

SAMUEL R. CURTIS.

CHAPTER XVI.

FROM DONELSON TO VICKSBURG.—THE TRANS-MISSISSIPPI CAMPAIGN OF 1862.

Price's Retreat from Springfield.—General Samuel R. Curtis.—Federal Occupation of Springfield and Advance into Arkansas.—The Indian Tribes West of the Mississippi; the Sioux War; Albert Pike's Intrigues.—Battle of Pea Ridge.—The Barbarities of War.—Operations in New Mexico.—Arizona; its social Organization; Hostility of the Apaches.—Resumé of the revolutionary Proceedings in Arkansas and Texas in 1861; Seizure of Arsenal at Little Rock; Meeting in Austin, Texas, in 1860; Governor Houston's Career; General Twiggs's Surrender; Confederate Forces in Texas at the Beginning of the War.—Sibley's Invasion of New Mexico.—John R. Baylor.—Colonel Canby's Defense of Fort Craig; Battle of Valverde.—Retreat of Sibley to Texas.—Curtis's Operations in Arkansas after the Battle of Pea Ridge; Advance on Little Rock; Governor Rector; Expedition up White River; Change of Base from Batesville to Helena.—Confederate Forces in Arkansas in the Autumn of 1862.—Guerrilla Operations.—Battles at Cane Hill and Prairie Grove.—The political Situation in Missouri; General Halleck's Policy.—Capture of New Madrid and Island No. 10.

IN this and the subsequent chapter we purpose to follow the course of military events in the West from the capture of Fort Donelson down to the Vicksburg campaign. This will bring the history of the war in the West down to the close of 1862. The events narrated are naturally grouped under two separate departments. To the first belong the military operations west of the Mississippi; to the second, the operations along the Mississippi and Tennessee Rivers—including the battle of Shiloh, the capture of Memphis, and the advance into Mississippi—and General Buell's and Rosecrans's campaigns in Kentucky and Tennessee.

These campaigns, even if we confine ourselves to the immediate field of active operations, disregarding the distant military centres from which instructions were issued and whence supplies were obtained, covered an area of nearly 100,000 square miles. The battle of Pea Ridge was fought on the very confines of civilization, at a point 500 miles distant from the line of General Bragg's march into Kentucky. From New Madrid to the mouth of the Arkansas was more than 200 miles in a straight line; from the latter point to St. Louis was more than 300; and yet this field, so wide in extent, was but a part of the theatre of war. General Halleck's and Buell's forces were the right wing only of the Federal army, separated from the left, indeed, by nearly a thousand miles, and by the wild and tortuous ranges of the Alleghanies, but still co-operating with it as effectually as if there had been no such vast interval of space between.


At the close of 1861 General Price had fixed his head-quarters at Springfield, in the southwestern part of Missouri. At that time, of the four lines of railroad in the state starting from

St. Louis, the two proceeding westward were entirely under Federal control. A portion of the lines to Springfield and to Ironton were in the hands of the Confederates. The situation of Price's army was not favorable for an offensive movement, but by retaining it during the winter he had gained a good supply of clothing for his troops and about 4000 fresh recruits from the state. He did not even regard his position as tenable. When, in the latter part of January, General Samuel R. Curtis advanced along the line of the railroad to Rolla and then to Lebanon, Price began to retreat toward Arkansas.

General Curtis, to whom General Halleck had given the command of the army in the field, was a native of Ohio, and at the time of which we are writing was fifty-five years of age. He had studied at West Point, and received an appointment in the army, but in 1832 had resigned his commission, and devoted himself to law and afterward to engineering. He fought under General Taylor in Mexico with the rank of colonel, was appointed military governor of Monterey and of other places occupied by the United States troops, and in these positions had developed a good degree of administrative ability. Subsequently he took a prominent part in the construction of railroads in the West. From Keokuk, in Iowa, he was elected to Congress in 1858 and again in 1860, but at the beginning of the war he resigned his seat in order to participate in the great struggle. He accompanied the New York Seventh from Philadelphia to Washington, and was made an honorary member of that regiment. He then went back to Iowa, superintended the earliest organization of troops in that state, and from the skirmish at Booneville was engaged in the war in Missouri under the conduct of General Lyon. He was at first colonel of the Second Iowa, but was soon made brigadier general of volunteers. He served under General Fremont, and afterward under General Halleck. The latter, upon the withdrawal of General Price to Springfield, gave General Curtis the command in the southwestern part of the state. The army committed to his hands was organized into four divisions, under Generals Sigel, Asboth, and Davis, and Colonel Carr. It was chiefly made up of troops from Missouri and Illinois. There were also some Indiana and Iowa regiments, and a battery from Ohio.

This army moved from Lebanon February 11th, and on the 14th General Halleck telegraphed to Washington that the Union flag then floated over the court-house in Springfield; that, after a short engagement, Price had retreated, leaving behind a large amount of stores and equipments, and that Curtis's cavalry were in close pursuit. The fact that Price had abandoned his sick, amounting to about 600 men, proves that that general scarcely anticipated the Federal advance. He had waited, however, till the last moment, expecting re-enforcements from the Confederate army in Arkansas. This gave General Curtis a great advantage; for, although Price was undisturbed in his retreat to Cassville, he was obliged from that point to keep up a running fight for four days, until he reached Cross Hollows in Arkansas. From this position he was soon driven fifty miles southward to the line of Boston Mountains, leaving behind him again his sick and most of his stores. Indeed, General Curtis's commissary had been mostly supplied by stores captured from the enemy during his march southward from Springfield. A large number of recruits were captured on their way from Missouri to join Price's army. Among these was Brigadier General Edward Price, son of the Confederate commander.

General Halleck kept up a series of dispatches to Washington of the most encouraging nature. Four days after he had announced that the Union flag floated over the Springfield court-house, he notified to General McClellan the fact that it was also floating in Arkansas. He added that Price had been driven several miles across the Arkansas line, that his rear was being cut up, and that stores and prisoners were being captured from him hourly. The country, wild with excitement over the capture of Donelson, accepted these dispatches as certain indications of victory already obtained by the Army



MAP OF THE WEST OF WAR IN MISSOURI.

of the Southwest. In fact, not only had nothing decisive been accomplished by that army, but it was daily being drawn into a perilous situation. The danger was not chiefly in its distance from a military base, but in its inferiority in numbers to the force which was being gathered against it. All along his line of advance—at Rolla, at Lebanon, at Springfield, and at Cassville—Curtis had weakened his force by leaving detachments to guard his communications, and could not, therefore, bring into the field more than ten or twelve thousand men, while the available force of the enemy was nearly twice that number, without counting the Indian allies of the Confederates. Situated just south of the border line between Arkansas and Missouri, and flanked on the west by the Indian Territory, the field of the proposed contest was the one which would have been selected of all others as the most favorable for the concentration of Price's, McCulloch's, and the Indian forces. Yet General Halleck's confidence in the Army of the Southwest was not wholly without justification. A good portion of General Curtis's force had bravely met the enemy at Carthage, at Wilson's Creek, and in subsequent battles, and even when opposed to superior numbers had dealt very effective blows. The Confederate army, too, was badly armed and weak in artillery.


The attitude assumed by the Indian tribes toward the war should here be briefly noticed. In 1789 there were within the limits of the United States, including the Territories, less than 100,000 Indians. In 1853, by the extension of the territorial domain from the acquisition of Texas, New Mexico, Utah, and California, their number had increased to more than 400,000. In California alone, upon its accession, there were 100,000. In New Mexico the estimated number was upward of 50,000. In Texas there were nearly 30,000. In Utah there were 11,000. At the beginning of the war, the pressure of emigration westward for a score of years had driven all the great Indian tribes west of the Mississippi. What was known as the Indian Territory then covered only a small area comparatively upon the map, and was hedged in on all sides by territories which had either already become states of the Republic, or would soon become such. This limited space had been given by the United States to the Indian tribes which had been driven across the Mississippi. Elsewhere, in Minnesota, Iowa, Oregon, and in the Territories, the Indians existed in great numbers indeed, but they were limited to certain reservations. The relation of the government to all the Indian tribes in the West had been peculiar. The policy pursued regarded the permanent interest of the white man alone, while it bestowed temporary indulgences upon the red man. Every thing else was left in the hands of the missionaries, who exercised a favorable influence upon this rapidly declining



INDIAN SQUAWS WINNOWING WHEAT.

race. It was unfortunate, however, that the patronage which the government bestowed upon the Indians was frequently dispensed through agents who took many opportunities to defraud the beneficiaries. This, and the natural antipathy against the white man which it is almost impossible to eradicate from the Indian blood, led, finally, in the summer of 1862, to an outbreak of hostilities even among the tribes as far north as Minnesota. The Sioux Indians in that state, numbering about 1200 warriors, suddenly, in the month of August, attacked the settlements of the whites, and began a series of massacres, unrivaled in their horrible details except by the former outrages perpetrated by the same race upon the infant colonial settlements of the Eastern States. The only premonition of this terrible event had been a rumor which prevailed in the spring and early summer that the Indian tribes of Utah, Colorado, Dacotah, and Western Nebraska were making preparations to ravage the Territories and frontier states. It was given out that Confederate emissaries had been among them, instigating them to revolt. This rumor, taking so general a shape, and being, moreover, the natural product of an excited imagination, appears to have had no practical effect. It aroused no serious suspicions in the minds of the settlers, although it led the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to publish an advertisement warning the public of the dangers likely to be encountered by travelers on the overland route to the Pacific. Without attributing the outbreak in August directly to Confederate agencies, it is yet quite certain that the distraction of the country by civil war led the ignorant Sioux to hope for success in an undertaking upon which in more tranquil times they would scarcely have ventured. Apart from the first success of the marauders not much was effected by them. The loss of life was estimated in round numbers at 800, and that

of property at between two and three millions of dollars. A few companies of troops under Colonel H. H. Sibley, afterward promoted to a generalship,



INDIAN CAMP CAPTURED BY COLONEL SIBLEY.

soon quelled the insurrection. In giving these details of the Sioux War we have anticipated in regard to time, but this seemed the most fitting place in which to speak of them, as they were somewhat nearly related to events which had been going on during the few previous months among the tribes farther south upon the Confederate border. In the summer of 1861 Albert Pike had been among these tribes acting as "commissioner of the Confederate States to the Indian nations and tribes west of Arkansas." Here, on the 12th of August, he had entered into a treaty with the Camanches, according to the terms of which that nation agreed to settle upon reserves claimed to have been leased by the Confederates from the Choctaws and Chickasaws, in the southern portion of the Indian Territory, namely, that portion included between the Red and Canadian Rivers; in return for which agreement the Camanches were to be under Confederate protection, in token of which Albert Pike gave their chiefs letters of safeguard.¹ Other tribes than the Camanches were also decoyed from their allegiance to the Federal government. A few days before the above treaty was made, the Confederate government had been organized at Mesilla, in Arizona, under John R. Baylor as governor. This movement was undertaken in spite of, rather than by the assistance of the Indians of that Territory. The evacuation of Fort Stanton by the Federal troops on the 8th of August left the enemy in possession of property equal to \$300,000, including the fort, and there was not a single Federal soldier left within the limits of Arizona. The territory claimed to have been leased from the Choctaws and Chickasaws embraced an area of 23,437 square miles, or a little less than one fourth of the Indian Territory. If the Creeks, Seminoles, Osages, and Cherokees could also be alienated from the United States, the Confederacy would then have secured the entire Territory, having a population of nearly 72,000 souls. This country, with its 52,000,000 of acres, would add greatly to the resources of the Confederate government, and, if it could be retained, would become a valuable security for the payment of the vast debt which that government must incur in the course of the war. Its mountains were filled with iron and coal. The Red River ran along its southern border, and the Arkansas almost through its centre. Albert Pike spared no pains to secure this boon for the Confederacy. To some extent he succeeded in bringing over even the Cherokees to the side of his masters. On the 21st of August, a mass meeting, attended by about 4000 of that nation, at Tahlequah, declared their adherence to the Confederate cause. The proceedings of this Indian convention were transmitted by John Ross, the principal chief of the Cherokees, to General McCulloch.² The Rev. Mr. Robinson, a missionary to the Cherokees, also made a

¹ The following is a copy of the letters of safeguard:

"The Confederate States of America to all their officers, civil and military, and to all other persons to whom these presents shall come:

"The bearer of this is Bis-te-va-na, the principal chief of the Ya-pa-rih-ca band of the Ne-um, or Camanches of the Prairie, and those who accompany him are the head men of that band, all of whom have this day concluded and signed in behalf of the whole Ya-pa-rih-ca band articles of a convention of peace and friendship between that band and other bands of the Ne-um with us, and have thereby agreed to settle and live upon reserves in the country between the Red River and the Canadian, leased by us from the Choctaws and Chickasaws; and the said chief has also agreed to visit the other bands of the Ne-um, not parties to the same convention, and now on the Staked Plain or elsewhere, and persuade them also to settle upon reserves in the same country.

"We have accordingly taken the said chief and the said head men, and all other persons of both sexes and all ages, of the said Ya-pa-rih-ca band, from this day forward under our protection, until they shall for just cause forfeit the same, and that forfeiture be declared by us; and we have therefore granted, and do grant to them and to each of them, these our

"LETTERS OF SAFEGUARD

for their protection, and to avail each and all of them as far as our authority and jurisdiction extends.

"You are therefore hereby charged to respect these letters, and give all the said persons protection and safe-conduct; and any infraction by any of you of this safeguard will be visited by us with all the penalties due to those who violate the public faith and dishonor the Confederacy.

"In testimony whereof, Albert Pike, commissioner of the Confederate States to all the Indian [SEAL.] nations and tribes west of those states, doth hereunto set his hand and affix the seal of his arms.

"Done and granted at the agency of the Confederate States for the Camanches, Wichitas, and other bands of Indians near the False Wichita River, in the leased country aforesaid, this twelfth day of August, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one.

"ALBERT PIKE,

"Commissioner of the Confederate States to the Indian nations and tribes west of Arkansas.

"Countersigned,

WM. QUEENSBURY,

"Secretary to the Commissioner."

² The following is a copy of John Ross's letter:

"Executive Department, Park Hill, Cherokee Nation, August 24, 1861.

"TO MAJOR CLARK, ASS'T QUARTERMASTER, C. S. A.:
"SIR,—I herewith forward to your care dispatches for General McCulloch, C. S. Army, which I have the honor to request you will cause to be forwarded to him by the earliest express.

"At a mass meeting of about 4000 Cherokees at Tahlequah, on the 21st instant, the Cherokees, with marked unanimity, declared their adherence to the Confederate States, and have given their authorities power to negotiate an alliance with them.

"In view of this action, a regiment of mounted men will be immediately raised and placed under the command of Colonel John Drew, to meet any exigency that may arise.

"Having espoused the cause of the Confederate States, we hope to render efficient service in the protracted war which now threatens the country, and to be treated with a liberality and confidence becoming the Confederate States.

"I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your humble servant, JOHN ROSS,
"Principal chief of the Cherokee nation."

report of the affair to the Federal government. He stated that the Confederate commissioner had assumed the payment of the annuities hitherto received by the Cherokees from the national government. This was not a mere paper treaty. The Cherokees followed up the convention with active preparations to defend themselves and to assist their new ally. A home guard of 1200 men was formed. The Creeks, also, had raised a thousand men for service in the Confederate army. It is probable that in these movements the Cherokees, Creeks, and Camanches were led by the same motives which in that very month the next year led the Sioux Indians to revolt. There was the same natural antipathy to the white man, mingled with a sentiment of revenge for past wrongs, real or imagined, and the same ignorant belief that the fortunes of the republic were declining, while the star of the Confederacy was in the ascendant. There was this difference, however. The Indians farther south very naturally considered that their immediate, if not their future destiny must be linked with that of the Confederacy, which was now opposing a very bold front against the national armies. All the Indian tribes, moreover, were doubtless gratified by the spectacle that was being afforded them of millions of white men pitted, army against army, in fraternal strife, and were willing, so far as possible, to add fuel to the fire of rebellion. They never proved an ally of much consequence to the Confederates, who had an eye rather to their territory than to their services in the field. The Indian troops which were raised were placed under the command of Albert Pike, who received as the reward of his labors the rank of brigadier general in the Confederate army.

Although Mr. Davis, in his message to the Confederate Congress, had declared that the events of the previous year had demonstrated that the government had attempted more than it had power successfully to achieve, and that serious disasters had resulted from the effort to protect the whole territory of the Confederacy, sea-board and inland, yet there was no disposition manifested in the subsequent conduct of the war to attempt any thing less. Certainly no such disposition was shown west of the Mississippi. If Price had been retreating, it was only because of the military advantages to be gained by retreat. Indeed, he would have remained at Springfield if McCulloch had promptly come to his support. Besides, the Confederacy, at this time, was intent upon holding the power which it had gained over the Indian country on its border, and which would have to be given up if its Western army should fall back far from that border. Every effort was now made to secure victory in the impending battle. The command of the trans-Mississippi Department was given to General Earl Van Dorn, who reached the camp at Boston Mountains on the 2d of March. Price and McCulloch had been at loggerheads in previous campaigns, and this appointment of Van Dorn to the command of the entire army exercised a wholesome influence.

General Curtis selected Sugar Creek, on the confines of Missouri, Arkansas, and the Indian Territory, as a line of defense. Here he awaited the attack of the enemy, which was made on Thursday, the 6th of March. Colonel Jefferson C. Davis, acting as major general in command of the third division, held a position on Pea Ridge, north of the creek, commanding the Fayetteville road, one brigade on the right of the road, the other on the left. Two batteries, one of six and another of four guns, covered the approach, and one of them commanded the valley to the eastward and westward. Sigel's two divisions were seven miles south of the creek, at Bentonville. Carr's division held the eastern part of the ridge. This ridge, from which the battle receives its name, extends along the north bank of Sugar Creek, and is broken toward the north by gradual slopes, with an occasional ravine. From the position occupied by the army to the Missouri line was nearly eight miles. Two roads traverse the ridge, one from Bentonville, another from Fayetteville, and converge toward Keetsville. As the Missouri line is approached, these roads pass through a narrow valley, and are lined on either side by steep and continuous ranges of hills. Midway between the roads as they strike the ridge is Leetown, near the creek; on the road from Fayetteville, and northeast of Leetown, was Elk-horn Tavern. From this tavern the Confederates designated the action as the battle of Elk Horn. To the northwest of Leetown an extensive ravine, known as Cross-timber Hollow, crossed the Bentonville road. The camp was protected in the rear by a thick oak scrubbery, which extended to the road on the west. Beyond this was an open field, bounded on the right by a range of hills near Elk-horn Tavern.

On the 5th, General Sigel, at Bentonville, was apprised of the enemy's approach through a scout, and also by a message from General Curtis, which conveyed similar tidings, and ordered his return to Sugar Creek. He promptly dispatched his train of 200 wagons northward, protected by a rear-guard. This guard, consisting of the Thirty-sixth Illinois and part of the Second Missouri, was attacked the next day by greatly superior numbers, and surrounded. But Sigel had remained behind, and succeeded in bringing off his men with an inconsiderable loss. He joined Curtis on the afternoon of Thursday.

Van Dorn had begun to advance on Tuesday. With General Pike's Indian division, his numbers probably did not fall short of 20,000 men. In the newspaper reports of the time they were estimated at from twenty-five to thirty thousand.¹ His march was by way of Fayetteville and Bentonville. Sending only a small force to demonstrate in Curtis's front, his plan was to make a detour to the westward, turning the Federal right, and, if possible, to gain the defile in Curtis's rear. But for Sigel's admirable skill in his retreat from Bentonville, by which he availed himself of the advantages which the nature of the ground afforded for the use of artillery against the enemy, he must have been cut off, his trains captured, and the whole Federal army

placed in a position of great peril. He, however, accomplished a junction with the main army near the western edge of Pea Ridge. Van Dorn had, on the night of the 6th, gained the rear of the Federal army, with Price on his left, fronting southward, and McCulloch on the right nearly opposite Sigel. The position taken by the Confederates compelled General Curtis to change front, after he had been all day engaged in obstructing the approach on the south side. The new line thus formed was at right angles to the one previously occupied, and extended from Sugar Creek to Cross-timber Hollow. Davis held the centre, Sigel the left, and Carr the right.

The battle of Pea Ridge opened on Friday morning, Van Dorn, concentrated against the Federal right, bearing down heavily upon Carr's division. Curtis, also, had so distributed his force that, while he had three divisions on his right—Carr's, Davis's, and Asboth's—only Osterhaus's division had been left to Sigel. McCulloch endeavored early in the day to move eastward, so as to co-operate with Price and Van Dorn, and thus the action became general. Osterhaus's division, with two of Davis's regiments, moved out a mile beyond Leetown. Three pieces of flying artillery were sent in advance, supported by the Third Iowa Cavalry. This was to delay the movements of the enemy until Osterhaus could come up. But the cavalry and artillery were swept back from the field like chaff before the wind. Farther to the right, Carr was also being driven back toward Elk-horn Tavern. The low brushwood and numerous hollows and ravines afforded shelter to the Confederate troops as they advanced, and enabled them to engage the Federals at close quarters, where their shot-guns, loaded with buck-shot, were more than a match for the best long-range rifle.


The enemy was pressing closely up to the road, which was the only possible avenue of retreat to the Federal army. Once gained in force by Van Dorn, and the day would be lost to the Federals if only McCulloch should hold his own, and prevent Davis and Osterhaus from re-enforcing the right. The battle going on between Leetown and Elk-horn Tavern must decide the event. When the Third Iowa Cavalry had been driven back, and the forces of McCulloch had reached the cover of the brushwood beyond Leetown, Colonel Osterhaus came up and engaged the enemy in a large open field to the left. Then the second brigade of Davis's division was sent in on the right, but was soon driven back. The enemy had gathered in large force on this part of the field. Here were now several thousand of McCulloch's men, supported by a large body of Indians. Davis's First brigade was with Osterhaus in the open field to the west. This was ordered to change its front and attack in the rear that portion of the enemy which was pressing the Second brigade. This movement was accomplished with good effect, though not until the Second brigade had lost some of its guns, which were soon after recovered by the First. The success of the sortie made by Davis's First brigade allowed the Second an opportunity to recover itself, and the enemy was driven from this part of the field, leaving behind him his killed and wounded. Among the former were General McCulloch and General McIntosh, his second in command. Then two regiments of Sigel's command re-enforced Davis, and were sent in on the right to support Carr. The desperate fight on the left centre had saved the day. Price's men had by night reached the Fayetteville road in Curtis's rear, and Van Dorn made Elk-horn Tavern his head-quarters. But, though victorious on his left, the enemy had been badly defeated on his right, and it was doubtful whether he could sustain his position on the morrow. In regard to the ill success of the Confederate right, it can not be doubted that McCulloch's and McIntosh's death discouraged their troops, and contributed materially to their repulse.

The result of the day, though very unsatisfactory to either army, were especially discouraging to the Federals. The enemy held their line of communications. Their supplies were nearly exhausted. Their mules had been without food for forty-eight hours. There was no escape except by defeating Van Dorn, who had strongly posted himself on the hills commanding the defile northward.

Saturday morning opened from a sky overcast with clouds. The enemy's cannon looked menacingly down upon the Federal encampment from the bold eminences to the northward, 200 feet in height. Batteries and battalions were posted at the base of these hills on either side. The Federal line was again changed, so that Davis held the right, Carr the centre, and Sigel the left. To General Sigel was allotted the most important part of the day's operations. The battle commenced at eight A.M. Sigel opened a heavy cannonade on Van Dorn's position, and advanced around to the left under cover of the fire. The Confederate artillery replied, but without much effect. Davis pushed round on the right, turning the enemy's left. The advantage gained was that the Federal artillery enfiladed the Confederate lines. Some of the enemy's guns were captured, and, to save them all from capture, they had to be withdrawn. Before the battle had lasted two hours, it had terminated in the retreat of the enemy from the field. The Confederates had failed of their object; but, on the other hand, it can not be said that the Federals had gained a very decisive victory. On both sides men and guns had been captured. The loss in killed and wounded on both sides was nearly equal, amounting, in either case, to about 1000.¹ Van Dorn withdrew his forces from the field without molestation.

¹ The Federal force engaged in the battle of Pea Ridge consisted of the following troops: First division, Colonel Osterhaus: Thirty-sixth Illinois, Twelfth Missouri, Seventeenth Missouri, Twenty-fifth Illinois, Forty-fourth Illinois, battalion Third Missouri, two battalions Benton Husars (cavalry), battalion Thirty-ninth Illinois Cavalry, two batteries of 6 guns each. Second division, Brigadier General Asboth: Second Missouri, Fifteenth Missouri, Sixth Missouri Cavalry, battalion Fourth Missouri Cavalry, two batteries 6 guns each. Third division, Colonel Jeff. C. Davis: Eighth Indiana, Twenty-second Indiana, Eighteenth Indiana, Thirty-seventh Illinois, Ninth Missouri, First Missouri Cavalry, two batteries, one of 4 guns another of 6. Fourth division, Colonel Carr: Fourth Iowa, Ninth Iowa, Thirty-fifth Illinois, Twenty-fifth Missouri, Third Iowa Cavalry, Third Illinois Cavalry (two battalions), Bowen's battalion of cavalry, two batteries of 6 guns and one of 4.

¹ Pollard says 16,000; but he evidently does not include the Indians.



MAP OF THE BATTLE-FIELD OF PEA RIDGE.

A. Camp of General Curtis.—B B. Route of Sigel from Bentonville.—I. Spot where McCulloch fell.—J. Tableau of Pea Ridge.

The day after the battle, the Confederate commander sent a burial party to General Curtis, under a flag of truce, to ask for the dead left upon the field. The request was granted by the Federal commander, who took occasion to express his regret that he had found on the battle-field many of his dead who had been tomahawked, scalped, and otherwise shamefully mutilated. A few days afterward Van Dorn replied, making a counter-charge that some of his men who had surrendered themselves prisoners of war had been murdered in cold blood by Germans of Sigel's command. Sigel did not deny the charge, but stated, in a communication to General Curtis, that when Elbert's three pieces of artillery were taken, the men serving at the guns were surrounded and shot dead, although seeking refuge behind the horses. "When such acts are committed," said General Sigel in this letter, "it is very natural that our soldiers will seek revenge, if no satisfaction is given by the commander of the Confederate army."¹

After the battle of Pea Ridge, Van Dorn retreated south of Boston Mount-

Only a few of these regiments were full, a large number of sick having been left behind at Rolla and Lebanon.

The official report of losses was as follows: First division, 144; second division, 119; third division, 329; fourth division, 701; total, 1351, of which 203 were killed. General Van Dorn stated his loss at 600. This does not include the prisoners taken by General Curtis, which the latter claims to have amounted to 1000. Pollard says that Van Dorn took 300 prisoners.

¹ How far General Sigel's account is justified may be inferred from the following extract from a narrative of the battle which appeared a month afterward in the Richmond Whig. It was written by an officer of General Price's army. He gives a vivid description of the action on Friday in that part of the field near Leetown, where General McCulloch and McIntosh were killed, which we quote in full:

"After listening some moments to the terrible tumult in the distance" [the writer refers here to the conflict going on near Elk-horn Tavern between Price's column and the Federal right], "suddenly, and within 300 yards of me, two or three cannon opened their brazen throats, hurling their missiles of death through the undergrowth in almost every direction. As the sound of the cannon came the third or fourth time, like the noise in springtime on the marshy margin of a lake, only more shrill, loud, and apparently more numerous than even the frogs, came the war-whoop and hideous yell of the Indians. Here I was unconsciously in the midst almost of McCulloch's charging squadron, and in range of a battery of three guns that were hurling death and defiance at them." [These were the guns of Elbert's flying artillery, which had been sent in advance to arrest McCulloch's progress toward the Federal right centre.]

"The battery was speedily charged and captured, those supporting it being borne backward three quarters of a mile by the impetuous forward press of the Confederates. Their retreat, most of the way, was through a corn-field, down a road upon its borders, but continuing into woods adjacent, full of undergrowth, where the main force of the enemy's strongest wing was posted. Here began the rattling musketry, which soon increased to a Niagara in sound. For hours there was hardly an intermission, save that created by the stanning roar of the cannon, so close that the ears of both parties were deafened. Within this vortex of fire fell McCulloch and McIntosh. At one time, having concluded to make my way to the immediate command of General Price, after passing from the corn-field down to the edge of the woods, just as four of us entered the woods a shell was thrown at us, bursting in our midst. . . . I then went leisurely over the corn-field, and rode back to the deserted guns.

"About forty-five men lay in the space of two or three hundred yards to the rear of the battery, all save one entirely dead, and all but three Dutchmen. . . . Here was a sterner feature of war than any I had yet seen. The Texans, with their large, heavy knives, had cloven skulls in twain, mingling blood, and brains, and hair. The sight was a sad one, but not devoid of satisfaction to our own exiles from home and wife. The character of the bloody victims, as denoted by their countenance, betokened victory for the South. I looked upon the faces of many dead enemies that day, and among them all found no expression of that fixed, fierce determination which Yankees describe as belonging peculiarly to the heroic hirelings who enlist for pay to desolate our homes."

ains. General Curtis fell back to Keetsville, where he received re-enforcements from Kansas and Missouri.

While General Curtis was on his march into Arkansas, events of considerable importance, though having no important bearing on the general campaign, were in progress farther westward, in that part of New Mexico which, since February, 1863, has been known as the Territory of Arizona.¹

This country had a population of whites roughly estimated at 20,000. The Indian population was more than twice as numerous, about half of whom were friendly to the whites, while the other half were hostile. The Apaches, the most hostile of the tribes, had overrun the country several times, and were called "devils" by their own race on account of their fiendish outrages. Although rich in mineral treasure of every sort, the Territory had been but partially developed. This was due to three causes. The principal obstacle was the negligence of the government during the few previous years. The two other unfavorable elements in the way of rapid growth—the hostility of the Apaches and the sterility of the vast deserts—could have been either removed or counteracted if the authorities at Washington had properly appreciated the value of the Territory. The great motive to emigration which existed in the mineral wealth of the country lost its effect upon the people on account of the insecurity of life, which intimidated all except the adventurer, the speculator, and the reckless criminal from settling in a region known from time out of mind as the theatre of Indian massacre. The essential defect was the absence of a military force adequate to protect settlers from pillage and murder.² This region of our Western territory has an additional importance from the fact that it furnishes the most convenient route for the proposed Pacific Railroad. While there were great objections to be brought against any of the projected routes, those against this were fewer and of a less formidable character. It was this route, running along the 32d parallel of latitude, that Jefferson Davis very ably advocated in the Senate. It was a much shorter route than any of the others which were under consideration, and it traversed a much milder region. The greatest obstacle was the scarcity of water along the route. Springs were, on an average, over twenty miles apart. In some cases as many as forty miles intervened between one supply of water and another. This scarcity of water was also a considerable obstacle to a continuous line of military posts. But this was a difficulty very easily obviated by a system of artesian wells. Such a system was, indeed, in 1858, in process of construction, in order to facilitate communication across the desert from Fort Fillmore to Albuquerque, and from Fort Union to Santa Fé. The events of 1861 not only interrupted the scheme of the Pacific Railroad route, but for more than a year threatened to deprive the United States of all military occupation of the Territory.


Upon the first outbreak of the Southern insurrection, and even before active hostilities were inaugurated, the revolutionists had their own way in the territory west of the Mississippi. In Arkansas, before that state had seceded from the Union, the United States Arsenal at Little Rock had been seized, with 9000 muskets, forty cannon, and a large supply of ammunition. Fort Smith was captured by the Confederates April 26, 1861. In Texas, General Twiggs, to whom had been committed all the forts and the military property of the United States in that department, had, before the secession of Texas, and without the slightest plea on the score of necessity, delivered up all the posts under his command, together with property which, not including forts and public buildings, was valued at a million and a half of dollars. The troops were allowed to leave the state. When the Ordinance of Secession had been passed, on March 2 of that year, there still remained in Texas a few detachments of Federal troops, and these were made prisoners and re-

¹ The act establishing the Territory of Arizona was approved by the President February 24, 1863. The first section defines the Territory as "all that portion of the Territory of New Mexico situated west of a line running due south from the point where the southwest corner of the Territory of Colorado joins the northern boundary of the Territory of New Mexico, to the southern boundary-line of said Territory of New Mexico."

² In his report for 1858, the Secretary of War, John B. Floyd, afterward Confederate general, thus treats of the situation on the Western frontier at that time:

"The whole strength of the army, as posted, consists of 17,984 men, and the actual strength on the 1st of July last was 15,764. In addition to other movements, this force is called upon to garrison 68 forts of a large and permanent character. . . . and to occupy 70 posts less permanently established, where the presence of a force is absolutely required. The area over which these forts and posts are spread embraces a circuit of about 3,000,000 square miles, and requires a journey of many thousand miles to visit the principal ones of them.

"The external boundary of our country, requiring throughout a more or less vigilant military supervision, is 11,000 miles in length, presenting every variety of climate and temperature, from the inclement cold of our Canada frontier to the tropical regions of Southern Texas. But the occupation of this long line of frontier is a trifling difficulty in comparison with that of protecting the double line of Indian frontier, extending from the Lake of the Woods to the banks of the Rio Grande, on the east side of the Rocky Mountains, and from beyond the River Oregon on the British frontier, to the head of the Gulf of California on the western slope of those mountains. Superadded to these lines, requiring to be occupied, are the great lines of intercommunication between the Valley of the Mississippi and the Pacific Ocean, which imperatively demand that protection which only the United States troops can furnish. These lines are very long, and are now extremely important, while every year renders them more and more so. From our Western frontier of settlements to those of Northern Oregon the distance is about 1800 miles; from the same frontier to the settlements of California, via Salt Lake, is 1800 miles; from the frontier of Arkansas, at Fort Smith, by Albuquerque or Santa Fé, to Fort Tejon, is about 1700 miles; and from San Antonio, by El Paso, to San Diego, near the borders of the white settlements, is 1400 miles; constituting an aggregate line of 6700 miles, which ought to be occupied, and which we pretend in some sort to keep open. This simple statement of facts demonstrates, stronger than any arguments could do, the absolute necessity for an increase of the army. . . . If there is a higher duty than another devolving upon a well-regulated government, it is to afford perfect protection to its citizens against outrage and personal violence; yet this great obligation is not performed by the government of the United States. For a large portion of the year, scarcely a week elapses without bringing us intelligence of some Indian massacre or outrage more shocking than death itself; and it most frequently happens that these acts go unpunished altogether, either from the want of troops for pursuit, or from their remoteness from the scenes of slaughter, which renders pursuit useless. In former times, when the hardy pioneer was allured away from the line of white settlements by fertile lands alone, he scarcely ventured so far as to be beyond succor and protection from those he left behind. But far different is the state of things at present. Our Pacific settlements, with their great inducements of rich lands, salubrious climate, and fabulously mineral treasures, present to the inhabitants of the Atlantic states temptations to emigration which the privations of an intervening wilderness and desert, and continual danger from roving bands of savages, hanging upon their march for many hundred miles together, can not deter them from undertaking. This migration strengthens the natural ties between the Atlantic and Pacific states, and adds immensely to the defensive strength of that remote region. Justice and humanity alike demand protection for these emigrants at the hands of government."




FORT WICHITA.




FORT ABUCKLE.




FORT DAVIS.



FORT BROWN.



FORT LANCASTER



THE ALAMO, SAN ANTONIO, GENERAL TWIGGS'S HEAD-QUARTERS.

leased on parole. The secession sentiment in Texas had never been violent. In December, 1860, the largest meeting ever held in Austin passed enthusiastic resolutions in favor of the old Union, and the meeting was made the occasion for a gala-day. Governor Houston, in a letter to the commission-



SAM. HOUSTON.

er sent to Texas by the State Convention of Alabama, said that secession would involve civil war and the ruin of our institutions, if not liberty itself. The governor, it seems, from another portion of this correspondence, had some schemes of his own in connection with the future of Texas. "Texas," said he, "has views of expansion not common to her sister states." He proposed to make the conquest of Mexico by the prowess of that single state. He was opposed to holding a State Convention. But the Convention was called, and the sentiment of the people having undergone a rapid change, the vote in favor of secession obtained a large popular majority. The governor endeavored to have the matter referred to the Legislature of the state, which was to assemble on the 18th of March. His reluctant attitude provoked the members of the Convention. It was thought by many that he was opposed to the confederation of Texas with the other Southern states, and favored her setting up for herself. The Convention insisted upon its absolute authority, and declared the act of secession an accomplished fact. State troops were then dispatched to the Rio Grande to occupy the posts abandoned by the Federal troops. Subsequently an ordinance was passed in the Convention, requiring the state officers to appear before that body and take an oath of allegiance to the Confederacy. The governor and secretary of state refusing to comply with this demand, their chairs were declared vacant. Lieutenant Governor Clark then became acting governor of the state.¹ In June all intercourse with the people of the Northern states was forbidden, and all citizens of the latter states were warned to leave Texas within twenty days. During the year 1861 no offensive operations were undertaken by the national government against Texas, with the exception of a bombardment of the Confederate batteries at Galveston in the month of August.

Of the forts surrendered by General Twiggs, the principal ones were Forts Davis, Arbuckle, and Wachita. Fort Davis was situated on the Rio Grande, about 500 miles from San Antonio, in a cañon of the Lympia Mountains. It was in the midst of the most picturesque scenery. On either side, the immense rocks forming the sides of the cañon tower upward to a height of 500 or 600 feet. Fort Arbuckle was on the northern frontier of the state, and Fort Wachita was sixty miles northwest of Arbuckle. It was near Fort Wachita that General Van Dorn had, in 1858, routed the Camanches in a pitched battle. Fort Brown, on the Rio Grande, and Fort Lancaster, on the San Antonio and San Diego mail route, were also included in the terms of

the surrender. General Twiggs had served with great distinction in the Mexican War. He was breveted major general for his gallantry at Monterey, and received a sword from Congress. As a reward for his disgraceful surrender of the United States forts and property in Texas, he received from the Confederacy the command of a major general, and was for a short time in command of New Orleans. He died at Augusta, Georgia, September 15, 1862. The surrender was made to Colonel Ben. McCulloch, who had been selected for this purpose by the revolutionary committee of the state, styling itself the "Committee of Public Safety." McCulloch, also, had served in the Mexican War, and had earned especial commendation from General Taylor in the battle of Buena Vista. He had had a great deal of experience in partisan warfare on the Texan frontier, and had done much for the cavalry service of the United States. As soon as Lincoln's election was known, he had identified himself with the secessionists in Texas. He had 800 men under his command when he received the surrender of San Antonio. He was soon sent abroad to procure arms for the state; but, before he had succeeded in this mission, he was made a brigadier general. His part in the war in Missouri has already been shown in this history. He died, as we have seen, in the battle of Pea Ridge.

Texas, immediately after her accession to the Confederacy, sent forces into all parts of the field to sustain the cause which she had adopted. Three regiments, under Wigfall, Hood, and Archer, were sent to Virginia; two, under Terry and Gregg, to Kentucky; and two, under Green and Lock, to Missouri. By the 1st of November, 1861, there were nineteen regiments in the field, of which seven were disposed of as above stated. Six were dispatched to the coast of Texas. The others were sent to the northern frontier, or were organized for operations in the Territories.

Texas, from her geographical position, became the natural base for operations against New Mexico.¹ The troops designed for the campaign in that country consisted, in November, of three regiments, organized into a brigade under the command of Brigadier General W. U. Sibley. During the previous summer the Confederates had not been idle in New Mexico. In July, although they did not invade the Territory in any formidable force, they created such a panic that nearly all of the Federal military posts were abandoned without a struggle. Forts Breckinridge and Buchanan were abandoned upon the rumored approach of the Texan troops, without any attempt at defense, and even without an estimate of the amount of force likely to be brought against them. The garrisons, numbering about 450 men, started over the mountains eastward to Fort Craig, which was located near Valverde, on the Rio Grande. While they were moving in that direction, the garrison of Fort Fillmore, consisting of nearly 700 men, under Major Isaac Lynde of the regular army, disgracefully surrendered to a force of less than 200 Texans on the 27th of the month. Four months afterward Major Lynde was dropped from the army list as a punishment for his delinquency. The next week after the surrender of Fort Fillmore, Lieutenant Colonel John R. Baylor, commanding the Confederate forces in the southern portion (Arizona) of New Mexico, issued a proclamation taking possession of the Territory in the name of the Confederacy, assuming the title of military governor. Soon after Fort Stanton was abandoned, thus throwing into the hands of the revolutionists property valued at nearly half a million of dollars. Fort Craig was also abandoned. Messila became the military capital of Arizona. General Albert Sidney Johnston received from Governor Baylor the command of the Confederate forces in the Territory, which at this time numbered less than 1000 men. On the 8th of September, however, General Johnston became commander of the entire military department of the West, and the charge of the operations in New Mexico was committed to General Sibley, who was preparing a military expedition for the complete conquest of that Territory. Sibley's head-quarters were at Fort Bliss, in Texas.

In the mean time the small Federal force left in New Mexico was under the command of Colonel E. R. S. Canby, who, by a general order of the War Department, was soon after placed at the head of the Department of New Mexico, with his head-quarters at Santa Fé.


The Confederate General Sibley had proposed to reach the field of operations early in September, 1861, but failed to do so, as he explains in his report, "from misunderstandings, accidents, deficiency of arms, etc." He says: "I found myself at this point" [Fort Bliss] "as late as the middle of January, with only two regiments and a half, poorly armed, thinly clad, and almost destitute of blankets. The ranks were becoming daily thinned with those two terrible scourges to an army, small-pox and pneumonia. Not a dollar of quarter-master's funds was on hand, or had ever been, to supply the daily and pressing necessities of the service, and the small means of this sparse section had been long consumed by the force under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Baylor, so that the credit of the government was not as available a resource as it might otherwise have been." Having established a general hospital at Donna Anna, he prepared to move up the Rio Grande, and on the 7th of February reached a point seven miles below Fort Craig, which, together with Fort Stanton, had been retaken by Canby. The latter occupied Fort Craig, the immediate object of the Confederate attack, with a garrison of 2500 men, 1000 of which were regulars.

On the 16th of February Sibley reconnoitred, advancing to within a mile of the fort. Finding the latter too strong to be attacked, and the Federal commander declining a battle in the open field, he determined to cross the Rio Grande below the fort to the east bank, to turn the Federal position, and thus compel an engagement. It was supposed in the fort that Sibley was withdrawing his force, especially as Colonel Canby's scouts had declared it

¹ In speaking of New Mexico, it will be well understood by the reader that Arizona is included under that designation, since the events of which we write occurred over a year before the territorial organization of Arizona.

¹ A few months after these events the ex-governor declared the act of secession justifiable and necessary.

"The life of General Houston is full of romance and adventure. He was born in Virginia, March 2, 1793; taken by his widowed mother to Tennessee while yet a boy; abandoned school because he could not agree with his teacher about his studies; ran away from a store, employment in which was too confining for his tastes; lived among the Indians as an adopted son of one of their chiefs for three years; returned home; entered the army as a private at the age of twenty; earned by his bravery promotions and the lasting friendship of General Jackson, under whom he served; obtained the appointment of Indian Agent, in which office he distinguished himself by his zeal in preventing the importation of negroes through Florida, then a Spanish province, into the States; resigned his commission in the army; studied law six months; was forthwith elected prosecuting attorney, and honorably acquitted himself in this position; gained such popularity as to obtain almost without opposition any office the State of Tennessee could give him; was elected, first, major general of militia, the representative to Congress, then twice governor of the state; in 1829 separated from his wife, resigned his gubernatorial office, left Tennessee forever to make his home thenceforth with the Indians; proved a faithful and valuable friend to them; accomplished the removal of several Indian agents for fraud; wearied in turn of this half savage life, emigrated to Texas; assumed at once a prominent position in this then nebulous republic as general in chief of all her forces; defeated and captured Santa Anna, and secured the independence of the state in a brief but brilliant campaign; left the military command of the Lone Star Republic to accept its presidency; proved himself as able and efficient in managing its civil affairs as he had in wielding the sword; represented her subsequently for two successive terms in the Senate of the United States; left the Senate only to be made governor; and continued, until a short period previous to his death, the most popular, as he certainly was the most able, man which the state contained."—*Harper's Magazine*, vol. xxx., p. 581.



impossible for the enemy to advance through the sand-hills on the east side of the river. In truth, General Sibley, by crossing, had placed his army in an unfavorable situation, as his camp was destitute of water, which could only be obtained by gaining a point above the fort. The Confederates crossed on the 20th. The day before, Canby had ordered his regulars—the Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Infantry—together with Colonel Kit Carson's and Pino's regiments—also to cross the river and occupy an elevation opposite to and commanding Fort Craig. On the 20th he sent across some cavalry and artillery to cover the infantry. An engagement followed, which was confined to the artillery, but in the course of which Pino's regiment became demoralized, and the entire force had to be withdrawn to the fort.

The Confederates were without water all day, and their animals, suffering extremely from thirst, became exhausted, and so completely broken down that the wagons could not be moved. It was now of the utmost importance that a Federal force should cut off the approach of the enemy to the river at Valverde, where was the only supply of water in the vicinity. For this purpose, the regulars, with Carson's regiment, some cavalry, and two batteries, were moved up the west bank in that direction, but, upon arriving at their destination, it was found that the Confederates had already anticipated them. The batteries were opened upon the enemy, compelling his retreat with considerable loss. The Federals crossed to the east bank, and encountered the full strength of Sibley's command, which now made a desperate stand, and there followed the action known as the battle of Valverde.

Colonel Canby came upon the field at noon with Pino's regiment of New Mexicans, which had occasioned so much disorder on the previous day. The forces engaged on both sides were nearly equal, in either case amounting to a little over 1500 men. The earlier part of the battle was little more than an artillery duel. The two Federal batteries were situated, one of them, Lieutenant Hall's, on the right, and the other, Captain McRae's, on the left. The latter, about two P.M., was advanced toward a wood which covered the enemy's right. A furious charge was made by the Texans, under Captain Lang, against this battery. His regiment was thinned at every step by successive volleys; but it still pressed on, picking off the gunners, one by one, with shot-guns and pistols, until only two men remained to man the guns. The force detailed to support McRae could not be brought up. Captain McRae had fallen; and soon the impetuous advance of the enemy decided the contest in this part of the field. The battery was captured, and no attempt was made for its recovery. On the right a similar attempt was made against Hall's battery, but the latter was gallantly supported by Carson, and the enemy at this point was repulsed. But the confusion on the left, consequent upon the loss of McRae's battery, made it necessary that Canby should withdraw from the field. He retired upon the fort in good order. The Federal loss in this battle was estimated at about 200; that of the enemy somewhat less.


Not being in a condition to assault Fort Craig, General Sibley moved northward against Albuquerque and Santa Fé, which were evacuated by the Federals. About the same time, Tucson, near the southern border of the Territory, was occupied by a band of roving guerrillas under Captain Hunter. From this point Hunter advanced northward toward the Pimo villages, and even threatened Fort Yuma, on the California boundary. The hostile Indians united with the Confederates, and the whole Territory, with the exception of the strong forts held by the Federal troops, was devoted to rapine and murder.

General Canby, in March, was able to make the offensive. After successful skirmishes with the Confederates at Apache Pass and Pigeon's Ranch,

he threatened Albuquerque, the enemy's principal dépôt of supplies. This movement compelled Sibley to evacuate the Territory, leaving his sick and wounded behind in the hospitals at Santa Fé, Albuquerque, and Sorocco. The Confederates had, by their outrages upon peaceful citizens, exasperated the inhabitants and made them bitter enemies. This doubtless hastened their retreat into Texas, which, under the steady pressure of the Federal force in their rear, was a succession of disasters. As they withdrew, Fort Fillmore, Fort Bliss, and El Paso were immediately occupied by the Federals under the command of General Carleton, who, being now re-enforced by troops from California, was enabled to hold the Territory against the enemy, and turn his attention to the conquest of the hostile Apaches.¹

After the battle of Pea Ridge, the military operations of either army in Arkansas were not especially significant. About a month after that battle, it was supposed that Price was moving toward Springfield. This led to a temporary withdrawal of the Federal army from Arkansas. But early in May General Curtis was again penetrating the state by a more easterly route. Moving southward from Salem, he occupied Batesville, on the White River. Between Batesville and Little Rock, on the Arkansas, was a distance of nearly eighty miles. This latter point, the capital of the state, was the object of the Federal advance. As Curtis moved in that direction, there was great excitement in the capital. Governor Rector, on the one hand, upbraided the Confederate government for having made no provision for the defense of the state, while, on the other, he frantically appealed to the Missourians and Texans to come to the rescue. He said: "It was for liberty that Arkansas struck, and not for subordination to any created secondary power, north or south. Her best friends are her natural allies, nearest at home, who will pulsate when she bleeds, whose utmost hope is not beyond her existence. If the arteries of the Confederate heart do not permeate beyond the east bank of the Mississippi, let Southern Missourians, Arkansians, Texans, and the great West know it and prepare for the future. Arkansas lost, abandoned, subjugated, is not Arkansas as she entered the Confederate government; nor will she remain Arkansas, a Confederate state, desolated as a wilderness. Her children, fleeing from the wrath to come, will build them a new ark, and launch it on new waters, seeking a haven somewhere of equality, safety, and rest."

But the governor does not appear to have rallied about him any formidable forces of resistance. He soon took a hasty departure from the capital, and the executive government passed over to the martial authorities. The pressing need of men in Tennessee had depleted the Confederate armies of the Southwest almost to the last extremity of weakness. But, on the other hand, the importance of the Tennessee campaign to the Federal cause also reduced Curtis's army to such an extent that he was forced to abandon the campaign against Little Rock. Thus there occurred a lull in the trans-Mississippi campaign, which was only partially disturbed by frequent military expeditions. The principal one of these was that undertaken in June, after the capture of Memphis, up the White River. The object of this expedition was to open communication with the army of General Curtis. Four gunboats—the St. Louis, Mound City, Lexington, and Conestoga—accompanied by a transport having on board Colonel Fitch's Indiana regiment, moved up the river toward St. Charles. The Mound City led, and, as it approached St. Charles, received the fire of two concealed batteries. The troops from



TUCSON, ARIZONA.

¹ At the close of the official report of his operations in New Mexico, General Sibley says: "In concluding this report . . . it is proper that I should express the conviction . . . that, except for its political geographical position, the Territory of New Mexico is not worth one quarter of the blood and treasure expended in its conquest. As a field of military operations it possesses not a single element, except in the multiplicity of its defensive positions. The indispensable element, food, can not be relied on. During the last year, and pending the recent operations, hundreds of thousands of sheep have been driven off by the Navajoes. Indeed, such were the complaints of the people in this respect, that I had determined, as good policy, to encourage private enterprises against that tribe and the Apaches, and to legalize the enslaving of them."



JOHN M. SCHOFIELD.


the transport were landed with the purpose of taking the batteries in the rear, when a ball from the bluff penetrated the casement of the Mound City, and passed through her steam drum. The result was that only 23 out of a crew of 175 escaped scalding. A scene of great confusion followed. Frantic with pain, men leaped into the water, and some of them were drowned. Boats sent to their relief from the other vessels were fired upon with grape and canister with fearful effect. But Colonel Fitch, hearing of the accident, only pressed his regiment more rapidly forward, and carried the batteries at the point of the bayonet. But the expedition failed of its main object, and General Curtis, on the 24th of June, evacuated Batesville, and by the middle of the next month had securely established a new base at Helena, on the Mississippi, about fifty miles above the mouth of White River. The events of the year from this time resolve themselves into a bare chronicle. On the 19th of September General Curtis was called to the command of the Department of Missouri, which was so defined as to comprehend Missouri, Kansas, and Arkansas. General Steele, who had arrived at Helena with a division of troops, then assumed the command of that post.

About this time the Confederate forces in Arkansas numbered probably 25,000 men. General Hindman, with about 5000 men, covered Little Rock

on the north side. At Batesville there were 2000, under McBride. Holmes held Little Rock itself with 2000 men. Farther down the river, near Pine Bluff, Roan had 5000. Rains held the northwestern part of the state with four or five thousand. Between these scattered detachments and the Federal forces there was an occasional encounter of arms. Sometimes the Confederates would group together in small detachments, and, marching into Missouri, would there unite with irregular banditti for the purposes of plunder or guerrilla warfare. When Curtis assumed command of the department, an army, styled the "Army of the Frontier," was organized under General John M. Schofield, whose object was to subdue guerrilla bands, and generally to co-operate with the other forces in the trans-Mississippi district. Just at the close of October, a portion of this army, under Generals Herron and Totten, and numbering six or seven thousand men, came into collision with the Confederates in Southwestern Arkansas. The battle was fought near Fayetteville Hollows, a few miles north of Boston Mountains. Totten, with the main column, advanced from Osage Springs, while Herron, with another column, started from Cross Hollows, with the design of striking the flank of the enemy, who was thought to be in the vicinity of Fayetteville, seventeen miles distant. Herron had a force of less than a thousand men, made up chiefly of cavalry, imperfectly equipped. It turned out that this force had alone to contend with a much superior force of Texan Rangers; but, notwithstanding the disparity of numbers, the enemy was driven four miles. In the same vicinity, just one month later (November 28, 1862), there was a small skirmish at Cane Hill, between three Federal brigades, under General James G. Blunt, and a force of Confederates, made up of Marmaduke's men, considerably re-enforced by guerrillas. This also resulted favorably to the Federals.

A few days afterward there was a more stubbornly contested action at Prairie Grove, a short distance northwest of Cane Hill. After the battle of Cane Hill, General Blunt had held the country in the immediate vicinity of the battle-field, that being the great wheat and corn growing district of the state. The Confederate forces were strongly re-enforced by bringing up the several detachments scattered over the state, and were commanded by General Hindman. These forces may be roughly estimated at 15,000. Hindman, with great promptness, advanced northward to cut General Blunt off from his communications. Blunt, at the first notice of this movement, sent for General Herron, who was at Wilson's Creek with the second and third divisions of Schofield's army. Herron moved at the instant, and in three days had marched over a hundred miles. In the mean while Blunt remained at Cane Hill, and the enemy slipped by him on his flank, thus gaining a position which, while it was strong against either Blunt or Herron, also enabled him to prevent their conjunction. It was, however, a position favorable to the Federal generals, on the simple condition of the ability of both to participate in the critical battle.

On the morning of December 7 Herron had reached Fayetteville, and, resting for an hour, pressed on along the road from that place southward. Up to the previous night he had kept up communication with Blunt, but that was now broken off, for Hindman was planted between them, and hoped to fight them in succession. It was Sunday morning; "a more beautiful morning or a grander sunrise," says Herron, "I never beheld;" but it inaugurated a day of bloody, terrible battle. Herron had sent 3000 cavalry to Blunt's support, and now his own need of such a force was most urgent. Part of his infantry and artillery must be detailed to guard his train of 400 wagons, leaving him, at his own estimate, only 4000 available men. As he came out on the prairie by the mountain road seven miles south of Fayetteville, the Arkansas cavalry, which had the advance, came "dashing back in great disorder." His army and Hindman's had met, having, as a newspaper



BATTLE OF ST. CHARLES, ON WHITE RIVER, ARKANSAS.



JAMES G. BLUNT



FRANCIS J. HERRON.

correspondent remarked, run together like two locomotives. Hindman's advance was pushed back on his main lines, which were found posted on a long ridge by a creek, and in Herron's immediate front. The Federal commander decided to attack, trusting that Blunt, who could not be more than ten miles away, would hear the booming of artillery, and attack in time to decide the contest in his favor. By ten o'clock the crossing began under cover of several batteries. Herron was fortunate in his artillery, as also in the superior discipline of his command. The contest went on fiercely on his left. A battery of the enemy, strongly posted on a hill, was captured, and then the position had to be abandoned. A counter-charge was ordered, but the Confederates could not stand up in the face of Herron's guns. Here, with varying fortune, the fighting was kept up till long after noon, and as yet nothing had been heard from Blunt.


General Blunt, when he first heard the sound of battle, a little after noon, was more than five miles from the scene of conflict. At two o'clock he was upon the field. He found the enemy on the ridge across the Fayetteville road. "On the north, and in front of the enemy's lines," says he, in his report of the battle, "was an open valley, divided into large fields, a portion of them cultivated in corn. At the east end of this valley, General Herron, with the second and third divisions, was engaged with the enemy." Blunt's column entered the valley at its western extremity, on the left wing of the enemy. Hindman was thus engaged in front and rear at the same time; but his force, though divided, was yet strong in each part. Between his and

Blunt's position there was a piece of woods, into which the greater part of Blunt's column was thrown. From three o'clock until nightfall there was no interruption of the battle. Both Herron's and Blunt's commands slept on their arms all night, prepared to renew the contest on Monday; but, under cover of the darkness, the enemy slipped away, and retreated across the Boston Mountains. The loss on both sides was severe; in Herron's command alone amounting to little less than a thousand. Blunt came upon the field later, and fought under less disadvantage, and suffered less severely. The Federal artillery had been worked with promptness and accuracy, and with terrible effect against the enemy, whose loss exceeded that of the Union army. The Confederates acknowledged that Hindman had been defeated. At the close of the month Blunt advanced south of Boston Mountains and took possession of Van Buren without any considerable resistance.

Early in 1863 a force of the enemy, under General Marmaduke, moved on Springfield, Missouri; but that place had been so carefully provided for against attack by General Browne that the Confederates were repulsed.

The military situation in Missouri was closely interwoven with the political. General Fremont's well-known political history, and his self-committal from the first to an anti-slavery policy, had excited against him the prejudices of the Missourians. His policy had been unwise, because it was both partisan and premature. When General Halleck was sent to take his place, in November, 1861, he was especially instructed to shape his political course in such a manner as to prove that President Lincoln's administration was committed, not to the abolition of slavery, but to the suppression of armed treason. To such a course Halleck steadfastly adhered so long as he was commander of the department. The necessity of severe military restrictions rendered political tolerance indispensable. Even after the Confederate armies were driven out of the state, there were thousands of citizens who still sympathized with the Confederate cause, and who were willing to sacrifice much for its success. Against these there could be only severity in so far as they gave actual aid to the enemy. But there were also thousands of citizens thoroughly loyal to the United States government. Severity against these, and in regard to points not involved in the main issue of the war, could not fail to alienate many of them from their adherence to the government, and drive them over to its opponents. In a state rent with intestine faction, it was wise to compose the strife so far as this could be done consistently with the simplest interpretation of loyalty.

With General Halleck the only test of loyalty was support of the government. Those who could not stand this test were singled out and treated as enemies. Any one was at liberty to think as he chose of slavery, but it fared hard with those who stumbled at the oath of allegiance. His measures against those found in arms against the government within the state, or contributing in any way to the comfort of the enemy, were justly severe. He ordered that all persons within his lines who, disguised as loyal citizens, were found giving information to the enemy, should be shot. Union families, crowding into St. Louis from all parts of the state, were quartered upon avowed secessionists. All the municipal officers of the city were required to take the oath of allegiance. His government, while it mulcted and punished the disloyal, yet protected them against all unauthorized violence. There could be no seizure of private property except on the plea of strict military necessity, and even in this case, if it was unauthorized, it was pun-






ISSUING PASSES AT ST. LOUIS.

ished with death. No arrests were made except upon definite and substantial charges. No slaves were taken from their masters except in cases where the latter were disloyal, and had used their slaves, or permitted them to be used for disloyal purposes. No fugitive slaves were admitted into his camps. Martial law was strictly enforced. All civil authorities attempting to interfere with the execution of any order from the head-quarters of General Halleck were arrested and punished. An order was issued requiring all publishers of newspapers, those of St. Louis excepted, to furnish General Halleck a copy of each issue for inspection, under penalty of having their papers suppressed. The officers of mercantile associations were required to take the oath of allegiance to the Federal government. The president and faculty of the University of Missouri, and the officers of all the railroad companies in the state, were required to take the same oath. Lawyers were not allowed to practice before submitting to the oath. The oath of allegiance was made the test of the privilege of suffrage at elections. Citizens who, as such, engaged in acts of hostility, were treated with marked severity. The arrest and trial of some persons apprehended for destroying railroad bridges and other property became the occasion of a correspondence, in which General Price insisted that these men should be treated as prisoners of war. General Halleck replied that no orders of General Price could save from punishment spies, marauders, and incendiaries; that if armed forces in the garb of soldiers, and duly organized as legitimate belligerents, destroyed

railroad bridges as a military act, they would be treated as prisoners of war; but that soldiers in the garb of citizens must suffer the usual penalties inflicted upon citizens for their crimes. In accordance with this response, eight persons, who were convicted of the crime of destroying the railroad bridges, were shot in the month of February, 1862. After the Federal victories in Tennessee, and the expulsion of Price from the southern border of the state, the military regulations hitherto in force were somewhat relaxed. During the remaining portion of General Halleck's career the disturbance from guerrillas was inconsiderable. General Schofield assumed the command of the department June 1, 1862, which position he resigned in September to General Curtis.

While Grant and Buell were preparing for an advance southward from Nashville, and Curtis was carrying on his campaign west of the Mississippi, General Pope and Commodore Foote moved upon the enemy's works at New Madrid and Island No. 10. The conflict on either side of the river was not more important than that for the possession of the river itself. Columbus had to be surrendered as the consequence of the capture of Donelson, but the new positions occupied by the Confederates at Island No. 10 and New Madrid were southward from Columbus only from twenty-five to thirty-five miles. The enemy determined to fall back step by step, in this way preventing the Federal gun-boats from establishing a connection with Farragut's fleet at the mouth of the river.



THE CABONNET RUNNING THE CONFEDERATE BATTERIES AT ISLAND NO. 10.

Island No. 10 is situated in a bend of the Mississippi, on the Tennessee border, and although ten miles above New Madrid on the river, is southwest of that place. New Madrid is on the Missouri shore. It was upon this island that the Confederates had erected their principal fortifications, which consisted of eleven earth-works, mounting seventy heavy guns. At New Madrid there was a bastioned earth-work mounting fourteen guns, and in the upper part of the town a battery of seven pieces. The line of intrenchments between the upper and lower work constituted the defense of the


heavy artillery, and no means of contending with the naval force in the river. While awaiting the arrival of his large guns, he posted a battery at Point Pleasant, twelve miles below, thus cutting off McCown from re-enforcements and supplies from the South. This battery had, of course, to be mounted with small guns, and, as a protection against the heavier artillery of the Confederate gun-boats, the guns were placed in sunk batteries, between the rifle-pits, which afforded protection to a thousand infantry. Thus invested on the south side, McCown drew re-enforcements from the island. The number of his command was nearly doubled, and three additional gun-boats increased the naval force, which was under the command of Commodore Hollins.

After waiting over a week, Pope received his siege guns from Cairo, which were, on the night of the 12th, placed within 800 yards of the enemy's main fortification, commanding the work and the river above it. At daylight the batteries were opened, and the fire of four heavy guns was concentrated upon the gun-boats with such effect as to disable some of them: also three guns in the enemy's land-works were dismounted. The only impression made by the Confederate batteries on Pope's lines was in the injury done to one gun, attended by the wounding of eight men, and in the loss of three men in an Ohio regiment. The result of the day's operations convinced the Confederate commander that it was useless to attempt farther resistance at that point, for General Pope was already about to cut off the line of retreat. McCown therefore abandoned New Madrid on the night of the 13th, leaving his dead unburied, and all his stores and ammunition, and even the knapsacks of his soldiers, and fell back upon the island. In regard to the military property abandoned by the enemy, the testimony of General Pope is that it included "all their artillery, field batteries, and siege guns, amounting to thirty-three pieces, magazines full of fixed ammunition of the best character, several thousand stand of inferior small-arms, with hundreds of boxes of musket cartridges, tents for an army of 10,000 men, etc." Untouched suppers, candles left burning in the tents, and the general appearance of the encampment, indicated that the retreat had been effected with unceremonious haste.

The Confederate force was now concentrated on the island. General Pope's occupation of New Madrid secured a perfect blockade of the river, and the defenders of Island No. 10 were too far removed from the main army under Johnston to receive any help from that source. The island, moreover, was not a good defensive position. It is flat, and commanded by the high ground on the left bank of the river. Its defenses had been constructed under the superintendence of General Beauregard, who, at the last moment, on the 5th of April, turned the command over to General McCall.

On the 14th of March, the day of the capture of New Madrid, Commodore Foote moved from Cairo with an armament consisting of eight gun-boats, all iron-clad except the Conestoga, and ten mortar boats, lashed to steamers.¹ Two regiments of infantry accompanied the expedition, which reached a point about four miles above Island No. 10 on the morning of the 15th. The next day a bombardment commenced, which continued until the 7th of April. The great point to be gained was the rear of the fortifications, which Beauregard had erected on the high ground commanding the island. To

¹ These mortar boats were constructed at St. Louis at the suggestion of General Fremont. They were about 60 feet long and 25 feet wide, surrounded on all sides by an iron plate bulwark six or seven feet high. The weight of the mortar itself was 17,210 pounds. Its bore admitted easily a 13-inch shell. From the edge of the bore to the outer rim was 17 inches. The weight of the mortar bed was 4500 pounds; that of the shell, filled with wet sand, was 230 pounds; filled with powder, 215 pounds.




A MORTAR.

place. These works were occupied by five regiments of Confederate infantry, with several companies of artillery. In the river the enemy had also six gun-boats, carrying from four to eight guns. The Confederate General McCown commanded the troops holding New Madrid.


New Madrid, being below Island No. 10, and its possession cutting off that island from its natural communication southward, was the first to be attacked. General Pope appeared before the town on the 3d of March, but had no




MORTAR BOATS IN PROCESS OF CONSTRUCTION.



THE GUN-BOAT FLEET DROPPING DOWN STREAM TO RECONNOITRE.



STEAMERS TOWING MORTAR-BOATS INTO POSITION.



OPERATIONS AGAINST ISLAND NO. 10.—BOMBARDMENT FROM THE MORTAR BOATS.