

CHAPTER XXXI.
THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN.

I. THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND.

The Beginnings of the Army.—Rousseau's Command at Camp Joe Holt, 1861.—Creation of the Department of the Cumberland; it includes Kentucky and Tennessee; General Robert Anderson its first Commander.—General W. T. Sherman succeeds Anderson, October, 1861.—Is succeeded by Buell in November.—The Department of the Cumberland becomes the Department of the Ohio, including Ohio, Indiana, and Michigan.—Kentucky and Tennessee soon absorbed by Halleck's Department of the Missouri.—Buell's Command styled "the District of the Ohio."—Rosecrans succeeds Buell, October 30, 1862, and the Department of the Cumberland is revived.—The Fourteenth Army Corps.—General Buell's Record.—Estimate of Rosecrans's Military Career; his Disadvantages; his subordinate Commanders, Generals Thomas, McCook, Crittenden, and Stanley.—The Organization of the Army.—Deficiency in Cavalry.—The Battle of Stone River undecided.—Fortification of Murfreesborough.—Confederate Attack on Fort Donelson.—Actions at Spring Hill and Franklin.—Capture of McMinnville.—Colonel Straight's Raid; his Capture and Escape.—Rosecrans urged to Advance.—Decision of his War Council.—Waiting for Grant.

THE campaign for the possession of Chattanooga began with Rosecrans's advance from Murfreesborough on the 24th of June, 1863, and terminated with General Bragg's defeat on the 25th of November, just five months and one day afterward. The secure tenure of Chattanooga cost two great battles, involving a loss on both sides—if we include the killed and wounded in these battles and during the siege of Knoxville—of over 50,000 men. This campaign had two well-defined periods. With the first of these, which closed when General Rosecrans was relieved of his command (October 19th, 1863), the Army of the Cumberland is alone directly connected.

The organization of this army had its beginning in a little band of Kentuckians, summoned to Camp Joe Holt, near Louisville, early in 1861. This body of volunteers was commanded by Colonel, afterward Major General Lovell H. Rousseau, who, understanding that war must for a time silence statesmanship, had left his seat in the Kentucky Senate, and rallied about him the loyalists of his State. His eloquence, courage, and patriotism found a clear and positive utterance in this unsettled period, when Kentuckians were wavering between secession and loyalty, bound on one side by the ties of kindred and association, on the other by a strong sentiment in favor of the Union. Under the influence of the words and examples of such men as Rousseau and Anderson, this sentiment became dominant over sectional interests, and was ardently espoused by the greater portion of the state. In answer to Rousseau's call, a force of nearly 2000 men was soon assembled in his encampment. At Camp Dick Robinson there was a similar force under General Nelson, and on the 15th of August, 1861, Kentucky and Tennessee were constituted a separate military district, known as the Department of the Cumberland. General Robert Anderson, the hero of Fort Sumter, was the first commander of this department, General W. T. Sherman being second in command. Sherman succeeded Anderson in October, 1861, and established his camp on Muldraugh's Hill, about 40 miles south of Louisville. Here he awaited the arrival of troops from the states north of the Ohio. These came promptly forward, so that before the close of the year there was assembled an army of 70,000 men, over 20,000 of whom were Kentuckians.

In November Sherman was succeeded by Buell. With this change of command the Department of the Cumberland became the Department of the Ohio—Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio being added to its content, while that portion of Kentucky lying west of the Cumberland River was transferred to the Department of the Missouri, then commanded by General Halleck. Subsequently (in March, 1862), Halleck's department was extended eastward to a north and south line passing through Knoxville, and was designated the Department of the Mississippi; three months later it included all of Kentucky and Tennessee, Buell's command being then known as the "District of the Ohio." When Rosecrans succeeded Buell (October 30, 1862), the title of his command was again changed, the Department of the Cumberland being revived, including all of Tennessee and Kentucky east of the Tennessee River, and such parts of Northern Alabama and Georgia as should be conquered by the United States troops. At the same time, the Department of the Tennessee, General Grant's command, comprised Cairo, Forts Henry and Donelson, and all of Kentucky and Tennessee west of the Tennessee River. Grant's troops were designated the Thirteenth, and those of Rosecrans the Fourteenth Army Corps.

The army which thus came under Rosecrans's command had an unstained record. Under Anderson and Sherman it had been but the nucleus of an army. Buell made it formidable in numbers, and perfect in organization and discipline; he created the Army of the Cumberland. Portions of it fought at Picketon, Prestonburg, Middle Creek, Pound Gap, and Mill Spring, but the whole army was engaged in battle for the first time at Shiloh, where, on the second day, it went into the fight in as perfect order as if it had fought a score of battles.

The superseding of Buell by Rosecrans was owing to a general lack of confidence in the former commander. During the space of nearly a year he had organized and disciplined a great army, but he had done little with it; he had gained no grand, positive success. The defeat of Bragg in Kentucky would have made Buell the great military hero of 1862. But Bragg escaped, after having compelled the Federal army to abandon its advanced position—escaped without a battle, except that of Perryville, which was precipitated by General McCook's disobedience of orders. The people were disappointed. Halleck had become dissatisfied with General Buell. Nothing but Thomas's urgent remonstrance had prevented him from making a change in the command when the Federal army reached Louisville, in the fall of 1862. Thomas declined the command which was then offered him, and urged the retention of Buell. After Bragg's retreat, Buell was court-

ed for the affair at Perryville, but was acquitted and restored to the command. But scarcely had this been done when he was again removed, and ordered to relieve General Banks in the Department of the Gulf. Learning that the change had been made by the President immediately on the receipt of a protest from Andrew Johnson, then Military Governor of Tennessee, he very properly declined to accept the new appointment. The command of the Army of the Cumberland should have naturally devolved upon General Thomas after Buell's removal, but it so happened that just at this time it had become impossible for General Rosecrans to remain any longer in the same military department with General Grant, and Halleck gave him the Army of the Cumberland. General Buell in some respects bore a remarkable resemblance to General Thomas. In temperament they were alike. Both were cool in the presence of danger. Both were perfect soldiers in bearing, courage, and honor. It is impossible fairly to criticize Buell's military career, because it was so soon concluded. If he had any great military fault, it was an excessive regard for regularity. This was of great value in the discipline of a large army, but might easily prove an impediment in the conduct of a campaign. He was a good tactician; he was a general of extraordinary energy; yet he lacked dash and brilliancy of movement. He excited no enthusiasm, and enthusiasm is the element upon which a volunteer army mainly lives and moves. If he lacked some of the excellencies which characterized our more brilliant leaders, he was also free from many of their prominent weaknesses. He was never petulant or impatient, and never lost his dignity. He was incapable of dishonor, and the charges which were made against him in 1862, impeaching his patriotism, were unjust, and, on the part of those who ought to have known him better, were malicious.

No general could have been more widely different to Buell than his successor, General Rosecrans. Personally, and as regards physical temperament, they were as far apart as the antipodes. Nature had done little to fit Rosecrans for the highest requirements of generalship. He was too courageous to avoid danger or responsibility, yet the most critical moment of a battle would sometimes find him beside himself with nervous excitement. To such a temperament, in any large field of human effort, the highest order of achievements is denied. Other things being equal, the best general is he who has the most self-control at the decisive moment, whose powers are in his most instant command, and to whom the hour of embarrassment or of peril comes, not fraught with confusion, but pregnant with suggestion. It is in such hours that battles are lost or won—lost, in nearly every instance, by the over-excitable general; and, in nearly every instance, won by the cool, self-possessed commander, who, seeing only the chances of success, is blind to the tokens of possible defeat. Rosecrans fought unequally. His early campaigns in West Virginia were in every particular admirably conducted. He very soon had the mortification of seeing other officers, who had effected less, absorb his command, and other and less promising plans adopted in preference to his own. After assuming command of the Army of the Mississippi (June 27, 1862), he fought well at Iuka and Corinth. He had never lost a battle before he took the Army of the Cumberland. His military career had been so successful as to command popular confidence, and great expectations were entertained of him, which were not fully realized.

Rosecrans was a general of more than ordinary ability. His plans were often brilliant, and led often to successful results. Then, again, they would be elaborate to an almost absurd degree, and so faulty as to embarrass himself rather than the enemy. His strategy at one time excites our admiration, and at another appals us with its manifest weakness. Now we feel that he is conducting a magnificent campaign, and the next moment he seems to be playing with his army. After weeks of steady and almost sleepless activity in preparing for movement, we behold him advancing, and at length—after a series of manœuvres, some of them admirable, and some of them, as likely as not, desperately short-sighted—in the presence of the enemy, we find him in a state of undue excitement, without any definite plan, knowing nothing about the hostile army, and incompetent to take his proper place as a commander on the field. Military critics will differ widely in their estimate of General Rosecrans; but he must be unjust who can not find much in him to admire, and he must be a very partial judge indeed who, after a mature consideration of Rosecrans's campaigns from November, 1862, to October, 1863, can pronounce him fully equal to his duties as a commander. At the same time it must be remembered that Rosecrans labored under great disadvantages, both from the difficult nature of the country through which he moved, and from the inadequate support which he received from the War Department. And so much is due to accident, or to favoring circumstances, in the final estimate which is made of public men, that probably Rosecrans, if he had had competent subordinates, and had outnumbered the enemy in his later campaigns, instead of being himself outnumbered, would to-day rank among the first generals of the war, and his faults have all been forgotten. Faults, so easily forgiven in those who succeed (upon whatsoever their success may have depended), fall with crushing weight upon those who fail.

The army which Rosecrans received from Buell was not what it had been. The ardor with which its soldiers had enlisted had been quenched by a year of fruitless labor. Over one third of the army (33,000 men) were in hospitals, on furlough, or numbered among the deserters. Every stage of Rosecrans's advance called for a strong detail of men for garrison duty. The cavalry arm of the service was far inferior to that of the enemy, and long lines of communication had to be guarded with extreme caution. The enemy, on the other hand, operating in a friendly country, could make his entire force effective against Rosecrans.

Very little alteration was made in the organization of the Army of the Cumberland on the change of its commanders. Its composition remained the same. It consisted, in about equal proportions, of veterans and raw recruits—the latter, of course, destitute of discipline, and the former poorly clothed and equipped. Thomas was given an active command, and Brigadier General Gilbert was relieved, and detailed for the protection of the railroad north of Bowling Green.

Major General George H. Thomas, commanding the centre of the army, consisting of Fry's, Rousseau's, Negley's, Dumont's, and Palmer's divisions, was Rosecrans's best general. He was now forty-six years of age. He had received a thorough military education, and acquired considerable military experience in the Florida and Mexican campaigns. At the beginning of the civil war he fought in Virginia, under Patterson and Banks, and received his appointment as brigadier general of volunteers August 17, 1861, when he was removed from Virginia to General Anderson's command. Here, early in 1862, he fought the battle of Mill Spring. From March of that year until the advance upon Corinth, his division, located at Nashville, constituted the reserve of Buell's army. He was, on the 25th of April, 1862, appointed major general of volunteers. A week later his division was transferred to the Army of the Tennessee, and he was assigned by General Halleck to the command of the right wing of that army. In June his command rejoined Buell. Upon the retreat of the latter to Louisville, Thomas was appointed his second in command. After the battle of Stone River, the Army of the Cumberland, under Rosecrans, was divided into three corps—the Fourteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-first—General Thomas commanding the Fourteenth, which consisted of five divisions, under Rousseau, Negley, J. J. Reynolds, Fry, and R. B. Mitchell.

Major General Alexander McDowell McCook, who commanded the Twentieth Corps of Rosecrans's army, was a native of Ohio, and about thirty years of age. He was a graduate of West Point, and in 1858 had been assigned to that institution as instructor in tactics and in the art of war. He was relieved from this position at the opening of the war, and appointed colonel of the First Ohio Regiment. With this regiment he fought at Bull Run. On the 3d of September, 1861, he was made a brigadier general of volunteers, and given a command in Kentucky. In his camp on Green River he organized the Second Division, with which he fought at Shiloh on the second day of that battle. In the movement on Corinth he commanded the advance of Buell's army. He fought the battle of Perryville against orders, but with determined bravery. He commanded the right wing of Rosecrans's army at Stone River, where he was driven back by the overwhelming forces of the enemy. Although a brave soldier, he was better fitted for a division than a corps commander.

The same judgment may be passed upon Major General Crittenden, commanding the Twenty-first Corps. Before the war his military education and experience had been confined to his service in the Mexican War as aide-camp to General Taylor. He was a Kentuckian, being the second son of Hon. John J. Crittenden. His elder brother George was in the Confederate army. He was of about the same age as General Thomas. If Generals McCook and Crittenden, who may be termed two of Rosecrans's "disadvantages," had been displaced by more competent officers, the history of the Army of the Cumberland would have been materially changed.

Major General David S. Stanley, who had been, at Rosecrans's request, transferred from the Army of the Mississippi to take the command of the cavalry of the Army of the Cumberland, was an officer whose great worth Rosecrans had already learned to appreciate. He graduated at West Point in the class of 1852, which numbered among its members McCook, Hartsuff, Slocum, and Sheridan. At the beginning of the war he was stationed at Fort Smith, in Arkansas. He fought under Lyon at Dug Springs and Wilson's Creek, and afterward joined Fremont in the movement on Springfield. He was appointed brigadier general of volunteers September 28th, 1861. Early in 1862 he joined General Pope's command, and his division was the first to occupy the trenches before New Madrid. In the advance on Corinth he commanded the Second Division of the Army of the Mississippi. In the battle of Corinth this division especially distinguished itself, holding the left centre, supporting Battery Robinette. Stanley joined Rosecrans at Nashville in November, 1862, and devoted himself to the reorganization of the cavalry of the Army of the Cumberland.

The departments of no army were ever more completely organized or more efficient in their operation than those of Rosecrans's. Take the matter of supplies for an example. No general ever was beset by greater difficulties in this respect. He was in a barren and hostile country, and the entire subsistence of his army must be transported over a distance of from one to more than two hundred miles, either by a railroad exposed at many points to interruption from the enemy's cavalry, or by the Cumberland River, which, during a considerable portion of the year, was too low for navigation. Yet the soldiers never wanted food. In other respects they were equally well provided for. To facilitate the advance of the army, a Pioneer brigade was organized, consisting of about 3000 men, commanded by James St. Clair Morton. Every measure was taken to learn the plans and forces of the enemy; the secret service of the Army of the Cumberland was one of its characteristic excellencies, and well repaid the \$10,000 per month which it cost the government. It was a service to which Rosecrans was very partial. He was the most Jesuitical of generals, and would himself have made a capital spy. It was in appreciation, probably, of his abundant mental resources in this direction that the title of "the wily Dutchman" was given him, both by ourselves and the enemy.

Before and for a long time after the battle of Stone River the enemy's superior cavalry force was a source of great anxiety and embarrassment to

Rosecrans. He fought stubbornly with the War Department for the means of increasing the numbers and efficiency of this arm of the service. He wanted good horses, saddles, and revolving carbines, and his importunity in asking for them seems to have only had the effect of vexing General Halleck. His requests were always urgent, but respectful. "I must have," he writes, January 14, 1863, "cavalry or mounted infantry. I could mount infantry had I horses and saddles. . . . With mounted infantry I can drive the rebel cavalry to the wall, and keep the roads open in my rear. Not so now. . . . Will you authorize the purchase of saddles and horses for mounting, when requisite, 5000 more infantry?" "Why," he asks, two weeks later, "should the rebels command the country which, with its resources, would belong to our army, because they can muster the small percentage of six or eight thousand more cavalry than we?" Toward the close of March he again reminds the general-in-chief of his need. "Let it be clearly understood," he writes, "that the enemy have five to our one, and can, therefore, command the resources of the country and the services of the inhabitants." By this time he had gained permission to mount 5000 infantry, and had succeeded in mounting 2000. But he was unable to mass his cavalry for expeditions, because they were occupied on picket duty. General Rousseau offered to raise 8000 or 10,000 infantry to increase the cavalry force if the government would mount and arm them, but he seems to have received no assurance that this would be done until the middle of summer. Of the cavalry force in hand, only forty per cent. was available for want of horses. This deficiency was repeatedly urged, but the horses were not furnished.²

Let us do Rosecrans ample justice in this matter. We can not over-estimate his embarrassment arising from a deficient cavalry force. What was done for Grant by the gun-boats could be done for Rosecrans only by a large and well-equipped force of cavalry or mounted infantry. It is probable that his urgent representations at length opened the eyes of the War De-

¹ Report of Congressional Committee on Rosecrans's Campaigns, p. 39.

² The two following letters to General Meigs and Secretary Stanton indicate Rosecrans's situation in respect of cavalry:

"Murfreesborough, May 10, 1863.
"GENERAL.—Your letter of the 1st instant, on the subject of cavalry horses, was yesterday received and carefully considered. I thank you for taking pains to write so fully. I will explain to you, with equal care, the true state of the case in this army, for I find you have fallen into quite a number of errors on the subject.

"1st. It is a fact that up to the 1st instant our total supply of cavalry horses was as follows:

Cavalry horses on hand.....	6537
Mounted infantry.....	1938
Total.....	8475
Less, at least one quarter, are not serviceable.....	2119
Making cavalry mounted not over.....	6356

"But when these troops are called out, we have at no time been able to turn out more than 5000 for active duty. The other cavalry horses, reported by Colonel Taylor, were:

Escorts and orderlies.....	2028
Unserviceable in Nashville.....	975
	3003

"You will thus see that we have not the cavalry you suppose. We are using the most strenuous and unremitting efforts to increase in care of horses and the efficiency of this arm.

"2d. But I must call your attention to the fact that this small cavalry force, effectively not half that is required for a permanent garrison of infantry equal to that of this army, have to furnish pickets, scouts, and couriers for Fort Donelson, Clarksville, Nashville, Gallatin, Carthage, and the front of this army from Franklin to this place, twenty-eight miles. You may thus form some idea of the labor imposed on our cavalry, and how our horses are worn out so rapidly.

"3d. As to the actual work of this arm, besides the routine labor, you will find it has some expedition or fight in mass nearly every week, and as yet without a single failure.

"4th. As to expeditions, we have not a sufficiently strong cavalry force to drive that of the enemy to the wall, or to risk detachments for the enterprises of which you speak to the rear of the rebels. The one which I did send out under Colonel Streight, in spite of our precautions, was captured by the superior cavalry force of the enemy, detached from Granger's front at Franklin, where Van Dorn has still left about four to our one.

"5th. As to forage, our want is for long forage, and is owing to the impossibility of getting transportation either by water or rail. You must remember we are 220 miles from our base of supplies at Louisville. You may rely on it, I am fully alive to all you have suggested, and ask for nothing which I am not fully satisfied will be an ample economy to the service. Had we a cavalry force equal to that of the enemy, we would have commanded all the forage of the country—commanded information of its inhabitants, upon whose fears we, instead of they, would thus be able to operate.

"As to the comparative number of cavalry in our and other armies, I am sure you are mistaken as to Russia at least, which has 80,000 regular cavalry, while all the outpost, picket, and courier duty is done by irregular cavalry. But, even were it otherwise, I know what cavalry would do for us here. I am not mistaken in saying that this great army would gain more from 10,000 effective cavalry than from 20,000 infantry. W. S. ROSECRANS, Major General Commanding.

"Brigadier General M. C. MEIGS, Quarter-master General, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C."

"Winchester, July 26, 1863.

"Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War:

"As you approve of General Rousseau's suggestions and views as to the advantage of raising an additional amount of force of 10,000 men to operate against the rebels from this direction, I have sent him to Washington with letters to yourself and General Halleck, and directed him to lay before you the plan which he has of obtaining from the disciplined troops recently mustered out of service in the East such a mounted force as would enable us to command the country south of us, and control its resources, cut off the enemy's means of drawing supplies from the country, destroy his lines of communication, and restore law and order to the entire country from which we have expelled the insurgents—a thing now impossible, because no one desires to avow his sentiments for fear the rebel cavalry or guerrillas will wreak vengeance on him. At the expense of repeating what I have so often laid before the War Department when urging the necessity of cavalry arms for the force we actually had in pay, but badly armed and mounted, I beg leave to state:

"1st. An adequate cavalry force would have given us control of all Middle Tennessee, with all its forage, horses, cattle, and mules, and driven the enemy from it without the battle of Stone River, and re-established civil order.

"2d. It would save us 5000 infantry now guarding our lines of communication, and the attendant expense.

"3d. We could have destroyed the enemy's lines of communication, and compelled him to relinquish East Tennessee and Chattanooga, and return to Atlanta.

"4th. We could have developed, by giving protection to the Union sentiment, which does not manifest itself much beyond the limits of our infantry lines, for fear of calling down the vengeance of the rebel cavalry and guerrillas, whose superior numbers and knowledge of the country have hitherto given almost exclusive control of it. As we advance we shall have the same condition of things renewed on our front, and must take with us a superior cavalry force to insure success. We should, moreover, require additional mounted force to control the country, protect the roads in our rear, exterminate guerrillas, and give confidence to the population, who will then readily furnish us with supplies, and give us information that will aid us to put down brigandage, and thus relieve us from the necessities of detachments of infantry at many points where otherwise they will be indispensable. The importance of General Rousseau's mission may be inferred from the value I attach to cavalry force to operate in connection with this army. To all these uses of cavalry I will add another no less important. Should we succeed in disorganizing the enemy's force, a powerful cavalry force will enable us to harass and destroy his communications, and thus make him an easy prey.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"W. S. ROSECRANS, Major General."

partment for the first time to the incalculable value of well-mounted cavalry. We find, at any rate, that after this period the Federal cavalry force was gradually increased and improved; but the change came too late to very materially assist Rosecrans, who, of all our commanders, was in most need of it.

Just before the battle of Stone River the Army of the Cumberland numbered 47,000 men, of whom little more than 3000 were cavalry. We have already, in a previous chapter, brought down the military operations of this army to the conclusion of the battle of Stone River. Before this battle Rosecrans had for some time been pressed to advance, but he found it hazardous to do so until Bragg had sent away his cavalry on distant expeditions. Yet so little were his real difficulties appreciated at Washington, that Halleck, in a long letter of instructions, had directed him to march to East Tennessee, a distance of over 240 miles, through a barren and mountainous region, and at the beginning of the most inclement season of the year. Even if the advance had been possible, Rosecrans's cavalry would have been ludicrously incompetent to protect his long line of communications, thus leaving the way open for Bragg to Nashville and the Ohio River.

The battle of Stone River was not decisive. Rosecrans inflicted upon Bragg greater damage than he received, and drove him from the field. It is a fact which can not be disputed, that the enemy had the advantage of superior numbers. The Federal army went into the battle 43,000 strong, and when it occupied Murfreesborough, January 5, numbered little more than 30,000. Neither army was in a condition, after the battle, to resume the offensive. The Army of the Cumberland had lost some of its bravest officers. Among these were its youngest brigadier general, J. W. Sill, who had been one of the first to join Sherman at Muldraugh's Hill in 1861; Colonel J. P. Garesché, chief of staff to General Rosecrans, whose head was

blown away by a cannon ball while he was riding over the field in execution of a special mission for his commander; and Colonels Roberts, Milliken, Shaeffer, McKee, Reed, Forman, Jones, Hawkins, and Kell. Brigadier General James A. Garfield, the hero of Middle Creek, succeeded Garesché as Rosecrans's chief of staff. This officer's skill and bravery on the battle-field was only equaled by the talent and uncompromising patriotism which he afterward displayed in the political arena.

After its occupation by the Army of the Cumberland, Murfreesborough was fortified and made a dépôt of supplies. Here the army remained encamped for six months, while General Grant was conducting the Vicksburg campaign. The rainy season soon began, but, while interfering with offensive operations, it swelled the waters of the Cumberland, and facilitated the accumulation of supplies. The monotony of camp life was relieved only by foraging excursions and encounters with the Confederate cavalry. These were conducted at some risk. Not unfrequently the men and wagons were picked up by the enemy, who succeeded sometimes, also, in capturing and burning a transport on the river.

An attempt was made by the Confederates, early in February, to obstruct the navigation of the Cumberland by the recapture of Fort Donelson. On the third of that month, Forrest, Wheeler, and Wharton advanced upon the fort from above and below, with eleven regiments of cavalry and nine guns. The garrison defending Fort Donelson at this time consisted of nine companies of the Eighty-third Illinois, with a battalion of the Fifth Iowa cavalry, and numbered less than 800 men, under the command of Colonel A. C. Harding. The only artillery defense was a battery of four rifled pieces and a single 32-pounder siege gun. A little after noon Harding was summoned to surrender, and promptly refused. The attack was then commenced. The defense was gallantly conducted, and after repeated charges, which cost them



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upward of 1000 men, the Confederates retired. Harding's loss was 16 killed, 60 wounded, and 50 prisoners.

On the 5th of March a Federal brigade, numbering 1306 men, under Colonel John Coburn, was surrounded and captured by Forrest's and Van Dorn's cavalry near Spring Hill. The cavalry and artillery of the command escaped. The Confederate force consisted of six brigades, under Generals Van Dorn, French, Armstrong, Crosby, Martin, and Jackson.

A fortnight later, Colonel A. S. Hall, with about 1400 men, encountered the Confederate General John Morgan at Milton, twelve miles northeast of Murfreesborough. Morgan attacked with a force numbering nearly 2000 men, and, after a fight of three and a half hours, withdrew from the field, defeated. The Confederate loss was about 400. Hall lost 60, killed, wounded, and missing.

About the middle of April, Van Dorn, with 9000 men, attacked General Gordon Granger's force at Franklin, consisting of Baird's and Gilbert's divisions, 1600 men and 16 guns, and Generals Smith's and Stanley's cavalry brigades of 2700 men, with four guns. The defense was materially assisted by an uncompleted fort, mounting two siege and two rifled guns, and commanding the northern approaches to Franklin. The attack was repulsed, the enemy losing about 300 men, and General Granger 37.

McMinnville, a few miles southeast of Murfreesborough, was captured on the 21st of April by General Reynolds's division, Colonel Wilder's mounted brigade, and a cavalry force under Colonel Minty, 1700 strong. About 700 Confederates were dispersed, and a few wagons taken.

In the mean time Colonel A. D. Streight had been given the command of an independent provisional brigade, consisting of his own regiment (the Fifty-first Indiana), the Eightieth Illinois, and portions of two Ohio regiments, numbering all together about 1800 men. Colonel Streight early in

April received instructions to proceed to Northern Georgia, to cut the railroads in Bragg's rear, and destroy all dépôts of supplies, manufactories of arms, clothing, etc.¹

¹ The following is a copy of the instructions given to Colonel Streight:

"Headquarters, Department of the Cumberland, Murfreesborough, April 8, 1863.
 "Colonel A. D. Streight, Fifty-first Indiana Volunteers:
 "By Special Field Orders No. 94, Paragraph VIII., you have been assigned to the command of an independent provisional brigade for temporary purposes. After fitting out your command with equipments and supplies, as you have already been directed in the verbal instructions of the general commanding this department, you will proceed, by a route of which you will be advised by telegraph, to some good steamboat-landing on the Tennessee River, not far above Fort Henry, where you will embark your command and proceed up the river. At Hamburg you will communicate with Brigadier General Dodge, who will probably have a messenger there awaiting your arrival. If it should then appear unsafe to move farther up the river, you will debark at Hamburg, and without delay join the force of General Dodge, which will then be en route for Iuka, Mississippi. If, however, it should be deemed safe, you will land at Eastport and form a junction with General Dodge. From that point you will then march in conjunction with him to menace Tusculum; but you will not wait to join in the attack unless it should be necessary for the safety of General Dodge's command or your own, or unless some considerable advantage can be gained over the enemy without interfering with the general object of your expedition. After having marched long enough with General Dodge to create a general impression that you are a part of his expedition, you will push to the southward, and reach Russellville or Moulton. From there your route will be governed by circumstances; but you will, with all reasonable dispatch, push on to Western Georgia and cut the railroads which supply the rebel army by way of Chattanooga. To accomplish this is the chief object of your expedition, and you must not allow collateral or incidental schemes, even though promising great results, to delay you so as to endanger your return. Your quarter-master has been furnished with funds sufficient for the necessary expenses of your command. You will draw your supplies and keep your command well mounted from the country through which you pass. For all property taken for the legitimate use of your command, you will make cash payments in full to men of undoubted loyalty; give the usual conditional receipts to men whose loyalty is doubtful; but to rebels nothing. You are particularly commanded to restrain your command from pillage and marauding. You will destroy all dépôts of supplies for the rebel army, all manufactories of guns, ammunition, equipments, and clothing for their use, which you can, without delaying you so as to endanger your return. That you may not be trammelled with minute instructions, nothing farther will be ordered than this general outline of policy and operation. In intrusting this highly important and somewhat perilous expedition to your charge, the general commanding places great reliance upon your prudence, energy, and valor, and the well-attested bravery and endurance of the officers and men in your command. Whenever it is possible and reasonably safe, send us word of your progress. You may return by way of Northern

