

ISLAND NO. 10 AFTER THE SURRENDER.

effect this, it was necessary that Pope should have transports to convey his troops from New Madrid to the Tennessee shore. Opposite Island No. 10, on the Missouri side, was a peninsula called Donaldson's Point, which widens inland. From New Madrid across the widest part of this peninsula Wilson's Bayou extends for about eight miles. Terminating in a large pond, it is only four miles distant from another pond which opens out into the river some distance above New Madrid. It occurred to General Hamilton, a subordinate of General Pope, that, by means of a canal, which should take advantage of the bayou and traverse the land between the two ponds, transports might be brought from Foote's fleet to New Madrid. This canal was undertaken, and cost the troops very much labor. It was twelve miles long, and for half of that distance it passed through heavy timber, which had to be sawed off by hand four feet under water. In this way the transports were brought through. But there was now another obstacle to the passage of the troops. From Tiptonville to the fortifications east of the island McCall had erected batteries commanding the river. It was necessary to have gun-boats to cover the passage. These fortunately succeeded in running the enemy's batteries on the island, the Carondelet on the 4th of April, and the Pittsburg on the 6th. These soon silenced the hostile works along shore, and by midnight on the night of the 7th the army was on the west bank of the Mississippi. "The passage of this wide, furious river by our large force," says General Pope, in his official report, "was one of the most magnificent spectacles I ever witnessed." Pope and Foote were now masters of the situation. The latter had been shelling the island for three weeks. During this bombardment the bursting of a rifled gun on board the St. Louis had killed and wounded fourteen men.

There was no battle. As soon as the crossing of Pope's command was ascertained, the Confederates withdrew from the island. Not a single life had been lost by Pope's army. There were captured three general officers, over 100 heavy siege guns, twenty-four pieces of field artillery, and several thousand stands of arms. A floating battery of sixteen guns was also taken, which had been brought from New Orleans to Memphis, and thence to Island No. 10. The prisoners, according to General Pope's estimate, including those taken on the main land, numbered 6700, including 273 field and company officers. Although the victory was bloodless, yet no battle-field had hitherto yielded so large results in captured material. The disaster to the Confederates was the more mortifying from the fact that, during the long siege, daily bulletins from the commanding general had assured them that the position was impregnable to the naval attack in front and unassailable in the rear. There appears to have been no knowledge on the part of the Confederate officers that the canal was being constructed on the west side of the river. The crossing of the Federals from New Madrid had all the effect of a surprise, which was followed by a panic, and those who escaped in the general confusion suffered very much from hunger and fatigue.

The same day that Island No. 10 was surrendered, the issue of the battle of Shiloh was being determined, more than 100 miles distant, on the banks of the Tennessee.

## CHAPTER XVII.

### FROM DONELSON TO VICKSBURG.—OPERATIONS IN KENTUCKY, TENNESSEE, AND NORTHERN MISSISSIPPI.

The Confederate Military Situation early in 1862; Lack of Munitions of War; Expiration of Terms of Enlistment.—Davis's War Policy an Offensive-defensive Policy.—Confederate Plans of Operation.—Beauregard and the Army of the Mississippi.—Battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg Landing.—General Grant's Position; Lack of defensive Preparations.—Confederate Success of April 6th.—Arrival of Re-enforcements.—Defeat of the Confederates.—Halleck's Arrival at Pittsburg Landing; Reorganization of the Army.—Advance against Corinth.—Colonel Elliott's Expedition.—Capture of Memphis.—Naval Contest on the River.—Mitchell's Campaign in Northern Alabama.

Kirby Smith and Bragg North of the Tennessee.—Guerrilla Warfare.—John Morgan.—Invasion of Kentucky.—Battle at Richmond, Kentucky.—Excitement in Cincinnati and Louisville.—Kirby Smith's Proclamation.—Bragg's Movements; Capture of Munfordsville; the Race for Louisville.—Buell's Army at Louisville.—Tragic End of General Nelson.—Bragg's Proclamation to the People of the Northwest.—Junction of the two Confederate Armies.—Bragg's Retreat.—Battle of Perryville.—Evacuation of Cumberland Gap.

Grant's Army in Northern Mississippi.—Battles of Iuka and Corinth.—Grant's Advance along the Central Mississippi Railroad.—General Hovey's Expedition.—Confederate Occupation of Holly Springs.

Rosecrans in command of the Department of the Cumberland.—His Campaign for the Defense of Nashville.—Battle of Murfreesborough, or Stone River.—Retrospect of Political Events in Tennessee.—Governor Johnson's Administration.

**A**FTER the evacuation of Nashville, Albert Sidney Johnston's army had fallen back to Murfreesborough. This position covered the approach into East Tennessee. The Federal plan of the campaign clearly did not contemplate an advance in that direction, for, although such an advance would afford relief to many suffering Unionists, still, for that reason alone it was not worth while to forego certain obvious military advantages connected with a campaign pushed directly southward toward Corinth. The principal of these advantages was the celerity of movement which was possible in an advance up the Tennessee River, and there was added to this the greater facility of obtaining supplies. An attempt was made by the Confederates to anticipate this advance by the fortification of Pittsburg Landing, a few miles from the southern border of Tennessee. This attempt was frustrated by the prompt action of two of Foote's gun-boats securing that point as a base of operations for General Grant's column, which advanced about the middle of March. This column consisted of five divisions, under Smith, McClernand, Wallace, Sherman, and Hurlbut. The two latter, made up chiefly of Ohio troops, had been added since the capture of Donelson. It took eighty-two transports to convey this army with its material of war. Savannah, a few



miles below Pittsburg, was made the grand-dépôt for supplies, which were drawn from St. Louis and Cairo. General Buell's army had its headquarters at Nashville, on the Cumberland, more than a hundred and twenty miles distant. Both armies were now under a single department, created by the President's order of March 11, and designated the Department of the Mississippi. To this department also belonged General Pope's command, and General Hunter's, in Kansas. The supervision of the Department of the Mississippi was given to General Halleck.

In the mean time the Confederate government had been making a great effort to reorganize its military forces in the field. In the first stage of the war troops had been enlisted only for the short period of twelve months, and during the early months of 1862 this term was expiring. Many of these re-enlisted. Calls were issued upon the states—upon Mississippi for seven regiments, upon Alabama for twelve, upon Georgia for 12,000 men, upon North Carolina for five regiments. These new levies, with the re-enlisted men, were all in the field by the 1st of April. All leaves of absence were revoked. Provision was also made for bringing into the army by conscription all able-bodied men between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five; those between these ages already in the army were compelled to remain.

Tennessee being the especial arena of the war in the West, her governor, Isham G. Harris, made extraordinary efforts to bring men into the field from that state. Before February 20 he had organized and put in the field fifty-nine regiments of infantry. He now proposed to "prepare for efficient service in the field the whole military strength of the state." As yet the war had done little toward exhausting the fighting material of the Confederacy. But few sanguinary battles had been fought. It has not been seldom that a single European battle has put out of combat a larger number of men than had been disabled or captured in the Confederate armies before April 1, 1862, and the number of captured had been considerably larger than that of the disabled. Even the most martial class of Southern fighting men, those who were readiest to volunteer, and who became fittest officers in the field, still remained almost intact. The streets of the larger towns and cities of the South were still thronged with able-bodied young men. The Confederate President urged as his plea for conscription not the fact that volunteer service was likely to prove inadequate, but that it confined the burden of the war to the most patriotic class of citizens; he proposed by conscription merely to regulate the supply of force, so that an effective reserve might be held back to await a future exigency.

copper, for a battery of six pieces. The bells furnished from Fredericksburg alone sufficed for two such batteries. Beauregard issued a similar notice to the people of the Southwest, which met with a prompt response. The public prints of the South were full of offers made by Southern women to give to the government all the bell-metal which could be gathered from their kitchen furniture. Lead for bullets was also scarce, and one lady sent the lead weight attached to the striking part of her clock to help supply this deficiency. Subsequently, munitions of war were brought in large quantities from abroad, some of which came through Atlantic ports, and a large quantity by way of Matamoras, on the Rio Grande; so that at the close of 1862 there was no longer any marked deficiency.

The general plan of military operations adopted by Davis, and which now began to be clearly developed, was an offensive-defensive policy; at any rate and always to check the Federal column of advance on a line as far northward as could be safely chosen, and to seize upon every opportunity for a counter-advance which should carry the war into the loyal states—this was the theory upon which the war was to be conducted by the Confederacy. Considering the main purpose of the revolution itself, and the circumstances under which it was undertaken, this policy was eminently wise. The war had been begun, on the part of the revolutionists, to secure the empire of slavery over a vast section of territory; for its support it rested upon the wealth of the slaveholding class, and the power which that wealth gave this class over the poor whites of the South. Undertaken in the interest of wealth and power, it was an unpopular war. The first principle controlling the conduct of the war was that every slave state must be retained within the bounds of the Confederacy, and as much of the Territories as could be held. The second principle was that the war must be removed as far as possible from the Southern states, partly because this would give the Confederacy a bold military front, but chiefly because the people, with the war at their thresholds, and levying upon them its utmost burden of want and horror, could not safely be trusted. With the presence of Federal armies on Southern soil the old Union sentiment would revive, the popular respect for the national flag would return, and the people, in conjunction with the Federal government, would turn the tables against the slaveholders. There would thus be a revolution within a revolution, in which event that class which was most directly interested in the war would suffer the entire burden of loss and shame. If the revolution had been a popular movement, then the problem involved would have been mainly a military one, unembarrassed by political entanglements.


In that case, the more pressing the demand for sacrifice of property or life, the more firm and sacred would have been the purpose to resist invasion. Under the circumstances, therefore, Davis's plan was wise. Other plans there might have been displaying greater military sagacity, but there was none which promised so much as this one.

This plan was one which we have termed offensive-defensive. But in the early months of 1862 only the defensive features could have been developed, and even these were developed under great difficulties, such as have been already detailed. The armies of the Union immediately available for conflict considerably outnumbered the revolutionary armies. This relation was reversed in a few months by the action of the Confederate conscription law. But this law did not begin to affect the army until early in June. Now every

thing must depend upon the new levies of volunteers.

The defensive plan which, under these circumstances, was adopted by the Confederates, was a simple one. Two routes were open to the Federal advance, along two separate systems of railroad communication. One of these—the Georgia system—centred in Atlanta. The other, which drained the states of Alabama and Mississippi, and was connected with the Georgia system by means of the line eastward from Montgomery, had no one vital centre, and its destruction would therefore involve a more complex and extended campaign. The natural approach to the one system was through Chattanooga—to the other through Corinth and Memphis. Buell's army, at Nashville, threatened rather the one; Grant's, at Pittsburg, threatened rather the other. Johnston, so long as he remained at Murfreesborough, covered the approach to Chattanooga, and a large column was being gathered at Corinth to oppose Grant. The Federal armies united would outnumber the Confederate, and this fact favored a concentration either in East or West Tennessee. Almost every military consideration dictated an advance on Corinth from Pittsburg. Johnston, fully aware of these considerations, did not long remain at Murfreesborough.

On the 5th of March, General Beauregard, who had just left Island No. 10 to its fate, assumed command of the Confederate forces in the Department of the Mississippi. In an address to his soldiers issued that day from Jackson, he said that the Confederate losses since the commencement of the war were about the same as those sustained by the national arms, and that for the reverses lately experienced the enemy must be made to atone. He wish-




THE WAR IN KENTUCKY AND TENNESSEE.

The principal difficulty now attending the military operations of the Confederates in the West, as in the East, was the lack of munitions. At the beginning of the war the seizure of all Federal forts along the coast had furnished material for a short period of war. But the Federal expeditions directed against important points on the sea-board soon called into requisition all the heavy guns thus captured. The Confederate factories were not yet adequate to supply the pressing demand either for small-arms or heavy artillery. Of the sixty regiments furnished by Tennessee, the government had only been able to arm but 15,000; the rest were armed with old rifles and shot-guns furnished by citizens. At Fort Henry, Donelson, New Madrid, and Island No. 10, hundreds of heavy guns and large numbers of small-arms had fallen into the hands of the Federals. The systematic evasion of the blockade, which, at a later period, contributed largely to the supply of the Confederate armies in war material, did not yet exist. Saltpetre for the manufacture of gunpowder was so scarce, and its possession so completely monopolized by speculators, that the Confederate Secretary of War, on the 4th of February, issued an order that all military commanders should impress the saltpetre in every district where it was found, paying therefor at the rate of 40 cents per pound. Then, again, in regard to the manufacture of light artillery, although there was an abundance of copper, there was not enough tin to convert the copper into bronze. The Ordnance Bureau, therefore, solicited from citizens the use of all bells which could be spared. The reason of this was that bells contained so large an amount of tin in their composition; a ton of bell-metal being sufficient, with the proper amount of





GENERAL BUELL CROSSING DUCK RIVER AT COLUMBIA, TO RE-ENFORCE GRANT.




SHILOH MEETING HOUSE.



PITTSBURGH LANDING.





PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF SHILOH, OR PITTSBURG LANDING.

ed those who shrunk from the task to transfer their arms to braver and firmer hands, and to return home—a request which, at a later period, no Confederate officer would have dared to make lest it should be complied with. Beauregard's army consisted of troops which had been in service for a few months in Tennessee and the adjacent states, to which large additions were daily being made. He had for his associates in command Generals Bragg and Polk, both of whom brought re-enforcements to his commands. Bragg had evacuated Pensacola in January for the more perfect defense of Mobile, and had now brought up a "fine corps of troops" from that city to Beauregard's assistance. Polk brought his entire command, with the exception of the detachment left on the Mississippi. Johnston, too, was already on the march from Murfreesborough with an army of veterans. By the 1st of April the united army was well in hand in the vicinity of Corinth, holding the Mobile and Ohio and the Memphis and Charleston Railroads. Beauregard commanded the entire army, which was divided into three corps under Polk, Bragg, and Hardee.

Not until the 28th of March did Buell leave Nashville. Grant's army was located on the south side of the Tennessee River, only eighteen miles from the combined armies of Johnston and Beauregard, who had already perfected their arrangements for an attack. It was three days before Buell's army had crossed Duck River, and then they were ninety miles from Grant. The enemy had every advantage, if he could only bring up his three corps and compel a battle, which must terminate disastrously to the Federal column, so inferior in numbers, at Pittsburg. Why, with this overwhelming advantage, Beauregard did not precipitate a battle with greater promptness, will always be an enigma to the historian. It was known, Beauregard says, in his report of the battle, as early as the 2d of April, that Buell was on his way to join Grant. Orders were issued at one o'clock on the morning of the 3d for the movement, and there were only eighteen miles between Beauregard and Grant. Beauregard might have moved even sooner than this. The only reason he gives for not doing so is the "want of general officers needful for the proper organization of divisions and brigades of an army brought thus suddenly together." He had had nearly a month in which to supply this want, and it is to be supposed that Johnston's column was already properly organized and officered. At least it is certain that the army was no better off in this respect on the 2d than it was two or three days ear-

lier. There was considerable delay in the movement. The orders issued by General Beauregard on the morning of the 3d contemplated that, on the 4th, the three corps would have reached the vicinity of Shiloh Church, so that an attack might be made on the 5th; a not very difficult undertaking, considering the short distance to be traversed. But the delays on the first day were great, and a severe rain-storm on the 4th interposed a farther impediment, so that it was not until late on Saturday afternoon of the 5th that the army reached the intersection of the road from Pittsburg to Hamburg. It must be remembered, however, that the difficulties in the way of Beauregard were also impediments in an equal degree to Buell's march. Yet the latter had arrived at Savannah, seven miles from Pittsburg, with the advance of his army, on the evening of the 5th.

Turning now to General Grant's position, we find it most vulnerable to attack. Pittsburg Landing is a narrow ravine, with high bluffs on either side. Farther back from the river the country is broken and thickly wooded, with here and there an open field. On the very eve of battle we find Grant's army encamped without a single breast-work or a single protection for a battery. The time had not yet come when the armies on either side had learned the all-important lesson of the value of artificial defense; but it was inexcusable that a permanent encampment should have been so entirely destitute of intrenchments. There were two gun-boats on the river—the Tyler and Lexington. Grant's advance line, consisting of three divisions, under Sherman, Prentiss, and McClelland, extended, without any judicious arrangement, from Owl Creek, on the right, to Lick Creek, on the left. The arrangement on the left was extremely faulty. Here one brigade of Sherman's division, under Stuart, was posted beneath bluffs which commanded the position. The rest of Sherman's force was three or four miles distant, away off to the right of Shiloh Church. This gap was only filled by Prentiss's division, as McClelland's was massed close up to Sherman's left and rear. Behind, and nearer the Landing, were the divisions of Hurlbut and Smith. The latter was commanded by W. H. L. Wallace, in the absence of General Smith, who was suffering still from a wound received at the siege of Donelson. At Crump's Landing, some miles below on the river, lay Lew. Wallace's division.

Such was Grant's position when it was attacked by the enemy, Sunday morning, the 6th of April. The attack was made in three lines. The first



was under Hardee, with one of Bragg's brigades; the second advanced in the rear of the first, under Bragg; while Polk's corps, with a reserve, under Breckinridge, in its rear, formed the third. The entire force attacking was estimated by Beauregard as a little over 40,000 men. The first blow, falling upon Prentiss and Sherman, amounted almost to a surprise. The pickets were driven in, and, close upon their heels, the enemy followed. There was the least possible preparation for an attack. Prominent officers were still in bed. Breakfasts were being prepared, as if no such event as a battle were at hand; and there was an entire lack of readiness in all details. Sherman, although, like the rest, taken by surprise, not having his men under arms until his advance guard had been driven back upon the main body, yet acted with great promptness and coolness. He called immediately to McClernand to come to his support on the left; sent word to Prentiss that the enemy was in his (Sherman's) front in force, and called upon Hurlbut to come up to Prentiss's aid. Leaving out Stuart's brigade, which must, under the circumstances, be left to its separate commander, being on the extreme left near Lick Creek, Sherman's division was drawn up in the vicinity of Shiloh Church. McDowell's brigade held the extreme right, with a battery guarding the bridge on the Purdy road over Owl Creek. Next to the left, and just west of the Corinth road, on which stood Shiloh Church, was Buckland's brigade. Hildebrand's brigade was on the east side of the road, with the church between him and Buckland. In front of Sherman's position ran a creek along his entire line. The position was good for defense, and, if advantage had been taken of it, and an abatis been constructed, the approach of the enemy up the slope to his encampment might have been repelled with ease. As it was, however, there was not even a breast-work, while the woods in front afforded cover to the enemy. Along the road in rear of the church Sherman had eight companies of cavalry, used to service at Donelson. A little after seven o'clock the general rode along his line on the left and became directly exposed to the fire, the enemy having already gained the woods in front, where he was massing his forces for attack. Here his orderly was killed. Appler's regiment—the Fifty-third Ohio—held the extreme left, and was ordered to hold it at all hazards, being encouraged to do so by the presence of a battery on his right, which was supported by three of McClernand's regiments. Two other Ohio regiments were on Appler's left, also having a battery on their right, at the church.

The battle was fairly begun at about eight o'clock in the forenoon. In excellent order, Hardee's columns advanced out of the woods in Appler's front, a portion of them passing obliquely to the left to occupy the huge gap between Prentiss and McClernand, others advancing directly against Sherman, and all covered by a heavy artillery fire from the woods, to which the two batteries already mentioned, in Hildebrand's front, responded. Soon Sherman heard sounds of musketry and artillery away to the left, indicating that Prentiss was engaged. In less than an hour these sounds grew ominous, clearly announcing that Prentiss was falling back. Sherman's own left, too, was being broken. Appler had fired but two rounds when he fell back, and was heard from no more during the battle, the movements of his regiment from this point becoming what Hildebrand, in his report, styles "general." The regiment at his right followed soon, and the battery posted between them was thus compelled to retire, with a loss of three guns, McClernand's three regiments being unable to support it. Hildebrand's own regiment then breaking up completed the rout on the left of the church. This necessitated the retreat of the battery at the church, and the abandonment of Sherman's entire encampment. So complete was the demoralization of Hildebrand's brigade, that the officer commanding saw no more of it that day. A new line was formed by Buckland and McDowell on the Hamburg road, a short distance in rear of camp, but was no sooner formed than it was abandoned with the loss of a battery. The only thing now to be done was to fall back still nearer to the river and close up on McClernand's right. This movement was fortunate for McClernand, who was now being hard pressed. McDowell's brigade was thrown against the enemy's left flank. Here the struggle was maintained until three o'clock P.M., the men taking advantage of every cover which the nature of the ground afforded.

On the left the Confederates met even greater success than on the right. Prentiss, as we have seen, was attacked nearly at the same time as Sherman. At this point, also, the surprise had been more complete than on the right. Prentiss's command consisted of seven regiments, nearly one half of which were from Missouri. The line was formed on the open field, while the enemy were sheltered by woods. On both flanks the Confederate columns advanced. A portion of Bragg's corps came in on Hardee's right. Prentiss was soon driven from his position; his rear was gained by the enemy, and he himself, with nearly half of his division, were captured. Before ten o'clock Prentiss's encampment was in the enemy's possession. Stuart's isolated brigade was now placed in a perilous position. McArthur's brigade, of W. H. L. Wallace's command, started for his assistance, but, coming in too far on the right, became involved in the retrograde movement of Prentiss's division. Stuart was on the Hamburg road, and a column of the enemy which came in on the field by this route attacked him just after he had withdrawn so as to be out of Bragg's way. Unable to hold his position, which was commanded by high bluffs, he fell back from ridge to ridge, making gallant resistance at each point, until at noon he was completely disorganized, and withdrew from the field.

In the mean while the columns which had swept aside Prentiss's division bent their whole force upon McClernand's position. This division was the best and strongest in the advanced line. It numbered twelve regiments, all but one composed of Illinoisans. The other two divisions in front consisted of raw men; but McClernand's division had borne the brunt of the Confederate assault at Fort Donelson, and in some measure was used to the hor-

rors of the battle-field. But having no efficient support on either hand, and the enemy being able to bring forward fresh troops continually, McClernand fell back, though not until he had lost more than half his artillery. His retreat was in good order, bringing him out at length on a line with Hurlbut. Thus by noon the entire Federal advance was driven in, routed for the most part, leaving three large encampments in the hands of the enemy, and having sustained heavy loss in artillery.

Two divisions alone now remained intact, Hurlbut's and W. H. L. Wallace's. These alone barred the victorious foe in front from the dépôts of ammunition and the transports. Wallace was now on Hurlbut's left, partially filling up the gap caused by Prentiss's rout. Hurlbut, for the sake of a better position, abandoned his camp and fell to the dense wood in the rear, where from this cover he had an advantage in repelling the enemy's advance across the open fields in his front. Soon after Wallace also fell back, and at half past four o'clock the entire Federal army was crowded into a narrow semicircular area extending about half a mile from the Landing.

For eight hours the battle had lasted, and yet the Confederates, notwithstanding their success, still lacked a complete victory. They could see on every side many of the material fruits of victory, such, indeed, as rarely ever attends a decisive triumph; but the business still before them gave them no leisure to secure these fruits. The work of the day would not be done until the Federals were swept from the field—from the Landing itself—as they had been from their camps. Besides, notwithstanding they had inflicted heavy injuries on Grant's army, their plan of battle had failed. It had been Johnston's design to leave an outlet of escape toward the north down the river, and to drive Grant's army in this direction by massing overwhelming columns against his left. Instead of this, the Federals had fallen back on either side upon the centre, and still presented an obstinate front. One circumstance had especially daunted the Confederates. At half past two o'clock their commander in the field had been killed while leading a charge against Wallace's division. He had received a Minie ball in his leg which severed an artery, and soon died from loss of blood. This had led to some confusion and delay on the most critical part of the field. Beauregard, who was suffering from indisposition, was then obliged to take the field, and, in the mean while, the Federals had fallen back to their last line about the Landing, and organized their scattered commands.

General Albert Sidney Johnston, the deceased Confederate commander, had had a somewhat eventful military career. His military education was completed at West Point in 1820. He served in the Black Hawk War, after which he left the army until 1836, when he emigrated to Texas, arriving there shortly after the battle of San Jacinto. He then entered the Texan army as a private soldier. Soon he superseded General Felix Houston in the chief command. This led to a duel between the two officers, in which Johnston was wounded. In 1838 he was appointed Secretary of War in



ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON.





HAMBURG LANDING.—COMMISSARY DÉPÔT ON THE TENNESSEE.

Texas, and the next year carried on a successful campaign against the Cherokees. He warmly advocated the annexation of Texas to the United States. In 1846 he commanded the volunteer Texan Rifles; was six months afterward an inspector general on General Butler's staff. President Taylor appointed him paymaster in 1849 with the rank of major, and upon the passage by Congress of the act authorizing the raising of additional regiments, he was made colonel of the Second Cavalry. In 1857 he was placed at the head of the forces sent to Utah, and was soon made the commander of that district. He resigned his position in the army at the beginning of the civil war, and upon his arrival at Richmond received a general's commission and the command of the Confederate Department of the Mississippi. He died upon the battle-field for lack of prompt surgical attendance. His death was at first carefully concealed from the army, and it was given out that it was not he, but George M. Johnston, provisional governor of Kentucky, who had been killed. The latter, who participated in the battle, was also mortally wounded.<sup>1</sup>

The Federal situation was discouraging, but far from hopeless. W. H. L. Wallace had been mortally wounded. Prentiss, with a good part of his division, had been captured. Half of the artillery of the army had been lost. The river, from Savannah to Pittsburg, was lined with stragglers, who were panic-stricken and unfit for fighting. Lew. Wallace's division of veteran troops, which had been expected all day from Crump's Landing, had mistaken its route, and had not yet reached the battle-field; and the whole army was now huddled together in the vicinity of the encampment which had been occupied by W. H. L. Wallace. The hospitals along the ridge near the Landing were full to overflowing with killed and wounded. All day the battle had been fought without any definite plan; at its opening Grant himself was miles away at Savannah, and when he came upon the field, at ten A.M., he saw nothing better to be done than to oppose the most stubborn resistance to the enemy. But the enemy had done his worst and spent his force. His loss in killed, wounded, and missing nearly equaled Grant's. Grant's dépôts of ammunition were still intact, and there was not the slightest doubt on his part that he would be able to hold with perfect ease the line which he had adopted. In this state of affairs General Grant visited Sherman's line. The two generals estimated their loss, and a plan was formed for future operations. The time was to come when these two officers were together to wield the united armies of the republic against the revolutionary forces which now, at the sunset of this 6th of April, were so defiant and confident of success. Grant naturally recurred to the battle of Donelson. He said to Sherman that, at a certain period of the battle, he saw that either side was ready to give way if the other showed a bold front. He

had taken the opportunity, and had ordered an advance all along the line, and the enemy had been beaten. It was just such a crisis now. The two instances were very nearly analogous. At Donelson, Pillow had succeeded in turning the Federal left upon its centre, driving one entire division from its camps. The reverse in the present instance was greater; but here, as before, the enemy had spent his force in exhausting charges, and a few fresh troops would be certain to turn the tide. These were now near at hand under Lew. Wallace. It was then decided that the army, thus re-enforced, should on the morrow assume the offensive.

In the mean time the defensive position at the Landing had been strengthened. All the artillery of the army had been placed by Colonel Webster, Grant's chief of staff, to cover every approach. For some time there had been a lull in the firing. The enemy was marshaling his columns for the final charge of the day. It was not long before these columns approached over the broken ground in front. But the fire from twenty guns checked their advance. They could make no headway against it. Suddenly, too, there burst forth against them a rapid and overwhelming fire from the two gun-boats, which had been waiting all day for an opportunity to share in the battle. This opportunity was now afforded by the position of General Grant's army. This new element in the conflict discomposed the Confederates, who were compelled to withdraw from the field.

That night Beauregard's head-quarters were at Shiloh Church. Just at dark Lew. Wallace came up. A portion of Buell's army had arrived. Buell came to Sherman at the close of the interview between the latter and General Grant, and assured him that he could bring 18,000 fresh men for to-morrow's battle. All night long these men were crossing in the transports. Nelson and Crittenden had been able to get on the field just at the close of the last repulse of the enemy. These divisions were formed near the Landing, in a line perpendicular to the river, stretching up to the Corinth road. This line was continued in the same direction west of the road, where Hurlbut, McClernand, and Sherman took up their position. Among these last three divisions were apportioned the fragments which were left of Prentiss and W. H. L. Wallace's. Lew. Wallace came in on the extreme right, continuing the line to the neighborhood of Shiloh Church. During the night McCook's division of Buell's army took the position on Crittenden's right, close up to the Corinth road. At nine o'clock it began to rain—a fortunate circumstance for those of the wounded who had been left on the field of battle, and were suffering from thirst. The gun-boats kept up an annoying fire all night, thus depriving the enemy of that sleep which was so necessary in view of the duties to be met in the morning. It was owing to this cannonade that the enemy was found the next morning to have withdrawn from the camps which he had captured on Sunday.


The battle of Monday did not compare either in length or severity with that of the previous day. The advance was along either side of the Corinth road, Grant on the right and Buell on the left. It would have been better, doubtless, if this disposition had been exactly reversed, as in that event the hardest of the fighting would have fallen upon Buell's fresh men; for, while the enemy had yesterday massed against the Federal left, he now directed his heaviest column against the right, which was held in great part by the jaded troops of Grant's army.

Beauregard was now outnumbered, and, although he made a gallant resist-


<sup>1</sup> The following extract from an article published in *Harper's Weekly*, January 30, 1858, shows in what esteem General Johnston was then held in the army:

"Colonel Johnston is now in the matured vigor of manhood. He is above six feet in height, strongly and powerfully formed, with a grave, dignified, and commanding presence. His features are strongly marked, showing his Scottish lineage, and denote great resolution and composure of character. His complexion, naturally fair, is, from exposure, a deep brown. His habits are abstemious and temperate, and no excess has impaired his powerful constitution. His mind is clear, strong, and well cultivated. His manner is courteous, but rather grave and silent. He has many devoted friends, but they have been won and secured rather by the native dignity and nobility of his character than by his powers of address. He is a man of strong will and ardent temper, but his whole bearing testifies the self-control he has acquired. As a soldier he stands very high in the opinion of the army. As an instance of this it may be mentioned that, in a large assembly of officers and gentlemen, the gallant and impetuous Worth, when asked who was the best soldier he had ever known, replied, 'I consider Sidney Johnston the best soldier I ever knew.'"






*Commissary Store Boats.*



*Landing Cannon.*



*The Interior of a Sanitary Steamer.*




*The General Hospital at Hamburg.*



*Showing Siege Guns to our lines.*

GENERAL HALLBECK'S ARMY ON THE TENNESSEE.





FORT PILLOW.

ance in the early part of the day, he had by noon brought into action his entire reserve force, and it was evident that he could neither hold his ground nor secure the fruits of yesterday's victory. He withdrew from the field in good order, falling back on Corinth.


We have called the attack on Sunday morning a surprise. General Grant claims that this was not the case, and that, if the enemy had sent him word when and where he would attack, he could not have been better informed. "Skirmishing," he says, "had been going on for two days between our reconnoitring parties and the enemy's advance." It is certain, however, that Johnston's attack had all the practical effect of a surprise. Grant himself admits: "I did not believe that they intended to make a determined attack, but simply to make a reconnoissance." It was just this determined attack, preceded by only a feeble and imperfect warning, which tended more than any thing to the Federal reverse on Sunday. A larger number of Grant's army were new troops as compared with the Confederate army. The enemy had the important advantage of attack also, while Grant's command had not even ordinary advantages in the way of defense. Thus the panic arose. With the exception of McClelland's division, there was not a regiment in the advance line, on the morning of the 6th, which had ever seen a battle, and Johnston gave these men their first impression of the fury of a charge, which came upon them so suddenly as immediately to produce demoralization. It was not the fault of field and company officers that this happened, for these officers did their best to rally their broken regiments, and themselves remained on the field after they had been totally abandoned by their commands.

The battle had no decisive effect on the campaign. The losses were not far from equal on both sides. The Confederate loss Beauregard estimates at nearly 11,000; that of the Federals was about 3000 more; and this difference may be explained by the number of prisoners lost in Prentiss's division. As to the forces engaged, there are no exact official estimates given on the Federal side. Grant had about forty regiments the first day, one fourth of which, at the lowest estimate, were of no use on the field. Buell and Lew. Wallace added to this force, on the second day, about 25,000 men.

Since the Confederates had taken the initiative of attack for the purpose of defeating one of two armies against which, combined, there was little hope of successful defense, and had failed in that purpose, the result of the battle, so far as they were concerned, was equivalent to a defeat. As a test of force it afforded encouragement to the Federal commanders. General Halleck determined to reorganize the armies under Grant and Buell, and to re-enforce them with every regiment that could be spared from other portions of the field. He started from St. Louis the very day after the battle. In less than two weeks after his arrival on the field, General Pope's division, 25,000 strong, had been brought up from New Madrid, and before the close of April the three columns, under their respective commanders, were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to move. The army thus gathered together under Halleck's command numbered more than a hundred thousand men. Beauregard, also, had increased his force by calling Price and Van Dorn from Arkansas, who


added an army which, if we are to believe a statement made to his soldiers by General Bragg, almost equaled "the Army of Shiloh." Bragg's entire address to his soldiers on May 5 indicates that the Confederate army at Corinth was quite equal to Halleck's. He says: "You will encounter him" [the enemy] "in your chosen position, strong by nature and improved by art, away from his main support and reliance, gun-boats and heavy batteries, and, for the first time in this war, with nearly equal numbers." He continues: "The slight reverses we have met on the sea-board have worked us good as well as evil; the brave troops so long retained there have hastened to swell your numbers; while the gallant Van Dorn and invincible Price, with the ever-successful Army of the West, are now in your midst, with numbers almost equaling the Army of Shiloh. We have, then, but to strike and destroy, and, as the enemy's whole resources are concentrated here, we shall not only redeem Tennessee, Kentucky, and Missouri at one blow, but open the portals of the whole Northwest." It must be admitted that Halleck's army was much superior to Beauregard's in artillery and equipments.

The roads south from Pittsburg were at this season of the year peculiarly difficult. At all times low and marshy, the country was now almost impassable; bridges which the enemy had burned had to be rebuilt; but, on the 3d of May, over comparatively dry roads, the army had advanced to within eight miles of Corinth. This place is twenty miles west of the Tennessee River, and somewhat farther from Pittsburg Landing. It is situated at the intersection of the Charleston and Mobile railroads. Between the small village and the Tennessee the country was broken, the roads across the marshes had been torn up, and the bridges destroyed. In the advance General Pope commanded the left, Buell the centre, and Grant the right; afterward the right was given to Thomas, Grant being made second in command. Pope's division was re-enforced with a division drawn from Curtis's Army of the Southwest. In order to prevent the re-enforcement of Beauregard, and to cut off his retreat, an expedition was sent out under Colonel Elliott, consisting of two cavalry regiments, with orders to strike the Mobile and Ohio Railroad in the vicinity of Booneville, and destroy the track, so as to



COLONEL ELLET'S RAM FLEET.





CLOSING SCENE OF THE NAVAL FIGHT BEFORE MEMPHIS.

effectually prevent its use for the next few days. Elliott, it was intended, should then make his way through Northern Alabama, reporting there to General Mitchell at Huntsville. General Mitchell's division of Buell's army, instead of moving with the others to Pittsburg Landing, had, just before the battle of Shiloh, pushed directly south into Northern Alabama. Elliott was partially successful, destroying a large number of locomotives and cars at Booneville.

Notwithstanding the confident tone with which Beauregard and Bragg had both addressed the army, indicating that Corinth must not be abandoned without a desperate struggle, that place was evacuated at the close of May without any considerable conflict with the Federal forces marching against it. Not a piece of ordnance was left behind.

At the time of the evacuation the water was falling so low in the Tennessee River that Halleck could no longer rely upon his water-base, and was obliged to resort to railway communications. This caused great delay, and the enemy were able to withdraw no inconsiderable number of troops eastward for the defense of Richmond, then threatened by McClellan. But to give up Corinth was also to retire from Memphis.


Immediately after the surrender of Island No. 10, Commodore Foote, with his mortar boats and some transports, moved down the river against Fort Pillow. This and Forts Wright and Randolph were the fortifications guarding the approach to Memphis, which was seventy miles below Fort Pillow, and fifty-eight below Fort Randolph. Fort Pillow is situated on the First

Chickasaw Bluffs on the Tennessee shore. These bluffs rise to the height of seventy-five or one hundred feet, and are broken by ravines. This point on the river is the first good position for defense below Island No. 10. The river here makes a wide bend around Plum Point, and immediately below, at the Bluffs, another bend, so that Fort Pillow commands several miles of the river both above and below. Upon the Second Chickasaw Bluffs stands Fort Randolph, with Fort Wright just above, so that these two works take up the line of defense where Fort Pillow leaves it off. Foote established his mortars at Craighead Point, opposite Fort Pillow, and three fourths of a mile distant. The bombardment commenced on the 17th of April by a fire from these mortars upon the fort and a small Confederate fleet in the vicinity of the latter. This attack was repeated daily, without any very sensible effect. In the mean time the Federal gun-boats lay at anchorage just out of range above the fort. There was no possibility of a co-operation of the land forces, at first on account of the height of the water in the river, and afterward because Pope's division was called upon to co-operate in the movement against Corinth. Pope's army of 20,000 men was withdrawn on the morning of the 17th to join Halleck's command at Pittsburg, which step, says Commodore Foote, "frustrated the best matured and most hopeful plans and expectations thus far formed in this expedition." Two regiments only, under the command of Colonel Fitch, were left to co-operate with the flotilla. The plan of attack proposed to be carried out, if Pope had remained, was, that a canal should be built on the Arkansas side, so as to enable the gun-boats and transports to get in the rear and thus cut off the Confederate batteries. Even with the small force left under Colonel Fitch, amounting



COLONEL ELLET'S RAM APPROACHING MEMPHIS.






STEAMBOAT LANDING.




OLD BATTERY AT THE NAVY-YARD



THE COTTON LEVEE.  
MEMPHIS BEFORE THE WAR.





JACKSON'S MONUMENT AT MEMPHIS.

to not more than 1200 men, an attempt was made to carry out this plan, but without success.

The circumstances in which Commodore Foote was placed greatly chafed his spirits. He expected, when he left New Madrid, to be able to capture Memphis within the space of one week, and the departure of Pope's army was, under these circumstances, a bitter disappointment. The wound which he had received at Fort Donelson added to his despondency. On the 14th of April he wrote to Secretary Welles:

"The effects of my wound have quite a dispiriting effect upon me from the increased inflammation and swelling of my foot and leg, which have induced a febrile action, depriving me of a good deal of sleep and energy. I can not give the wound that attention and rest it absolutely requires until this place is captured."

His position was one in which he could not make a formidable attack, and one even which occasioned him apprehension. His force consisted of seven iron-clad and one wooden gun-boat, sixteen mortar boats, "only available in throwing shells at a distance, and even worse than useless for defense," and the small land force under Colonel Fitch. Against him were nine Confederate gun-boats already at Fort Pillow, and ten others reported on their way to Memphis from the Lower Mississippi. He expected soon to hear of the arrival in his front of the heavy gun-boat Louisiana, just being completed at New Orleans. This boat occasioned him some alarm, though he had not much to fear from the others, most of which were wooden, though armed with heavy guns. Fort Pillow, according to his report, had not less than forty heavy guns. "Under these circumstances," he writes, "an attack on our part, unless we can first establish a battery below the fort under the protection of the gun-boats, would be extremely hazardous, al-

though its attempt might prove successful, and even be good policy under other circumstances; but it can hardly now be so regarded, as a disaster would place all that we have gained on this and other rivers at the mercy of the rebel fleet, unless the batteries designed to command the river from below are completed at No. 10, or at Columbus, which I very much doubt. I therefore hesitate about a direct attack upon this place now, more than I should were the river above properly protected." Commodore Foote doubtless retained a vivid recollection of his contest with the water-battery at Donelson. At New Madrid and Island No. 10 every thing had been made to depend upon a movement in the rear of the enemy's works. Such a movement was now scarcely possible. Even the tools necessary for cutting the proposed canal were not at hand, having been removed with Pope's army. Foote's indisposition, early in May, rendered it necessary for him to transfer the command of the Mississippi flotilla to Captain C. H. Davis. He returned to the East, and at Washington took the superintendence of the Bureau of Equipment until the summer of 1863, when he was appointed to supersede Admiral Dupont in the command of the South Atlantic squadron. While on his way to that destination he was taken ill, and died at New York on the 26th of June, 1863. His services in the West had been properly appreciated by the people and the government. He had been raised to the rank of rear-admiral, his commission dating from July 16, 1862.

On the 10th of May a naval action took place on the river between the Federal and Confederate fleets. The Confederate squadron consisted, according to Davis's report, of eight iron-clad steamers, four of which were fitted as rams from old New Orleans tow-boats, the upper works of which had been cut away, and their sides protected, in some instances, by railroad iron, and in others by bales of cotton, hooped and bound together by iron bands.



HOISTING THE NATIONAL FLAG OVER THE POST-OFFICE AT MEMPHIS.




These rams proceeded up the river and attacked the mortar boats. The gun-boat *Cincinnati*, under Commander Stembel, followed by the *Mound City*, under Commander Kilty, hurried up to the support of the mortar boats. The *Cincinnati* had hardly cut loose from the shore, and was in a position which prevented her from being easily handled, when the most formidable of the rams came up to close quarters. Twice the *Cincinnati* let fly her stern guns at the ram, but without effect, and the latter came against her with great force, although without effecting any serious damage. This blow enabled the *Cincinnati* to move out from shore, when she hurled broadside after broadside against the sides of her grim antagonist. The ram again trusted to her striking power, and the two vessels again struck with a violent blow, and, at the same moment, the ram received a full broadside from the gun-boat alongside, while on both sides there was a free discharge of musketry. At this crisis, and while all around him was in confusion, Commander Stembel shot the pilot on board the ram, and the next moment himself received a severe wound. But the ram was disabled and drifted down the stream. In the mean while the *Mound City* disabled two others of the enemy's vessels. The entire Confederate fleet had withdrawn before the action had lasted an hour. The *Mound City* and the *Cincinnati* were so badly crippled as to need repairing.

Fort Pillow was evacuated on the 4th of June, as a consequence of the evacuation of Corinth. Every thing of any value was either carried away or destroyed. All that now stood between the Federal force and Memphis was the Confederate fleet. Flag-officer Davis started immediately down the river, and, on the morning of the 6th, the enemy's fleet of eight vessels was discovered lying off the levee at Memphis. On both sides preparations were made for an immediate contest. Five gun-boats—the *Benton*, *Cairo*, *Carondelet*, *Louisville*, and *St. Louis*—with two vessels of the ram fleet, the *Queen of the West* and *Monarch*, under Colonel Ellet, moved down the river, the rams getting into action first. The Confederate fleet was ranged in two lines of battle. The contest was not long, lasting little more than an hour, and terminated in the destruction or capture of seven of the enemy's vessels. In the very beginning of the action the *General Lovell* was sunk by the *Queen of the West*, in the middle of the river, with most of her crew. The *Beauregard* and *Little Rebel* had their boilers blown up; the former went down, and the latter had to be abandoned by her crew. One boat, the *Jeff Thompson*, took fire from the Federal shells, and burned to the water's edge. The *General Price* was run ashore and abandoned. The *Sumter* and *Bragg* were disabled and captured. A single boat—the *Van Dorn*—succeeded in effecting an escape. Only three men of the Federal flotilla were wounded in the engagement.

Memphis was immediately surrendered by the mayor, John Park; and Colonel Fitch, with his little command, took possession of the city. During the whole of the naval action the levee had been crowded with a throng of interested spectators. Not a few of these hoped that it might terminate in the triumph of the national arms. The capture of Memphis left the Confederates no large city in Tennessee. Indeed, with the exception of a small force in East Tennessee, about Chattanooga, Knoxville, and Cumberland Gap, there was not, at the time of the capture of Memphis, any Confederate army in the state. *Beauregard's* army had fallen back to *Tupelo*, about eighty miles south of Corinth, on the *Mobile and Ohio Railroad*, followed by the advance of the Federal army under General Pope. General Grant's army held the line of railroad skirting the southern boundary of Tennessee from Memphis to Corinth. *Buell's* column was already moving upon Chattanooga, which had been uncovered by *Beauregard's* retreat. In this direction, as we have already indicated, General Mitchell had been operating for the last two months, and had established himself at Huntsville, on the railroad connecting Memphis and Corinth with Chattanooga; but, for want of support, he had been obliged to withdraw from all territory occupied by him south of that point. On the 1st of May he wrote to the Secretary of War: "The campaign is ended, and I now occupy Huntsville in perfect security, while all of Alabama north of the Tennessee River floats no flag but that of the Union." When *Buell* moved against Chattanooga, Mitchell's command was given to General Rousseau, and General Mitchell received the command of Port Royal. Thus, about the middle of June, we find Southern Tennessee, from Memphis nearly to Chattanooga, held by three Federal armies, whose combined strength can not have been less than 125,000 men. Soon we shall see this line completely broken up by a formidable movement of the enemy in the rear.

Shortly after his retreat from Corinth, General *Beauregard* retired for a brief period from the army on account of ill health. His command was turned over to General *Bragg*, who forthwith prepared to assume the offensive. He began to move his army from *Tupelo* westward toward Chattanooga. One reason of this movement was to anticipate General *Buell's* march in the same direction; but *Bragg* had an ulterior purpose beyond that. He intended from Chattanooga to strike boldly into Kentucky. By this movement he expected not only to compel the abandonment by the Federals of their advanced positions, but also, by the aid of Kentuckians, to establish the Confederate government in Kentucky. He was certainly justified in assuming the offensive; for, although the Confederates had been steadily losing territory, they had, in the mean time, by this very contraction, been steadily gaining men. Detached forces had been drawn in from all parts of the Confederacy, and were available at the most critical points of conflict. The Conscription Act also had brought into the field large numbers of fighting men. The Federal armies, on the other hand, though, taken all together at this time, not far outnumbering the forces of the enemy, were scattered all along the rivers in the West, and all along the Atlantic coast. The advance southward of Halleck's army necessitated a series of detached garrisons



HUNTSVILLE, ALABAMA.





JOHN MORGAN.

sons along the lines of railroad used for the transportation of supplies. These garrisons were made the more necessary on account of the guerrilla operations of the enemy, which in the summer of 1862 were especially troublesome in Kentucky.


Bragg's projected invasion was preceded by a series of guerrilla expeditions. The lower counties of Kentucky suffered chiefly from their ravages. Property was stolen, outrages of every sort were not unfrequently perpetrated upon Union citizens, bridges were burned, and even the friends of the Confederacy did not escape the lust of these desperadoes for plunder. The most successful of these expeditions was one undertaken by John Morgan, the most noted guerrilla leader of the war. Morgan was a native of Kentucky. When the war broke out he was a planter of considerable means, but he left his plantation and became attached to General Hardee's division of the Confederate army. He had protected Johnston's rear in the retreat from Nashville. Soon after that event he gathered about him a band of daring Kentuckians, whom he led in a series of predatory operations against railroads, supply-trains, and loyal citizens. His own regiment was joined on this occasion by some partisan rangers from Georgia, a Texas squadron, and two companies of Tennessee cavalry. He started from Knoxville July 4, and his expedition was accomplished in less than one month. During that time he penetrated two hundred and fifty miles within the Federal lines, captured a large number of defenseless towns, took a large number of small-arms, and destroyed a great amount of valuable military property. On the 11th of July Morgan had reached Lebanon, a short distance south of Frankfort. The place was protected by less than a hundred men, and fell easily into Morgan's possession. Here large government dépôts, filled with sugar, coffee, and other provisions, were destroyed. Morgan proceeded as far northward as Cynthiana, where the garrison was surrounded and captured, after a desperate conflict with superior numbers. This put an end to Morgan's successful career. He was soon overtaken at Paris, and defeated by a Federal force under the command of General Green C. Smith. At the same time Forrest was engaged in an expedition of a similar character. On the 13th of July, the day Morgan entered Cynthiana, Murfreesborough, in Tennessee, was surrendered to Forrest. The surrender was attended by the capture of an entire Michigan regiment. The impetuous onset of the Confederate cavalry appears to have at once nearly settled the fate of the town. The force defending the place no doubt exceeded Forrest's command. According to General Buell's report, the attack might have been effectually repelled. Encouraged by these successes, Colonel Morgan, who had retreated into Tennessee, even ventured to attack Clarksville, on the Cumberland River, below Nashville, and succeeded in capturing that place, with a large quantity of military stores.

The retreat of Beauregard's army from Corinth was without doubt a most judicious movement. It was, in great measure, a surprise to General Halleck, who was thus compelled to form new combinations. Bragg, who came into command on the 16th of June, had in this way gained time not only to re-enforce his army, but even to prepare for a formidable movement into Kentucky. Every day brought some new increment to his army through the operation of the Conscription Act. As we have said previously, the Confederacy had suffered very little from the exhaustion of its fighting population; and, in regard to the munitions of war, there soon ceased to be any

great uneasiness, for every week now brought into the several Confederate ports artillery of various calibre and small-arms without number; and, even apart from this foreign supply, there were already in operation, at Richmond and the great military centres in Georgia and the Carolinas, extensive manufactories devoted to the production of all the needed material for conducting the war. The situation since the early spring had wonderfully changed. The prospects of the Confederacy were every day growing brighter. The vast combinations which McClellan had formed for the capture of Richmond had miscarried, as will be shown in the subsequent chapter. The government established by the revolutionists had shown itself competent to meet emergencies which but a few months since had threatened its speedy overthrow. That government, although it had failed to obtain recognition from the great European powers, had elicited signal marks of respect by the energy with which it was conducting a war of so great magnitude; and by many eminent foreign statesmen, whose words carried with them great weight and authority, it was considered to be on the fair road to success. At home, that government had not yet betrayed its inherent weakness. Its hold upon the masses of the Southern people had not yet been relaxed. The bold front which it was now prepared to show in the field inspired the timid with respect and confidence, and silenced its strongest opponents. But this bold front must be maintained, and at much risk. Any very deliberate action was not within the scope of the policy which was forced upon the Confederate executive. Like all revolutionary governments, the Confederacy was in no position where it could exactly measure its resources and exercise a rigid economy in the exhaustion of its vital forces. Whatever else it might be, it *must* be audacious; when it ceased to be that, it gave up its prestige altogether. It was not permitted to stand upon the defensive, and await the developments of the national government against which it was arrayed. In a game of that sort it must inevitably be the loser. Depending for its very existence upon impulse rapidly awakened, it must be maintained also by popular impulse. To hesitate, even upon the most rational and carefully considered policy for effective defense, was to invite a popular reaction. Audacity was, therefore, the watchword of the revolutionists. The enemy must be stricken, blow upon blow, and paralyzed before he should have time given him to develop his more various resources for war. And with the splendid armies now in hand, both in the East and West, this seemed quite possible to the Confederates. It looked like an easy matter to push back the waves of war northward, and, by a contrary tempest, to sweep every battle-field, and in the heart of the great commercial cities of the North, and perchance in the national capital, to dictate the terms of peace. What these terms would be was significantly foreshadowed in the daily editorials of the Richmond journals. Among these were the acceptance by the Northern states of the Confederate Constitution, and the acknowledgment of the right of secession.


Evidently the Confederates were on the eve of important offensive movements, from which they expected the most extravagant measure of success. What these movements were in the West has already been indicated. To what issue they came, under the leadership of General Bragg, it will be our business to show in the remaining portion of this chapter.

The possession of Knoxville and East Tennessee gave General Bragg the



N. B. FORREST.





CINCINNATI, OHIO.

necessary foothold for the invasion of Kentucky. If General Mitchell's column had been sufficiently strengthened, it might have occupied such positions in Northern Alabama and Georgia as would have compelled the evacuation of East Tennessee. In the month of June the Confederates had abandoned Cumberland Gap. With a little exertion on General Buell's part, Chattanooga and Knoxville might have been captured. The summer months were occupied by Buell in straggling, impotent blows against the enemy. He sent an expedition where he ought to have marched with an army. Thus, on the 7th of June, General Negley appeared before Chattanooga with a handful of troops, and instituted what perhaps might be called the feint of a siege. A few more thousand men, who could easily have been spared for the purpose, would have captured the place, insured our possession of Knoxville, and have given the Federal army a strong position on the enemy's flank if he should advance into West Tennessee. By the want of energy displayed in the West, the Confederates were allowed two advantages. They were able to re-enforce their army in Virginia, and they were permitted in the West to take the initiative and to advance northward by the most auspicious route. It is true, doubtless, that the battle of Shiloh had been a heavy blow to the army. But this blow had fallen chiefly upon

General Grant's column. Buell's army was fresh and well organized. The great want in the West was of a military leader—a man with military intuitions—a man of sufficient nerve to hold in hand and effectively wield the columns of a large army. Such leaders there were. Grant, Sherman, and Thomas—afterward recognized as the great martial heroes of the continent—belonged to the Western army, and held prominent positions; but they were overshadowed by officers whose claims were more ostentatious. General Grant had shown great ability in the conduct of the operations against Fort Donelson. This the country had appreciated simply because it resulted in success; the coolness with which the general had formed new combinations when his first plan had been disturbed by the sudden attack on his lines, and the promptness with which he had done the right thing at just the right time—these qualities had passed unobserved. At Pittsburg Landing, on the 6th of April, he had exhibited the same coolness and nerve, and the result was a success; but, just at the point of success, Buell came on the field, and the sudden turn which eighteen thousand fresh men gave to the battle caused the latter to be regarded as the hero of the entire action. Both Grant and Sherman had made great mistakes—they had not yet learned all the lessons of the battle-field. We have seen how, at Fort Henry, Grant, by



VOLUNTEERS CROSSING THE OHIO FROM CINCINNATI TO COVINGTON.



waiting too long, had let the garrison slip by him on the road to Donelson. We have seen also what meagre preparation both he and Sherman had made against Beauregard's attack in the battle of Shiloh; but the time had not yet come when the armies on either side had learned to intrench themselves even in the most temporary encampment. General Thomas owed whatever elevation he had at this time to his victory over Zollicoffer at the battle of Mill Spring; but the time was to come yet when he should win most important victories—when, by a simple master-stroke, he should wipe out of existence the Confederate Army of the West. General Halleck, the commander of the department in which these generals were operating, was himself an officer of more than ordinary ability. He was a careful student of military science, and was capable of great strategic combinations. He lacked, however, those peculiar characteristics which insure success to the commander on the field. Early in July, just after McClellan's celebrated change of base, he was called to Washington to occupy the position of general-in-chief, a position for which he had eminent qualifications. His retirement from the West left Buell and Grant as the two great actors in that field, the former at that time being considered the greater general. Pope, who had won great distinction as the hero of New Madrid and Island No. 10, was also removed to the East, to take an important command in Virginia.

This latter general was fighting a desperate battle on the old field of Bull Run on the same day that an important engagement was going on between the Federal troops and the advance of General Kirby Smith at Richmond, Kentucky. Kirby Smith commanded the Confederate forces in East Tennessee. Early in August he had commenced to move northward in two divisions, commanded by Churchill and Claiborne. Though he met with little resistance in his march, he encountered many difficulties. For many days his men had nothing to eat but green corn. His ordnance train was brought through without loss. However troublesome the intermediate journey, Smith's army knew that it was marching to the fertile valley of the Kentucky. At Richmond the first formidable resistance was encountered. This place is situated about fifty miles southeast of Frankfort, the capital of the state. There was a force stationed here under the command of Brigadier General M. D. Manson, consisting of about eight regiments, mostly Indiana troops, a small squadron of cavalry, and nine pieces of artillery. Smith's army was met a short distance from Richmond by this force, and the action began early on the morning of August 30. The enemy executed a successful flank movement with a portion of Churchill's division, and broke the Federal lines. General Manson was captured. Just as the field was being abandoned to the enemy, General Nelson, coming from Lexington, tried to rally the flying troops, but without success; he was wounded in the effort. The superiority of the enemy in cavalry, as well as infantry, to a great degree decided the battle. The Federals left a large number of killed and wounded on the field, and lost largely in prisoners. Nearly all of their artillery, too, was captured.

This sudden movement of the enemy, who had already reached the banks of the Kentucky, created intense excitement both in Kentucky and Ohio. In Frankfort the Legislature was in session, but on receiving intelligence of the defeat at Richmond adjourned to Louisville, moving to that place the archives of the state, and about one million of money from the banks of Richmond, Lexington, and Frankfort. A proclamation was issued by Gov-

ernor Robinson calling upon the citizens to take up arms in defense of the state. In two days time Lexington was taken. At this stage of his progress Kirby Smith proclaimed to the people the object of his invasion. He said: "We come, not as invaders, but liberators. We invoke the spirit of your resolutions of 1798. \* \* \* We call upon you to join with us in hurling back from our fair and sunny plains the Northern hordes who would deprive us of our liberty that they may enjoy our substance." The Confederate cavalry entered Frankfort on the 6th of September. There was no efficient force, as it then seemed, to prevent Kirby Smith from reaching the Ohio River. It was even anticipated that he might capture Cincinnati.

The excitement in Cincinnati was so great that martial law was proclaimed, all places of business were closed, and the citizens were required to arm in defense of the city. Governor Tod issued a proclamation urging upon the citizens of Ohio the immediate requirements of the hour. General Lewis Wallace was placed in command of the force gathered together to cover the approach to Cincinnati.

In the mean time, while Kirby Smith was demonstrating against the line of the Ohio farther north, the great bulk of Bragg's army entered Kentucky, by way of Chattanooga, *en route* for Louisville. The season for this movement was well timed. If successful, the abundant harvests of the Kentucky and Ohio valleys, already ripening in the fields, would fall into the hands of the victors; for, while Kirby Smith was charging against the Federals that they were holding Kentucky in order to secure her substance, the Confederates were open to precisely the same charge.<sup>1</sup> Suddenly, as Bragg drew nearer to Frankfort, Kirby Smith left Cincinnati, and, by a forced march, succeeded in effecting a junction with him at the capital on the 4th of October. Here the two commanders amused themselves with the inauguration of Mr. Hawes as provisional governor of Kentucky.

General Bragg's own column when he entered the state on the 5th of September consisted of thirty-six infantry regiments, with five regiments of cavalry. In one week's time the advance of the column appeared in front of Munfordsville, at the crossing of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad over Green River, and demanded the surrender of the place. Up to this time Bragg had demonstrated against Nashville, in order to keep Buell at the latter place until he could strike the railroad between the Federal army and Louisville, which was its great base of supplies. He had, to a great degree, succeeded in deceiving Buell as to his real object, but his purpose was at length betrayed through intercepted dispatches. His movements had been well planned. Smith's column demonstrated against Cincinnati on the right, Bragg's against Nashville on the left; then suddenly, in both cases, the mask was laid aside, and both columns joined near Frankfort, a few miles from the real objective point of the campaign. The movement was as bold in conception as it was ingenious in design. But it failed in one important particular—it proceeded too leisurely. General Bragg was

<sup>1</sup> "The great and true source of meat supply is the State of Kentucky. If our armies could push directly forward over that state, and occupy it to the banks of the Ohio, the political advantages secured to the South would be of even small account compared with those she would derive in a sumptuary point of view. There are more hogs and cattle in Kentucky available for general consumption, two or three to one, than are now left in all the South besides; and steps ought to be taken by government to drive back these animals, as well as mules and horses, as our armies march forward, and place them within our lines. It is not only positively important to us that these animals should be promptly secured as they fall within our grasp, but it is negatively so, also, in depriving the enemy of the convenient supplies of meat for their armies which they have derived from Kentucky."—*Richmond Examiner*, September 12, 1862.




FEEDING TROOPS AT THE MARKET PLACE IN CINCINNATI.





GENERAL BUELL'S ARMY ENTERING LOUISVILLE.





VETERAN TROOPS MOVING UP THE OHIO TO LOUISVILLE AND CINCINNATI.

too confident of the completeness of his disguise. It will be admitted that both columns of his army encountered great obstacles in the way of a rapid march. He was compelled, in a great measure, to depend upon the country for supplies; but the country was full of adherents to the Confederate cause. He had, in the earlier stage of his march, a difficult route; mountains were to be crossed, and here, where there must be the greatest delay, supplies were least abundant. Then, again, after a difficult march, his troops needed rest before they would be in a condition to fight decisive battles. All these difficulties must be admitted; but, in view of other marches made by great armies during the war—marches longer and far more difficult, but accomplished in one half the time—it is impossible not to lay the failure of Bragg's really splendid scheme for the occupation of the line of the Ohio to his slowness of movement. It was on the 21st of August that he had crossed the Tennessee River, just above Chattanooga. It was six weeks before his army was joined by Smith's at Frankfort. Yet he was delayed by no important battle. The battle of Richmond, in which Kirby Smith was engaged, was decided in one day. Bragg himself had fought a battle at Munfordsville on the 14th and 16th of September. The advance of his column, as previously stated, had demanded the surrender of this place on the 13th. The Federal force stationed there for the protection of the bridge, under Colonel Wilder, consisted of a little over three thousand men, with four guns. This force surrendered on the 17th, after having sustained two attacks, with a loss of eight men killed and twenty wounded. Re-enforcements had arrived, so that the number of prisoners taken by the enemy was four thousand five hundred men, with ten guns. Apart from these battles, which gave the enemy over seven thousand prisoners, there was no serious engagement on the line of march. There can scarcely be a reasonable doubt but that Bragg and Smith, if they had moved with greater rapidity, might have taken possession of Louisville without a struggle. What would have followed it is hard to say. Evidently General Bragg counted upon a more considerable demonstration in his favor from the citizens of Kentucky than he received. As had just been proved in Maryland, so too it was demonstrated in Kentucky, that the state was at heart loyal to the national government. Even the occupation of Louisville would not have, probably, added materially to the number of Bragg's army, while his advanced position would have been untenable against the combination of forces which must soon have gathered against him.

But in the race for Louisville Buell came out ahead. Having been made aware of Bragg's purpose, Buell kept in his front, covering Nashville at the same time. Although the enemy had destroyed the bridge across Green River, Buell's command forded that stream, driving the Confederates out of Munfordsville, and advanced rapidly toward Louisville. To this latter place had been transferred the intense excitement which a few days before had

prevailed in Cincinnati. Many veteran troops, chiefly from Grant's army, had been sent to both these places up the Mississippi and the Ohio, and, mingled with the new levies of troops, had done much to allay the popular apprehension. The command at Cincinnati was given to General Lewis Wallace, and General William Nelson commanded the troops at Louisville. Notwithstanding Buell's haste to reach Louisville, it is still quite certain that, but for one circumstance, Bragg would have beaten him in the race. The road which the latter was taking crossed Salt River near Bardstown, about thirty-five miles south of Louisville, and the bridge at this point he found destroyed. The delay thus occasioned gave Buell the start. Just before the Federal army entered Louisville, on the 25th of September, the panic there had reached its height. In twenty-four hours more Nelson would have abandoned the city. All non-combatants had been sent out, and every thing was in confusion. To confusion was added a want of confidence on the part of many in General Buell's generalship. Indeed, the latter had scarcely got his army into the panic-stricken city before he found that an order had been issued from the War Department placing General Thomas in command, and it was mainly on account of the persistent solicitation of the latter that Buell was retained.

The position which General Buell held was very similar to that of McClellan at the same period. Both generals were unfortunate from the political associations in which, whether by their own will or otherwise, they had become entangled. Americans do not easily forget the past histories of prominent public characters. This tenacity of memory is shown in the embarrassments which attended Fremont's administration in Missouri. It had not been forgotten that McClellan and Buell had in former times had political affiliations with men who were now leaders of the revolution. The great masses of the people, notwithstanding this knowledge, were willing to wait until the military competence or incompetence of these officers should have been proved, and to rest their judgment upon that basis alone, although there were many honest men who, from the well known sympathy of McClellan and Buell with a distinctively Southern sentiment, feared that they would conduct the war with less vigor than might else be expected. There are many circumstances which to the historian will show that this apprehension was well grounded, though, as regards patriotism, no impeachment will ever rest against the names of either of these generals. In the mean time, even if they had been so inclined, they were not allowed to pursue a purely military policy without disturbance. A few partisans were determined to meddle with their military policy. Those whose sympathies were allied to theirs pressed them to a lenient policy, which would soften the blows directed by their arms against the wealthy slaveholding classes of the South. These recommended the advance of those according with them in sentiment to the first commands. On the other hand, there were those equally parti-



san who pressed them in exactly the opposite direction. These were unwilling that the war should be conducted, no matter how successfully, upon a policy which should touch too lightly the institution of slavery. They did all in their power to incite popular opposition to McClellan and Buell, and they urged strongly upon the President the necessity of their removal from command. The latter, taking sides with the great masses of the people, waited the course of military events, determined that the war for the Union must succeed, and that, if success should seem to be more sure from leaving slavery intact, he would so leave it; if by its destruction, then it should be destroyed.

Buell's temporary removal had no other than military grounds, the justice of which was afterward fully proved. Thomas, as we have seen, though better fitted to command, protested against the decree from Washington, which was then retracted. He himself was made second in command, and thus occupied a position in which his military talent could not be made available.

General Buell's army, designated as the Army of the Ohio, numbered altogether, after its junction with Nelson, about a hundred thousand men, one half of whom were new recruits, who had been pouring into Louisville for the last few days. At Louisville he lost thousands by desertion. The army consisted of three corps. General Alexander McDowell McCook commanded the First Corps, and General Crittenden the Second. Both these corps had been engaged in the second day's fight at Shiloh. The Third Corps, commanded by General C. C. Gilbert, was Nelson's old command. The command had been assigned to Gilbert at first temporarily, when Nelson was sent to Louisville. Nelson's tragical end gave him the permanent command.

General Nelson was shot at Louisville on the 29th of September by General Jefferson C. Davis. The affair grew out of the insolence of General Nelson toward the latter, who immediately borrowed a pistol and shot him as he was ascending the stairs of the Galt House. General Nelson was a native of Kentucky. He had been, at the beginning of the war, over twenty years in the naval service, when he was suddenly transferred to a military department, relieving General Anderson of his command in Kentucky. When General Buell's army advanced to Nashville, Nelson had an important command. At the time of his death he had not yet recovered from the wound which he had received at the recent battle of Richmond. He was rough in his manner, but a good disciplinarian, and an excellent officer on the field. The difficulty between Generals Davis and Nelson appears to have sprung from some domestic dissension, and to have been aggravated by an exhibition of insolence on the part of Nelson, who had given Davis an insignificant command over the home guard defending the city. On the morning of the 29th Nelson met Davis at the Galt House, and asked him respecting the number of men in his command. Davis answered that he had about so many, giving the number approximately. Nelson replied angrily, mingling expressions of rage with those of insult, and upon Davis demanding an apology, struck the latter in the face. Davis then borrowed a pistol from a lawyer in the vicinity, followed Nelson up the stairs and shot him, inflicting a mortal wound. For this act he was subsequently tried by court-martial and acquitted. General Davis was not a graduate of the Military Academy, but had been, previous to the war, appointed from civil life to a command in the regular army. He was one of Major Anderson's sub-

ordinate officers in the defense of Fort Sumter. Immediately after the surrender of that fort he returned to Indiana, his native state, and took command of the Twenty-second Indiana Volunteers, joining General Fremont's army in Missouri, where he was promoted to the command of a brigade, and took a prominent part in the conflict with General Price, both under Fremont and subsequently under General Curtis. The spirit of General Davis was evinced in the affair at Milford in 1861, where, with a force of scarcely five hundred of the Iowa cavalry, he surprised a Confederate camp, capturing a force of the enemy nearly three times the number of his own command, with a thousand stand of arms, and a large quantity of military stores. It was not until this action that he received from the government a rank corresponding to his actual position. His commission as brigadier general dates from December 18, 1861.

General Bragg at Bardstown, September 26, issued a proclamation which is worthy of note, because it discloses the hopes at this time entertained by a large portion of the Confederacy in regard to the Northwestern states of the Union. Disclaiming any purpose of invasion, he said that his object was "to secure peace, and the abandonment by the United States of their pretensions to govern a people who never have been their subjects, and who prefer self-government to a union with them." He said that, at the inauguration of the Confederate government, commissioners were sent to Washington to adjust the difficulties growing out of a political separation, but that the national government refused them recognition. "Among the prettexts," said he, "urged for the continuance of the war is the assertion that the Confederate government desires to deprive the United States of the free navigation of the Western rivers." On the contrary, he stated that the Confederate Congress had, prior to the commencement of the war, publicly declared that the navigation of the Mississippi should be free to the states upon its borders. Having thus appealed to the interest of the people of the Northwest, he proceeded to make another appeal, namely, to their desire for peace. The Confederacy, he said, restricted itself to the moderate demand that the United States should cease to prosecute war against it; but, because the government at Washington was relentless in this particular, the Confederates were driven to protect their own country by transferring the seat of war to that of an enemy who pursued them "with an implacable and apparently aimless hostility." "So far," he said, "it is only our fields that have been laid waste, our people killed, our homes made desolate, and our frontiers ravaged by rapine and murder." It rested, therefore, with the people of the Northwest to put an end to the invasion of their homes, either by prevailing upon the general government to desist from war, or, if that should not prove possible, their own state governments, in the exercise of their sovereignty, should secure immunity from the desolations of war by making a separate treaty of peace, which the Confederate government would be "ready to conclude on the most just and liberal basis." "Nature," he said, "has set her seal upon these states" [i. e., the states of the South], "and marked them out to be your friends and allies. She has bound them to you by all the ties of geographical contiguity and conformation, and the great mutual interests of commerce and productions. When the passions of this unnatural war shall have subsided, and reason resumes her sway, a community of interest will force commercial and social coalition between the great grain and stock-growing states of the Northwest, and the cotton, tobacco, and sugar regions of the South. The Mississippi River is a grand artery of their mutual national lives, which men can not sever, and which never ought to have been suffered to be disturbed by the antagonisms, the cupidity, and the bigotry of New England and the East. It is from the East that have come the germs of this bloody and most unnatural strife. It is from the meddlesome, grasping, and fanatical disposition of the same people who have imposed upon you and us alike those tariffs, internal improvement, and fishing bounty laws, whereby we have been taxed for their aggrandizement. It is from the East that will come the tax-gatherer to collect from you the mighty debt which is being amassed mountain high for the purpose of ruining your best customers and natural friends. \* \* \* You say you are fighting for the free navigation of the Mississippi. It is yours freely, and always has been, without striking a blow. You say you are fighting to maintain the Union. The Union is a thing of the past. A union of consent was the only union ever worth a drop of blood. When force came to be substituted for consent, the casket was broken, and the constitutional jewel of your patriotic adoration was forever gone."

General Bragg was not the only one who anticipated important results from the offer of peace to the Northwest based on a future alliance. The very same day that Bragg issued the above proclamation, the Committee on Foreign Affairs laid before the Confederate Congress a report in favor of recommending to the President the "issuance of a proclamation touching the free navigation of the Mississippi and its tributaries, and the opening of the markets of the South to the inhabitants of the Northwestern states upon certain terms and conditions." The time at which this report was made, and the likeness which in all respects it bears to Bragg's proclamation, indicates that the latter was a deliberately considered document, in which the military officer was the representative of a policy already approved by the great body of the Confederates. It is quite evident, also, that prominent men in the Northwest, in sympathy with the revolution, had given considerable encouragement as to the success of such a policy. As much as this is directly stated in one part of the report. "It is gratifying," the document reads, "to discover that high-spirited and intelligent public men in several of the Northwestern states have of late become exceedingly active in their endeavors to discourage and suppress the ferocious war spirit heretofore raging among their fellow-citizens, and that their honest and patriotic efforts have been already attended with the most marked success." At the same



JEFFERSON C. DAVIS.



time, a minority report was laid before Congress dissenting from the views expressed by the majority of the committee. This report was signed by E. Barksdale, J. R. McLean, and W. R. Smith. These individuals did not believe it advisable to offer exclusive commercial privileges to a portion of the people against whom the Confederacy was in arms. They did not see but that similar motives and arguments might be brought to bear upon the Eastern states as successfully as upon those of the Northwest. The manufacturers of the New England states, they thought, would be as likely to be conciliated by a discriminating tariff as the Northwestern farmers by the removal of all tariff, and their ship-owners by a monopoly of the carrying trade of the South as the people along the Mississippi by the free navigation of that river. Give the city of New York, said they, the conduct of our commercial affairs, and she would be as likely to desist from her wickedness toward the Confederates as Cincinnati would be if allowed to exchange her pork on profitable terms for Southern cotton and tobacco. The signs of returning reason, indicating a desire for the return of peace among the inhabitants of the Northwestern states, were not as apparent to them as to the majority of the committee.<sup>1</sup> But, notwithstanding this view of the case, as presented in the minority report, it is very evident that the prosperity of the South would have been enhanced to a far greater degree by an alliance with the Western than one with the Eastern states, if she should succeed in establishing her independence. The great obstacle in the way was the indisposition of the Western states to form such an alliance upon such a basis.

General Bragg's proclamation contained a formidable menace in the event of the refusal by the Northwest of the proposed adjustment. He said in effect: "Here I am with an army which, including Smith's off at my right, numbers not less than sixty thousand men. I bring also the olive-branch, which you refuse at your peril." But, unfortunately for him, the bridge across Salt River was down, and Buell, with his army, had already entered Louisville. At the same time that he menaced, it was likely that he must prove his ability to accomplish his threats. Indeed, it now was becoming quite clear that this Bardstown proclamation was to be the great feat of his boldly-planned campaign. He forthwith made arrangements for retreat. Instead of pushing on toward Louisville, he ordered his trains eastward toward Harrodsburg, leaving a strong force at Bardstown, with orders to keep Buell back until October 4th. In the mean time he went to Frankfort, where Kirby Smith arrived on the 4th, and the two officers on that day amused themselves with the inauguration of a Mr. Richard Hawes as provisional governor of the state.

Buell was slow to move against the enemy. His army was tired with long marching, and his men came to Louisville without shoes and poorly clad; but it can scarcely be doubted that the enemy were suffering even more inconvenience from precisely the same causes. He gave his army a full week's rest at Louisville, and it was only on the 1st of October that, forming a movable column out of his three corps, he marched out, with a train of nearly two thousand wagons, stretching over twenty-two miles, to

find the enemy. During the week he had been waiting the enemy's cavalry had swept the country in the vicinity of Louisville, destroying daily property estimated by hundreds of thousands. In this matter of cavalry Bragg had great advantages over Buell, whose army, on the other hand, was no doubt more perfectly equipped, and was certainly larger in point of numbers than Bragg could bring upon the field. Buell advanced at the rate of about ten miles per day, and reached Bardstown the very day Bragg had determined upon as that beyond which it was no longer necessary to hold the place. But, leisurely as were Buell's movements, they brought his army into such close proximity with Bragg's rear as to give the Confederate general some uneasiness. This brought on the battle of Perryville, which was fought on the 8th of October.

Buell, either from excessive caution, or because he was not aware of the enemy's situation, had already lost a precious opportunity. He ought to have been fighting the enemy at Bardstown on the 1st, instead of just then beginning his march. If he intended to fight at all, here he had every advantage in his favor. Let us see what he really did, and with what result.

Smith, after the mock inauguration of Governor Hawes was over, fell back toward Harrodsburg. Buell had dispatched one division—Sill's, of McCook's corps—to look after him. The other two divisions—Rousseau's and Jackson's—formed the left column of Buell's army, and took the road to Mackville. Gilbert, with the third corps, formed the centre column, moving by a road farther westward. Crittenden's corps, the right column, moved to Bardstown, and was delayed at that point by slight skirmishes. Gilbert reached the northern skirt of Perryville on the 7th, and began to annoy Bragg's rear with his artillery. McCook was within call; Crittenden would be in the course of twenty-four hours. Bragg had from fifteen to twenty thousand men within call. These were not all upon the field at Gilbert's first collision with Bragg's rear, for the reason that the latter had preferred to make a stand at Harrodsburg, where, on the 9th, he would be re-enforced by Kirby Smith's army. Buell's movements had altered this determination, and Bragg, with great promptness, brought up Hardee's two divisions, under Buckner and Anderson, and Cheatham's, which was commanded by General Polk. Buell, notwithstanding he could outnumber the enemy, still wished to avoid a battle at this point, and he ordered up McCook's corps from Mackville—a place equidistant from Harrodsburg and Perryville, and ten miles from either—only because he anticipated that he should meet with some resistance at this stage of his march.

McCook received this order at 2 o'clock on the morning of the 8th, and hurried up his column. His advance connected with Gilbert's left on the road to Perryville before eleven A.M. The march had been through a rugged country so destitute of water that the men suffered much, and even the hospitals were insufficiently supplied. Along the route Gilbert's artillery was heard all the morning, but there was no general engagement in the forenoon. McCook arrived upon the field not a moment too soon, as the enemy was already preparing to occupy the commanding position on Gilbert's flank, which Buell intended the First corps to hold. This position

<sup>1</sup> The following is the text of both reports:

**MAJORITY REPORT.**—The Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred certain resolutions relating to the true policy of the war, and recommending to the President the issuance of a proclamation touching the free navigation of the Mississippi and its tributaries, and the opening of the market of the South to the inhabitants of the Southwestern states upon certain terms and conditions, have had the same under consideration, and now report back said resolutions, with one or two slight amendments, and recommend that they be adopted.

The expediency of conducting the war in which we are engaged with all possible activity, and of carrying that war into the enemy's country, so soon as the same shall be found practicable, is believed to be now universally admitted by all enlightened men who have given their attention to the subject. It is evident that we must rely alone upon our own energies for success in the struggle of arms which is now in progress. In the present condition of affairs it is quite manifest that, in order to bring the sanguinary struggle in which we are engaged to an early termination, it will be necessary that every portion of our army should be kept in a state of constant readiness for active exertion, and that no opportunity should be neglected of striking the forces of the enemy, wherever to be found upon Southern soil, with that boldness and heroic energy which are so certain to secure to our arms the most signal success.

It is equally manifest that the enemy will never be willing to desist from the unjust and ferocious war which they are now waging until the evils and inconveniences thereof shall have been brought home fully to themselves. When our valiant and disciplined armies (enhanced in numbers and in strength, as it is hoped they will shortly be) shall have once found their way to the heart of the enemy's country, and have inflicted a just retaliation upon those who have so ruthlessly ravaged our territories, pillaged our towns, and desolated our homes, it is to be reasonably expected that even they will at last be able to discern the rank injustice and brutal cruelty which they have compelled us to experience, and for the perpetration of which they have not been heretofore subjected to any thing like adequate punishment.

Your committee are well satisfied that the issuing of some such proclamation by the President as that described in the resolutions referred to them, at such time as he shall deem expedient, could not but be attended with the most salutary effects. It is an undoubted fact that the government at Washington, aided by unscrupulous local demagogues in the Northwestern states, has succeeded to a considerable extent in deluding the people of that region into a general belief that, should we succeed in our struggle for independence, it is the intention of the government and people of the Confederate States to shut them out from the free navigation of the Mississippi River and its great tributaries; and though the Provisional Congress of these states long ago emphatically negated this idea by well-known acts of formal legislation, yet your committee is assured that the delusion on this subject still continues to exist among the people of the Northwest, and that the gross misapprehension in regard to the intentions and policy of the Confederate States of America, thus engendered and kept in existence by wicked and designing men, has operated most effectively in prompting the people of the Northwestern states (so closely connected with the South heretofore, both by geographical and political ties) to contribute freely, both in men and money, to the prosecution of a war which, if successful on the part of those with whom it originated, would be, eventually, as disastrous in its effects to the people of the Northwestern states themselves as to those of the Confederate States of America. It is gratifying to discover that high-spirited and intelligent public men in several of the Northwestern states have of late become exceedingly active in their endeavors to discourage and suppress the ferocious war spirit heretofore raging among their fellow-citizens, and that their honest and patriotic efforts have been already attended with the most marked success.

Such a proclamation as that recommended in the resolutions referred to this committee, it is confidently believed, would have a tendency greatly to strengthen the efforts of the advocates of peace in the Northwestern states, be calculated to bring those states quickly into amicable relations with the states of the South, withdraw them ultimately altogether from their present injurious political connection with the states of the North and East, with which they have really so little in common, and thus enable us to dictate the terms of a just and honorable peace from the great commercial emporium of that region, through whose influence mainly has this wicked and unnatural war been thus far kept in progress.

**MINORITY REPORT.**—The undersigned, a minority of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, beg leave to dissent from the report of the majority upon certain resolutions referred to the committee, touching the issuing by the President of a proclamation to the inhabitants of the Northwestern

states, tendering to them the free navigation of the Mississippi River, and advantageous treaty stipulations at the close of the war.

It is submitted that subjects relating to the conduct of the war are not appropriate matters of investigation by the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

But, waiving this consideration, the undersigned totally dissent from the views of the majority touching the duties of this house. It is a work of supererogation for this body to undertake to decide and to declare the mode of conducting the war. It is a question involving consequences of vital moment, legitimately pertaining to the functions of the executive and those who have been chosen to lead our armies. But if such duty were, in fact, devolved upon this body, as is implied by the report of the majority, it would be in violation of all the rules of enlightened warfare to unfold the plan which it is designed to pursue in the prosecution of the war.

It is believed that thus far the executive has availed himself of the means placed at his disposal for conducting the war in the manner most judicious and effective; and that in the signal success which has attended our struggle for the maintenance of the independence of the Confederate States will be found sufficient reason for leaving him, without interference, to the exercise of the duties imposed by the Constitution.

The undersigned dissent from the recommendation that the government should tender to a portion of the citizens of the government with whom we are at war exclusive commercial privileges. It is not the part of wisdom to commit our government to any fixed policy in advance. Legislation should not be anticipated, but should be shaped by existing events. If a deviation from this plain suggestion of wisdom be advised in the present instance upon the idea of the influence of an appeal to the self-interest of the inhabitants of the Northwestern states, it should not be forgotten that the same argument might, with equal propriety, be addressed to the inhabitants of the New England states. The manufacturers of that section would be conciliated by pledges that a discriminating tariff would, at the close of hostilities, be put into speedy operation for building up their interests, and ship-owners would be propitiated by pledges that they would be permitted to perform the carrying trade of the South as under the old Union. And the city of New York would be induced to pause in her course of folly and wickedness toward the Confederate States if assured that they would confer upon her the privilege of conducting their commercial affairs and enriching herself upon the proceeds of her labor.

The Northern people derived, under the former government, an annual profit of not less than \$100,000,000 upon Southern trade. Their implements of war will be laid aside when assured that their coffers shall be filled with the proceeds of Southern labor. But the undersigned do not hesitate to repel the suggestion that the people of the South are willing to purchase peace by such a sacrifice of their rights, and by so degrading a concession to Northern cupidity. To be respected, our course must be firm and our legislation rational and just.

At an early period after the organization of the government of the Confederate States, a law was passed declaring the free navigation of the Mississippi River, with certain salutary restrictions. The policy of the government has not been changed on this subject. It is presumed to have been known to the inhabitants of the Northwestern states before they embarked in a wicked and unjustifiable war against the people of the Confederate States. To proclaim this policy at the present time, coupled with offers of their lucrative trade, in the manner suggested by the majority, would be, in the highest degree, derogatory to the dignity of the government. It would bring upon it the imputation of pusillanimity. It would be accepted by the enemy as a confession of conscious weakness, and its inevitable tendency would be to prolong the war.

The undersigned are firm in the opinion that the most effective mode of conquering a peace is not to be found in extending to the enemy propositions of reconciliation, but in the vigorous prosecution of the war.

The signs of returning reason, indicating a desire for peace among the inhabitants of the Northwestern states, upon the discovery of which the majority have congratulated the House, are believed to be delusive. The undersigned regret to say that they have not been able to discern them. But, in the event of the actual existence of these alleged pacific indications, it is clear that they are the result, not of temporizing expedients on the part of the government of the Confederate States, but of its manifestations of purpose to prosecute the war with vigor and effect.


For these reasons the undersigned dissent from the views of the majority, and ask the concurrence of the house in the opinion that they should be rejected.

E. BARSDALE,  
J. R. MCLEAN,  
W. R. SMITH.



on Gilbert's left was especially important, because it secured access to Chaplin's Creek. McCook formed his line on the range of hills known as Chaplin's Hills west of that stream, the road to Perryville being in the rear. Two of Rousseau's brigades held the right; Terrell's, of Jackson's division, held the left. This latter brigade not only guarded the left flank, but protected the trains in the rear. In order to still farther strengthen the left, Starkweather's brigade of Rousseau's division was placed in reserve behind Terrell. Another brigade of Jackson's division, under Colonel Webster, was in reserve farther to the right, near Russell's house.

wagon loads of bacon, six thousand barrels of pork, fifteen hundred mules and horses, eight thousand beeves, and a large lot of swine." Of the jeans nearly all were taken from a single establishment in Frankfort. A large amount of plunder was captured. The enemy staid there four weeks, and during all that time trains of cars were running southward laden with mess pork and other stores, and numerous wagon trains similarly laden were traversing all the roads in that direction. The fact that this was possible illustrates the need which then existed for an efficient Federal cavalry force. Indeed, the want of such a force shows an extraordinary degree of negligence on the part of the government at this stage of the war.



Bragg attacked a little after noon. He was compelled by McCook's position to cross the stream more to the north, but his batteries played upon the national troops from favorable positions on both sides of the stream. Before long, Terrell's brigade was attacked with great impetuosity. This brigade consisted entirely of raw troops, and it was only through some mistake in manoeuvre that it was not in reserve in the place of Starkweather's. Terrell's men wavered beneath the shock, and, although their division commander, General Jackson, advanced to rally them, they were swept from the field, leaving Parsons's battery in the hands of the enemy. Jackson was killed at the first fire. He was struck in the right breast by a piece of an exploded shell, and, with the exclamation "Oh God!" fell from his horse and died without a struggle. Even the enemy paid a tribute to his gallantry. Terrell also fell directly after, and McCook's left flank was uncovered, and would have been destroyed, with the loss of the trains, but for the pluck of Starkweather's men. These belonged to Rousseau's division, General O. M. Mitchell's old command.

The invasion of Kentucky had made it necessary for the Federal troops under General Morgan to evacuate Cumberland Gap. This gap is nearly eighty miles in length, and is about one hundred and fifty miles southeast of Lexington. The mountain on either side rises to the height of twelve hundred feet; the gap itself is traversed by an excellent road. The position was important to the Confederates, chiefly because it guarded the approach to East Tennessee, and thus covered the line of railroad connecting Richmond with the valley of the Mississippi. It had remained in their hands until General Mitchell's campaign had compelled them to abandon it, about the middle of June, when it was occupied by a division of national troops under General George W. Morgan. A number of unsuccessful attempts were subsequently made by the Confederates to regain the Gap. It was only when Bragg's advance into Kentucky had cut off all supplies that General Morgan determined to withdraw. He held out bravely to the last moment. On the 11th of September he had no corn left, and only a meagre supply of beans and rice. On the 17th he withdrew from the Gap, blowing up the magazine, and burning the commissary building, with his tents, wagons, gun-carriages, and other martial appliances. His retreat of two hundred and fifty miles, through a mountainous and unproductive country, to the banks of the Ohio, forms an interesting episode of the war. Sometimes destitute of water, always dependent for its daily supply of food on foraging, harassed perpetually by Confederate cavalry, and sleeping at night under the open sky, his command reached the Ohio River on the 4th of October. The whole command numbered nearly twelve thousand men, and it succeeded, in spite of many embarrassments, in bringing off twenty-eight pieces of artillery and four hundred wagons. This success is the more remarkable when it is considered that Morgan was continually skirmishing with the enemy, and was obliged to build new roads, under very disadvantageous circumstances, for the conveyance of his trains. His sick he had been compelled to leave at the Gap.

As soon as McCook had become assured of the safety of his left, he rode over to the right only to find that Rousseau also had been driven back. He was even compelled to use Webster's brigade. His reserves were now all in the front, and he was obliged to call for re-enforcements. In his effort to support the right, Colonel Webster was killed; Lytle, who held the extreme flank, fell on the field. It was not until the position at Russell's house had been abandoned that McCook received any re-enforcements. Then Colonel Gooding's brigade, of R. B. Mitchell's division, came upon the field. This brigade consisted of three regiments, accompanied by a battery, and added fifteen hundred men to McCook's command, which in the morning had numbered thirteen thousand. Of these there were now not more than seven or eight thousand men capable of fighting.

Bragg's invasion had broken up the advanced line of the national forces in Eastern Tennessee. It had also, to a great extent, depleted General Grant's army in Mississippi, portions of which had been sent to Cincinnati and Louisville. But a sufficient force was left to retain the line already held, which extended from Corinth, in Mississippi, to Tusculumbia, in Alabama. Some important changes had occurred since the month of July. General Halleck had been called to Washington to assume the position of general-in-chief, and the command of that portion of the Western army not included in General Buell's department had been given to General Grant. Pope had been called away to take command of the Army of the Potomac, and his place was now taken by General Rosecrans.


It was nearly dark when Gooding had succeeded in wresting the position at Russell's house from the enemy and saving the line. But this had been accomplished at great sacrifice. At the close of the brief but desperate encounter, five hundred out of the fifteen hundred had been killed or wounded. Colonel Gooding himself had been taken prisoner. Then there came up another brigade from Gilbert, which went into position on Gooding's right. In fact, Buell was only just now aware that any battle was in progress. He had given orders that McCook should not fight; but as the enemy attacked, and so much depended upon McCook's position, it is hard to see what else could have saved the day but fighting. The battle was now over. McCook had with great difficulty held his own, and had saved his command, while Gilbert stood apart, with some twenty thousand men or more, giving scarcely more assistance or co-operation than if he had been fifty miles from the field. The enemy, with one third of the force which Buell had in his front, had, by making that force bear upon McCook's corps alone, overwhelmed the latter on both flanks, and almost swept it from the field.

The loss had been very heavy on the Federal side. In Rousseau's division alone the casualties amounted to over 2000; in Jackson's the loss was greater, but many of these were counted as missing. The Confederates must have lost nearly as many men, as they attacked formidable positions.

The next morning General Bragg withdrew his force to Harrodsburg, and, with Kirby Smith, moved southward toward Camp Dick Robinson, and thence out of the state altogether. The Confederates, although they failed in the military object of their invasion, succeeded in carrying out of Kentucky a great deal of plunder. According to a statement made by the Richmond Examiner, "the wagon train of supplies brought out of Kentucky by General Kirby Smith was forty miles long, and brought a million yards of jeans, with a large amount of clothing, boots, and shoes, and two hundred







PERRYVILLE, KENTUCKY.

Though Bragg had taken the bulk of the Confederate army in the West into Kentucky, still a large Confederate force had been left in Northern Mississippi. This force, under the command of Generals Price and Van Dorn, confronted General Grant in September, holding a position which, from its uninterrupted railroad connection with Chattanooga, enabled it to co-operate with Bragg's movement. Van Dorn was the principal in command. If his force had been united to that of General Price, the whole would have constituted an effective army. Instead of this, the plan of operations agreed upon contemplated that Price should cross the Tennessee River to operate against the rear of General Buell, who was then advancing northward to intercept Bragg; and, in the mean time, while Grant's forces would thus be drawn eastward from Corinth, the latter place was to be captured by Van Dorn. Upon the first development of this plan, Grant began to concentrate his army by abandoning Tusculumbia and Iuka. A small force under Colonel Murphy was left at the latter place. Almost immediately afterward a body of Confederate cavalry dashed into the town, drove Murphy out, and captured the place, which contained a large quantity of medical and commissary stores. For neglecting to destroy the six hundred and eighty barrels of flour which were there stored, Colonel Murphy was arrested by General Buell. It was now determined by General Grant to attack General Price on the north, west, and south.

The left wing of Price's army rested near Iuka, a little village of about three hundred inhabitants. Against this position, Grant, accompanied by Ord's division, moved with about eighteen thousand men, taking the road to Burnsville, a little northwest of Iuka. Rosecrans, with two divisions, under

Generals Stanley and Hamilton, was ordered to Jacinto, to attack in the rear. Both columns started at the same time. Rosecrans reached Jacinto on the 18th of September, and the next day, after a march of twenty miles, advanced against the enemy. The enemy's skirmishers were met at Barnett's Corners, and were driven in. Grant in the mean time had arrived at Burnsville. By some misunderstanding, each column awaited for the attack to be commenced by the other. This occasioned considerable delay. At length a dispatch came from General Grant stating that he was waiting upon Rosecrans's attack. The latter promptly moved forward, and found the Confederates posted on a high ridge about two miles from Iuka. It was then four o'clock P.M. General Hamilton's division formed in line under a severe fire. The enemy had clearly an advantage in position. Hamilton could bring but a single battery, the Eleventh Ohio, to bear upon him. The ground was broken by ravines, and densely covered with undergrowth. It has been claimed for each side that it was outnumbered by the other. Rosecrans, in an order issued eight days after the battle, speaks of the unequal ground, which permitted the enemy to outnumber his men three to one. On the other hand, Pollard says that the Confederates were "overmatched by numbers."

It was almost night when the battle commenced, but in the two hours during which it lasted it raged with uncommon fierceness. Upon the Fifth Iowa and the Eleventh Missouri, supporting the battery, fell the most stunning blows from the enemy. The former lost seventy-six, the latter one hundred and sixteen, in killed and wounded. About the Eleventh Ohio battery there was the hottest work. The action had scarcely lasted half an



IUKA, MISSISSIPPI.





RICHARD F. OGLESBY.

hour before seventy-two of its men were put out of combat. The battery was charged and captured by the Confederates, and was again recaptured by the Fifth Iowa. Thrice again was it captured and recaptured. The fighting was in some instances hand to hand. It is said that in one spot, not over sixteen feet square, there were counted the next morning seventeen Confederate soldiers lying dead around one of their officers.

Grant did not attack, and during the night Price's army left the field. By casualties in the field and captures during the forced retreat, the loss sustained by that army amounted to upward of two thousand men. The Federal loss was nearly eight hundred. General Grant's combinations rendered it impossible for General Price to carry out his original plan of cooperation with Bragg. Van Dorn had also failed of his object, not having reached Corinth soon enough to insure its capture. The two armies, under Price and Van Dorn, were soon concentrated at Ripley, some distance west of Iuka, for an attack on Corinth. General Grant had abandoned Iuka and returned to Corinth. Four days afterward, Rosecrans, who had just been promoted to be a major general, assumed command of that place. In order to guard the line of railroad upon which the Federal army depended for supplies, General Grant proceeded to Jackson, fifty miles north of Corinth, having posted Ord's force on the same railroad farther south, at Bolivar. Thus Rosecrans was left at Corinth with an army numbering little more than twenty thousand men.

Van Dorn, in command of the Confederate army in Mississippi, moved against Corinth on the 2d of October, the day after Buell marched from Louisville against Bragg. The battle known as the Battle of Corinth was fought on the 3d. Van Dorn moved from Chewalla, on the line of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, west of Corinth. It ought to have been evident to the Confederate commander that an attack on Corinth had scarcely a chance of success. He had a larger army than Rosecrans, it is true; but the latter held a position which, considering the situation of Grant's and Ord's columns, was defensible against an army more than twice as strong as that constituting its defense. The reason that Van Dorn moved from the west on Corinth was his knowledge of the fact that Beauregard, early in the year, had constructed fortifications on the north and east. These fortifications had been very much strengthened since the Federal occupation. Halleck had constructed a line of works inside of those constructed by Beauregard, and Grant had constructed still another inside of this latter. This interior line consisted of a chain of redoubts, arranged with a view to concentrate the fire of several heavy batteries upon an attacking force.

As soon as the enemy's approach assumed a definite shape, Rosecrans called in the outpost garrisons on the south side at Iuka, Burnsville, and Rienzi. The outpost on the Chewalla road was withdrawn a short distance and strengthened. It yet appeared doubtful to Rosecrans whether the main attack would be directed against himself, or against Bolivar, Bethel, or Jackson, at which places there were strong garrisons. But he would rather gain than lose on either supposition. If the attack was mainly against Corinth, then his position was eminently favorable for defense; if against any position farther north, then his position was equally favorable for offensive operations in the enemy's rear. Of the two cases offered, he would have much preferred the latter, as more fatal to Van Dorn. In an interview with his

division commanders on the morning of the 3d, Rosecrans instructed them "to hold the enemy at arm's-length" until the latter should assume a definite position, when they were to take a position where they could avail themselves of their batteries and the favorable ground in the vicinity of Corinth.

On the 3d, the Federal troops on the Chewalla road had been pushed back with severe loss. Brigadier General Hackleman was killed, and General Oglesby was severely wounded. It was Davies's division that had been principally engaged. The fight all day had been a general skirmish in the midst of dense timber, where heavy artillery could not be used to advantage. The plan of attack was, however, pretty fully developed. The main rebel column under Van Dorn rested its right upon the Chewalla road, and extended toward the north; its left, under Price, lay upon the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, almost directly north of Corinth, while Lovell held the extreme right. It was upon this side of the town—the northwest side—that Van Dorn expected to find the line of defense weakest. But during the past ten days other works had been built here, of which the Confederate commander was ignorant. The new line consisted of four redoubts. On the right, near Beauregard's old line, one of these was situated. On the night of the 3d, Fort Richardson, mounting five guns, was constructed, to cover the approach by the Bolivar road, which ran out from Corinth a little east of north. Fort Williams, which had been built to command the heights over which ran the road from Chewalla, was a very strong work, mounting several heavy Parrott guns; and Fort Robinette, built on a high, narrow ridge, enfiladed both the Bolivar and the Chewalla roads. Still another fort on the extreme left, near the Corinth Seminary, strengthened that flank, at the same time that it afforded additional protection to the centre. The ground along this line was unusually favorable to the use of artillery.

With admirable skill, Rosecrans had anticipated the probable approach of Van Dorn's army—had done his best, indeed, to tempt the latter in this very direction, and had made this part of his line as strong as any other. His line of battle on the morning of the 4th faced northward. Hamilton's division, which had just fought the battle of Iuka, held the right from Fort No. 1 to Fort Richardson. Then came Davies's division, joined on the left by six companies of Yates's sharpshooters. Stanley's division, consisting of two brigades, came next in order, its left resting on Fort Robinette, and McKean's division, with McArthur's brigade, held the extreme left. The cavalry, under Colonel Mizner, was posted on both wings and in the rear. The whole line was covered well in front by the undulations of ground, and the various batteries, under Lieutenant Colonel Lathrop, were either protected by fortifications or by an apron of hay or cotton-bales.

The near approach of the Confederates had placed the town of Corinth in an uncomfortable situation. There were a great number of non-combatants in the place, and the knowledge that the enemy was within a thousand yards of Rosecrans's line, and could easily shell the town, was a reasonable ground of uneasiness. Whatever apprehension there may have been on this point was realized before daylight. A battery had been planted by the enemy in Stanley's front, and not more than two hundred yards distant from Fort Robinette, from which, before daybreak, a fire was opened upon the town. The breakfast-fires of the Federal soldiers enabled the enemy to get the proper range, and a good number of shells were sent into the streets of Corinth. There was panic then among the non-combatants, who had been



DAVID S. STANLEY.



uneasy all night, and who now had recourse to hurried flight. At daylight a fire from Fort Williams in a very few minutes silenced the troublesome battery. The enemy meanwhile was forming at a little distance in the woods, while batteries on either side were already in action, and skirmishing was going on between sharpshooters in the marshy ground in front.

At about half past nine Price's column, in a dense mass, debouched on the Bolivar road. As it advanced it took the form of a wedge, and moved up with fierce velocity, as if it would pierce and overwhelm all opposition. Every Federal battery directed its full and unobstructed fire against this massive column, piercing it in front and on the flank, and making huge gaps in it—gaps which were no sooner made than filled. Musketry was then added to artillery; "but," says an eye-witness, "the enemy bent their necks downward and marched steadily to death, with their faces averted like men striving to protect themselves against a driving storm of hail." The Federal sharpshooters from behind their hastily-built breastworks poured in their fire, but still Price's column moved inflexibly onward. As it came nearer, the wedge had opened and developed into two columns, spreading out over the whole front of the field. Up the whole line pressed over every obstruction—up to the crest of the hill, flanking Fort Richardson on the right. Davies's division began to falter; but at the right moment Rosecrans was in its ranks, and they rallied, but not until the enemy had gained Fort Richardson. Even Rosecrans's head-quarters were captured, and from the shelter of the house a fire was opened on troops in the rear. In the yard of this house seven Confederate soldiers were found dead after the battle. Richardson, after a desperate and unequal contest for the possession of the fort, fell at last, and the enemy rushed into the captured work. Scarcely had the fort been taken before it was retaken by the Fifty-sixth Illinois.

Hamilton's division on the right had, in the mean time, swept the enemy's lines on the flank with a steady fire. Having fallen back a little when Stanley wavered, it now charged forward in the wake of the Fifty-sixth Illinois. There was an advance all along the line. A few minutes before, and it had appeared for a moment uncertain whether the enemy might not compensate for his terrible loss in approaching by an important success on Rosecrans's flank. But now all was changed. Price's entire column was broken and in swift retreat, flinging aside its arms, and scattering into the woods from which, but a little before, they had issued an immovable phalanx.

Van Dorn's column, which was to have attacked simultaneously with Price on the Chewalla road, was delayed by the nature of the ground. Ravines, and densely-wooded thickets, and artificial obstructions were in his way. The action with Price was over in a few minutes, and Van Dorn came on the field too late. Still the latter advanced. If the advance of Price's column had been gallant, yet it was surpassed by the almost incredible bravery of the Texan and Mississippian soldiers of Van Dorn's command. Besides the entanglements and topographical obstacles in their way, their line of advance was within point-blank range of the thirty-pound Parrott guns of Fort Williams and the guns of Fort Robinette. Supporting these works was a strong column of veterans as yet fresh for the battle. But Van Dorn's men overcame all obstacles with a courage that seemed irresistible. Colonel Rogers came on in advance at the head of his Texan brigade. But they paused at the ditch; Rogers fell just as he had leaped over. Then the Ohio brigade of Stanley's division, which Colonel Fuller had all this while kept lying with their faces to the ground behind the ridge on the right of the fort, rose and delivered six successive volleys, driving the Texans back. But the Confederate supports came up, and there was a severe hand-to-hand fight, which resulted at length in the success of the national troops. The victory had been gained at a fearful cost of life. The Sixty-third Ohio went into the fight with two hundred and fifty men, and left just one half that number of killed and wounded on the field. The rout of Van Dorn's column was as complete as had been that of Price's. Forts Williams and Robinette, the latter of which had borne the brunt of the assault, now poured their ruinous shower of shell into the midst of the flying enemy. Such had been the obstinacy of the assault on Fort Robinette that fifty-six dead Confederates were found heaped up in front of the redoubt.

The battle had lasted now for an hour and a half since Price's column came out on the Bolivar road. But the pursuit was an important part of the battle. Says the correspondent from whom we have already quoted: "The pursuit of the beaten foe was terrible. Sheets of flame blazed through the forest. Huge trunks were shattered by crashing shells. You may track the flying conflict for miles by scarified trees, broken branches, twisted gun-barrels and shattered stocks, bloodstained garments and mats of human hair, which lie on the ground where men died; hillocks which mark ditches where dead rebels were covered, and smoothly-rounded graves where slaughtered patriots were tenderly buried." The retreat was continued across the Hatchie River to within a short distance of Ripley. General Hurlbut, of Ord's command, joined in the pursuit. Hurlbut, while the battle was going on, had started from Bolivar, intending to strike the enemy's rear. On the 5th the enemy's retreat was intercepted. Eight guns were captured, many hundred small-arms, and several hundred prisoners.

As regards the generalship displayed in the battle of Corinth, there can be but one opinion. General Rosecrans planned and fought the battle with consummate skill. It must of course be admitted that he was exceedingly fortunate in having opposed to him two generals who were as rash in their attempt against Corinth as their attack was magnificent. Very few battles in the war were so obstinate and bloody as the battle of Corinth. General Rosecrans, in a congratulatory order issued October 25th, said to his troops:

"Upon the issue of the fight depended the possession of West Tennessee,



E. O. C. ORD.


and perhaps even the fate of operations in Kentucky. The entire available force of the rebels in Mississippi, save a few garrisons and a small reserve, attacked you. They were commanded by Van Dorn, Price, Villipigue, Rust, Armstrong, Maury, and others, in person. They numbered, according to their own authorities, nearly forty thousand men—almost double your own numbers. You fought them into the position we desired on the third, punishing them terribly; and on the fourth, in three hours after the infantry entered into action, they were beaten. You killed and buried one thousand four hundred and twenty-four officers and men, some of their most distinguished officers falling, among whom was the gallant Colonel Rogers, of the Second Texas, who bore their colors at the head of his storming column to the edge of the ditch of Battery Robinette, where he fell. Their wounded, at the usual rate, must exceed five thousand. You took two thousand two hundred and sixty-eight prisoners, among whom are one hundred and thirty-seven field-officers, captains, and subalterns, representing fifty-three regiments of infantry, sixteen regiments of cavalry, thirteen batteries of artillery, and seven battalions, making sixty-nine regiments, thirteen batteries, seven battalions, besides several companies. You captured three thousand three hundred and fifty stands of small-arms, fourteen stands of colors, two pieces of artillery, and a large quantity of equipments. You pursued his retreating columns forty miles in force with infantry and sixty miles with cavalry, and were ready to follow him to Mobile, if necessary, had you received orders. \* \* \* \* \*

"But our victory has cost us the lives of three hundred and fifteen brave officers and soldiers, besides the wounded. \* \* \* The memory of the brave Hackleman, the chivalrous Kirby Smith, the true and noble colonels Thrush, Baker, and Miles, and Captain Guy C. Ward, with many others, live with us and in the memory of a free people, while history will inscribe their names among its heroes."

The same day that this order was issued General Rosecrans was ordered from Corinth to Cincinnati to command the Department of the Cumberland, which was made to comprise that portion of Tennessee east of the Tennessee River, and such parts of Northern Georgia and Alabama as might be taken possession of by the national forces. The armies of the West were at this time reorganized, the troops under General Grant constituting the Thirteenth Army Corps, and those under Rosecrans the Fourteenth. On the 16th of October Grant had been assigned to the command of the Department of the Tennessee, which was defined to include Cairo, Forts Henry and Donelson, Northern Mississippi, and all of Kentucky and Tennessee west of the Tennessee River.

After the battle of Corinth, Van Dorn, collecting together the scattered fragments of his army, took a position in the vicinity of Holly Springs, on the Cairo and New Orleans Railroad. General Grant, having received a considerable re-enforcement from new levies, followed the line of this railroad, advancing southward from Bolivar and Jackson. He began this movement on the 4th of November. During the month of November it remained at Lagrange, three miles east of Grand Junction. The Federal occupation of New Orleans, and the advance which the national armies had made into Arkansas, seemed to render possible a successful campaign for the complete





GRAND JUNCTION, TENNESSEE.

Orleans Railroad. But there were great obstacles in the way of success in this direction, the most formidable of which was that the advance was far into the enemy's country. A long line of communications stretched back in the rear, which must be guarded against attack. No small portion of Grant's army must be detached for garrisons at Columbus, Humboldt, Trenton, Jackson, Bolivar, Corinth, and Grand Junction, and at every stage of the advance there must be a farther depletion. Much might have been effected by a large and effective force of cavalry; but this force was wanting. The distance over which supplies were to be transported, even to Grand Junction, was one hundred and forty miles. Memphis was far preferable to Columbus as a base of supplies, being only fifty miles distant from Grand Junction, but the road was not in running order.

On the 28th of November Grant moved from Lagrange. The next day Hamilton's advance entered Holly Springs, from which Van Dorn had retired, and was reported to be strongly fortified on the Tallahatchie River. By December 1 the main portion of Grant's army was in camp at Lampkin's Mills, south of Holly Springs, and seven miles north of the Tallahatchie. Simultaneously with Grant's advance General Curtis marched a column of seven thousand men, under General Alvin P. Hovey, from Helena, in Arkansas, on the Mississippi, intending to co-operate with Grant by striking Van Dorn's flank on the Tallahatchie. This caused Van Dorn to give up the position held by him on that river and to retire farther southward, through Oxford, closely followed by Grant.

Hovey's expedition was very successful. The cavalry which accompanied it, under Colonel Washburn, contributed greatly to this success. Hovey's column crossed the Tallahatchie on the 28th of November, and then destroyed the railroad line for some distance. At Oakland an engagement occurred with the Confederate cavalry, which resulted favorably to Colonel Washburn. The Confederate steam-boats on the Tallahatchie were destroyed, and some locomotives which had been left behind by the enemy. Having effected this much, and the enemy having fallen back nearly to Jackson, the expedition returned to Helena. A few days later, General Grant having made his head-quarters at Oxford, Van Dorn saw the way open for an attack on Grant's rear. He determined, therefore, to surprise and capture Holly Springs. About daylight on the morning of December 20, Van Dorn's cavalry, consisting of twenty-two regiments, appeared in the streets of Holly Springs. In the railroad *dépôt*, on the east side of the town, there were two trains of cars, one of them empty and the other loaded with cotton. These were fired. A hundred men were guarding the valuable government stores at the *dépôt*, but these were soon overwhelmed and captured. Other detachments of infantry in the suburbs of the town were surprised and captured in squads. Six companies of the Second Illinois Cavalry were surrounded, but, after a gallant fight, cut their way out, and the enemy began his work of destruction. All the Northern men in town were taken prisoners, and, after being plundered, were paroled. The passenger and freight *dépôts* were burned. The arsenal, full of arms and ammunition, suffered the same fate. Some twenty or thirty buildings on the public square and eighteen hundred bales of cotton were involved in the conflagration. It was estimated that the government property destroyed amounted to two millions of dollars, besides the cotton.

The attack on Holly Springs was not a surprise to General Grant, who had telegraphed to Colonel Murphy, commanding the town, that he would be attacked. He had sent on re-enforcements, which, however, arrived too late. The telegraphic dispatch to Colonel Murphy reached him on the evening of the 19th. He had under his command five or six hundred infantry, besides the Second Illinois Cavalry, and, with a proper disposition of this force, and making the necessary preparations for defense, he might have resisted the attack successfully until re-enforcements came to his assistance. General Grant, in his order four days afterward, properly stigmatized the surrender of the place as disgraceful. He said: "With all the cotton, public stores, and substantial buildings about the *dépôt*, it would have been perfectly practicable to have made, in a few hours, a defense sufficient to resist, with a small garrison, all the cavalry force brought against them, until the re-enforcements, which the commanding officer was notified were marching to his relief, could have reached him."<sup>1</sup>

Other stations along the line were captured, and it was the enemy's intention to destroy every bridge between Corinth and Columbus. The destruction of his *dépôt* of supplies at Holly Springs rendered it impossible for Grant to continue his advance southward. He returned to Holly Springs with his army, from which a detachment of ten thousand men was sent to General Sherman to assist in the operations against Vicksburg.

Returning from General Grant's department to that which was now under

<sup>1</sup> The Richmond Dispatch of January 15 contained the following estimate of the victory gained at Holly Springs:

"The surprised camp surrendered 1800 men and 150 commissioned officers, who were immediately paroled. And then commenced the work of destruction. The extensive buildings of the Mississippi Central *dépôt*—the station-house, the engine-house, and immense store-houses—were filled with supplies of clothing and commissary stores. Outside of the *dépôt* the barrels of flour were estimated to be half a mile in length, one hundred and fifty feet through, and fifteen feet high. Turpentine was thrown over this, and the whole amount destroyed. Up town, the court-house and public buildings, livery-stables, and all capacious establishments, were filled, ceiling-high, with medical and ordnance stores. These were all fired, and the explosion of one of the buildings, in which was stored one hundred barrels of powder, knocked down nearly all the houses on the south side of the square. Surely such a scene of devastation was never before presented to the eye of man. Glance at the gigantic estimates:


"1,809,000 fixed cartridges and other ordnance stores, valued at \$1,500,000, including 5000 rifles and 2000 revolvers.

"100,000 suits of clothing and other quartermaster's stores, valued at \$500,000; 5000 barrels of flour and other commissary stores, valued at \$500,000.


"\$1,000,000 worth of medical stores, for which invoices to that amount were exhibited, and 3000 bales of cotton, and \$600,000 worth of sutlers' stores."

According to this account, General Grant's wife was among the captured.






Railroad Depot.



Rebel Armory.



HOLLY SPRINGS, MISSISSIPPI.





ALVIN P. HOVEY.

Rosecrans's command, we find the eastern, and a large portion of the central part of Tennessee occupied by the Confederate army which Bragg had withdrawn from Kentucky in October.

The army which Rosecrans received from Buell was now largely re-enforced by new levies. President Lincoln had, in July and August, called 600,000 new men into the field.<sup>1</sup> Buell's army had been greatly depleted by desertions. In June some 14,000 men were absent from his command. This demoralization increased to such an extent that, in September, special officers were appointed to arrest deserters and return them to service. Rosecrans had in his army so many raw recruits that he was compelled to devote considerable time to their discipline. In moving against Bragg, he had also to contend against another difficulty. Two large armies had ravaged the space intervening between the Ohio and the Tennessee Rivers since the middle of summer. It was now autumn; and, unless Rosecrans waited for the harvests of another year to ripen, he could enter upon an active campaign only after he should have accumulated a large store of provisions. Not only could he not supply his army from the country, but the very avenues of communication with a distant base of supplies must be provided. The Cumberland River was too low for his purpose. The Louisville and Nashville Railroad had been destroyed by Bragg. The bridges had been burned, and the tunnel at Gallatin, north of Nashville, had been destroyed. The railroad must be repaired, and even then it would be a poor substitute for the river. The enemy had a superior force of cavalry, under Forrest and Morgan, and it would be no difficult matter for Bragg to dispatch a force to his rear which would undo in an hour the work of days. It would not have been easy to interrupt the water communication except by elaborate fortifications. A river does not depend upon the safety of bridges, as does a railroad, for its continuous and perfect communication.

In the subordinate officers there was some change. We drop Gilbert, and have the good fortune of Thomas's company as an actual instead of a nominal commander. McCook and Crittenden are retained, and Rousseau is deservedly elevated to the command of a corps. In the exchange of Buell for Rosecrans we are also gainers, if we look for vigorous operations. There are many obstacles in the way, as we have pointed out; but Rosecrans meets these with a determined will. Little more than a month after his assumption of command he is on the move, and by the 1st of November has his advance at Bowling Green. A week later McCook's corps passed through Nashville. But the railroad had been completed only as far as to the northern border of Tennessee.

<sup>1</sup> The following table, prepared from official reports, shows the number of troops furnished by each of the loyal states up to December 1, 1862. This table does not include the 80,000 furnished just after the capture of Fort Sumter.

|                    |         |                           |           |
|--------------------|---------|---------------------------|-----------|
| Maine.....         | 30,240  | Indiana.....              | 96,698    |
| New Hampshire..... | 16,000  | Illinois.....             | 130,059   |
| Vermont.....       | 19,006  | Michigan.....             | 47,220    |
| Massachusetts..... | 72,107  | Wisconsin.....            | 42,557    |
| Rhode Island.....  | 10,000  | Minnesota.....            | 10,957    |
| Connecticut.....   | 28,551  | Iowa.....                 | 50,000    |
| New York.....      | 219,059 | Kansas.....               | 14,000    |
| New Jersey.....    | 27,400  | California.....           | 9,000     |
| Pennsylvania.....  | 230,000 | Oregon.....               | 1,500     |
| Delaware.....      | 2,500   | Colorado.....             | 3,300     |
| Maryland.....      | 10,000  | Nebraska.....             | 3,500     |
| West Virginia..... | 20,000  | New Mexico.....           | 2,000     |
| Kentucky.....      | 55,000  | District of Columbia..... | 2,000     |
| Missouri.....      | 38,031  | Total.....                | 1,355,087 |
| Ohio.....          | 164,402 |                           |           |

This estimate includes nearly 100,000 volunteers furnished for special service and for a short period of time.

If the Confederates ever needed a commander bold, and at the same time wise, it was now. The opportunity offered to such a commander was even greater than it had been in the summer. Then the Confederate armies were being rapidly filled by the new Conscription Act, and numbers had made Bragg confident of great results to be gained by a march to the Ohio. His invasion had not gained the objects for which it was undertaken. He had failed to take Louisville and Cincinnati. He had not even gained any important victory in the field. The Northwestern states had not sued for peace, notwithstanding the magnanimous terms which he had offered. Even the citizens of Kentucky had not rallied around his standard. Those who joined him had been pressed into the service against their will. What might have been the attitude of Kentuckians if he had succeeded in the military objects of his invasion is only conjecturable. Many had greeted his arrival when the way seemed open to a grand success. Many had been intimidated by the formidable appearance of his army when there was a panic in the great Northern cities on the line of the Ohio, and when as yet the Federal armies appeared incompetent to oppose an adequate resistance. But when his army began to halt, then to waver, and finally to retreat without the prestige of victory before Buell's army, the situation was reversed. Those who were intimidated lost their fears. Those whose expectations of Confederate success had been aroused now lost their hope, and began to fear for the consequences of their premature demonstrations in Bragg's favor. Bragg had been unable to accomplish what he had threatened against those who resisted him, and had disappointed those who had been too hasty and prodigal in their trust. When his troops left Lexington, women ran through the streets wringing their hands in terror and dismay, and his train was encumbered with the vehicles of panic-stricken refugees. When the more wealthy citizens looked upon the flaming piles in which their property was being consumed, because if left it would no longer enrich a Confederate army, the keen anguish of distress was mingled with a sentiment of disgust for the treachery of which they had become the unhappy victims. But an immense amount of stores which had been captured from the defenseless was carried away by the retreating army, and this was almost the solitary token of its poor success. When the train passed through Bryantsville, on the 13th of October, the few guns and ammunition wagons which had been captured had the precedence. Then came the long train of captured stores, which was followed by humiliated refugees, flying with their negroes in every imaginable sort of vehicle, from stately carriages and stage-coaches down to ambulances and Jersey wagons. The infantry, artillery, and cavalry of the army brought up the rear, and intermixed with the medley spectacle were vast herds of cattle, horses, and mules. "The effect of our retreat along the road every where," writes a Confederate historian,<sup>1</sup> "was sinking and depressing in the extreme. No miniature banners waved, no white kerchiefs greeted our troops with approving smiles from lovely women, and no wild cheer was heard responsive to the greetings which had attended their march into Kentucky. Trembling women stole to the doors to look upon the strange, mystified scene before them, and, as the truth gradually forced itself upon them, their eyes filled with tears, and they shrank back, fearing even to make the slightest demonstration of friendliness. All was sullen, downcast, and gloomy." The same writer farther on admits "that the South was bitterly disappointed in the manifestations of public sentiment in Kentucky." He says: "The exhibitions of sympathy in this state were meagre and sentimental, and amounted to but little practical aid to our cause. Indeed, no subject was at once more dispiriting and perplexing to the South than the cautious and unmanly reception given to our armies, both in Kentucky and Maryland. The reference we have made to the sentiment of each of these states leaves but little room to doubt the general conclusion that the dread of Yankee vengeance and love of property were too powerful to make them take risks against these in favor of a cause for which their people had a mere preference, without any attachment to it higher than those of selfish calculation."

In the summer, then, Bragg had been overconfident of his power to overwhelm the states of the Northwest by his newly-conscripted army. Now his force was less in number, but the opportunity offered was, even under this disparaging circumstance, more tempting to a vigorous military leader. It was possible now to make use of the solitary advantage gained by the summer campaign. The devastation of the country over which both armies had passed and repassed, while it hindered Rosecrans, in so far helped Bragg. The latter had shown a great degree of boldness in design in the summer campaign, but, at the same time, had betrayed his lack of great executive ability. So far as successful execution of a plan depended upon fearless firmness, he could be trusted; so far as it depended upon keen and comprehensive insight, he was almost certain to be foiled. It was just this latter element, which he so much wanted, that was most necessary in an encounter with Rosecrans, who was himself especially distinguished by this very characteristic of genius. The Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston was now in command of the department, but he was unable to take the field on account of a severe wound received in Virginia, in the battle of Seven Pines. That Johnston was a far abler general than Bragg can not well be questioned, but what would have been the prospect of success if he had been actually in command, it is scarcely possible to infer from the most careful scrutiny into his subsequent campaigns.

On the 26th of November the cars for the first time ran through to Nashville. A heavy force was posted at Gallatin to protect the road. From that time the preparations for the campaign were speedily pushed forward. At the close of December the army had been clothed, and sufficient ammuni-

<sup>1</sup> Pollard's Second Year of the War, p. 159.





WILLIAM B. ROSECRANS.

tion and supplies were brought to Nashville to secure the army against the needs which might at any time arise from the interruption of the railroad. Having made these preparations, Rosecrans awaited his opportunity, which was not long wanting. It was impossible for Bragg to make a false move which would not immediately lay him open to his wary antagonist. To all appearance Rosecrans was at his leisure. It was given out that he would no doubt go into winter quarters at Nashville. But, as soon as his army was provided for, he began to look with dissatisfaction upon the interval between Nashville and Murfreesborough. Which army should cross that intervening space to attack the other—his or Bragg's? Bragg's army numbered sixty thousand men, of which force nearly one third was cavalry. Rosecrans had 40,000 infantry and about 3000 cavalry. The question as between a movement, from Nashville on Murfreesborough and one from Murfreesborough on Nashville was momentous. The army receiving the attack would avoid the waste of force attending an advance movement, and be able to avail itself of fortifications. But it was important that an action should not long be delayed. The enemy could well afford to wait, but every day materially diminished Rosecrans's stock of provisions. Happily for Rosecrans, Bragg solved the problem, and in a highly satisfactory manner, by sending off a large portion of his cavalry under Forrest and Morgan. Forrest was dispatched to General Grant's rear, while Morgan advanced into Kentucky to break Rosecrans's line of communication. This was a fortunate event for Rosecrans. One brigade of the enemy's cavalry, under the best horseman of the Confederacy, was thus out of the field. Morgan was not dangerous, acting in his rear, as provision had been made against that event. These "clouds of mounted men," as Rosecrans called them, had been his principal annoyance. They swept the country in every direction. Rosecrans's cavalry force was so small that it was kept within the infantry lines. Bragg had still a large cavalry command left under Generals Wheeler and Wharton. So settled was Bragg's opinion as to Rosecrans's indisposition to assume the offensive, that he had on neither of the roads leading in his direction any heavy force. Polk and Kirby Smith were at Murfreesborough, while Hardee held the left toward Franklin with an advanced guard at Nolensville. Rosecrans deemed that his opportunity had arrived, and moved December 26th. McCook's corps of three divisions advanced on the

Nolensville pike against Hardee. Thomas, with two divisions under Negley and Rousseau, advanced by the Franklin and Wilson pikes to threaten Hardee's flank, and then to fall in to Nolensville, ready, in the event of McCook's success, to support Crittenden against an attack at Stone River, south of Lavergne; for Crittenden had advanced along the Murfreesborough pike to the latter place with Wood's, Palmer's, and Van Cleve's divisions. Crittenden's corps at Lavergne was the pivot of the entire movement; McCook's was to strike hard upon Hardee; and Thomas's was to support either McCook or Crittenden, as circumstances should decide. The plan was admirably well conceived. There were two possible issues to the action: either Hardee would be re-enforced, and the main battle would be fought west of Murfreesborough; or he would fall back on Murfreesborough, uniting with Polk and Smith in the defense of that place.

On the 26th McCook was skirmishing all day, and at night occupied a strong position at Nolensville. The same night Crittenden was at Lavergne, having passed over a rough and difficult country, intersected by forests and cedar brakes. Thomas also had made good progress, meeting little resistance. All this day and the next the separate columns pushed on through a drenching rain. The Christmas holidays were now begun, but they were no holidays to the weary soldier. On the second day of his advance the movements of Hardee were clearly developed. He was retreating, but not southward. It was now certain that the battle would be fought at or a little north of Murfreesborough. On the night of that day Crittenden had reached Stewart's Creek. Thomas had brought his column to Nolensville. McCook was following Hardee closely and watchfully. On the 29th McCook's advance brought him within seven miles of Murfreesborough; Crittenden moved to within three miles of that place, at Stone River; and Thomas held the centre, Rousseau's division being nearer to Crittenden, and held in reserve; while Negley's was in the front. That night Rosecrans, having moved his head-quarters to Stewart's Creek, went to the front, where he remained. Although it was only about thirty miles from Nashville to Murfreesborough, Rosecrans's advance on the latter was greatly impeded by Wheeler's and Wharton's cavalry. The main cause of delay, however, was the necessity for Rosecrans to await the development of the affair between McCook and Hardee.



The situation of Bragg's army was a good one for defense. Upon Murfreesborough as a centre numerous important pikes converge. The railroad from Nashville, taking Lavergne upon its route, runs through the town in a southeasterly direction. As Rosecrans had little cavalry, it was not necessary for Bragg to detach from his army any considerable force to guard that portion of the railroad which was in his possession. He held a central position, while Rosecrans moved along the radii of a quadrant. One thing, however, was unfavorable. The topography of the country in the vicinity of Stone River rendered it difficult to operate successfully with cavalry. It was a broken and heavily-wooded country, with here and there an open field, and was well adapted to the use of infantry and artillery.

The battle known as the battle of Stone River lasted several days. But the main actions—those which decided its character and result—were fought on the 31st of December, 1862, and the 2d of January, 1863. The battle was fought on the banks of Stone River, a stream which, flowing eastward, crosses the pike a mile north of Murfreesborough, where it abruptly changes its course, flowing northward and parallel with the road. On the evening of December 30th, the left of Rosecrans's line lay along the river on its western bank. Two divisions of Crittenden's corps, Van Cleve's and Wood's, extended from the Murfreesborough pike to the river. The other division—Palmer's—held the cotton-field on the right of the pike. Thomas held the centre, with Negley on Palmer's right, and Rousseau in reserve. McCook lay off to the left, his line being extended to a great length toward the Franklin road, facing southeastward.

Stone River, which skirted the Federal left, ran through the enemy's line. The great mass of the Confederate army lay on the west bank opposite McCook. This portion of Bragg's lines was held by Hardee's corps. Breckinridge's division of this corps was detached from the rest, and held a position on the east bank. Polk held the ground between Hardee and Breckinridge.

Both Bragg and Rosecrans had determined to attack on the 31st, and the plan of attack formed by each exactly corresponded. On each side the bulk of the army was massed on the left wing. Bragg thought to whip McCook, and push Rosecrans off from the pike connecting him with Nashville. Rosecrans designed to crush Breckinridge, and, rapidly following up the blow, get in between the enemy and Murfreesborough. Neither had any positive expectation of being attacked by the other. As Rosecrans was obliged to bring his left wing across the river in order to carry out his plan, his movements were subject to greater delay. He was thus somewhat anticipated by Bragg. He had instructed McCook, in case of an attack being made upon his corps by Hardee, to hold out stubbornly, thus insuring the success of the attack on Breckinridge and Polk.

McCook's corps consisted of three divisions, which extended from left to right thus: Sheridan, Davis, Johnson. The latter division was surprised by Hardee at daybreak on the 31st, and while Rosecrans's movements on the left had hardly begun. The latter was not unwilling that McCook should be attacked, if only it did not disturb his prearranged plan. But in this respect he was destined to be disappointed. He was not aware of the advantage which Hardee was rapidly gaining on McCook. Perhaps he remembered the obstinacy with which this corps of McCook's had a few weeks before withstood the attacks of the same enemy at Perryville. Three or four hours of obstinate resistance on McCook's part would without doubt enable him to overwhelm Breckinridge; certainly such commanders as Davis and Sheridan could maintain the battle for that length of time. There was one thing, however, which disturbed Rosecrans's confidence. McCook's line, he feared, was not arranged in a proper manner. He had the night before spoken of this arrangement to McCook. Said Rosecrans: "I don't like the facing so much to the east, but must confide that to you, who know the ground." The battle had been going on about an hour, when one of McCook's staff officers announced that the right was heavily pressed, and needed assistance. The messenger was not sufficiently explicit. He certainly failed to impress upon Rosecrans's mind the impression that there was any danger. The fact was that two of Johnson's brigades—Kirk's and Willich's—had been routed, leaving their batteries in the enemy's hands. Davis, too, had been doubled up brigade by brigade, although gallantly resisting, and driven back. This was not reported to Rosecrans; and the latter, although he heard the battle swerving more and more to the left, supposed that McCook was refusing his right gradually, according to the instructions given him. He therefore directed the officer to return and direct General McCook to hold on obstinately.

It was not long before a second officer arrived, as Van Cleve was crossing Stone River, and stated that the right wing was being driven. This was now only too evident to Rosecrans, who could hear the sound of battle rapidly swaying northward. Sheridan had followed Davis, and the peril was now imminent. Van Cleve was recalled, and two of his brigades sent over to the centre. Rousseau's division was sent into the cedar brakes to support Sheridan, and become the nucleus of a new formation. The scene which met Rosecrans's eye as he went over to the right would have unnerved a man of less resource. The stragglers from McCook's routed command were swarming to the rear through the brakes in crowds. The enemy had succeeded in breaking up Rosecrans's plan of attack, and had carried his first position. Even Negley had given way in the centre, and Rousseau could scarcely bear up against the impetus of the attack. All the troops on Palmer's left had been sent to the right. The only division which retained its original position was Palmer's. Let us see how that division was situated, so much now depended upon it. Most of the division was now on the right of the pike. Cruft's brigade was a little in the rear, in the wood. Hazen stood across the pike, so that his front line extended eastward to the

railroad which runs between the pike and the river. It was of the first importance that this position of Hazen's should be held, in order to cover the formation of a new line, in which work Rosecrans was now engaged. The river on Palmer's left, being deep and having but a single ford, was a good flank defense. A rise of ground at the railroad afforded some protection against the enemy's artillery. Palmer's troops were well-disciplined veterans, and were fresher than the troops of the enemy, who had been fighting since morning. About ten o'clock Hazen and Cruft were attacked in great force; but, fortunately, the valor of the Federal troops and the strength of Parsons's artillery baffled every onset. The whole of Bragg's army, with the exception of Breckinridge, was now engaged. At one o'clock P.M. and at four o'clock fresh attempts were made to drive Hazen from his position, but without success.

In the mean time Rosecrans had been at work farther to the right. When McCook's routed battalions retreated out of the corn-fields and through the skirts of the woods on Rousseau's flank, the latter officer found it quite impossible, under the circumstances, to get his division into position in the cedar thicket. Galloping off to General Thomas, he described his situation. In the rear there was open ground, about three miles distant from Murfreesborough. Here the railroad and turnpike, about fifty rods apart, run through a slight cut, forming a natural rifle-pit. Farther back there is on either side of the road a swell of ground, which, once gained and held, constituted an impregnable position. To this favorable position Rousseau withdrew his division, with General Thomas's permission. Guenther's and Loomis's batteries were posted on the left, with Stokes's Chicago battery, and were strongly supported by a brigade of regulars. Scribner's brigade took position in the natural rifle-pit above mentioned, and Beatty's brigade held the crest on the right, which stretched away to the northern edge of a cedar wood. Scarcely had the line been formed, stretching from Hazen northwestwardly to Van Cleve's position on the right flank, when the gray uniforms of Hardee's troops were seen issuing from the edge of this wood. The hill on the left, where the batteries had been placed, commanded the entire space in front of the wood on the right, and as rapidly as the enemy came forth into the open ground his ranks were mown down without mercy. It was impossible for Bragg to move Rosecrans from his strong position, while every onset decimated the ranks of his own troops. The prompt formation of the Federal line in the strongest possible position had turned the fortune of the battle. But Rosecrans's loss in the early part of the day had been heavy. Over twenty-five pieces of artillery had fallen into the enemy's hands, and a large number of prisoners had been captured by Wharton's cavalry. Wheeler had the day before succeeded in gaining Rosecrans's rear, and captured a large number of wagons loaded with supplies and baggage, and so small was the Federal cavalry command that he made the entire circuit of the lines, and joined Wharton on the left. But these movements of the enemy's cavalry scarcely disturbed Rosecrans, who could not by any mere annoyance, or even partial reverse, be diverted from the end he had in view.


The battle on Wednesday ended with the complete repulse both of Hardee on the right and of Polk at the centre. Hazen at the close of the day withdrew from the advanced position which he had held with wonderful tenacity for ten hours. The next day opened the new year, 1863. Rosecrans's position was so strong that Bragg feared to make an assault, and contented himself with skirmishing and a few cavalry raids. Rosecrans had been re-enforced by Starkweather's and Walker's brigades; but he preferred to wait for fresh supplies of food and ammunition before resuming offensive operations.

On Friday, the 2d of January, the contest was renewed with some degree of vigor. Bragg early in the morning directed a heavy cannonade against the Federal centre from four strong batteries, and made demonstrations against the right. But this show of attack was not followed up, and, indeed, was intended merely to discover whether Rosecrans still kept his position in force; for the cavalry scouts had reported to Bragg indications of a retrograde movement on the part of the Federal commander.


While Bragg was speculating thus in regard to the movements of Rosecrans, the latter was quietly crossing Stone River with Van Cleve's division, and, before Bragg was fully aware of the movement, he had gained a position on and under cover of an eminence which commanded Polk's line, enfilading it. Either Polk must withdraw or Van Cleve. The whole of Breckinridge's division, therefore, was massed in front of the threatening position, and heavily supported by artillery, and by cavalry to the number of 2000. Before the formidable assault which was made by Breckinridge at about four o'clock P.M., Van Cleve retired in some confusion to the other side of the river. But it was not long before the situation at this point was exactly reversed, and the pursuers were the pursued.

Just on the other side of the river from the eminence carried by Breckinridge was the crest from which, on Wednesday, Loomis's, Guenther's, and Stokes's batteries had belched forth destruction against the enemy. Here General Crittenden, who commanded on this part of the field, directed his chief of artillery to dispose his batteries for a terrific cannonade, while three brigades—two of them from Negley's division—were ordered up to meet the enemy, who was endeavoring to push his advantages. At this point Rosecrans reports: "The firing was terrific and the havoc terrible. The enemy retreated more rapidly than they had advanced. In forty minutes they lost 2000 men." Bragg had timed his assault fortunately for himself. Had it occurred earlier, with the same disastrous result, there would have been no need of protracting the already sufficiently bloody battle of Stone River for another day. Rosecrans says: "It was now after dark and raining, or we should have pursued the enemy into Murfreesborough. As it was, Crittenden's corps passed over, and, with Davis, occupied the crests, which were in-





MURFREESBOROUGH, TENNESSEE.



THE APPEARANCE OF BRAGG'S DESERTED ENCAMPMENT.




trenched in a few hours." If Bragg had deemed Polk's line untenable with a single division in this commanding position, now that it was occupied by a whole corps it was absolutely necessary for the Confederate general to withdraw. In order to guard against an attack on his right, which might again, as on Wednesday, disturb his plans, Rosecrans resorted to a very ancient, but very effective species of strategy. By a heavy division of camp-fires, and by a feigned line of battle, whose only reality consisted in torches, he succeeded in impressing the Confederate commander with more respect for his forces in that direction than might have been entertained upon a closer inspection.

About noon on the 3d of January, Bragg determined to give up the contest. Up to that time there had been no fighting during the day. It had been raining since long before daybreak, and Rosecrans would have found great difficulty in pushing the enemy, dragging his artillery through the muddy fields. Besides, the troops of both armies were nearly exhausted by exposure and fatigue. That night Bragg retreated to Duck River with perfect security. It was an utter impossibility for Rosecrans, under the circumstances, to follow in pursuit. Even if the weather had been favorable, he had no cavalry, and his artillery horses were worn out.

Bragg and Rosecrans, in their official reports of the battle, both claim that they were opposed by superior numbers. Rosecrans estimates the force with which he left Nashville at nearly 47,000, and in the battle at 43,000. The enemy's force he estimates at over 62,000. Bragg, on the other hand, gives the number of his effective force, on the morning of December 31, as less than 35,000, and estimates the force opposed to him at nearly 70,000.

Considering the numbers engaged, the battle of Stone River was one of the bloodiest of the whole war. The entire Federal loss in killed was 1553, of whom 92 were officers. The wounded numbered a little over 7000, and the loss in prisoners was nearly 3000, making the Federal loss in the aggregate nearly 12,000, or more than one fourth of the entire army. The entire Confederate loss is stated by Bragg as 10,000. Both armies lost the services of important general officers by death or wounds. General Sill, of McCook's corps, was killed. On the Confederate side, Generals James E. Rains and Roger M. Hanson were killed, and Generals Chalmers and Adams were disabled.



THE STONE RIVER MONUMENT.

Turning now from the military operations in Tennessee, we will close this chapter with a review of the political situation in that state.

The manner in which Tennessee was first carried over to the side of the rebellion has been recorded in this history. The governor of that state, Isham G. Harris, had from the first identified himself with the Confederate leaders. With evident reluctance, Tennessee followed the policy urged upon it by its governor. The eastern portion of the state was intensely loyal, giving 33,000 out of 48,000 votes against secession. Among those who disapproved of secession was John Bell, who, as Presidential candidate, carried the largest vote in the state. But he equally disapproved of what was then styled the coercive policy of the administration in relation to the seceded states. He regarded this policy as a justification of the state in refusing aid to the general government, but, as a matter of expediency, advised the people to take the attitude of neutrals and mediators. It was impossible, however, after the President's proclamation of April 15, 1861, for the more conservative citizens to stem the tide which then set in in favor of the revolutionists. Those who had before counseled inaction now looked with favor upon that clause of Governor Harris's reply to Secretary Cameron, which, while it refused two regiments of militia to put down the insurrection, threatened to raise 50,000 troops, if necessary, for the defense of Southern rights. Even Neil S. Brown, formerly Governor of Tennessee, who had joined Bell in his efforts to sustain a neutral position, now recommended a vigorous war policy. He said: "I have hoped obstinately against such an alternative; but the conviction is forced upon my mind that it is the settled policy of the administration, and, so far as I can see, of the whole North, to urge a war of extermination against the South. The clouds are gathering in every direction, and the signs now are that the border states are to be the battle-ground. In this view, the first duty is to arm at once; and to talk of keeping out of such a contest, if it comes, is simply idle."

When the Legislature met in extra session on the 25th of April, Governor Harris, in his message, recommended the passage of an ordinance separating the state from the Union, with a view of joining the Confederacy as soon thereafter as possible. The members of the Legislature had not been elected upon any such issue as was now presented, and could not fairly be said to represent the views of the people. But the governor "could see no propriety for encumbering the people of the state with the election of delegates to do that which it was in the power of the Legislature to enable them to do for themselves." The Legislature had been in session about a week, when Henry W. Hilliard, commissioner from the Confederate States, appeared before it, and addressed the members. His object, he said, was to establish a temporary alliance between Tennessee and the Confederacy, as a movement preliminary to a permanent relationship. Something more was at issue than the right to hold slaves, namely, the right of self-government.

This address and the governor's message induced the Legislature, on the 1st of May, to instruct Governor Harris to enter into a military league with the Confederacy. The governor, in obedience to this instruction, appointed as commissioners for that purpose Gustavus A. Henry, Archibald O. W. Totten, and Washington Barrow. The league was established May 7th between these gentlemen and Mr. Hilliard. According to the terms of the Convention, the military operations, offensive and defensive, of Tennessee against the United States were, until the union of that state with the Confederacy, to be as completely under the control of President Davis as if the union had already been established. Upon becoming a permanent member of the Confederacy, the state would turn over to the Confederate government all the public property, naval stores, and munitions of war in her possession and acquired from the United States. The expenditures of the state in the interim were to be met and provided for by the Confederate government.

There was a great majority of the Legislature in favor of the ratification of this treaty. On the 6th of May an ordinance was passed submitting to the vote of the people a Declaration of Independence. At the same time with the Ordinance of Secession, another for the adoption of the Confederate Constitution was submitted to the people. The Legislature passed an act calling on the governor to raise 55,000 men for the defense of the state, 25,000 of whom were to be immediately fitted for the field. Before the day of election—June 8, 1861—Governor Harris had most of these 25,000 men in camp, equipped, for the most part, with munitions belonging to the United States. The presence of this army was intimidating to the people; it was an indication of the governor's determination to sustain the revolutionary party in any event; for these armed men had been put into the field before the people had expressed a desire to separate from the Union, and it was not likely that any expression of opinion which the people might now make would avail any thing. Apparently, the result of the election was a majority of 57,000 in favor of secession. What the vote really cast was it will never be possible to ascertain. The means already used by the governor to precipitate the secession of the state had not been so honorable as to preclude a reasonable suspicion that his agents would see to it that the revolutionary party should show an overwhelming majority.


In order to still farther strengthen the power which he had gained, Governor Harris, in May, ordered the disbandment of all organizations except his own, and that all arms belonging to such organizations be returned to the State Arsenal at Nashville. All debts due to the citizens of Northern states, he declared, must be repudiated.

So steadfast were the counties of East Tennessee to the Union, that the general government had not yet discontinued the mails in that section.<sup>1</sup> At Knoxville in May, and at Greenville in June, large Union Conventions were held. Several of the central and western counties joined in the protest against the revolution. The Convention at Greenville lasted three days. A declaration of grievances was adopted, in which it was stated that the right of free suffrage had been obstructed by Governor Harris's government; that the people had been insulted in their own homes, and that women and children had been shot down by brutal soldiery, and innocent citizens plundered and butchered. It was declared that the Ordinance of Secession was not binding upon loyal citizens. A memorial was prepared, petitioning the Legislature to afford the people of East Tennessee a separate government. But this portion of the state was unable to cope with Governor Harris and his army, and it was not yet possible for the United States to furnish any material assistance. In spite of weakness, the people held fast to their opinions, and were abundantly rewarded with persecution. Irregular squads of cavalry and infantry swept the country, conscripting the citizens, destroying the crops, and heaping every possible indignity upon defenseless women and children. Soon the thoroughfares into Kentucky were crowded with refugees, who made their way across the mountains with great difficulty. Able-bodied men also fled and entered the Union army. The first regiment of loyal Tennesseans was composed of soldiers who had been exiled from their homes. Many of these were wealthy, and, for the Union cause, left all their possessions behind them to be ravaged by the secessionists, and many left behind them families. The number of men left, however, was sufficient to oppose an obstinate resistance, and the mountainous character of the country favored their efforts for self-defense. At length these men grew bolder, and, in an irregular manner, assumed a sort of offensive warfare, burning the bridges along the line of the railroads over which the Confederate forces received their supplies.

Tennessee was the first of the Confederate States occupied by the national

<sup>1</sup> The counties in which loyalty prevailed were the following: Anderson, Bledsoe, Blount, Bradley, Campbell, Carter, Claiborne, Cocke, Grainger, Green, Hamilton, Hancock, Hawkins, Johnson, Knox, Marion, McMuir, Meigs, Monroe, Morgan, Polk, Rhea, Sevier, Sullivan, and Washington.





WILLIAM TECUMSEH SHERMAN.

armies. The fall of Donelson insured the fall of Nashville also. The Confederate government of the state then transferred its seat to Memphis. All the troops raised by Governor Harris had been ungrudgingly yielded up to the demands of General Albert Sidney Johnston, and at the time of the capture of Donelson the governor had not a single armed company subject to his command. General Buell occupied Nashville on the 25th of April, 1862. Three days before this, General Grant issued an order declaring West Tennessee under martial law. The capture of Memphis in the June following entirely disorganized Governor Harris's government. The governor himself took the field, and was present at some of the most important battles of the year.

The appointment of Andrew Johnson as military governor of Tennessee, with the rank of brigadier general, was confirmed by the United States Senate on the 5th of March, 1862. Andrew Johnson, who was to be the next Vice-President of the United States, and who was, through a melancholy occasion, to be also its President, was born at Raleigh, North Carolina, December 29, 1808. His parents occupied a humble station in life. The father died when the son was about four years of age, and the circumstances of the

family were still more straitened. When ten years old the boy became a tailor's apprentice, and in the shop, through an accidental acquaintance with a man of eccentric but studious habits, he learned to read, and acquired a rudimentary education. He went to Tennessee while still a young man, and there married. His choice of a partner proved quite fortunate to his future prospects, for his wife became his teacher. In 1829 Mr. Johnson held his first office, that of alderman of Greenville, of which city he was, in the subsequent year, elected mayor. In 1835 he was sent to the state Legislature, where he espoused the principles of the Democratic party. Under the auspices of this party he was elected a member of Congress in 1843, where, in regard to the important questions of the admission of Texas, the Mexican War, the Tariff of 1846, and the Homestead Bill, he strongly advocated the policy upon which his election was based. In 1857 he was elected to the United States Senate for the full term which would end in 1863.

Johnson was a Democrat after the school of Andrew Jackson. The Jacksonian element of his democracy was especially apparent in his career at the time of the first development of the secession theories in the Senate of the United States. Among the Southern senators he stood almost alone in his



denunciation of secession as treason, and in his advocacy of the right of the general government to exact from the states submission to the Constitution and the laws. In his speech delivered December 19, 1860, his argument against disunion was very strong as affecting Southern interests. He predicted that disunion must destroy slavery; that a hostile or even alien government upon the border of a slaveholding state would be the natural haven of rest to the hunted slave. "If one division was allowed, others would follow; and," said he, "rather than see this Union divided into thirty-three petty governments, with a little prince in one, a potentate in another, a little aristocracy in a third, a little democracy in a fourth, and a republic somewhere else—a citizen not being permitted to pass from one state to another without a passport or a commission from his government—with quarreling and warring among the petty powers, which would result in anarchy—I would rather see this government to-day—I proclaim it here in my place—converted into a consolidated government." In view of the proposed aggression by the Southern states upon the Federal forts and Federal ships, his language was still stronger. In a speech delivered March 2, 1861, he said: "Show me those who make war on the government and fire on its vessels, and I will show you a traitor. If I were President of the United States I would have all such arrested, and, if convicted, by the Eternal God I would have them hung."

In assuming his position as Governor of Tennessee, Mr. Johnson was, of course, obliged to resign his seat in the Senate. Fortunately, he had been twice governor of the state in previous years, and knew well the temper of the people with whom he would have to deal. But even thus his course

<sup>1</sup> "The President has conducted this mighty contest, until, as commander-in-chief of the army, he has caused the national flag again to float undisputed over the Capitol of our state. Meanwhile the state government has disappeared. The executive has abdicated; the Legislature has dissolved; the judiciary is in abeyance. The great ship of state, freighted with its precious cargo of human interests and human hopes, its sails all set, and its glorious old flag unfurled, has been suddenly abandoned by its officers and mutinous crew, and left to float at the mercy of the winds, and to be plundered by every rover upon the deep. Indeed, the work of plunder has already commenced. The archives have been desecrated, the public property stolen and destroyed; the vaults of the State Bank violated, and its treasures robbed, including the funds carefully gathered and consecrated for all time to the instruction of our children.

"In such a lamentable crisis, the government of the United States could not be unmindful of its high constitutional obligation to guarantee to every state in this Union a republican form of government, an obligation which every state has a direct and immediate interest in having observed toward every other state; and from which, by no action on the part of the people in any state, can the Federal government be absolved. A republican form of government, in consonance with the Constitution of the United States, is one of the fundamental conditions of our political existence, by which every part of the country is alike bound, and from which no part can escape. This obligation the national government is now attempting to discharge. I have been appointed, in the absence of the regular and established state authorities, as military governor for the time being, to preserve the public property of the state, to give the protection of law actively enforced to her citizens, and, as speedily as may be, to restore her government to the same condition as before the existing rebellion.

"In this grateful but arduous undertaking, I shall avail myself of all the aid that may be afforded by my fellow-citizens. And for this purpose I respectfully but earnestly invite all the people of Tennessee, desirous or willing to see a restoration of her ancient government, without distinction of party affiliations or past political opinions or action, to unite with me, by counsel and co-

was a difficult one to pursue. The state had not been wholly occupied by the national arms. Even those portions which had been brought again under Federal control were infested by the raids of Morgan and other daring partisan rangers. The Union sentiment among the citizens was not as fervent as had been anticipated, partly because sectional antipathies had been naturally intensified by the bloody strife, and partly because the chance of war might in a few weeks reverse the current of success in favor of the Confederates.

Governor Johnson reached Nashville on the 12th of March, accompanied by Emerson Etheridge, clerk of the House of Representatives, and Horace Maynard, member of Congress from Tennessee. The next evening after his arrival he was called upon by citizens, who desired to elicit an expression of opinion on the critical question of the day. The address which he delivered on the occasion he afterward published as an "Appeal to the People of Tennessee." It was eminently conservative. Military rule was, for a time, a necessity. It did not arise from the desire of the Federal government to usurp powers belonging to the states, but from the constitutional obligation imposed upon the President to provide for every state a republican form of government. In the present instance, there was a state which had no government whatsoever. The government which had been had disappeared, and, in the confusion incidental to a period of strife, anarchy must ensue, unless, for a period, a provisional government could be established. His declaration of the policy which he intended to pursue was succinct, but very plain. Those who had been loyal would be honored; those who would become so would be welcomed on their return; but intelligent and conscious

operative agency, to accomplish this great end. I find most, if not all of the offices, both State and Federal, vacated either by actual abandonment, or by the action of the incumbents in attempting to subordinate their functions to a power in hostility to the fundamental law of the state, and subversive of her national allegiance. These offices must be filled temporarily, until the state shall be restored so far to its accustomed quiet that the people can peaceably assemble at the ballot-box and select agents of their own choice. Otherwise anarchy would prevail, and no man's life or property would be safe from the desperate and unprincipled.

"I shall, therefore, as early as practicable, designate for various positions under the state and county governments, from among my fellow-citizens, persons of probity and intelligence, and bearing true allegiance to the Constitution and government of the United States, who will execute the functions of their respective offices until their places can be filled by the action of the people. Their authority, when their appointments shall have been made, will be accordingly respected and observed.

"To the people themselves the protection of the government is extended. All their rights will be duly respected, and their wrongs redressed when made known. Those who through the dark and weary night of the rebellion have maintained their allegiance to the Federal government will be honored. The erring and misguided will be welcomed on their return. And while it may become necessary, in vindicating the violated majesty of the law, and in reasserting its imperial sway, to punish intelligent and conscious treason in high places, no merely retaliatory or vindictive policy will be adopted. To those especially who in a private, unofficial capacity have assumed an attitude of hostility to the government, a full and complete amnesty for all past acts and declarations is offered, upon the one condition of their again yielding themselves peaceful citizens to the just supremacy of the laws. This I advise them to do for their own good, and for the peace and welfare of our beloved state, endeared to me by the associations of long and active years, and by the enjoyment of her highest honors."



A LOCAL SOUTHERN FAMILY FLYING NORTH.





FORT NEGLEY, NASHVILLE.

treason must be punished. A full amnesty was offered to all who in a private, unofficial capacity had been hostile to the government.

Upon the refusal of the Common Council of Nashville, and other officers, to take the oath of allegiance, Governor Johnson declared their places vacant, and appointed others to fill them. The mayor was arrested for "disloyal practices." The press was placed under military supervision. This firm policy elicited important results. The citizens began to express anxiety to take the oath, and even Confederate soldiers were desirous of availing themselves of the general amnesty. Trade began to revive; vacant houses were reoccupied; there was security of life and property.

That the majority of the citizens in Nashville was not any too loyal is apparent from the vote given May 22d for judge. A disunionist, Turner S. Foster, was chosen by a majority of 190. Governor Johnson gave Judge Foster his commission, and the same day had him arrested and sent to the Penitentiary. On the 12th of May a Union meeting was held at Nashville, and a fortnight afterward at Murfreesborough. Substantially the same resolutions were adopted on both occasions. The state to which the revolution had reduced Tennessee is touchingly depicted in the language of these resolutions. Schools, colleges, universities, churches, were closed; the common-school fund had been abstracted and carried away; the funds of the State Bank had been seized by Governor Harris and his adherents; the state debt had been increased by millions; commerce had been cut off and manufactures shut up; judicial proceedings were suspended—and all this was the result of the unfortunate alliance into which the state had entered with the Confederacy.

Governor Johnson's policy was such as the circumstances of his position compelled him to adopt. In all things he was firm. It would have pleased him better if he had not been so frequently forced to take arbitrary measures. But indulgence to the enemies of the government was certain to be abused. He was even obliged to force those who could not desist from the use of treasonable language to go south beyond the Union lines. He found loyal citizens who had been reduced to extremest poverty by the rebellion, and he deemed it not unjust to assess the wealthy sympathizers with the rebellion for the relief of these people.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The following was the form of the circulars sent by Governor Johnson to some of the richest secessionists of Nashville:

"State of Tennessee, Executive Department, Nashville, August 18, 1862.

"SIR,—There are many wives and helpless children in the city of Nashville and county of Davidson who have been reduced to poverty and wretchedness in consequence of their husbands and fathers having been forced into the armies of this unholy and nefarious rebellion. Their necessities have become so manifest, and their demands for the necessities of life so urgent, that the laws of justice and humanity would be violated unless something was done to relieve their suffering and destitute condition.

"You are therefore requested to contribute the sum of — dollars, which you will pay over within the next five days to James Whitworth, Esq., Judge of the County Court, to be by him distributed among these destitute families in such manner as may be described.

"ANDREW JOHNSON, Military Governor."

Nashville, the military centre of the Federal armies in Tennessee, was four times isolated from the Northern states before the end of August. On the 28th of August General Rousseau was placed in command of the city. He was soon succeeded by General Thomas; but the presence of the latter with Buell's army being very much needed, Negley assumed the command. While Bragg was fighting Buell at Perryville, the Confederate Generals J. R. Anderson and Forrest, attended by Governor Harris, concentrated a large force east of Nashville for the purpose of making an attack upon the city. But the army which they had brought together was defeated at Lavergne on the 7th of October by a detachment of General Negley's troops, commanded by General Palmer. Other attempts were directed by the Confederates against Nashville, but these never succeeded. That which caused Negley the most annoyance was the busy persistence with which Morgan worried his line of communication with the North. At one time, soon after the battle at Lavergne, both Negley's army and the citizens were so far deprived of supplies that they were compelled to live off the country, and even the area allowed them to forage in was very much restricted by the Confederate cavalry. The troops had been for some days living on half rations when Rosecrans reached Nashville with his army in November.

The retreat of Bragg's army from Murfreesborough after the battle of Stone River brought the whole of Western and Middle Tennessee under Federal control. Afterward Burnside's operations in East Tennessee almost entirely defeated the forces of the Confederacy in that portion of the state. But for the power of Morgan and Forrest, it would have been possible to have reorganized the state under a permanent government. As it was, the provisional government continued throughout the year 1863, and it was not until January 26, 1864, that Governor Johnson issued his proclamation for a state election.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Governor Johnson would willingly have taken this step at an earlier stage if the people had been prepared for it. His views on the subject of reorganization are thus expressed in a public speech made in September, 1863:

"Tennessee is not out of the Union, never has been, and never will be out. The bonds of the Constitution and the Federal power will also prevent that. This government is perpetual; provision is made for reforming the government, and amending the Constitution, and admitting states into the Union, not for letting them out of it.

"Where are we now? There is a rebellion; this was anticipated, as I said. The rebel army is driven back. Here lies your state—a sick man in his bed, emaciated and exhausted, paralyzed in all his powers, and unable to walk alone. The physician comes. Don't quarrel about antecedents, but administer to his wants, and cure him as quickly as possible. The United States sends an agent or a military governor, whichever you please to call him, to aid you in restoring your government. Whenever you desire, in good faith, to restore civil authority, you can do so, and a proclamation for an election will be issued as speedily as it is practicable to hold one. One by one, all the agencies of your state government will be set in motion. A Legislature will be elected. Judges will be appointed temporarily, until you can elect them at the polls; and so of sheriffs, county court judges, justices, and other officers, until the way is fairly open for the people and all the parts of the civil government to resume their ordinary functions. This is no dice, intricate metaphysical question. It is a plain, common-sense matter, and there is nothing in the way but obstinacy."