CHAPTER XXIII.

THE INVASION OF MARYLAND.—ANTIETAM.

Result of the Campaign in Virginia.—The Invasion of the North.—Maryland! my Maryland! Jackson's Scheme.—Lee's Design.—The Fleece.—The Confederate Army.—Lee's Address to the People of Maryland.—His Reception.—The Command given to McClellan.—The Shenandoah Valley invaded.—The Armies met.—The Battle.—Lee's Loss.—Stonewall Jackson's Death.—The Confederate Left.—Lee's Adjournment of the Congress.—McClellan advanee.—Battle at Turner's Gap.—McClellan and Hancock.—McClellan advances across the Antietan.—The Battlefield of Antietam.—Approach of the Union Forces.—Imprudence of McClellan.—Bengal Tiger.—A Plan of Battle for the next Day.—Hooker attacks the Confederate Left.—It would be necessary to turn Lee's Center and rear attacks the Left and Center.—Sedgwick repulsed.—On the Left.—The Fight in the Country.—Preparation of Action at Nine.—Arrival of Generals with General Lee.—The Rebel Army.—Lee crosses the Antietam and drives back the Enemy.—A. P. Hill comes up from Harper's Ferry.—Burnside repels.—Ours the Victory.—Iron in and out of Action.—Estimate of Losses.—Results of the Battle.—The President's Speech.—Lee's Letter freeing the Slaves.—After the Battle.—Lee crosses the Potomac.—Affair at Sharpsburg.—McClellan and the Administration.—Lee's Message to Congress.—Lee's Letter to McClellan on September 15—He crosses the Potomac.—Advances toward Warrensburg.—Lee moves to Culpepper.—Position of the Armies.—McClellan removed from Command, and Burnside appointed.

In the brief campaign, lasting only twenty days from the time when the first shots were fired at Bull Run, and only a week after the decisive movement for taking Pope's army in the rear was commenced, Lee had accomplished more than he had ventured to hope. Not only had the siege of Richmond been raised, but Virginia was virtually freed from the presence of the Federal armies; the main part of the force which had threatened the capital had been driven out of Maryland, and the enemy's advance into the state, and bring offance; both should advance uponly thearrisbug, and thence upon Phila-ton, and of all the troops for the defense of the capital."

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 lied on the Shenandoah Valley to Washington overnment to retain all its available force to provide this been organized by McClellan that, in spite of the shock which it had

ard after, and the Army of the Shenandoah Valley was driven out of Maryland. It was right, he said, that they should know, as far as concerned them, the purpose which had brought the Confederate army into the state. "The people of the Confederate States had long watched the wrongs and outrages which had been in-22,000 troops, for he was determined that every man of them should suffer for their great privations of rest and

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the Blue Ridge to rendezvous, by General Lee's

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forces had passed over into Virginia to meet the disaster of Ball's Bluff. There was nothing to oppose the passage. As the head of the column reached the middle of the river, the Confederates opened fire by a means of the beginning of his cherished plan of invasion of the North, passed, raised his hat, while bands and voices struck up the words and music of "My Maryland." The entire Confederate force following the 7th was destroyed after Baltimore the largest town in Maryland. All told they numbered barely 60,000, for without a battle thousands had fallen exhausted by the way, unable to keep up with the swift march.4

1 stonewall Jackson, 390.

2 The extent to which the army was reduced by fatigue and exhaustion is absolutely titulated by the Confederate accounts. "The men were in a state of collapse. The army was in a state of collapse. The army was in a state of collapse. The army had presented itself a gov-

3 The officers who had served under McClellan on the Peninsula. The core of the army

4 "Never had the army been so dirty, ragged, and ill-armed as on this march."—R. E. Jones, in ibid., 46, 723.

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accountably and against McClellan's wish at Harper's Ferry, there was a
moveable force of nearly 100,000 men to operate against Lee in Maryland.
McClellan took the field at the head of this force.
McClellan took the field in Maryland in person on the 7th, when the
march toward Lee was fairly begun. The army moved in three columns.
The right wing, under Barnicle, comprised his own corps and that of
Hooker. The centre, under Sumner, comprised his own corps and that of
Manassas. Franklin, in command of his corps and Couch's division, had the
left. Porter's corps, not fully organized, followed after. The move-
ment was slow, for Lee's plan had not yet developed itself. In the six
days, from the 7th to the 13th, the advance was barely thirty miles.
McClellan was also deceived as to the strength of the enemy, estimating it
at 120,000 men—twice the real number.

Lee's object in crossing the Potomac at a point so near Washington, in-
stead of at Harper's Ferry or above, and thence advancing into the heart
of Maryland, was to assume a position which should threaten both Washing-
ton and Baltimore. This he supposed would draw the enemy after him; is an elevated plateau, falling steeply toward the Potomac, and sloping
Maryland, was to assume a position which should threaten both Wash-
ning- Virginia side, Loudon Heights. In the angle at the junction of the rivers
Lee undertook to dislodge, and, if possible, capture the forces there. To
effect this, he divided his army, sending the whole of Jackson's command
and half of Longstreet's toward Harper's Ferry, retaining with himself D.
H. Hill's division, half of Longstreet's corps, and the greater part of
the cavalry.1 McClellan's advance had been so slow that Lee trusted that
Harper's Ferry could be reduced and his army reunited before he would
be called upon to meet the enemy.2 In forming his plan of operations, Lee
must have underestimated the Federal force as greatly as McClellan over-
estimated that of the Confederates. He could not have supposed that the
enemy whom he had outnumbered and defeated at Groveton, and whom
he had seen in full retreat to the fortifications at Washington, should within
ten days have swelled to a force outnumbering his own almost three to
one.3 He must have supposed that his own effective force and that of the
enemy were about equal.

Harper's Ferry is at the junction of the Potomac and the Shenandoah.
The Potomac, coming from the north, meets the Shenandoah, ranging from
the west, at the foot of a spur of the Blue Ridge, here known as Elk Mount-
ain. The united streams have torn a narrow passage through the mountain,
reading it from summit to base, leaving on either side steep cliffs a thou-
sand feet high. The eastern cliff is Maryland Heights; the western, on the
Virginia side, London Heights. In the angle at the junction of the rivers
is an elevated plateau, falling steeply toward the Potomac, and sloping gen-
tly toward the Shenandoah, and stretching backward at the level of the
surrounding country. The ridge of this plateau is Bolivar Heights, at the
foot of which nestles the village of Harper's Ferry. Some one had once

1 Jackson's "command," including A. P. Hill's division, comprised 14 brigades.
2 Longstreet's corps" will indicate only
3 Jackson's effective strength of a brigade at this time, previous to losses in battle, was 1500; some, however,
was 164,359, of whom 71,210 were stationed within the defenses at Wash-
and did
10 of these were detached
for duty"—Com. Rep., 482.
called this place "the Thermopylae of America." It might have been so in the times when war was waged with bow and sword, with spear and sling, but with the appliances of modern warfare the place has no defensive value. It is completely overlooked by both Louden and Maryland Heights at such a distance and height that a plunging fire of artillery or musketry can be poured into it from either without the possibility of reply. It is a mere military trap, unless the commanding heights were also held in force; and then it is worthless, as no enemy need go near it in order to cross the Potomac from either direction to invade Maryland or Virginia. Johnston had perceived this fifteen months before, and abandoned the place without resistance, and against positive orders, the moment it was menaced. Lee strangely considered its possession essential to his proposed operations, and, in order to seize it, divided his army. Had he done otherwise, the course of the campaign must have been wholly different. He would have fought the decisive battle far in the interior with the whole, instead of with a part of his force. Had he been defeated, his army must have been annihilated, for the victorious enemy would have been between him and Virginia, cutting off all possibility of succor or retreat. Had he been victorious, he might probably have anticipated Sherman's march to the sea, for beyond the Alleghenies there was no army to oppose him; and from Philadelphia he might have dictated terms of peace.

Harper's Ferry was held by a force of about 18,000, including an outpost at Martinsburg. They were raw troops, commanded by Colonel Miles. About 1500 men were posted on Maryland Heights, the remainder were intrenched on Bolivar Heights. Lee's plan was to surround this force, and thus capture it. His orders were issued on the 8th, and their execution commenced the next morning. Walker, whose two brigades had been sent to the mouth of the Monocacy to destroy the canal aqueduct, was to cross to the Potomac, ascend its right bank, and seize Loudon Heights. McLaws, with eight brigades, was to march from Frederick, pass the South Mountain at Crampton's Gap, cross the narrow valley to the foot of Maryland Heights, which he was to ascend and occupy, disposing his forces in such a way as to hold the roads winding around its base, thus cutting off all retreat in that direction. Jackson, with fourteen brigades, was to cross the South Mountain at Turner's Gap, advance to the Potomac, cross it high above Harper's Ferry, sweep down its right bank, capturing or driving back the force at Martinsburg, and then march directly upon Harper's Ferry. The remainder of the army was to march toward Hagerstown, where, or at Boonesboro', it was to be rejoined by the portion which, it was assumed, would hold Harper's ferry. The force with which he was to do this succeeded in its designs upon Harper's Ferry.

The directions of this order were executed with great precision. Walker took possession of Loudon Heights on the 12th. He sent two brigades to scale the ascent and gain the summit. They encountered some resistance from the troops posted there; but this was overcome, the Federals abandoning their works, pitching the guns down the cliffs, and making their way across the river to Harper's Ferry. Maryland Heights was in the possession of the infantry of McLaws on the evening of the 13th. The next morning was employed in cutting a road to the top of the Heights practicable for artillery, along which four guns were laboriously dragged, and from these fire was opened upon the town.

Jackson, in the mean while, was pressing upon his longer march with that speed which had gained for his command the name of the "foot cavalry." Leaving Frederick on the 10th, he reached the Potomac next day at Williamsport, 25 miles above Harper's Ferry, and on the 12th entered Martinsburg. The Federal troops abandoned this place at his approach, and fell back to Harper's Ferry. Jackson followed hard after, and on the following morning came in sight of the Union force, drawn up on Bolivar Heights. In three days he had marched 80 miles. The remainder of that day and the whole of the 14th were spent by Jackson in ascertaining by courier and signal, the positions of Walker and McLaws upon Loudon and Maryland Heights. He found that they had gained the positions assigned for them, and had subdued the only roads by which the Federals could retreat down the Potomac. "You know," said he, "that the enemy on Bolivar Heights were beyond the effective range of their light guns. Separately as they were from him by rivers, they could afford no direct assistance in ousting the Federal force as it then stood. Jackson undertook to..."
of the United States army." Jackson made a gesture of recognition, and again closed his eyes. "He has come to arrange terms of surrender," continued Hill. Jackson made no reply; he was fast asleep. Again, half awakened, he said, drowsily, "The surrender must be unconditional; every indulgence can be granted afterward," then fell fast asleep once more, leaving Hill to decide upon the terms. The terms granted were certainly liberal. All were to be paroled, retaining their personal effects, and officers their side-arms; transportation to be furnished to carry away the property. Upon these terms more than 11,000 men were surrendered. The Confederates gained 73 guns, with but little ammunition, 18,000 small-arms, and a considerable amount of stores. The capture cost the Confederates perhaps two score of lives, and the Federalists about as many.

Although the affair at Harper's Ferry proved of ultimate disadvantage to the Confederates, it was disgraceful alike to the military authorities at Washington, who left the place in a force which was in no use, and to the officers who attempted no adequate defense. Miles died a few hours after the surrender, but his conduct was sharply censured by the Military Commission. Ford, who shamefully abandoned Maryland Heights, was dismissed from the service on the ground of "such lack of military capacity as Jackson is crossing the Potomac at Williamsport, and probably the whole rebel army will be drawn from Maryland." Receiving nothing from Harper's Ferry or Martinsburg today, and positive information that the line is cut, corresponded with Mr. Lincoln: "Halleck to McClellan, Sept. 13: "Until you know more certainly the enemy's force south of the Potomac, you are wrong in uncrossing the capital. I am of the opinion that the enemy will send 5000 men into action out of more than twice that number with which he had set out. The South Mountain rises to a height of about 1000 feet, the depression at Turner's Gap being about 400 feet. But the gap is so narrow that a few hundred men with artillery could hold the summit against an army. But Jackson is crossing the Potomac at Williamsport, and probably the whole rebel army will be drawn from Maryland." Receiving nothing from Harper's Ferry or Martinsburg today, and positive information that the line is cut, corresponded with Mr. Lincoln:

**In the Invasion of Maryland.—Antietam.**

The Confederates left Frederick on the 10th, and the place was occupied by the Federals on the 12th, after a skirmish fairly between the portions behind as a rear-guard. On the evening of the next day, accident, which had three weeks before Lee by disclosing to him the situation of Pope, placed in McClellan's hands the order from Lee disclosing his designs, and the position and movements of every division of the Confederate army. Thus informed, McClellan's course was plain. He had 100,000 men within a few hours' march from Frederick. Lee had divided his army into two parts, neither of which, by McClellan's own exaggerated estimate, consisting of more than 60,000, and, in fact, of only has many. By a rapid march, the whole Union army could be thrown right between the two lines.

He proposed to "cut the enemy in two, and beat him in detail." His arrangements were for once made with due promptness. That night orders were sent to every general. Franklin was to cross the South Mountain by Cra upon the enemy, and relieve Harper's Ferry. The remainder of the army, under Sumner and Reno, in the advance, followed by Sumner with his own corps and that of Mansfield, with the division of Porter which had come up, was to march upon the heels of Lee toward Boonesboro', crossing the South Mountain at Turner's Gap, six miles above Cumberland, and fall upon that half of the Confederate army which had not been sent toward Harper's Ferry.

Lee had meanwhile moved leisurely past the South Mountain. On the 13th the Longstreet had reached Hagerstown, D. H. Hill stopping at Boonesboro'. On the afternoon of the 13th the Confederate commander was startled by intelligence that the Federals, whom he had supposed to be quietly resting at Frederick, were pressing swiftly toward Turner's Gap. If they succeed in passing the mountains, after a skirmish fairly between the portions of his divided army. Hill was hurried back to the Gap at once to keep the enemy in check until Longstreet could be recalled from Hagerstown. Lee felt the full peril of his position. He had with him barely 28,000 men, and these stretched along a distance of 25 miles. To provide for the worst, he sent his trains across the Potomac, encouraged by only two regiments. Hill reached the summit of the Gap early in the morning of the 14th, just before the head of the Federal force came up. His division had left Hanover Junction, a few miles from Redwood, on the 28th of July, and joined Lee at Chancellorsville, fully 150 miles distant, on the 3d of August. Two years later, after a day's rest, pushed forward to the Potomac and into Maryland. They had not been engaged in a single action. But "the struggling had been enormous, in consequence of heavy marches, deficient commissariat, want of shoes, and inefficient officers," so that he could bring less than 5000 men into action out of more than twice that number with which he had set out.

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charged this in front, while Smith moved round to assail it in flank and rear. The Confederates held it for two days, and in the evening Franklin debouched into Pleasant Valley, three miles on Maryland Heights on the opposite side, and only six from Harper’s Ferry, whence the sound of firing indicated that the place was still held. The Federal loss on October 15 was 115 killed and 418 wounded; the Confederates more, for they left behind 600 prisoners, most wounded.

On the morning of the 10th McLawns drew back his whole force, leaving only two regiments upon the heights, and formed it across the lower end of the Valley, Franklin forming his across the upper end. Both lay watching each other all the morning, each supposing the other to be stronger, and neither daring to attack. The numbers were, in reality, nearly equal, the Confederates having a small preponderance.

The passes of the South Mountain having been forced, the position of Lee was hopeless. He had with him less than 30,000 men, the Confederates 17,000. The Federal loss in the action was nearly 2000; for at Antietam, three days later, he could bring into action only 2000. Some of Longstreet’s brigades also lost heavily. The Federals secured 1500 prisoners, most of them from the wounded. The entire loss of the Confederates, in killed and wounded, was probably something more than 2000. Reno was killed near the close of the battle. The Confederates lost Garland. Both were brave officers and accomplished gentlemen.

Simultaneously with the battle at Turner’s Gap, an action had been going on at Harper’s Ferry, which held out, and was the Union corps, coming after in different columns, bad b”Stone-wall; Sloan’s division, which had not come up, engaged in a fierce but desultory combat, each availing itself of every natural barrier.

Until late in the afternoon the battle on the Confederate side had been fought wholly by Hill. But about four o’clock Longstreet had come up with eight brigades, worn and exhausted by the long march from Hagerstown. Some of these were badly engaged, but they came two hours too late to change the fortunes of the day. When night closed in the Federals had won every position and held the Gap, through which their whole force could make an ostentatious display of infantry, artillery, and cavalry on the opposite crest. The action was fought with desperate energy, and McClellan decided, in view of what he had seen during the day, to bring the battle on at Turner’s Gap, an action which had become somewhat entangled, and in which the enemy was seen to be in process of retreat.