



COLD HARBOR.—MCLELLAN'S HEAD-QUARTERS.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.

II. ON THE SHENANDOAH AND THE CHICKAHOMINY.¹

The Chickahominy.—McClellan's Advance.—Correspondence between McClellan and the President.—McDowell ordered to move.—The Order suspended.—Jackson's Operations in the Valley of the Shenandoah.—Retreats from Winchester.—Joined by Ewell.—Battle of Kernstown.—The Order to McDowell.—Battle of Bull Pasture.—Position of the Union Forces.—Battle of Front Royal.—Retreat of Banks to the Potomac.—Crosses the River.—Panic at Washington.—Fremont's Movements.—Battle of Lewisburg.—McDowell ordered to follow Jackson.—He sends Shields reluctantly.—Jackson in Peril.—He Retreats up the Shenandoah.—Eludes Fremont and Shields.—The Pursuit by Fremont.—Battle of Cross Keys.—Battle of Port Republic.—End of the Pursuit.—Results of Jackson's Expedition.—The Union Army on the Chickahominy.—Battle of Hanover Court-house.—Elation of McClellan.—Condition of Johnston.—The Union Left across the Chickahominy.—Battle of the Seven Pines: Johnston's Plan.—His Statement of his Force.—The Storm at Richmond.—Casey driven back.—Conduct of his Division.—Keyes and Kearney forced beyond the Seven Pines.—New Line formed.—Close of the Action.—Battle of Fair Oaks: Sumner crosses the Chickahominy.—The first Action, May 31.—The second Action, June 1.—Repulses of the Confederates.—Hooker's Reconnoissance.—The Losses.—Results of the Battles of Seven Pines and Fair Oaks.—What might have been accomplished.—McClellan and McDowell.—Bridges and Intrenchments.—Lee takes Command.—His Antecedents and Character.—Resigns his Commission.—Enters the Southern Army.—Fortifies Richmond.—His Plan on assuming Command.—Stuart's Expedition.—McClellan ready.—Affair of King's School-house.—McClellan's Dispatches.—The Evening before the Seven Days.

THE Chickahominy, rising in swampy uplands northwest of Richmond, flows southeastwardly for about fifty miles, parallel with and midway between the James and the York rivers. It then turns sharply to the south, and, after a winding course of twenty miles, falls into the James forty miles below Richmond and ten west of Williamsburg. Toward its mouth it becomes a considerable stream, navigable by small steamers for twenty or thirty miles. The military operations of the Peninsular campaign embraced that part of the stream between Bottom's Bridge on the south, where it is crossed by the Williamsburg road, and Meadow Bridge, fifteen miles to the north, where it is crossed by the Fredericksburg Railroad. Richmond lies nearly opposite the centre of this line, about six miles from the Chickahominy at its nearest approach.

Between these points the river flows through a belt of wooded swamp three or four hundred yards wide. The swamp is bordered on both sides by low bottom lands sloping gently up to the level of the surrounding country. The entire breadth of the interval is about a mile, in some places a little more, in others a little less. The tops of the trees rise to the level of the uplands, screening the view from one side to the other. In dry summer weather the stream is a mere rivulet, flowing sluggishly through the swamp, sometimes in a single channel, oftener in several. A moderate shower fills the channel, which is about a dozen yards wide and four feet deep. A heavy shower or a continuous rain-fall, causing a rise of two feet more, floods the swamp and overflows the bottom lands. These bottoms are intersected by deep ditches, and even when not overflowed are so soft as to be impassable for cavalry and artillery.

The swamp and stream had been crossed by several bridges. All of those in front of Richmond had been destroyed by Johnston when he fell back from Yorktown and Williamsburg, and the approaches to them were com-

manded by batteries on the southern side. Besides the bridges were a few fords, approached by side-roads, over which a pedestrian could in dry weather make his way over swamp and stream. But this season had been unusually rainy. The channel was always full to the brim, and every shower flooded swamp and bottoms. Infantry might possibly have picked their way across in loose order, but cavalry would have sunk to the horses' girths, and artillery and trains beyond their axles, in the spongy soil. For an army the Chickahominy was impassable except by bridges, and these, as experience soon proved, must be built above the level of the highest floods, and provided with long approaches across the swamp. The best places for the bridges were covered by the batteries of the enemy, and other points had to be chosen. Bridges of boats and pontoons were out of the question. The soil was too soft and spongy to afford a foundation for piles. It only remained to build the bridges upon trestles, the approaches being embanked or corduroyed. As a military obstacle, the narrow Chickahominy, with its bordering swamps and bottoms, liable to overflow at any moment, was more formidable than a broad river which could be crossed by boats, or over which a pontoon bridge could be thrown in a few hours.¹


In moving from Williamsburg the right wing of the Federal army had kept to the north, striking the Chickahominy at New Bridge, directly in front of Richmond; the left wing, keeping to the south, had reached the river at Bottom's Bridge, thirteen miles below. On the 22d of May, Stoneman's advance guard of cavalry and Franklin's corps, on the right, were near New Bridge, with Porter at supporting distance in the rear; Keyes, on the left, was at Bottom's Bridge, with Heintzelman as a support; between Keyes and Porter was Sumner, connecting the right with the left. The head-quarters were established at Cold Harbor, just in the rear of the head of the right wing. The bulk of the enemy were across the Chickahominy, on the main road from New Bridge to Richmond; but a detachment had been left at Mechanicsville, on the north bank, four miles above.² This was brushed away on the 24th by the artillery, which forced it across the bridge, which was then destroyed.

The approaches to Richmond from below were only slightly held. Bottom's Bridge had been demolished, but close by was a practicable ford, which had been seized on the 20th, when a division crossed the river and occupied the opposite high ground. Naglee made a long reconnoissance in force down the right side of the Chickahominy, taking almost the same route by which, five weeks later, the Union army retreated to the James. He followed this by another reconnoissance directly toward Richmond, going beyond the Seven Pines, only six miles from the city. In neither reconnoissance was any serious resistance encountered, or the enemy found in force. Keyes's corps was then sent across the Chickahominy at Bottom's Bridge, with orders to take up a position near the Seven Pines. Heintzelman's corps was also sent across; and he, being the senior officer, was placed in command of all the forces then on the south side of the stream.³ Johnston, in his retreat, had strangely neglected to obstruct the York River Railroad, running directly from Richmond to the White House on the Pamunkey. The bridge by which the railroad crossed the Chickahominy was indeed destroyed, but so little other damage was done that by the 26th the road was in operation up to the river, and the bridge nearly reconstructed.

¹ Since the date of note ¹, p. 328, we have secured the Confederate "Reports of the Operations of the Army of Northern Virginia, from June, 1862, to and including the Battle of Fredericksburg, Dec. 13, 1862." They include the reports of Jackson and his subordinate officers of the operations in the Valley of the Shenandoah, and Lee's report of his operations from the Seven Days' Battles to the Battle of Fredericksburg. There are also about 350 reports of subordinate officers, the whole forming two large volumes. These will be cited as "Lee's Rep.;" the references being throughout to the pages of the edition printed by order of the Confederate Congress at Richmond in 1864.

² For the character of the Chickahominy as a military obstacle, see especially *Art. Op.*, 19, 20; *McC. Rep.*, 189; also both works *passim*.

³ Strictly speaking, the banks of the Chickahominy are the northwest and the southeast. In reports and documents they are variously denoted as the *south* or *west*, and the *north* or *east*. The side toward Richmond, being the right looking down the stream, will be called by us the *right* or *south*; the opposite one, the *left* or *north*. ² *McC. Rep.*, 186-188; 213, 214.



control of McDowell and of his forces as you indicate;" adding that McDowell could go by land quicker than by water; by land "he can reach you in five days after starting, whereas by water he will not reach you in two weeks, judging by past experience."¹

On the morning of the 24th McClellan received a dispatch from the President announcing that McDowell would soon be with him. The President had left McDowell's camp the evening before. Shields's command was there, but so worn that he could not move till Monday, the 26th; but both he and McDowell said that they would positively move on the morning of that day. Meanwhile Anderson, the Confederate general who was opposing McDowell's advance, had as his line of supply and retreat the road to Richmond. Could not McClellan, almost as well as not, while he was building the Chickahominy bridges, send a force from his right to cut off the enemy's supplies from Richmond, preserve the railroad bridges across the two forks of the Pamunkey, and intercept the enemy's retreat? If he could do that, he would prevent the army now opposed to him from receiving an accession of nearly fifteen thousand men, and if he saved the bridges he would secure a line of railroad for supplies besides the one he then had. The President closed by reiterating, "You will have command of General McDowell after he joins you precisely as you indicated in your last dispatch to me of the 21st." There was in this dispatch one sentence ominous of evil: "We have so thinned our line to get troops for other places that it was broken yesterday at Front Royal, with a probable loss to us of a regiment of infantry and two companies of cavalry, and putting Banks in some peril."²

McClellan was greatly elated by this dispatch. McDowell's forty thousand would soon be added to his command, giving him a force "sufficiently strong to overpower the large army confronting him." His elation was brief. On the afternoon of the same day he received another dispatch from the President announcing that the order for McDowell to march toward Richmond had been suspended.³

The reason for this sudden change of order is to be found in the bold and skillful operations of "Stonewall Jackson," one hundred and fifty miles from McClellan, and half as far from McDowell. In the previous autumn Jackson had been assigned to the command of the Confederate forces in the Valley of the Shenandoah. During the winter and early spring his force was about ten thousand men, but his numbers were apparently doubled by the celerity of his movements. "The rapidity of his marches," says a Confederate writer, "is something portentous. He is heard of by the enemy at one point, and before they can make up their minds to follow him he is off at another. He keeps so constantly in motion that he never has a sick-list, and no need of hospitals. He will assuredly make his mark in this war, for his untiring industry and eternal watchfulness must tell upon a numerous enemy, unacquainted with the country, and incommoded by large baggage trains."⁴ His operations were annoying rather than important, except as they compelled the Federal government to keep a considerable force to watch him; but by hard service his command was brought into a state of great efficiency.

Simultaneously with Johnston's abandonment of Manassas in March, Jackson fell back up the valley from Winchester toward Staunton, followed by Shields, with a division of Banks's Fifth Corps. This retreat, which was kept up as far as Newmarket, brought Jackson within fifty miles of Johnston, who lay near Gordonsville, awaiting the development of McClellan's plans. Shields undertook to decoy Jackson from joining Johnston. He made a feigned retreat back to Winchester, marching his whole force thirty miles in one day. The ruse was successful. Jackson turned to pursue. Banks, who thought it impossible that Jackson would venture to attack him, marched his whole corps, with the exception of Shields's division, toward Centreville. Shields, who still hoped that Jackson would venture an attack, secretly posted the bulk of his division in a secluded position two miles from Winchester. The people of that town, ignorant of this, reported to Jackson that the place was evacuated except by a small rear-guard. On the evening of March 22, Jackson's cavalry made a dash into Winchester, driving in Shields's pickets. The attack was repulsed after a sharp skirmish, in which Shields was severely wounded, his arm being broken by the fragment of a shell. Banks, confident that Jackson would not renew the engagement, set off next morning for Washington; but Shields, anticipating a strong attack, notwithstanding his wound, prepared to receive it. The assault began at noon with a sharp artillery fire, which met with a strong reply. At three o'clock Tyler's brigade charged upon the Confederate batteries on the left, and captured them. Then followed a general and successful assault upon the Confederate right and centre. The Confederates retreated, leaving their dead and wounded behind. Banks returned next morning, and pursued the retreating enemy thirty miles to Woodstock, ceasing the pursuit only when his men were thoroughly exhausted. The Federal loss in this engagement was 103 killed and 441 wounded. Of the Confederates, 270 were reported to have been buried on the battle-field, and many others by the inhabitants. Their entire loss was estimated at 500 killed and 1000 wounded.⁵

McClellan still continued to urge that his force should be re-enforced; especially that McDowell's whole corps should be sent to him at once by water. "My pickets," he writes,¹ "are within a mile of Bottom's Bridge, and scouts are within a quarter of a mile. I am advancing on the other roads. The indications are that the enemy intend fighting at Richmond. Our policy seems to be to concentrate every thing there. They hold central positions, and will seek to meet us while divided. I think we are committing a great military error in having so many independent columns. The great battle should be fought in mass; then divide if necessary." Sound advice: if he had himself acted upon it two weeks later at Fair Oaks, or six weeks later at Cold Harbor, his campaign would have had a different termination.

Three days later² he transmitted what the President calls his "long dispatch." It had been raining, and "rain on this soil soon makes the roads incredibly bad for army transportation;" yet this was the very region where he had insisted, not four months before, that "the roads are passable at all seasons of the year."³ He had been a mile across the Chickahominy, the enemy being about half a mile in front. All the bridges were destroyed, and "the enemy were in force on every road leading to Richmond, within a mile or two west of the stream." Yet on the previous day they were not in great force opposite Bottom's Bridge,⁴ upon the Williamsburg road; and on the same day Naglee had made his reconnoissance down the right bank for a dozen miles, crossing other roads, without serious resistance, or finding "the enemy in force;" and on the third, fourth, and fifth days after, "a very gallant reconnoissance was pushed by Naglee with his brigade beyond the Seven Pines," seven or eight miles beyond the river, meeting "considerable opposition," but none which his single brigade could not overcome.⁵ Thus one of the main approaches to Richmond by way of the Williamsburg road and the York River Railroad for eight miles beyond the stream and within six of the city, was not, for a full week, "held by the enemy in force." All accounts, McClellan continued, represented the numbers of the enemy as greatly exceeding his own, and every thing gave positive assurance that the approach to Richmond involved a desperate battle between the opposing forces. All his divisions were moving toward the foe, and he should advance steadily and carefully, attacking in such a manner as to employ his greatest force. He regretted the state of things in McDowell's command; he had no means of knowing when he would start, what were his means of transportation, or when he would be in the vicinity of the Chickahominy; but there was little hope that he would come by land in time for the coming battle. He was, moreover, not sure that he comprehended the orders which had been given to McDowell; he wished that the extent of his own authority should be clearly defined, and hoped that McDowell would be placed under his orders, he himself being strictly responsible for the closest observance of the President's instructions; and, above all things, let McDowell be sent at once by water. "But, in any event," he concluded, "I shall fight with all the skill, caution, and determination that I possess, and I trust that the result may either obtain for me the permanent confidence of my government, or that it may close my career."

To this the President replied on the same day, "You will have just such

¹ Com. Rep., 329.

² McC. Rep., 199.

³ "In consequence of General Banks's critical position, I have been compelled to suspend General McDowell's movements to join you. The enemy are making a desperate push upon Harper's Ferry, and we are trying to throw General Fremont's force and a part of General McDowell's in their rear."—McC. Rep., 200.

⁴ Southern Generals, 172.

⁵ The Federals usually style this action, fought March 23, the Battle of Winchester. The Confederates more properly call it the Battle of Kernstown, from the hamlet near which it was fought. Shields states his own force to have been 6000 infantry, 750 cavalry, and 24 pieces of artillery. He estimates the force of the enemy at 9000 infantry, 1500 cavalry, and 36 guns.—(Reb. Rec., iv., 328-343.) Pollard says that the Confederate forces amounted to 6000 men, besides Ashby's cavalry, while Shields was 18,000 strong. "The enemy," he says, "was left in possession of the field of battle, two guns, four caissons, and about 300 prisoners. Our loss was about 100 killed,

¹ May 18; Com. Rep., 327.

² May 21, McC. Rep., 196-198.

³ Ibid., 104.

⁴ Ibid., 190.

⁵ Ibid., 213; Naglee's Report, Reb. Rec., v., 81.



JAMES SHIELDS.

This repulse was a severe check to Jackson. He fell back, faintly pursued by Banks, to Harrisonburg, where he remained for three weeks; and then, on the 19th of April, crossed the south fork of the Shenandoah, thus placing himself within supporting distance of Johnston, who, "shutting out his army from all intercourse with the public," held his position behind the Rappahannock and Rapidan, the main body being near Gordonsville. Toward the close of April, when the plans of McClellan had become developed, Johnston took the bulk of his forces to the Peninsula, but detached Ewell's division of about ten thousand to the support of Jackson. The junction took place on the last day of April.¹

In the mean while great changes had been made, and were proposed to be made, in the disposition of the Federal forces in this region. A new Department, called that of the Rappahannock, including the District of Columbia, had been created, the command being assigned to McDowell. Shields's division was withdrawn from Banks and attached to McDowell, who, thus strengthened, was ordered on the 17th of May to join McClellan before Richmond, but still to keep himself in a position to cover Washington.² Banks, who had followed Jackson as far as Harrisonburg, was at the same time ordered to fall back fifty miles to Strasburg, and there fortify himself. Forces from Fremont's Mountain Department were approaching Jackson's

and probably twice as many wounded; that of the enemy was certainly more than double. The greater portion of our dead left on the field of battle were buried under the direction of the mayor of Winchester. Some fifty citizens collected the dead, dug a great pit on the battle-field, and gently laid the poor fellows in their last resting-place. Scarcely a family in the country but had a relative there."—*Southern History of the War*, i., 281-284.

Shields, in a published letter, congratulated himself that "Jackson and his stone-wall brigade, and all the other brigades accompanying him, will never meet this division again in battle." Yet he adds, somewhat inconsistently, "The enemy's sufferings have been terrible, and such as they have nowhere else endured during the war; and yet such were their gallantry and high state of discipline that at no time during the battle or pursuit did they give way to panic. They fled to Mount Jackson, and are by this time, no doubt, in communication with the main body of the rebel army." In his official report he says: "Jackson, with his supposed invincible stone-wall brigade, were compelled to fall back in disorder upon their reserve. Here they took up a new position for a final stand. A few minutes only did they stand, when they turned dismayed and fled in disorder."—*Reb. Rec.*, iv., 329-335.

¹ *Southern Generals*, 175, 263, 347.

² "Upon being joined by General Shields's division, you will move upon Richmond by the general route of the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad, co-operating with the forces under General McClellan, now threatening Richmond from the line of the Pamunkey and York Rivers. While seeking to establish, as soon as possible, a communication between your left wing and the right wing of General McClellan, you will hold yourself always in such a position as to cover the capital of the nation against a sudden dash of any large body of the rebel forces. General McClellan will be furnished with a copy of these instructions, and will be directed to hold himself in readiness to establish communication with your left wing, and to prevent the main body of the enemy's army from leaving Richmond and throwing itself upon your column before the junction of the two armies is effected."—*McC. Rep.*, 195.

position from the direction of Romney. The advance, under Milroy, came along the western side of the Shenandoah Mountains as far as McDowell, a village forty miles southwest of Harrisonburg, which was still occupied by Banks. Here Milroy was attacked, on the 8th of May, by Jackson, and, although re-enforced by Schenck, who had come up just in time with a small re-enforcement, was compelled to retreat after a sharp engagement. In this action, sometimes called that of Bull Pasture, the Confederates sustained the heavier loss, but, having a strong supporting force at hand, though not actually engaged, they gained their point of driving Milroy from the field and capturing a considerable amount of stores.¹ Fremont, with his main body, had been coming down from the same direction. His advance having been thus driven back, he halted at Franklin for fully ten days.

The Federal forces in this region were now so widely scattered as to invite an attack upon some of their severed portions. Banks, stripped of Shields's division, was at Strasburg with barely 6000 men. Fremont was at Franklin, seventy miles away to the southwest, with the Shenandoah Mountains between him and Banks. McDowell was near Fredericksburg, as far to the southeast, just ready to march toward Richmond. A single regiment, and a few companies, 1400 men in all, were at Front Royal under Colonel Kenly; these, with a few at Rectortown, formed the only connection between Banks and McDowell. Jackson, who had concentrated his command at Harrisonburg, was practically nearer each of these bodies than any one of them was to any other. Banks was the nearer and weaker enemy, and Jackson resolved to strike at him. Concentrating his whole command at Newmarket, he marched down the South Fork of the Shenandoah, placing the three ranges of the Masanutten, the North, and the Shenandoah Mountains between himself and Fremont, and struck Kenly at Front Royal at noon on the 23d. The Union force was posted here merely as a protection against guerrilla raids, and was wholly too weak to resist an attack in force. It was swept away after a brave but brief resistance, four fifths being killed or captured.

The Confederates then pushed toward Winchester, hoping to gain the rear of Banks, who was still at Strasburg, and cut off his retreat down the Valley. Banks's position was perilous. To remain at Strasburg was to be surrounded, and either starved out or beaten. An attempt to retreat westward over the mountains would involve the abandonment of his trains at the outset, with the certainty of being attacked on his flanks by a superior force. All that remained for him was to retreat down the Valley, "entering the lists with the enemy in a race or a battle, as he should choose, for the possession of Winchester, the key of the Valley." The distance for each was about equal. At nine o'clock on the morning of the 24th the retreating column was on its march, the train in front. The rear had hardly gone three miles when reports came from the front that the enemy held the roads. The train was sent to the rear, and the troops moved to the front. After a short encounter, the head of the Confederate column was beaten back, and Banks succeeded in reaching Winchester. Before daybreak next morning he was assailed by Jackson with superior and constantly increasing force. After a desultory conflict of five hours, Banks began a hurried retreat toward Martinsburg. Here he halted a couple of hours, and then pushed on for the Potomac, which he reached at Williamsport by sunset. The river was still between him and the pursuing enemy. The ferry was barely sufficient to transport the ammunition train; the ford was occupied by the wagons; the cavalry could wade and swim the stream; but there was no apparent means

¹ Our casualties amounted to 28 killed, 80 severely wounded, 145 slightly wounded, and 3 missing, making a total of 256.—*Schenck's Report*. "The Confederate loss in this action was considerable. Of 350 killed and wounded, nearly two thirds were Georgians. We engaged the enemy with not more than one third of his own numbers, which were about 12,000."—*POLLARD*, ii., 35. But the official reports of Milroy and Schenck give their entire force at 2268, while they believed that the Confederates "brought into action not less than 5000, besides their reserved force of 8000 in the rear."



FRONT ROYAL.



SCENE OF THE BATTLE NEAR FRONT ROYAL.

to get the infantry across. Fortunately, however, a pontoon train had been brought along all the way from Strasburg, and by its aid the infantry were all got across before noon of the next day. "Never," says Banks, "were more grateful hearts in the same number of men than when, at midday on the 26th, we stood on the opposite shore." In this retreat of fifty-three miles Banks lost six or eight hundred men, of whom the greater part were captured. Of his train of 500 wagons he lost 55, besides considerable stores destroyed at Strasburg and Winchester. Banks, some days after, estimated his entire loss at about 900, of whom 38 were known to be killed and 155 wounded, the rest missing.¹

Jackson reached the river just in time to see his enemy safe on the Maryland side. He rested there for a single day, and had divine service performed in camp. He issued an address to his army congratulating them upon their success in driving the Federal army from the Valley of the Shenandoah, and capturing several thousand prisoners, and an immense quantity of stores and provisions.

This movement of Jackson caused a panic in Washington almost as great as that which the approach of McClellan had occasioned at Richmond. Rumor trebled his force. Geary, who was posted at Manassas Gap, reported that, besides those in pursuit of Banks, there were 10,000 at Front Royal, and as many more at Orleans, all pressing forward in the same direction. Washington was thought to be menaced. "I think," telegraphed the President to McClellan on the 25th, "that the time is near at hand when you must either attack Richmond or give up the job, and come back to the defense of Washington." The Secretary of War telegraphed to the governors of several states that "intelligence from various quarters left no doubt that the enemy in great force were marching toward Washington," and directed them to send all their militia and volunteers for the defense of the capital. Military possession was ordered to be taken of all railroads, and they were directed to hold themselves in readiness to transport troops and munitions to the exclusion of all other business.

Fremont was ordered to move southeastward from Franklin to Harrisonburg, thus throwing himself upon Jackson's rear. On the very day before this order was sent, and at the very hour when Kenly was annihilated at Front Royal, a brigade of Fremont's command, under Colonel Crook, had gained a decided advantage over a superior force of the enemy, under Heth, at Lewisburg, fifty miles to the southwest, across the Alleghany Mountains. Fremont issued a glowing order to his troops, announcing that "the results of this victory would be important," and that "the forces now under his immediate command lacked but the opportunity to emulate the gallantry and share the glory of their comrades of the Army of the Kanawha."² The opportunity was not wanting, for at that moment the order was on its way directing him to march against Jackson. Instead of going southeastward to Harrisonburg as ordered, he went northeastward toward Strasburg, making a much longer march, but, as he averred, by a more practicable route, to throw himself upon Jackson's rear.

McDowell was at the same time ordered to lay aside for the present the movement upon Richmond, and to put 20,000 men in motion at once for the Shenandoah, to operate either in conjunction with Fremont or alone against Jackson, and for the relief of Banks. He obeyed the order with a heavy heart. He wrote to the President, "Co-operation between General Fremont and myself to cut off Jackson is not to be counted upon, even if it is not a practical impossibility. I am beyond helping distance of General Banks, and no celerity or vigor will avail as far as he is concerned. The line of the retreat of

the enemy's forces up the Valley is shorter than mine to go against him. It will take a week or ten days for the force to get to the Valley by the route which will give it food and forage, and by that time the enemy will have retired. I shall gain nothing for you there, and shall lose much for you here. It is, therefore, not only on personal grounds that I have a heavy heart in the matter, but I feel that it throws us all back; and from Richmond north we shall have all our large masses paralyzed, and shall have to repeat what we have just accomplished." The President replied, in his simple, earnest way: "I am highly gratified at your alacrity in obeying my order. The change was as painful to me as it can possibly be to you or to any one. Every thing now depends upon the celerity and vigor of your movement."¹ McDowell seems not to have dreamed that Jackson would follow Banks up to the Potomac, placing himself, going and returning, almost twice as far from Strasburg as either Fremont or McDowell would have to go to reach that vital point. This remonstrance

was dated on the 24th of May. Nine days after, Jackson, on his retreat, passed through Strasburg, just before the junction of Fremont and Shields, whose division of McDowell's corps was sent to the Valley, and was to have been effected. Had either or both of these commands marched with only half the celerity of Jackson in his advance and retreat, the Confederate force would have been shut up in the lower portion of the Valley, with scarcely a possibility of escape.

Jackson perceived the full peril of his situation. Giving his wearied force but a single day's rest, he began his retreat on the 29th, masking the

¹ Com. Rep., 274, 275.



MAP OF OPERATIONS IN THE VALLEY.

¹ Banks's Report, etc., *Reb. Rec.*, 52-67; 139-141.

² *Reb. Rec.*, 141.

movement by a feigned attack upon Harper's Ferry by Ewell's division. On the 30th his whole reunited force was at Winchester, but made no delay there, pushing straight on for Strasburg. On that same day, Fremont, after a hard march up the west side of the Shenandoah Mountains, had crossed this and its outlying range, Hunting Ridge, and was at Wardensville. Next day the advance was pushed forward to the road between Winchester and Strasburg. Jackson had passed that point only a few hours before on the way to Strasburg. Fremont followed, and on the morning of the 1st of June his advance came upon Jackson's rear. A skirmish ensued; but Fremont's advance was checked, and Jackson got clear to Strasburg. Here he was told that Shields had been for forty-eight hours in possession of Front Royal, but had not joined Fremont. He at once inferred that he was marching down the South Fork of the Shenandoah by way of Luray, meaning to cross and get first to Newmarket. Sending a detachment to burn the bridges over the South Fork, Jackson kept rapidly on up the turnpike, harassed by Fremont's pursuing force. So close were they upon him that his only means of escape seemed to be to put the North Fork of the Shenandoah between him and his pursuers. He crossed the stream at Mount Jackson on the 3d, destroying the bridge behind him. This was hardly accomplished when the Federal forces appeared on the opposite bank. It took a whole day to reconstruct the bridge. Jackson had thus secured so much the start, and on the 5th reached Harrisonburg, the point from which he had commenced his adventurous march a fortnight before. Here he made no delay, for Fremont was again close on his rear. He turned to the east toward Port Republic on the North Fork, hoping to cross that before Shields, who was marching more slowly down its east side, could come up. Ashby's cavalry, with some infantry, was left as a rear-guard at Harrisonburg. Colonel Wyndham, of the Union cavalry, making a reconnoissance on the 7th, fell into an ambuscade, and, with a considerable portion of his men, was captured, an infantry skirmish ensued, in which each side suffered some loss. In this skirmish Ashby was killed.

Thus far, owing to the happy accident which enabled him to slip between Fremont and Shields at Strasburg, and to the start gained by the destruction of the bridge at Mount Jackson, the Confederate army had retreated without serious loss. But the two commands of the Federals, each fully equal to his own, were marching in parallel lines about fifteen miles apart, but with the deep South Fork of the Shenandoah, over which all the bridges

below Port Republic had been destroyed, between them. If Shields reached this place first in force, Jackson would be hemmed in. There was now no alternative but to prevent this junction by checking Fremont, and then either out-fighting or out-marching Shields. Ewell, whose division had performed the main part of the fighting in this expedition, was posted at the Cross Keys, midway between Harrisonburg and Port Republic, while Jackson himself kept on four miles farther, to the neighborhood of the latter place.

Ewell's position was strong. In front was a valley and rivulet, with woods on either flank. He was attacked by Fremont on the 8th. The action lasted from eleven in the morning till four in the afternoon, skirmishing and artillery fire being kept up until dark. Ewell held his position during the night, but before dawn was ordered to join Jackson, who was seriously threatened at Port Republic by Shields. In this action Ewell had five brigades of 8000 men, but only 6000 were brought into close action. Fremont's whole force was about 18,000, less than half of whom were brought upon the field. Both Fremont and Ewell assert that they occupied the field of battle, and thus each claims the technical honors of victory. The real advantage was certainly with Ewell. He had checked Fremont's advance, and left Jackson's whole force for another day free to act against Shields.¹

Port Republic is a forlorn village, situated in the angle formed by North and South Rivers, affluents of the South Fork of the Shenandoah. The South River is a shallow stream easily fordable, the North River crossed by a wooden bridge connecting the town with the Harrisonburg road. Shields's advance had reached this place on the morning of the 8th. A body of cavalry dashed across the South River into the town, and planted a gun opposite the entrance to the bridge. A Confederate brigade crossed, drove them back, and captured the gun, the cavalry falling back three miles to their infantry support. Night closed this skirmish, which was going on simultaneously with the battle at Cross Keys, seven miles distant. By dawn Ewell had joined Jackson, who resolved to throw his whole force across the river and attack Shields, burning the bridge in his rear, so as to prevent Fremont from joining Shields. His whole force was now upon the east side of the South Fork, which ran between him and Fremont. Tyler, who led the advance of Shields, had barely 3000 men. Posting these in a commanding position, covered by a battery of six guns, he awaited the attack. Several assaults of the enemy were repelled with heavy loss; but a Confederate brigade, marching through a dense forest, charged upon Tyler's left flank, and by a combined assault on front and flank forced him from his position, with the loss of all his guns except one; these were abandoned because the artillery horses had been killed. The retreat was orderly, the enemy pursuing for a number of miles.

Just at the close of the action the force of Fremont appeared on the opposite side of the river, but no attempt was made to cross. Jackson states his loss in this battle at 133 killed, 929 wounded, and 14 missing—1167 in all, of whom nearly two thirds belonged to Ewell's division, which had been also engaged the previous day. In these three days this division lost nearly 1000 men. The Union loss in killed and wounded must have been much smaller, but Jackson claims to have taken 450 prisoners.²

Here ended the pursuit of Jackson. Why the forces of Fremont and Shields were not united and brought against Jackson is one of the mysteries of this miserable campaign. On the 8th of June, the day of the battle of Cross Keys, orders were sent from the War Department that Fremont should "take post with his main force near Harrisonburg, to guard against operations of the enemy down the Valley of the Shenandoah;" and Banks, who had meanwhile recrossed the Potomac, should take position at or near Front Royal; and that McDowell, "having first provided adequately for the defense of the City of Washington, and for holding the position at Fredericksburg, should as speedily as possible execute his former instructions to march toward Richmond, whither, indeed, McCall's division of his army had in the mean while been ordered to go by water."³ Fremont, instead of stopping at Harrisonburg, fell back in a few days as far as Mount Jackson, leaving his wounded behind; Shields took post at New Market; and Jackson, on the 12th, retired across the South River, where he remained near Weyer's Cave for three days, when he set out to join Lee at Richmond. The object which he had in view had been fully accomplished. With barely 20,000 men he had neutralized McDowell's 40,000, Fremont's 20,000, and driven Banks's 6000 beyond the bounds of the Confederacy, leaving McClellan to confront first Johnston and then Lee before Richmond.

The order of May 24th shut off McClellan from all hope of any immediate support from McDowell's corps, and he proceeded to shape his measures accordingly. The first thing to be done, in his estimation, was to throw a series of bridges across the Chickahominy, in order to enable his whole army to cross at different points. Of these there were eleven, "all long, difficult, and with extensive log-way approaches." The necessity of all these is not apparent, for nearly the whole army was finally passed over by two of them. "The entire army," McClellan affirms, "could probably

¹ Each commander, in his official reports, greatly exaggerates the loss of the other in this battle. Ewell says: "There are good reasons for estimating the loss of the enemy at 2000 in killed, wounded, and prisoners. On a part of the field they buried 101 at one spot, 15 at another, and a house containing some of their dead was said to have been burned by them; and this is only a part of their loss."—(*Lee's Rep.*, i., 63.) Fremont, in his report, made next day, says: "The enemy's loss we can not clearly ascertain. He was engaged during the night in carrying off his dead and wounded in wagons. This morning, on our march, 200 of his dead were counted on one field, the greater part being badly mutilated by cannon-shot. Many of his dead were also scattered through the woods, and many have been already buried."—(*Reb. Rec.*, v., 110.) Fremont estimated his own loss at 125 killed and 500 wounded, making no mention of prisoners, of whom, indeed, it is hardly possible there could have been many. Ewell's report states his loss specifically at 43 killed, 230 wounded, and 14 missing—287 in all.—(*Lee's Rep.*, i., 120.)

² *Lee's Rep.*, i., 55-60, 121; Tyler's Report, *Reb. Rec.*, v., 110.

³ *Com. Rep.*, 275.



THOMAS JONATHAN JACKSON.



BRIDGE ACROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY SWAMP.

have been thrown across the Chickahominy immediately after our arrival, but this would have left no force on the left bank to guard our communications, or to protect our right and rear. If the communication with our supply *dépôt* had been cut by the enemy, with our army concentrated on the right bank of the Chickahominy, and the stage of water as it was many days after our arrival, the bridges carried away, and our means of transportation not furnishing a single day's supplies in advance, the troops must have gone without rations, and the animals without forage; the army would have been paralyzed.¹ But Bottom's Bridge and the railway bridge, only a mile apart, and on the direct line of his communications, were above the reach of the highest water, and, these protected, his communications across the river were safe. It was surely easier to protect these than a half score of points. He believed all the time that he was confronted across the river by a force greatly superior to his own; and yet, by some unexplained course of reasoning, he decided, "under the circumstances, to retain a portion of the army on the left bank of the river until our bridges were completed."² He divided his army into two parts, neither of them in a position to aid the other in case of a sudden attack in force. The troops that crossed the Chickahominy were directed in a General Order "to go prepared for battle at a moment's notice." They were to preserve discipline, obey orders, and especially to bear in mind "that the Army of the Potomac has never been checked; keep well together, throw away no shots, but aim carefully and low, and, above all things, rely upon the bayonet."³


By the 28th of May the two corps of Keyes and Heintzelman, forming the left wing, were on the south side of the Chickahominy, massed checker-wise along the Williamsburg road for a distance of about six miles. The right wing, comprising the corps of Sumner, Franklin, and Porter, was stretched for eighteen miles along the north bank of the Chickahominy. The two wings formed an acute-angled triangle of unequal sides, the apex being at Bottom's Bridge. The distance between the centre of the two wings was hardly five miles in a direct line, but between them flowed the Chickahominy, over which no practicable bridge had been thrown except at the apex of the triangle. If the left wing, which was thus thrown across the river toward Richmond, were attacked in force by the enemy massed in superior numbers on that side, the right wing could come to its aid only by a march of more than twenty miles; so if the right were assailed, it could be aided by the left only by an equal march.⁴ For a hostile commander, with any thing like an equal force, there were two courses open. He could throw his entire strength upon the weaker left wing with a probability, as sure as any thing in war can be, of annihilating it; or he could fling his

whole army upon the Federal right, attacking its weak line of communication with its supplies. Johnston tried the former plan at the close of May. He failed only through accidents which neither party could anticipate. Lee tried the second plan at the close of June, under circumstances which should have insured its defeat. The result was that the Federal army, outgeneraled, but not outfought or outnumbered, was driven from the Chickahominy to the James, bringing the Peninsular campaign to a disastrous close.

For a few days McClellan's dispatches to the President were hopeful. On the 25th of May, the time was very near when he should attack Richmond. Next day, he was "quietly closing in upon the enemy preparatory to the last struggle." He had cut the Virginia Central Railroad in three places, and would try to cut the other railroad. He thought the Richmond intrenchments not very formidable, and hoped soon to be within shelling distance. His arrangements for the morrow were very important, and, if successful, would leave him free to strike on the return of the force detached.¹

He had just learned that a considerable force of the enemy was near Hanover Court-house, to the right and rear of his army, threatening his communications, "and in a position either to re-enforce Jackson or to impede McDowell's junction, should he finally move to join us." This force, as it afterward appeared, was Branch's division of raw men from North Carolina. Fitz John Porter was ordered to dislodge them. Marching fourteen miles through a heavy rain, Porter's advance, under Emory, reached the neighborhood of Hanover Court-house at noon on the 27th, and found a portion of the enemy drawn up across the road to dispute their progress. Emory, re-enforced by a portion of Morell's brigade, routed this body after an hour's firing, and the main body of the Union force were ordered to pursue them northward, while Martindale, with three regiments, was sent westward toward Ashland to obstruct the railroad and cut the telegraph wires. He soon found himself opposed by a superior force, and sent to Porter for re-enforcements. For reply he received orders to march to the right, in which direction the enemy were, as Porter supposed, retreating north, pursued by the main part of the corps. Martindale rejoined that the enemy was on his left, but prepared to obey orders, when he was directed to march to a certain distance and halt. But so confident was he that Porter was misinformed of the position of the enemy that he obeyed the order only in part, keeping back a portion of his force to guard the van of the main column. Soon his force of 1000 men was attacked by the whole strength of the enemy, estimated at from 5000 to 7000 men. He stood his ground stoutly for two hours, but was sorely bested. His centre was broken, and the enemy getting through the woods upon both his flanks. Porter at length found that he was mistaken in supposing the enemy was retiring to the north, and that he had been "pursuing a myth." He faced his whole column about, and fell upon the flanks of the enemy, who were held at bay by Martindale. The Confederates were routed, and fled in confusion.

¹ *McC. Rep.*, 200. ² *Ibid.*, 201. ³ *Gen. Order*, May 25th, *Reb. Rec.*, v., 431. ⁴ McClellan, while attempting to explain why he failed to push his advantage at Fair Oaks, shows the complete isolation of his two wings. He says: "The only available means of uniting our forces at Fair Oaks for an advance upon Richmond, soon after the battle, was to march the troops from Mechanicsville and other points on the left bank of the Chickahominy down to Bottom's Bridge, and thence over the Williamsburg road to the position near Fair Oaks, a distance of about twenty-three miles. In the condition of the roads at that time this march could not have been made with artillery in less than two days."—*Report*, 223.



SHELLING ACROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY SWAMP.

"The immediate results of these affairs," says McClellan, "were some 200 of the enemy's dead buried by our troops, 730 prisoners sent to the rear, one 12-pound howitzer, one caisson, a large number of small-arms, and two railroad trains captured. Our loss amounted to 53 killed, 344 wounded and missing."¹

McClellan was jubilant at the result of this action, the first which had been fought by his direction. It was, he said, a glorious victory; the rout of the rebels was complete—not a defeat, but a complete rout. Porter had gained two complete victories over superior forces. The enemy were concentrating every thing on Richmond; he would do his best to cut off Jackson, but was doubtful whether he could. All the railroads had been cut but that from Richmond to Fredericksburg. The President replied that he was very glad of Porter's victory, but added, "If it was a total rout of the enemy, I am puzzled to know why the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad was not seized. Again: As you say you have all the railroads but the Richmond and Fredericksburg, I am puzzled to see how, lacking that, you can have any except the scrap from Richmond to West Point. The scrap of the Virginia Central from Richmond to Hanover Junction, without more, is simply nothing. That the whole of the enemy is concentrating upon Richmond I think can not be certainly known to you or me." McClellan was no wise satisfied with this guarded congratulation. "I do not think," he wrote, "that you at all appreciate the value and magnitude of Porter's victory. He has entirely relieved my right flank, which was seriously threatened; routed and demoralized a considerable portion of the rebel forces. It was one of the handsomest things of the war, both in itself and its results. Porter has returned, and my army is again well in hand. Another day will make the probable field of battle passable for artillery."² Martindale, whose firm stand against superior forces had secured the victory, was not so enthusiastic either as to the conduct of the affair or its value.³

Johnston was in no position to attack, or even seriously to threaten, McClellan's right on the eastern side of the Chickahominy. He had fallen back from Yorktown, from Williamsburg, and then across the Chickahominy, simply because he was opposed to a greatly superior force. Of course, plausible reasons must be given for these movements. Yorktown, it was said, was evacuated because "McClellan, by his arrangements, had made the place untenable;"⁴ the strong lines at Williamsburg were abandoned because he wished to fight the enemy in the open field, out of the reach of gun-boats;⁵ the Chickahominy was crossed because he did not wish to fight a great battle with so formidable an obstacle in the way of his retreat, in case he was worsted.⁶ Branch's six regiments, so far from being sent from Richmond to threaten McClellan's right and his communications with his base of supplies, were moving down from Gordonsville to the defense of Richmond, whither Johnston was calling every man, with the exception of Jackson's command in the Valley of the Shenandoah. Two days before the

affair at Hanover Court-house, J. R. Anderson, who had been confronting McDowell near Fredericksburg, was on his way to Richmond, and the day after the battle his force passed Ashland, almost within sight of Porter's battle-field, and hurried on to the capital. There was now no enemy between McDowell and McClellan, and their advanced guards were only fifteen miles apart. Jackson was at this moment at Williamsport on the Potomac, 200 miles away. The terror excited at Washington by his bold movement alone prevented the junction of McDowell with McClellan.¹

But if McClellan's right wing, stretched along the eastern branch of the Chickahominy, was unassailable by any force at Johnston's command, the weaker left, practically isolated on the other side of the stream, invited a sharp and sudden blow. About 30,000 men, belonging to Keyes's and Heintzelman's corps, had been sent across the Chickahominy.² Keyes, whose corps was in the advance, intrenched itself a mile behind a place on the Williamsburg road known as "The Seven Pines," nearly midway between the river and Richmond. The place was named from a clump of pine-trees which formerly stood at the crossing of several roads. Casey's division of this corps was pushed a thousand yards beyond the Pines to Fair Oaks Farm.³ Here were two pleasant houses in a grove of fair oak-trees, with a long pile of wood cut for the railroad. Casey's pickets were advanced a thousand yards farther to the edge of a dense forest, through an opening in which the enemy were desecrated in force. The region was mostly wooded and intersected by marshes, with small clearings around the few houses. The trees were hastily cut down to form abatis, rifle-pits were dug, and one or two redoubts for artillery hastily constructed.

Heintzelman's corps lay behind that of Keyes, stretching also to the left, in order to cover the approaches to the White Oak Swamp, which came close up to the Williamsburg road. Although Keyes was in the advance, Heintzelman was told by McClellan that he was to command on that side of the Chickahominy, and if there was any fighting to do, he must do it. He thought the troops were too much scattered, but dared not change their position in face of the positive orders which he had received; but after a week he got authority to place his men as he saw fit, and sent half of them

¹ *McC. Rep.*, 211, *De Joinville*, 68.—As early as May 29th McClellan was apprized of the significance of the Confederate troops near Hanover Court-house. On that day he wrote to the Secretary of War: "General Anderson left his position in the vicinity of Fredericksburg at 4 A. M., Sunday [May 25th], with the following troops: 1st South Carolina; one battalion South Carolina Rifles; 12th, 13th, and 14th South Carolina; 3d Louisiana; two batteries of four guns each, namely, Letcher's Virginia, and McIntosh's South Carolina batteries. General Anderson and his command passed Ashland yesterday morning en route for Richmond, leaving men behind him to destroy the bridges over the telegraph road, which they traveled. This information is reliable. It is also positively certain that Branch's command was from Gordonsville, bound for Richmond, whither they have now gone. It may be regarded as positive. I think that there is no force between Fredericksburg and the Junction" [of the Virginia Central and Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroads, ten miles north of Ashland]. Yet the very next day he wrote that his right flank had been "seriously threatened" by Branch, the dispersal of whose division had effected "the clearing of our right flank and rear;" this "dispersal," apart from the loss of prisoners and killed, amounting only to hastening their march to Richmond. He repeats this statement in his Report prepared more than a year later, asserting that Branch's force "was in the vicinity of Hanover Court-house, to the right and rear of our army, thus threatening our communications."—(*Report*, 211, 212, 205.) They were certainly to the right, at a distance of fifteen miles, and endeavoring to get away; but they were not in his rear, and could only threaten his communications by almost reversing their line of march, and putting the Chickahominy and three fifths of the Union army directly between themselves and the Confederate force before Richmond. Lee, indeed, made this very movement a month later, but not until his strength was nearly double that of Johnston, and he had measured the capacity of his antagonist. He made it, also, with more than 60,000 men, instead of with six regiments.

² "There were four divisions on the right bank of the Chickahominy—one a very weak one. I should think the strength of the four divisions must have been 30,000 men, perhaps."—McClellan's *Testimony*, *Com. Rep.*, 433.

³ There are two Fair Oaks mentioned in the reports of the actions of May 31st and June 1st. The failure to discriminate these has given rise to much confusion. "Fair Oaks Farm" is on the Williamsburg road, something more than half a mile beyond the Seven Pines. "Fair Oaks Station" is a wooding point on the railroad, about a mile from the farm.

¹ *McC. Rep.*, 208.

² *Ibid.*, 208-212.

³ "The whole line of our march and our left flank, by the order of the commander-in-chief, was left exposed and open to assault; following the directions which the general gave, instead of a victory, we should have been involved in an ugly catastrophe. . . . I went with a force of only about 1000 men to encounter the whole force of the enemy that day, from 5000 to 7000. The general results were these: A cross-fire opening upon us from the woods; I had my wings supported in columns—my centre was broken—and maintained my position there about two hours, while the rest of the army were pursuing a myth, when the return of the second brigade under Morell enabled us to take the rebels thus held at advantage, and repulse them, resulting in the rout of the enemy. . . . I never comprehended any object in the movement to Hanover Court-house except it was to intercept some of the enemy, if any should happen to be between Hanover Court-house and Fredericksburg."—Martin's *Testimony*, *Com. Rep.*, 635-637.

⁴ *Southern Generals*, 265.

⁵ *Pollard*, ii., 16.

⁶ *Memphis Appeal*.



R.R. bridge over the Chickahominy


Spring on the R.R.

The last resting place

In Camp

ARMY SCENES ON THE CHICKAHOMINY.

Bridge-builders.



forward to the Seven Pines. This was only the day before the battle opened.¹

Johnston, in the mean while, was informed, but only partially, of the movement across the Chickahominy. His "trusty scouts" could only tell him on the 30th of May that Keyes's corps had crossed, and were encamped on the Richmond side of the stream. He resolved to "attack them next morning, hoping to be able to defeat Keyes's corps completely in its advanced position before it could be re-enforced." The attack was to be made by the four full divisions of Huger, Longstreet, D. H. Hill, and G. W. Smith, comprising fully three fifths of Johnston's entire force.² The main assault was to be made in front by Longstreet, with his own division and that of Hill; Huger was to move down the Charles City road, and attack the left flank of the force engaged by Longstreet; and Smith was to march down to the junction of the New Bridge and Nine-mile roads, and be ready to assail the right flank of Keyes or to cover Longstreet's left.

During the afternoon and night of the 30th a storm more violent than had been known for a generation swept over Richmond. This seemed providential for the Confederates. The channel of the Chickahominy was already full to its brim. The stream, swollen by the storm, would overflow the swamp and bottom, preventing any aid to be sent to Keyes from the other side. The left wing of the Union army seemed doomed. Though it was twice as strong as Johnston supposed, it was still greatly overmatched, and its destruction would have been the greater success for the Confederates.³

The attack was to be made simultaneously at daybreak. The storm delayed the movements of the troops, but by eight o'clock Longstreet was in position, ready to begin. Hour after hour he waited for Huger, unwilling to make a partial attack instead of the combined movement which had been planned. Noon had passed before he decided to commence the assault, without waiting for the dilatory Huger.⁴

Casey's division of Keyes's corps was in the advance at Fair Oaks Farm, three quarters of a mile in front of the Seven Pines, its pickets being pushed a third of a mile farther, up to the very edge of the wood in and behind

which the enemy was posted, his strength being fully screened from view. There had been indications of an impending attack. The cars had been heard running all the night before from Richmond, indicating that troops were being brought to the front. Early in the morning an aid of Johnston was captured close to the Union lines. Keyes ordered his division to be under arms at 11 A.M. Soon tidings were brought that the enemy were coming in force down the Williamsburg road. Casey advanced several batteries toward his picket-lines to meet them, at the same time sending back for re-enforcements. He had scarcely done this when the enemy burst through the screen of woods. The pickets and supporting regiments were swept back in confusion. The artillery had been thrown forward; in order to save the guns, Naglee made a bayonet charge upon the advancing enemy, and pressed them back to the woods. Here he was met with a furious fire of musketry, and forced back; the guns were saved, with the exception of a single piece, and the whole division fell back to the line of defense at Fair Oaks Farm. Here this weak division, scarcely five thousand strong, held its ground for three hours against three times its number. But at length, pressed in front, almost enveloped on both flanks, and having lost one third of its number, it fell back to the second line of defense in front of the Seven Pines, then held by Couch's division. The retreat was made just in time. Had it been delayed a few minutes, the whole division would have been surrounded and captured. As it was, they lost a battery of five guns. Casey maintained that this stubborn resistance at this line really saved the day, and prevented this action from resulting "in a severe repulse, which might have resulted in a disastrous defeat."⁵

Couch's division at the Seven Pines had been weakened by sending regiments to the support of Casey. Their line of defense, protected by a slight abatis, lay across the road. Keyes, the corps commander, who was now on the ground, brought forward what re-enforcements he could from the rear, and made a stand. Thus far the weight of the fight on the Confederate side had been borne by Hill's division, which was in the advance. Longstreet's force now came up, and pressed the line in front, while its superior numbers enabled it to assail the right and left flanks at the same time. Couch, who was on the right with two regiments, was forced from his position. Instead of falling back, he withdrew along the Nine-mile road to Fair Oaks Station, where he took part in the action which soon began at that point. Longstreet, who was now on the field, leaving the Union right, pressed with all his force upon the centre and left, between Couch and the main body of the division. Heintzelman by this time had brought forward Kearney's division of his corps, Hooker's being then near White Oak

¹ The conduct of Casey's division was at the time a matter of sharp discussion. Several officers, who saw only the disorganized regiments, reported that it had behaved disgracefully; McClellan, in his first dispatch, declared that "Casey's division, which was the first line, gave way unaccountably and discreditably." Upon more complete information, he officially withdrew the charge, saying, "I withdraw the expression contained in my first dispatch, and I cordially give my indorsement to the conclusion of the division commander, that 'those parts of his command which behaved discreditably were exceptional cases.'"—(McC. Rep., 222.) Still it is certain that the division, as such, was broken by the overwhelming force to which it was opposed. A portion of it, with others, rushed back, a disorganized mass. Heintzelman, in his Report, states the case fairly. He says: "Some of the regiments fought gallantly till overwhelmed by superior numbers. After they were once broken, however, they could not be rallied" [as a body, that is, since, as he implies and as Keyes affirms, among the fragments of regiments which formed the line which finally checked the Confederate advance were portions of Casey's, as well as of Couch's and Kearney's divisions]. "The road was filled with fugitives (not all from this division) as far as Bottom's Bridge. Colonel Starr's regiment, of General Hooker's division, had to force its way through them with the bayonet, and a guard I placed at Bottom's Bridge stopped over a thousand men."

¹ Heintzelman's Testimony, *Com. Rep.*, 351.

² In the organization of the Confederate army, a "division" was the largest member, answering to a "corps" in the Union army. Each division comprised from four to six brigades. The strength of a division at this time was about 12,000, so that the attack, as planned, would have been made by 48,000 men; but, as Huger failed to execute his part, there were but 36,000 Confederates actually engaged. Including Branch and Anderson, who reached Richmond the day before with about 12,000, Johnston could have had barely 20,000 men beyond these four divisions; as Huger had only recently been brought from Petersburg, where he was posted for some time after his abandonment of Norfolk, Johnston could not have fallen back from Yorktown and Williamsburg with more than 45,000. For General Johnston's own statement of his force at different periods of the campaign, see note at the end of this chapter.

³ "I determined to attack next morning [May 31st], hoping to be able to defeat Keyes's corps completely in its more advanced position before it could be re-enforced. . . . Heavy and protracted rains during the afternoon and night, by swelling the stream of the Chickahominy, increased the probability of our having to deal with no other troops than those of Keyes."—(Johnston's Report.) "The storm of May 30th was terrible. Never, even in the tropics, have I seen a more sudden and sweeping deluge. The creek which flowed at the bottom of the hill below the house in which I lived [in Richmond], and over which, in ordinary times, a boy might leap, filled the valley, on the morning of May 30th, with a shallow lake more than one hundred yards in width."—(Hurlbert, in *De Joinville*, 114.) "During the day and night of the 30th of May a very violent storm occurred. The rain, falling in torrents, rendered work on the rifle-pits and bridges impracticable, made the roads almost impassable, and threatened the destruction of the bridges across the Chickahominy. The enemy, perceiving the unfavorable position in which we were placed, and the possibility of destroying that part of our army which was apparently cut off by the rapidly-rising stream, threw an overwhelming force upon the position occupied by Casey's division."—(McC. Rep., 215.) "General Keyes's corps and a part of General Heintzelman's were on the right bank of the Chickahominy. General Sumner's corps, with the rest of the army, were on the other bank of the river. The enemy took advantage of our position, and the small force that was on the right bank, and made their preparations to just gobble up Keyes's whole corps. They attacked me on the 31st of May. The preceding night was one of the worst I ever saw. I never before heard such a thunder-storm as there was on that night."—(Casey's Testimony, *Com. Rep.*, 443.) "On Friday night we had one of the worst rain-storms, thunder and lightning, that I ever saw. A man who had lived there twenty-nine years said that it was one of the worst storms they ever had in that country."—(Heintzelman's Testimony, *Com. Rep.*, 354.) "Through all the night of the 30th of May there was a raging storm, the like of which I can not remember. Torrents of rain drenched the earth. The thunderbolts rolled and fell without intermission, and the heavens flashed with a perpetual blaze of lightning. From their beds of mud and the peltings of this storm, the Fourth Corps rose to fight the battle of the 31st of May, 1862."—(Keyes's Rep.)

⁴ Johnston says that the advance was made at 2 P.M., "the engagement being opened by artillery and skirmishers, and by 3 o'clock it had become close and heavy." But, according to the concurrent accounts of all the Union officers, the skirmishing began by noon, and within an hour the action became serious. Johnston's report was written nearly a month after the battle, and while he was still feeble from the effects of his wound. There can be no doubt that he is incorrect in his statements of time, placing the important periods of the action two hours later than they actually occurred. In giving the time, we adopt the general statements of the Union authorities.



SILAS CASEY.



DARIUS N. COUCH.

Swamp, too far away to come up in time. The fight raged fiercely with varying success for an hour and a half, until five o'clock, when the Union force began slowly to give way, and fall back from the position at the Seven Pines. The right, with Couch, had moved northward toward Fair Oaks Station; the left, with Berry, of Kearney's division, held its ground, keeping the enemy before it in check until nightfall, when they fell back southward by way of the White Oak Swamp. The Union centre fell back fighting a few hundred yards to a narrow strip of woods crossing the Williamsburg road. Here Heintzelman in person succeeded in rallying about eighteen hundred men, the fragments of regiments, and checked the advance of the enemy, who never got beyond this belt of woods. It was almost by accident that this stand was successful. Keyes, who was on the left of the proposed line, saw that the key to the position was a spot where the wooded ground sloped abruptly to the rear. If the enemy gained this the day was lost. He called a single regiment to follow him across an open field of seven or eight hundred yards. They dashed on in the face of a scorching fire, and gained the spot just in time. "Had they been two minutes later," says Keyes, "they would have been too late to occupy that fine position, and it would have been impossible to have formed the next and last line of battle, which stemmed the tide of defeat, and turned it toward victory." The new line, formed of fragments from regiments from every division which had been engaged—Casey's, Couch's, and Kearney's—had hardly been formed, when a heavy mass of the enemy, which had been held in check, came down upon it. They were met by a fire so deadly that their advance was checked.

It was now past six o'clock, and, though it wanted an hour of sunset, the dense vapors rising from the swamp made all objects indistinct. The Confederates, who had pressed the Union forces for two miles from Fair Oaks Farm to beyond the Seven Pines, fell back a little toward Richmond, passing the night under arms on the battle-field and in the camps which they had won. The Union troops fell back a mile in the other direction to an intrenched camp.

The battle had hardly opened when the sound of musketry was heard at McClellan's head-quarters, six miles away in a direct line, on the other side of the Chickahominy. He was confined to his bed by illness, but sent an order to Sumner, whose corps lay nearest the battle-field, and who had just thrown two bridges over the Chickahominy, to hold himself in readiness to march to the scene of action. The storm which had on the previous evening burst so furiously over Richmond, had spent its force there and to the south; northward it was comparatively slight. The inundation which Johnston supposed would render the Chickahominy impassable by day-break began to appear at noon. It was now two hours after noon. The bridges had become almost impassable, many of the timbers of the best one being already floating. Sumner more than obeyed the order which he had received. Instead of merely preparing to move, he advanced his two divisions—those of Sedgwick and Richardson—halting the leading company of each upon the bridge opposite it. He thus saved an hour, when, as events proved, minutes were priceless.

Tidings came to head-quarters that the day was going hardly, and Sumner, at half past two, was ordered to cross. Sedgwick's division in the advance pressed over the shaking bridge. The artillery was dragged with difficulty through the swamp on the other side. Sumner, with this division, guided by the sound of the firing, pushed on to Fair Oaks Station, where he arrived just in time to fight the battle of Fair Oaks, which, although no one

then knew it, prevented that of Seven Pines from being an entire defeat for the Union forces. At Fair Oaks Station he met Couch, who told him that he had been separated from the rest of the army, and was momentarily expecting an attack. Sumner took the command, and hastily formed Sedgwick's division and Couch's few regiments along the north side of the railroad from the station eastward. The formation was incomplete, when, at five o'clock, the enemy opened a furious attack upon his centre, hoping to get possession of the battery of artillery which had been posted there.

This Confederate force was composed of G. W. Smith's division, which had for eight hours remained idle at its post where the Nine-mile road joined that leading to New Bridge. Johnston had taken his place here, and Jefferson Davis had come out to witness the fight. This division had taken its post at eight o'clock in the morning. For three hours, from one till four, Johnston was utterly unaware that a battle had been going on scarcely four miles away.¹ At four o'clock Johnston ordered Smith to move, and in an hour he had begun a hot attack upon Sumner's line. The early twilight was just closing in, when Sumner, who had sustained a heavy fire, charged with six regiments directly into the woods, and hurled the enemy back in confusion. At this moment Johnston was struck by a fragment of a shell, severely wounded, and borne from the field. Night closed the battle of Fair Oaks, as it closed at almost the same moment that of the Seven Pines.

Just then Richardson's division of Sumner's corps came upon the field. He had begun to cross the Chickahominy by "Sumner's lower bridge," which was nearest to his own camp; but before his division was half over, the rising waters made this bridge impassable, and two brigades, with all the artillery, had to cross by the upper bridge, over which Sedgwick had crossed. When this division came up, it was posted along the railroad to the left of Sedgwick, connecting this with Birney's brigade of Heintzelman's corps, which had been sent in that direction, but had halted, without having taken part in the fight.² The two forces bivouacked in the field, their picket lines being within speaking distance.

The disabling of Johnston left the Confederates with an incompetent leader. Smith, who succeeded to the command, appears to have gone over to the Seven Pines, but found the forces there in no condition to renew their attack here on the next morning.³ But the attack was fiercely renewed on

¹ We here follow Johnston's notation of time, as it relates to matters that came under his personal observation. He says: "I had placed myself on the left of the force employed in this attack, with the division of General Smith, that I might be on a part of the field where I could observe and be ready to meet any counter-movement which the enemy's general might make against our centre or left. Owing to some peculiar condition of the atmosphere, the sound of the musketry did not reach us. I consequently deferred giving the signal for General Smith's advance until four o'clock, at which time Major Jasper Whiting, of General Smith's staff, whom I had sent to learn the state of affairs with General Longstreet's column, returned, reporting that it was pressing on with vigor. . . . Smith's division moved forward at four o'clock, General Whiting's three brigades leading. Their progress was impeded by the enemy's skirmishers, which, with their supports, were driven back to the railroad. At this point Whiting's Own and Pettigrew's brigades engaged a superior force of the enemy. Hood's, by my orders, moved on to co-operate with Longstreet. General Smith was desired to hasten up with all the troops within reach. He brought up Hampton's and Hatton's brigades in a few minutes. The strength of the enemy's position, however, enabled him to hold it until dark. About sunset, being struck from my horse, severely wounded, by a fragment of a shell, I was carried from the field, and Major General G. W. Smith succeeded to the command."

² Birney was put under arrest by Heintzelman, and brought before a court-martial on charge of disobedience of orders in having halted his brigade. He was honorably acquitted, it being shown that he had obeyed orders received from Kearney, his immediate commander. His brigade, then commanded by Colonel Hobart Ward, did good service in the action of the following day.

³ Thus only can we explain Johnston's statement that "General Smith, who succeeded to the command, was prevented from resuming his attack on the enemy's position next morning by the discovery of strong intrenchments not seen on the previous evening." He indeed adds: "Smith's division bivouacked on the night of the 31st within musket-shot of the intrenchments which they were attacking when darkness stayed the conflict." But there were no intrenchments near Fair Oaks Station, where Smith's attack upon Sumner was made. Johnston represents the sharp fighting on the railroad next day merely as a demonstration upon two of the Confederate brigades, which was repelled. But he was clearly misinformed as to the character of this action. The con-



EDWIN V. SUMNER.



SEARCHING FOR THE DEAD AND WOUNDED.



PICKETS IN THE WOODS.

the right, near Fair Oaks Station. The Confederates advanced down the railroad—avoiding Sedgwick's division, which had fought the previous day, and was still held to the right by Sumner in position at Fair Oaks—and fell upon Richardson's division, which formed the centre. The attack, repulsed at one point, was renewed at another, but without success, Richardson's line, supported by artillery, standing firm.

Meanwhile Hooker had come up from the left, making for the heaviest fire, for the ground was so densely wooded that the position of the combatants could not be seen. He found Birney's brigade, now commanded by Ward, drawn up in line of battle, and with this force fell upon the enemy's rear, and, after an hour's hard fighting, pushed them from the woods by which they were sheltered. He then ordered a bayonet charge. The enemy broke and fled toward Richmond. Almost at the same moment Richardson's whole line, farther to the right, advanced, pouring in its fire at close range, following up the advantage by a bayonet charge, which put the enemy to flight. The line of retreat followed by the Confederates took them from the railroad to the Williamsburg road, where the forces who had the day before gained the battle of Seven Pines still held the direct way to Richmond, and the whole force moved back, utterly foiled in the object for which the attack had been made. The Union force was too much scattered to venture a pursuit.¹

The battle of Sunday, June 1st, began at seven in the morning, and was over at eleven. At noon McClellan came upon the field at Fair Oaks, but he had no orders to give; he was quite satisfied with what had been done.² On the next day the Union forces assumed the position at Fair Oaks Farm which they had held before the battle. Sumner also retained his position at Fair Oaks Station, strengthening it by earthworks. The losses in killed and wounded in these two battles were nearly equal. That of the Confederates was 4233; that of the Union, 4517, of whom 890 were killed; there were also 1222 missing, three quarters of them from Keyes's corps.³ The

current accounts of all the Union generals show that it was a serious attack by Smith's entire division, which was effectually repulsed.—See Richardson's Letter, *Reb. Rec.*, v., 87; Sumner's Testimony, *Com. Rep.*, 363; Hooker's Testimony, *ibid.*, 578; *McC. Rep.*, 220; *De Joinville*, 77.

¹ Heintzelman gave orders to pursue, but countermanded them at the urgent request of Kearney, who said it was better to let well enough alone, and that McClellan would order a general advance in a few days. Next day he learned that the Confederates had retreated in confusion, and sent Hooker forward, who penetrated to within less than four miles of Richmond. He was then stopped by order of McClellan, and directed to establish his command on the ground occupied before the battle by Casey's division at Fair Oaks Farm.—*Com. Rep.*, 352, 578.

² Sumner's Testimony, *Com. Rep.*, 363.

³ These are the official statements. McClellan's report of his loss is:

Corps.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
General Sumner's.....	183	894	146
" Heintzelman's.....	239	980	155
" Keyes's.....	448	1753	921
	890	3627	1222

Johnston does not distinguish between killed and wounded. He says:
 Longstreet reports the loss in his command at being about..... 5000
 Smith reports his loss at..... 1233
 4233

Confederate attack was well conceived, and, had it been carried out according to Johnston's plan, would hardly have failed of success. If Huger had come down upon the left at any time, or if Smith had moved only an hour earlier from the right, Heintzelman and Keyes must have been utterly crushed. Or had the full flood of the Chickahominy come down, as was expected, four hours before instead of four hours after noon, Sumner could not have crossed, and the Union forces on the south side of the river would have been annihilated in plain sight of the whole army on the opposite bank, utterly powerless to give any aid.

As it was, the blow had utterly failed, and the Confederate force hurried back to Richmond broken and dispirited. Had McClellan known how utterly broken it was, he might have marched straight on to Richmond on the 1st of June.¹ The city itself and its approaches were then utterly unfortified. Even McClellan was convinced, only six days before, that the Richmond intrenchments were not formidable.² There was, indeed, nothing between him and Richmond except the six miles of space, a few rifle-pits and sand-works not mounted with artillery, and the disjointed fragments of a defeated army. The formidable works which in a few days crowned every hillock and swept every road were hardly begun. They were the work of Lee, constructed at a later date. Hooker saw nothing of them when he

McClellan indeed says (*Rep.*, 221), "General J. E. Johnston reports the loss of the enemy in Longstreet's and Smith's divisions at 4283; General D. H. Hill, who had taken the advance in the attack, estimates his loss at 2500, which would give the enemy's loss 6783." But Hill's division was included in Longstreet's "command," and his loss forms a part of Longstreet's. There is, indeed, reason to suspect that the Confederate loss is understated by Johnston. Hurlbert, the translator of *De Joinville*, who was at the time detained in Richmond under surveillance, says: "There were published in the Richmond papers detailed brigade and regimental reports of the losses in sixty out of seventy-two organizations, regiments, battalions, and companies mentioned as taking part in the engagements. I computed these losses as they were published. The sum total was 6733, killed, wounded, and missing." Correcting a probable misprint (6233 for 6283), this is within one of McClellan's statement of the Confederate loss, purporting to be taken from Johnston's Report. It is to be noted, however, that the 2500 loss ascribed to Hill's division make just the difference between the two statements (4233 and 6733). It might be supposed that some one, seeing these two statements, and finding in Johnston's Report no separate mention of Hill, whose loss must have been large, his division doing most of the fighting on the first day, assumed this number in order to make the accounts coincide, and that McClellan hastily adopted the statement without verifying it by Johnston's Report. From the nature of the actions, the Confederates charging intrenchments, and being exposed to artillery, while they brought none into the field, their loss might be presumed to be in excess. We, however, admit Johnston's statement into the text.

¹ Hurlbert (*Appendix to De Joinville*, 112) says: "They were in a perfect chaos of brigades and regiments. The roads to Richmond were literally crowded with stragglers, some throwing away their guns, some breaking them on the trees—all with the same story, that their regiment had been 'cut to pieces,' that the 'Yankees were swarming on the Chickahominy like bees, and fighting like devils.' In two days of the succeeding week the provost-marshal's guard collected between 4000 and 5000 stragglers, and sent them into camp. What had become of the command of the army no one knew. By some persons it was reported that Major General Gustavus W. Smith had succeeded Johnston; by others, that President Davis had taken the reins of the army. General Johnston himself was reported to be either actually dead or dying. . . . Had I been aware on that day of the actual state of things upon the field, I might easily have driven in a carriage through the Confederate lines directly into our own camps. It was not, indeed, till several days after the battle that anything like military order was restored throughout the Confederate positions." ² *McC. Rep.*, 204.



FAIR OAKS FARM.—BURYING THE DEAD AND BURNING THE HORSES.



PICKET GUARD ON THE CHICKAHOMINY.

advanced within three and a half miles of Richmond. Had it been found inexpedient to endeavor to march into Richmond, there was nothing to prevent the Union lines from being advanced fully a mile and a half, clear beyond the woody belt which had sheltered the Confederates. Richmond would then have been within shelling distance. McClellan seems never to have imagined the possibility of an advance by his left wing, which then comprised three of his five corps. He simply said that he could not at once throw his whole army across the Chickahominy, and pronounced the idea of then marching upon Richmond as too absurd to be entertained by any one. But his ablest officers, who had met the enemy at Seven Pines and Fair Oaks, were of a different opinion.¹

The Chickahominy continued to rise slowly but continuously all through Sunday, June 1st, though the rain had ceased. Many supposed that its upper waters had been dammed, and that the sluices had been opened. All the bridges, except the railroad bridge, were swept away or their approaches submerged. For several days the railroad bridge was the only communication between the two wings of the army, and that was made passable only by planks laid between the rails.² To build new bridges high above the water seemed to McClellan the work of the time. He kept up, however, a brisk correspondence with the government at Washington, the main topics being the weather, and what he was going to do when the weather should permit.³ The weather was certainly unpropitious. Never, within the mem-

ory of the oldest inhabitant, had there been on the Peninsula such a rainy season as this.

McDowell was now, for the third time, ordered to join McClellan. He wrote from Manassas to McClellan joyfully announcing the fact. McCall's division was to go by water, the remainder of the corps by land. He himself, with the remainder, would be with him in ten days by way of Fredericksburg. This was on the 10th of June. Two days after, he wrote that McCall was on the way, but circumstances would prevent him from coming with the other troops at the time promised; but he asked that McCall's division should be so placed as to join the remainder of his corps when they arrived. McClellan had all along been jealous of McDowell. He wrote to the President intimating that McDowell was willing that the general interests should be sacrificed to increase his own command. He wished no troops not under his full control, but would prefer to fight the battle with what he had, and leave others responsible for the result.¹ McCall's division

very strong position, I may wait for what troops I can bring up from Fortress Monroe [he had just been officially informed that Wool's department had been merged into his own, General Dix there replacing Wool, who was sent to Fort McHenry, near Baltimore]. "But the morale of my troops is now such that I can venture much, and do not fear for odds against me. The victory is complete, and all credit is due to our officers and men."—(*Com. Rep.*, 333.) June 2. "Our left is every where advanced considerably beyond the positions it occupied before the battle." [This is erroneous. The left never occupied a position on the Williamsburg road in advance of Fair Oaks Farm; and Fair Oaks Station, where Sumner posted himself, was no nearer Richmond.] "I am in strong hopes that the Chickahominy will fall sufficiently to enable me to cross the right. We have had a terrible time with our communications, bridges and causeways, built with great care, having been washed away with the freshet. All that human labor can do is being done to accomplish our purpose." June 3. "The Chickahominy has been almost the only obstacle in my way for several days. Every effort has been made, and will continue to be, to protect the communications across it. Nothing of importance except that it is again raining." June 4. "Terrible rain-storm during the night and morning; not yet cleared off; bridges in bad condition, and still hard at work upon them. I have taken every possible step to insure the security of the corps on the right bank, but I can not re-enforce them from here until my bridges are all safe, as my force is too small to insure my right and rear, should the enemy attack in that direction, as they may probably attempt. I have to be very cautious now." June 5. "Rained most of the night—has now ceased, but it is not clear. The river is still high and troublesome. Enemy opened with several batteries on our bridges near here this morning; our batteries seem to have pretty much silenced them, though some firing is still kept up. The rain forces us to remain in *statu quo*." June 7. "The Chickahominy has risen so as to flood the entire bottom to the depth of three and four feet. I am pushing forward the bridges in spite of this; and the men are working night and day, up to their waists in water, to complete them. The whole face of the country is a perfect bog, entirely impassable for artillery or even cavalry, except directly in the narrow roads, which renders any movement either of this or the rebel army utterly out of the question until we have more favorable weather. I am glad you are pressing forward re-enforcements so vigorously. I shall be in perfect readiness to move forward and take Richmond the moment McCall reaches here, and the ground will admit the passage of artillery. I have advanced my pickets about a mile to-day, driving off the rebel pickets and securing a very advantageous position." [It is hard to see in what direction the rebel pickets were advanced a mile; certainly not toward Richmond.] June 10 (much abridged). "I have information, not reliable, that Beauregard has arrived. I am completely checked by the weather; the Chickahominy is in a dreadful state; we have another rain-storm on our hands. I shall attack as soon as weather and ground will permit; but there will be a delay. I suggest that large detachments should be sent from Halleck's army to strengthen this. I will attack whenever the weather permits."—(*McC. Rep.*, 224-230.)

¹ McDOWELL TO MCCLELLAN—June 10: "For the third time I am ordered to join you, and hope this time to get through. In view of the remarks made with reference to my leaving you and not joining you before by your friends, and something I have heard as coming from you on

¹ After having shown (*see ante*, p. 348, Note ⁴) the utterly isolated position of the two wings of his army, he proceeds: "The idea of uniting the two wings of the army in time to make a vigorous pursuit of the enemy, with the prospect of overtaking him before he reached Richmond, only five miles distant from the field of battle, is simply absurd, and was, I presume, never for a moment seriously entertained by any one connected with the Army of the Potomac. An advance, involving the separation of the two wings by the impassable Chickahominy, would have exposed each to defeat in detail. Therefore I held the position already gained, and completed our crossings as soon as possible."—(*McC. Rep.*, 223.) But Keyes testified: "I think McClellan should have pushed right on after the battle of Fair Oaks. I do not know why he did not cross and attack, and win the battle. I think, if he had possessed the great quality of an energetic general, we should have taken Richmond."—(*Com. Rep.*, 445.) Sumner testified: "When the enemy had retreated after the battle of Fair Oaks, I know of no military reason for not immediately following them up to Richmond; and from information which we afterward received, I do believe that if the general had crossed the Chickahominy with the residue of the army, and made a general attack with his whole force, we could have carried Richmond. . . . If we had attacked with our whole force, we should have swept every thing before us; and I think the majority of the officers who were there think so now."—(*Ibid.*, 366.) Keyes testified: "I am not able to state why the enemy were not pursued; but it is my opinion that if they had been vigorously pursued by all the forces available for the pursuit, our army might have gone into Richmond."—(*Ibid.*, 609.) Hooker was asked, "Suppose that, the next day after the repulse of the enemy at Fair Oaks, General McClellan had brought his whole army across the Chickahominy, and made a vigorous movement upon Richmond, in your judgment, as a military man, what would have been the effect of that movement?" He replied, "In answer to that, I would say, that at no time during the whole campaign did I feel that we could not go to Richmond."—(*Ibid.*, 579.) Hooker had, the day after the battle, advanced a mile or more toward Richmond beyond Fair Oaks Farm, meeting no resistance except a little picket-firing, when he was recalled by a telegram to the effect that he should "return from his brilliant reconnaissance: we can not afford to lose his division." "I had no expectation," he said, "of being lost."—(*Ibid.*, 578.)

² *Art. Op.*, 26.

³ June 2. "Our left is within four miles of Richmond. I only wait for the river to fall to cross with the rest of the force, and make a general attack. Should I find them holding firm in a



WOODBURY AND ALEXANDER'S BRIDGE.

arrived on the 12th and 13th. They were posted on the extreme right, the point nearest to Fredericksburg. A few new regiments seven in all, were sent from Baltimore and elsewhere to Fortress Monroe, and a like number of older ones were sent thence to the Chickahominy.¹ McClellan moved his head-quarters across the Chickahominy on the 13th. By the 20th the bridges over the Chickahominy were measurably finished—in all eleven, of which seven were practically of use: Bottom's Bridge; the Railroad Bridge, the means of bringing up most of the supplies to the left wing; the Foot Bridge, on the shortest line between the two wings, "available for infantry under certain circumstances;" Duane's Bridge, "practicable for all arms;" Woodbury's Infantry Bridge, "available for infantry;" Woodbury and Alexander's Bridge, "for all arms;" and Sumner's upper bridge, or the Grapevine Bridge, the one over which Sumner had crossed to win the battle of Fair Oaks, "in condition to be used in emergency by all arms."² Franklin's corps was now passed over, leaving only Porter's corps and McCall's division on the north side. Earth-works were in the mean while thrown up along the entire front on the south side, in an irregular semicircle, from the edge of White Oak Swamp up to Fair Oaks Farm and Station, then down to the Chickahominy at Woodbury's Bridge, five miles measured around the arc, and three along its chord formed by the river. The works were of no great strength, for the generals in command disapproved of them; they thought they made the men timid.³ There were half a dozen redoubts, each mounting six or eight guns, connected by infantry parapets of timber and earth, with a ditch in front. The redoubts had parapets ten or twelve feet thick, and some were provided with magazines; the connecting lines were three or four feet thick at top.⁴

On the 3d of June, two days after the battle of Fair Oaks, Robert E. Lee was appointed to the command of the Confederate army in Virginia. For almost two centuries the Lees had been among the "First Families of Virginia." A century ago, Thomas Lee, grandson of the first American Lee, and grandfather of Robert E. Lee, was President of the Council and acting governor of the province. He kept almost royal state at his residence in Stafford.⁵ Three of the sons of Thomas Lee bore prominent parts in our Revolutionary struggle. Two of them, Richard Henry and Francis Lightfoot Lee, were among the signers of the Declaration of Independence: the former, on the 7th of June, 1776, moved in the Continental Congress the fa-

mous resolution that "These United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent states; that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved." Another son, the father of the Confederate general, was Henry Lee—the famous cavalry commander "Legion Harry." He was chosen by Congress to deliver the funeral oration on the death of Washington, in which occurs the phrase, "First in war, first in peace, and first in the hearts of his countrymen." He fell into pecuniary embarrassments, and died in 1818, leaving among other children Robert Edmund Lee, a boy of twelve.¹

It was not hard for the son of "Legion Harry" to gain admission to West Point. He entered this national institution in 1825, and, after four years, graduated with the highest honors of his class. It is recorded of him that "he never received a reprimand or had a mark of demerit against him." For more than thirty years his military record was not merely stainless, but most honorable. During the war with Mexico he was with Scott as Chief of Engineers. He was, indeed, the favorite officer of that veteran commander, and was mentioned with special honor in almost every one of his voluminous dispatches. This war over, he became Superintendent at West Point; but after two years he left, having received a commission in the cavalry. He served with honor in various quarters, fighting the Indians on the Texan frontier, and capturing John Brown at Harper's Ferry. The outbreak of secession in 1860 found him again in Texas, with the rank of colonel, but standing first on the list recommended for promotion to the rank of general. Thirty years before he had married the daughter and heiress of Mr. Custis, the step-child and adopted son of Washington. Through her he had become the proprietor of Arlington House, on the Potomac, and other large estates, all connecting him directly with the wife of Washington.

He was now fifty-five years old. For thirty-six years he had been in the military service of the United States. He had time and again sworn the military oath, binding him by the strongest obligation known among men to loyalty to the nation. He had risen high in his profession, and the highest rank in it was within his reach. To abandon the Union would peril every thing: professional rank, private fortune, and, if secession failed, his good name among men. But he was a Virginian, and, according to the theory of his section, his primary allegiance was due to his state. If she broke away from the nation, he must go with her. He came to Washington, and had a meeting with Scott, his old commander and friend. This was on the 18th of April, 1861, the day succeeding that upon which the Virginia Act of Secession was passed. He considered himself bound, he said, not to retain his commission in the army. Scott urged him not to resign. "I must," said Lee; "I can not consult my own feelings in the matter." Two days later he sent in his resignation, accompanying it with a pathetic letter, which breathed a hope that he might not yet be called to fight against the flag under which he had so long served.² The hope was

that subject, I wish to say I go with the greatest satisfaction, and hope to arrive with my main body in time to be of service. McCall goes in advance by water. I will be with you in ten days with the remainder, by Fredericksburg." June 12. "The delay of General Banks to relieve the division of my command now in the Valley beyond the time calculated upon will prevent my joining you with the remainder of the troops I am to take below at as early a day as I named. My third division (McCall's) is now on the way. Please to do me the favor so to place it that it may be in a position to join the others as they come down from Fredericksburg."—(*Raymond's Administration of President Lincoln*, 247.)

MCCLELLAN TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR—June 14: ". . . It ought to be distinctly understood that McDowell and his troops are completely under my control. I received a telegram from him requesting that McCall's division might be placed so as to join him immediately on his arrival. That request does not breathe the proper spirit. Whatever troops come to me must be disposed of so as to do the most good. I do not feel that in such circumstances as those in which I am now placed, General McDowell should wish the general good to be sacrificed for the purpose of increasing his command. If I can not fully control all his troops, I want none of them, but would prefer to fight the battle with what I have, and let others be responsible for the result. . . ."—(*McC. Rep.*, 232.)

¹ "On the 12th of June the 16th Massachusetts joined Hooker's division. Several regiments arrived about that time. I got about 5000 men for my corps about that time."—(Heintzelman, in *Com. Rep.*, 355.)

² "I was never in favor of those field-works. I think they have a tendency to make the men timid, and do more harm than good; and I think the older officers of the army think so. Formerly it was a matter of army regulation not to throw up field-works, because it made the men timid."—(Sumner's Testimony, *Com. Rep.*, 366. For the nature of these field-works, see *Art. Op.*, 30, 31, with Plan No. 15.)

³ "There is no structure in our country to compare with it. The walls of the first story are two and a half feet thick, and of the second story two feet, composed of brick imported from England. It originally contained about one hundred rooms. Besides the main building, there are four offices, one at each corner, containing fifteen rooms. The stables are capable of accommodating one hundred horses."—(*Lossing's Field-Book of the Revolution*, ii., 217.)

¹ General Charles Lee, dismissed from the Revolutionary army for his conduct at and after the battle of Monmouth, and thenceforth the bitter enemy of Washington, has been strangely confounded with "Legion Harry," one of his most trusted officers during the war, and his intimate friend thereafter. Charles Lee was born in Wales, and was in no way connected with the Lees of Virginia. For a sketch of the last days of Charles Lee, see John Estlin Cooke, in *Harper's Magazine* for September, 1858, p. 502.


² LEE TO SCOTT, April 20, 1861: "Since my interview with you on the 18th instant, I have felt that I ought no longer to retain my commission in the army. I therefore tender my resignation, which I request you will recommend for acceptance. It would have been presented at once but for the struggle it has cost me to separate myself from a service in which I have devoted all the best years of my life, and all the ability I possessed. . . . Save in defense of my native state, I never desire again to draw my sword." To his sister he wrote on the same day: "The whole South is in a state of revolution, into which Virginia, after a long struggle, has been drawn; and though I recognize no necessity for this state of things, and would have forborne and pleaded to the end for redress of grievances, real or supposed, yet in my own person I had to meet the question whether I should take part against my native state. With all my devotion to the Union, and the feeling of loyalty and duty of an American citizen, I have not been able to make up my



ROBERT E. LEE.

futile. Lee soon found himself fighting with his state and against his nation, with what skill, and bravery, and ill-fortune is yet to be told. That very month, four years after, he surrendered the fragments of his great army to the successor of the man who had so vainly urged him against taking the fatal step.

Three days after his resignation, Lee formally accepted from the State Convention the position of commander of all the forces of Virginia, not yet one of the Confederate states, though soon to become one. The President of the Convention, in formally announcing the appointment, amplified the famous sentence which the father of the general had uttered respecting the Father of the Union. Lee rejoined, reiterating that he should only fight in behalf of Virginia.¹



SAMUEL COOPER.

When the state forces of Virginia were merged into the army of the Confederacy Lee was appointed brigadier general, but was still outranked by Cooper and A. S. Johnston, who

mind to raise my hand against my relatives, my children, and my home. I have therefore resigned my commission in the army, and, save in defense of my native state, with the sincere hope that my poor services may never be needed, I hope I may never be called on to draw my sword."
—(*Southern Generals*, 36.)

¹ The President of the Convention said: "You are at this day among the living citizens of Virginia, 'First in War;' we pray to God most fervently that you may so conduct the operations committed to your charge that it will soon be said of you that you are 'First in Peace;' and when that time comes, you will have earned the still prouder distinction of being 'First in the hearts of your Countrymen.'" Lee replied: "I would have much preferred that your choice had fallen

upon an abler man. Trusting in Almighty God, an approving conscience, and the aid of my fellow-citizens, I devote myself to the service of my native state, in whose behalf alone will I ever again draw my sword."
—(*Southern Generals*, 44.)

had held older commissions in the army of the United States.¹ His unsuccessful operations in Western Virginia have been already narrated.² He was then sent to superintend the coast defenses in Georgia and South Carolina. When the Union forces began to menace Richmond, he was recalled to superintend the defenses of the Confederate capital. Randolph was nominally Secretary of War, but the actual functions of the office were performed by Lee.

Little had been done to fortify Richmond before the battle of Fair Oaks. When Lee was appointed to the command he issued a stirring address to his troops. The army, he said, had made its last retreat, and henceforth its watchword must be "Victory or Death." He first set himself at work to surround the capital with defenses, while he awaited the arrival of new troops, and watched the developments of the plans of his opponent. By the time McClellan's bridges were complete Richmond had become a fortified camp, and Lee thought himself in a condition to assume the offensive at a favorable moment.³ To ascertain the precise position of the Federal right,

upon an abler man. Trusting in Almighty God, an approving conscience, and the aid of my fellow-citizens, I devote myself to the service of my native state, in whose behalf alone will I ever again draw my sword."
—(*Southern Generals*, 44.)

¹ Of Albert Sidney Johnston, killed at Shiloh, we have had occasion to speak (*ante*, p. 299, 300). We shall not henceforth have to speak of Samuel Cooper, and will here dismiss him in a brief note. He was born in the State of New York in 1798; was educated at West Point; rose by slow seniority until 1852, when we find him colonel and adjutant general. He married into the Mason family of Virginia, and became a Virginian by adoption. When secession occurred he resigned his commission, offered himself to the Confederates, and was named adjutant general. Traitor to his state as well as to his nation, like Semmes of the Alabama, it is notable that his last official act as Adjutant General of the United States was to affix his signature to the order by which Twiggs was "dismissed from the army of the United States for his treachery to the flag of his country." Cooper sent in his resignation on the 7th of March, 1861. It was accepted, but was to take effect from the 1st, the day when he signed the order for the dismissal of Twiggs. On the 15th he was at Montgomery tendering his services to the Confederacy. He acted as Adjutant General of the Confederacy during the war.—(*Southern Generals*, 286-294.) ² *Ante*, p. 144.

³ "After the battle of Seven Pines, the Federal army, preparatory to an advance upon Richmond, proceeded to fortify its position on the Chickahominy. . . . The intention of the en-



BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF RICHMOND AND VICINITY.



JAMES E. B. STUART.

and the nature of its communications with its base of supplies on the York River, Stuart, with fifteen hundred cavalry, was sent to make a raid clear around the rear of the Union forces on the north bank of the Chickahominy. He set out on the 13th of June, veiling his purpose by going first northward, in order to give the impression that his object was to re-enforce Jackson. Then turning sharply southeastward to Hanover Court-house, he found himself unexpectedly clear to the right and rear of the Federal lines. Thence he dashed toward the White House, destroying some dépôts of provisions, which were protected by scarcely a corporal's guard, and turned southwestward to the Chickahominy, which he reached at midnight of the 14th, some miles below Bottom's Bridge. Here he found the ruins of an old bridge, from which a temporary foot-bridge was constructed, over which the men crossed, the horses swimming the stream. Only a single man was lost by Stuart in this daring expedition. He brought with him a hundred and sixty-five prisoners, and more than twice as many horses.¹ McClellan saw in this exploit only a raid productive of no important result.² But the real result was of immense moment. It showed that McClellan's communications were utterly unprotected, and that he was open to a blow on this vital point. Lee at once directed Jackson to move rapidly down from the upper valley of the Shenandoah, and join him upon the north side of the Chickahominy, where his main force would be at the appointed time. To mask this movement, Whiting's division was ostentatiously dispatched in the direction of Jackson, apparently with the design of strengthening him for a movement toward Washington.³ The ruse succeeded. The movement was hardly made when it was known to McClellan and at Washington. The President saw in it a weakening of the Confederate force at Richmond equivalent to a corresponding strengthening of McClellan. The general saw in it an illustration of the strength and confidence of the enemy opposed to him. Lincoln wished to know when McClellan would attack; McClellan replied that the attack would be made "after to-morrow, as soon as Providence will permit."⁴

emy seemed to be to attack Richmond by regular approaches. The strength of his left wing rendered a direct assault injudicious, if not impracticable. It was therefore determined to construct defensive lines, so as to enable a part of the army to defend the city, and leave the other part free to cross the Chickahominy and operate on the north bank. By sweeping down the river on that side, and threatening his communications with York River, it was thought that the enemy would be compelled to retreat or give battle out of his intrenchments.—(*Lee's Rep.*, i., 5.) "The earth-works designed by Lee were of considerable magnitude, and were constructed in different shapes, to suit the conformation of the ground. They swept all the roads, crowned every hillock, and mounds of red earth could be seen, in striking contrast with the rich green aspect of the landscape. Redoubts, rifle-pits, casemate-batteries, horn-works, and enfilading batteries were visible in great numbers in and out of the woods in all directions. Some were mounted with heavy siege-pieces of various calibre, but the majority were intended for field-guns."—(*Southern Generals*, 52.)

¹ Stuart's Report, *Reb. Rec.*, v., 192.

² "The burning of two schooners laden with forage, and fourteen government wagons, the destruction of some sutlers' stores, the killing of several of the guard and teamsters at Garlick's Landing, and some little damage done at Tunstall's Station, and a little *éclat*, were the precise results of this expedition."—*McC. Rep.*, 231.

³ "Yours of to-day, making it probable that Jackson has been re-enforced by about ten thousand from Richmond, is confirmed. . . . If this be true, it is as good as a re-enforcement to you of equal force. I could better dispose of things if I could know about what day you can attack Richmond."—(Lincoln to McClellan, June 18.) "Our army is well over the Chickahominy . . . the rebel lines run within musket range of ours. Each has heavy supports at hand."

STRENGTH OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY IN VIRGINIA FROM SEPTEMBER, 1861, TO JUNE, 1862.

General J. E. Johnston, at the request of the writer of this History, furnishes the following authentic statement of the force under his command during this period:

January 31, 1862.

"In September, 1861, the effective strength of the army under my command in Northern Virginia was about 37,000. It occupied Leesburg, Centreville and Manassas, and the Lower Occoquan.

"On the 31st of December it had been increased, by improved health and the addition of Loring's and Holmes's troops, to 54,000, including Jackson's command. Jackson's 8000 were near Winchester and Romney. There were 2600 at Leesburg; 31,800 at Centreville and Manassas; 7000 on the Lower Occoquan and near Dumfries; and 5000 about Fredericksburg. This army was much reduced during the winter by the effect of what we called the 'Bounty and Furlough Law,' but received some recruits from the South in the early spring. When, in April, it moved to Williamsburg, its strength (effective) was about 50,000, of which 6000 were left with Jackson in the Valley, and 6000 with Ewell, on the Rappahannock.

Jackson commenced his march to join Lee on the 17th. It was expected that he would be at Ashland, fifteen miles from the extreme right of the Federal line, on the 24th. Up to this time McClellan believed him to be at Gordonsville, seventy miles away. Reports, industriously circulated so as to reach Washington, placed him every where: at Gordonsville, at Port Republic, at Harrisonburg, at Luray, and even at New Creek—a hundred or a hundred and fifty miles from his real position. Some informants said that he was moving toward Richmond; others that he was to march upon Washington and Baltimore as soon as McClellan should attack Richmond. The President believed that these reports were mere bluffs, and suspected that the real movement was toward Richmond, as it proved to be.¹

Picket-firing and desultory skirmishing with artillery had been going on all along at intervals. On the 25th, the "bridges and intrenchments being at last completed, an advance of our picket-line on the left was ordered, preparatory to a general forward movement." The object was to ascertain the nature of the ground beyond a belt of swampy woods half a mile in front of Fair Oaks Farm. The attempt was vigorously opposed, and a desultory fight occurred, lasting from eight in the morning to five in the afternoon: "not a battle, but merely an affair of Heintzelman's corps, supported by Keyes," with some aid from Sumner. According to McClellan, his point was fully gained. The Confederates give a different report of the "affair." As events happened, it matters little whether or not a few hundred yards were here won. The "forward movement" for which it was preparatory was made the next day, but by Lee, not by McClellan.²

At five o'clock McClellan telegraphed to Washington that the "affair is over, and we have gained our point fully . . . all is now quiet." An hour and a half later another dispatch from him went over the wires. It said that Jackson's advance was at Hanover Court-house; Beauregard was at Richmond; there were 200,000 men opposed to him; he should probably be attacked next day; he would do all he could, and, if his army was destroyed by overwhelming numbers, he could at least die with it, and share its fate; if the result of the coming action was disaster, he was not responsible; there was no use of again asking for re-enforcements.³

There were, indeed, some errors in this dispatch. None of Beauregard's army had come to Richmond. Instead of 200,000, the Confederates had barely half as many effective men; instead of "having to contend with vastly superior odds," McClellan's army was somewhat in excess of the enemy. Beauregard was at a quiet watering-place in Alabama, because his "physicians urgently recommended rest and recreation." These physicians were apparently none other than Jefferson Davis and his chief adviser Benjamin, who, to say nothing of old grudges dating as far back as Bull Run, were displeased with his abandonment of Corinth.⁴ But the essential part was true. Jackson, for once a day behind his time, was near Hanover Court-house, with not merely his advance, but with his whole force. He himself had been that day at Richmond, where a general council of war was held, at which the plan of attack for the next day was settled;⁵ and two hours before the dawn of the next morning six divisions of the Confederate army would be on their march beyond the Chickahominy, to fall upon the Union right, not half their number, isolated on the north side of the stream.⁶

A general engagement may take place any hour. An advance by us involves a battle more or less decisive. They have certainly great numbers and extensive works. If ten or fifteen thousand men have left Richmond to re-enforce Jackson, it illustrates their strength and confidence. After to-morrow we shall fight the rebel army as soon as Providence will permit. We shall await only a favorable condition of earth and sky, and the completion of some necessary preliminaries."—(McClellan to Lincoln, same day, *Com. Rep.*, 336, 337.)

¹ *McC. Rep.*, 235, 236.

² This "affair" is named by the Confederates the Battle of King's School-house. Its actual results appear to be that the Federals lost about 600 men—516, not including Palmer's brigade, as stated by McClellan; the Confederates, probably, not quite as many. McClellan says (*Rep.*, 236, 237): "Our object was fully accomplished; the enemy was driven from his camps." Wright, who commanded the Confederate centre, says (*Lee's Rep.*, i., 386): "When the fight ceased at dark, I occupied the very line my pickets had been driven from in the morning, and which I continued to hold until the total rout of the Federal army on the 29th." Lee says (*Rep.*, i., 6): "The enemy attacked on the Williamsburg road. The effort was successfully resisted, and our line maintained."

³ "Several contrabands just in give information confirming supposition that Jackson's advance is at or near Hanover Court-house, and that Beauregard arrived with strong re-enforcements in Richmond yesterday."

"I incline to think that Jackson will attack my right and rear. The rebel force is stated at (200,000) two hundred thousand, including Jackson and Beauregard. I shall have to contend against vastly superior odds if these reports be true. But this army will do all in the power of men to hold their position and repulse any attack."

"I regret my great inferiority in numbers, but feel that I am in no way responsible for it, as I have not failed to represent, repeatedly, the necessity of re-enforcements; that this was the decisive point, and that all the available means of the government should be concentrated here. I will do all that a general can do with the splendid army I have the honor to command, and if it is destroyed by overwhelming numbers, can at least die with it, and share its fate."

"But if the result of the action, which will probably occur to-morrow, or within a short time, is a disaster, the responsibility can not be thrown on my shoulders; it must rest where it belongs. Since I commenced this, I have received additional intelligence confirming the supposition in regard to Jackson's movements and Beauregard's arrival. I shall probably be attacked to-morrow, and now go to the other side of the Chickahominy to arrange for the defense on that side. I feel that there is no use in my again asking for re-enforcements."—*McC. Rep.*, 238.

⁴ *Southern Generals*, 237.—After the evacuation of Corinth, May 30th, "Mr. Davis telegraphed to General Bragg to assume permanent command. General Beauregard was thus laid on the shelf, not to be reinstated, as Mr. Davis passionately declared, though the whole world should urge him to that measure."—(General Jordan, Beauregard's Chief of Staff, in *Harper's Magazine* for October, 1865.) For some of the grounds of the old dispute between Davis and Beauregard, see *ibid.*; also *Southern Generals*, 223-225.

⁵ *POLLARD*, ii., 311.

⁶ *Lee's Rep.*, i., 122, 126, 173.

"The remaining 38,000 were sent to the position near Yorktown in two bodies. I accompanied the second, which arrived on the 17th of April. Magruder's own force was about 15,000, making our army at Yorktown near 53,000, exclusive of cavalry. Sickness and the fight at Williamsburg reduced this number by 6000. Our loss at Williamsburg was about 1800.

"According to the above numbers, the strength of this army, when it reached the neighborhood of Richmond, was about 47,000. To this were added, near the end of May, Anderson's and Branch's troops—about 13,000—and three brigades of Huger's division—not quite 7000. If the effect of sickness is not considered, this would make the army amount to 67,000 at the time of the fights at Fair Oaks and Seven Pines. On that occasion, four brigades of G. W. Smith's division were engaged at Fair Oaks; and at Seven Pines, D. H. Hill's four, and two of Longstreet's, were engaged on the 31st of May. On the morning of June 1st there were nine Confederate brigades at Fair Oaks, five of them fresh, and thirteen at Seven Pines, seven of them fresh—that is to say, which had not been engaged the day before."