CHAPTER XVI
FROM DONELSON TO VICKSBURG.—THE TRANS-MISSISSIPPI CAMPAIGN OF 1862.

Pickett's Retreat from Springfield.—General Samuel R. Curtis.—Federal Occupation of Springfield and Advance into Arkansas.—The Indian Tribes West of the Mississippi; the Sioux War; Albert Pike's Intrigues.—Battle of Pea Ridge.—The Barricades of War.—Operations in New Mexico.—Arizona; its Social Organization; Hostility of the Apaches.—History of the revolutionary proceedings in Arkansas and Texas in 1861; Suicide of Arsenal at Little Rock; Meeting in Austin, Texas, in 1860; Governor Houston's Career; General Twiggs' Surrender; Confederate Forces in Texas at the Beginning of the War;—Sibley's Invasion of New Mexico.—John H. H. B. Baylor.—Colonel Canby's Defense of Fort Craig; Battle of Valverde.—Retreat of Sibley to Texas.—Curtis's Operations in Arkansas after the Battle of Pea Ridge; Advance on Little Rock; Governor Becker; Expedition up White River; Change of Base from Natoma to Helena.—Confederate Forces in Arkansas in the Autumn of 1862.— Guerrilla Operations.—Battles at Cass Hill and Prarie Grove.—The political Situation in Missouri; General Halleck's Policy.—Capture of New Madrid and Island No. 10.

In this and the subsequent chapter we purpose to follow the course of military events in the West from the capture of Fort Donelson down to the Vicksburg campaign. This will bring the history of the war in the West down to the close of 1862. The events narrated are naturally grouped under two separate departments. To the first belong the military operations west of the Mississippi; to the second, the operations along the Mississippi and Tennessee Rivers—excluding the battle of Shiloh, the capture of Murfreesboro, and the advance into Mississippi—and General Buell's and Rosecrans's campaigns in Kentucky and Tennessee.

These campaigns, even if we confine ourselves to the immediate field of active operations, disregarding the distant military centres from which instructions were issued and whence supplies were obtained, covered an area of nearly 100,000 square miles. The battle of Pea Ridge was fought on the very confines of civilization, at a point 500 miles distant from the line of General Bragg's march into Kentucky. From New Madrid to the mouth of the Arkansas was more than 200 miles in a straight line; from the latter point to St. Louis was more than 500; and yet this field, so wide in extent, was but a part of the theatre of war. General Halleck's and Buell's forces were the right wing only of the Federal army, separated from the left, indeed, by nearly a thousand miles; and by the wild and tortuous ranges of the Alleghenies, but still co-operating with it as effectually as if there had been no so vast interval of space between.

At the close of 1861 General Price had fixed his headquarters at Springfield, and advanced along the line of the railroad to Rolla and then to Lebanon. Price began to retreat toward Arkansas.

General Curtis, to whom General Halleck had given the command of the army in the field, was a native of Ohio, and at the time of which we are writing was fifty-five years of age. He had studied at West Point, and received an appointment in the army, but in 1832 had resigned his commission, and devoted himself to law and afterward to engineering. He fought under General Taylor in Mexico with the rank of colonel, was appointed military governor of Monterey and of other places occupied by the United States troops, and in these positions had developed a good degree of administrative ability. Subsequently he took a prominent part in the construction of railroads in the West. From Keokuk, in Iowa, he was elected to Congress in 1858 and again in 1860, but at the beginning of the war he resigned his seat in order to participate in the great struggle. He accompanied the New York Seventh from Philadelphia to Washington, and was made an honorary member of that regiment. He then went back to Iowa, superintended the earliest organization of troops in that state, and from the skirmish at Booneville was engaged in the war in Missouri under the conduct of General Lyon. He was at first colonel of the Second Iowa, but was soon made brigadier general of volunteers. He served under General Fremont, and afterward under General Halleck. The latter, upon the withdrawal of General Price to Springfield, gave General Curtis the command in the southwestern part of the state. The army committed to his hands was organized into four divisions, under Generals Sigel, Asboth, and Davis, and Colonel Carr. It was chiefly made up of troops from Missouri and Illinois. There were also some Indiana and Iowa regiments, and a battery from Ohio.

This army moved from Lebanon February 11th, and on the 14th General Halleck telegraphed to Washington that the Union flag then floated over the court-house in Springfield; that, after a short engagement, Price had retreated, leaving behind a large amount of stores and equipments, and that Curtis's cavalry were in close pursuit. The fact that Price had abandoned his sick, amounting to about 600 men, proves that general scarcely anticipated the Federal advance. He had waited, however, till the last moment, expecting re-enforcements from the Confederate army in Arkansas. This gave General Curtis a great advantage; for, although the latter part of January General Samuel R. Curtis advanced with an army of nearly fifty thousand men, chiefly militia, under the command of General Samuel R. Curtis, the army was mostly supplied by stores captured from the enemy during his march southward from Springfield. A portion of the lines to Springfield and to Rolla were again in Union hands was organized into two large amounts of stores and equipments, and that Curtis's cavalry were in close pursuit. The fact that Price had abandoned his sick, amounting to about 600 men, proves that general scarcely anticipated the Federal advance. He had waited, however, till the last moment, expecting re-enforcements from the Confederate army in Arkansas. This gave General Curtis a great advantage; for, although the latter part of January General Samuel R. Curtis advanced with an army of nearly fifty thousand men, chiefly militia, under the command of General Samuel R. Curtis, the army was mostly supplied by stores captured from the enemy during his march southward from Springfield. A portion of the lines to Springfield and to Rolla were again in Union hands—organized into major generals—were ordered to pursue Price, and to return to Springfield as soon as possible. The latter, upon the withdrawal of General Price to Springfield, gave General Curtis the command in the southwestern part of the state. The army committed to his hands was organized into four divisions, under Generals Sigel, Asboth, and Davis, and Colonel Carr. It was chiefly made up of troops from Missouri and Illinois. There were also some Indiana and Iowa regiments, and a battery from Ohio.

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of the Southwest. In fact, not only had nothing decisive been accomplished by that army, but it was daily being drawn into a perilous situation. The danger was not chiefly in its distance from a military base, but in its inferiority in numbers to the force which was being gathered against it. All along his line of advance—at Rollin, at Lamine, at Springfield, and at Cassville—Curtis had weakened his force by leaving detachments to guard his communications, and could not, therefore, bring into the field more than ten or twelve thousand men, while the available force of the enemy was nearly twice that number, without counting the Indian allies of the Confederates. Situated just south of the border line between Arkansas and Missouri, and flanked on the west by the Indian Territory, the field of the proposed contest was the one which would have been selected of all others as the most favorable for the concentration of Price's, McCulloch's, and the Indian forces. Yet General Halleck's confidence in the Army of the Southwest was not wholly without justification. A good portion of General Curtis's force had bravely met the enemy at Carthage, at Wilson's Creek, and in subsequent battles, and even when opposed to superior numbers had dealt very effective blows. The Confederate army, too, was badly armed and weak in artillery.

The attitude assumed by the Indian tribes toward the war should here be briefly noticed. In 1789 there were within the limits of the United States, including the Territories, less than 100,000 Indians. In 1838, by the extension of the territorial domain from the acquisition of Texas, New Mexico, Utah, and California, their number had increased to more than 400,000. In California alone, upon its accession, there were 100,000. In New Mexico the estimated number was upward of 50,000. In Texas there were nearly 30,000. In Utah there were 11,000. At the beginning of the war, the pressure of emigration westward for a score of years had driven all the great Indian tribes from the Mississippi to the Missouri. What was known as the Indian Territory then covered only a small area comparatively upon the map, and was hedged in on all sides by territories which had either already become states of the Republic, or would soon become such. This limited space had been given by the United States to the Indian tribes which had been driven across the Mississippi River. In Minnesota, Iowa, Oregon, and in the Territories, the Indians existed in great numbers indeed, but they were limited to certain reservations. The relation of the government to all the Indian tribes, and, if it could be retained, every thing else was left in the hands of the government.

The attitude assumed by the tribes toward the war should here be briefly noticed. In 1789 there were within the limits of the United States, which to speak of them, as they were somewhat nearly related to events in the Pacific. Without attributing the outbreak in August directly to the Rev. Mr. Robinson, a missionary to the Cheyennes, it may be added that the Indian tribes toward the war should here be briefly noticed. In 1789 there were within the limits of the United States, including the Territories, less than 100,000 Indians. In 1838, by the extension of the territorial domain from the acquisition of Texas, New Mexico, Utah, and California, their number had increased to more than 400,000. In California alone, upon its accession, there were 100,000. In New Mexico the estimated number was upward of 50,000. In Texas there were nearly 30,000. In Utah there were 11,000. At the beginning of the war, the pressure of emigration westward for a score of years had driven all the great Indian tribes from the Mississippi to the Missouri. What was known as the Indian Territory then covered only a small area comparatively upon the map, and was hedged in on all sides by territories which had either already become states of the Republic, or would soon become such. This limited space had been given by the United States to the Indian tribes which had been driven across the Mississippi River. In Minnesota, Iowa, Oregon, and in the Territories, the Indians existed in great numbers indeed, but they were limited to certain reservations. The relation of the government to all the Indian tribes, and, if it could be retained, every thing else was left in the hands of the government.

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Dorn to the command of the entire army exercised a wholesome influence. Soon after recovered by the First camp at Boston Mountains on the 2d of March. Price and McCulloch had the Second brigade. This movement was accomplished with good effect, to secure victory in the impending battle. The command of the trans-Missouri, with Osterhaus in the open field to the west. This was ordered

loch had promptly come to his support. Besides, the Confederacy, at this field to the left. Then the second brigade of Davis's division

manifested in the subsequent conduct of the war to attempt any serious disasters had resulted from the effort to protect the whole territory of the Confederacy, sea-board and inland, yet there was no disposition hold his own, and prevent Davis and Osterhaus from re-enforcing the right to the command, the trans-Missouri and the Indian Territory, as a line of defense. Here he awaited the attack of the enemy, which was made on Tuesday, the 6th of March. Colonels Jefferson C. Davis, acting as major general in command of the third division, held a position on Pea Creek, and Sigel, marching from Bentonville, occupied a position on the right of the Federal army. Once gained his position on the morrow. In regard to the

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A. Camp of General Curtis.—B. Route of Sigel from Bentonville.—C. Spot where McCulloch fell.—D. Taliesin of Tyler's Peak.

The day after the battle, the Confederate commander sent a burial party to General Curtis, under a flag of truce, to ask for the dead left upon the Smith corn-field near Fortvit. Upon the first outbreak of the war great numbers of the Southern troops had entered the state, and the actual strength on the Western frontier at that time was 68 forts and 1,800 men. These lines, requiring to be protected from the incursions of marauders, extend along the whole line of our enemy's frontier, from the dike opposite Forts McPherson and Fort Sam Houston, on the Gulf of California, via Los Angeles, Fillmore to Albuquerque, and from there to Forts Fillmore to Forts Whipple and Fort Tejon, and from the borders of the white settlements, to the line of the Blue, which is the boundary between the United States and Mexico.

The battery was speedily captured and captured, and the actual strength on the border of the Terrible sets was 68 forts and 1,800 men. These lines, requiring to be protected from the incursions of marauders, extend along the whole line of our enemy's frontier, from the dike opposite Forts McPherson and Fort Sam Houston, on the Gulf of California, via Los Angeles, Fillmore to Albuquerque, and from there to Forts Fillmore to Forts Whipple and Fort Tejon, and from the borders of the white settlements, to the line of the Blue, which is the boundary between the United States and Mexico.

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er sent to Texas by the State Convention of Alabama, said that secession would involve civil war and the ruin of our institutions, if not liberty itself. He was opposed to the confederation of Texas with the other Southern states, and favored her setting up for herself. The Convention insisted upon its organization in the name of the Confederacy, assuming the title of military governor. General Twiggs, who was preparing a military expedition for the complete conquest of New Mexico, issued a proclamation taking possession of the Territory of that name, and all citizens of the latter states were warned to leave Texas within the prescribed term, or be deemed traitors. The Convention passed an act declaring all persons refusing to comply with this demand, their chairs were declared vacant. In two months the Confederates had seized without a struggle. Forts Breckinridge and Buchanan were surrendered less than 1000 men. On the 8th of September, however, General Sibley, who was preparing a military expedition for the complete conquest of New Mexico, issued a proclamation taking possession of the Territory in the name of the Confederacy, assuming the title of military governor. Soon after Fort Stanton was abandoned, thus throwing into the hands of the revolutionists property valued at nearly half a million of dollars. Fort Craig was also abandoned. Mesilla became the military capital of Arizona. General Albert Sidney Johnston received from Governor Baylor the command of the Confederate forces in the Territory, which at this time numbered about 4000. On the 1st of November, 1861, there were nineteen regiments in the field, of which 8000 men under his command. Three days later a convention met at Monterey and received a sword from Congress. As a reward for his disgrace- }

er on parole. The escapee sentenced to prison for the state of Texas, from her geographical position, became the natural base for operations against New Mexico.1 The troops designed for the campaign in that country consisted, in November, of three regiments, organized into a brigade under the command of Brigadier General W. H. Sibley. During the previous summer the Confederates had moved into New Mexico. In the mean time the small Federal force left in New Mexico was weakened, numbering about 450 men, started over the mountains eastward to Fort Craig, which was located near Valverde, on the Rio Grande. While they were moving in that direction, General Sibley, with nearly 800 men under his command, was preparing a military expedition for the complete conquest of New Mexico, issued a proclamation taking possession of the Territory in the name of the Confederacy, assuming the title of military governor. Soon after Fort Stanton was abandoned, thus throwing into the hands of the revolutionists property valued at nearly half a million of dollars. Fort Craig was also abandoned. Mesilla became the military capital of Arizona. General Albert Sidney Johnston received from Governor Baylor the command of the Confederate forces in the Territory, which at this time numbered about 4000. On the 1st of November, 1861, there were nineteen regiments in the field, of which 8000 men under his command. Three days later a convention met at Monterey and received a sword from Congress. As a reward for his disgrace-
impossible for the enemy to advance through the sand-hills on the east side of the river. In truth, General Sibley, by crossing, had placed his army in an unfavorable situation, as here his was deficient in water, which could only be obtained by gaining a point above the fort. The Confederates crossed on the 29th. The day before, Canby had ordered his regulars—the Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Infantry—together with Colonel Kit Carson’s and Pino’s regiments—also to cross the river and occupy an elevation opposite to and commanding Fort Craig. On the 30th he sent across some cavalry and artillery to cover the infantry. An engagement followed, which was confined to the artillery, but in the course of which Pino’s regiment became demoralized, and the entire force had to be withdrawn to the fort.

The Confederates were without water all day, and their animals, suffering extremely from fatigue, became completely broken down that the wagons could not be moved. It was now of the utmost importance that a Federal force should cut off the approach of the enemy to the river at Valverde, where was the only supply of water in the vicinity. For this purpose, the regulars with Carson’s regiment, some cavalry, and two batteries, were moved up the west bank in that direction, but, upon arriving at their destination, it was found that the Confederates had already anticipated them. The batteries were opened upon the enemy, compelling his retreat with considerable loss. The Federals crossed to the east bank, and encountered the full strength of Sibley’s command, which now made a desperate stand, and there followed the action known as the battle of Valverde.

Colonel Canby came upon the field at noon with Pino’s regiment of New Mexican, which had occasioned so much disorder on the previous day. The forces engaged on both sides were nearly equal, in either case amounting a little over 1500 men. The earlier part of the battle was little more than an artillery duel. The two Federal batteries were situated, one of them, Lieutenant Hall’s, on the right, and the other, Captain McRae’s, on the left. The latter, about two P.M., was advanced toward a wood which covered the enemy’s right. A furious charge was made by the Texans, under Captain Lang, against this battery. His regiment was thinned at every step by a transport having on board Colonel Fitch’s Indiana regiment, moved up forces engaged on both sides were nearly equal, in either case amounting to the west bank in that direction, but, upon arriving at their destination, it was found that the Confederates had already anticipated them. The batteries were opened upon the enemy, compelling his retreat with considerable loss. The Federals crossed to the east bank, and encountered the full strength of Sibley’s command, which now made a desperate stand, and there followed the action known as the battle of Valverde.

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Not being in a condition to assault Fort Craig, General Sibley moved northward against Albuquerque and Santa Fé, which were evacuated by the Federals. Almo the same time, Tucson, near the southern border of the Territory, was occupied by a band of roving guerrillas under Captain Hunter. From this point Hunter advanced toward Fort Craig, turned the town, and even threatened Fort Yuma, on the California boundary. The hostile Indians united with the Confederates, and the whole Territory, with the exception of the strong forts held by the Federal troops, was devoted to roving and marauding.

General Canby, in March, was able to make the offensive. After successful skirmishes with the Confederates between Batesville and Little Rock, on the Arkansas, was a distance of nearly eighty miles. This latter point, the capital of the state, was the object of the Federal advance. As Curtis moved in that direction, there was great excitement in the capital. Governor Rector, on the one hand, upbraided the Confederate government for having made no provision for the defense of the state, while, on the other, he frantically appealed to the Missourians and Texans to come to the rescue. He said: "It was for liberty that Arkansas struck, and not for subordination to any sectional party, north or south. Her best friends are her natural allies, nearest at home, who will pulsate when she bleeds, whose utmost hope is not beyond her existence. If the arteries of the Confederate heart do not permeate beyond the east bank of the Mississippi, let Southern Missourians, Arkansians, Texans, and the great West know it and prepare for the future. Arkansas lost, abandoned, subjugated, is not Arkansas as she entered the Federal government; nor will she remain Arkansas, a Confederate state, desolated as a wilderness. Her children, fleeing from the wrath to come, will build them a new ark, and launch on new waters, seeking a haven somewhere of equality, safety, and rest."

But the governor does not appear to have rallied about him any formidable forces of resistance. He soon took a hasty departure from the capital, and the executive government passed over to the martial authorities. The pressing need of men in Tennessee had depleted the Confederate armies of the Southwestern almost to the last extremity of weakness. But, on the other hand, the importance of the Tennessee campaign to the Federal cause also reduced Curtis’s army to such an extent that he was forced to abandon the campaign against Little Rock. Thus there occurred a lull in the trans-Mississippi campaign, which was only partially disturbed by frequent military expeditions. The principal one of these was that undertaken in June, after the capture of Memphis, in the White River. The object of this expedition was to open communication with the army of General Curtis. Four gunboats—the St. Louis, Mount Clem, Lexington, and Conestoga—accompanied by a transport having on board Colonel Fitch’s Indiana regiment, moved up the river toward St. Charles. The Mound City led, and, as it approached St. Charles, received the fire of two concealed batteries. The troops from

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1 At the close of the official report of his operations in New Mexico, General Sibley says: "In concluding this report, it is proper that I should express my deep sense of the great West known as the conquest of the hostile Apaches."

2 It is well known that the Territory of New Mexico is not worth one quarter, except for its political geographical position, the Territory of New Mexico is not worth one quarter as a field of military operations. To lose a single element, except in the multiplicity of its defensive positions. The indispensable ele-
on the north side. At Batesville there were 2000, under McRide. Holmes held Little Rock itself with 2000 men. Farther down the river, near Pine Bluff, Roan had 5000. Rains held the northwestern part of the state with four or five thousand. Between these scattered detachments and the Federal forces there was an occasional encounter of arms. Sometimes the Confederates would group together in small detachments, and, marching into Missouri, would there unite with irregular banditti for the purposes of plunder or guerrilla warfare. When Curtis assumed command of the department, an army, styled the "Army of the Frontier," was organized under General John M. Schofield, whose object was to subdue guerrilla bands, and generally to cooperate with the other forces in the trans-Mississippi district. Just at the close of October, a portion of this army, under Generals Herron and Totten, and numbering six or seven thousand men, came into collision with the Confederates in Southwestern Arkansas. The battle was fought near Fayetteville Hollows, a few miles north of Boston Mountains. Totten, with the main column, advanced from Osage Springs, while Herron, with another column, started from Cross Hollows, with the design of striking the flank of the enemy, who was thought to be in the vicinity of Fayetteville, seventeen miles distant. Herron had a force of less than a thousand men, made up chiefly of cavalry, imperfectly equipped. It turned out that this force had alone to contend with a much superior force of Texan Rangers; but, notwithstanding the disparity of numbers, the enemy was driven four miles. In the same vicinity, just one month later (November 25, 1862), there was a small skirmish at Cane Hill, between three Federal brigades, under General James G. Blunt, and a force of Confederates, made up of Marmaduke's men, considerably re-enforced by guerrillas. This also resulted favorably to the Federals.

A few days afterward there was a more stubbornly contested action at Prairie Grove, a short distance northwest of Cane Hill. After the battle of Cane Hill, General Blunt had held the country in the immediate vicinity of the battle-field, that being the great wheat and corn growing district of the state. The Confederate forces were strongly re-enforced by bringing up the several detachments scattered over the state, and were commanded by General Hindman. These forces may be roughly estimated at 15,000. Hindman, with great promptness, advanced northward to cut General Blunt off from his communications. Blunt, at the first notice of this movement, sent for General Herron, who was at Wilson's Creek with the second and third divisions of Schofield's army. Herron moved at the instant, and in three days had marched over a hundred miles. In the mean while Blunt remained at Cane Hill, and the enemy slipped by him on his flank, thus gaining a position which, while it was strong against either Blunt or Herron, also enabled him to prevent their conjunction. It was, however, a position favorable to the Federal generals on the simple condition of the ability of both to participate in the critical battle.

On the morning of December 7 Herron had reached Fayetteville, and, resting for an hour, pressed on along the road from that place southward. Up to the previous night he had kept up communication with Blunt, but that was now broken off, for Hindman was planted between them, and hoped to fight them in succession. It was Sunday morning; "a more beautiful morning or a grander sunrise," says Herron, "I never beheld;" but it inaugurated a day of bloody, terrible battle. Herron had sent 3000 cavalry to Blunt's support, and now his own need of such a force was most urgent. Part of his infantry and artillery must be detailed to guard his train of 400 wagons, leaving him, at his own estimate, only 4000 available men. As he came out on the prairie by the mountain road seven miles south of Fayetteville, the Arkansas cavalry, which had the advance, came "dashing back in great disorder." His army and Hindman's had met, having, as a newspaper
correspondent remarked, run together like two locomotives. Hindman's advance was pushed back on his main lines, which were found posted on a long ridge by a creek, and in Herron's immediate front. The Federal commander decided to attack, trusting that Blunt, who could not be more than ten miles away, would hear the booming of artillery, and attack in time to decide the contest in his favor. By ten o'clock the crossing began under cover of several batteries. Herron was fortunate in his artillery, as also in the superior discipline of his command. The contest went on fiercely on his left. A battery of the enemy, strongly posted on a hill, was captured, and then the position had to be abandoned. A counter-charge was ordered, but the Confederates could not stand up in the face of Herron's guns. Here, with varying fortune, the fighting was kept up till long after noon, and as with terrible effect against the Federal artillery had been worked with promptness and accuracy, and the Federals could not stand up in the face of Herron's guns. Here, with varying fortune, the fighting was kept up till long after noon, and as with terrible effect against the Federal artillery had been worked with promptness and accuracy, and...
ished with death. No arrests were made except upon definite and substantial charges. No slaves were taken from their masters except in cases where the latter were disloyal, and had used their slaves, or permitted them to be used for disloyal purposes. No fugitive slaves were admitted into his camps. Martial law was strictly enforced. All civil authorities attempting to interfere with the execution of any order from the head-quarters of General Halleck were arrested and punished. An order was issued requiring all publishers of newspapers, those of St. Louis excepted, to furnish General Halleck a copy of each issue for inspection, under penalty of having their papers suppressed. The officers of mercantile associations were required to take the oath of allegiance to the Federal government. The president and faculty of the University of Missouri, and the officers of all the railroad companies in the state, were required to take the oath. Lawyers were not allowed to practice before submitting to the oath. The oath of allegiance was made the test of the privilege of suffrage at elections. Citizens who, as such, engaged in acts of hostility, were treated with marked severity. The arrest and trial of some persons apprehended for destroying railroad bridges and other property became the occasion of a correspondence, in which General Price insisted that these men should be treated as prisoners of war. General Halleck replied that no orders of General Price could save from punishment spies, marauders, and incendiaries; that if armed forces in the garb of soldiers, and duly organized as legitimate belligerents, destroyed railroad bridges as a military act, they would be treated as prisoners of war; but that soldiers in the garb of citizens must suffer the usual penalties inflicted upon citizens for their crimes. In accordance with this response, eight persons, who were convicted of the crime of destroying the railroad bridges, were shot in the month of February, 1862. After the Federal victories in Tennessee, and the expulsion of Price from the southern border of the state, the military regulations hitherto in force were somewhat relaxed. During the remaining portion of General Halleck’s career the disturbance from guerrillas was inconsiderable. General Schofield assumed the command of the department June 1, 1862, which position he resigned in September to General Curtis.

While Grant and Buell were preparing for an advance southward from Nashville, and Curtis was carrying on his campaign west of the Mississippi, General Pope and Commodore Foote moved upon the enemy’s works at New Madrid and Island No. 10. The conflict on either side of the river was not more important than that for the possession of the river itself. Columbus had to be surrendered as the consequence of the capture of Donelson, but the new positions occupied by the Confederates at Island No. 10 and New Madrid were southward from Columbus only from twenty-five to thirty-five miles. The enemy determined to fall back step by step, in this way preventing the Federal gun-boats from establishing a connection with Farragut’s fleet at the mouth of the river.
Island No. 10 is situated in a bend of the Mississippi, on the Tennessee border, and although ten miles above New Madrid on the river, is southwest of that place. New Madrid is on the Missouri shore. It was upon this island that the Confederates had erected their principal fortifications, which consisted of eleven earth-works, mounting seventy heavy guns. At New Madrid there was a bastioned earth-work mounting fourteen guns, and in the upper part of the town a battery of seven pieces. The line of intrenchments between the upper and lower work constituted the defense of the place. These works were occupied by five regiments of Confederate infantry, with several companies of artillery. In the river the enemy had also six gun-boats, carrying from four to eight guns. The Confederate General McCown commanded the troops holding New Madrid.

New Madrid, being below Island No. 10, and its possession cutting off that island from its natural communication southward, was the first to be attacked. General Pope appeared before the town on the 8th of March, but had no heavy artillery, and no means of contending with the naval force in the river. While awaiting the arrival of his large guns, he posted a battery at Point Pleasant, twelve miles below, thus cutting off McCown from re-enforcements and supplies from the South. This battery had, of course, to be mounted with small guns, and, as a protection against the heavier artillery of the Confederate gun-boats, the guns were placed in sunk batteries, between the rifle-pits, which afforded protection to a thousand soldiers. Thus invested on the south side, McCown drew re-enforcements from the island. The number of his command was nearly doubled, and three additional gun-boats increased the naval force, which was under the command of Commodore Hollins.

After waiting over a week, Pope received his siege guns from Cairo, which were, on the night of the 12th, placed within 800 yards of the enemy's main fortification, commanding the work and the river above it. At daylight the batteries were opened, and the fire of four heavy guns, placed upon the gun-boats with such effect as to disable some of them; also three guns in the enemy's land-works were dismounted. The only impression made by the Confederate batteries on Pope's lines was in the injury done to one gun, attended by the wounding of eight men, and in the loss of three men in an Ohio regiment. The result of the day's operations convinced the Confederate commander that it was useless to attempt further resistance at that point, for General Pope was already about to cut off the line of retreat. McCown therefore abandoned New Madrid on the night of the 13th, leaving his dead unburied, and all his stores and ammunition, and even the knapsacks of his soldiers, and fell back upon the island. In regard to the military property abandoned by the enemy, the testimony of General Pope is that it included "all their artillery, field batteries, and siege guns, amounting to thirty-three pieces, magazines full of fixed ammunition of the best character, several thousand stand of inferior small-arms, with hundreds of boxes of musket cartridges, tents for an array of 10,000 men, etc." Untouched supper, candles left burning in the tents, and the general appearance of the encampment, indicated that the retreat had been effected with unceremonious haste.

The Confederate force was now concentrated on the island. General Pope's occupation of New Madrid secured a perfect blockade of the river, and the defenders of Island No. 10 were too far removed from the main army under Johnston to receive any help from that source. The island, moreover, was not a good defensive position. It is flat, and commanded by the high ground on the left bank of the river. Its defenses had been constructed under the superintendence of General Beauregard, who, at the last moment, on the 5th of April, turned the command over to General McCall.

On the 14th of March, the day of the capture of New Madrid, Commodore Foote moved from Cairo with an armament consisting of eight gun-boats, all iron-clad except the Conestoga, and ten mortar boats, lashed to steamers. Two regiments of infantry accompanied the expedition, which reached a point about four miles above Island No. 10 on the morning of the 15th. The next day a bombardment commenced, which reached a point about four miles above Island No. 10. The great point to be gained was the rear of the fortifications, which Beauregard had erected on the high ground commanding the island. To
THE GUN-BOAT FLEET DROPPING DOWN STREAM TO RECONNOITRE.

STEAMERS TOWING MORTAR-BOATS INTO POSITION.

OPERATIONS AGAINST ISLAND NO. 10—BOMBARDMENT FROM THE MORTAR BOATS.