



WATER BATTERIES AT COLUMBUS.

CHAPTER V.

KENTUCKY AND MISSOURI.

Neutrality of Kentucky.—Her Devotion to the Union.—Governor Magoffin's Position.—Confederate Occupation of Columbus.—Grant at Paducah.—Proceedings of the Legislature.—Its Address to the People of Kentucky.—Zollicoffer's Invasion.—Buckner's Operations.—Importance of Columbus.—Jeff. Thompson.—Battle near Fredericktown.—Battle of Belmont.—Object of the Battle.—The Retreat.—Losses.—McClelland's Address.—The Situation in Central Kentucky.—Skirmish at Munfordsville.—Nelson's Operations in Eastern Kentucky.—Battle at Pikeville.—Missouri.—General Fremont's Department.—Confederate Plans.—McCalloch, Pillow, Hardee, and Thompson.—Fremont's Proclamation.—Skirmishes.—Advance of Price.—Siege of Lexington.—Mulligan's Surrender.—Price's Retreat and Fremont's Advance.—Price's Proclamation.—Zagonyi's Charge.—Fremont's Removal.—Hunter's Retreat.—Advance of Price to the Osage.—Battle of Milford.—The Confederate Retreat.—The Situation at the close of 1861.—McClellan appointed General-in-chief.—Reorganization of the Western Armies.—The new Commanders.—McClellan's Instructions.—His Plans in the West.


UNTIL the autumn of 1861, Kentucky had quite successfully maintained a perfectly neutral position as regards any active participation in the war on either side. Her governor, Beriah Magoffin, had curtly replied to the President's call for troops in April, that Kentucky would "furnish no men for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern states;" and he had also given the President to understand that no Federal troops were desired within the limits of that state. And, as no direct assistance was given to the Confederacy, and a like restriction was laid upon the Confederate forces, the general government had, as a matter of policy, respected this neutral position. Whatever may have been the secret inclination of the governor toward the Confederacy, the people of the state and its Legislature were, in the main, loyal to the Union. In the election of members of Congress, called to meet in special session on the 4th of July, 1861, every district but one elected strong Union men; and the election for members of the Legislature in August had a similar result. This disposition of the state, as soon as it became apparent to the Confederates, aroused their indignation, and it was openly proposed in the South to cut off all commercial intercourse with the Kentuckians. The New Orleans Delta of August 20th declared: "We will not pay the 'Blue Grass' country of Kentucky for its loyalty to Lincoln by opening our markets to its hemp fabrics. We must discriminate in favor of our gallant ally, Missouri, and give her the benefit of our marts in preference to either open foes or insidious neutrals. It is the clear duty of our government to declare Kentucky under blockade." This was certainly a very impolitic suggestion; for, at this very moment, the government at Washington was considering in what way it might completely cut off the Confederacy from the one sole communication now open to it from the North, viz., by the Louisville and Nashville Railroad; and it was only by reason of its reluctance to irritate the people of Kentucky that the Federal government hesitated to lay its positive embargo upon this road, by which the South was every day gaining every thing and

losing nothing. It seems strange, therefore, that at this juncture Tennessee herself should have put out her hand and shut to the door of her prison-house. This stopped the passage of cotton, rice, and turpentine to Louisville; but it also shut out from Tennessee a rich supply of grain and pork, which at this time were of the greatest value to the South.

It became immediately evident that Kentucky must take an active part in the war on one side or the other. The prevailing sentiment of the people was in favor of the Union. But the southern portion of the state was in great part secessionist, and it was the cherished plan of the Confederacy to take advantage of this by throwing a large force into the counties just across the border. Measures were taken to carry out this plan, and early in August the Confederate Congress had passed an act authorizing enlistments in Kentucky. A Federal force also was being collected together at "Camp Dick Robinson," under General Nelson, for the purpose of insuring protection to loyal citizens. This led to a correspondence between the governor and the President, the former demanding the removal of this force, and the latter refusing to comply with the demand.

When the Legislature met, on September 5th, the governor, in his message, insisted on neutrality, and recommended that a force be raised by the state for its own defense, and that all other military bodies should be disbanded. But on this same day the Legislature was notified that Confederate troops had invaded the state, occupying and fortifying strong positions at Hickman and Chalk Bluffs. The invading force, which was commanded by Leonidas Polk, also occupied Columbus, that commander giving as a reason for so doing that he was only anticipating the occupation of the place by a Federal force, which intended, if not to take direct possession of Columbus, at least to plant batteries on the Missouri side of the river so as to command the town. Thus the neutrality of Kentucky was ended forever. It is a matter of little consequence whether it was a Federal or a Confederate force which first entered the state, since the purpose of either must have regarded, not Kentucky, but the main issue of the war, which had already assumed such proportions that it overleaped all ordinary boundaries, and the geographical position of Kentucky made it absolutely necessary that the state should become the most important arena of the coming campaign. Two days after the occupation of Columbus, General Grant, accompanied by two gun-boats, took possession of Paducah, at the mouth of the Tennessee, and a few miles above Cairo; and extensive preparations were made by the Federal government to resist the advance northward of the Confederates.

Polk had insisted upon it as a condition of his own withdrawal that the Federal forces in the state should likewise be removed. The Legislature, however, decided that the very mention of any condition of this nature was an insult to Kentucky, and passed a resolution demanding the unconditional withdrawal of the Confederate forces. The proceedings of the Legislature



LEONIDAS POLK.

during the rest of the month were honorable both to itself and to the state. The State Guard was disarmed; a series of resolutions was passed, requesting Major Anderson to take command of the military forces in the state, and indicating the stern resolution of the people to repel the invasion upon which the Confederates had so daringly entered; and, upon the veto of these resolutions by Governor Magoffin, they were passed by the requisite vote over his veto. A bill also was passed authorizing the Military Board to borrow three million of dollars, in addition to the million authorized May 24th. Another bill was passed calling out forty thousand volunteers, and one tendering the thanks of the Legislature to Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana, for prompt and needed assistance in forwarding troops for the defense of the state. A resolution was voted demanding the resignation of Senators Breckenridge and Powell; and at the close of the session, an address, memorable for its patriotism, was issued to the people of the state. In this latter, the condition of the state is briefly summed up in the following terms:

"Every effort was made for compromise and settlement. The Federal government did not insist upon our active aid in furnishing troops, seeming content if we obeyed the laws. Those engaged in the rebellion, however, planted camps of soldiers all along our southern border, seized by military power the stock of our railroad, impudently enlisted soldiers upon our soil, made constant raids into this state, robbed us of our property, insulted our people, and seized and carried off our citizens. Thus exposed to wrongs, with no power to prevent them, some of our citizens formed camps under the Federal government for the defense and protection of the state. In this condition we found Kentucky when the Legislature met on the first Monday in September. We were assured by the President of the Confederate States that our position should be respected; but the ink was scarcely dry with which the promise was written when we were startled by the news that our soil was invaded, and towns in the southwest of our state occupied by Confederate armies. Our warnings to leave were only answered by another invasion in the southeastern portion of the state. These sudden irruptions of such magnitude, skillfully directed, show that the assault on Kentucky was preconcerted, prepared, and intended long before. Thrice have the revolutionists appealed to the ballot-box in this state, and thrice have the people expressed by overwhelming majorities their determination to stand by the Union and its government. The attempt to destroy the union of these States we believe to be a crime not only against Kentucky, but against all mankind; but up to this time we have left to others to vindicate by arms the integrity of the government. The Union is not only assailed now, but Kentucky is herself threatened with subjugation. We have no choice but action, prompt and decided. Let us show to insolent invaders that Kentucky belongs to Kentuckians, and that Kentucky's valor will vindicate her honor."

This position was fully supported by the people. In the mean time, while General Polk was invading the western portion of the state, Zollicoffer was operating in the southeast. A slight skirmish took place on the 17th of September at Barbourville; and, to give notice of his hostile approach, Zollicoffer, on the same day, telegraphed to the state authorities that the safety of Tennessee necessitated his occupation of Cumberland and the long mountains of Kentucky, and that he had accordingly taken possession.

A month afterward he met with a severe repulse at Camp Wild-cat, in Laurel County. He had nearly eight thousand men, including two regiments of cavalry, which he had determined to bring against Colonel Garrard's Kentucky regiment; but the latter was speedily re-enforced, and the entire command given to General Schoepf, who maintained his position, which was one of great natural strength, against the repeated assaults of a foe numerically superior to his own. At about the same time, General Buckner was operating on the line of the railroad between Louisville and Nashville, in the central portion of Kentucky. On the 21st of September General Anderson assumed command both of the state and national forces.


The Confederate force at Columbus—more formidable than any other in the state—was soon increased to thirteen regiments, with six field and one siege battery, and three battalions of cavalry. It had also three steamers on the river. This force was concentrated at Columbus, which was strongly fortified, as also was Hickman, twenty-five miles farther south. The strength which was massed at Columbus was not only to be feared for its bearings on the campaign in Kentucky, but from the ease with which it might exert a decisive influence upon military operations in Missouri. One of the strongest motives which led to the Confederate occupation of Kentucky was the desperate state of affairs in Missouri. Arkansas had failed to support General Price. The battle of Wilson's Creek, which had been won with so great sacrifice and against terrible odds by the Federal forces under Lyon and Sigel, had interposed a check against the advance of the combined armies of the Confederacy from which they could not readily recover. McCulloch had withdrawn to Arkansas with his forces, leaving Price to continue the campaign as best he might. All eyes were turned to Columbus for a retrieval of the fortunes of the Confederacy in the West. In the early part of November it would have been very practicable for General Polk to disturb our military operations on the west of the Mississippi. It was to prevent a disturbance of this nature that the battle of Belmont was fought early in November. For three weeks Jeff. Thompson had been pushing his way up the river into Missouri. In the middle of October, from his camp in St. Francois County, he had issued one of his characteristic proclamations.

"Patriots of Washington, Jefferson, Ste. Genevieve, St. Francois, and Iron Counties!" exclaims he, "I have thrown myself into your midst to offer you an opportunity to cast off the yoke you have unwillingly worn so long. Come to me and I will assist you, and drive the invaders from your soil or die with you among your native hills. Soldiers from Iowa, Nebraska, and Illinois, go home! we want you not here, and we thirst not for your blood. We have not invaded your states; we have not polluted your hearthstones; therefore leave us, and, after we have wiped out the Hessians and Tories, we will be your friendly neighbors if we can not be your brothers!"

A few days later found him at Fredericktown, a little farther in the interior of Missouri, with a force of thirty-five hundred men. At Pilot Knob, a short distance north of this point, were three or four Federal regiments. General Grant immediately formed a combination which in two days completely routed Thompson, sending him southward at a somewhat brisker rate of speed than had marked his advance. This is the proper place to speak of this engagement, although it occurred in Missouri, because Thompson's movements so entirely depended upon co-operation from Columbus. A force of fifteen hundred men, under Colonel Plummer, of the 11th Missouri, was dispatched along the road from Jackson to Dallas, to move upon Fredericktown in such a manner as to cut off Thompson's retreat, and, co-operating with Colonel Carlin at Pilot Knob, to compel an engagement, greatly to the disadvantage of the enemy. Upon his approach, Plummer sent to Pilot Knob a messenger, with a letter, informing Carlin of his intention to attack the enemy on Monday, October 21st, and requesting co-oper-



STERLING PRICE.



PILLOW KNOB, MISSOURI.

ation in front. This letter was intercepted by the enemy, and Thompson fell back about a mile from Fredericktown on the Greenville road, and there awaited attack. Through the information thus gained by the enemy an important advantage had been lost; yet by the re-enforcement which Plummer might have from Pilot Knob, and the superior artillery force which was at his disposal, the chances of success were yet all on his side. Accordingly, on Monday, he advanced against the enemy, who were commanded by Thompson and Lowe, attacked them, and, after a spirited fight, in which he received very important aid from Major Schofield, of the 1st Missouri Light Artillery, he drove the enemy routed from the field. The Confederate Colonel Lowe was killed in the engagement; and of the Federal officers, Major Gavitt and Captain Hingham were killed. The pursuit was kept up with considerable vigor. To prevent any interference from Columbus with columns sent to continue this pursuit was one of the chief objects of the movement against Belmont.

Belmont is just opposite Columbus, on the western or Missouri side of the river, and at this time was held by a small Confederate force under Colonel Tappan. Columbus itself was so strongly garrisoned that it would have been useless for General Grant, with the force at his disposal, to have attempted either a siege or an assault upon that strong-hold; and Belmont, being entirely commanded by the guns of Columbus, was worth nothing as a military position without the latter. The movement, then, as is also evident from written statements of General Grant previous to the battle, was of the nature of a reconnoissance, with the objects already indicated.

As soon as General Polk had any notice of our approach, he anticipated that Columbus would be directly attacked, and General Grant had taken special pains to make him think so, by sending General Smith (commanding at Paducah) with a considerable force, which marched in two columns, the one on Mayfield, and the other to within a few miles of Columbus; and, to help on the effect of this demonstration, a small detachment was ordered to Ellicott's Mills, twelve miles from Columbus, on the Kentucky side. These movements were made simply for the purpose of misleading the Confederate commander. Grant's forces, in the mean time, started from Cairo on the evening of November 6th, a great part of them being under the immediate command of General McClelland, and also landed on the Kentucky side of the river, nine miles below Cairo. In this way the enemy was entirely put off his guard as to Belmont, the point of direct approach. When, at daylight the next morning, Grant and McClelland's forces landed on the Missouri side, a short distance from Belmont, then it was that Polk's attention was for the first time turned in this direction, and he sent Pillow across from Columbus to support Tappan, still supposing, however, that Columbus was the main object of attack.

Pillow had crossed not a moment too soon; for the Federal army had

promptly formed their line of battle, and driven in the Confederate outposts and sentries, and, having left a battalion in reserve near the transports, companies were thrown out as skirmishers, and in a few minutes the general engagement ensued. Grant's whole force, with the exception of his reserve, was thrown out in skirmishing columns, which led to a useless waste of his strength; whereas, if he had known the weakness of the enemy on the field at his first arrival, he might have literally crushed him by a sudden onset with his full force, and before the arrival of re-enforcements. The Confederates were driven back to their encampment—a strong position, lumber having been felled for several hundred yards about it, and an abattis formed. General McClelland, at the onset, attempted to outflank the enemy's right wing, and cut off re-enforcements from Columbus. Here the struggle was continued with great severity for half an hour; but Betzhoven's battery kept him back, and the attempt failed. Not so, however, in the centre. Here the attack was so vigorous that the enemy's line was almost immediately broken and the men thrown into confusion. Pillow was obliged to bring up his reserve of artillery, consisting of two batteries and a half, with which he kept the Federal army in check until he had restored communication between the two wings of his army. But his efforts to recover himself proved unavailing; for he had no sooner made his arrangements for a spirited resistance, than it was reported to him that three of his regiments and his most important battery were out of ammunition. Only one course was left him in this extremity, and that was to keep the battery in position, and to make a bayonet charge with the three otherwise defeated regiments, trusting to Polk to send him speedily the help which every moment he needed. But the commander at Columbus, still believing that his own position was in jeopardy, hesitated and held back assistance until Pillow had sent message after message, and was completely exhausted. Grant, seeing how matters stood, pushed his advantage to the utmost, and by furious and repeated onsets carried the abattis, and drove the enemy, foot by foot, and from tree to tree, pell-mell down the banks of the river, and within protection of the guns of Columbus. Pillow's division was so severely cut up that not a single company remained intact, and the whole body were crowded together in confusion.

But here the defeated enemy was re-enforced by several thousand fresh troops, and Grant was attacked in front, flank, and rear, and was in danger of being cut off from his transports. To prevent this, he retreated, the Confederates all the time charging upon his ranks, until he came up with his reserve, when he collected his forces together, and, ordering up fresh regiments and artillery from his reserve, recommenced the contest. Throwing his forces with great fury against General Cheatham's division, which was leisurely approaching, he broke the ranks of the latter, and, advancing his batteries close to the banks of the river, opened a murderous fire upon Pil-



WILLIAM NELSON.

low's flank and upon some steamers, which, with re-enforcements, were crossing the river from Columbus. Then the heavy guns of Columbus poured in their cannonade upon the battle-field, and were answered by Federal cannon from Belmont. It soon became evident, however, that so many re-enforcements had been sent across that it would be impossible for General Grant's men, who had been engaged from half past ten in the morning until five in the afternoon, to successfully hold their ground, and a retreat was again ordered. The enemy had been re-enforced to about thirteen thousand men, a force nearly three times as large as our own, and closely followed the retreating, but really victorious army of General Grant. The latter retreated in good order, embarked upon his transports, and left a battle-field which he had certainly won, but could not hope to keep. Our loss in killed, wounded, and missing was, according to General Grant's report, one hundred and eighty-four; that of the enemy was, by their own admission, over two thousand. Yet the battle was claimed by the Confederates on the ground that Grant was unable to hold the field.

After the battle, McClelland issued the following address to his soldiers:

"Few of you had ever seen a battle. You were imperfectly disciplined, and had inferior arms; yet you marched upon a concealed enemy superior in numbers, and on ground of their own choosing. You drove them steadily for two miles of continued fighting, and forced them to seek shelter under the heavy batteries at Columbus. You drove them from their position and destroyed their camp, bringing with you, on retiring, two hundred prisoners, two field-pieces, and a large amount of other property. Re-enforced from Columbus, they formed in large numbers in your rear to cut you off, while the heavy guns of Columbus were playing upon your ranks. Fighting the same ground over again, you drove them a second time. A portion of the command, becoming separated from the rest, made a successful and well-ordered movement by another route, and returned to the river. After a day of fatiguing marches, fighting as you marched, having been nearly six hours actually engaged, you re-embarked and returned to your camp."

Turning from the western to the central portion of the state, we find military movements in progress on a very extensive scale, Louisville, on the Ohio, being the head-quarters of the Union Department. When General Anderson assumed the command of this department, September 21, General Buckner was at Bowling Green, on the railroad between Louisville and Nashville, about seventy-one miles from the latter. This was an important military position, being at the junction of two roads leading into Tennessee. Buckner had been led to believe that, if he should come to Louisville, or even to Bowling Green, with a competent force, he would receive re-enforcements by thousands; but he hardly got a regiment, and kept very close to Bowling Green, in the southern part of Kentucky, though he had made a boast that he would winter in Louisville.

In the month of November great accumulations of Federal troops were collecting together from the states north of the Ohio River; and by the 1st of December there was in Kentucky alone an army of seventy thousand men, of which twenty thousand were citizens of the state. About four thousand of these were located at "Camp Dick Robinson," in Garrard County. This vast force had nothing between it and Nashville, and therefore noth-

ing between it and the virtual occupation of the State of Tennessee, except the army of Buckner, numbering thirty thousand men. No hostile collision between these two opposing forces occurred with the exception of an unimportant, though uncommonly severe skirmish at Munfordsville, on the Green River, and a few miles north of Bowling Green, on the road to Louisville. This action took place on the 17th of December, on the south bank of the river; but only a few companies were engaged, and the result had no bearings upon the general issue.

In the southeast, Zollicoffer, whom we left at Barbourville after his repulse at Camp Wild-cat, advanced, on the 10th of December, with strong force toward Somerset, compelling Schoepf, who occupied that town with a Federal division, to retire. The Confederate commander then encamped at Mill Spring, where he fortified his position, and remained until his overwhelming defeat at that place early in 1862.

General Nelson was in command of a small Federal force which he had been organizing in the eastern portion of the state, on the Virginia border. On the 2d of November he occupied Prestonburg, on the west fork of the Big Sandy. From Prestonburg he moved upon Pikeville in two columns, one of which, under Colonel Sill, was sent by a circuitous route to attack Colonel Williams in the rear, while Nelson, with the other, took the direct river route. Williams, who occupied Pikeville with about a thousand troops, made every preparation to offer a vigorous resistance. Two hundred of his men waited in ambush for General Nelson's advance (under Colonel Marshall) about twelve miles down the river from Pikeville. The Federal troops had had a very difficult march through the mud and rain, and, besides this, were living on half rations; but their resistance was successful, and the next day the Confederate force made an unconditional surrender. This short campaign of General Nelson, lasting only twenty days, drove the rebels from the eastern part of Kentucky.

Thus closed the year's campaign in Kentucky. General Anderson, on account of ill health, had resigned his command; and Sherman, his successor, for the same reason, gave way to Buell, who, with his head-quarters at Louisville, took command of the new army that was accumulating at the close of the year.

After the death of Lyon, who had given his life to wrest Missouri from the tightening grasp of the Confederacy, the burden, not only of responsibility, but of active duty in the field, rested upon Fremont, who assumed the command of the West a short time before the battle of Wilson's Creek. General John C. Fremont, a native of Georgia, of French descent, reared and educated in South Carolina, and afterward distinguished as an engineer and explorer, was appointed colonel of the United States Army in 1846, and commanded a battalion in the Mexican War. He was the first candidate of the Republican party for the presidency, but failed of being elected. At the breaking out of the war in 1861, Fremont was in Paris; but, receiving information of the events of April, he immediately purchased a large quantity of arms for the government, and returned to his native country in June. In July he received his commission as major general with the following order: "The State of Illinois, and the states and territories west of the Mississippi and on this side of the Rocky Mountains, including New Mexico, will in future constitute a separate command, to be known as the Western Department, under the command of Major General Fremont, of the United States Army, head-quarters at St. Louis." We have previously stated the



JOHN C. FREMONT.



GEN. McCULLOCH.

difficulties incident to this command, which were very much heightened by the necessities of the Eastern Department. It was under these difficulties that the hard-contested battle of Wilson's Creek had been fought. This battle, however, so severely punished the Confederate army that it did not venture any farther advance; and as forces were rapidly accumulating under the President's new call, every month's delay was favorable to our army in the West.

In the mean time, large bodies of Confederate troops were collecting in the southeastern part of the state, threatening Cairo. The western portion of Missouri had furnished a great number of recruits, which were accumulated together at points most available for a contemplated advance against Cairo and St. Louis. McCulloch, after the battle of Wilson's Creek, had returned to Arkansas, and was recruiting his wasted strength from the border counties. Pillow was at New Madrid, on the Mississippi, with an army of about thirty thousand men; while Hardee occupied Greenville, east from Cairo, on the St. Francis River, with five thousand men; and Thompson, still nearer Cairo, was collecting a large force of disloyal Missourians. With this combination of forces, the Confederate generals were confident of their ability to drive our forces north of the Missouri River before the end of August.

It was under these circumstances that Fremont issued a proclamation declaring Missouri under martial law, and ordering that all persons taken with arms in their hands within the lines of his army—lines extending from Leavenworth, by way of the posts of Jefferson City, Rolla, and Ironton, to Cape Girardeau on the Mississippi—should be tried by court-martial, and, if found guilty, should be shot; also that the property, real and personal, of all persons in the state, who should take up arms against the United States, or who should be directly proven to have taken active part with their enemies in the field, should be confiscated to the public use, and their slaves, if they had any, should be declared free. This proclamation, so far as it related to slavery, was afterward modified by President Lincoln to suit the provisions of the Confiscation Act, passed by Congress August 6th, 1861.

This proclamation of Fremont called forth a counter-proclamation from Jeff. Thompson at Camp Hunter, wherein the latter most solemnly promised that for every member of the Missouri State Guard, or soldier in alliance with them, who should be put to death in pursuance of Fremont's order, he would hang, draw, and quarter a Union man in retaliation. Fremont's measure, in its main features, seemed to be necessary to restore quiet in the state. Neither life nor property were secure from violence; murders were committed by the wholesale; bridges were ruthlessly destroyed; and every where indiscriminate plunder and outrage attempted to shelter itself under the Confederate flag, and to claim privileges not even accorded to regularly organized combatants.

The month of September was for the most part a month of preparation on the Federal side. There was considerable skirmishing. Thus, during the first week of the month, Colonel Williams, with about eleven hundred national troops—Kansas and Iowa Third—was compelled to retreat from Shelbina, in Northern Missouri, before a superior force commanded by Martin Green, a self-appointed Confederate officer. This force of Green's, however, after having been increased to about three thousand men, was in a very few days effectually dispersed by Pope, who captured his baggage and provisions. Another skirmish, in which the Third Iowa also figured, on the 12th of the month, was one of uncommon severity, five hundred Union troops having been attacked by about four thousand rebels. After the struggle had lasted for an hour, and a hundred and twenty of our men had been disabled, their commander, Lieutenant Colonel Scott, ordered a retreat. A short time afterward, Colonel Smith's command, with four pieces of can-

non, met the enemy by another road, and, engaging them as they were about to cross the Missouri River, severely punished and routed them.

As a precaution, and in order that he might be able to use the greater portion of his army for a movement which he was planning against Price in the southwestern part of the state, Fremont, at some expense, fortified St. Louis.

In the mean time, Price, who had found an able ally in General Harris, marched northward, and joined his forces with those of the latter. As they were about to encamp, at the beginning of September, they received information that some moneys, amounting to a hundred thousand dollars, were at that very time on the point of being conveyed by a detachment of Federal troops to Lexington from Warrensburg. Although the Confederate troops were wearied with long marches when this communication was made to them, the prospect of securing so valuable a prize was an incentive not to be withstood. They marched at double-quick upon Warrensburg, but, upon their arrival there, found that they had been anticipated by the Federal troops. Their indignation was not at all mollified by certain caricatures which the German soldiers of our army had sketched on the walls in charcoal drawings, representing in a rude but vivid manner the disappointment of the Confederates in finding the money-boxes empty. After halting at Warrensburg for two days, Price moved upon Lexington, on the south bank of the Missouri River, whither the money had been conveyed. The Federal force at Lexington, consisting of about half a regiment of Home Guards, was strongly entrenched, and gave the enemy a severe repulse. Colonel Mulligan, with his Irish brigade, was sent to re-enforce Lexington. Price, too, found no difficulty in obtaining a vast number of recruits; for it was generally known that victory would bring with it the coveted gold. The Federal force had been increased to 2500 men, and the fortifications greatly extended and strengthened. On the 12th of September, scouts and advanced pickets, driven in, reported the approach of the enemy. The attack was at first concentrated upon the college, which had been strongly fortified; but the fire was so briskly answered by our troops that a retreat was ordered to Fair Ground until Price's supplies of ammunition should come up. In six days the attack was renewed. General Rains took up a position on the east and northeast of the town, while General Parsons attacked from the southwest, all the guns in front firing upon Colonel Mulligan's works at the same time. Affairs with the garrison soon began to assume a critical position, for sharpshooters had been detached which had cut them off from their supplies of water. Messengers had been sent by Mulligan to Jefferson City urging on re-enforcements, but they were captured by the enemy. So, too, small detachments of force dispatched to his assistance were cut off in detail, and defeated or captured. While matters were at this pass, a steamer came down the river bringing clothes, provisions, and ammunition; but these also fell into the hands of the enemy, who, indeed, stood in immediate need of the last two articles. At the same time, the hills north of the town were taken by Harris's and McBride's troops. Against these Colonel Mulligan made a *sortie* to drive them from the position, but his force was insufficient. This important point was protected by the Confederates by means of extensive movable breast-works constructed from hempen bales. About two o'clock of the 20th, after fifty-two hours of uninterrupted fighting, his troops and the means of defense having been entirely exhausted, Mulligan displayed the white flag, and surrendered his brave garrison as prisoners of war. Besides a great number of stands of arms, a considerable quantity of ammunition, and a vast amount of commissary stores, nine hundred thousand dollars in hard cash was also captured.

Fortunately for us, Price, for want of sufficient ammunition, was unable to follow up his victory with that decisive movement for which his success opened the way. Fremont, in alarm, hastened to Jefferson City, and hurried up his preparations to attack Price, who, upon the concentration of the



JAMES A. MULLIGAN.



THE DEFENSE OF LEXINGTON.

Union troops at Jefferson City, retired to Springfield, thus bringing himself into easy communication with Arkansas, and tempting Fremont to a distance from his source of supplies.

The Federal advance into Southwestern Missouri was made in five divisions, under Hunter, Pope, Sigel, Asboth, and McKinstry. This advance followed closely upon Price's retreat. The latter arrived at Neosho, in the southwest corner of the state, just in time to be present at the meeting of the State Legislature, and to celebrate the secession of Missouri with a salvo of one hundred guns. Here he joined McCulloch, but the meeting between the two was far from cordial.

Price's proclamation, issued at Neosho shortly afterward, indicates very forcibly the critical situation of the Confederate affairs in Missouri. "In the month of June last," he says, "I was called to the command of a handful of Missourians. . . . When peace and protection could no longer be enjoyed but at the price of honor and liberty, your chief magistrate called for fifty thousand men to drive the ruthless invaders from a soil made fruitful by your labors and consecrated by your homes; and to that call less than five thousand responded out of a male population exceeding two hundred thousand men. Some allowances are to be made on the face of the want of military organization, a supposed want of arms, the necessary retreat of the army southward, the blockade of the river, and the presence of an armed and organized foe. But nearly six months have now elapsed. The army of Missouri, organized and equipped, fought its way to the river. And where now are the fifty thousand? Had fifty thousand men flocked to our standard, with their shot-guns in their hands, there would now be no Federal hirelings in the state to pollute our soil. Where are those fifty thousand men? A few men have fought your battles. A few have dared the dangers of the field. Come to us, brave sons of the Missouri Valley. I must have fifty thousand men. I call upon you, in the name of your country, for fifty thousand men. Where are our Southern Rights friends? We must drive the oppressors from the land. I must have fifty thousand men. Numbers give strength. Numbers intimidate the foe. Numbers make our arms irresistible. Numbers command universal respect and insure confidence. We must have fifty thousand men! Come with your guns of any description that can be made to bring down a foe. If you have no arms, come

without them. We must have fifty thousand men. Give me these men, and, by the help of God, I will drive the hireling thieves and marauders from the state. Be yours the office to choose between a free country and a just government and the bondage of your children. I, at least, will never see the chains fastened upon my country. I will ask for six and a half feet of Missouri soil on which to repose, for I will not see my people enslaved. Come on, my brave fifty thousand heroes—gallant, unconquerable Southern men! We await your coming."


Fremont arrived in Springfield on the 27th of October. He had sent Sigel forward to the south of Springfield, toward Wilson's Creek, who, coming up with the rear of the enemy just as the latter was about to retreat, made a spirited attack upon him. And here it was that Major Zagonyi, commander of Fremont's body-guard, made his brilliant and ever-memorable charge, leading his men up a steep hill in the face of the most murderous fire, and driving the enemy through the town.

Just at this crisis the order came from Washington for the removal of Fremont, who was succeeded by Hunter. The latter in a few days abandoned Springfield and moved toward Rolla, thus allowing Price to recover the ground from which he had just been driven by Fremont. General Fremont had created a great degree of enthusiasm in the West, and, without any doubt, every secessionist was delighted at his removal. As he had just begun his campaign when he was superseded, it is impossible to criticise his generalship, whether favorable or unfavorable.

As soon as Hunter began to recede, Price again advanced, moving in three divisions toward Kansas, with the intention of making that his field of operations. He had under his command about 20,000 men; and on the last day of November he was at Monticello with his centre, his right wing resting on Stockton, and his left on Nevada. His plan was to reach Kansas, and then, having supplied his troops with arms, to destroy the track of the Northern Railroad, and cut off communication with St. Louis. But General Halleck, who had superseded Hunter on the 18th of November, had, ere a month was passed, completely upset Price's project by more deeply-laid strategy of his own. Instead of succeeding in cutting off St. Louis, Price found himself, at Christmas, compelled to look out for his own communications, which, so far as Northern Missouri was concerned, were entirely cut



FREMONT'S BRIDGE ACROSS THE OSAGE



SPRINGFIELD, MISSOURI.

off by Halleck's operations between the Missouri and the Osage Rivers. This was accomplished by a movement of General Pope from Sedalia on the 15th of December, which cut off Price's army on the Osage from a large body of recruits then on their way to its support from the counties north of the river, and at the same time from its northern base of supplies. Price was deceived by a feint movement against Warsaw on the Osage, while Pope, after moving about eleven miles in that direction, turned suddenly into Henry County toward a point farther west, placing his force, numbering four thousand, between the main body of the enemy and the squads of recruits scattered about at different points on the north side of the river. Most of these bodies—one of which was 2200 strong, encamped six miles north of Chilhouse—were dispersed by Pope's pursuing cavalry, and returned to their homes; and at the mouth of Clear Creek, near Milford, a force of the enemy numbering over 1500 were surrounded and captured on the 18th, together with a large amount of ammunition and subsistence, and a thousand stand of arms. In these movements Pope had guarded against an attack on his flank by stationing a considerable force at Clinton to intercept any columns which Price might dispatch from Osceola. Thus cut off from supplies of men and food, the position of the enemy, at any moment open to attack, was no longer tenable, and he was forced to retreat from his camp on Sac River, in St. Clair County, to Springfield, where General Price received considerable supplies of clothing and camp equipage, and prepared to go into winter quarters. Here also he gained three or four thousand recruits. But these were of no avail against the force which Halleck was preparing to hurl against him. Therefore, in the latter part of January, when this force was concentrating at Rolla, he fell back from Springfield to Arkansas, where, from his camp on Cove Creek, he reported to self-exiled ex-Governor Jackson. He had failed to get his fifty thousand men.

The fall and winter campaign of Price in Missouri was of critical importance, yet it seems not to have been appreciated by the Confederate authorities. General Price held throughout the year, from the commencement of his operations in Missouri, an independent position, acting quite entirely on his own responsibility. He was neither supplied with men nor with the material of war. Even in the fight at Wilson's Creek, where he had so vast a superiority in point of numbers, his old rifles and his miserable artillery put him at a decided disadvantage. At that time he had McCulloch with him; but the two officers were always at variance, and after that battle he was left entirely alone. Meantime our forces were daily increasing in numbers, and threatened, in a short time, merely by numerical superiority, to drive the entire Confederate force from the state. If, after the capture of Mulligan, Price had been abundantly supplied with ammunition, he would, without any doubt, have attacked General Fremont before the latter could have had time to concentrate his army; but, when Lexington surrendered, it is said that he had only two thousand percussion-caps in his whole command. Had his situation been otherwise, it is difficult to say what might have been the result, but it is certain that he would have held important advantages over Fremont, which might have entirely reversed the actual events of the year. By reason of the deficiencies in Price's commissary and ammunition, Fremont was allowed sufficient time to concentrate his own forces and to compel the retreat of the enemy. When the indefatigable Confederate leader again advanced, he was driven back, as we have seen, before Halleck's superior strategy and an overwhelming superiority of numbers. And here, in connection with the difficulties which all along followed Price in his operations during the year, the reader will allow us again to allude to the importance of the battle fought by General Grant at Belmont, which,

although it availed nothing toward the reduction of the strong-hold of Columbus, yet entirely cut off General Polk from any possible opportunity of co-operating with the Confederate forces in Missouri. It was upon this co-operation that the prospects of Confederate success in Missouri chiefly depended. When Polk and Pillow occupied Columbus, Jeff. Thompson, at the same time, established himself on the opposite side of the river; but when the latter attempted to operate in the interior and keep up his connection with Columbus, Grant came promptly upon the field between him and his base, thus, by the engagement at Belmont, cutting off both him and Price from their most important centre of support. In this way the vast combination of forces which the Confederates had prepared in the southeastern portion of Missouri, along the line of the Mississippi, with the view of an advance against Cairo and St. Louis, was baffled. This combination had been in preparation since July. At first it assumed the most threatening aspect. Fremont, however, had kept the enemy in check by a display of naval force on the Mississippi which deceived the enemy as to his ability to defend Cairo. Then the battle of Wilson's Creek was fought, and the force of the enemy very much weakened. In a month or two they again began to hold up their heads; Columbus was occupied by Polk and Pillow; then followed the defeat of Thompson and the battle of Belmont. And thus the year closed, but not without hope to the Federal army in Missouri; for the enemy had been defeated in the western part of the state; Pope held the north securely by his small but active force; the Confederates in the southeast had lost more than they had gained, and were powerless to advance; and, finally, re-enforcements were daily bringing the Union army nearer to a position favorable for aggressive movements in the coming spring, that should forever clear the state of the Confederate armies.

The retirement of General Scott in October immediately affected the situation in the West. On the 31st of October he addressed a letter to the Secretary of War, requesting that his name might be placed on the list of army officers retired from service. For three years, he said, he had been unable to mount a horse, or even to walk without difficulty. On the afternoon of the day in which the letter was received by the secretary, the President, accompanied by his cabinet, visited the lieutenant general at his residence, and read him the official order carrying out his request, and placing him upon the list of retired officers, without any reduction of his current pay, subsistence, or allowances—this latter provision having been specially made in his behalf by Congress on the 5th of August, in anticipation of his early withdrawal from active service. The interview was an affecting one. The last great officer of the old school of military tactics thus disappeared from the stage, retaining his well-earned laurels as the veteran hero of two important wars.

An order was immediately issued by which George B. McClellan became commander-in-chief, under the President, of all the armies of the United States. Two days after assuming this command, McClellan, in a brief speech made at Philadelphia, said, "It is for the future to determine whether I shall realize the expectations and hopes that have been centred in me. The war can not last long. It may be desperate. I ask in the future forbearance, patience, and confidence. With these we can accomplish all." McClellan's mind, largely speculative, had looked inevitably upon the whole field, even when he was in command of only the Army of the Potomac. The command of all the armies in the field gave full scope for the execution of his comprehensive plans. The Department of the West had now to be entirely reorganized. The next day after McClellan was made general-in-chief, Fremont was relieved of his command,¹ and about the middle of November his

¹ It is not meant to be indicated here that Fremont was removed solely at the instigation of McClellan; nor, if that were the case, is any fault meant to be found with the order, which, under the circumstances, was perfectly justifiable. The difficulties and jealousies growing out of political differences between the prominent actors engaged in the suppression of the Southern insurrection were already becoming only too painfully evident. The three of these actors who were most prominently representative were the President and Generals McClellan and Fremont. The latter two had each of them a preconceived bias of opinion, which controlled their respective policies in regard to the conduct of the war. McClellan's sympathies determined in favor of the South and its institutions; Fremont's in exactly the opposite direction. And as in each case the bias of opinion ruled the practical policy of these men, it is fair to call the disposition in each a partisan one. The President had also his bias of opinion, which was in favor of Northern institutions; but he was no partisan, inasmuch as his conduct was regulated solely by the Constitution, his interpretation and administration of which was affected only by imperative circumstance. No domestic institution of the South was touched by his hand until it became evident that the in-

terference became either an absolute necessity, or at least an important means in order to preserve the integrity of the national government. Apart from the peculiar attitude of the border states, there was no doubt as to the expediency of striking directly at slavery as the chief support of the insurrection. In order to secure Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, the blow was postponed. It was the necessary policy of government, during the period when these states were trembling in the balance between loyalty and treason, to desist from any interference with slavery unless some greater gain could come to the nation from the opposite policy. It was during this period that Fremont had command in Missouri. Without authority, he adopted a political policy which excited the opposition of those who, though desirous that the military authority of the nation should prevail in the state, were yet determined that the constitutional rights of the state should remain inviolate. This exercise of authority was at the time both arbitrary and unwise, and could easily have been avoided. The opposition to Fremont in the border states was a sufficient reason for his removal; and when McClellan was placed at the head of the entire field, that step became necessary to prevent political jealousy and rivalry from impeding the onward movement of the war.



DON CARLOS BUELL.

department was subdivided into three: first, New Mexico, which was assigned to Colonel Canby; second, the Kansas Department, the command of which was given to General Hunter, including Kansas, part of the Indian Territory, Nebraska, Colorado, and Dacotah; and, third, the Department of Missouri, under Halleck, including, besides that state, Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Arkansas, and all of Kentucky west of the Cumberland River. The Department of the Ohio, including the portion of Kentucky not under Halleck's command, Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, and Tennessee, was given to General Buell. The Department of West Virginia, under Rosecrans, and that of the Potomac, continued the northern lines of occupation to the Atlantic. There could hardly have been a greater change than McClellan's new position produced in the military prospect of the Western armies. New commanders took the place of the old in every important field. General Hunter, a graduate of West Point, had commanded the second division at the battle of Bull Run, and on the removal of Fremont had assumed the command in Missouri until Halleck's arrival. The latter, from California, was also a graduate of West Point, was at one time a professor in the institution, and was the author of several well-known military works. He had served with distinction in Mexico, and entered the civil war with the rank of major general. Don Carlos Buell, commander of the Ohio Department, had served in the Mexican war, where he had twice been promoted by brevet. At the beginning of the war he had received a command on the Potomac, with the rank of brigadier general.

These new commanders in the West were appointed at McClellan's suggestion, with the approval of the President. They were to act under McClellan's instructions; and what the tenor of these instructions were we gather from the letters addressed to them at this time by the general-in-chief. In regard to the Department of Missouri, the general had evidently the impression that every thing had gone wrong under Fremont's administration. In his letter to Halleck, dated November 11th, he expressed his dissatisfaction in the strongest terms. He said that Halleck would have extraordinary duties, apart from those devolving upon him as a military commander, to perform. Chaos must be reduced to order; the personnel of the staff of the department would have to be changed, and a system of reckless expenditure, and fraud perhaps unheard of before in the history of the world, would have to be reduced to the limits of an economy consistent with the interests and necessities of the state. Contracts would have to be overhauled; and it was to be very carefully considered whether the existing organization of the troops were perfectly legal. In regard to military operations, he advised that Rolla, Sedalia, and other interior points should be held in considerable strength, while the main army should be concentrated on the Mississippi. His instructions to General Buell intimated that he considered the Department of Ohio second only to his own in importance. "It is possible," he said, "that the conduct of our political affairs in Kentucky is more important than that of our military operations. The military problem would be a simple one could it be entirely separated from political influences; such

In regard to the other charges made against Fremont—those made by Frank Blair, and partially reiterated in McClellan's instructions to Halleck—they were simply puerile. The expenses incident to Fremont's administration were no greater in proportion than those of any other department. His fortification of St. Louis was imperatively demanded by the condition of his own command, and the threatened advance of an enemy superior in numbers; and as to Western contracts, it is yet to be discovered that they were any more fraudulent or unsatisfactory than those made nearer Washington. The charge that Fremont was inaccessible to those seeking his presence for the purposes of business is wholly without foundation.

is not the case. Were the population among which you are to operate wholly or generally hostile, it is probable that Nashville should be your first and principal objective point. It so happens that a large majority of the inhabitants of Eastern Tennessee are in favor of the Union; it therefore seems proper that you should remain on the defensive on the line from Louisville to Nashville, while you throw the mass of your forces, by rapid marches, by Cumberland Gap, or Walker's Gap, on Knoxville, in order to occupy the railroad at that point, and thus enable the citizens of Eastern Tennessee to use, while you at the same time cut off, the railway communication between Eastern Virginia and the Mississippi." This letter was addressed to Buell on the 7th. Five days afterward he wrote again, urging an advance into Eastern Tennessee as soon as it could be made with a reasonable prospect of success. In the mean time, all the avenues by which Kentucky lay open to invasion were to be carefully guarded. Previous to McClellan's appointment there had been no carefully elaborated plan comprehending the entire field of military operations in the East and West. In the East, McClellan, upon whose army the safety of the capital so entirely depended, had been able to gather together a large army—not so large as he desired, but still large enough to secure him against successful attack—thus giving him ample opportunities for fortification and extensive organization and discipline. In the West, the Federal generals had been compelled to fight at the very outset; to fight battles, moreover, in which they had terrible odds to encounter, without hope of support or re-enforcement from the government. There was no time for preparation, nor was there an opportunity for extensive organization. There was a force barely sufficient to meet the enemy in the field, and there could be found no reserve to prepare and to organize in camps and by means of camp drills. What troops there were in the West had an organization by which they managed somehow to hold the enemy in check, whether it was a legal organization or not; but they had been reduced to a minimum, in order to supply the Army of the Potomac. But, now that the Western field had come under his own command, McClellan began to appreciate its importance and its necessities. In August he advised the smallest possible force in this field, estimating that, if Kentucky took the right position—and she did—there would be no more than 20,000 needed, together with those which could be raised in that state and Eastern Tennessee, "to secure the latter region and its railroads, as well as ultimately to occupy Nashville." In October he had said that it was a matter of regret to him that it had not been deemed expedient by the national government to concentrate the forces of the nation in his then special field on the Potomac, but that some amends for this oversight might still be made by transferring from all the other armies their superfluous strength, thus re-enforcing his "main army." With this same end in view he recommended that all the cavalry and infantry arms, as fast as procured, be sent to this army; that the Western armies should be put entirely on the defensive, in order to allow his to assume the offensive; and that no more outside expeditions be attempted until he had fought the great battle in front. It was less than four days after he made these important suggestions that he was made general-in-chief. Thus placed at the head of the entire field, his estimate of the necessities of the West was materially different from what it had been when that section had been under Fremont's administration. For the first time it was discovered that a new order of things must be inaugurated in the West. "I soon found," says McClellan, "that the labor of preparation and organization had to be performed there; transportation, arms, clothing, artillery, discipline, all were wanting." Now, instead of giving the Army of the Potomac the initiative, he purposed to make the advance into East Tennessee a preliminary movement, after which his Virginia army would come in with a *coup de main*, and end the struggle. Nashville and Richmond would be captured by a simultaneous attack, and the Confederate line of defense would be thrown southward within the limits of the cotton states. From Richmond the Potomac army would advance to Charleston, where it would be met by a naval expedition; Buell would be pushed forward to Montgomery, or meet the Potomac army in Georgia; while Halleck would meet another naval expedition in New Orleans, and the occupation of the Southern sea-ports would render all farther resistance to the national government as useless as it would be desperate. The plan was brilliant and comprehensive, and showed that the general-in-chief had great powers of speculative combination. But we allude to it in this connection merely to show the importance which McClellan attached to the Western armies the moment they passed out of other hands into his own. It was a matter, therefore, for national congratulation that the West and the East had been thus included within a single command, since, within the short space of a single week, so remarkable a change had been effected, by which armies hitherto reduced in force, crippled in every appliance of war, and undervalued as to their comparative importance, were now to be made as efficient as they were worthy, and to be allotted their full share of the glories as well as the hardships of future campaigns. In the last week of October, McClellan expresses to the Secretary of War his regret that there has not been such a concentration of forces in Virginia as to allow the Army of the Potomac to enter upon an aggressive campaign before the season for such a campaign should be past. The very next week, all the armies of the West as well as of the East are placed at his disposal; but we find no longer an inclination on his part to withdraw any portion of the Western armies into Virginia. Indeed, his reason for delaying the campaign is now no longer the one given a week ago, viz., the inferiority of the Potomac army in respect of numbers, but the neglect from which the Western army has itself been suffering all along—its lack of preparation and organization. Henceforth he waits, not to fill up the ranks of the Virginia army, but to make preparations in the West.