



GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN.

CHAPTER IV.

THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.—BALL'S BLUFF.

The new Army.—Its Organization.—General McClellan.—Difficulties in his Way.—The Material of War.—Fortifications about Washington.—Popular impression as to the early close of the War.—McClellan's Memorandum addressed to the President.—His Estimate of the Force requisite for an aggressive Campaign.—Operations during the Summer and Autumn.—Reconnoissance toward Lewinsville.—Evacuation of Munson's Hill by the Confederates.—Confederate Batteries at Matthias Point.—Blockade of the Lower Potomac.—Operations on the Upper Potomac.—Position of Forces.—Confederate Occupation of Leesburg.—McCall's Advance to Drainesville.—Ashby's Raid on Harper's Ferry.—Devens's Reconnoissance toward Leesburg.—The Battle of Ball's Bluff.—Death of Baker.—The Defeat and Slaughter of the Federals.—Cause of the Disaster.—The Confederate Army in Virginia.—Ord's Advance to Drainesville.—Object of the Movement.—McCall's Division.—The March.—The Enemy flanked.—His Retreat.—Losses.

THE battle of Bull Run had been lost. The enemy had not improved his opportunity against our panic-stricken capital; no victory gained in the war was more fruitless of benefit to the victors, and to the vanquished there could have been no success more fortunate, on the whole, than was their defeat. The battle had been a test-battle for a continent that for three generations had been nursed in peace—a test-battle both for the North and South, it is true, but, as usually happens in such a case, the former, whose strength had been broken, learned the lesson, while the latter, blinded by temporary and easily-won success, became over-confident, and saw in the Federal rout of July only a magnificent illustration of the martial superiority of Southern chivalry. Thus it happened that while the South relaxed its strength, the muscular North contracted and prepared to strike blows. The great uprising in April had brought to the capital a vast assemblage of militia; and these, not waiting for the mature results of discipline, but pushed on by the incessant clamor of people and press, had shouldered arms, to which the majority of them were unused, and marched forth of a hot summer's day to meet the defiant foe beyond Centreville, very much as the same number of men would have gone to a picnic or a fancy tournament, and with not half the regularity that would have marked an ordinary training day; and this mock army had been swept from the field, disorganized and useless. Following upon this disaster came a second uprising, which gave us, at length, an army of soldiers.

But this was the work of time, and it was also a work of great difficulty. Perhaps the chief obstacle in the way of such a military organization as was required was the habitual predisposition of the people to peaceful occupations. Among the many shrewd sayings of Lord Bacon was this: that a nation devoted to the minute operations of mechanism and to lucrative commerce is the least likely, of all others, to be martially disposed. In addition to this we were a republic, and there was no distinction of classes, as between the ruling and the ruled, and thus none of that subserviency of one class to another which leads naturally to military subordination and discipline. It was an easy matter for Congress to vote and to raise half a million of men. But the manner in which recruiting was carried on introduced into this body an absolutely worthless element. Officers were appointed at the head of regiments as the reward for filling up their ranks, and the motives to deception were too powerful to be resisted; sometimes one third of a regiment which had been mustered into the army was found, upon inspection, to be unfit for active service. Here was one difficulty. But if there was a large class of "incapables" among the privates, there was a still larger class in proportion among the officers, who, for the most part, had no military knowledge whatever. This was the kind of army which displaced the armed


crowd of the summer campaign; this was the army which, at a week's notice, rushed to the protection of the capital; but it was not the kind of army that could carry on a campaign—that could stand reverses or bear success. There was not a sufficiently large force of the regular army to form a respectable nucleus about which this crude mass might be gathered and organized. The army that was needed had to be made, and it must be made out of unpromising material.

But who was to transform this half million of men into good and trustworthy soldiers? We had one general—Winfield Scott—who had been tried, and in whom the country had great confidence. But he was infirm, and had arrived at that period of life when it was beyond his power to endure the fatiguing duties that must inevitably fall upon the commander of so large an army. He himself, aware of this, although unwilling wholly to disengage himself from the struggle, suggested that another be placed at the helm, he himself retaining a general oversight of operations. For this important office he proposed General George B. McClellan.

The campaigns in West Virginia in the summer of 1861 contrasted most favorably with the operations carried on at the same time in the eastern part of the state. The topography of West Virginia presented a very great obstacle to military operations; but these difficulties existed in a greater degree for the Confederates than for ourselves, inasmuch as we had the advantage—in this case a decisive one—of having the surrounding people on our side. The attempts, therefore, which were made by Garnett and his fellow-officers to occupy this mountainous region were thwarted, without any great sacrifice except the labor involved in arduous marches, and somewhat more than the ordinary exposure that belongs of necessity to a soldier's life. However strongly the enemy might be fortified, he had always a long line of communication to protect, and, by simply cutting this line, he would always be compelled to risk the chances of battle, in which the advantages were mostly in our favor. The campaign was wisely planned in every part, and McClellan was unusually fortunate in the vigorous support given him by Rosecrans. Nor does the fact that the commander himself was not always personally present on the field of conflict at all diminish the credit due to the military skill which planned and controlled the battle. The good degree of military sagacity developed in these battles, and the rapidity with which one victory followed upon the heels of another, at a time when the whole country was impatient for activity, brought McClellan into a prominence which he enjoyed without a rival. Another quality, more characteristic of McClellan than of any other general, and one which was more than all others calculated to make him the centre of popular attraction, was his extraordinary capability of creating enthusiasm in his army. This enthusiasm was of no ordinary character, but rather a sort of inspiration, by which the troops became identified with their leader, a part and parcel of his personal ambition and destiny as well as of his military operations. It was not a simple, frank outburst of admiration, but it was personal sympathy, fervent devotion. Fortunate beyond the usual estimate put upon them were all these characteristics, and they doubtless had great weight with General Scott; but with the lieutenant general there was another consideration of at least equal importance—McClellan, having been from the first scrupulously jealous of what the Southern states deemed to be their rights, would be likely to conciliate the South, if conciliation were yet possible, and his appointment would unite the country by bringing even the pro-slavery party of the North over to the support of the war, whereas the appointment of a member of the Republican party, as it seemed to Scott, would provoke the enemy to a more determined resistance and distract our counsels at home. But there was a greater danger which was not foreseen, viz., the possibility, nay, the almost inevitable certainty of disagreement between a general and an administration representing sentiments radically opposite to his own; and the jealousies growing out of this opposition in sentiment lost us many a battle and many an opportunity of bringing the war to a speedy termination. These troubles were, however, in the background, and it will not be necessary to consider their origin and development until we come to treat of the Peninsular Campaign of 1862.

In the mean time, the difficulties which McClellan had to encounter and overcome at the outset, and before any active operations could be attempted, were very great and numerous. Some of these we have indicated in connection with the raw material which was given him to make into an army. This particular class of difficulties McClellan looked directly in the face, and it is probable that so great a number of men were never in so short a space of time organized into an efficient army. In this organization the regiment was the unit. Four regiments constituted a brigade, and three brigades a division. Each division had four batteries, three served by volunteers and one by regulars, the captain of the latter commanding the entire artillery of the division. The regulars were not distributed, but were kept together in divisions by themselves. In the constitution of this army, McClellan's intimate acquaintance with European tactics became of very great value and assistance. The result was perhaps not an equivalent to the Southern army in some important respects, for the latter entered more naturally into military organization; the officers were men accustomed to rule, the men to be ruled, and the existence of slavery in the South had always necessitated a very near approach to martial law as the ordinary status of society.

But soldiers are only the muscular basis of an army; it is the mechanical appliances of war that give an army availability and multiply its power. These appliances are of two sorts, offensive and defensive. And here again the difficulty did not consist in obtaining the raw material or a sufficient supply of money, but in elaborate construction, requiring the tedious labor of months. As Congress could vote half a million of men, so it could vote



INTERIOR OF THE UPPER BATTERY AT CHAIN BRIDGE, WASHINGTON.

half a thousand millions of dollars; but it could no more easily metamorphose money into muskets, cannon, and pontoon bridges than raw militia into soldiers. If we consider merely the amount of food necessary to five hundred thousand men, it sums up in the short space of one week to nearly three million pounds of meat and four millions of flour, besides three hundred and fifty thousand pounds of coffee and five hundred and twenty-five thousand pounds of sugar. The systematic regulation of this enormous supply presupposes arrangements the most complicate in advertisement of proposals, in shipment and transportation, and finally in distribution. Then the arrangements for equipments and munitions required still more time for their completion. The number of small arms at the disposal of the government was fearfully inadequate. These had either to be manufactured in this country or imported. The Springfield armory and that at Harper's Ferry were the principal sources of the home supply at the beginning of the war, and the latter of these had been destroyed in April. There were not enough muskets in the North to supply the 75,000 men of the President's first call. Even the Springfield armory could furnish no more than 25,000 per year. Evidently, then, new armories had to be set in operation, and those already existing enlarged, while in the mean time the most strenuous efforts were made to secure a foreign supply. Not only was the quantity of small arms necessary to carry on an extensive campaign slowly produced, but there was an equal impediment in the way of promptly furnishing heavy artillery.

The very tents of the soldiers taxed all the sail-makers of the country to the utmost extent of their working powers. Wagons, and harness, and cavalry equipments of every sort existed only in the raw material, and slowly advanced out of this primitive form under the manufacturer's busy hand. The industrial activity of the North was thoroughly aroused to meet the


sudden and pressing demand; all that could be done quickly was done. But skill is the result of experience; it does not spring up at any momentary emergency; and, therefore, all work requiring a great degree of mechanical elaboration was of slow completion; and the number of laborers fitted for such work being insufficient, others must be trained before they could be of any efficiency.

Not only must there be a vast increase of *matériel* for offensive warfare, but the disorganization of the army after its defeat at Bull Run made it necessary to surround Washington with defensive works of great strength. This was partially begun on the occasion of our first advance into Virginia and the occupation of Alexandria, when Forts Runyon and Corcoran were constructed as *têtes-de-pont* to the Long Bridge and the Aqueduct. A fortnight afterward Fort Albany was laid out, commanding the Columbia and the Aqueduct and Alexandria roads. After McClellan assumed command of the Army of the Potomac, the interval between Fort Corcoran and Fort Albany was filled by a series of works within supporting distance of each other; and strong works were built controlling the principal routes leading to Washington from the north. Thus was established the basis of an adequate fortification for the defense of the capital; but to complete the works so far as to justify any great depletion of the army in front of Washington for the purposes of an offensive campaign was the work of months.¹

¹ "The theory of these defenses is that upon which the works of Torres Vedras were based—the only one admitted at the present day for defending extensive lines. It is to occupy the commanding points within range of each other by field-forts, the fire of which shall sweep all the approaches. These forts furnish the secure emplacements of artillery. They also afford cover to bodies of infantry. The works may be connected by lines of light parapets, or the ground (where practicable) may be so obstructed that the enemy's troops can not penetrate the interval without being exposed, for a considerable time, to the destructive effects of the artillery or musketry fire of the forts. "With such a system established, the defense against a powerful attack requires that all the



INTERIOR OF FORT SUMTER.



FORT COCKERAN, ARLINGTON HEIGHTS.

In the face of all these impediments, it was the popular impression that the war would be, by great victories gained on the field, brought to completion in two or three months. Besides, there were a few who supposed that our immense and formidable preparations would intimidate the South, and obviate the very necessity of fighting. But the South was not intimidated. She herself voted 500,000 men, and brought a large proportion of that number into the field, partly by volunteering, and in great measure by conscription. Then it was apparent to every military eye that the whole strength of the two sections must meet, and that the side to yield would be that which was more rapidly exhausted. It was also evident that the preliminary preparations in the matter of organization must be thoroughly completed before a campaign could be ventured against an enemy whose force, though not equal to our own in point of numbers, had a great advantage in position, being situated at the centre of an arc along whose circumference it would be necessary for us to operate in any aggressive movement. The popular impression, however, as to the early termination of the war still remained; indeed, a shorter time elapsed before the date which had been set for a final settlement than would have sufficed for our army to learn how to build a pontoon bridge.

The season suitable for active operations previous to the winter of 1861 passed by without any important movement. In a memorandum addressed to the President early in August of that year, McClellan expressed his convictions in regard to the nature of the coming campaign in the most explicit terms. Having stated that the war differed from all others in this respect, viz., that in ordinary wars the purpose was simply to conquer a peace and make a treaty on advantageous terms, while in this it was necessary to crush a population sufficiently numerous, intelligent, and warlike to constitute a nation, he proceeded to urge the necessity for an overwhelming display of physical force. Our foreign relations and financial credit, he said, demanded that the military action of the government should be prompt and irresistible. The plan of operations which he advised was the following:

The rebels having made Virginia their main field of operations, it was therefore necessary that the great conflict should take place in that state. But, to weaken the resistance at this point, movements should be made both by land and water in other directions, and especially in the West, upon the Mississippi, and, as soon as Kentucky was sufficiently cordial in her loyalty, through that state into Eastern Tennessee. These separate and co-operative movements would not require a very large force; but for the main



FORT ALBANY, NEAR ALEXANDRIA.

army—that of the Potomac—he urged a force of 273,000 men, to be supplied with the necessary engineer and pontoon trains and transportation. In direct co-operation with this force, a strong naval armament should be prepared to move against important points along the enemy's sea-coast. As an argument in favor of so large an army in the East, he suggested that the capture of Richmond was only the first step into the enemy's country; and as every successful advance lengthened our line of communications, large detachments of force would be necessary to protect that line, while the enemy, at every withdrawal, would be able to make a greater concentration of his own forces.

Undoubtedly, in his proposed distribution of forces, McClellan underrated the difficulties of the Western campaign. At least, it soon became evident

forts shall be garrisoned; that a certain amount of infantry, cavalry, and movable artillery be distributed along the lines sufficient to hold them until reserves can be brought to support; and, finally, it requires a movable force held as a reserve, which may be shifted from point to point, to meet the enemy's effort wherever it may be made, and where, aided by the works, they can repel superior numbers.

"It is evident that without fortifications a place can not be considered secure unless held by considerably greater numbers than the enemy can bring to assail it. No less an authority than Napoleon says that, aided by fortifications, 50,000 men and 3000 artillerymen can defend a capital against 300,000 men, and he asserts the necessity of fortifying all national capitals."—General Burnard's Report, p. 12.

that to subdue the Confederates in Kentucky and Missouri alone required a force much larger than McClellan considered necessary for an advance into East Tennessee.

This memorandum was addressed to the President, at his own request, within two weeks after the battle of Bull Run. Three months afterward, in the latter part of October, there being a strong desire on the part of the country and the President for an immediate advance of the Army of the Potomac, McClellan made another statement to the President, representing the force available for an advance movement as only about 76,000 men, while that of the enemy behind intrenched fortifications was fully 150,000. It is true there was present for duty a force of 147,000 men, but over 13,000 of these were either unarmed or unequipped. Out of the 134,000 left, 58,000 must remain to protect Washington, to guard the Potomac, and to garrison Baltimore and Annapolis, leaving only 76,000 for the aggressive movement against Richmond.

In order to an advance, McClellan thought that 35,000 men should be left to protect Washington, 13,000 to guard the Potomac, 10,000 to garrison Baltimore and Annapolis, while there should be a column of 150,000 for active operations. This would require an aggregate, present and absent, of 240,000 men. As to the force of the enemy at Manassas, McClellan was no




MUNSON'S HILL.

doubt egregiously mistaken. His information was gathered from unreliable sources, and any reports that militated against his preconceived opinions he summarily rejected. There is no good reason to believe that the enemy at Manassas numbered over 50,000 men; for even at a later period, when their ranks had been re-enforced by conscription, they were estimated at only about 80,000.

Thus so far as the main operations against Richmond were concerned. But the army was not idle during the summer. Reconnoitring parties were continually scouring the country to within a short distance of the enemy's lines. Frequently these reconnoissances resulted in skirmishes, which accustomed the soldiers to being under fire. One of the most important of those which occurred during the summer was that made by General Smith, on the 25th of September, toward Lewinsville. The general had several thousand troops in his command, and, shortly after their arrival at Lewinsville, they were attacked by a large force of the Confederates from Falls Church. The result of the sharp conflict which ensued was the retreat of the enemy and the capture of some of his stores by General Smith. Two days afterward the Confederates abandoned the fortifications on Munson's Hill, which they had held ever since the battle of Bull Run.

The enemy was active during the summer and autumn chiefly in two directions—to prevent navigation on the Lower Potomac, and to find his way across some of the fords of the Upper Potomac into Maryland; and these operations on the right and left of McClellan's army were at the same time offensive and defensive, as they not only impeded transportation on the Potomac, and threatened raids into the fertile valleys north of that river and against the important line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, but also guarded either flank of the Confederate army at Manassas. Preparations for the blockade of the Lower Potomac were commenced previous to the battle of Bull Run. The Secretary of the Navy was not uninformed of

these movements, and as early as June suggested to the War Department the necessity of occupying Matthias Point, the possession of which in force would secure the navigation of the river from the threatened interruption, and at the same time furnish a foothold on the Virginia shore for operations against the enemy's right flank. The extreme left of the Federal army, in the neighborhood of Alexandria, was not more than five or six miles above a line run directly east from Manassas Junction, which was distant twenty-five miles. From Alexandria the Potomac runs almost directly south to the mouth of Acquia Creek, a distance of thirty miles; then it runs directly east for fifteen miles, where it rounds Matthias Point—a very prominent projection northward into the stream, and almost entirely separated from the main land by Gamble's Creek. It was a point which, at that early period of the war, might easily have been held by a small detachment of troops. But no measures were taken for its occupation by General Scott. His suggestions to the War Department being unheeded, the Secretary of the Navy took the matter into his own hands with the best material at his command. At this time, it must be remembered that the government had no gun-boats or iron-clad monitors, and the engagement of batteries by wooden ships of war were serious undertakings, in which the batteries had clearly the advantage. The United States steamers the Pawnee and the Pocahontas, and a naval flotilla under Commander Ward, with several steam-boats under naval officers, constituted the Potomac squadron, whose office it was to prevent communication with that part of Virginia which belonged to the Confederacy, intercepting supplies, and protecting transports and supply-vessels in their passage up and down the river. Commander Ward having discovered, by means of a reconnoissance off Matthias Point, that the Confederate troops encamped there were about to erect a battery, on the 26th of June sent up to the Pawnee, at Acquia Creek, for two boats armed and equipped. Two small cutters' crews were dispatched from the Pawnee,



CONFEDERATE BATTERIES AT EVANSFORT.




CONFEDERATE BATTERIES AT BIRD'S FERRY, ON THE POTOMAC.

which, with a boat's crew from Ward's vessel—the Freeborn—made between thirty and forty men. This party effected a landing at the Point the next morning, driving in the rebel pickets. They found preparations for erecting a battery, and, under cover of the Freeborn's guns, they proceeded immediately to throw up a sand-bag breast-work, which they completed before night, when, leaving their work in order to bring guns from the vessel to mount them, they were surprised by a party of the enemy concealed in the bushes on the shore; a few of them were taken prisoners, and the rest escaped to the steamer. Commander Ward was killed in the engagement. No Confederate battery, however, was maintained on Matthias Point, it being beyond supporting distance of the main army. In a few weeks the right bank of the Potomac was lined with batteries from High Point to Matthias Point, a distance of from thirty to forty miles. After McClellan assumed the command of the Army of the Potomac, the subject was again brought to the attention of the War Department by Secretary Welles. The President was anxious that something should be done, and in this anxiety he represented the feelings of the Northern people, who deemed it a humiliation that the Confederates should be able to maintain an efficient blockade of one of our principal channels of transportation. The Navy Department threw the responsibility upon the military, and, in return, the military shifted it off upon the naval. In a letter addressed to the Secretary of the Navy on the 12th of August, General McClellan says:

"I have to-day received additional information which convinces me that it is more than probable that the enemy will, within a very short time, attempt to throw a respectable force from the mouth of Acquia Creek into Maryland. This attempt will probably be preceded by the erection of batteries at Matthias and White House Points. Such a movement on the part of the enemy, in connection with others probably designed, would place Washington in great jeopardy. I most earnestly urge that the strongest possible naval force be at once concentrated near the mouth of Acquia Creek, and that the most vigilant watch be maintained day and night, so as to render such passage of the river absolutely impossible. I recommend that the Minnesota, and any other vessels available from Hampton Roads, be at once ordered up there, and that a great quantity of coal be sent to that vicinity sufficient for several weeks' supply. At least one strong war vessel should be kept at Alexandria; and I again urge the concentration of a strong naval force in the Potomac without delay. If the Navy Department will render it absolutely impossible for the enemy to cross the river below Washington, the security of the capital will be greatly increased. I can not too earnestly urge an immediate compliance with these requests." But the measures urged in this letter only looked to the defensive, and seemed quite unsatisfactory. If there was occasion to fear that the enemy's audacious operations on the south bank of the Potomac really threatened an advance into Maryland, which might place Washington in jeopardy, this only seemed to furnish an additional argument in favor of an attempt to dislodge the enemy from his positions. From this view of the case, it was only natural that a great pressure should be brought to bear on McClellan to induce him to co-operate in such an attempt, with as strong a force as might be necessary to secure its success. Really there was no occasion to fear an advance of the enemy from the mouth of Acquia Creek into Maryland; no movement could have been more unwise on the part of the Confederates; and, if it had been made, it is far more probable that the invading column of the enemy would be put in jeopardy than the Federal capital. But there was real occasion to fear that the Potomac might be rendered impassable to Federal vessels; and yet, while McClellan recommended "the strongest possible naval force" to be stationed in the Potomac to guard against a fancied danger, no means were taken to guard against that which was really threatened. The attitude of McClellan in respect to this matter was characteristic of his general policy. So formidable did the force of the enemy seem to him, that he even feared the event of a battle in which he himself should take the defensive, thinking it a matter of doubt, in case General

Johnston should advance against him in front, flanking him at the same time by a movement across the Lower Potomac into Maryland, whether he might not be overwhelmed by such superior numbers in his front as to be unable to take care of the flanking column of the enemy, which would march triumphantly into Washington. If he was apprehensive as to the results of an attack, he was naturally far more apprehensive of the result of any movement on his own part which might bring on a general engagement. It was this latter motive which was really the ground of his disinclination to co-operate in any undertaking involving a direct assault upon the enemy's works. His idea of a campaign was that complete preparation ought to be made before any thing should be accomplished, and then to dispose of the enemy by a single decisive victory. It was now scarcely a month since the battle of Bull Run. Hardly any thing had been done as yet toward the re-organization of the army. From their previous impatience of inactivity, the people had gone over to the opposite extreme, and a rash movement now would incur a double measure of condemnation. Without any doubt, therefore, McClellan was both consistent and prudent in his determination not to tempt a general engagement at this time by a movement against the position of the enemy on the right bank of the Potomac. He should also have been firm. But so strong was the feeling of the President and the Secretary of the Navy in favor of the movement, that he vacillated, and made preparations for throwing Hooker's division across the river to carry the Confederate batteries by assault. On one occasion he promised that this force should be ready at an appointed time, and the Navy Department provided the necessary transports, and Captain Craven collected his flotilla together; but when the time came McClellan had changed his mind, and the troops were not on hand. The disappointment was aggravated by the fact that no notification was given that the troops would not be sent. The reason given for this alteration of purpose was, that the troops, according to the opinion of McClellan's engineers, could not be landed with safety. It was replied that the Navy Department would be responsible on that score, and the troops were again promised, and the disappointment was repeated. This led to some ill feeling; and Captain Craven gave up his command very unwisely, on the ground that he would be held responsible for the blockade of the Potomac. McClellan's fault was in his vacillation. He should have been steadfast in his refusal so long as the matter was left to his discretion. His position was thoroughly supported by his corps of engineers. On the 27th of September, General Barnard, chief engineer, in company with Captain Wyman, of the flotilla, made a reconnoissance of the enemy's batteries as far as Matthias Point. In his report he says: "Batteries at High Point and Cockpit Point, and thence down to Chopawamsic, can not be prevented. We may, indeed, prevent their construction on *certain* points, but along here, somewhere, the enemy can establish, in spite of us, as many batteries as he chooses. What is the remedy? Favorable circumstances, not to be anticipated, nor made the basis of any calculations, might justify and render successful the attack of a particular battery. To suppose that we can capture *all*, and by mere attacks of this kind prevent the navigation being molested, is very much the same as to suppose that the hostile army in our own front can prevent us building and maintaining field-works to protect Arlington and Alexandria, by capturing them, one and all, as fast as they are built." In another communication on the subject of crossing troops for the purpose of destroying these batteries, he says: "The operation involves the forcing of a very strong line of defense of the enemy, and all that we would have to do if we were really opening a campaign against them there. It is true, we hope to force this line by turning it at Freestone Point" [a few miles below the mouth of the Occoquan]. "With reason to believe that this may be successful, it can not be denied that it involves a risk of failure. Should we, then, considering all the consequences which may be involved, enter into the operation merely to capture the Potomac batteries? I think not. Will not the Ericsson, assisted by one other gun-boat, capable of keeping alongside these batteries, so far control their fire as to keep the navigation suffi-



THE SEMINOLE AND POCAHONTAS ENGAGING THE CONFEDERATE BATTERIES AT EVANSFORD.

ciently free as long as we require it? Captain Wyman says yes." In the mean time conflicts were every day occurring with the batteries along the bank, but never with any decisive results, and not unfrequently resulting in serious injury to the vessels engaged. We need only refer to a single instance of these conflicts—that in which the *Seminole* and *Pocahontas* figured, early in the month of October. These two vessels on this occasion engaged the three batteries at Evansport. The action was commenced by the *Seminole*, but her fire was not returned until she came within full range of the batteries, which then opened upon her in earnest, striking her in several places. A heavy shell exploded close under the bows, throwing the water over the fore-castle deck. A ball passed through the rails over the engine hatch, another through the hammock nettings, and one struck the mizzen-mast a few feet above the deck, badly injuring it. It was evident that only iron-clad vessels could reduce fortifications of this nature; and in this case, as in all others, the attempt had to be given up. No disastrous results followed from the erection of the Confederate batteries, nor was either the War or the Navy Department responsible for their existence, they having been erected at a time when neither of these departments were in a condition to prevent it. After the Potomac flotilla left to co-operate with the Port Royal Expedition, the river was effectually closed. Whatever embarrassment this may have been to the government, a careful consideration of the subject must lead to the conclusion that the difficulty was inevitably incident to the peculiar situation of the opposing armies. But, if the responsibility must rest any where, it should be with the Navy Department, which might have sent vessels of sufficient strength to reduce the enemy's works. This, however, was not done, for the very good reason that new batteries could be built as rapidly as the old ones were destroyed. Nothing could have effectually protected the navigation of the Potomac except the military occupation of its entire right bank by our army, and this occupation, clearly inadvisable at an early period, did not, at a later epoch, harmonize with General McClellan's plan of operations. What that plan was we shall consider in its appropriate place.

We now turn to the movements of the enemy on the Upper Potomac, which led to the battle of Ball's Bluff.

While, in October, the two main armies of Virginia were facing each other at Manassas, or rather, through their advanced pickets, at Fairfax Court House, each watching the movements of the other and expecting attack, considerable activity prevailed on the upper Potomac. General Banks, who had superseded Patterson after the battle of Bull Run, had been pushing his outposts several miles up the valley from his position at Harper's Ferry. This was in great measure occasioned by the movements of the enemy, who, having consumed every thing in the vicinity of Manassas and Centreville, found it necessary to make expeditions up the river for provisions, and especially into Loudon county, in the vicinity of Leesburg, where, through the numerous fords of the Potomac, raids could be easily made into Maryland. Leesburg was about forty miles from Harper's Ferry. Between twenty and thirty miles to the north the Federal troops held a favorable position on Sugar-loaf Mountain for observing the movements of the enemy in this direction. General Stone also had an important command

at Poolesville, in the vicinity of Edwards's Ferry. Our pickets lined the river from Harper's Ferry to Washington; and to avoid this uninterrupted series of police, the enemy resorted to the most elaborate manœuvring. His force, which had been detailed to Leesburg, consisted of the brigade of General Evans, or four regiments of soldiers; but this number was supposed by the Federal commanders to be much greater, they being misled by the *ruse* to which the enemy resorted, of showing himself at various places at short intervals of time, so as to multiply the apparent number in his command. The Federal position was in every way favorable for cutting off and surrounding Evans's brigade. To the north was General Banks at Harper's Ferry, and Geary at the Sugar-loaf; directly east was Stone at Edwards's Ferry, and sixteen miles farther to the eastward was McCall, with a large force at Drainesville. A little to the eastward of Leesburg, Goose Creek empties its waters into the Potomac, and across this small stream lies the Gum Spring road leading to Manassas. McCall's position at Drainesville bore upon this line of communication. The town of Leesburg itself, in a military point of view, was of great value to either army, lying on the railroad line from Washington to Winchester, and its possession securing the crops both of the Loudon and Shenandoah valleys. It was also a good position from which to carry on an irregular aggressive campaign against Maryland. But McClellan was on his guard; every ford was strongly defended, every movement of the enemy subjected to the strictest examination, and fortifications were erected at every available point. The Confederates, not being in sufficient force to man a great number of works if they had had them, relied not upon intrenchments or fortifications, but upon making a sudden attack in some unexpected quarter. They had, therefore, but a single battery, which was situated between Leesburg and Edwards's Ferry.

At this time the Confederate General Ashby, with his cavalry, was stationed at Charlestown, in the Shenandoah Valley, whence he continued, by a series of raids, to harass our forces at Harper's Ferry, a few miles to the northwest. The Confederates having now undisputed control of the lower Potomac, through their batteries at Acquia Creek, were seeking, by the co-operation of Evans with Ashby, to obtain a similar advantage on the upper part of the river. On the 13th of October, Ashby's troops, with four companies of Evans's brigade, and two pieces of his artillery, made an unusually daring expedition to Harper's Ferry. Taking up his position on the Loudon Heights, a severe skirmish occurred between the opposing forces, and some of the store-houses and mills in the village of Harper's Ferry were fired by the shells of the enemy. Otherwise no important result was gained, and it was with great difficulty that Ashby was able to withdraw from the position which he had so boldly taken.

Evans, in the mean time, in danger of being cut off by McCall, fell back to a position on Goose Creek, still holding Leesburg. Besides the danger of an attack from the direction of Drainesville, it will be remembered that General Stone threatened Evans's force from two points on the river, viz., from Edwards's Ferry and Harrison's Island, both being about five miles from Leesburg, and the same distance from each other. At Harrison's Island Colonel Devens was stationed, with a few companies of the 15th Massachusetts. Pickets were sent out by Evans in each of these directions. This



CHARLES DEVENS.

was the situation on Saturday night, the 19th of October. The next day General Stone, having evidently the impression that the main force of the enemy was in some other quarter, and that Leesburg was defended by only two or three companies, made his arrangements to cross the river and bring on an engagement. This determination led to the battle of Ball's Bluff, which has also been called the battle of Leesburg. Considering merely the disposition of the Federal forces, and the number of men available for an attack, it seems almost impossible that the combination formed should result in a disaster so complete as that which followed, and which we must now consider.

Ball's Bluff rises to the height of thirty feet from the river's edge, directly opposite and about a hundred yards from Harrison's Island. A reconnoissance had been made a few days previously from this point by Federal scouts, accompanied by engineers, and it was found that only a few companies held Leesburg. All the arrangements for attack seem to have proceeded on the basis of this reconnoissance. On Sunday at sunset, after furiously attacking the enemy's position from Edwards's Ferry, and devoting especial attention to a battery called Fort Evans, known to be at the right, General Stone landed a few of his troops on the Virginia side, but at dusk returned them to camp. At evening Colonel Lee, with a battalion of the 20th Massachusetts, and the 20th New York, or Tammany regiment, and a section of artillery, was in position at Conrad's Ferry, between Edwards's Ferry and Harrison's Island, ready to act in support of Devens, who had been ordered to cross the river to Ball's Bluff, and, proceeding toward Leesburg, to disperse an encampment which scouts had reported as existing a mile north of the town.

Devens had not completed his crossing before sunrise Monday morning, so inadequate were the means of transportation. Not long after he had crossed, Colonel Edward Baker came upon the island with his 1st California regiment, and commenced crossing. Early in the day he reported in person to General Stone, who directed him to cross at the island and take command of all the forces on the Virginia side. In this interview, according to Stone's report, made a week after the fight, the latter had distinctly intimated to Baker the nature of the situation; he had informed him what means of transportation he might have at his disposal; he had distinctly warned him that it was impossible to support him directly by a column crossed at Edwards's Ferry on account of the battery (Fort Evans) which interposed; he advised him to make no advance except against an inferior force, and to take no more artillery across than he had infantry to protect; and distinctly, in his written orders, he left it to the brave colonel's discretion whether to advance or retire, after that he had crossed and reconnoitred. With these instructions, Colonel Baker hurried to the field.

Devens, in the mean time, had accomplished his reconnoissance. He found that the scouts had been deceived, mistaking certain openings in the woods for white tents; but he encountered a Mississippi regiment on picket duty, and had retired fighting all the way to his landing-place, where his retreat was covered by Colonel Lee. The position to which he retired was a semi-circular opening in the forest, stretching out from the bluff; and thither the enemy boldly followed him, taking a position under cover of the woods in his flank, and pouring upon his men a merciless fire. Random firing was thus continually heard by Baker's regiment as it was crossing the river. Gorman's brigade had crossed in the morning at Edwards's Ferry, on a reconnoissance toward Goose Creek, for the purpose of drawing Evans's attention from the right; still there was a sufficient force retained at the latter point to outnumber Colonel Devens, leaving out of sight the advantage of the enemy in the matter of position.

The California regiment was from seven o'clock in the morning until four in the afternoon crossing the river, and in the mean time numbers of them fell victims to the concealed fire of the enemy. At first there was no means of conveying the men across except an old water-logged scow, carrying about


forty men; but another scow, capable of holding sixty, was afterward dragged up from the canal. This leisurely proceeding plainly indicates that the Federal commanders had no conception of the number of the enemy on the other side. The reconnoissances which had been made were notably deficient; in each case a picket guard of the Confederates had been encountered, when the reconnoitring force had retired, and, beyond the number of the combatants directly met, no information had been gathered. A small cavalry force, though it would not have mended the deficiency in boats, would at least have obtained the position and numbers of the foe to be encountered, and thus have awakened the Federal officers to the peril of making an attack in the careless manner in which it was made, both in regard to transportation and the number of men detailed. General Stone reports that he sent such a force, but his order was disobeyed.

After having crossed, the men climbed up the steep banks with their artillery, consisting of five pieces; skirmishers were sent out and the line of battle formed, with the California regiment on the left, the 15th Massachusetts and the Tammany regiment on the right, and the 20th Massachusetts in the centre, making, all told, a force of 1720 men. But in the woods was a much superior force. Gorman had retired from Goose Creek without accomplishing any thing more than a temporary diversion, and thus the force of the enemy at Ball's Bluff was continually re-enforced from the main body opposite Edwards's Ferry.


Our forces were received with a volley from the enemy; then followed random firing, and then again the volley, every fire being preceded by a hideous yell. This continued for half an hour, our men being leisurely picked off, as in an ambuscade, while the enemy was securely covered by the woods both from our musketry and artillery. In the severity of this onslaught the Rhode Island artillerymen deserted their pieces, which were immediately manned by Colonels Wistar and Cogswell, the former of whom was killed and the latter wounded. Every moment the enemy grew bolder and more desperate, our men suffering terribly from the incessant fire, and having no possible protection except that furnished by a slight elevation of the ground. But there was no wavering. For two hours the brave men stood their ground thus, every minute telling its quota of murders. Then a council of war was held. What was to be done? Evidently three courses lay before Colonel Baker, and with him was left the decision between them. One was to retreat. But that involved recrossing the river, and, with the terrible advantage now held by the enemy, this would necessitate incalculable loss. Another course which might be taken was for Baker to cut his way through the woods to Edwards's Ferry. But in that case there was a considerable force of the enemy to be encountered in front, and a powerful battery, besides the overwhelming force which would pursue them from behind; the way, moreover, led through the woods. The only other course left was to remain and await re-enforcements. But how were these to come? Even the scanty supply of boats at hand were scattered, under no command or management; indeed, re-enforcements which had been sent could not, on this very account, find their way to the field. There seems to have been no possible escape from the net in which our forces had been carelessly immeshed. But in this extremity Baker dreams not of surrender. It is reported (and the report is accredited by General Stone) that at this point, and just as our officers had decided to hold the field, a mounted Confederate officer came out from the covert and beckoned our forces to advance, and that Colonel Baker, seizing upon this suggestion, led his men in a charge upon the enemy's position in the woods. However it may be as regards the suggestion, it is true that the colonel did lead his men in an impetuous charge, riding himself far in the front; that, with his hand placed in his breast after his usual manner, he coolly gave orders to his men, advising them to fire lower, and encouraging them with the hope of final success; and that in a moment a sheet of flame surrounded him as with the illumination of lightning, and he fell at the head of his column, the victim of an ill-advised battle. His body was with difficulty recovered. The command devolving upon Cogswell, he resolved to cut his way out to Edwards's Ferry; but this was now impossible, as our men in broken ranks were already hastening to cross the river. Colonel Devens had deserted his command and crossed the river on horseback. The scow was soon filled with men, when it was swamped, and many of the men lost. In utter confusion, the troops rolled over each other down the bank; some, attempting to swim across, were drowned, and a greater number were shot by the enemy, who never for one moment slackened fire. There was a sufficient force on the island to prevent pursuit, and with the retreat of our forces the engagement terminated. The Federal loss was 350 killed and wounded, and 500 taken prisoners. Among the wounded was a son of Oliver Wendell Holmes.

It seems almost a miracle of negligence that, with several thousand men available for this very field, and with abundant facilities for procuring suitable transportation, so small a force of men should have been placed at the mercy of an enemy whose numbers were unknown, and that, too, without adequate means of safe retreat in case of disaster. Nor was this the whole sum of the error. Why did Gorman retire from Goose Creek? His command was not very much inferior in numbers to that of the enemy, all told, and yet he simply exchanges shots with a Mississippi regiment and withdraws. If he had held his ground, and hung upon the flanks of Evans, his co-operation with Baker might have been efficient, and the day have ended with victory instead of defeat. Whoever may have been responsible for this reverse, no blame in connection with it is to be attributed to General McClellan, who only ordered Stone to make a feint at crossing, so as to co-operate with McCall at Drainesville.

The success of the enemy led to no important results. Our most serious loss was the death of Colonel Baker. His career had been one of unusual



GENERAL STONE'S DIVISION AT EDWARDS'S FERRY, OCTOBER 20, 1861.



EDWARD D. BAKER.

brilliance. He was born in London, but his father, soon after the birth of his son, emigrated to Philadelphia, and in a few years went to the West. Edward studied law, and rose to a high degree of eminence in that profession. From his fine address, the impressiveness of his presence, and his irresistible eloquence, he became a general favorite in the West. In Illinois, California, and Oregon, he, as resident of those states successively, carried on a successful political career. In Oregon he was elected United States senator in 1859. He was one of the ablest debaters in the Senate. The most striking characteristic of the man was that a great occasion inevitably inspired him and swayed his course. In the incipency of any important movement he seemed to interpret its full meaning, and clearly to see the end from the beginning. This made him both ready and transparent in utterance; and these elements, added to the fire of eloquence that was in him, made him one of the best orators of the country. Thousands will remember, till they cease to remember any thing, his speech at the great Union Meeting in New York City when the war first broke out. Every sentence was like the full wave of a powerful sea, and carried the whole multitude on before it, swaying them and thrilling them like music. Yet there was no sentiment nor extravagant verbiage in his rhetoric. No sooner had he made that speech than he immediately began the work of recruiting a regiment for the war. He was afterward offered a higher position, even that of a major general, but he preferred to serve as colonel of his original regiment. Previous to the battle of Ball's Bluff he seems to have had a presentiment of his fate; he hurried to Washington, disposed of all his affairs, even to his own burial-place, and then returned to the field to die there doing his duty. This battle, in which one half of the men in the field were killed, wounded, or taken prisoners, and the loss of Colonel Baker, awakened throughout the country a determination that the officers concerned in the management of the affair should be held responsible.

In the mean time, directly after the engagement, orders were received from McClellan to hold the island and the Virginia shore at Edwards's Ferry

at all hazards. Re-enforcements were sent, but it was finally deemed best to withdraw entirely to the Maryland side of the river.

The Confederate army in Virginia at this time consisted of three separate armies, styled respectively the Army of the Potomac, the Army of the Valley, and the Army of the Acquia. The first of these, comprising four divisions, under Doren, Longstreet, and the two Smiths (G. W. and Kirby), was under the command of Beauregard; Jackson commanded the Army of the Valley, and Holmes that of the Acquia. The entire army, with its left threatening the upper, and its right the lower Potomac, while its centre rested on Manassas, covering the direct route to Richmond, was under the command of General Johnston. This was the position during the winter. On the 20th of December an engagement of some importance occurred near Drainesville. General Ord, following instructions from McCall, proceeded with five regiments, including Lieutenant Colonel Kane's regiment, a battery, and two squadrons of cavalry, on the Leesburg pike in the direction of Drainesville. The purpose of this movement was to drive back the enemy's pickets, which had advanced to within four or five miles of the Federal lines, with a reserve force at Drainesville, and to procure forage from the farms of disloyal citizens in the vicinity. A few miles to the east of Drainesville Difficult Creek crosses the pike. Here General J. F. Reynolds was posted with the first brigade ready to support the main column. Brigadier General Meade was also called up with the second brigade for a similar purpose. Thus McCall's entire division was involved in the general movement, though General Ord's brigade was the only one directly engaged. General McCall's division, immediately after the occupation by our forces of Munson's Hill and Falls Church, had been stationed at the right of these positions, with its encampments stretching away over a beautiful tract of country toward Lewinsville, thus forming the right wing of the great Potomac division, securing the Chain Bridge, guarding against a flank movement from Leesburg, and, in connection with Banks's division on the upper Potomac, against an invasion of Maryland, or a raid upon the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. The Leesburg pike, starting from Chain Bridge, passes through Lewinsville, and, ten miles farther on, through Drainesville, running nearly parallel with the railroad from Alexandria to Leesburg. This railroad beyond Falls Church was occupied by a portion of the Confederate force holding possession of Leesburg, and at Hunter's Mill, a little to the southeast of Lewinsville, intrenchments had been thrown up, with rifle-pits and batteries. Drainesville also was threatened, and this being an important position on McCall's right, it was no small part of his duty to keep it clear of the enemy. At the present time, as we have already indicated, there was a strong reserve picket of the enemy in the neighborhood of Drainesville; there was also a full brigade at Herndon's Station, about four miles south of the town, and a force of five hundred infantry and cavalry at Hunter's Mill, besides a small infantry detachment, numbering two hundred, between Drainesville and the Potomac. The position of these forces, taken in consideration with the facility with which Confederate re-enforcements might be brought up by the road from Centreville, made it necessary that General Ord's movement should be supported by the entire strength of the division. The troops of this division were from Pennsylvania. Those selected for the main column of the expedition were the third brigade, consisting of the Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Twelfth regiments, to which was added a regiment of riflemen—the "Bucktails"—under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Kane. The Easton Battery, consisting of two 24-pounders and two 12-pounders, and a detachment of Colonel Bayard's cavalry, made up the entire column which started out of camp on Friday morning at six o'clock, with the cavalry and the "Bucktails" in the advance. It was a clear, frosty morning; the road was rugged, stretching through the woods, whose wintry foliage somewhat solemnized the picture. At half past ten a dispatch was sent to General McCall, acquainting him with the position of the enemy, which we have already indicated. The general mounted his horse, and, with his staff and a cavalry escort, followed in the road which Ord's brigade had taken in the



THE VILLAGE OF LEWINSVILLE, VIRGINIA.



BUILDING HUTS FOR THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

morning, arriving on the field shortly after the battle commenced. General Ord, having dispatched a foraging party to the farms of prominent secessionists between the pike and the river, moved on to Drainesville, where he waited for the Tenth, Sixth, and Twelfth to come up. Upon his arrival the Confederate cavalry picket was dispersed, and two companies of the "Buck-tails," together with the Ninth regiment, Colonel Jackson, were so disposed, in connection with the battery, as to cover the approaches to Drainesville from the south. The enemy in the mean time, with four regiments under command of General Stuart, advanced along the Centreville road, which was skirted by a dense wood on either side. Where the road debouches into an open clearing the Sumter battery was stationed, mounting six guns, and skirmishers were deployed to the left and right. In front of the enemy's battery, and five hundred yards distant, was the Easton battery; and between these two an artillery duel was kept up for half an hour. Then an attempt was made by the enemy, who advanced from the cover of the woods, to turn our left, which was repulsed by Colonel McCalmont and two or three shells from the battery, when it was given up. The Confederates were strongly flanked on the right by the Ninth and Twelfth, the former of whom met the enemy in close quarters. The front was held by the Sixth and by the Kane Rifles on opposite sides of the road, which, in its entire length, was commanded by our battery. Discovering that the enemy's guns were in a position open to an attack from their right and in the rear, General Ord detached two or three guns from the battery for this purpose, which soon poured in their enfilading fire with brilliant effect. It was this feature of the attack which most annoyed the Confederates, and finally compelled their retreat. So accurate was the fire from our battery, that every shot seemed to tell upon the enemy; one of his caissons was blown up; another was left behind; gun-carriages were broken, while the road was strewn with other evidences of destruction. The retreating columns of Stuart were pursued for a short distance, after which the entire command, having won the day, returned to camp. The Confederate loss was estimated at over two hundred and thirty, while that of the Union troops, all told, was no more than sixty-nine. This victory had no important result, but, as being the first important success achieved by the Army of the Potomac, received more attention than would otherwise have been given it, and called forth a special congratulatory letter from Secretary Cameron.

The situation in the West differed very materially from that in Virginia. In the latter, preparations were necessarily made on a gigantic scale. Here was gathered the concentrated strength of both armies—the Federal and the Confederate; and upon these, as it seemed, the final issue of the war depended. But this issue was not to be developed through impetuous and rashly-undertaken onsets, as was supposed, but very much through that stationary attitude which, by shallow critics on both sides, was sneered at as "masterly inactivity"—through the careful measuring of strength against strength in quiet, and the patient waiting for opportunity. This attitude followed as a necessity from a situation in which the advantage could rest with the assailant only on the condition of his having an available force vastly superior to that assailed. Whichever side assumed the offensive must be able to face two disadvantages—one, that of marching against a fortified position, and the other, that involved in a distant source of supplies. These disadvantages

could only be overcome by overwhelming odds. And how was this counterbalancing advantage to be gained by either side over an enemy forever watchful, and able, at least for a long time to come, to encounter re-enforcement with re-enforcement? So long as this situation remained, it was inevitable that whichever of these two armies should advance beyond a certain point, and risk an engagement with the other, must, unless there be some fatal mistake in the conduct of the defense, be beaten and driven back. If our naval force could have been made available in a direct attack upon the enemy's strong-hold, we should have needed no other advantage. But the situation did not allow any calculation of our naval resources as a direct element. It was impossible, therefore, that the conflict in Virginia should come to a decisive crisis until operations elsewhere should have brought one of the combatants to the verge of exhaustion, or at least to such an extremity as would give the other a decided advantage in the matter of available strength. Since it was morally certain that a vigorous series of campaigns in the West and along the sea-board must in the end bring the South to that point, our Army of the Potomac could afford to wait. The magnitude of that army was, in this connection, a fortunate circumstance for us; for, although it could not at first materially affect the general situation, yet, when the South should begin to be exhausted, it would enable our Western armies to aim rapid and effective blows against points disproportionately weak, or compel such a concentration of the Confederate forces as would necessitate the abandonment of important positions. The "quiet on the Potomac," therefore, did not diminish the importance of our Virginia army.

But in the West the situation, as we have said, was very different. Here what was to be done invited dispatch. We started on good vantage ground, moreover, inasmuch as we had superior facilities for the transportation of troops and supplies, and a more adequate supply of excellent arms; and the promptness of our military movements forestalled the enemy both in Missouri and Kentucky. While the Confederate generals in all their offensive operations put themselves at a distance from their supplies both of food or ammunition, we had the rivers on our side, answering both as avenues of communication and as a means of moving into the heart of the enemy's country. This made our naval resources more available in the Western campaign than they could be in Virginia. The operations of the enemy in the West always partook of the nature of an extensive raid rather than of a regular combination of forces for a sustained effort; and whenever they erected fortifications, they were soon compelled to abandon them, on account of the ease with which they were flanked and cut off from their distant base.

Our operations in the West were of course, from the first, mainly flank movements in relation to the position in Virginia. The objective point was East Tennessee. This was involved in McClellan's plan, as developed in his memorandum addressed on the 4th of August to the President. There were, as we shall see hereafter, two plans or routes by which this point might be reached. But, gained by whatever plan, East Tennessee was even then seen to be the very keystone of the Confederate arch.

The critical situation, as regards popular sentiment, in the border states of Missouri and Kentucky, demanded a prompt and adequate display of force in those states, in order to secure the passive loyalty of Southern sympathizers and the active co-operation of Unionists. The progress of events in these two states will be the subject of our next chapter.