only available approaches to Chattanooga from McLemore's Cove. He has dispatched Wheeler's cavalry to the left to press the Federal forces in the Cove, in order to divert attention from

been concentrated at Lee and Gordon's Mill on the 12th, before the order to attack had been issued to General Polk.

¹ When was it that Rosecrans first became acquainted with the actual situation of Bragg's army? This question is not answered in his report with any degree of precision. On the evening of the 10th he was certain that the main body of Bragg's army "retired by the Lafayette Road, but uncertain whether he had gone far." At 3:30 P.M. on the 11th, he informed Crittenden that "the enemy was in heavy force in the Valley of the Chattanooga." At 3 P.M. on the 12th, he sent General R. B. Mitchell, of the cavalry corps, to General Thomas with verbal orders instructing the latter to direct McCook and Stanley to move up within supporting distance of his corps. The reason given for this movement does not imply that Rosecrans then knew that the Confederate army was near Lafayette; it was ordered "with a view of moving upon the enemy at the earliest practical moment." Mitchell (probably by taking the road east of Lookout Mountain) struck Negley's headquarters. The following is a copy of the letter written by Negley to Thomas upon Mitchell's arrival (1 A.M. on the 13th):

"Major General THOMAS:

"GENERAL.—General Mitchell, of the cavalry corps, has just arrived from General Rosecrans's headquarters, having left there at 3 o'clock P.M. He brings verbal orders from General Rosecrans to the following effect, which he desires me to communicate to you:

"That you order General McCook and Stanley, with his cavalry, to move at once within supporting distance of your corps, with a view of moving upon the enemy at the earliest practicable moment.

"General Rosecrans complains of a want of information in regard to your movements and position, and of the numbers and position of the enemy.

"Feeling confident, from the remarks that General Rosecrans made to General Mitchell, that he is totally misinformed as to the character of the country in this vicinity, and of the position, force, and intentions of the enemy, I write you on that point, so that you can communicate with him at once.

"Also, to inform you that one of my scouts (young Bailey), who is intelligent and reliable, has just returned from the vicinity of Bird's Mills, stating that he was informed by Mr. Paine, and other citizens, that in the affair of yesterday our force was confronted by Buckner's entire command, two other divisions of infantry from the vicinity of Dug Gap, and a force of five or six thousand cavalry. That the enemy expected to hold us at Dug Gap, while Buckner and the cavalry could pass to our rear, and take possession of Stevens's and Cooper's Gaps. That Breckinridge's command was on Pigeon Ridge, or at Lafayette. That Bragg was concentrating his entire force at or near Lafayette. That the rebel cavalry west of Pigeon Ridge had passed through Worthing Gap, and the infantry had fallen back to the top of the ridge and beyond. The smoke from their line of encampment was visible this evening.

"A similar statement was made by two other citizens on hearsay. . . . General Brannan returned from his reconnaissance this evening. He advanced as far as Widow Davis's Cross-roads. He met with only a small cavalry picket, which fled at his approach. Indications were that the enemy were on and beyond Pigeon Ridge. . . .

"I have the honor to remain yours very truly, JAS. S. NEGLEY, Major General."

The whole tenor of this letter indicates that the order brought by Mitchell was based upon no accurate knowledge by Rosecrans of the enemy's position. Yet it is clear, both from this order and from the instructions already issued to Crittenden to move to Lee and Gordon's Mill, that Rosecrans was, on the 12th, beginning to lose confidence in his scheme for striking the tail end of Bragg's army, and to be alarmed for his own safety. His petulant complaint of Thomas's negligence in forwarding information was an indication of his own fears. On the 13th the ground upon which he had stood slipped clean away from under his feet. On that day he received from Thomas, from McCook, and from Crittenden information which only too clearly demonstrated that Bragg's entire army was concentrated at Lafayette and along the eastern slope of Pigeon Mountain.

² What is throughout this chapter called "Chickamauga Creek" is really the West Fork of Chickamauga Creek.

³ McCook probably moved upon the best instructions he had in regard to the roads. There is some discrepancy, however, between his own and Rosecrans's statements. McCook says, "It was my desire to join General Thomas by the mountain road, *via* Stevens's Gap; but not having any guide, and all the citizens concurring that no such road existed, and General Thomas also stating that the route by Valley Head was the only practicable one, I determined to join him by it." Rosecrans, in his report, states that McCook was ordered to take the mountain road. This might be explained on the supposition that McCook received an order from Rosecrans subsequent to the one received from Thomas.

⁴ "The tardy arrival of McCook's corps came near being fatal to us."—Rosecrans's Testimony before the Congressional Committee.

⁵ Rosecrans thus writes to Halleck from near Gordon's Mill, 1:30 P.M., September 16: "From information derived from various sources from my front, I have reason to believe what you assert in your dispatch of yesterday, 4:30 P.M., is true, and that they [i.e., Longstreet's forces] have arrived at Atlanta at last. Push Burnside down."

his real movement, and Forrest's to the right to cover his advance. But he has not advanced. His forces, on the night of the 17th, lie along Peavine Creek, east of Pigeon Mountain. Nothing has been in his front between him and Chattanooga, except cavalry, with a small detachment of infantry, for the past four days. Chattanooga itself has only been held by Wagner's brigade, and all the while Bragg appears to have taken it for granted that the Federal army was concentrated in his front. He has been waiting also for Longstreet's corps, three brigades of which, under General Hood, have just arrived, and now, when Rosecrans's army is really concentrated in his front, he issues his orders for the crossing of Chickamauga Creek.¹ It is impossible to calculate the advantage of this delay to Rosecrans's army.

West Chickamauga Creek, which now separated the opposing armies, takes its rise from the junction of Mission Ridge with Pigeon Mountain at the southern extremity of the Cove, and runs northeastwardly down the Cove by Pond and Crawfish Springs, touching the Lafayette and Chattanooga Road at Lee and Gordon's Mill, and, after its junction with the main creek, empties into the Tennessee four miles above Chattanooga. About four and a half miles below Lee and Gordon's Mill, in a straight line, is Reed's Bridge, on one of the roads from Ringgold to Rossville. Here was the extreme right of Bragg's line on the night of the 17th. Between this point and Lee and Gordon's Mill there are several available crossings—at Alexander's Bridge, and at Byron's, Tedford's, Dalton's, and several other fords. The roads leading to these from the east were bad, both from their narrowness and from the mountainous character of the country. The stubborn resistance of Minty's and Wilder's cavalry delayed the crossing of Bragg's forces on the 18th. The right column, proceeding from Ringgold, was commanded by General Bushrod R. Johnson, and consisted of his division—made up of three improvised brigades from Mississippi—and Hood's,² which also consisted of three brigades. The two divisions numbered over 7000 men. Forrest's cavalry co-operated with this column, covering its front and right upon the march. At Peavine Creek, between Chickamauga Hill and Pigeon Mountain, an attempt was made by a small detachment of Minty's cavalry to resist the progress of Johnson's column, but without success. The attempt was repeated when the Confederates reached Reed's Bridge, again with insufficient force, and with no better result than before. Johnson succeeded in saving the bridge from destruction, and began to cross his command at 3 o'clock P.M., partly by the bridge, and partly by the ford above. He then swept southward in front of the points where Walker's and Buckner's corps had been ordered to cross.

Walker's corps, nearly 6000 strong, encountered stout resistance at Alexander's Bridge (about three miles south of Reed's), and the Federal cavalry having, after a sharp skirmish, succeeded in destroying the bridge, was compelled to cross by night at Byron's Ford. One brigade was left east of the creek to guard the ordnance train, which could not cross with the troops.

Buckner's corps, 10,000 strong, started from a point near Rock Spring Church, and crossed Pigeon Mountain, following the route taken by Walker's, but, turning southward upon approaching the Chickamauga, secured the crossing at Tedford's Ford, but, waiting Walker's movements on the right, did not cross till the next morning.

Thus, before daylight on the 19th, Bragg had, including cavalry, over 15,000 men across the creek. Buckner's corps consisted of Stewart's and Preston's divisions. It was ready to cross, as was also Cheatham's division of Polk's corps. These, crossing early on the morning of the 19th, increased the force on the east of the creek by 16,000 men. Hindman's division of Polk's corps, and Breckinridge's and Cleburne's of Hill's corps, held the left, south and west of Lee and Gordon's Mill, on the opposite side of the creek, and did not cross until the afternoon and night of the 19th.

These movements indicate clearly the enemy's plan of operations. Anticipating no serious opposition on his extreme right, Bragg expected to secure the approach to Chattanooga by the Lafayette Road, and then to close down upon the Federal army and fight the battle upon a field from which, even in the improbable event of his defeat, he could fall back upon the strong-hold which a fortnight before he had been compelled to abandon on account of his weakness, but which now, with his army heavily re-enforced—nearly doubled, in fact³—he could easily hold against the combined armies of Burnside and Rosecrans. For Bragg to gain the front which he sought, and extend his army across the Lafayette and Dry Valley Roads and the intervening ridges, would have been to win the battle's prize before the battle itself had been fought. But here Bragg was again disappointed. His advance had been too long delayed, and his movements on the 18th had been unexpectedly retarded. And thus it happened that the battle of Chickamauga came to be fought for the very position which Bragg had hoped to gain before fighting it.

¹ The following is a copy of these orders.

"I. Johnson's column, on crossing at or near Reed's Bridge, will turn to the left by the most practicable route, and sweep up the Chickamauga toward Lee and Gordon's Mill.

"II. Walker, crossing at Alexander's Bridge, will unite in this move, and push vigorously on the enemy's flank and rear in the same direction.

"III. Buckner, crossing at Tedford's Ford, will join in the movement to the left, and press the enemy up the stream from Polk's front at Lee and Gordon's Mill.

"IV. Polk will press his forces to the front of Lee and Gordon's Mill, and, if met by too strong resistance to cross, will bear to the right, and cross at Dalton's Ford, or at Tedford's, as may be necessary, and join the attack wherever the enemy may be.

"V. Hill will cover our left flank from an advance of the enemy from the Cove, and, by pressing the cavalry in his front, ascertain if the enemy is re-enforcing at Lee and Gordon's Mill, in which event he will attack them in flank.

"VI. Wheeler's cavalry will hold the Gap in Pigeon Mountain, and cover our rear and left, and bring up the stragglers.

"VII. All teams, etc., not with the troops, should go toward Ringgold and Dalton, Georgia, beyond Taylor's Ridge. All cooking should be done at the trains; rations, when cooked, will be forwarded to the troops.

"VIII. The above movements will be executed with the utmost promptitude and perseverance."

² Hood did not take command of his division until it had crossed the creek.

³ "Nearly half our army consisted of re-enforcements just before the battle."—*Bragg's Report*.

For Rosecrans's army had been, the last five days, marching for dear life, and when Bragg crossed the Chickamauga he found this army, which he had expected to strike near Lee and Gordon's Mill, upon his front and right, prepared to contest inch by inch the possession of the Lafayette and Chattanooga Road.¹ Its own celerity of movement, and Bragg's delay (in this case due to excessive caution), had again saved the Federal army.

While awaiting the arrival of McCook's corps, Thomas's and Crittenden's extended from the Dry Valley Road in front of Stevenson's Gap to Crawfish Spring, being connected at Pond Spring by Wilder's cavalry. Wood's division of Crittenden's corps still held a strong defensive position at Lee and Gordon's Mill,² and the river below that point was guarded by Minty's cavalry, which crossed and reconnoitred the country on the left front, occasionally meeting and skirmishing with the enemy. The gaps of Pigeon Mountain to the south were also carefully guarded by Thomas's command. As soon as McCook came up he closed in on Thomas's right, and Crittenden drew in his right upon Crawfish Spring, to give place for Thomas. Wilder's cavalry was then detached and sent to the left.

The 18th was a day of terrible anxiety to General Rosecrans. Reports at different periods of the day came in from Wood and Wilder of the enemy's advance upon the left. The Lafayette Road must be secured, if possible, at any hazard. Before night Palmer's and Van Cleve's divisions of Crittenden's corps were upon the creek to Wood's left and right, and all night long Thomas was marching by the road to Widow Glenn's, and past the slopes of Mission Ridge, toward Kelly's Farm on Chickamauga Creek, away off to the left of Crittenden; so that on the morning of the 19th the right of the army rested at Crawfish Spring, which the day before had been its left. Negley's division had been left by Thomas to guard the fords of the Upper Chickamauga in the vicinity of Crawfish Spring. Granger, with the reserve corps, was at Rossville.

The battle of the 19th was opened by General Thomas. The head of his column reached Kelly's at daylight, and went in on the left of Wilder (who had the night before been driven back to the heights east of the Widow Glenn's), Baird taking position first, then Brannan upon his left. At this point, Dan McCook, commanding a brigade of Granger's reserve corps, reported the presence of an isolated brigade of the enemy between Kelly's house and Reed's Bridge, and Brannan, with two brigades, was advanced on the road to the bridge to secure the capture of this detached force. Baird also advanced to keep in line with Brannan. These dispositions were made at 9 A.M. Soon after, Palmer's division, of Crittenden's corps, came up on Baird's right. The fight began at about ten o'clock.³ It consisted at first of sharp skirmishing with Forrest on the Reed's Bridge Road. The movements of Johnson and Hood the night before toward Lee and Gordon's Mill had left Walker's corps in a somewhat isolated position on the Confederate right. Wilson's brigade, of this corps, after conducting the ordnance train across the creek, was called upon to support Forrest. Coming in contact with this force, Croxton's brigade, of Brannan's division, had become engaged, and drove the enemy for half a mile, when the latter was re-enforced by Ector's brigade, and it was necessary to send in Baird's division. The small force of the enemy engaged at this point was steadily pressed back until it was supported by the remainder of Walker's corps.⁴ After an hour's severe fighting, Croxton's brigade had been withdrawn, and Baird and Brannan, uniting their forces, drove the enemy from their front.


In the mean time, Cheatham's division came up to Walker's support at noon, and, forming in rear of the latter, advanced upon Baird, striking him in the flank, and throwing two of his brigades into confusion. Baird was driven back before overwhelming numbers for some distance, when the fortunate arrival of Reynolds's and Johnson's divisions on his right again turned the tide of battle. These fresh divisions, advancing with Palmer's (which had been opportunely sent by Crittenden), struck Cheatham's flank, and thrust him back in disorder upon Walker's corps, Brannan's troops attacking him at the same time in front, and recapturing the artillery which Baird had lost in his retreat. While Cheatham was thus hotly engaged, and being driven in confusion, Stewart's division, of Buckner's corps, coming from the Confederate left to his support, attempted in vain to drive Thomas back from his advanced position. His three brigades—Clayton's, Brown's, and Bate's—advanced each in its turn. In one hour's fighting Clayton lost nearly 400 officers and men,⁵ and, being withdrawn, Brown took his place, and gallantly charged through a dense underwood extending along his front, when he encountered a terrific fire from all arms. He was unable to use his artillery, while the batteries in his front and on his right flank poured into his ranks murderous volleys of grape and canister. Checked for a brief moment, he again pushed forward and up the slope, where the strength of the Federal position and an attack on his right compelled him to retreat, after the loss of many of his best officers and a large number of his men. Bate relieved him then, meeting the same fire which had driven back his brother commanders, but, with Clayton's support, succeeded in driving the Federal force in his front beyond the Chattanooga Road.

¹ "The enemy, whose left was at Lee and Gordon's Mill when our movement commenced, had rapidly transferred forces from his extreme right, changing his entire line, and seemed disposed to dispute, with all his ability, our effort to gain the main road to Chattanooga in his rear."—*Bragg's Report*.

² "A stronger position naturally than that which General Wood occupied can scarcely be imagined. The creek at Gordon's Mill bends round in the form of a semicircle, the convexity being toward the south, whence the enemy would have advanced toward General Wood. An eminence, forming what would be a diameter of the circle if completed, runs from east to west, uniting the extremities of the bend. Upon this General Wood had placed his artillery. The creek itself, of considerable depth, and with a bank several feet high upon our side of it, constituted a splendid ditch, and all along its bank lay Wood's men, behind a rude but efficient breastwork of logs and rails."—*National Account, Rebellion Record*, vii., p. 409.

³ Forrest reports the capture of two batteries at an early stage of the engagement, but that he was unable to bring them off for want of horses.

⁴ *General A. P. Stewart's Report*.



POSITION OF FORCES JUST BEFORE THE OPENING OF THE BATTLE OF THE 19th.

The battle had already extended far up the creek. By two o'clock Hood and Johnson had become involved in the struggle, and the entire Confederate line, as it then stood, below Lee and Gordon's Mill, had been engaged with the exception of two brigades of Preston's division (Buckner's corps), which, on rising ground, held the extreme left of Bragg's army west of the Chickamauga. On the Federal line, division after division had been sent in—Van Cleve's, of Crittenden's corps; then Davis's, of McCook's; then Wood's, from Lee and Gordon's Mill; and, finally, Sheridan's. Each in its turn had driven the enemy, and then, outflanked, had been thrust back. The arrival of Sheridan's division finally stayed the enemy's progress on the Federal right.

On the centre the Confederates had in the mean time gained considerable advantage, and the shells from their batteries almost reached the Widow Glenn's house, where Rosecrans's headquarters were. Negley's division had therefore been withdrawn from Crawfish Spring, arriving upon the field at 4 30 P.M. This division was dispatched to the centre, where it found that Van Cleve had been dislodged from the line. Negley immediately attacked, and drove the enemy steadily till night. Palmer had been endangered by the disaster to Van Cleve, but the advance of the enemy upon his flank was checked by General Hazen, who, driven back upon an elevation of ground, promptly manned twenty guns and poured a cross-fire into the enemy's charging column, which threw it back in disorder.

The attack which had for a time broken the Federal centre had begun on Reynolds's right. After Cheatham's repulse there had been a lull in the battle in front of the Federal left from 4 o'clock till about 5, during which Brannan and Baird had reorganized their commands, and had been withdrawn to a strong position on the extreme left, in which direction Thomas expected the next attack. But the enemy made his advance some distance farther to the right. Brannan's division and the greater portion of Baird's were promptly sent to Reynolds's assistance, arriving just in time to prevent disaster. Even while Van Cleve was being driven in the centre, Thomas was driving the enemy on the left.

In pursuing the enemy Thomas's lines became very much extended, and were now concentrated upon more commanding ground. It was supposed that the battle for that day was over. But Thomas had scarcely completed the disposition of his forces before he was again attacked by the enemy. Pat Cleburne's division, of Hill's corps, having crossed the river at Tedford's Ford, had reached the Confederate right soon after sunset. Passing over the line which Thomas had just driven back, and supported on his left by Cheatham, he made an unexpected charge upon Johnson and Baird's divisions, producing considerable confusion in their ranks; but order was soon restored, and the enemy repulsed.¹ In this night attack General Preston Smith, of Cheatham's division, was killed. This engagement terminated the battle of the 19th.

The battle thus far had been waged for a position. When it began in the morning neither of the two armies had formed its line, though in this respect the advantage had been with the Confederates. If Bragg had been aware of Thomas's movement made on the night of the 18th, the result of the morning's, and, probably, of the whole day's fighting would have been far different. Supposing the Federal forces to be in the neighborhood of Lee and Gordon's Mill, Bragg had moved his own too far up the creek, leaving Forrest only on his extreme right; and while he had been moving them back to the right to meet the emergencies arising out of the engagement with Thomas, Rosecrans was given time to bring up his divisions to Thomas's support. In this way Thomas's movement to the left had spoiled the enemy's preconceived plan of operations. Every assault which had been made during the day upon the vital point of the Federal line, its extreme left, had been severely repulsed. Whatever ground had been gained by Bragg had been upon the centre, where Van Cleve had been driven back so far that, until Negley's arrival, the communication was cut off between Thomas and Rosecrans's headquarters at the Widow Glenn's.² Earlier in the day (say at 2 o'clock P.M.) the line of each army had extended along the Lafayette and Chattanooga Road. But upon the restoration of the Federal line, after the break on its centre, the left and centre had been refused, leaving this road, from Lee and Gordon's Mill to within less than a mile of Kelly's house, in possession of the Confederates. This refusal of the line was rather an advantage to Rosecrans than to Bragg, since it gave the Federal army a stronger position.

It is impossible to estimate, with any degree of precision, the comparative injury inflicted upon the two armies in this first day's battle. Unquestionably the Confederates sustained the heavier loss. They had little opportunity for using artillery, on account of the thickly wooded country over which they moved.³ Of the Federal divisions, Baird's and Johnson's had suffered the most severely. The former, when flanked and driven back by Walker's corps, had lost a regiment of regulars, 411 strong, besides 100 other prisoners and two batteries. One of these was the First Michigan, formerly "Loomis's" battery. Its commander, Lieutenant Van Pelt, stood by his guns to the last, and gave up his life with them, falling into the hands of the enemy mortally wounded.⁴

Rosecrans's headquarters had been all day at the Widow Glenn's, where he could receive by a direct road communications from General Thomas. His immediate presence upon the field was at some portions of the day extremely necessary. If, just before noon, he had been with Crittenden, he would have sent in supports to Thomas's right with such promptness that Walker's corps must have been completely destroyed or driven into the river. Instead of being there, he was pacing his headquarters at the Widow Glenn's in nervous excitement, while his aids, with the assistance of the distressed widow, were attempting to locate the line of battle by the sound of the firing. The general ought to have known that he could most effectually assist Thomas by his personal direction of the battle to the right of the latter.

Leaving out the reserve corps under General Granger at Rossville, Rosecrans's whole army on the field, except two brigades, had been engaged on the 19th. Curiously, both General Bragg and General Rosecrans claim that they were opposed to superior numbers on this day. In fact, however, the forces engaged had not been far from equal; if there was any superiority, it was in Rosecrans's favor. But Bragg had full 15,000 men who had not been under fire, if we include Kershaw's and Humphreys's brigades of Longstreet's corps, which came up in time for the next day's battle. Breckinridge's and Hindman's divisions were across the river by night, but had taken no part in the battle.

A council of war was held after dark at Rosecrans's headquarters, and the disposition of forces and the conduct of the battle of the next day were determined upon. That it would be a desperate conflict was certain. The battle already fought had been for the road to Chattanooga. The attempt to secure this road would be renewed the next day with forces which it would be hard to withstand. Failing of success at this point, the enemy would do his best to crush the army which stood in his way.

General Longstreet, in person, arrived at Bragg's headquarters before midnight. To him was given the command of the left wing of the Confederate army, consisting of that portion of the troops which during the day had been under Hood's command—Buckner's corps, and Hood's and Johnson's divisions—with the fresh troops under Hindman and McLaws. The accession of Breckinridge's division was the only change made in the right wing, which had been and would still remain under the command of General Polk. Bragg ordered Polk to attack the next morning at daybreak, meaning that from his extreme right the battle should extend, division by division, to the extreme left.

The Federal line during the night was reorganized. Thomas's front remained as he had already established it, with part of Brannan's division in reserve. It extended in a semicircular form (at least its formation may be thus characterized with sufficient accuracy for our purpose) around Kelly's house, covering the road in front and on either flank. From the point where it crossed the road on the south side it was refused, to conform with the refusal of the left and centre extending southwestwardly. McCook's corps closed up on Thomas, and refused its right upon the ground north of and covering the Widow Glenn's house. Wood's and Van Cleve's divisions were placed in reserve, in a position to support either Thomas or McCook. Neither of the corps organizations was intact. Palmer, of Crittenden's, and Johnson, of McCook's corps, were with Thomas, while Negley, who belonged to Thomas, was with McCook. The line extended thus from left to right: Baird (his left refused to cover the road), Johnson, Palmer, Reynolds, Brannan, Negley, Davis, Sheridan; with Wood and Van Cleve in reserve. Johnson's and Palmer's divisions extended from Baird's lines to the road south of Kelly's house, Reynolds's and the other divisions being to the west of the road. In the rear of Johnson and Palmer was an open field, while farther back, on the other side of the road, were dense woods. The road from Ringgold to Rossville was well guarded by the cavalry and Granger's corps.

The Confederate right wing, confronting the three divisions of Thomas east of the Lafayette Road, consisted of four divisions—Breckinridge's, Cleburne's, Cheatham's, and Walker's. The two latter were in reserve. Longstreet's command extended from Cleburne's position, with Stewart on the right, then Johnson, then Hindman holding the left. Hood was in reserve, to Johnson's rear. Preston was held in reserve on the left rear. Humphrey and Kershaw, when they came up, were also held in reserve.

Bragg's army had a hard day's work before it, and it was all-important that it should be begun early. But his orders to Polk were for some reasons (certainly unsatisfactory ones to Bragg) not carried out. The attack was not begun on the right until nearly 10 o'clock A.M. Every moment of this delay had been of great advantage to Thomas, whose troops had been all night felling timber and strengthening their line by temporary breastworks.¹ And when the fight began it progressed slowly. The work assigned to Polk—namely, to thrust Thomas back from his position, and thus double

recaptured by Brannan. Hood captured a battery from Jeff C. Davis's division, but it was afterward recaptured. On the Federal side it was claimed that there was a balance against the Confederates of three guns.

¹ "At dawn General Bragg was in the saddle, surrounded by his staff, eagerly listening for the sound of Polk's guns. The sun rose and was mounting in the sky, and still there was no note of attack from the right wing. Bragg chafed with impatience, and at last dispatched one of his staff officers, Major Lee, to ascertain the cause of Polk's delay, and urge him to a prompt and speedy movement. General Polk, notwithstanding his clerical antecedents, was noted for his fondness for military ostentation, and carried a train of staff officers whose numbers and superb dress were the occasion of singular remark. Major Lee found him seated at a comfortable breakfast, surrounded by brilliantly dressed officers, and delivered his message with military bluntness and brevity. General Polk replied that he had ordered Hill to open the action, that he was waiting for him, and he added, 'Do tell General Bragg that my heart is overflowing with anxiety for the attack—overflowing with anxiety, sir.' Major Lee returned to the commanding general, and reported the reply literally. Bragg uttered a terrible explanation, in which Polk, Hill, and all his generals were included. 'Major Lee,' he cried, 'ride along the line, and order every captain to take his men instantly into action.' In fifteen minutes the battle was joined, but three hours of valuable time had been lost, in which Rosecrans was desperately busy in strengthening his position."—*Pollard's Lost Cause*, p. 450.

¹ *Thomas's Report*. But Cleburne claims that he drove the Federals a mile and a half, taking two or three hundred prisoners and two or three guns.

² Thomas, hearing of this break, feared that the entire right would be routed, and began to dispose his line with reference to covering its retreat to the Dry Valley Road, but he was soon relieved of his apprehensions by Negley's arrival.

³ "As most of the ground over which the battle was fought was very thickly wooded, we could not see more than three hundred yards to the front, consequently could seldom use artillery."—*Report of Major Potter, commanding the Artillery of Buckner's Corps*.

⁴ Bragg reports the capture of several batteries by Walker's corps, but only these two were secured. A. P. Stewart reports the capture of twelve guns, but only four were sent to his rear. Jackson, of Cheatham's division, reports the capture of six guns, but these were probably among the



THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA, SEPTEMBER 19th.

up the Federal line, pressing it back upon Longstreet—was not found easy to execute.

Breckinridge opened the attack. He had not reached Cleburne's right until after dawn, and knew nothing of the ground. Of his three brigades Helm held the left, Stovall the centre, and Adams the right, being the extreme right of the whole line. The division extended so far to the right that only a portion of Helm's brigade encountered the Federal line in a direct advance westward, and thus Stovall and Adams, meeting no resistance, pushed forward, seriously threatening Thomas's flank. Baird's division did not quite reach the Lafayette Road; Thomas had, therefore, as early as two o'clock A.M., written to Rosecrans, asking for Negley's division to supplement his line. Rosecrans had promised that it should be sent forthwith. Seven o'clock came, an attack was momentarily expected, but Negley had not arrived. The request was repeated, and was received by Rosecrans at eight o'clock. Some demonstration of the enemy in Negley's front led Rosecrans to retain this division until it was relieved by McCook. McCook having been ordered to promptly relieve Negley, Rosecrans, accompanied by General Garfield, rode along his entire line. Upon returning to the right he found Negley where he had left him, not having been relieved.

Beatty's brigade was immediately sent to Thomas, the other two being ordered to follow as soon as other troops were ready to take their position. Beatty reached Thomas in time, fortunately, to secure his line. Breckinridge's left brigade had already been severely cut up, having been exposed to a front and enfilading fire from a foe concealed behind breastworks, and, after two assaults, in which General Helm, commanding the brigade, and a large number of his subordinate officers, had been killed, this portion of the line was withdrawn. Stovall and Adams, however, had advanced, driving back two lines of Baird's skirmishers. Stovall halted at the road, but Adams pressed forward, his line and Stovall's being now formed perpendicular to the road, to conform to Baird's position. The advance now was through the woods west of the road. Stovall attacked the angle of the works, and was soon forced to retire. Adams, encountering Baird's left, now re-enforced by Beatty and some regiments from Johnson's, Brannan's, and Wood's divisions, was severely beaten. Adams, wounded, and a large number of prisoners, were captured. Thus, before noon, Breckinridge had been driven from the field. To prevent a repetition of the attack at this point, Negley was ordered to mass all the artillery which could be spared upon a position commanding the enemy's approach, but, from some misunderstanding, Negley took a very different position from that which had been indicated.

Cleburne, on Breckinridge's left, had advanced against Johnson's, Palmer's, and Reynolds's divisions with no better success. Owing to Polk's utter neglect of his line in the morning, there was no well-arranged plan of attack. Cleburne, in the hurry occasioned by orders to dress upon Breckinridge's left, had got into some confusion. His left, also, in advancing, converged with Longstreet's line of advance in such a manner that part of Wood's brigade passed over some of Stewart's division, and Deshler's was thrown entirely out of line in Stuart's rear. Thus a part of Wood's brigade moved against that part of Thomas's line which turned westward upon the road. Crossing a field bordering the road, near Poe's house, this brigade received a heavy oblique fire, and in a few minutes sustained a loss of 500 men, killed and wounded. Deshler might then have been sent in; but Polk's brigade, on Wood's right, had also been repulsed, and Cleburne's whole line was withdrawn to a safe position some 400 yards in the rear. On the retreat General Deshler was killed, a shell piercing "fair through his chest."¹

In the mean time, the Federal divisions on Thomas's right have met with a terrible misfortune. Upon the failure of McCook to relieve Negley in the morning, Crittenden had been ordered to do so, sending in Wood's division. But this movement had been delayed until half past nine o'clock. McCook's line, holding the extreme right, was not satisfactory to Rosecrans, being too far removed from the troops on its left. After repeated orders from Rosecrans, this difficulty was only partially remedied. Messages still continued to come from Thomas, asking for re-enforcements. Van Cleve's division was sent to his aid. Shortly after this a most unfortunate event took place. Captain Kellogg, coming across the field to bring further tidings to Rosecrans that Thomas was still heavily pressed, thought he discovered a break in the line on Reynolds's right. In fact there was no such break, but Brannan's division, from its arrangement in *echelon* at this point, had occasioned the delusion. Rosecrans forthwith ordered Wood, who had relieved Negley, to close up and support Reynolds. Wood, misapprehending the intent of the order, moved his division entirely out of line, "at double quick," and passed to Brannan's rear. Thus a gap *was made* where previously none had existed, and through this gap the enemy advanced, throwing the entire right wing into confusion, from which it did not recover.²

¹ Cleburne's Report.

² General Wood having claimed that he did right in moving out of line, and had no discretion to do otherwise, General Rosecrans, on the 12th of January, 1864, wrote to Adjutant General Thomas the following letter:

"GENERAL.—The report of the general in chief shows that a letter from one of my division commanders at the battle of Chickamauga, commenting on the report of his commanding general, has been received at the War Department, and subsequently published by its authority. The general in chief refers to that letter as a rival authority to my own, and as raising a doubt on the accuracy of a point in my report. The letter, dated October 23, ult., four days after I left the command, is based on a quotation from my official report, to which, evidently, the writer was not at that time entitled, and which, therefore, *prima facie*, was surreptitiously obtained. It has been received and publicly used as a document disparaging my report, without having been referred to me, or passing through my hands, as required by military courtesy and army regulations.

"The War Department is therefore respectfully requested, as an act of justice, to cause the above and following observations to be filed and published as an appendix to my official report of the battle of Chickamauga:

"Brigadier General T. J. Wood writes and sends to the War Department a clandestine letter to show, contrary to the inference drawn in my report, that he did right, under an order to 'close up

Longstreet had waited until 11 o'clock, and then, seeing that Polk was making no serious impression upon the enemy, began the attack with the left wing. Stewart was closed up to the right, to make room for Hood in the front line. Humphreys's and Kershaw's brigades (McLaws's division), were, on their arrival, brought up as supports to Hood, whose division was made the main column of attack. Longstreet's order of battle was entirely reversed by the character which the conflict had assumed on the right. His left, instead of his right, became the movable column. Stewart's division, upon reaching the Lafayette Road, was there stationed, forming the pivot upon which Longstreet's wing turned. Hood's column was up just in time to take advantage of the break occasioned by Wood's sudden withdrawal, above alluded to, and the troops on his right and left pushed the attack with great vigor. General Hood received a severe, and it was then thought mortal wound, just after his column had penetrated the Federal lines, and General Law, commanding one of his brigades, succeeded to the command. But, notwithstanding the loss of their old commander, the troops pressed their advantage, flanking Jeff Davis on the one side, and Brannan on the other, cutting off five brigades from the right of the army, and driving them to the rear. The blow had fallen just as Rosecrans was weakening his right by sending two of Sheridan's brigades to Thomas. These brigades were recalled to oppose the enemy's advance, and Davis closed up to the left for the same purpose. But the enemy's charge could not thus be resisted. The attack now extended from beyond Brannan's right to a point west of the Dry Valley Road. The Confederates at the weak point outnumbered the Federals three to one. McCook's five brigades were driven back, with a loss of nearly half their men. The right of Brannan was driven back, and two of his batteries, moving to a new position, were taken in flank, and thrown back through two of Van Cleve's brigades, then on their way to Thomas, producing inextricable confusion. In this way these two brigades of Van Cleve, with the five already mentioned, were driven from the field on the road to Rossville. Davis and Sheridan strove in vain to make a stand. Hindman's division had advanced far to their right, making resistance useless. Johnson had advanced on Hindman's right, swelling the volume of the assaulting column. In this charge of Longstreet's command the Confederates claimed a capture of seventeen guns.

Rosecrans, McCook, and Crittenden had all been swept from the battlefield. Thomas alone was left, with one of Negley's brigades, and the divisions of Baird, Johnson, Palmer, Reynolds, and such portions of Wood's and Brannan's as had not been involved in the disaster, to withstand the entire Confederate army. Negley had taken some fifty pieces of artillery to the rear, in obedience, as he supposed, of Thomas's orders. He thus saved a large number of guns from capture, and offered a somewhat formidable resistance to the enemy's advance. But the Confederate success against McCook's line compelled him to withdraw, and he went to Rossville, where he was very efficient in the reorganization of Rosecrans's scattered troops.¹

on General Reynolds and support him, in taking his division out of the line of battle and in rear of Brannan's division, to a reserve position in rear of Reynolds. My report, dealing with facts, and avoiding personal censure, shows that General Reynolds sent me word, by Captain Kellogg, A.D.C. to General Thomas, that there were no troops on his immediate right, and that he wanted support there; that, supposing Brannan's division had been called away, I told an aid to write to General Wood an order to close up on Reynolds and support him, who wrote as follows:

"Headquarters, September 20, 10 45 A.M.
 "Brigadier General T. J. Wood, Commanding Division, etc.:
 "The general commanding directs that you close up on Reynolds as fast as possible, and support him. Respectfully,
 FRANK S. BOND, Major and A.D.C."

"Now, with this order in his hand:
 "1st. When General Wood found there was no interval to close, because Brannan's troops had not left, his plain duty as a division commander was to have reported that fact to the general commanding, who was not more than six hundred yards from him, and asked farther orders. His failure to do so was a grave mistake, showing want of military discretion.

"2d. When about to move, notwithstanding this, his duty, on being informed, as he was by one of his brigade commanders, that his skirmishers were engaged, and the enemy in line of battle opposite his position, General Wood was renewedly bound to have reported the facts and taken orders before leaving his position at such a critical time. But, instead of doing so, he privately withdrew his troops from the line, and let the enemy in, in the face of an order the wording of which shows that no such operation as the *opening*, but, on the contrary, the *closing* of a gap, was intended by it.

"3d. This conduct of General Wood, treated in the report with all the reserve consistent with the truth of history, contrasts most unfavorably with that of General Brannan, commanding the division next on his left, who, a little earlier in the day, when he received an order to leave his position and support the left, finding his skirmishers engaged, reported the fact to General Thomas, desiring to know if, under such circumstances, he should execute the order. He was told, 'No; stay where you are.'

"4th. It also contrasts with General Wood's own conduct and correspondence only a few days previously, when he protested against a reprimand of his corps commander for not occupying a position at Wauhatchie, lecturing his senior on the impropriety of what he termed 'blind obedience to orders,' and in upward of fifty pages of manuscript trying to prove his conduct consistent with that sound discretion which a division commander ought to exercise in removing his troops from the danger threatened by the literal execution of orders.

"The material difference of circumstances in the two cases, as appears from his own writings, being that the discretion he exercises at Wauhatchie, and the 'blind obedience' he pleads at Chickamauga, both have the effect of getting his troops out of danger.

"As the best of generals are liable to mistakes, I should have been content to leave those of General Wood to the simple historical statement of them, presuming he regretted them far more deeply than even myself. And, so feeling, I called attention to his military virtues—vigilance, discipline, providence of his commissariat, and care of his transportation. But his mean and unsoldierly defense of error shows him wrong both in head and heart.

"Respectfully, your humble servant, (Signed), W. S. ROSECRANS, Major General.
 "Brigadier General L. THOMAS, Adjutant General U. S. A.
 "Official: R. S. THORN, Captain, A.D.C."

¹ Both Generals Wood and Brannan, in their reports, endeavor to disparage General Negley's conduct in this connection. Brannan says:

"General Negley, so far from holding my right as he had promised, retired with extraordinary deliberation to Rossville at an early period of the day, taking with him a portion of my division, as will be seen by the report of Colonel Conwell, commanding First Brigade, leaving me open to attack from the right, as well as from the left and front (from which point the rebels attacked simultaneously on four several occasions), and my rear so far exposed that my staff officers, sent back for ammunition, were successfully cut off, and the ammunition, of such vital importance at that time, prevented from reaching me, thus necessitating the use of the bayonet as my only means of defense."

General Wood says:
 "Before closing my report, I deem it my duty to bring to the notice of the commanding general certain facts which fell under my observation during the progress of the conflict on the 25th. As I was moving along the valley with my command, to the support of General Reynolds, in conformity with the order of the commanding general, I observed on my left, to the west of me, a force posted high up on the ridge. I inquired what force it was, and was informed that it was a part (a brigade, perhaps) of General Negley's division. I was informed that General Negley was with the force in person. I remember distinctly seeing a battery on the hill-side with it. At the

On the Federal right there was indescribable confusion. The trains had all been pushed along the Dry Valley Road, and mingled with the disorganized troops, blocked up the road to Rossville. Rosecrans and Garfield, his chief of staff, left the field together, taking the Rossville Road. To a retreat from this part of the field there was no alternative. As far as the eye could reach, there was no orderly array of battle, and no direct communication with the left. Was Thomas beaten also? This was the question which now agitated the minds of the general and his staff officer. If he was routed, then clearly Rosecrans's place was at Chattanooga, where he could best provide for the safety of his army and of his trains. Finally, the two officers, before reaching Rossville, came to a point where two roads led, one to Chattanooga, and the other around to Thomas's position. Firing could be heard in the latter direction with considerable distinctness. Apart from this firing, there was no hint to guide General Rosecrans. The two officers listened most intently, and reached exactly opposite conclusions. Rosecrans had already arrived at a conviction that the entire army was defeated. He judged that the firing which he heard was scattered, and indicated disorganization. Garfield, who doubtless had a more correct ear, thought it was the firing of men who were standing their ground. He felt that Thomas was not beaten, and, as General Rosecrans was determined himself to go to Chattanooga, he asked permission to go to Thomas. This was given. Rosecrans went to Chattanooga, and telegraphed to General Halleck that his army was beaten. Garfield went to Thomas; what he found there we shall soon discover.

It is scarcely strange that Rosecrans should have jumped at the conclusion that Thomas was defeated. That he was not seems almost a miracle; but it was just such a miracle as had twice already during this campaign saved the army from destruction. If Longstreet had known the full extent of the disorder which his first assault had produced, he would have thrown caution to the wind, and have pursued with *abandon*. But, fortunately, he did not know. His divisions on the right had met with obstinate resistance. Hindman, instead of pursuing the advantage gained on the extreme left, was moved eastward to support Johnson. Thus time was given for the formation of a new Federal line from Thomas's right, across the commanding heights which constitute the southern spurs of Mission Ridge, east of McFarland's Gap.

Thomas, meanwhile, knew nothing of the disaster to the Federal right. Just before the repulse of the enemy on his extreme left, a little after noon, he sent to Rosecrans to hurry up Sheridan's division, which had been promised him. Captain Kellogg, his aid sent for this purpose, proceeding to the right, met a large force of the enemy in the open corn-field to the rear of Reynolds, advancing cautiously. This force was at first supposed to be Sheridan's troops, but the mistake was soon discovered, and the enemy was driven back. The gap between Reynolds and Brannan was filled, and Wood's division—so much of it as remained—was placed on the right, in prolongation of Brannan's line.

It can easily be seen that if, during the formation of this line, or previous,

time it was certainly out of reach of any fire from the enemy. This was between 11 and 12 o'clock in the day. A little later in the day, perhaps half or three quarters of an hour, when I became severely engaged, as already described, with the large hostile force that had pierced our lines and turned Brannan's right, compelling him to fall back, I looked for the force that I had seen posted on the ridge, and which, as already remarked, I had been informed was a part of General Negley's division, hoping, if I became severely pressed, it might re-enforce me, for I was resolved to check the enemy if possible. But it had entirely disappeared; whether it had gone I did not then know, but was informed later in the day it had retired to Rossville, and this information I believe was correct. By whose orders this force retired from the battle-field I do not know; but of one fact I am perfectly convinced: that there was no necessity for its retiring. It is impossible it could have been at all seriously pressed by the enemy at the time—in fact, I think it extremely doubtful whether it was engaged at all."

It is not necessary here to attempt any defense of so brave and skillful an officer as General Negley against such charges as these. We will simply quote the opinion of the Court of Inquiry called upon to investigate General Negley's conduct in the spring of 1864. The finding of this court was as follows:

"No question has any where been raised as to the conduct of General Negley on the 19th of September, the first day of the battle of Chickamauga. He commanded on that day his entire division, and it appears from the evidence that his conduct throughout was creditable.

"Early on the second day General Negley was assigned a position in the line on the right of General Brannan, from which he was relieved between 8 and 10 o'clock by Wood's division.

"He was then ordered to take a position on the extreme left; but his division having been relieved at a later hour than was expected, his reserve brigade was sent meantime in advance of the others, and became separated from him, taking a place in the line under General Baird. Subsequently another of his brigades was placed in line on the left of General Brannan, and under the command of that officer. A little later in the day, as General Negley was moving to a position on Mission Ridge, to which he had been ordered by General Thomas, he gave up to General Brannan, on his urgent appeal for support, the largest regiment of his last brigade, retaining for himself only two weak regiments and four companies of another regiment. The point to which he was directed was in rear of the centre of the line. Here he found a battery; other batteries and parts of batteries joined him, and it appears on evidence that he had at last fifty guns under his care, with only the small infantry support above referred to, namely, two small regiments and four companies of another regiment, in all 600 or 700 men.

"The gap in the line made by the withdrawal of Wood's division, the rout of the entire right, and the unresisted advance of the enemy from that direction, as well as the advance of the enemy from the left of the line, the enemy having outflanked and driven in a portion of the left also, subjected General Negley to such hazard of losing this large park of artillery as made it expedient, in his judgment, to withdraw it to a point on the Dry Valley Road, about two or three miles from Rossville. It appears in evidence that this movement was executed in good order, and all the artillery saved.

"Here General Negley met Generals Davis and Sheridan, with portions of their command, and considerable bodies of disorganized troops from various commands. He co-operated with the division commanders above referred to in taking such measures as the exigencies of the occasion seemed to require, and toward evening retired to Rossville.

"General Negley exhibited throughout the day (the second of the battle) and the following night great activity and zeal in the discharge of his duties, and the court do not find in the evidence before them any ground of censure.

"The impression which seems to have been entertained by General Brannan that General Negley had ordered one of his brigades to the rear is not sustained by the testimony.

"It appears in the evidence that Brigadier General Wood, on one or more occasions, at the headquarters of the Army of the Cumberland, and in presence of the commander of that army and a portion of his staff, indulged in severe reflections upon the conduct of Major General Negley, applying to him coarse and offensive epithets. When placed upon the stand before the court he failed entirely to substantiate any charge or ground of accusation against him. The court deem it their duty to express their marked condemnation of such conduct, leading to vexation and unprofitable investigation prejudicial to the service.

"II. The record and opinions in the foregoing cases have been submitted to the President of the United States. He is of opinion that no farther action is required, and the Court of Inquiry is dissolved.

By order of the Secretary of War,

E. D. TOWNSEND, A. A. G."

the enemy had assaulted the Federal right with any considerable force, he must have made himself complete master of the position. Not less fortunate, nor less decisive than Longstreet's delay, was General Gordon Granger's arrival upon this part of the field just as Wood had got into position on the new line. Granger had started from Rossville at 11 o'clock with General Whittaker's and Colonel Mitchell's brigades, under the immediate command of General Steedman, leaving Colonel Dan McCook's brigade to guard the Ringgold Road. He had heard heavy firing, and judging, from the sound, that Thomas was being hard pressed, he felt that his presence upon the field was necessary. It was about three and a half miles from Rossville to the point where Thomas was then engaging Breckinridge. Granger had gone over two thirds of this distance when the enemy made his appearance in the woods to the left. This hostile force was found to be only a party of observation, and Granger pressed on with his column, leaving the enemy at this point to be taken care of by Dan McCook.

While Granger is advancing the battle has been steadily swaying to the left along Thomas's line, until it has reached Reynolds's and Brannan's divisions. Against these McLaws and Stewart, with a part of Cleburne's division, have been directing assaults as violent as those which Breckinridge and Cleburne have been making against the stronger line north and west of the Lafayette Road—stronger, because situated on more favorable ground, and more thoroughly fortified by breastworks. The result had been different: while Breckinridge and Cleburne are being driven back, Longstreet's division, though sustaining terrible loss and repeated repulse, are at length gaining ground. It is at this point that Wood withdraws from Brannan's right, and the disaster follows on the Federal right which we have already described. Brannan now withdraws from his works, and the whole of Thomas's line east of the Lafayette Road is refused, moving back upon the spurs of Mission Ridge. All this has taken place as Granger is marching for the field. Longstreet is preparing for a fresh assault upon the new position with overwhelming numbers, and, when that assault comes, Thomas feels that, so far as he can see, there is no hope for his army—no possible alternative to defeat.

At this critical moment clouds of dust are seen rising to the left and rear. In those phantom-like columns lurk hope or disaster. Some new element is about to enter into the chemistry of this doubtful battle, which now waits for the development of this approaching force for its solution. The direction from which this force is coming gives no clew as to its character: it is as like to prove hostile as friendly. At length long lines of men are seen emerging from the woods, crossing the Lafayette Road in perfect discipline, their banners fluttering above, and their bayonets glittering in the sunlight. An aid has reconnoitred, and reports that it is an infantry force. But *whose?* Soon this vital question was answered from the advanced colors—the red and blue, with the white crescent, marking Granger's battle-flag.

Granger had come up in time. Already Longstreet had gathered his columns for an assault in front and on either flank. He had called for assistance from General Polk, but the latter had been too badly beaten to respond.¹ Thomas's right rested upon a chain of heights beginning about a fourth of a mile west of Kelly's house, and extending westward about one mile toward the Dry Valley Road. These heights are covered with open woods, have a gentle but irregular slope on the south, north, and east, and their summits are a hundred feet above the level of the surrounding country.² McFarland's Gap—now the great strategic point of the battle-field—was on the extreme right. This gap is the entrance from the battle-field into Chattanooga Valley. The Dry Valley Road from this point to Rossville was crowded with the trains of the Federal army. The stand which was now taken by Thomas, if obstinately held till nightfall, would secure the safe retreat of the army to Rossville.

Granger, as he came up, was sent in on Brannan's right. Wood had already been formed on Brannan's left. Steedman led Granger's men up the crest of the hill, contending as he advanced against an assaulting column of the enemy which had gained the summit of the ridge. Moving forward his artillery, he dislodged the enemy and drove him down the southern slope, inflicting upon him a fearful loss in killed and wounded. The arrival of fresh troops had revived the courage of the Federals at this point, and every assault of the enemy from this time until nightfall was repulsed with great slaughter. The conflict here was desperate. Granger's command consisted in great part of troops which had never before tasted battle; but they fought with heroic obstinacy, losing nearly half their numbers. With great difficulty Longstreet succeeded in bringing his men to charge again, after they had been driven from the ridge and the gorge to the south of it. He had put in now his last division, and his troops were exhausted by their repeated assaults.

In the mean time, General Garfield, about four o'clock P.M., after running the gauntlet of the enemy's fire on the left, reached Thomas, bringing him the first official intelligence of the disaster which had befallen the right of the army at noon. Garfield had left the field with Rosecrans, as we have seen, at the time of the disaster; as he now returned to it, he found the ridge just in rear of the point where the right had been beaten, held by

¹ "About 3 o'clock in the afternoon I asked the commanding general for some of the troops of the right wing, but was informed by him that they had been beaten so badly that they could be of no service to me. I had but one division [Preston's] that had not been engaged, and hesitated to put it in, as our distress upon our right seemed to be almost as great as that of the enemy upon his right."—*Longstreet's Report*.

² Such is the description given in Buckner's report. In regard to the topography of the battle-field, the writer of this chapter has been compelled to depend upon Confederate reports, not finding any fair description elsewhere. Rosecrans is usually very minute in the description of the topography of his campaigns; but he probably never sufficiently explored the battle-field of Chickamauga to describe it with any degree of accuracy.

Thomas's line, which at the same time still retained the Lafayette Road. It was to him a glorious moment. He alone, of all the army which then held the field, had witnessed the advance of Hood's irresistible columns and the wreck of a whole line of battle; and he alone, of all those who had left the field, was permitted to witness the magnificent spectacle of Longstreet's repulse from the ridge. It was the fulfillment of the promise which his own heart had whispered to itself when he parted company with Rosecrans near Rossville.¹

Shortly after Garfield's arrival, Thomas received a dispatch from General Rosecrans suggesting the withdrawal of the army to Rossville. Rosecrans had already learned from Garfield that Thomas was making a bold stand in the old tracks of the morning, and that the enemy was being repulsed. At half past five General Thomas ordered Reynolds to withdraw from his position. The line which had been assumed and obstinately held thus far, though strong in position, was weak in numbers. Only about twenty thousand men held the entire front from the Lafayette to the Dry Valley Road. Thomas, since noon, had been with his right. He saw that against the overwhelming numerical superiority of the enemy he could not hold out much longer. He, therefore, prepared to retire from the field. In passing from Wood's rear to Reynolds's position, to point out to the latter officer the position where he wished him to form line to cover the retirement of the divisions farther to the left, he found the enemy advancing in this direction to his rear. Upon this hostile force Reynolds was ordered to charge, and the enemy was driven beyond the left of the line. Wood, Brannan, and Granger were then withdrawn. Johnson's and Baird's divisions were attacked just as they were retiring, but they succeeded in moving from the field in order, and without serious loss.²

General Negley's presence at Rossville, where, with Sheridan's and Davis's assistance, he had rallied a considerable body of troops, and provided them with rations, was of very material assistance to General Thomas. But for these generals the retreat of the disorganized troops would have been continued to Chattanooga. Upon Thomas's arrival at Rossville, he posted Negley's division on the Ringgold Road; Reynolds's on Negley's right, stretching to the Dry Valley Road; Brannan's in reserve to Reynolds's right and rear; while McCook's corps extended from the Dry Valley Road nearly to Chattanooga Creek.

Bragg's army was too tired and too sadly worsted to attempt pursuit on the night of the 20th. On the 21st a few straggling blows were directed against the Federal army at Rossville. Thomas, feeling that he could not hold his position there against the Confederate army, suggested to Rosecrans that he be ordered to Chattanooga. The order was issued at 6 P.M. on the 21st, and by 7 o'clock the next morning Rosecrans's army was withdrawn to that place without opposition from the enemy.

Thus ended the battle. Though driven from the battle-field, the Federal army had succeeded in shutting the enemy out of Chattanooga. It had fought bravely, and had retired in good order, after having for two days held its position. Even the disaster upon its right on the 20th, taking from the field over 10,000 men, had not crushed its power of resistance. While it held the battle-field it repulsed every assault of the enemy, and withdrew only when its ammunition and supplies had given out, and it had become certain that its position could not be held for another day. The solitary advantage which the enemy had to show as a proof of his victory was his final possession of the battle-field. As to the numbers engaged on the Confederate side there are widely varying estimates.³ After an investigation

¹ There is a general misapprehension in regard to this ride of Garfield's to the front from Rossville, caused probably by the publication of explanatory letters from sources which ought to be authentic, but which are not so. Of this nature is a letter recently (during March, 1867) published in the *New York Citizen*. This letter, entitled "Rosecrans at Chickamauga—The Question Solved," is based entirely upon information given by a member of Rosecrans's staff. Now this member of Rosecrans's staff knew absolutely nothing of what he relates as to this matter. He makes Rosecrans "fall in" with Garfield at or near Rossville, whereas it was at this very point that Garfield parted with Rosecrans, after having been with him all the time from the beginning of the battle on the 19th. By a still wider error he makes Rosecrans receive reports at this point that Thomas continued to hold his position. Rosecrans received no such reports. Neither Garfield nor Rosecrans had any thing to guide them in their conduct at this time save their own inferences. As to Rosecrans "knowing that the fate of our army depended upon our holding Chattanooga," it is clear that any such dependence upon Chattanooga could only follow upon the defeat of the entire army. Until this utter rout was established the case was exactly reversed: the ability to hold Chattanooga depended upon the fate of the army. Again, Rosecrans is made to send Thomas orders by Garfield "to hold his position at all hazards until nightfall, and then to retire to Rossville." Rosecrans sent no order to Thomas by Garfield. A dispatch was sent later in the day to Thomas, ordering the latter to retire to Rossville. Moreover, it is stated that the only way for Rosecrans to reach Thomas "was via Rossville, and thence out on the east side of the ridge, it being impossible to cross the ridge at any intermediate point." Certainly the advance of the enemy had not been continued so far as to prevent the crossing of the ridge at any point north of McFarland's Gap; and there was no other difficulty. From McFarland's Gap Rosecrans could have certainly gone on horseback to Thomas with as much ease as troops were a short time afterward brought over precisely the same route which he would have taken, the only difference being that the direction was opposite. The enemy at no time during the battle penetrated to the road which Rosecrans would have taken. But did Rosecrans know that this route was clear for him? We answer, no. And it is here, and not in the fact that there was no such route, that Rosecrans can find his only apology. From what he could see, he suspected that Thomas was also defeated. He says in his official report:

"Giving the troops direction to rally behind the ridge west of the Dry Valley Road, I passed down it, accompanied by General Garfield, Major McMichael, and Major Bond, of my staff, and a few of the escort, under a shower of grape and canister and musketry, for two or three hundred yards, and attempted to rejoin General Thomas and the troops sent to his support by passing to the rear of the broken portion of our lines, but found the routed troops far toward the left; and, hearing the enemy's advancing musketry and cheers, I became doubtful whether the left had held its ground, and started for Rossville. On consultation and farther reflection, however, I determined to send General Garfield there, while I went to Chattanooga to give orders for the security of the pontoon bridges at Battle Creek and Bridgeport, and to make preliminary dispositions either to forward ammunition and supplies, should we hold our ground, or to withdraw the troops into good position."

The simple fact is that Rosecrans made a great mistake. He arrived too soon at the conviction that his whole army was defeated, and upon that conviction he went to Chattanooga, because he deemed it his duty to do so. The charge of cowardice, or of an apathetic abandonment of the field, which have been made against him, are too ridiculous to be even mentioned. Rosecrans was a general against whose bravery or patriotism there can rest no reproach.

² The Confederate reports indicate that the entire line was carried by assault, and that Thomas was driven. This was not the case. There was no serious assault. The enemy simply occupied a position deliberately abandoned by Thomas.

³ Rosecrans's estimate of the numbers opposed to him seems to us to be extravagant. He says

of the official returns of numbers from Bragg's army before the battle, and of the Confederate reports of the battle (which are very minute), we judge that the effective force of the enemy, including re-enforcements, amounted to 70,000 men, of whom 55,000 infantry and cavalry were directly engaged on the battle-field. Rosecrans was clearly outnumbered.¹ His entire army, including cavalry, was not far from 60,000 strong. His force actually engaged in the battle amounted to from 43,000 to 47,000 men.

The Federal army lost in the battle 1644 killed, and 9262 wounded. Bragg reports a capture of 8000 prisoners. Halleck's report (for 1863) estimates Rosecrans's missing as 4945. The loss in cavalry was 500, making a total Federal loss of 16,351. The Federal loss in artillery Bragg makes 51 guns, and Rosecrans 36 (meaning probably the net loss, subtracting from his entire loss the guns which had been captured from the enemy). The Confederate loss in killed and wounded largely exceeded that sustained by Rosecrans. Bragg reports a loss of two fifths of his command, but does not give the exact figures. Halleck, in his report, says that the Confederate journals admitted a total loss of 18,000. This is probably not far from the truth.² Bragg lost 2003 prisoners, leaving his loss in killed and wounded about 16,000.

(In a letter published after the battle): "The enemy reports a loss of 18,700 killed and wounded, and admits his loss to have been 20 per cent. of his entire command—a very large loss—which gave him 93,500 at Chickamauga." But this calculation is based upon a mistake which would actually double the enemy's numbers. Bragg distinctly states in his report that his loss amounted to two fifths (40 per cent.) of his entire command, which would give him—supposing his loss 18,700 (Bragg, however, does not state the exact number), 46,750 instead of 93,500. Rosecrans thinks one fifth of the numbers engaged "a very large loss." But in his official report of the battle he says, "I am fully satisfied that the enemy's loss largely exceeds ours." Now Rosecrans lost in killed and wounded 11,406, or more than one fifth of his own army.

Rosecrans (in the letter alluded to) arrives at this estimate of the enemy's numbers in another way. "Bragg," he says, "had 32,000 troops when driven from his entrenched camps at Shelbyville and Tullahoma, across the mountains and the Tennessee. Buckner joined with about 10,000 troops from East Tennessee, Johnston with about 25,000, and Longstreet with about 25,000 more, giving again 92,000 as his whole force." This also is a gross miscalculation. Bragg's force and Buckner's united, on June 20th (four days before Rosecrans advanced from Murfreesborough), amounted to 46,000 effectives—a larger estimate than Rosecrans gives. But we can find no evidence that Bragg had received 50,000 re-enforcements. At any rate, no such number was engaged in the battle. From the Army of Virginia about 12,000 men were sent under Longstreet, but Bragg reports that only 5000 of these arrived in time to participate in the battle. The re-enforcements from other sources actually engaged were B. R. Johnson's and Walker's commands, or about 15,000 men. Of Bragg's own army (the Army of Tennessee, including Buckner), the Confederate reports indicate that there were engaged about 27,000, exclusive of cavalry. This estimate would give the enemy about 47,000 infantry actually engaged at Chickamauga.

The estimate, as made up from the Confederate official reports, is the following:

| LONGSTREET'S COMMAND. | | POLK'S COMMAND. | |
|---|--------|--|--------|
| Buckner's Corps..... | 9,207 | Breckinridge's Division..... | 3,766 |
| Hindman's Division..... | 6,122 | Cleburne's Division..... | 5,115 |
| B. R. Johnson's Division..... | 3,633 | Walker's Corps..... | 6,975 |
| Longstreet's Corps (proper), consisting of Hood's and McLaws's Divisions..... | 5,000 | Cheatham's Division (approximate)..... | 7,500 |
| | 24,012 | | 23,356 |
| | | | 24,012 |
| | | | 47,371 |

There is good reason to believe that Bragg underestimates the number of Longstreet's own troops when he puts it at 5000. Longstreet had five brigades, three under Hood (Law's, Benning's, and Robertson's), and two under McLaws (Kershaw's and Humphreys's). Kershaw had all the regiments which he had at Chancellorsville, and the Eighth North Carolina in addition. He must have had at least 2000 men. Giving Humphreys 1500 men, and Hood's three brigades 3500 (a moderate estimate in either case), Longstreet's proper command (engaged) numbered 7000. This would make the entire infantry force of the enemy, in round numbers, 50,000. The cavalry force engaged probably numbered 5000, making a total of 55,000.

This army was composed of regiments from each of the eleven Confederate States, and from Kentucky. All together there were about 115 regiments and 11 battalions; and the battalions would have made about four regiments of the average size. The average for each regiment was little over 400 men. Forty-four regiments—a little over one third of the army—were from Tennessee. Over 20 were from Alabama; 19 from Mississippi; 5 from Kentucky; 13 from Arkansas, and about the same number from South Carolina; 5 from Texas; 15 or 16 from Georgia; 6 from Louisiana; 8 from Florida; 7 from North Carolina; and from Virginia only 2. The Virginians were all in Buckner's command. B. R. Johnson's command, which Greeley (*Am. Conflict*, vol. ii., p. 415) makes consist of Virginians, had not a Virginia regiment. Cheatham's division consisted almost wholly of Tennesseans. Humphreys's brigade was made up of Mississippians entirely, and Kershaw's entirely of Carolinians.

The estimate of Bragg's army which we have been considering is for the forces actually engaged. The estimate for his whole army would be largely above this. Just before his retreat from Chattanooga he had 45,000 effectives. His re-enforcements, and the additions made to his cavalry by recruiting, before the battle, increased this force to over 70,000.

¹ The last official returns from Rosecrans's army before the battle are those of August 31st. C. Goddard, A. A. G. of Rosecrans's staff, quoting from these returns, gives the following as the effective force of the several divisions:

| | | | | | |
|------------------|-----------------|--------|------------------------------|-------------------|--------|
| Fourteenth Corps | Baird's..... | 5,792 | Twenty-first Corps | Wood's..... | 2,664 |
| | Negley's..... | 5,130 | | Palmer's..... | 5,703 |
| | Brannan's..... | 6,615 | | Van Cleave's..... | 5,308 |
| | Reynolds's..... | 6,625 | | | 13,675 |
| | | 24,172 | Granger's Reserve Corps..... | | 4,500 |
| Twentieth Corps | Davis's..... | 4,386 | | | 13,675 |
| | Johnson's..... | 5,007 | | | 14,345 |
| | Sheridan's..... | 4,352 | | | 24,072 |
| | | | 14,345 | | 53,822 |

This estimate includes the entire infantry force, with the exception of Wagner's brigade left at Chattanooga. Goddard says: "I am morally certain that these returns, made previous to crossing the Tennessee, show a considerably larger force than took active part in the battle. What percentage should be deducted I can not well say. . . . There was a regiment left at Crawfish, I think to guard the hospital. That, with the details for train guards, hospital and ambulance attendance, etc., would, I think, reduce the fighting strength at least 3000 men. I made a rough estimate at Crawfish, and put down our effectives at about 42,000, which was, I think, not far from right."

It is probable that much more than 3000 men were detailed—it would not be unfair to say 5000. Deducting this and Granger's force—which only came up at the close of the battle, and after a force more than double his own had been swept from the field—and we have left 47,392. As the cavalry on the 19th and 20th was almost entirely detached to guard the exposed flanks of the army, it ought not to be estimated as a part of the force actually engaged on the field. Rosecrans's army, all told, cavalry and infantry, numbered nearly 60,000 just before the battle.

² The Confederate reports give the losses in all the brigades excepting those of Gist's, Ector's, and those of Hood, McLaws's, and Cheatham's divisions. Leaving out these 10 brigades, the loss in these several commands is as follows:

| | Killed. | Wounded. | Missing. | Total. | Per Cent. |
|-------------------------------|---------|----------|----------|--------|-----------|
| Wilson's Brigade..... | 99 | 423 | 80 | 605 | .50 |
| Buckner's Corps..... | 908 | 2575 | 90 | 2,969 | .43 |
| Breckinridge's Division..... | 166 | 909 | 165 | 1,240 | .33 |
| Cleburne's Division..... | 204 | 1339 | 6 | 1,549 | .34 |
| Hindman's Division..... | 272 | 1480 | 88 | 1,850 | .30 |
| Liddell's Division..... | 162 | 963 | 277 | 1,402 | .44 |
| B. R. Johnson's Division..... | 188 | 1051 | 106 | 1,435 | .43 |
| Total..... | 1394 | 8974 | 882 | 11,250 | .36 |

Ector's loss was about the same as Wilson's. Ector and Wilson's brigades numbered together 2400 before going into action. They lost more than half. Gist's loss is not reported, but was at least 400. The greater part of Cheatham's division was held in reserve on the 20th; but his loss on the 19th was severe. In all he must have lost 1600 men. Thus, leaving out the casualties in Longstreet's own corps, we have,

| | |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| From precise data..... | 11,250 |
| Ector's Brigade (estimated)..... | 600 |
| Gist's Brigade (estimated)..... | 400 |
| Cheatham's Division (estimated)..... | 1600 |
| | 13,850, or about 34 per cent. |