



ANDREW HULL FOOTE.

## CHAPTER XI.

## FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON.

The original Plan for the Advance of the Western Armies.—The Resistance to be overcome.—Estimate of Forces in the West.—The new Plan of Operations.—The Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers.—Their military Importance.—The Mississippi Flotilla.—Commodore Foote.—McClelland's Reconnoissance toward Columbus.—The Capture of Fort Henry, February 6, 1862.—Expedition up the Tennessee to Florence, Alabama.—Preparations for an Attack on Donelson.—Position of the Fort.—Disposition of the Confederate Army.—Buckner, Floyd, Johnson, and Pillow.—Floyd's Suggestion in regard to the Defense of the Fort.—Operations on Thursday, February 13; Investment of the Fort by General Grant; Assaults on the Confederate Lines.—Arrival of the Gun-boats.—Naval Attack on Friday; its ill Success.—Confederate Council of War Friday Night.—The Battle of Saturday; early Success of the Confederates; their final Repulse.—Floyd's second Council; its Deliberations.—Escape of Floyd and Pillow.—Surrender of Fort Donelson by Buckner, Sunday Morning, the 16th.—Evacuation of Bowling Green, Nashville, and Columbus.—Polk's Withdrawal to Island No. 10.


THREE times now within a period of three months had the way been laid open for an attack upon the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad; twice through Pound Gap and Virginia, and again, after the victory of Mill Spring, by way of Cumberland Gap. In neither case was the opportunity improved, because the Federal force at hand was not sufficiently large to secure a permanent possession, and because the plan of invading Tennessee through Eastern Kentucky had been given up for another, more feasible, and involving larger and more satisfactory results. It was deeply regretted by the government, and was the subject of complaint among many loyal people of the North, that the deliverance which had been promised through the original plan to the Unionists of East Tennessee had to be postponed; but any merely temporary relief would evidently have only aggravated their sufferings. The new plan of operations transferred the burden of the spring campaign in the West from the department of General Buell to that of General Halleck, and the field of activity from Eastern to Central and Western Tennessee. Originally it was proposed that Buell should advance through Cumberland Gap, and take possession of the line of communications connecting Tennessee with Richmond—a line which could be reached by a march of little more than thirty miles from the Gap—while Halleck should co-operate by the movement of a joint naval and land expedition down the Mississippi. The resistance to be overcome in this plan was very great in each department. Buell had two impediments; one was Buckner's army, now strongly fortified at Bowling Green, and the other the geography of Eastern Kentucky. Bowling Green was, in relation to Tennessee, a most important military position, situated a little to the south of the centre of Kentucky, at the head of navigation, on the Big Barren, a branch of Green River, and commanding the only two lines of railroad communication between the two states, namely, the Louisville and Nashville Road, and the branch of that route which, taking its departure five miles below Bowling Green, has its western terminus at Memphis. The Confederate army at this point must either be met in its intrenched position, or left in the rear. Though not impregnablely fortified, Bowling Green was easily protected from an attack on the north, the approach in that direction being across the river; and, in order to cut off its communications with the South, it would be necessary to occupy in force each of the two railroad lines above mentioned. Whatever might have been the success of an attempt to capture it, it could not have been accomplished without great exhaustion of force; and to push

a large army into Tennessee, leaving Buckner in its rear, would have been absolutely ruinous. In Halleck's way, on the Mississippi, was Columbus—the Gibraltar of the West—thirteen miles below Cairo, and connected by railroad with Bowling Green and the South. From this point, at the beginning of the year, the Confederate line of occupation stretched westward through Bowling Green and into Virginia, where the Great Kanawha continued it on toward the eastern strong-hold of Manassas. Fort Columbus was originally a position of great natural strength. The eastern bank, on which it lay, was lined above and below by bluffs 150 feet in height; and north of the town, one of these bluffs, facing up the river, was fortified with three tiers of batteries, and mounting altogether upward of fifty guns; the other sides open to attack were also well fortified. The works on the summit of the hill cover an area of nearly four miles. To prevent the passage by the fort of gun-boats, a strong iron chain stretched across to the opposite bank. The entire armament of Columbus consisted of 140 pieces of artillery.

Still proceeding on the supposition that the plan which we have indicated, and which was the one originally proposed, was to be carried into execution, what was the amount of force on each side available for the campaign?

On the 1st of December, 1861, there were in Kentucky 70,000 Union troops, of which about 23,000 were raised in the state. These troops were under the command of General Buell, whose head-quarters were at Louisville. At that time upward of 18,000 of these troops had not yet been sworn in, and the greater portion were recently armed and undisciplined. But the work of recruiting and organization was rapidly going on, and it was to continue until Buell's command should number 100,000 men. In Missouri, at St. Louis and Cairo, Halleck was gathering another army, fully as large as that of Buell. Regiments from Illinois, under the command of General Grant, constituted the great proportion of this army. Nothing is easier than to overestimate the effective force of an army freshly recruited. Take, for instance, the combined force of Halleck and Buell at the beginning of 1862. It is set down in round numbers at 200,000 men. But from this flattering estimate made on paper we have, in the first place, to deduct between twenty to thirty per cent. for forces not yet fairly in the field. This would leave say 150,000 men in camp. Of this 150,000 a considerable proportion would be without arms and unorganized; a great number of regiments would be detached as garrisons at important points; and a still farther deduction would have to be made for those disabled by sickness, so that not more than 100,000 men could be counted upon as available for active operations in an offensive campaign. Neither Halleck nor Buell, therefore, could count upon a column of over 50,000 men each. That this estimate is not founded on conjecture will appear when we come to consider the forces engaged at the siege of Donelson. What was the force which was opposed to this by the Confederates? The two great centres about which this force gathered were, as we have already indicated, Columbus and Bowling Green, each of which was held by an army ranging from 20,000 to 30,000 strong. There were various detachments of force in Tennessee, the most important of which was Crittenden's little army, which Thomas had driven to Gainesborough. Bowling Green was the direct objective of Buell's attack, as Columbus of Halleck's. The scattered detachments in Tennessee might easily be gathered together to harass the right flank of Buell's army if he should pass across the mountains through Cumberland Gap. The forces at Columbus and Bowling Green, in their fortifications, were able to resist more than three times their own number in case of an attack made directly against them; they were so connected with each other and with their base of supplies that they would be able to stand a siege of any duration, as the Federal force would be clearly inadequate to their perfect investment; they occupied a central position, while the attack must move along the radii of an extended arc; the probabilities, therefore, in case of a direct attack, were decidedly in their favor. In the plan of operations originally proposed, such an attack was necessarily involved. This was clearly the case as regards Columbus; and no good general would ever dream of leaving so large a force as that at Bowling Green in his rear, unless his line of communication was secure against interruption. There could be no security like this in an advance through Eastern Kentucky. This advance, therefore, taken in connection with the co-operative movement of a naval and land force down the Mississippi, involved of necessity the capture both of Bowling Green and Columbus. Nothing would have better suited Albert Sidney Johnston, the Confederate general commanding in the West, than an attempt on the part of the Federal generals to reduce these two strong-holds. The attempt would certainly have resulted, if not in defeat, at least in such an exhaustion of force as would have made the Confederates masters of the situation in the entire West.

If, in relation to the above plan of operations, the Confederate position appeared to be one of extraordinary strength, it was yet, in relation to another plan, especially vulnerable; and every formidable difficulty incident to the one plan suggested some remarkable facility connected with the other. While East Tennessee was protected from invasion by Buckner's army and three ranges of mountains, West Tennessee was only protected by two small forts weakly garrisoned, one on the Cumberland River, and the other on the Tennessee. While, on the one hand, there was access only by mountain passes and over miserable roads, on the other there were two unobstructed rivers; while an advance, in the one case, left the only possible channel of communication with any source of supplies in the hands of the enemy, in the other it was not only secure against any interruption of this nature, but, on the other hand, threatened the communications of the enemy himself. The Confederate armies at Bowling Green and Columbus, which, in relation




COMMODORE FOOTE'S GUN-BOAT FLOTILLA ON THE MISSISSIPPI.

to the one plan, were impregnable towers of strength, were, in relation to the other, not simply deficient in force, but most unfortunately situated. They held advanced positions suitable as centres of offensive operations, but without a supporting force sufficient for an aggressive campaign; and while they could not be turned by a flank movement either on their right or left, they could yet be left in the rear by the movement of Halleck's entire naval and land force between them along the courses of two rivers, which, above Forts Henry and Donelson, were entirely in possession of the Federal armies. These two rivers were the Tennessee and the Cumberland.

The course of the Cumberland, from its rise among the mountains of Eastern Kentucky, and through its extensive curvature into Tennessee on its way eastward through Nashville, and then northward through Western Kentucky until it empties into the Ohio, we have already described. The head waters of the Tennessee are separated from those of the Cumberland by the Cumberland Mountains. After the Clinch and the Holston, which are the head tributaries of the Tennessee, have united just east of Knoxville, that river takes a southwesterly course, passing a little north of Chattanooga and down into Alabama, through the northwest corner of which it again returns into Tennessee, and, after traversing the entire breadth of the latter state, runs in a course nearly parallel to that of the Cumberland through Western Kentucky, and empties into the Ohio at Paducah, ten miles below the mouth of the Cumberland, having described a course of 700 miles in length. It was the existence of these two rivers which, leading into the very heart of the Confederacy, and constituting at the same time the most rapid, convenient, and secure channel of communication with the North, transformed the plan of the spring campaign in every important particular, and exchanged a very doubtful prospect for the glorious certainty of victory; and yet their importance was ignored both by the Federals and the Confederates—by the former until Buckner's increasing army at Bowling Green had made an advance into Tennessee by way of Cumberland Gap a perilous undertaking, by the latter until a Federal advance by way of the Tennessee and Cumberland was a danger imminent and no longer to be averted. The peril to the Confederate armies which was involved in this advance was not wholly unforeseen, but it was not contemplated as one likely to be realized, or, if it should be realized, one which was likely to be of great magnitude. At an early period, General Polk, commanding at Columbus, had intended to occupy Paducah at the mouth of the Tennessee; but he was anticipated in this movement by General Grant, who took possession of the place with a small force, which, by accessions from Cape Girardeau, was increased to about 5000 men. Not gaining any foothold in this quarter, the Confederates had built two forts—Henry and Donelson—the former on the Tennessee, and the latter on the Cumberland, near the Tennessee border, and just north of the railroad from Bowling Green to Memphis, hoping that these strong-holds could be sufficiently strengthened before the Federal armies would be prepared to advance. Here, at this time, was the great weakness of the western half of the Confederacy, and both Commodore Foote and General Grant strongly favored an advance in this direction. The plan involving this movement was formed suddenly by General Halleck, and, as has been shown already, entirely transformed the main features of the campaign as originally proposed. Fortunately, all the preparations which had been made with the view of proceeding directly against Columbus were just as available for an advance down the Tennessee.

The most important element in this preparation was the naval fleet which had been constructing on the Mississippi. It had been begun by General Fremont, who had found it necessary in this way to supplement his insufficient force. This fleet consisted of a flotilla of twelve gun-boats at Cairo, carrying in all 126 guns, and of thirty-eight mortar-boats, which had been built at St. Louis, and then towed down to Cairo to receive their armament. Some of the gun-boats had been iron-clad, and cost \$89,000 each. The Benton, which was the most formidable, carried sixteen guns; the Mound City, Cincinnati, Louisville, Carondelet, St. Louis, Cairo, and Pittsburg, carried thirteen guns each; and the Lexington, Essex, Tyler, and Conestoga only nine. The mortar-boats were sixty feet long by twenty wide, surrounded by iron-plated bulwarks; and the mortars, weighing nearly a ton, with a charge of fifteen pounds of powder threw a shell three and a half miles. A portion of these boats were not yet ready for action. The entire fleet was under the command of Commodore A. H. Foote. This naval officer was a native of Connecticut. He had entered the navy as midshipman at the age of fifteen; and his memorable services against the pirates in the East Indies and against the slave-trade on the African coast had gained him an honorable fame. He was now fifty-five years of age. His strength of purpose, his unflinching energy in execution, and his Christian character placed his name among the noblest of American naval heroes.

Up to the very latest moment the Confederates were led in every possible way to expect an attack on Columbus by Halleck, and an advance by Buell into East Tennessee. This expectation on their part was doubtless heightened by quite extensive demonstrations against Columbus both on the river and by land, which were made by Grant and Foote in the middle of January. On the 7th of that month, Commodore Foote, with three gun-boats—the Essex, Lexington, and Tyler, made a reconnoissance down the Mississippi to within two miles of Columbus. At the same time, an expedition was organized by General Grant to operate by land in the same direction. This expedition was under McClelland's immediate command, and consisted of somewhat more than 5000 men, of which 4000 were infantry, 1000 cavalry, besides two batteries of light artillery. The men belonging to Schwartz's battery were the only soldiers in the entire command who were not from Illinois. On the 9th of January the cavalry crossed the river from Cairo to Fort Hall, on the eastern side, and guarded the approaches from Columbus,



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the infantry and artillery following the next day. Reconnoissances were made in all directions, and especially toward Columbus, not discovering the enemy, though coming within a mile and a half of his defenses. On the 14th, McClernand, with his whole force, took up a position north of Blandville, and commanding the road between Columbus and Paducah by the occupation of O'Neill's and the Blandville bridge across Mayfield Creek. The next day he crossed Mayfield Creek, and at Weston's General Grant came up with him. Proceeding to Milburn, ten miles east from Columbus, the expedition, at this point, might have been looked upon by General Polk either in the light of a demonstration against Columbus, or of a movement against the railroad running southward from Columbus to Union City. In the mean time General Smith had marched several columns from Paducah to Mayfield, whence communication was established with McClernand. After making this formidable demonstration in the vicinity of Columbus, the Federal troops were suddenly, on the 21st, returned to Cairo.

Movements were also made by General Buell, after the victory at Mill Spring, which indicated an advance in force into East Tennessee. The Cumberland River was crossed at Waitsborough, and a column pushed toward Cumberland Gap, while General Buell seemed to be massing his forces mainly on his left. That these operations had the designed effect on General Johnston is apparent from his sending a considerable force to Knoxville.

Just on the eve of conflict the Confederacy began to suspect that Forts Henry and Donelson were after all to be the objective points of attack. The sudden withdrawal of Grant's forces from the vicinity of Columbus, and Buell's change of front—General Thomas, instead of going to Tennessee, having turned back to Danville, forming a junction with Nelson, and thus flanking Bowling Green on the left—these movements revealed the secret of the whole campaign. The situation, from this point of view, became a critical one. Beauregard was immediately sent from Manassas to consult with Johnston in the West. It was too late, however, to readjust the elements involved in the impending conflict. The President's order for a general advance all along the line from Manassas to Columbus had gone forth, and the blow must soon fall. No forces could be spared from the eastern half of the Confederacy to Johnston's assistance; nothing but the delay of the Federal armies could relieve him. Perhaps he depended somewhat on this delay. The Federal fleet was not yet fully prepared; only a portion of the gun-boats had been iron-plated; several of the mortar-boats were yet only partly built; the Western army, also, was only partially organized. But this hope was vain. President Lincoln was determined to strike immediately with so many of the boats as were ready, and with so much of the army as could be made available for action, thinking that the Confederates would by delay gain more in the strength of their defensive positions than the Federal army would in its power to attack. And certainly, if the Confederates had been given time to re-enforce their weak positions on the Tennessee and the Cumberland, the whole prospect of the spring campaign would have been materially altered to their advantage.

The battles of Middle Creek and Mill Spring were not directly involved in the plan of the campaign, which really commenced with the operations against Fort Henry. All the preparations having been completed, General Grant, commanding at Cairo, proceeded up the Tennessee under convoy of Foote's flotilla of gun-boats. Ten regiments, with artillery and cavalry, and with three days' rations in their haversacks, embarked at Cairo, and preceded by the gun-boats, reached Paducah on Monday, February 3d. The

next morning the fleet moored on the east bank of the Tennessee, nine miles below Fort Henry. A reconnoissance was then made to detect the presence of batteries, if there were any, along the bank, and to draw the fire of the fort for the purpose of ascertaining its range. While engaged on this reconnoissance, the Essex was pierced by a 32-pound shot. No serious injury was done, but a warning was received in regard to the inefficiency of this boat, which, originally employed as a ferry-boat at St. Louis, had been remodeled and fitted up as a gun-boat. That night the troops, having landed from the transports, were encamped at Bailey's Ferry, between three and four miles north of the fort, having their encampment on an elevated ridge running parallel with the river. Wednesday was spent on both sides in making preparations. When the Federal troops landed at Bailey's Ferry, General Tilghman, commanding the fort, was absent at Fort Donelson, but, having received information of the Federal approach, he immediately returned. Colonel Heiman, in the mean time, had guarded the approach to Fort Henry, on the Dover road, with two pieces of artillery. The garrison of Fort Henry at this time—Tuesday night—consisted of little more than 2500 men. These, together with the force on the Dover road, made an army of 3200 men. It was palpably impossible to hold the position against a formidable attack. The situation of the fort itself was very unfavorable. Occupying a position not high enough above the river to be secure against the violence of the spring freshets, it was surrounded on all sides by elevated positions, which, once gained by the enemy, enfiladed its own defenses. One of these, on the opposite bank, Fort Heiman, was thought so important that it had been occupied by a small force, and had been partially fortified. On Wednesday morning two Tennessee regiments were added to the garrison, and the force at Fort Heiman was recalled. A sudden rise of the river made the situation still more unfavorable for the Confederates. It not being possible to hold the commanding positions to which we have alluded, the Confederate force was concentrated within its intrenched camp, abandoning the outer series of rifle-pits.

The day passed by without an attack. General Grant was waiting for his re-enforcements to come up from Cairo. Reconnoissances, however, were made by the Federals on the road to Dover, which led Tilghman to believe that the main portion of Grant's land forces was to be sent against Fort Donelson. It was this supposition alone which determined him to remain and abide the issues of a battle. But on Thursday morning he was undeceived. Grant had, the previous night, issued his order for Commodore Foote to attack the fort on Thursday at eleven o'clock. His plan of co-operation was to march one column, consisting of eleven regiments of McClernand's division, to a point between Forts Henry and Donelson, on the Dover road, and another, consisting of ten regiments, under General C. F. Smith, to Fort Heiman, on the west bank; both columns to advance simultaneously with the gun-boats.

Seven gun-boats—the Essex, Carondelet, Cincinnati, St. Louis, Conestoga, Tyler, and Lexington, participated in the engagement. Four of these were partially iron-clad, the Essex being less perfectly inclosed in plates than the rest. These four formed the first line of the advance on Thursday. At half past ten the boats got under way, and the prompt and gallant commodore repeated his instructions to his men. The other three iron-clads were to keep in line with the flag-ship Cincinnati. It was urged upon the officers and men that it was of the greatest importance that they should keep cool during the engagement, and fire with slowness and deliberation, both to prevent heating the guns and random firing, and also to avoid unnecessary waste of ammunition. Somewhat more than a mile north of the fort Panther Island is situated. Thus there were two channels of approach; the one on the east side being commanded by the guns of the fort, while the other, more shallow, was covered by the island. Obstructions which had been placed in the latter had been partially removed, and the high water enabled the boats to pass over those which remained without injury. Steaming up this passage slowly, so as to allow the troops on the two banks time to get into position, the four iron-clads finally appeared at the head of the island, with the three other boats closely following in their rear. Under cover of the island, they had entirely escaped the long-range fire from the fort. They now took up a position and opened upon the fort, the three boats in the rear firing over those in front. Neither the fort nor the gun-boats were able to use their entire armament, the former, out of seventeen guns, only manning eleven, while only the same number were used by the latter out of seventy-five. The Confederates had twelve guns commanding the river: one ten-inch columbiad, one rifled 24-pounder, two 42-pounders, and eight 32-pounders.

Before the bombardment had fairly commenced, Tilghman, becoming aware of Grant's movements on his right and left flanks—for such, in fact, were the movements of McClernand and Smith—disappointed and alarmed, immediately determined upon the retreat of the main body of his small army, before these operations, which would render escape impossible, should have been completed. There was no time to lose, and there was but a single avenue of retreat. In a few minutes the attack of the gun-boats would render the intrenched camp untenable, as fully two thirds of it was exposed to their fire. There was no chance of holding the fort against the preparations which Tilghman saw being made against it, and the only object of an engagement on his part would be to give time to his retreating columns. Accordingly, the order for their withdrawal to Fort Donelson was given, only the heavy artillery, with about seventy men, being left in Fort Henry. While this movement was being executed under Colonel Heiman, and the gun-boats were commencing their attack on the fort, McClernand's division was slowly making its way through the woods, and through the mud which was the result of a storm on the previous night. But for this impediment



FOOTE'S GUN-BOATS ASCENDING TO ATTACK FORT HENRY.



W. D. PORTER

the retreat of the Confederates would have been cut off and the investiture of the fort rendered complete.

The bombardment, however, proceeded successfully, the first shot being fired at half past twelve o'clock. There was no cessation in the firing, and every shot from the boats made its impression on the fort, upon which Foote concentrated his entire fire, leaving the movements going on in the rear to General Grant, who, as we have seen, was unavoidably behindhand. The action on both sides was carried on with great spirit. A single 80-pound shell disabled every one of the Confederates at one gun, and the bursting of another produced a similar catastrophe. Neither were the gun-boats unharmed. The Essex received a shot which penetrated her starboard boiler, and, filling the boat with steam, scalded her captain, W. D. Porter, and several of the crew, and she was compelled, disabled, to drift down the stream. The remaining gun-boats continued their fire, and steadily approached to within a thousand yards of the fort, and, after a hot engagement, lasting a

little over an hour, achieved the victory. Tilghman had held out until all but four of his guns were disabled and the walls of the fort were giving way, when he pulled down his flag and surrendered the fort. This stubborn resistance had been prolonged to allow the main body under Heiman time to effect its retreat. Sixty-two prisoners were surrendered with the fort, among whom were twelve commissioned and six non-commissioned officers. Tilghman, who had been induced to remain to keep up the courage of his men, and who surrendered with them, was a stout man, and courteous in his manners, though of a somewhat haughty air. He was a graduate of West Point. On the occasion of his capitulation he expressed to the commodore his willingness to surrender to so brave a man. Foote replied, "You do perfectly right in surrendering; but you should have blown me out of the water before I would have surrendered to you."

From the extent of the outworks of Fort Henry, it was evidently the intention of the Confederates to re-enforce it very strongly. The rapidity, however, with which the Federal commanders proceeded to attack, prevented this re-enforcement; and it was only the failure of General Grant to move his land forces with the requisite promptness that allowed the Confederates to escape. A pursuit was ordered, and the rear of the enemy overtaken, but nothing was gained except a few prisoners who had lagged behind on account of exhaustion, and several pieces of light artillery.

The capture of Fort Henry opened the Tennessee River to the Federal gun-boats up to the head of navigation at Florence, in Northern Alabama. Immediately after the surrender, Lieutenant S. L. Phelps, commanding the Conestoga, proceeded up the river, accompanied by the Tyler and Lexington. About twelve miles south of the fort the Memphis and Ohio Railroad from Bowling Green crosses the river, after which it continues southeast to McKenzie, and from this point communication is established with Columbus by a branch road running northwest through Union City. The main road is continued from McKenzie on to Memphis. The connection, therefore, between Bowling Green and both Columbus and Memphis depended on the railroad bridge across the Tennessee. This point was reached by Phelps a little after dark, and not only was the draw closed, but the machinery for turning it had been disabled. At the same moment, several Confederate transports were half a mile above the bridge, trying to escape up stream. A party was landed, and it took an hour to open the draw; then, the Tyler being left behind to destroy the railroad, the other two boats gave chase to the transports. Some of the latter were laden with military stores, and these had to be abandoned and fired; the concussion produced by the explosion of considerable quantities of gunpowder on board broke the skylights of the Conestoga, and raised the light upper deck from its fastenings. The house of a Union man living on the river bank was blown to pieces by the force of the explosion. Proceeding up the river to Cerro Gordo, in Hardin County, a Confederate steamer, which was being converted into a gun-boat,



ALABAMA LOYALISTS GREETING THE FEDERAL GUN-BOATS.

was captured the next day, and the day after two more at Eastport. Florence, at the foot of the Muscle Shoal, was the natural terminus of the expedition. Here a deputation of citizens waited on the lieutenant deprecating violence, and especially praying that their railroad bridge might not be destroyed. As there was no military motive to the destruction of the bridge, the request was granted. The expedition then returned. The most important feature connected with it was the exhibition, all along the route, of the Union sentiment of the people. Lieutenant Phelps, in his report, says: "We have met with the most gratifying proofs of loyalty every where across Tennessee, and in the portions of Mississippi and Alabama which we visited. Most affecting instances greeted us almost hourly. Men, women, and children, several times gathered in crowds of hundreds, shouted their welcome, and hailed their national flag with an enthusiasm there was no mistaking; it was genuine and heartfelt."

Forts Henry and Donelson, although miles in the rear of Columbus and Bowling Green, were the front and centre of the Confederate line. Henry had been captured. It only remained to carry the works at Donelson, and the centre was broken. Johnston held, and now knew that he held, a wretched line of defense. It stretched from Bowling Green to Columbus, 120 miles; was protected by less than 50,000 men; at its central position, which was as weak as it was accessible, there could not be brought up in time to be of use one third of that number. Time had from the first been a master element in this campaign. The President's Military Order had contemplated the value of moments. It was not an order to move simply,

or to prepare to move, but to move at once, even with an uncompleted armament. And after the movement had begun, time still controlled the chances and results. When Tilghman saw what was the disposition of the Federal forces on the forenoon of the 6th, he knew that he could not hold Fort Henry; yet, only to gain two hours and ten minutes, he risked an engagement, and lost twenty-one men killed and wounded, besides sixty prisoners. Those two hours' fighting netted him a profit of full 3000 men. The mud, which hindered Grant's troops moving on his flank, helped him to this result. And, now that Henry was captured, very much depended on the rapidity with which a blow could be struck at Donelson. Every day wasted amplified the defensive works of that fort, and brought behind them thousands more of defenders.

The gun-boats, however, had to be consulted in this matter of speed. It was thought impossible to do without them; they had taken Henry, and it was intended that they should play the most important part in taking Donelson. But Commodore Foote wanted time, the very thing which could not be spared. The Essex and the Cincinnati had been worsted on the 6th, and were in no condition to fight again. Of the iron-clads only the St. Louis and the Carondelet remained intact. It is true, the places of the two injured boats could be filled by others, but Fort Donelson was incomparably superior to Fort Henry in the resistance it would offer. More boats were needed; at least the two disabled ones ought to be repaired. While Foote protested on these grounds against an immediate attack on Donelson, Halleck and Grant insisted upon it as a military necessity. With the most rapid movement possible, much precious time would be consumed. The troops for Fort Henry had started with only three days' rations; the army **must**




FORT DONELSON, TENNESSEE.

be newly supplied. The prisoners, the sick, and the wounded must be attended to; new boats must be brought round from Cairo, also transports with re-enforcements; and, before the army at Fort Henry could move over from the Tennessee to the Cumberland, provision must be made for a change of base.

Tilghman had surrendered Fort Henry on Thursday; it was not until the next Wednesday, the 12th, that Grant had his entire column in motion toward Donelson, though a great portion of McClernand's division had moved the previous day. Here was a delay of six days, which, though necessary, was very costly. The distance between the two forts was twelve miles, over thickly wooded hills, broken by deep ravines, which, near the rivers, were choked with back-water. The roads were good, the weather pleasant and mild. The two main divisions of the army, McClernand's and Smith's, moved in separate columns; the strength of both, in round numbers, amounting to 20,000 men, including seventeen batteries, and from 1200 to 1500 horsemen. In the march, as in subsequent operations, McClernand kept to Smith's right. The two commands were in communication with each other early in the afternoon, within two miles of the fort. The rest of the day was occupied in manœuvring the troops into position, which was attended with slight skirmishing here and there, to test the enemy's strength and to find his line of works, a matter of great difficulty from the nature of the ground. The Confederate pickets and outstanding forces were pushed back to their defenses, and the Federal forces rested for the night on a line in general parallelism with that of the enemy. During the night batteries were posted in

the most favorable position then accessible. It was General Grant's design to make an assault the next day simultaneously with the gun-boats.

Donelson was stronger, both by nature and art, than Henry. The position was a more commanding one, and it was more strongly fortified. The course of the Cumberland from Dover, where Fort Donelson was situated, toward its mouth, was almost due north; but just before reaching the town, and in passing it, westward. Upon a bluff, rising by a gentle slope from the river, just at the bend, to the height of a hundred feet, the State of Tennessee had built Fort Donelson. The fort was on the south, or left bank, its water batteries, from an elevation of thirty feet, commanding the river as far as their guns could reach. Back of the fort extended a plateau of a hundred acres; a deep gorge broke the bluff toward the south. The town of Dover, lying just above on the river, was also on an elevation, separated from the plateau on which the fort was situated by a long valley, filled to a considerable depth with back-water from the Cumberland. The country for miles around is uneven; not mountainous, but hilly and heavily timbered. The numerous elevations that diversify the surface terminate in bluffs, whose abrupt and precipitous sides, difficult of access even to the nimble goat, lead down into rough-looking ravines. The timber on the hills immediately skirting the lines of defense had been cut down by the Confederates to secure a full sweep for artillery, and to form an extensive abattis-work obstructing the approach. To return to the fort. The table-land on which it lay was the work of art, the ground having been leveled to afford room for the fortifications and rifle-pits, which covered the entire space. By ravines along its



MAP ILLUSTRATING THE WESTERN CAMPAIGN IN FEBRUARY, 1862.

boundary the *tableau* was separated from a series of wooded hills, whose distance from the fortified line was about 800 yards.

The unfavorable feature of the defense was that the fort was so easily commanded by these neighboring ridges.

It was not until the middle of December that prominent attention was directed to the works at Henry and Donelson. "On reaching Donelson," says Tilghman, who was sent there at that time, "I found at my disposal six undisciplined companies of infantry, with an unorganized light battery, while a small water battery of two light guns constituted the available river defense. Four 32-pounders had been rightly placed, but were not available." With two forts on his hands, Tilghman found his time for preparation short. By the 25th of January, when re-enforcements were being brought up in anticipation of attack, the batteries had been completed, and a field-work, with a trace of 1000 yards, had been built in the rear of the fort, and the work of protecting the approaches by rifle-pits had been commenced. Two weeks later Fort Henry was surrendered, and the vital importance of Donelson, covering the approach to Nashville, seemed for the first time to be thoroughly understood. Beauregard and Johnston were in anxious consultation, and it was concluded between them that Nashville must be defended at Donelson—that the best engineers and the ablest generals should be sent to the fort, and all the re-enforcements which could be spared should be hurried up with all possible dispatch.

On the evening of the 6th, Heiman's command, 3000 strong, entered Donelson, with the not highly encouraging reminiscence of Foote's gun-boat fleet still clinging to them. This was the main force then occupying the defenses. Three Tennessee regiments were placed in the fort, constituting a garrison of about 1600 men. The re-enforcements which, during the next week, arrived at Donelson, came mostly from Bowling Green by railroad. General Bushrod R. Johnson came up on the 8th, and took the command until the arrival of Pillow on the 10th.

Pillow found the works incomplete. Two heavy guns for the water battery were yet unmounted; the works in the rear were deficient both in extent and strength, and competent artillerymen were lacking. It was late to make these discoveries; but prompt measures were taken to supply all deficiencies, the soldiers working in their trenches day and night. Even the tools necessary for this kind of work were so scarce that they had to be passed from one regiment to another. In the mean time artillery companies were being exercised in the use of their guns. For three days the soldiers were at work constructing rifle-pits along the first line of heights, including within its crescent the fort and water batteries, with the field-work in their rear, and also the town of Dover, which it became now an imperative necessity to defend, since it had been made a *dépôt* for supplies.

On the night of the 11th Buckner came to hand, and was placed in command of the right, near the fort. Bushrod Johnson held the left, near Dover. Between the two, prominently advanced on a strong position on the left centre, was Heiman's command. The space to be defended was a quadrangle, lined by the Cumberland on the north, by two pretty large creeks on the east and west, and on the south by the outer line of rifle-pits. The quadrangle was intersected by the wide stream of back-water running between the fort and Dover, which divided the right from the left, making it difficult to manoeuvre one division in support of another; a great disadvantage, considering the length of the line—nearly three miles. This line, distant from the river from 400 to 1200 yards, was only one third completed on Wednesday morning, when Grant started from Fort Henry.

The re-enforcements to Donelson came in by detachments, some of them so tardily that they came near being left out altogether. Buckner's division, with the exception of one regiment, was all in before the 12th of February. The Second Kentucky came in with B. R. Johnson on the 8th; Brown's brigade on the 8th and 10th. Floyd's division, which, after its reverses in West Virginia, had been sent to Tennessee, was the last to arrive. His force

consisted of four Virginia and one Mississippi regiment, and was distributed into two brigades—Wharton's and McCausland's, to which a portion of Baldwin's brigade of Buckner's division was temporarily attached. Floyd had received the order to re-enforce Donelson on the 12th. He had already, on the 7th and 8th, sent on Wharton, but was hesitating about the policy of dispatching the rest of his division. From Clarksville, on the 12th, he wrote to Johnston, urging that the main portion of the defensive force should be concentrated at Cumberland City, "leaving at Fort Donelson enough to make all possible resistance to any attack which might be made upon the fort, but no more." He thought that the character of the country made it dangerous to concentrate the entire army in the fort, and that a large body at Cumberland City should flank the Federal army attacking the fort. He also advocated the obstruction of the river to make it impassable for gun-boats.

Whatever wisdom there may have been in these suggestions, they were too late to be applicable to the occasion. Grant was already within two miles of the fort, and Floyd had hardly dispatched his letter to Johnston before peremptory orders came from the latter to advance his force immediately. Floyd had been anxious to secure the adoption of his plan; and on the 11th, when Buckner left him to join Pillow, he carried to the latter an order from Floyd for the concentration of Buckner's and his own divisions at Cumberland City. Upon a consultation between Pillow and Floyd the plan was changed, and the morning of the 13th found Floyd's whole force inside of the Confederate intrenchments. The same morning also the Forty-first and Forty-second Tennessee arrived. On this Thursday morning the defensive army probably numbered at least 15,000 men.<sup>1</sup>


On Thursday, the day set for the attack, there was but little disparity between the opposing forces; what there was favored the Federals, but it did not amount at most to more than 3000 or 4000 men. The gun-boats and transports not arriving according to appointment, another twenty-four hours' grace was given the Confederates, of which they sedulously took advantage. Federal artillery was placed on the spurs opposing the lines of defense; McClernand's division was brought up as nearly as possible to the south of Dover, so as to command the river road to Charlotte, the main outlet for escape in that direction. Oglesby's brigade held the extreme right, supported on the left by W. H. L. Wallace; Smith's division was drawn up on the left. Skirmishers had the day almost entirely to themselves. Among those on the Federal side the most famous were Birge's regiment of sharpshooters, each one of whom, in gray uniform and gray felt cap, watched from behind his stump for the appearance of Confederate heads above their defenses. The distance between these keen-eyed watchers on one side and on the other was only about 300 yards. The fire was so incessant and so fatal that the Confederates were allowed no rest except in their uncomfortable rifle-ditches, it being impossible for them to reach their tents over the ridge without exposure. These ditches, with the earth-work in front, had been, as Floyd plaintively intimates in his report, carelessly, because hastily, constructed so far from the ridge as to compel this exposure.

The great event of the day was the gallant but useless assault made by three Illinois regiments—the Seventeenth, Forty-eighth, and Forty-ninth—supported by two others, on an advanced position of Heiman's. The Forty-eighth belonged to W. H. L. Wallace's brigade, the others to Payne's. When Wallace moved in the morning to the support of Oglesby, Colonel Hayne, with the Forty-eighth, had been left near the centre in support of a battery; 500 yards to his right were posted the Seventeenth and Forty-ninth, under Colonel Morrison. Hayne moved his regiment up to these, and, assuming the command of all three at Morrison's request, prepared to storm the redoubt in their front. This redoubt, separated from them by a wooded valley, formed Heiman's right centre. Heiman's position was an elevation shaped like a V in contour. On either side a valley separated his brigade from Buckner on the right, and on the left from Drake's brigade, which occupied another elevation, and which we have hitherto considered

<sup>1</sup> In the estimate of the number of men defending Donelson the Confederate accounts are various. Lieutenant F. H. Duquecon, one of the officers engaged, reports the number as 18,000. This also was the estimate given in an account of the battle by the *Richmond Dispatch*. He ought to have had some opportunity of knowing; he belonged to the Fourteenth Mississippi, which reached Dover from Bowling Green on the 9th, and was present until Saturday noon, when he received a wound in the leg. Contrary to this is Pillow's report, which puts the number at only 13,000. The *Nashville Patriot*, in the corrected copy of its list of casualties at Donelson, gives the following estimate of the numbers engaged:

48th Tenn....	230	3d Tenn....	650 (750)	3d Miss....	500
42d " .....	498	51st " .....	80	4th " .....	535
53d " .....	280	50th " .....	650	14th " .....	475
49th " .....	300	2d Ky.....	618	20th " .....	562
30th " .....	654	8th " .....	300	26th " .....	434 (443)
18th " .....	615 (685)	7th Tex.....	300	50th Va.....	400
10th " .....	750	15th Ark....	270	51st " .....	275
26th " .....	400	27th Ala....	216	56th " .....	350
41st " .....	450 (575)	1st Miss....	280	36th " .....	250
32d " .....	558 (555)				
					11,480 (11,781)
Battalions of infantry: Colin's and Gowan's.....	330				
Battalions of cavalry: Gantt's .....	227 (800)				
Milton's .....	15				
Forrest's .....	600 (1200)				
Artillerists.....	677				
					1,849 (2,922)
Total.....					13,329 (14,703)

The numbers in the parentheses are corrections made from the reports of Confederate officers. Wherever these reports give numbers at all, they, save in one instance, exceed the corresponding ones in the list. It is fair, then, to presume that where no number is given there would also be an increase. It is certainly evident that Pillow understated his force; and it is possible that Duquecon's would, if all the data were known, prove much nearer the truth. Two things should be remembered in this connection. One is, that, on account of hurry of preparation, so urgent as to forbid the ordinary roll-call in the morning, and also by reason of the irregularity with which re-enforcements came in, as well as the confusion consequent upon the surrender, no actual estimate was made. Floyd, when questioned by the Confederate Secretary of War, was entirely ignorant of the strength of his command. It is also to be remembered that, as a rule, Confederate reports studiously underestimate the forces engaged on that side. The estimate which we have given in the text is the one given by the Confederate Lieutenant Colonel Gilmer, chief engineer of the Western Department.



INTERIOR OF WATER BATTERY AT FORT DONELSON.

as a part of Heiman's command. Heiman's advanced salient was, at this stage of the investment, the only portion of the Confederate line distinctly visible. From this point the enemy's cannon had sweep of the valley across which the Federal troops filed in approaching Dover. Through the valley on Heiman's right ran a road from Dover westward to the Tennessee; here the line of rifle-pits was broken. On this side Heiman had two regiments; in the centre was posted Maney's battery, with two regiments, supported by another on the left side. The battery was on the summit of the hill and exposed. It was opposed on the 12th by two Federal batteries, which were under cover of the woods, one of them bearing on Heiman from the right, and the other from the left, the latter bearing also on Buckner's left. These two Federal batteries had kept up a bombardment all day Wednesday, their fire being returned not only by Maney's battery, but also by Graves's on Buckner's left, and by another at Drake's position. On the morning of the 13th another battery was brought against Heiman's left, and the one bearing on his right was advanced. In the course of the forenoon the advance line of skirmishers from the Illinois troops was observed making its way through the woods. Maney began to shell the woods; Graves also kept up a fire to the right, the gunners suffering severe punishment from Federal sharpshooters. Two lieutenants fell at Maney's in quick succession, but the guns were kept in play. Meanwhile Hayne's column, at 11 o'clock, had pushed across the valley and up the hill to within forty rods of the enemy's rifle-pits. The Confederates now commenced firing along the entire line from 2000 rifles, while the three batteries kept up their thundering. The path of the approaching Federals was impeded by brushwood and fallen timber. The slaughter was abundant and merciless. Fifteen minutes of this deadly work seemed enough for endurance that in the end only promised to be bootless. The brave Illinoisans began to give way. Then they rallied again, and were repulsed; and still again, when they finally withdrew, having been under fire for nearly an hour. Colonel Morrison was severely wounded in the action, and carried from the field.

Somewhat farther to the left, and at about the same time, a less formidable though equally gallant assault was made by a portion of Lauman's brigade, the fourth of General Smith's division. This brigade consisted of four regiments, together with which Birge's Sharpshooters were associated. On Lauman's right front Cavender's 20-pound rifled Parrots had been placed in a position commanding a portion of the enemy's works, the Seventh Iowa and Birge's regiment acting as support. This had been the position on the evening of Wednesday. Thursday morning two regiments—the Fourteenth Iowa and the Twenty-fifth Indiana—were ordered to assault the Confederate line one mile from their front. The movement was over rugged ground. In the wooded ravine just beneath the position to be assailed the line was formed. The Twenty-fifth Indiana then moved up the hill, “under a most galling fire of musketry and grape,” says Lauman, “until their onward progress was obstructed by the fallen timber and brushwood.” A position was gained and held at a severe cost in life for two hours, when the regiment was ordered back out of range. In the mean time the Fourteenth Iowa had crossed a ravine and gained a position away to the right, which it held to some purpose, while Lieutenant Parrott, who, with the Seventh, was supporting the Cavender Parrots, came up between the two assailing columns, holding the centre. This position was held by Lauman's brigade till night. In addition to these assaults, a heavy cannonade was kept up all day, and nearly all night firing was continued, keeping the Confederates under arms in their trenches.

Thursday night, the weather, which had previously been genial for February, began to be cold and disagreeable; a storm of snow, mingled with sleet, caused great suffering among the troops. The change was so sudden that evidently no preparation had been made for it.

There was yet no sign of any of the gun-boats except the Carondelet, which reached Donelson on the 12th, and the next day gave the enemy a foretaste of good things to come by sending upward of one hundred and fifty shells into the fort. This was on the morning of the 13th, and was intended to aid the assaults made at that time on portions of the Confederate line. The enemy returned the fire with spirit, but most of their guns shot over the gun-boat, only two striking; one of these, a 128-pound shot, passed through the port casemate of the Carondelet, burst her steam-heater, and fell into the engine-room. No one, however, was seriously injured. During this engagement, which lasted about an hour, the Confederate Captain Dixon, of the Engineer Corps, was killed at the battery. As to the other boats besides the Carondelet, thus: Tuesday night, before Grant had left Fort Henry, the steamer Minnehaha, with Colonel Baldwin and his regiment, the Fifty-seventh Illinois, on board, came up to the fort, and transports with reinforcements were following after. These transports Grant ordered, through Baldwin, to be turned back to Paducah, whence they were to start under convoy of the gun-boat fleet for Smithland, and thence up the Cumberland to a point a few miles below Donelson, where they were to land the reinforcements the next afternoon. The Minnehaha started down the Tennessee at midnight, and reached Paducah early the next morning, having met on the way eight or ten transports loaded with troops. But it was found that only a part of the fleet were at Paducah; the remainder straggled slowly up; and it was ten o'clock on Wednesday night when the whole armament arrived at the mouth of the Cumberland.

“The scene,” writes the *Times* correspondent, “was magnificent beyond description. The night was as warm as an evening in August in our more northern latitudes; a full moon looked down from an unclouded sky, and glanced off from bayonets, plumes, and sword-hilts without number. At intervals long jets of fleecy smoke burst out along the parapets of the two forts on the heights overlooking the town, and the boom of the welcome



went reverberating over the hills, till from the long distances in Kentucky it came back like a whisper. In turns the bands on the boats charmed the ear with most eloquent music, which, added to the effect of scores of gayly-dressed ladies promenading the upper decks, gave the scene more the character of some vast drawing-room gathering; so much like was it, that no one would have been surprised had the whole crowd suddenly resolved into eddies of whirling waltzes, or the swift, changeful currents of quadrille or gallopade."

The progress of the fleet, slow enough hitherto, now began to be impeded by the downward current of the Cumberland. Forty-five miles only were made in nine hours. This brought the fleet to Eddyville, where it was greeted with vociferous demonstrations of loyalty; one gray-haired man was so affected at hearing "Yankee Doodle," that he took off his hat and gave three cheers for the Union. At midnight, Thursday, the armament reached its destination. It consisted of six gun-boats and fourteen transports. From the latter a column of 10,000 men were landed, bringing Grant's army up to 30,000 strong. These fresh troops were General Lew. Wallace's division, consisting of regiments from Ohio, Indiana, Kentucky, and Nebraska. The landing was about three miles below the fort. The distance to be traversed by these troops before they could reach McClelland's left was very great, and the march could only be accomplished by means of a circuitous route, which, avoiding the back-water west of the fort, ran around by Smith's rear along the ridges held by the Federal army. In this way it happened that Lew. Wallace's men were all day Friday getting into position.

This delay led to a new disappointment. It had been intended that, as early as possible in the day, a combined attack should be made by the gun-boats on the water batteries and by the land forces on the rear. In the latter part of the programme the new troops were given an important part, but their necessarily tardy movements prevented any operations on Friday by Grant's army except the usual skirmishing and cannonade.

The gun-boats, however, steamed up the river, and at three o'clock P.M. commenced the attack. They were six in number. Four—the St. Louis, Carondelet, Louisville, and Pittsburg—were iron-clad, each mounting thirteen guns; the other two, the Tyler and Conestoga, were wooden, mounting each nine guns. There was one boat less than the number at Fort Henry, and the conditions of the conflict were materially altered. The armament of Fort Donelson was greater than that at Fort Henry. Besides eight pieces in the main fort, there were the two batteries, mounting thirteen guns. Then, again, the water batteries at Fort Henry were of no use on account of their inferior position; those at Donelson, on the other hand, were elevated thirty or forty feet above the river. Remembering, therefore, that at Fort Henry two of his iron-clads had been disabled, it is hardly possible that Commodore Foote entered upon this engagement without serious apprehensions regarding the result. He had discovered the vulnerable points of his gun-boats, but, before he had leisure to fortify them, he was called upon to expose them again to danger.

As at Fort Henry, the wooden boats kept well to the rear of the iron-clads, which steamed up to the fort in the form of a crescent, opening fire at a distance of a mile and a half. The Confederate batteries did not reply until the boats were within point-blank range of their guns. Only twelve bow-guns could be brought to bear from the fleet; the enemy, from the fort and the batteries, worked nearly twice that number. The fleet moved slowly up into closer and closer combat, until it reached a point only about 300 yards (Pillow says 150) from the Confederate guns. Foote probably hoped that close range would make his fire more effective. From where he stood he could have reached with his shot and shell nearly every spot within the Confederate lines. But he had no time to regard the opportunity, tempting as it was. These heavy guns, belching out ruin against the sides of his vessels, must be attended to first of all. Already the shot from a ten-inch columbiad and a rifled 32-pounder were beginning to tell on his boats, and Pillow was carefully watching their effect. But the fire from the fleet also was beginning to drive the gunners from their post; only give the gun-boats fifteen minutes more, and the victory would be theirs. But just at this critical moment "two unlucky shots"<sup>1</sup> turned the tide. One, penetrating the pilot-house and mortally wounding the pilot, carried away the wheel of the St. Louis; the other disabled the tiller-ropes of the Louisville, and both vessels drifted helplessly down the stream. The frightened gunners returned to their batteries and redoubled their efforts, and soon the Pittsburg and the Carondelet followed their retiring comrades. After a fight of an hour and a half the gun-boats had been defeated with a loss of fifty-four killed and wounded; among the latter was the commodore himself, whose foot was seriously injured. A portion of the casualties was due to the bursting of a rifled gun on board the Carondelet. The Confederate batteries, well protected and well served, were essentially uninjured; according to the report of Gilmer, the Confederate chief engineer, not a man in them was killed. The wooden gun-boats, as has been said, participated in the battle only at long range, and threw curveting shell, which, passing over the Confederate works, exploded in the air above them; on board these boats there were no casualties. It may have somewhat contributed to the defeat of the gun-boats that, in the excitement natural to a situation of more imminent peril, their guns were not worked with the deliberation which more than any thing else secured success for them at Fort Henry.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> General Grant's Report.

<sup>2</sup> Foote's great difficulty for some weeks had been that he was unable to get enough men to man his gun-boats. Thus, when he was about to move against Fort Henry, he says in a letter to Secretary Welles,

"I have been obliged, for want of men, to take from the five boats remaining at Cairo all the men, except a sufficient number to man one gun-boat for the protection of that important post. . . . It is peculiarly unfortunate that we have not been able to obtain men for the flotilla, as



After the attack, the cessation of which was like the clearing up of a thunder-storm, a consultation was held between Foote and Grant, in which it was decided that the former should return to Cairo to prepare a more formidable fleet, while General Grant should complete his investiture of Donelson. To prevent Columbus from re-enforcing Donelson, the Tyler was sent around to complete the destruction of the railroad bridge just above Fort Henry. Phelps's expedition of the previous week had failed, it seems, of doing its work thoroughly at this important point. The St. Louis and the Louisville were yet in a condition to remain, and it being thought necessary to keep up a show of force, or, at the least, to protect the transports, they did remain. The next day they steamed up the river and threw a few shells into the fort; but the only serious attack made by the gun-boats was that of the 14th.

Floyd, who as senior officer assumed the chief command on his arrival, had inferred, from the close pressure of the Federal troops up to his lines, and from the pertinacity of their assaults on Thursday, that he would certainly be attacked by Grant's whole army Friday morning. We have seen already how he came to be disappointed. All the forenoon he waited in vain; there was nothing but the usual skirmishing. Doubt made the Confederate commander restless, for something on one side or the other must be done quickly. If Grant would not fight him, then he must fight Grant. Of the two alternatives he very much preferred the former, remembering the assaults of yesterday; every repetition of these assaults exhausted the assailant. At last, after waiting nearly all day, the matter was decided for him; at three o'clock the gun-boats attacked in front, but the accompaniment of assault in the rear was not forthcoming. The gun-boats were driven away disabled, beaten. But, in spite of the shouts of victory arising from the two water batteries, Floyd had been disappointed. "I was satisfied," he says, "from the incidents of the last two days, that the enemy did not intend again to give us battle in our trenches. They had been fairly repulsed, with very heavy slaughter, upon every effort to storm our position, and it was but fair to infer that they would not again renew the unavailing attempt at our dislodgment, when certain means to effect the same end without loss were perfectly at their command. We were aware of the fact that extremely heavy re-enforcements had been continually arriving, day and night, for three days and nights,<sup>1</sup> and I had no doubt whatever that their whole available force on the Western waters could and would be concentrated here, if it was deemed necessary, to reduce our position. There was no place within our intrenchments but could be reached by the enemy's artillery from their boats or their batteries. It was but fair to infer that, while they kept up a sufficient fire upon our intrenchments to keep our men from sleep and prevent repose, their object was merely to give time to pass a column above us on the river, both on the right and left banks, and thus to cut off all our communication, and to prevent the possibility of egress."

It was Floyd's policy, therefore, to fight the enemy at the earliest possible moment. But it was too late to accomplish any thing that day. A little after dark, at Floyd's summons, all the division and brigade commanders of the Confederate army were gathered together for consultation at General Pillow's head-quarters. It was then and there unanimously agreed that an attack should be made, in accordance with Floyd's proposition, the next morning, for the purpose of cutting their way out into the open country southward. It fell upon Pillow and Buckner to plan the attack. The situation to be considered was this: there were three roads leading southward from Dover. One of these closely skirted the river for a distance of twelve or fifteen miles, then branched off toward Charlotte. Another ran farther to the west, connecting with the former road and also with Charlotte. The third, still farther west, is mentioned in the Confederate reports as the Wynn's Ferry road. Across these roads stood Oglesby's and W. H. L. Wallace's brigades—in fact, the great body of McClelland's division. Lew. Wallace's division held the ridge on the left of the Wynn's Ferry road. Every one of these roads was strongly fortified by Grant with 24-pound siege guns. In order to secure a retreat, Grant's right must be defeated and rolled up on his centre. But how dispose the forces for this attack? This was the great difficulty. Pillow's force alone, estimated by himself at 7000, including Floyd's, was incompetent for such a task; it was necessary that the great bulk of the three corps under Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner should be massed against the Federal right. Yet the proposition submitted by Pillow was that Buckner should lend him Hanson's Second Kentucky regiment, and that, with this and the troops already intrenched on the left, he (Pillow) would roll up Grant's right to a point opposite Buckner, where the latter should attack in flank and rear, and the enemy be driven to his gun-boats. A very satisfactory operation, if it could be accomplished. But one thing the over-sanguine Pillow had lost sight of in his calculations: if he should fail in his part, as most probably he must, then the battle would have been ventured in vain. Buckner, demurring to this impossible plan, had one of his own to

they only are wanting to enable me to have at this moment eleven full-manned, instead of seven partially-manned, gun-boats ready for efficient operations at any point. The volunteers from the army to go in the gun-boats exceed the number of men required, but the derangement of companies and regiments, in permitting them to leave, is the reason assigned for not more than fifty of the number having been thus far transferred to the flotilla."

Again, starting for Donelson:

"I leave again to-night with the Louisville, Pittsburg, and St. Louis for the Cumberland River, to co-operate with the army in the attack on Fort Donelson. I go reluctantly, as we are very short of men, and transferring men from vessel to vessel, as we have to do, is having a very demoralizing effect upon them. Twenty-eight men ran off to-day (Feb. 11), hearing that they were again to be sent out of their vessels. I do hope that 600 men will be sent immediately. I shall do all in my power to render the gun-boats effective in the fight, although they are not properly manned; but I must go, as General Halleck wishes it. If we could wait ten days, and I had men, I could go with eight mortar boats and six armored boats."

<sup>1</sup> This was not true. The only considerable body of re-enforcements which had reached Grant by Friday night were Lew. Wallace's division. It was true, however, that Grant intended to complete the investment of Floyd's position, if it took 50,000 men to accomplish it.

suggest, which certainly was wiser, though it was doubtful if any more good would come out of it than from Pillow's. His plan was, that, leaving a regiment or two in his intrenchments on the right, he would move his command up near to Pillow's, and, while the latter attacked Grant's right, he would attack the right centre, "and, if successful, take up a position in advance of the works on the Wynn's Ferry road, to cover the retreat of the whole army." Buckner also lost sight of the fact that, in leaving his lines on the left, he left them open to the enemy. But this circumstance was of no serious moment except in the event of a failure in the main assault; but in that very possible event all would be lost! General Buckner's plan prevailed.

The night which followed—that of Friday—was as bitterly cold as the preceding. The next morning opened with a cold and cheerless sky. Pillow had ordered his men under arms at half past four, to march out of their works at five, more than an hour before light, but a halting brigade made the time of march fifteen minutes past five.

Baldwin's brigade, consisting of a Mississippi and a Tennessee regiment, had the advance, moving along the road west of the river road. A third of a mile on the march, and the enemy was found in some force. Baldwin found great difficulty in manœuvring. The Twenty-sixth Mississippi, in front, was three times broken up in disorder while deploying. On the left of the road was an open field of 400 or 500 acres, open to the enemy's fire. The Twenty-sixth Mississippi having been formed on the right, and the Twenty-sixth Tennessee filling up a gap still left between that regiment and the road, and also holding the road itself, Pillow sent the Twentieth Mississippi around to the left in the open field just mentioned, where it was only food for powder, and was soon afterward withdrawn. By this time Baldwin's right was re-enforced by the arrival of McCausland's Virginians and other regiments, while his left was strengthened by Wharton's brigade. Pillow's entire force operating against the Federal right was, at his own estimate, not less than 7000 strong.

The attack was wholly unexpected by the Federals, who were taken at considerable disadvantage. The several brigades of McClelland's division were very much detached from each other, and the difficulty of support was heightened by the masses of tangled brushwood, black-jack, and dense undergrowth of trees, which made the manœuvre troublesome. Opposed to the advancing column of attack was a portion of Oglesby's brigade, a few Illinois regiments, who held the road, inadequately supported by artillery.

At first the advanced Federal regiments occupied the crest of the hill at the foot of which Baldwin, McCausland, and Wharton were deploying their forces. The troops on both sides were mostly under cover of the woods—a circumstance which concealed the immense volume of the Confederate assault. Part way up the slope the Confederate column advanced and watched its opportunity, skirmishing and sharp-shooting, in the mean while, actively going on. Wharton tried to gain way in the open field on the left, but a storm of Minié balls kept him back. After an hour's skirmishing, the left of the column, under General Johnson, pushed up a ravine around to the left, flanking the Illinoisans, a dozen Confederate batteries in the mean while crashing the woods with their missiles. Hitherto Oglesby's favorable position had baffled the enemy's advance. The Confederate troops, many of them raw recruits, required "extraordinary exertions on the part of their field and company officers to prevent their being thrown back in confusion to their trenches."<sup>1</sup> But the movement to the left drove Oglesby's right back to another position. Here a determined attack was made, met by an equally determined resistance.

The battle extended along the lines, involving, at seven A.M., two regiments of W. H. L. Wallace's brigade, supporting Oglesby on the left. These were the Eleventh and Twentieth Illinois, under Ransom and Marsh. A Confederate column charged up the hill in their front, and gained the road—the one west of the river road—but were repulsed, giving way to a fresh line, which advanced boldly to repeat the assault. Wallace brought nearly his entire brigade, consisting of 3400 men, upon the hill, and, with the assistance of Taylor's and McAllister's batteries, again and again drove back the defiant foe.

It was now half past eight o'clock, and re-enforcements from the centre of the line, held by Lew. Wallace, were moving past to the extreme right, which, bent out of its original line, was yet obstinately disputing every step of ground. Lew. Wallace's division had been awakened in the morning by the noise of battle far away to their right, and had supposed that Oglesby was attacking the enemy. At eight o'clock a message came from McClelland asking for assistance. Wallace had been ordered to hold the centre at all risks, to prevent the enemy's escape in that direction. A messenger was dispatched to Grant's head-quarters, but the latter was on one of the gun-boats, consulting with Foote in regard to the possibilities of another naval attack. Lew. Wallace, receiving a second and more urgent message from McClelland, stating that his flank had already been turned, sent forthwith Colonel Cruft's brigade. This brigade, consisting of two Indiana and two Kentucky regiments, moved on to the woods beyond Taylor's battery, and nearly to the extreme right of the line. Here it became engaged with a column of the enemy emerging from a ravine in Oglesby's rear.

Oglesby's brigade, which had held on till the last, was now getting out of ammunition. Graves's battery, from the Confederate intrenchments, had now more effective range than it had had all the morning, and thinned the ranks at every discharge. In good order the brigade gave way, breaking through Cruft's line in its retreat, and leaving the latter fearfully exposed to the sweeping fire of the enemy's infantry and artillery. Cruft had been misled by his guide, and had taken a position too far to the right, which he was

<sup>1</sup> See Baldwin's Report.

soon compelled to abandon. Every thing now seemed to depend upon the steadfastness of W. H. L. Wallace's brigade. Upon his batteries, from three separate and commanding situations, the Confederate artillery was pouring its vials of wrath. Looking out upon his right hand, he could see Pillow's columns already pressing upon his rear. Between his brigade and them only a single regiment of Oglesby's command remained on the field. That regiment was the Thirty-first Illinois, commanded by Colonel John A. Logan, late a Congressman from Illinois, but who, at the beginning of the war, had resigned his seat for the colonelcy of this regiment. Colonel Logan had been wounded in the thigh, but he still kept his post. Having ordered the surgeon to dress his wound, he again went to the front, remarking that he had fired twenty-two rounds since his hurt, and he could fire at least as many more now that the wound was dressed. His regiment partook of his dauntless spirit, and remained on the field till the last cartridge was gone.

Matters were now, indeed, getting on rather badly in McClernand's division, and they got on worse and worse until nearly noon, when the Confederates had gained their first point, having pushed him off of the two roads to Charlotte. They had also captured a portion of his artillery. Swartz's battery they had taken and lost, and taken again. A part of McAllister's battery was also captured. McClernand's whole line was retreating, but in good order. "He did not retreat," says Pillow, "but fell back, fighting us and contesting every inch of ground." It had taken Pillow from six o'clock till noon to perform his part of the day's work, viz., to roll McClernand back upon Lew. Wallace, upon the Wynn's Ferry road. But where was Buckner?



LEWIS WALLACE.

Going back, then, to trace Buckner's progress during the day, we find it in the morning considerably behind time in its operations. In the first place, it had to wait for Head's regiment to come up from Heiman's left to take possession of the abandoned lines. In the second place, the roads were slippery with ice, and in the darkness this was a great inconvenience. The fight was already in progress with McClernand when Buckner reached the rifle-pits on the right of Pillow's previous line. Here, as the tardy regiments came up, the line was formed near the point where the Wynn's Ferry road crossed Pillow's intrenchments. Colonel John C. Brown's brigade, consisting of three Tennessee regiments, partly held the rifle-pits, and was partly held in reserve. Graves's battery was placed at the left of the road, bearing on two Federal batteries in its front, one on the road, the other opposite Buckner's left. This battery also gave a good share of its attention, as has been already seen, to McClernand's brigades on the Federal right, who were contesting the field with Pillow, and who were already gradually giving way.

Buckner's attack proceeded from a point on Heiman's left. The latter, however, kept his original position, and Drake, who had the day before held the hill on his left, was now with Pillow. Buckner's command amounted to over 4000 men. Not wishing to waste his force by assaults, he intended simply to hold his position and await the issue of the battle, which was now culminating on his left. But Pillow needed a more active co-operation than this; Buckner must relieve him by an advance. At nine Buckner was made to understand this, and sent the Fourteenth Mississippi, supported by two of his Tennessee regiments, against the batteries in his front, while Graves sent his compliments entirely to the Federal right, his fire in front being masked by Buckner's advance. Yesterday these compliments were lightly

thought of—"Valentines" the soldiers called them facetiously—it was the middle of February—but to-day it was more serious. Graves's artillery made more impression than even Buckner's advance. While McClernand's right was retiring, exhausted of ammunition, his left was pushing the Confederates back to their defenses. Here Buckner, thwarted, crouched till noonday, when Pillow, who had almost forgotten him in the excitement of his partial victory, began to bethink himself of his military partner—of operations then due on the Wynn's Ferry road.

Accompanied by Gilmer, he rode across the field, and found Buckner where we have just left him, resting behind his intrenchments, and contemplating the strength of the two Federal batteries yonder in his front. But that would not take the batteries. A movement was quickly made, at Pillow's order, flanking them on their left and rear, while Pillow himself, with Forrest, his right-hand cavalry-man, who had been harassing Oglesby's and W. H. L. Wallace's rear, made a charge from the right. The batteries were driven back, leaving four pieces in the hands of the enemy. Buckner had gone around by way of the valley just off Heiman's left, and now his forces joined those of Pillow, who had come round from the other side.

Now, if ever, was the time for this Confederate army, or "our people"—as Floyd, in his peculiar but unmilitary style, expresses himself—to escape southward toward Nashville. The route to Charlotte was open, and now the Wynn's Ferry road also was clear. This evidently was the design from the beginning. With a view to this, all the regiments had taken with them blankets and knapsacks, with three days' rations. But the excitement of successful pursuit made a mere escape appear a tame and unworthy consummation of so costly a victory. Why not continue the movement against Lew. Wallace, and then against Smith himself, and sweep Grant's army entirely away from the front of Donelson? This question was not modestly nor wisely answered by Pillow and his associates in command. It was forgotten that, although a portion of Grant's army, unprepared for assault, had been met and beaten in detail, the attack could no longer have this advantage. The fight had already lasted six hours; the regiments which had been driven had retired slowly, and were by no means demoralized. Many of these regiments had already had time to recover themselves, and with the troops yet untouched in their rear, presented a firm and irresistible front to their now well-nigh exhausted enemy. Nor this alone; but it was probable that in two hours more Floyd's army would itself be driven, and the avenue of escape which was now open be again closed against it. All this was forgotten in the excitement of victorious advance.

Instead of the whole army escaping by the river route to Charlotte, only Baldwin's two regiments remained on this route, B. R. Johnson having hurried off the others to the right for a new battle.

Lew. Wallace had not been idle all this time. After sending Cruft's brigade to McClernand's assistance, it was not long before fugitives from the right crowded in confusion upon his rear, and a mounted officer came galloping down the road, shouting, "We are cut to pieces!" To remain stationary longer would invite panic. Tayer's brigade was moved forward, with Wallace himself in advance. The junior Wallace, Oglesby, and McArthur, with portions of their brigades, were almost immediately met retiring in good order, and calling for more ammunition. The enemy was following close upon these. Between Pillow's advance and the retiring troops Tayer's brigade was interposed, being advanced to the tip of the ridge, and there formed in a line at right angles with the old one. This was the nucleus for a new front. Wood's battery, a portion of the Chicago light artillery, was posted in the road along which the enemy must advance—at its right an Illinois and Nebraska, and at its left an Illinois and Ohio regiment. Two Illinois and an Ohio regiment were held in reserve. In the mean time, McClernand's men were refilling their cartridge-boxes. Cruft's brigade had joined Tayer's on the right, and Taylor's battery was brought to bear on the enemy, whose advance was now completely checked. Now the waves of battle began to flow backward against the Confederates.

At three o'clock General Grant rode up the hill and ordered an advance against the retiring ranks of the enemy. At McClernand's request, Lew. Wallace, whose troops were comparatively fresh, undertook the assault. Cruft's brigade, headed by the Eighth Missouri and the Eleventh Indiana, from Smith's division, with two Ohio regiments in reserve, formed the assailing column. The ground to be gained was in great part the same which had been given up in the forenoon. Across the valley or extended ravine in Wallace's front was the ridge which had been last yielded. Here the Confederates were re-forming their line. Up this ridge a charge was made by two Missouri and Indiana regiments, led by Colonel M. L. Smith, while Cruft moved around the base of the hill to the right. Before Smith lay an ascent of one hundred and fifty yards, "broken by outcropping ledges of rock, and, for the most part, impeded by dense underbrush." Cruft had to make his way around upon the enemy's flank through brushwood. At intervals up the hill Smith's skirmishers were rapidly advanced, and a lively bushwhacking followed between them and the Confederate pickets, each side taking shelter, as opportunity offered, behind rock and tree. Slowly the two regiments followed, and, when less than fifty yards had been gained, received a volley from the hill-top. It now fared hard with the skirmishers. Smith ordered his men to lay down, and when the violence of the fire was exhausted, they rose again and pushed on up the hill. Thus falling when the fire was hottest, and then rising again, they at last reached the top, and Cruft at the same time attacking the enemy on the hill-side, the ridge was cleared. The fight and pursuit lasted for two hours, and by five o'clock the enemy had entirely disappeared from the field, taking refuge in his intrenchments.

While this was going on along the Wynn's Ferry road, an assault was

also being made by Smith's division on Buckner's intrenchments. While Buckner was yet on his way back to his lines the storm fell upon Head's almost solitary regiment, which had been distributed along the rifle-pits for a distance of three quarters of a mile. The regiment altogether only numbered a little over 400 men fit for duty. These had been sharp-shooting all the forenoon. At two o'clock Buckner's men began to return to their rifle-pits, but in great disorder. An attack was made by Smith before Hanson's regiment, which was the first to return, had got into position.

General Smith's troops were fresh, and impatient to take part in the action. His division consisted of four Iowa, three Indiana, two Illinois, and one Missouri regiment. Three of these, the Second and Seventh Iowa, and the Twenty-fifth Indiana, supported by others, were selected for the assault, the main column of the division making a feint farther to the right. The ground to be gained was more precipitous and difficult than elsewhere along the lines.

The assault was undertaken under cover of Stone's Missouri battery. The regiments engaged in it were not surpassed by any in the service. It was at the head of the Second Iowa that General Lyon charged and fell at the battle of Wilson's Creek. After the fight had lasted an hour at the right of the entire Confederate line, this regiment made an onset and gained a portion of the rifle-pits. Stone's battery was brought forward, and although two regiments were ordered up from the fort, and others of Buckner's were now at hand, it was impossible for the enemy to regain what he had lost. This position enfiladed the entire right of the defenses of Donelson, and, if darkness had not intervened, Buckner's force would have been immediately routed.

The day had come to a close—a day of uninterrupted battle. For the first time during the war had it occurred that all day long an engagement had been continued between the two opposing armies. The troops engaged on either side must be credited with distinguished bravery. It was on this occasion, for the first time, that Southerners admitted that Northern troops would fight as well as their own, and even then it was given out that this was true of the Western troops alone. Those engaged on the Confederate side were mostly from Tennessee and Mississippi; those on the Federal mostly from Illinois. From the latter state were at least twenty-nine regiments, four of which were of artillery; from Iowa there were six regiments; from Indiana the same number; from Kentucky there were two, and from Missouri three. If these troops—and many of them were raw recruits—had not been pretty richly endowed with Western "grit," there is no doubt but that Pillow would have effected his design and delivered his army. But although, for nearly four hours, Oglesby almost entirely alone bore the brunt of the tremendous blow aimed at the Federal right, there was no flinching, and, until the ammunition gave out, there was no retreat. They so severely punished the Confederates that even after the latter had, by an obstinate contest of six hours, gained possession of the roads leading southward from Dover, they were no longer in a condition for the escape which they had fought to secure.

In a battle so severe, the casualties were on both sides remarkably small. Grant gives no definite estimate of losses in his report, but sets them in the rough at not less than 1200, which is far beneath the true figure.<sup>1</sup> Pillow estimates his losses at 2000. The list of Federal losses are especially remarkable for the number of field-officers killed and wounded. The two regiments which lost more than any others were the Eleventh and Thirty-first Illinois, these two being the last to give way when McClernand was driven. The loss of the Eleventh Indiana was almost half that of Wallace's entire brigade. It was the resolution with which both officers and men resisted the overwhelming attack of Pillow and Johnson that gained the day for the Federals. "We came to take that fort," said Oglesby, "and we will take it!" This was the sentiment of Grant's entire army.

That night the Confederate generals held a second council of war about midnight. It had taken till 12 o'clock to bury the Confederate dead. As on the previous night, the place of meeting was at General Pillow's headquarters in Dover. Floyd was there, and Pillow, attended by his aids, and Buckner, and in the course of the consultation Colonel Forrest made his appearance. The council was held under circumstances of ill omen. "Our people" had made a desperate fight, but the gateways of escape which it had forced open were now shut against it. This had been clearly ascertained by scouts, who had returned with the gloomy intelligence that the Federal camp-fires were in the same positions as on Friday night. Forrest did not believe this testimony, but ocular evidence satisfied him of its truth. At one o'clock orders had been given for the entire command to be under arms at four o'clock in the morning, to march out on the road to Charlotte. Now these orders would have to be rescinded. And there was no other way of escape. Floyd had at night sent up the river to Nashville

<sup>1</sup> The following is the list of casualties as given in the officers' reports immediately after the battle:

Twenty-fifth Kentucky.....	84	Second Iowa.....	198
Thirty-first Indiana.....	69	Twenty-fifth Indiana.....	115
Seventeenth Kentucky.....	40	Seventh Iowa.....	39
Forty-fourth Indiana.....	43	Birge's Sharpshooters.....	4
Eleventh Illinois.....	330	Eighth Missouri.....	45
Twentieth Illinois.....	133	Eleventh Indiana.....	34
Forty-eighth Illinois.....	42	Twelfth Iowa.....	30
Forty-fifth Illinois.....	22	Taylor's Battery.....	9
Seventeenth Illinois.....	81	McAllister's Battery.....	2
Forty-ninth Illinois.....	68	Total.....	1388

Less than half the regiments are here represented. The greatest number of casualties of course befell McClernand's division, Smith's suffering hardly any. Not a regiment of Oglesby's or Thayer's brigade is represented in this list; yet Oglesby must have suffered more in proportion than any other brigade engaged. W. H. Wallace's brigade lost 637. If we put Oglesby's loss at only 700, we have, together with the numbers given in the list, a little over 2000, without including Thayer's losses.

all the boats, with the wounded, and three hundred Federal prisoners which had been captured during the day, so that even this outlet was closed. The scene at Pillow's head-quarters at about three o'clock on Sunday morning had all the interest of a drama. The following dialogue will represent in substance the consultation which followed after the report of the investment of Dover had been made by the scouts.

FLOYD. "Well, gentlemen, what is now best to be done?"

Profound silence.

FLOYD (again). "General Pillow, what do you think it is best to do?"

PILLOW. "I think that we had better adhere to our previous resolution to cut our way out, sir."

FLOYD. "Well, General Buckner, what do you think it is best to do?"

BUCKNER. "We can try to cut our way out, as we did yesterday, but we should lose three fourths of our command, sir. I can not hold my position for half an hour after daylight. If I attempt to take my force out I shall be seen by these fellows that have ensconced themselves in part of my intrenchments. They will surely cut me to pieces!"

COLONEL FORREST. "But I will cover you with my cavalry."

BUCKNER. "That will make no difference. We can not cut our way out without its costing us three fourths of our men."

FLOYD. "I concur with General Buckner."

PILLOW. "If we can fight them another day in the trenches, by to-morrow we can have boats enough here to transport our troops across the river, and let them make their escape to Clarksville."

BUCKNER. "It will be impossible for me to hold my position for half an hour, as I have already informed you."

PILLOW. "But why can't you hold your position? I think you can hold your position; I think you can, sir."

BUCKNER (a little touched). "I know my position better, perhaps, than you do, sir. I can only bring four thousand men to bear against the enemy, while he can oppose me with any given number. You, gentlemen, know that yesterday morning I considered the Second Kentucky, Colonel Hanson's regiment, as good a regiment as any in the service; yet such was their condition yesterday afternoon, that, when I learned the enemy was in their trenches (which were to our extreme right, and detached from the others), before I could rally and form them, I had to take at least twenty men by the shoulders, and put them into line as a nucleus for formation."

FLOYD. "It is evident, as General Buckner says, that we can no longer hold out in the trenches. What shall we do?"

BUCKNER. "The other alternative, it appears to me, is a plain one. We can surrender. It is an alternative which we can accept without dishonor, considering our determined resistance of yesterday. To repeat that resistance to-morrow would cost three fourths of the command—a sacrifice which no commander has a right to make."

FLOYD. "We will have to capitulate; but, gentlemen, I can not surrender; you know my position with the Federals; it wouldn't do—it wouldn't do!"

PILLOW (still bent on "cutting out"). "I will neither surrender myself nor my command; I will die first!"

BUCKNER. "Then I suppose, gentlemen, the surrender will devolve upon me?"

FLOYD (looking out for the main chance). "General, if you are put in the command, will you allow me to take my brigade out by the river?"

BUCKNER. "Yes, sir, if you move your command before the enemy act upon my communication offering to capitulate."

FLOYD. "Then, sir, I surrender my command."

PILLOW (angrily). "I will not accept it; I will never surrender!"

BUCKNER (calling for pen, ink, and paper, and not forgetting the bugler). "I will accept, and share the fate of my command."

Floyd, Pillow, and Forrest then began to busy themselves about getting out of the way. The former escaped with about fifteen hundred men, one half of his command, on board the steamer General Anderson and another smaller boat. These had come down at about daybreak from Nashville. Curiously, considering the state of affairs at Donelson, one of these boats brought down four hundred raw troops. The manner of proceeding with the escape was to cross the river with a boat-load of troops, and then to return for more. Pillow and his staff got across in a small flat-boat, four feet by twelve, procured for him by an aid-de-camp, making their way to Clarksville by land. Forrest in the mean time, with a portion of his command, "cut out" by crossing the back-water on the left, and appear to have had an unpleasant time of it. To say nothing of the water, which was "saddle-skirt deep," the weather was so intensely cold that "a great many of the men were frostbitten, and it was the opinion of the generals that the infantry could not have passed through the water and have survived it." The two hundred were brave fellows, but Gantt, and Wilcox, and Henry—Forrest's subordinates—preferred to remain with Buckner, and were surrendered.

The scene at the river, where Floyd was embarking his "people" became exciting as the morning light grew more distinct. All Floyd's brigade, with the exception of the Twentieth Mississippi, consisted of Virginians under Wharton and McCausland. For these latter he showed the preference; they were embarked first; and, "to prevent stragglers from going aboard," Colonel Brown, commanding the Mississippi regiment, was directed to place a strong guard around the steam-boat landing. The boats had only come down a short time before daylight, and the rumor that the position was to be surrendered spreading through the camps, a multitude of soldiers flocked to the river "almost panic-stricken and frantic," hoping to escape. But the Twentieth Mississippi "stood like a stone wall." After several trips

had been made, and nearly all of the Virginia regiments taken across, Buckner, who had already capitulated, began to grow uneasy, and ordered the boat to leave the landing, threatening, in case of delay, to send a shell in that direction.

Thus the night and morning with the Confederate army. Outside of their intrenchments, meanwhile, was a painful and heart-sickening scene. Thousands of dead and wounded were lying on the bloody field. On such a night, to be helpless from severe wounds was a suffering less dreadful than death itself, for it was bitter cold. Where Lew. Wallace's division held the battlefield, the terrible sufferings of these helpless soldiers were, so far as possible, relieved. The ground, according to Wallace's report, "was thickly strewn with the dead of McClelland's regiments. The number of Illinoisans there found mournfully attested the desperation of the battle, and how firmly they had fought it. All night, and till far in the morning, my soldiers, generous as they were gallant, were engaged in ministering to and removing their own wounded and the wounded of the first division, not forgetting those of the enemy."

As morning broke upon the Federal ranks, it found them on all sides drawn up ready for an assault on Donelson, in conjunction with an attack by the two gun-boats which Foote had left behind. Before the action was commenced a white flag was seen above Fort Donelson, the sound of Buckner's bugle was heard, and the following note came directed to General Grant from General Buckner:

"SIR,—In consideration of all the circumstances governing the present situation of affairs at this station, I propose to the commanding officer of the Federal forces the appointment of commissioners to agree upon terms of capitulation of the forces and post under my command, and in that view suggest an armistice until twelve o'clock to-day. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
S. B. BUCKNER."

To which General Grant replied:

"Yours of this date, proposing an armistice and appointment of commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received. No terms other than an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted.

"I propose to move immediately upon your works. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
U. S. GRANT."

This elicited from General Buckner the following remarkable answer:

"SIR,—The distribution of the forces under my command, incident to an unexpected change of commanders, and the overwhelming force under your command, compel me, notwithstanding the brilliant success of the Confederate arms yesterday, to accept the ungenerous and unchivalrous terms which you propose. I am, sir, your very obedient servant,  
S. B. BUCKNER."

The Fifty-eighth Ohio Volunteers was the first regiment on the enemy's battery, and, immediately upon possession, its band opened with the "Star Spangled Banner."<sup>1</sup>

At the lowest estimate, 10,000 men were surrendered with the fort, besides forty pieces of artillery. Grant estimated the number of prisoners at from 12,000 to 15,000. The prisoners were, for the most part, dressed in citizens' clothes, having no military mark except black stripes on the pants. The officers had on gray uniforms, and were distinguished from Federals holding similar rank by the great profusion of gold lace. Most of the Tennessee regiments had enlisted only for twelve months, and had received no pay since they had entered the service.<sup>2</sup>

The results of the victory at Donelson distinguished it above any victory which had hitherto been gained in American history. The prisoners taken would have made a larger army than Scott led in Mexico. It was not merely a siege, but a great battle. In his congratulatory order to his troops General Grant said:

"The victory achieved is not only great in the effect it will have in breaking down rebellion, but has secured the greatest number of prisoners of war ever taken in any battle on this continent." And surely he did not overstep the limits of a becoming modesty in adding, "Fort Donelson will hereafter be marked in capitals on the map of our united country, and the men who fought the battle will live in the memory of a grateful people."

Very soon after the surrender of Donelson both General Floyd and General Pillow were relieved of their commands.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The German colonel, Bausenwein, commanding the Fifty-eighth, was full of innocent rapture over the Confederate booty. In his report to the adjutant general he breaks out in this wise: "I have some 4000 muskets, revolvers, Bowie-knives, etc., now under guard, and thousands of tents, provisions of enormous bulk (!)—in fact, every thing of war implements. Hundreds of horses and mules! Our company officers walk no more; they are supplied with Secesh saddles, horses, and mules, and happiness beams from their eyes and lips!"

<sup>2</sup> As regards the disposition made of the prisoners the following order will inform the reader:

"SPECIAL ORDER.

"Head-quarters, Army in the Field, Fort Donelson, February 16, 1862.

"All prisoners taken at the surrender of Fort Donelson will be collected as rapidly as practicable, near the village of Dover, under their respective company and regimental commanders, or in such manner as may be deemed best by Brigadier General S. B. Buckner, and will receive two days' rations preparatory to embarking for Cairo. Prisoners are to be allowed their clothing, blankets, and such private property as may be carried about the person, and commissioned officers will be allowed their side-arms. By order  
U. S. GRANT, Brig. Gen."

<sup>3</sup> The Confederate Congress commenced its session two days after the capture of Donelson. Just one week after the capture, Jefferson Davis was inaugurated as President of the Confederate States under the auspices of a permanent government. It is hardly any wonder that Mr. Davis should have resented the echoes of disaster coming to his ears at such a time. It was an ill omen for the so-styled permanent government. His resentment was certainly not diminished by the consciousness that he himself was responsible for the defeat. Anxious to divert popular vengeance from his own freshly-crowned head, he, on the 11th of March, sent to Congress, together with the official reports of the battle, the following special message:

"Executive Department.


"I transmit herewith copies of such official reports as have been received at the War Department of the defense and fall of Fort Donelson. They will be found incomplete and unsatisfactory. Instructions have been given to furnish farther information upon the several points not made intel-



HOWING GREEN, ARKANSAS.

The more immediate results of the Federal victory were the evacuation of Bowling Green and Columbus by the Confederates. While the battle was being fought on Saturday, General A. S. Johnston was already at Nashville, awaiting the arrival of his command from Bowling Green.

The column dispatched by Buell against Bowling Green consisted of General Ormsby M. Mitchell's (third) division. General Mitchell was a na-



ORMSBY MCKNIGHT MITCHELL.

ligible by the reports. It is not stated that re-enforcements were at any time asked for; nor is it demonstrated to have been impossible to have saved the army by evacuating the position; nor is it known by what means it was found practicable to withdraw a part of the garrison, leaving the remainder to surrender; nor upon what authority or principles of action the senior general aban-

doned responsibility by transferring the command to a junior officer. In a former communication to Congress I presented the propriety of a suspension of judgment in relation to the disaster at Fort Donelson until official reports could be received. I regret that the information now furnished is so defective. In the mean time, hopeful that satisfactory explanation may be made, I have directed, upon the exhibition of the case as presented by the two senior generals, that they should be relieved from command, to await farther orders whenever a reliable judgment can be rendered on the merits of the case.

JEFFERSON DAVIS."

The charges intimated in the above were more specifically stated by H. B. Brewster, the Confederate A. A. General, in the following communication, addressed to Generals Floyd and Pillow, March 16:

"Under date of March 4 the Secretary of War says: 'The reports of Generals Floyd and Pillow are unsatisfactory, and the President directs that both these generals be relieved from command till farther orders.' He farther requests General Johnston 'in the mean time to request them to add to their reports such statements as they may deem proper on the following points:

"1st. The failure to give timely notice of the insufficiency of the garrison of Fort Donelson to repel attack.

"2d. The failure of any attempt to save the army by evacuating the post when found untenable.

"3d. Why they abandoned the command to their inferior officer, instead of executing themselves whatever measure was deemed proper for the entire army.

"4th. What was the precise mode by which each effected his escape from the post, and what dangers were encountered in the retreat.

"5th. Upon what principle a selection was made of particular troops, being certain regiments of the senior general's brigade, etc."

The different answers made by the two generals to these charges were characteristic. Pillow was manly but independent; and inasmuch as he had himself advised an effort to escape with the entire army, he could hardly have felt the burden of blame resting very heavily on his shoulders; still he answered as if the charges applied to himself as much as to any body. In regard to the failure to give timely notice of the need of re-enforcements, he said that up to Friday, the 14th, there was no such need; but if there had been, General Johnston had no men to spare. In this case it was clearly, as it appeared to him, the best policy to fight their way out. He seemed inclined to blame Buckner, as indeed he had reason to, for having failed to do his part of the work on Saturday, and thus enabling the enemy to recover himself. It was his own opinion that the assault might have been again tried with success on Sunday; but this was only his private opinion; and when the command was delivered over to him, he could not act upon it in the face of Buckner's and Floyd's assertion that it would cost three fourths of the army.

Poor Floyd, on the other hand, feeling that the onus of complaint unavoidably rested on himself, was disposed to resent the charges and to kick them back in the President's face.

In the first place, he had planned the whole defense to suit himself, but stupid Johnston did not agree to his plans. He knew that Johnston's whole army could not repel the Federal advance up the Cumberland. He considered the fort illy chosen, to begin with. Then, again, it had only thirteen guns, and only three of these were available against iron-clads. [Pretty well available, we should say, considering the results of the gun-boat fight on Friday!] He did not call for re-enforcements because he thought there were already troops enough in the miserable fort, considering that it was only a trap after all. He thought the main object of the defense at Donelson was to gain time for Johnston to evacuate Bowling Green with all his supplies and munitions of war.


Hold Donelson, indeed! Why, it could not be held except with a force of 95,000 men; 50,000 at the fort, 20,000 at Clarksville, and 25,000 more at Nashville. What use, then, of making



GENERAL MITCHELL'S DIVISION CROSSING GREEN RIVER, FEBRUARY, 1862.



NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE.



RAILROAD BRIDGE ACROSS THE CUMBERLAND AT NASHVILLE.

Bowling Green, a distance of forty-two miles. The town was occupied on the 15th without resistance, only three regiments of the enemy remaining behind. Both of the bridges across the Big Barren River were destroyed, and the Confederates had succeeded in shipping all their artillery to Nashville. In the mean time, Johnston, as we have said, was at Nashville directing operations, and awaiting the event of the battle at Donelson. Up to the latest moment Pillow promised him success. So late as Saturday night that sanguine officer telegraphed to him, "On the honor of a soldier, the day is ours!" The telegram was received at midnight, and Nashville rang with the jubilations of an excited people. At dawn the news came of the surrender of the fort. Then cheers were exchanged for a tumult of fear. It was Sabbath morning, and the good people of the town were at church thanking God for a great victory, when Governor Harris galloped through the streets of the capital proclaiming that Donelson had fallen, and their army had been captured, and that at any moment the enemy might come down upon them. In an excited, hurried manner he summoned the state Legislature, and adjourned it to Memphis, leaving by a special train in the afternoon himself with the state archives. A scene of the utmost confusion followed. If the city had become the victim of a universal conflagration, the panic could scarcely have been greater. The churches were broken up, the streets were crowded with weeping women, and the side-walks were filled with trunks and baggage thrown hastily out of the houses, and sometimes from the third story windows. The more reckless of the citizens abandoned themselves to plunder. In the midst of this general and confused exodus, General Johnston's army might have been seen moving across

an ado about a re-enforcement of a dozen or so thousands of men, which would be but a drop in the bucket.

As to the "failure of any attempt to save the army by evacuating the post when found untenable," this seemed to Floyd a biting sarcasm on Jeff. Davis's part. Pray, what had the bloody fight of the 15th meant, if it was not an "attempt to save the army by evacuating the fort." But perhaps the President was not satisfied because the attempt, unsuccessful on Saturday, was not repeated on Sunday. He would remind the President that "there is such a thing as human exhaustion—an end of physical ability in men to march and fight—however little such a contingency may seem possible to those who quietly sleep upon soft beds, who fare sumptuously every day, and have never tried the exposure of protracted battles and hard campaigns." Floyd then begins to grow somewhat extravagant in his details of what his army had suffered; he speaks pathetically of "the conflict, toil, and excitement of unsuspended battle running through eighty-four hours."<sup>(1)</sup> His excited imagination sees three Federal soldiers where there was but one. How was this force, six times his own, to be thrust aside? Then, besides, if his soldiers should cut their way out, "they would have to march over a battle-field strewn with corpses."<sup>(1)</sup>

The remaining charges related chiefly to Floyd's escape with a good part of his own division after a surrender had been determined upon. This was easily explained. There were two boats, and these came so late that it was impossible for only a small part of the army to escape. The senior general preferred, of course, to save his own troops to any others.

However ludicrous some parts of Floyd's report may appear, his arguments, on the whole, were perfectly just and reasonable. Like Tilghman at Fort Henry, Floyd could, by the defense of Donelson, effect nothing, except to gain time for Johnston to form a new line more defensible farther south. Donelson was, indeed, nothing else but a "trap," as Floyd called it; and if any one was culpable for setting this trap, it was Jefferson Davis himself. He had placed the Confederate army of the West in a situation adapted neither to offensive nor defensive operations, being too feeble for the former, and disposed in the worst possible manner for the latter.

the Cumberland, with a long train following, which did not get over all night. Floyd had got up with his small detachment, and now remained as a rear guard until the retreat should be accomplished. On the following Thursday he too took his departure.


There was sufficient reason why Nashville should have been abandoned, but there was hardly any occasion for the panic which crazed its citizens, who expected to see the gun-boats coming up before sundown. General Johnston had received the tidings of defeat as early as four o'clock Sunday morning. If he had issued a simple proclamation to quiet the natural alarm of the citizens, the tumult which followed would have been avoided. He left all this in the governor's hands, who only made matters worse. It was true that Nashville was no longer tenable. The city had no natural situation which could be made available for defense. Good turnpike roads led to it from all sides, and through it ran the Cumberland, navigable for the Federal fleet. Johnston's engineer reported that the city could not be held by a force less than 50,000 strong. This, however, was only ground for the removal of the army, and need only have disturbed such of the citizens as were particularly desirous of leaving their homes and property for the sake of sharing the fortunes of the Confederacy. But that which moved the citizens of Nashville was not so much disinterested patriotism as mortal terror. The Southern leaders had studiously endeavored, and in a great measure had succeeded in producing a popular impression among the people that within the lines of the Federal armies they were secure from no violence. This had been the impression ever since Beauregard had said that "Beauty and booty" was the motto of the Union soldiers.<sup>1</sup>

The day after the surrender of Donelson, Commodore Foote, though still suffering from his wound, left Cairo with eight mortar-boats, two iron-clads, and the Conestoga, for another advance up the Cumberland—this time against Clarksville, a fortified position on the river, about fifty miles below Nashville, and on the Virginia Railroad. On the 20th, Clarksville, abandoned by its garrison, fell into Foote's hands. The railroad bridge across the river had been destroyed. The commodore, at the request of the mayor and other prominent citizens, issued a proclamation, guaranteeing safety to such citizens as chose to remain in the city. General Smith was left in command, while Foote returned to Donelson to prepare an expedition against Nashville. Buell had already sent large re-enforcements to Grant. A portion of these, under General Nelson, accompanied Foote on transports. These

<sup>1</sup> The following, from the Nashville *Banner of Peace* of about this date, indicates the manner in which this impression had been produced:

"We have felt too secure, we have been too blind to the consequence of Federal success. If they succeed, we shall see plunder; insult to old and young, male and female; murder of innocents; release of slaves, and causing them to drive and insult their masters and mistresses in the most menial services; the land laid waste; houses burned; banks and private coffers robbed; cotton and every valuable taken away before our eyes, and a brutal and drunken soldiery turned loose upon us."





COLUMBUS, KENTUCKY.

troops occupied the capital without opposition. General Buell himself arrived on the 26th, and issued a proclamation, the object of which was to secure the citizens of Nashville from spoliation or injury. By this order, soldiers were "forbidden to enter the residences or grounds of any citizens on any plea, without authority."


The next day, General Grant, accompanied by his staff, came up from Clarksville. Among other of the citizens, they called on Mrs. James K. Polk, the wife of a late President of the United States. This lady, then about fifty years of age, had all her life been associated with the South, and her sympathies were clearly with the Confederate rather than with the United States government. But these sympathies she did not express, from a courteous regard for her visitors. "She hoped that the tomb of her husband" (which was in a corner of the beautiful garden, surrounded by cedars and magnolias) "would protect her household from insult and her property from pillage; farther than this, she expected nothing from the United States, and desired nothing."

The Confederate government, by their too hasty abandonment of Nashville, lost a large amount of stores. These consisted especially of clothing and commissary supplies. The mob had, for the most part, taken care of this property. Floyd had great difficulty in driving off the greedy crowd. The Confederate quarter-master left the city eight days before the arrival of the Federal army; if he had remained, he could doubtless have saved property amounting in value to hundreds of thousands.

With remarkable rapidity, it was now proposed to move on Columbus with Foote's fleet. This was needless, as already General Beauregard had ordered Polk to evacuate that strongly fortified place, and to adopt a position on the river farther south. The position selected by Polk was Island No. 10, the main land in Madrid Bend, on the Tennessee shore, and New

Madrid, on the opposite bank. Island No. 10 was about ten miles below Columbus. Defensive works had been thrown up at these points the previous autumn, and heavy batteries were being constructed. On the 25th orders were issued for the removal of the sick, preparatory to the evacuation of Columbus. Two days afterward General McGown was assigned to the command of the new position, his division being ordered thither February 27. The commissary, quarter-master's, and ordnance stores had all been removed, and afterward the heavy guns. March 1, Polk's entire army, except the cavalry, evacuated Columbus—General Stuart's brigade moving, by way of the river, to New Madrid, the remainder by land to Union City. On the 3d, two days after Polk and his staff left the works, a scouting party, consisting of a portion of the Second Illinois cavalry, sent from Paducah by General Sherman, took possession of the town. The next day the fleet came down, and three regiments, under Generals Cullum and Sherman, took permanent possession.

The campaign commenced on the 1st of February had now terminated. It had been brief, but decisive. It had lasted but one month, but it was a continued series of victories. It renewed the enthusiasm of a people which had grown tired of waiting for results. Grant and Foote—the two heroes of this campaign—came before the people bearing splendid trophies in their hands. Henry, Donelson, Bowling Green, Nashville, and Columbus—all reduced within a period of thirty days—appeared to Unionists to speak prophetically of the fate awaiting all Confederate strong-holds. A month ago, and one half of Kentucky was firmly held in the grasp of the Confederate armies; now, not only that state, but the greater part of Tennessee also, was restored to Federal allegiance. Hopes were entertained that another year of vigorous work would bring back all the seceded states.



THE CAPITOL AT NASHVILLE.