



BULL RUN, NEAR UNION MOUNT, CROSSED BY THE ORANGE AND ALEXANDRIA RAILROAD.

CHAPTER III.

THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

The Proclamation and Volunteers.—The opposing Armies.—Popular Impatience.—Forward to Richmond.—Determination to Advance.—McDowell's Appointment.—Forces at his Command.—Beauregard and Johnston.—The Situation at Manassas.—Beauregard's Proclamation.—Topography of the Region.—Movements of the Confederates.—The Ambush at Vienna.—Johnston and Patterson.—Treachery in the Departments.—Patterson out-generaled.—Johnston sets out to join Beauregard.—McDowell's Advance.—The Halt at Fairfax.—Outrages by the Soldiers.—McDowell's Order.—The March to Centreville.—Skirmish at Blackburn's Ford.—McDowell's First Plan of Operations.—Why abandoned.—His Second Plan.—Johnston and Beauregard at Manassas.—Their Plan of Attack.—War and Chess.—Strength of the two Armies.—The Advance upon Bull Run.—Time lost.—Tyler in Position.—Topography of the Battle-field.—General Position of the Confederates.—The Battle of the Morning.—The Confederates repulsed.—They fall back to the Plateau.—Jackson's Stand.—Johnston and Beauregard on the Field.—Reorganization of the Confederates.—Estimate of Forces.—The Battle of the Afternoon.—The Confederate Position.—Rout of the New York Zouaves.—The Zouaves and the Black Horse Cavalry.—Keyes's Movement.—The Fight on the Hill.—The Federal Batteries disabled.—The Fight on the Ridge.—Federal Anticipations of Victory.—Confederate Re-enforcements.—The Rout.—Arrival of Jefferson Davis.—Stand of Sykes with the Regulars.—The Flight of the Federals.—The Pursuit by the Confederates.—Civilians on the Field.—At Cub Run Bridge.—Miles's Division.—Miles and Richardson.—The Halt at Centreville.—The Flight to Washington.—Reports of the Battle.—General Resumé.—Object and Means of the Expedition.—Causes of its Failure.—Burnside and Schenck.—General Note.—Authorities for the History.—Name of the Battle.—Patterson's Explanation.—List of Regiments.—The New York Zouaves.—Losses on both Sides.

THE President's proclamation of April 15, calling for 75,000 militia for three months, also summoned Congress to meet in extra session on the 4th of July. Notwithstanding the contemptuous refusal of the governors of six states, whose quotas amounted to 12,000 men, more than 80,000 promptly responded to the call. They saved the national capital from seizure; but it soon became evident that this force was wholly inadequate to the task of "suppressing the combinations and causing the laws to be duly executed." On the 3d of May another proclamation was put forth by the President calling for 42,000 volunteers for three years, and ordering an increase of 23,000 men to the regular army, and 18,000 to the navy. The nation uprose to the greatness of the occasion rather than to the smallness of the demand. In a month five men volunteered for one who had been asked. When Congress met, just two months from the date of the call, it was formally announced by the Secretary of War that there were in active service 260,000 men, of whom 153 regiments, with 165,000 men, were volunteers for three years, 25,000 regulars, and 80,000 volunteers for three months; besides these, fifty-five regiments, 50,000 strong, had been accepted, and would be in the field in twenty days; so that after the three months' men had withdrawn there would remain an army 230,000 strong. Government seemed to doubt whether this was a sufficient force. The Secretary of War said, "It will remain for Congress to determine whether the army shall at this time be in-

creased by the addition of a still larger volunteer force." The President, with a deeper but yet inadequate insight into the magnitude of the rebellion, asked that Congress, "in order to make the contest a short and decisive one, should place at the control of the government for this work at least 400,000 men."

While the administration was thus in doubt as to the adequacy of the force at its disposal for the work to be done, there was now no doubt on the part of the people. When men saw regiment after regiment hurrying to camp or parading the streets, when they heard of them pouring forward in a continuous stream which seemed to block up every approach to the capital, they were confident that the Confederacy had no power to withstand the forces arraying themselves on its borders. Great as were these forces, they were exaggerated in popular estimation. A regiment proposed to be raised was set down as accepted; one accepted was considered to be in the field; one in the field to be ready for immediate service. The people did not know, and the government dared not tell them, that there was a fearful lack of arms, munitions, and equipments—of every thing necessary to transform a crowd of men into an army. Through the villainy of Floyd, the complicity of Toucey, and the imbecility of Buchanan, the loyal states had been stripped of arms. Of the three great armories, two had fallen without opposition into the hands of the Confederates. Norfolk, with its accumulation of 2000 great guns, was theirs. Harper's Ferry, with its machinery almost uninjured, was theirs, needing only to be transported to a safe place. The Union had merely the armory at Springfield, which was then capable of turning out only 25,000 muskets a year. The private armories then in existence could furnish only a few thousand more. As far as men were concerned, government could create an army by a word; to supply the arms, without which in modern warfare there can be no army, was a work of time. A few could be furnished by importation from abroad; for the rest, not only the arms themselves, but the means of creating them, must be created. The enemy was for the time abundantly supplied. The sudden seizure of the forts and arsenals from the Chesapeake to the Rio Grande, from Virginia to Alabama, had put into his hands more weapons than he could use. Men were not wanting on either side; but while the Federal regiments stood idle in camp for want of arms, the Confederates had weapons ready for every company that could be raised. The Confederates availed themselves of this initial advantage. The ink with which the Virginia Ordinance of Secession was written was hardly dry before Richmond was chosen as the capital, where their Congress was to meet on the 20th of July, and troops from the farthest South were pushed to the northern frontiers of the Confederacy, within sight of the dome of the Federal Capitol.

The people of the North could see no sign of a corresponding activity. Their forces never moved southward far enough to lose sight of the Poto-

mac. Day by day they grew more impatient of this delay, for which they could see no good reason. Buchanan's administration had been feeble and treacherous; was not that of Lincoln treacherous and feeble? Twenty thousand men had twelve years before marched from Vera Cruz to Mexico; why could not ten times as many, under the same commander, march from Washington to Richmond or Montgomery? That commander, it was hinted rather than said, was a Southerner by birth. It was acknowledged that for more than half a century he had been true and loyal, but were not Davis and Stephens loyal, Twiggs, Lee, and Johnston faithful, and even Floyd, Cobb, and Thompson honest, until the time came when they must choose between their country and their section? Had the old treason gone out when the new administration came in?

Such were the questions which all men were asking themselves during the months of May and June, and it needed but a word, fitly or unfitly spoken, to rouse a storm of indignation against the government. That word was supplied by the New York *Tribune*, a newspaper which, from various causes, was at the moment the exponent of popular feeling. For a score of years it had, through evil report and through good report, maintained the principles of the Republican party, always earnestly, if not always wisely. That party had now, after a long and weary contest, triumphed in every free state but one. The circulation of the paper was large. It reached every hamlet in the North and West; it passed from house to house, from hand to hand, and had every week a million of readers, by a large portion of whom it was accepted as authority. At length, on the 26th of June, it contained an article headed "the Nation's War-cry," which in just thirty words gave expression to the common feeling, and form to the general demand. "Forward to Richmond!" it said. "The Rebel Congress must not be allowed to meet there on the 20th of July. By that date the place must be held by the national army." Day after day these thirty electric words were repeated without change, like the Roman senator's "Carthage must be destroyed." Day after day this brief text was followed up by an elaborate discourse. Government was charged with indifference, if not treachery. The rebels were ready to fly at our approach. If the right men were in the right places, the war could be virtually ended in three months. If this was not done, it would be the fault of incompetent or treacherous leaders; politicians in or out of uniform, who did not wish the rebels routed, and in whose official statements no reliance was to be placed. If the rebellion was not thoroughly put down by spring, it would be because the nation had been betrayed by the government; it must acknowledge itself beaten, and recognize the independence of the Confederacy. And so on through every form of direct or insinuated accusation.¹

The force of these appeals lay in that they were echoes of the popular feeling to which they gave form and expression. It pressed upon government with a force which could not be withstood. Members of Congress crowded upon the President and General Scott complaining of the inactivity of the army, and urging them to heed the cry, "Forward to Richmond!" The administration was in a sore strait. If the movement was attempted, there was a more than equal chance of its failure: if it was not attempted, government would lose the confidence of the country. A lost battle might be retrieved; public confidence lost could never be regained. The President, looking mainly at the political aspect of the case, was in favor of the movement. The commanding general, looking mainly at the military aspect, was opposed to it; but at last, against his judgment, gave a reluctant consent.

The movement having been determined upon, it only remained to make the best preparations possible. General Scott could not take the command in person. Age and infirmity had come upon him. For three years he had been unable to mount a horse; it was with difficulty that he could walk a few steps; he was tormented with dropsy and harassed by vertigo. Four months later he was compelled to ask to be suffered to retire from active service. The request was granted, and, full of age and honors, he was released from the command which he had so long and honorably held. Meanwhile the actual conduct of the enterprise must be intrusted to other hands. The choice fell upon General Irvin McDowell. He was in the prime of manhood; had graduated twenty-seven years before at the Military Academy with high honor; had served through the Mexican war, and was brevetted as captain for gallant and meritorious conduct in the hard-fought battle of Buena Vista. When peace came he relinquished his rank in the line, and entered the adjutant general's department. At the outbreak of the rebellion he returned to duty in the field, and was appointed brigadier general in the regular army, his commission dating from May 14, 1861. To consid-



IRVIN McDOWELL

erable military experience he joined a personal character beyond reproach, and loyalty above suspicion. In selecting him for the command, government made the wisest choice then possible. It had yet to learn who were the generals endowed with great military genius. On the 27th of May McDowell was appointed to the command of a new military department, comprising all Virginia east of the Alleghany Mountains and west of the James River, with the exception of Fortress Monroe and its immediate vicinity. He set himself at once to the task of organizing into an army the regiments placed under his command. He took up his headquarters at Arlington House, once the residence of the adopted son of the Father of our Country, from whom it had passed by marriage into the hands of General Lee, who had forsworn his military oath, thrown up his commission in the national army to head the insurgent forces in Virginia, and was soon to be appointed to the chief command of the entire Confederate army.

The force at the disposal of government for the execution of this enterprise was far less than was supposed. On the morning of the 27th of June, when the nation's war cry—"Forward to Richmond!"—reached Washington, there were in and around Washington 38,600 Federal troops. Of these, 15,700 were across the Potomac in Virginia, the remainder being in the District. Patterson, with about 18,000 men, was fifty miles away, near Harper's Ferry, watching an equal Confederate force in the Valley of the Shenandoah. All that was expected of him was to prevent that army from interfering with the march into Virginia. Butler at Fortress Monroe, Banks in Maryland, and McClellan in West Virginia, with some 40,000 men in all, could not directly co-operate. Of the 310,000 men whom the Secretary of War a week after announced to be at the disposal of the government, about 100,000 were in actual service. Of these, something more than 50,000 could be concentrated near the capital, from which, after leaving behind a force to garrison Washington and its defenses, McDowell must draw the army which was to advance. The 8th of July was fixed upon as the day for the commencement of the movement. But the regiments came up slowly, many of them eight or nine days after the time fixed upon, and were sent forward without ever having been formed into brigades or having been seen by their commanders. Time passed on until the 15th, and yet the arrangements were far from complete; but the pressure from without was so strong, that orders were given for the advance on the following day. The force had been organized into five divisions. The First Division, under Tyler, consisted of eleven volunteer regiments, and three companies of cavalry and artillery. The Second Division, under Hunter, seven volunteer regiments, a battalion of regulars, a corps of marines, and six companies of cavalry and artillery. The Third Division, under Heintzelman, had ten volunteer regiments, and three companies of cavalry and artillery. The Fourth Division, under Runyon, had seven regiments of New Jersey volunteers. The Fifth Division, under Miles, had nine volunteer regiments, with two companies of artillery. The entire army numbered 35,000, of whom about 33,000 were volunteers. Of these one third were for three months, whose term of service was about to expire. About 1000 were regulars from a number of regiments, 500 were marines, and the remainder were cavalry and artillery. Of cavalry there were but four companies. Though falling fully 20,000 short of the number generally attributed to it, this was the largest army ever brought together under one command on this continent.

The Confederates, meanwhile, having resolved to make Virginia the seat of war, and having transferred their seat of government from Montgomery to Richmond, had pushed forward two considerable armies toward the Potomac. Beauregard's bloodless capture of Fort Sumter had made him the hero of the South, and to him was intrusted the command of the most important of these armies, that of the Potomac; while to Johnston, his superior in rank, was confided the command of the Army of the Shenandoah. The

¹ "THE NATION'S WAR-CRY.—Forward to Richmond! Forward to Richmond! The Rebel Congress must not be allowed to meet there on the 20th of July! BY THAT DATE THE PLACE MUST BE HELD BY THE NATIONAL ARMY!"—*Tribune*, June 26 to July 3.

"... If the rebels are not virtually whipped when the next spring opens, and if they shall meanwhile have steadily confronted our troops without losing ground, we may consider that the republic has been betrayed by the folly or incompetence of its trusted leaders, and that disunion is a fixed fact."—*The Same*, June 27.

"... The war can not much longer be conducted and held in check by politicians, whether in uniform or out. . . . If the men in Washington wish to convince the public that they have really repented, and are ready to do their duty, let them see to it that the national flag floats over Richmond before the 20th of July."—*The Same*, June 27.

"The real question is this: Does General Scott (or whoever it may be) contemplate the same end, and is he animated by like impulses with the great body of the loyal, liberty-loving people of the country? . . . Does he want the rebels routed, or would he have them conciliated? If the national forces shall be beaten in a fair stand-up fight—which we do not believe possible—the patriot millions will acknowledge the corn and the independence of Secession. If our side beats, the rebel leaders must abscond. . . . and we may just as well determine who is who in three months as in thirty."—*The Same*, July 1.

"... Forward, then, and anticipate the rebel force, which only awaits our approach to flee. Forward to Richmond, and place the national foot on the neck of the traitor who already sues for peace."—*The Same*, July 1.

"... Unfortunately, the credit to be given to declarations from the State Department is much impaired."—*The Same*, July 2.

Army of the Potomac took up a position judiciously chosen, either to threaten Washington or to defend Richmond. From Alexandria on the Potomac, just below Washington, starts the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, running southwestwardly, and forming the northern link in the great southern chain of railways. After traversing the flat Potomac region, it begins to climb the gradual slope of the outlying ranges of the great Alleghany chain. Twenty-seven miles from Alexandria it meets the Manassas Gap Railway, which, running almost due west for fifty miles, pierces the valley of the Shenandoah at Strasburg, thence turning south for a score of miles down the valley. These two roads meet on an elevated plateau. The point of union is known as Manassas Junction. From this point the railway runs southwardly, past Warrenton and Culpepper, fifty miles, to Gordonsville, where it connects with the great network of railway which, reaching every point in the South, has its focus at Richmond. From Manassas to Washington is about thirty miles; to Richmond about eighty in a direct line, but almost twice as far by the circuitous railway routes. Practically, however, it is nearer to Richmond for defensive purposes than to Washington for offensive. Before its military occupation the Junction was an insignificant place. It consisted of a low wooden *dépôt*, a dingy house for refreshments, and half a dozen small cottages scattered about over the bleak plain.

Beauregard, who had been ordered to the Mississippi, and was actually on his way thither when he was recalled, and ordered to take the command of the Army of the Potomac, reached Manassas early in June, and on the 5th issued a violent and mendacious proclamation addressed to the people of the region. "A reckless and unprincipled tyrant," he said, "has invaded your soil. Abraham Lincoln, regardless of all moral, legal, and constitutional restraints, has thrown his abolition hosts among you, who are murdering and imprisoning your citizens, confiscating and destroying your property, and committing other acts of violence and outrage too shocking and revolting to be enumerated. All rules of civilized warfare are abandoned, and they proclaim by their acts, if not on their banners, that their war-cry is 'Beauty and Booty.' All that is dear to man—your honor and that of your wives and daughters—your fortunes and your lives, are involved in this momentous contest." The people were summoned to rally to his camp. The neighboring planters responded to his call, partly in person, and more freely by sending their slaves, by whom, in a short time, a strong earthwork was thrown up, which was named Camp Pickens, in honor of the governor of South Carolina. The troops, thus freed from all other labor, could devote their time to military drill, and were soon brought into a state of tolerable efficiency.

The position, apart from its fortifications, was by nature a strong one. From the foot of the Blue Ridge a plain of about twenty miles in width slopes eastward down to the lowland region of the Potomac. This whole plain is broken and intricate, sparsely dotted with hamlets, plantations, and solitary houses, with patches of woodland, partly forests of considerable size, and partly of the scrubby growth of pine and oak which springs up spontaneously in the exhausted and abandoned fields of Virginia. It is intersected in every direction by streams, elsewhere denominated creeks, but in the local dialect known by the more picturesque name of "runs." Roads, which are hardly more than by-paths, traverse the plain in every direction, leading through the fields and woods to the solitary dwellings. The principal of these streams, which almost claims the rank of a river, is Bull Run. Pursuing a winding course, with a general direction from northwest to southeast, it drains a considerable tract of country, and falls into the Occoquan about twelve miles from its junction with the Potomac. It has worn a deep channel through the limestone strata, and the banks are generally steep and rocky. At intervals of a mile or two these banks are broken down so as to form fords, which are the only places where the stream can be crossed, with the exception of two bridges—one a substantial stone structure over which passes the Warrenton turnpike, the other a mere wooden bridge at Blackburn's Ford, seven miles below, on the direct road from Centreville to Manassas. A mile or so below this is the bridge by which the Orange and Alexandria Railway is carried over the Run. Three miles beyond the Run is Manassas Junction, where the Army of the Potomac had intrenched itself. The Run itself formed an admirable defensive line, eight miles long, from the Stone Bridge to the railroad. It could only be crossed by an army at the fords, and such was the nature of the approaches to these that they could be maintained against a greatly superior force. There was no necessity for fortifications, and with the exception of a strong abattis across the road at the Stone Bridge, there were no artificial defenses on the whole line. The wooded slopes of the hills furnished masks for batteries better than could be provided by art.

Beauregard, having securely intrenched himself at Manassas, pushed forward detachments toward Washington. An outpost was established at Fairfax Court House, ten miles on the road to Washington, where intrenchments were thrown up. The cavalry and light artillery made dashes to within sight of the Federal works at Arlington Heights, and could catch glimpses of the dome of the national Capitol, of which they hoped soon to have possession. One of the boldest of these dashes was made by Colonel Gregg to the north of Washington. He penetrated forty-five miles to the Potomac, and returning, on the 17th of June, when at Vienna, on the Loudon railway, he learned that a train of cars loaded with Federal soldiers was at hand. Placing two guns in ambush at a curve of the road, he awaited their approach, and as they rounded the curve poured in a well-aimed fire, which raked the cars from front to rear, killing a number of the soldiers, and scattering the rest. They then hastily pushed back without suffering any loss. With this exception, and a few unimportant rencounters between small squads of scouts, there had been no active hostilities between the two




FIG. 1. SKETCH OF THE POSITION OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC AT MANASSAS JUNCTION.

armies of the Potomac. Nor had there been any serious encounters between the forces to the north of Washington.



JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON.

General Joseph E. Johnston, who had been assigned to the Army of the Shenandoah, arrived at Harper's Ferry on the 23d of May, and assumed the command. He found there nine regiments and two battalions of infantry, four companies of artillery, with sixteen guns, and about three hundred cavalry. He saw at once that the place was untenable against even an equal force. It was so completely overlooked that it was more favorable to an attacking than a defending force. Patterson, across the Potomac, was watching him, ready to cross and advance up the valley from the east, while McClellan, after his successes in West Virginia, was expected to come into the valley from the west; with these forces in his rear, he would be cut off from giving any aid in case of need to the Army of the Potomac. He therefore wished to abandon Harper's Ferry, and fall back twenty-five miles to Winchester, where all the practicable roads from the west and northwest, as well as from Manassas, meet the main route from Pennsylvania and Maryland. But the military authorities at Richmond overruled him, and directed him still to occupy Harper's Ferry. On the 13th information came that Romney, fifty miles to the northwest, had been seized by a strong body of Federal troops, who were supposed to be the vanguard of McClellan's army coming down to form a junction with Patterson, and three days later information came that Patterson had crossed the Potomac at Williamsport, and was apparently advancing up the valley upon Winchester. Johnston then took the responsibility of abandoning Harper's Ferry, and threw his army by a flank movement across Patterson's presumed line of march. Patterson at once recrossed the Potomac, and Johnston, having received a dispatch from Richmond sanctioning the movement which he had already made on his own responsibility, resumed his original plan, and fell back to Winchester, where he intrenched himself strongly. Here he could oppose McClellan from the west, Patterson from the northeast, or form a junction with Beauregard at Manassas if necessary. On the 23d of June Patterson again crossed the Potomac and marched toward Winchester. Johnston slowly retired, and some skirmishing took place, with no decisive results.

McDowell's advance had now been determined upon. In making his estimates of the force necessary to accomplish the work before him, he had stipulated that Johnston should be so "taken care of" as not to be able to come to the assistance of Beauregard. This work was intrusted to General Patterson. Johnston's army had been increased by eight regiments from the far South, and about 2500 militia called out from the neighboring counties in Virginia. As it lay strongly intrenched at Winchester at the middle of July, it numbered about 18,000 of all arms. Patterson's army was of about the same strength. They were almost all volunteer regiments whose term of service was about to expire; they were dissatisfied with the treatment they had received, and would not stay one hour beyond their time. Patterson vastly overrated the strength of the enemy, and dared not attack them; he would rather lose the chance of accomplishing something brilliant, than, by hazarding his column, endanger the success of the campaign by defeat. So he was satisfied with merely watching Johnston, and endeavoring to hold him at Winchester. On the 17th of July he received a telegram from Washington that McDowell had advanced, and that on the next day Manassas Junction would probably be carried. He believed that Johnston's forces were still before him, and that he had detained them until it was too late for them to assist Beauregard. He lay all the 18th awaiting an attack, not dreaming that his skillful opponent was then, with all his available force, on the way to join the Army of the Potomac; and it was only on the 20th, at the very hour when Johnston was joining Beauregard, that Patterson learned that he had been thoroughly out-generated. It was too late to retrieve the error, even had he been capable of making a bold movement; and so, on the 21st, while the fight at Bull Run was going on, Patterson fell

quietly back to Harper's Ferry. While the smart of the great defeat at Bull Run was yet fresh, Patterson was charged with gross negligence, if not with absolute treachery. A calmer view showed nothing to sustain these charges. A task had been imposed upon him beyond his powers, and he failed in accomplishing it. He was simply incompetent, not wantonly negligent, still less treacherous. The decision of the government, by which he was honorably discharged from service, was just and proper.


Treason, however, was rife in every department of the government at Washington. For years a system had been growing up under which the clerkships in the various departments had been mainly bestowed upon Southerners. When cabinet ministers and naval and military officers were false, it could hardly be expected that civil clerks should be true. By their means the Confederate government was fully informed of every movement made or contemplated at Washington. The most secret dispatches, and the most private documents of the government at Washington, were copied and sent to the authorities at Richmond. A military map of Eastern Virginia had been prepared by government officials. It was thought to be of such importance that it was furnished only to Federal officers of the highest rank; yet a copy of it was found on the table of a Confederate captain at Fairfax.

McDowell's advance was commenced on the morning of the 17th of July. Beauregard was notified of it from "a trusty source" in time to give orders in the evening of that day that his advanced brigades should fall back from Fairfax. He also sent an aid-de-camp to Johnston at Winchester, calling for assistance, and indicating the point to which his march should be directed. By the time that this message reached Johnston, he had received direct communications from Richmond ordering him to go to the support of Beauregard. This order was received by Johnston at Winchester at one o'clock on the morning of the 18th. To comply with this order, Johnston must either defeat or elude Patterson. He chose the latter course. Leaving his sick, nearly 1700 in number, at Winchester, with the Virginia militia, and posting a strong rear-guard to induce Patterson to believe that his whole army was still in front, he pushed his whole available force up the Valley of the Shenandoah, and thence, through Ashby's Gap in the Blue Ridge, to the line of the Manassas Railway, which brought him by noon of the 20th to Manassas Junction, where, in virtue of his superior rank, he assumed the command of the entire army. He was at Manassas before Patterson dreamed that he had left Winchester, two days' march away. All that he dared hope was that he had gained a day and a half upon Patterson, who, he presumed, would join McDowell during the 22d.

McDowell's advance set out from the camps near Washington on the afternoon of July 16, but the main body did not commence its march until daybreak on the following morning, moving in four columns by roads nearly parallel. The advance was slow, for the men were unaccustomed to marching, and were incommoded by carrying the loads to be borne in light marching order. The roads also had been obstructed, and ambushes were to be expected. Fairfax Court House was reached at about noon. The works thrown up here had been deserted, and the place was seized without opposition, only a few straggling shots being fired, by which three or four men were wounded. The greater part of the men had marched only six miles, and McDowell wished to push on at once to Centreville, six miles farther, but he was told that the men were worn out, not so much by the distance marched as by the more wearying work of waiting on foot. So a halt was ordered for the day. The troops were in high spirits. They looked upon the falling back of the Confederate forces as the first step in the retreat which would not cease until Richmond was reached. "It is ardently hoped,"



ROBERT PATTERSON.



PLANS OF OPERATIONS.

This map indicates, in a general way, the operations, actual or proposed, on both sides, previous to the battle of Bull Run.—A A shows McDowell's advance to Centreville.—B Runyon's division, left in reserve near Fairfax Court House.—C C McDowell at Centreville.—D D Confederate batteries across Bull Run.—E E McDowell's first plan to turn the Confederate right.—F F McDowell's second plan to turn the Confederate left, which brought on the battle.—G G Beauregard's original plan of attacking with his right the Federals at Centreville.

wrote one newspaper correspondent, "that the rascals will make a stand at Manassas. But it is greatly feared that they will run again. If Beauregard does not give us battle at Manassas, his army will be thus thoroughly demoralized, and he is beaten past a ray of hope." The march was looked upon as a picnic excursion; the men gave themselves up to the humors of camp life. Some dressed themselves in women's clothes, and paraded the town; one fellow donned an imitation of a clerical gown and band, and with an open book in his hands stalked through the street, reading the funeral service of the President of the Southern Confederacy. Some—only a few—did not content themselves with these unmilitary displays. They set out on predatory excursions to the neighboring houses, and came back swinging their plunder upon their bayonets. Several houses were sacked and burned, though no personal injury was inflicted. McDowell repressed these outrages by a sorrowful and stern order. "It is with the deepest mortification," he said, "that the commanding general finds it necessary to reiterate his orders for the preservation of the property of the inhabitants of the district occupied by the troops under his command. It is again ordered that no one shall arrest or attempt to arrest any citizen not in arms at the time, or search, or attempt to search any house, or even to enter the same, without permission. The troops must behave themselves with as much forbearance and propriety as if they were at their own homes. They are here to fight the enemies of the country, not to judge and punish the unarmed and defenseless, however guilty they may be." The severest military penalty was threatened for any violation of this order. No more outrages were committed. The troops bivouacked under the open sky, the general and his staff, like the men, sleeping on the ground. Next morning the army resumed its march, and the whole force, with the exception of Runyon's division, which was left at Fairfax, was soon concentrated near Centreville.

Centreville is a village of a score or two of houses, straggling along a ridge at the confluence of several roads, about four miles from Bull Run. One of these roads—the Warrenton turnpike—goes almost due west, crossing the Run at the Stone Bridge. Another, going southwestward, and crossing the Run at Blackburn's Ford, goes directly to Manassas Junction, three miles beyond the stream, connecting by cross-roads with the different fords above and below. Tyler, whose division now led the advance, reached the village early on the 18th, and finding that the enemy had fallen back, pushed forward to make a reconnoissance in the direction of Blackburn's Ford, taking with him four regiments of Richardson's brigade. They found the enemy in considerable force hidden in the woods which bordered the Run. Some sharp though random firing from artillery was interchanged for several hours. The New York Twelfth was thrown into confusion; Richardson wished to charge with the other regiments, and carry the hostile position; but Tyler, who knew that it was no part of the commanding general's plan to bring on an action here, refused his consent. A reconnoissance only had been intended, and this had been made in stronger force than was desirable. The troops were accordingly withdrawn. In this skirmish the loss on each side was about equal. The Confederates lost 15 killed and 53 wounded,

several of them mortally—68 in all; the Federals lost 19 killed, 38 wounded, and 26 missing—83 in all.

McDowell could never have contemplated a march upon Richmond, with the army under his command, in face of the force directly opposed to him and of the re-enforcements which could be hurried up from Richmond and beyond. He did not even intend to assail them directly in the strong position at Manassas. His purpose was to gain their rear, and break their railway communication both with the forces at Richmond and in the Valley of the Shenandoah. The two armies of the enemy, cut off from communication with each other and with Richmond, would be forced to fall back from their position threatening the capital, leaving Manassas, the key of the direct route to the south, in his hands. To accomplish this, he proposed to make a sudden movement to the left, cross the Occoquan just below its junction with Bull Run, and strike a blow at the enemy's railroad communication in this direction. He had not, therefore, accompanied his army in its advance from Fairfax to Centreville. He had indeed expected to encounter the army at Fairfax, and was disappointed at their abandonment of that place without a struggle. The march to Centreville was intended merely as a demonstration. On the morning of the 18th he set out on a reconnoissance of the country to his left, through which he proposed to advance. He was soon convinced that the country in that direction was impracticable for the advance of his army, and was forced to abandon his first plan and form another. Coming to Centreville, he learned the results of Tyler's and Richardson's reconnoissance to Blackburn's Ford. This showed that the enemy had done wisely in falling back to the line of Bull Run, and that they were in too great force there to allow an attempt to force the passage with any reasonable hope of success; and even if the passage were forced, he would find himself in front of the strong position at Manassas, which was not to be desired. Still, something must be done, or the whole expedition would be an absolute failure; a failure without even an attempt to strike a blow. What was to be done must be done speedily. A large and the best part of his force consisted of three months' men, whose term of service was about to expire. They, at least, had had a few weeks of discipline. The three years' men were all new to military life. In a few days he would have lost ten thousand of his best troops. Every day's delay, while it would probably add to the strength of the enemy, would diminish his. The march to the left having been found impracticable, and a direct advance in front being too dangerous to be risked, the only alternative was to attempt to turn the enemy's position on the right.

From reconnoissances made and information received on the 19th, he learned that the enemy's extreme left was at the Stone Bridge, directly in his front, where the Warrenton turnpike crosses Bull Run; and that some two or three miles above was Sudley's Ford, which was unguarded, and could be reached by an almost unused forest road. The enemy apparently expected an attack some miles below; if his feeble left could be turned by surprise before he could bring up his force to sustain it, it could be forced back, the turnpike seized, and a detachment sent forward by it to cut the railroad in the rear of Manassas Junction. This movement, to be success-

ful, must be a surprise; it must be accomplished before the enemy were prepared to resist it; and, moreover, provision must be made that while a considerable part of the Federal force was thus detached to turn the Confederate left, his own left should not be turned by the enemy from below.

McDowell's final plan was based upon these considerations. The 19th and 20th of July were devoted to making the requisite arrangements. Rations for three days were prepared and distributed, and the details of the enterprise were arranged. Miles's division was to be left in reserve near Centreville; Richardson's brigade, temporarily detached from Tyler's division, and attached to that of Miles, was to make a demonstration upon Blackburn's Ford, holding the enemy there in check. The remainder of Tyler's division, composed of the brigades of Schenck, Keyes, and Sherman, was to march straight down the turnpike, threaten the Stone Bridge, and be ready to cross and advance along the turnpike as soon as the bridge was cleared of the enemy, meanwhile occupying the forces in their immediate front. The main attack was to be made by Hunter's and Heintzelman's divisions, who were to proceed by the forest road on the right to Sudley's Ford, cross the Run, and then, turning sharply down the opposite bank, force the enemy's left below the bridge, and thus clear the way for Tyler to cross. The march was to be begun at half past two on the morning of Sunday, July 21, Tyler in the advance, going straight down the turnpike to the bridge, upon which he was to open a cannonade. Hunter and Heintzelman were to follow for a couple of miles till they came to the road to the right, where they were to turn off and make their way to their crossing-place at Sudley's Ford. It was supposed that Tyler would be ready to open fire at the bridge by daybreak—a little after four o'clock—and that Hunter and Heintzelman would be across the Run at six.

The enemy, meanwhile, had not been inactive. Johnston, whom McDowell had supposed to be detained at Winchester by Patterson, had slipped off unperceived with the whole of his available force, and, preceded and accompanied by eight regiments, numbering 6000 men, had, on the preceding day, joined Beauregard at Manassas. He had left the remainder of his force behind, for the Manassas Railway was not able to transport the whole at once; but he was assured that 5000 more would be sent forward from the Piedmont Station in a few hours. Reaching Manassas, in virtue of his superior rank he assumed the command of the combined forces. He had assumed that Patterson would discover his departure from Winchester, and, hastening to join McDowell, would reach him on the 22d, giving him a decided superiority in force; but, in the mean while, if his own expected 5000 came up on the evening of the 20th, he would, for a night and a day, have the greater numbers. Beauregard, being thoroughly acquainted with the ground, and apprised of the approach of the Army of the Shenandoah, had prepared a plan of battle, to which Johnston at once gave his assent. He proposed to cross Bull Run below the Stone Bridge with the whole force of the two armies, and attack McDowell, whom he expected to find lying at Centreville, before the expected re-enforcements from Patterson should join him. The Confederate troops were posted with this view, and orders were given for carrying the movement into effect; but the 5000 from Piedmont did not come up; the order was countermanded just at daybreak; the Confederates remained at their posts on their side of Bull Run without attempting their proposed offensive movement on the Federal left. At that same moment the Federal army—two hours behind its appointed time—had fairly commenced its offensive advance upon the Confederate left. If either commander had fathomed the plans of the other, the battle would have been fought on different ground, and probably with a different result.

War has been compared to the game of chess. The parallel fails in many important particulars. In chess each piece has a fixed and absolute value, and each player may know exactly his own force and that of his opponent. He who plays most skillfully must win. In war neither commander knows the exact value of his own force, and can only conjecture that of his adversary. Above all, there is the great disturbing element of time. A movement which would insure success if made at the right instant, may be useless or fatal an hour later. This element of time modified the whole course of the battle of Bull Run, and in the end decided its result. The Confederate re-enforcements did not come up as was expected, and the order for attack was countermanded. The Federal forces made their attack some hours later than was designed, and lost the expected advantage of surprise; and, finally, when the battle hung in even balance, a Confederate re-enforcement, of which neither side could know, turned the scale.

The two armies opposed to each other at the dawn of July 21 were almost equal. McDowell had set out with 35,000; of these, Runyon's division of 5000 had been left behind to hold the communications with Washington. At Centreville, on the evening of the 20th, he had 30,000; but among these were the Pennsylvania Fourth regiment and the battery attached to the New York Eighth: their term expired on the 20th, and they insisted upon their discharge. McDowell vainly tried to induce them to stay a few days longer. They refused. They had fulfilled the letter of their enlistment; and, on the morning of the 21st, while their comrades were marching forward to battle, this recreant Pennsylvania Fourth regiment, with the battery of the New York Eighth, slunk back to the rear to the sound of the enemy's cannon. Deducting these dastards, the killed and disabled of the 18th, and the sick of the various divisions, the Federal army, on the morning of the 21st, numbered, within a few hundreds more or less, 28,000 available men. At that same time the Confederate Army of the Potomac numbered about 22,000 (by the official statement, exactly 21,833) effective men. Of the Army of the Shenandoah 6000 had already arrived, making 28,000 in all. During the battle other re-enforcements to the Confederates came up, raising the Army of the Shenandoah from 6000 to 8334, besides Hill's Virginia regi-



DAVID HUNTER.

ment of 550. The entire force at the command of the Confederate general was a little less than 31,000.¹ What portion of either army were brought into action at each stage of the battle will appear hereafter. McDowell, after the discharge of the battery of the New York Eighth, had forty-nine guns. The Confederates had at the commencement of the action precisely the same number; another battery of four pieces was brought up by the re-enforcements, making fifty-three in all. The Confederate artillery was generally inferior in calibre and range, but as the firing was at close distance, this disadvantage was more than made up by the greater ease and rapidity with which they could be handled and discharged. The organization of the Confederate troops was decidedly superior. They had been brought together into brigades, under commanders whom they knew, while the greater portion of the Federals had been thus organized only since the march began, and were to a great extent unacquainted with their commanding officers. In cavalry the Confederates were much the stronger. They had at least twelve companies, while the Federals had but four.

The Federal divisions were set in motion by moonlight, at that stillest hour which just precedes the dawn. The time for each movement was carefully designated. Tyler, who lay in front of Centreville, was to lead the way, and go straight down the turnpike to the Stone Bridge, which he was to threaten. Hunter, who was encamped a mile or two in the rear, was to follow for two or three miles along the turnpike till he came to the forest road branching off to the right toward Sudley's Ford, where he was to cross the Run, and then turn sharply down the west bank. Heintzelman was to follow Hunter for about two miles on the forest road, then turn and cross the Run below him. All were to move at half past two. It was thought that Tyler would be in position to open fire at daybreak, a little after four; that Hunter, entering the forest road as soon as daylight enabled him to thread its tortuous course, would cross the Run at six, followed closely by Heintzelman, so that the whole force would be on the expected battle-ground in the cool of the morning. But a night movement is always liable to interruptions. These occurred at every step. Tyler occupied the turnpike two hours longer than was expected, keeping Hunter and Heintzelman so much behind their time. Then the road through the Big Forest was longer and more difficult than had been supposed, and the passage of the Run was made at nine instead of six. Three hours were thus lost when minutes were of priceless worth.

McDowell had anticipated the probability of delay, and wished to move his columns a few miles forward the preceding night; but he yielded to the wishes of some of his officers, who thought it would be more pleasant to make but a single march. For the second time within three days he threw away a victory which a more enterprising commander would have grasped. If, instead of halting at Fairfax on the 17th, after a march of only six miles, he had pushed on at once to Centreville, the battle of Bull Run would have been fought two days earlier. The Federals would have gone into action two thousand stronger and the Confederates ten thousand weaker on the

¹ Exactly 30,715, according to the lowest rendering of General Beauregard's official report. He may have intended to state the total number at from 600 to 2000 greater, his report being somewhat obscure on this point. See, on this subject, the note at the end of this chapter.



SAMUEL F. BENTZELMAN.

19th than on the 21st. With 28,000 against 31,000, the battle was hardly lost on Sunday; with 30,000 against 21,000, it might have been won on Friday. So, if but one of the three hours lost on the morning of the 21st had been saved by a march on the evening of the 20th, the victory, almost within the grasp of McDowell, would not have been wrested from him by the unexpected arrival of the Confederate re-enforcements brought on by Smith. But we turn from what might have been to what was.

At six o'clock, two hours behind time, Tyler's three brigades were in front of the Stone Bridge; Hunter's two brigades were threading their way, Burnside leading, along the forest road; Heintzelman's two brigades were just turning into the forest. They had all crossed Cub Run, a narrow stream whose steep banks were spanned by a wooden bridge. They hardly noticed it in the morning twilight, but had occasion to remember it before evening. McDowell and his staff now rode up. Still apprehensive of a strong attack upon his left and rear, he ordered Howard's brigade, of Heintzelman's division, to remain in reserve, in case it should be necessary to re-enforce Miles at Centreville.

At half past six a shot from Tyler's 30-pounder announced to the other divisions that he was in position. Stationing a scout among the branches of a tall tree, which commanded a view of the opposite side of the Run, he waited for two hours until Hunter and Heintzelman, coming down on the other side, should drive back the enemy, and render it possible for him to cross to their direct support. In the mean while, to carry out his feigned attack, he sent one brigade a mile down the Run toward the next ford guarded by the enemy, upon whom he opened fire, which was vigorously returned, with little damage on either side. All this time he kept up a slow cannonade without eliciting any reply from the enemy in his front. They had beforehand ascertained that he was beyond the range of their guns, and did not care to waste ammunition and disclose their position by useless firing. At half past nine Burnside had reached the Run, crossed without opposition, followed by Porter's brigade and Heintzelman's division, and, after a brief halt for rest, pushed down the Run, and found himself confronted by the enemy on the northern slope of what was to be the battle-field of the day.

The course of Bull Run for half a mile above and below the bridge is nearly north and south. The turnpike crossing it goes almost due west from Centreville. Beyond the bridge it traverses a low wooded bottom half a mile broad, mounts a slight ascent, then sinks again down to a little hollow, by which a small brook, called Young's Branch, comes from the west, and then, making a short turn to the south, finds its way into Bull Run. The road following the valley of Young's Branch ascends for a mile by an easy slope until it gains the level of the plain about two miles from the Run. Here it is crossed by another road winding southward from Sudley's Springs. This road formed the western boundary of the battle-field. The valley of Young's Branch is shaped somewhat like a sickle, lying with its edge to the south and west. Upon that side the ground rises by a sharp ascent about a hundred feet to a plateau of an irregular oval form, containing about one hundred and fifty acres of cleared land, cut up into small fields, with here and there patches of young oaks and pines. Along the eastern and southern sides of the plateau was a dense thicket of second-growth pines, and across the upper edge of the fields a broad belt of oaks upon both sides of the Sudley road. Near the upper edge of the plateau was a house occupied by Mrs. Henry, and half a mile below another owned by a free negro named Robinson. Both were small wooden buildings densely embowered in trees, and surrounded by fences. This plateau, a mile long from east to west, and half a mile broad from north to south, was the bat-

tle-field of the afternoon, the sharpest fighting being in the oak woods, at the two houses, and in front of the pine thicket. The other side of the valley of Young's Branch slopes gently up to the north in a succession of open, undulating fields, covered with grass, and dotted over with groves and thickets. This slope was the scene of the battle in the morning.

While the Federal army was advancing to the attack, the Confederates were in the same position which they had occupied for some days along the southwestern side of Bull Run. Ewell's brigade was at Union Mills Ford, on the extreme right. The brigades of Jones, Longstreet, Bonham, and Cooke were successively posted close to the Run, in front of the principal fords, up to the Stone Bridge, a distance of eight miles. Between these, but slightly in their rear, so as to be able to support either of the front brigades that might be assailed, were the brigades of Holmes, Early, Jackson, and Bee. Beauregard, sanctioned by Johnston, assuming all along that the battle would be fought on his right, had concentrated his main strength upon that wing, leaving his left at the Stone Bridge comparatively weak. The front line of brigades consisted wholly of the troops of the Army of the Potomac; those of the Army of the Shenandoah, who were wearied by their rapid march from Winchester, being placed in reserve in the rear. But the battle being fought upon the left, the main brunt fell upon the Army of the Shenandoah.

Colonel Evans, who held the extreme Confederate left at Stone Bridge, deceived by Tyler's demonstrations, notified Beauregard that a strong attack had been commenced on that flank. The Confederate commander, directing that position to be held at all hazards, sent orders that a rapid and determined attack should be made upon the Federal flank and rear at Centreville. By this movement they expected to achieve a complete victory by noon. Johnston and Beauregard then took a position on a commanding hill in the rear of the centre of the Confederate lines, where for two long hours they awaited tidings of the battle. They came at last in an unwelcome shape. The order for an advance by their right had miscarried, and it was too late to renew it. Three hours would be required to effect the movement, and minutes were beyond price, for the action opened by the Federals on the left had gone sorely against the Confederates. After giving hasty orders countermanding that for an advance of the right, dispatching aids to Manassas to hurry up the re-enforcements momentarily expected by railway, and directing the reserve regiments to hasten to the scene of action, Beauregard and Johnston galloped to their left, where the roll of musketry and the din of artillery announced that a severe conflict was going on. An hour's sharp riding brought them at noon to the plateau in the rear of the Henry and Robinson houses. They looked upon a battle to all appearance lost. We now turn to that point where the battle had been fought.

Before nine o'clock, while Hunter and Heintzelman were winding their way unseen along the forest road, Evans became convinced that the attack on his front was a feint, and suspected that an attempt was making to turn his left. He had but fifteen companies at the Bridge. Leaving four in position there, with the other eleven and two guns he marched across the fields and took up a position to check the advance of the enemy, sending word to Bee, who commanded the nearest brigade in reserve, to hurry up to the scene of action. At half past ten the head of Burnside's column came in sight of Evans, and the action was opened. Bee, a gallant South Carolinian, who had been trained at West Point, had fought under Scott in Mexico, had been twice breveted for meritorious conduct at Cerro Gordo and Chapultepec, and who in this his last action gave proof of great military capacity, brought on his brigade of four regiments and two companies, with Imboden's battery, and drew them up on the edge of the plateau; but, seeing Evans sorely pressed by Burnside, he advanced down the slope, across the turnpike, over Young's Branch, and threw himself into the action. Burnside was now overmatched, and called for aid. Sykes's eight companies of regulars hurried down from Porter's column on the right, and restored the balance. At this moment, Hunter, whose division comprised the two brigades of Porter and Burnside, was wounded, and borne from the field. The command nominally devolved upon Porter, the senior officer; but, as he was throughout the action with his own brigade, Burnside was actually in command on his part of the field. Porter's column, coming down the Sudley road, were now in striking distance, and poured in a heavy fire from the right. The Confederate line began to waver, then fell back slowly and sullenly toward the turnpike. Just then, when the fight had continued for more than an hour, a fresh column appeared over the low ridge which separated Bull Run from the Federal left. This was Sherman's brigade of Tyler's division, which had been all the morning on the opposite side waiting for an opportunity to cross and take part in the conflict.

Tyler, warned from his observatory in the tree-top of the progress of the real attack, had withdrawn his feigned assault, and had brought up his three brigades in front of the Stone Bridge. Assured that the enemy were in no condition to molest him, he had ordered Sherman's brigade to cross the Run above the bridge, and support the forces hotly engaged on the opposite side. The crossing was effected without opposition, and just before noon Sherman came upon the field. The Confederates, now attacked by Sherman on the right, pressed by Burnside and Sykes on their centre, and galled by Porter on their left, rushed broken and shattered up the slope of the plateau, and half way across it, beyond the Robinson and Henry houses. Here they met support. Jackson, who had been in reserve next behind Bee, had brought forward his five regiments, and gained the eastern edge of the plateau across which Bee's broken, though not routed force was flying. "They are beating us back," said Bee to Jackson, as they met. "Sir, we will give them the bayonet," replied Jackson. Bee, encouraged by Jackson's firm front, tried to rally his men. "Here is Jackson," he cried, "standing like a stone

wall!" The word fitted the mood of the moment. "Stonewall! Stonewall!" was passed from man to man; from that moment this became a part of the name by which the favorite Confederate leader was known. We shall have need, in describing the events of the next two years, to speak often of "Stonewall Jackson."

It was now past noon. Jackson's firm stand had gained a breathing-space for the Confederates upon the lower, or southeastern brow of the plateau. Sherman had joined the rear of Hunter and Heintzelman, who, coming down upon the upper margin of the plateau, had fairly outflanked the Confederate left. Tyler had brought over Keyes's brigade directly after Sherman's, and was menacing the lower edge of the plateau, where the Confederates were making what seemed their last stand in and in front of the pine thicket. Howard's brigade, detached in the morning from Heintzelman's division, had been ordered forward, and had secured the Run. Burnside's brigade, which had first entered into action, had exhausted its ammunition, and been withdrawn a little to the rear to replenish it, but could almost immediately be brought into action. Eighteen thousand men had now passed the Run, and as the Confederates had been driven clear away from the Stone Bridge, there was nothing but an undefended abbatis of felled trees to hinder Schenck, with Tyler's remaining brigade, from crossing and adding two thousand more to the force actually engaged.

Johnston and Beauregard now came upon the plateau. The Confederate forces there consisted at this moment of Jackson's five regiments which had not yet been engaged, and the shattered remains of Bee's and Evans's commands. These in the morning had numbered about 7500 men, but fully five hundred had been killed and wounded, so that the Confederate forces on the field at that moment were about 7000. Their position was strong. The pine thicket and the clumps of trees afforded admirable shelter. Their artillery, consisting of thirteen guns, was posted so as to play upon the coming enemy, and yet so sheltered as to be itself hardly exposed. The first task of the Confederate commanders was to reorganize the broken regiments. Johnston placed himself by the colors of the Fourth Alabama, which had lost all its field-officers, and Bee's shattered companies rallied around him on the right. Beauregard, as he posted the lines on the left, where the first onset of the enemy would fall, addressed the men in sharp and decisive words. That position was of the last importance; re-enforcements were close at hand, but until these came they must hold their posts at all hazards and against any odds. Order having been restored, and the forces posted, Johnston took his station at a point from which he could overlook the whole scene in every direction, and send forward the re-enforcements to the precise point where they could be most effective, while Beauregard remained in command of the field. Just beyond a ravine which forms the southern boundary of the plateau is a commanding elevation, upon which stands a house known as the "Portico," or "the Lewis House," overlooking the course of the Run above and below, and the field of battle. Here Johnston took up his head-quarters. Re-enforcements had begun to come up, and by the time that the Federal right was fairly in position for attack, the Confederates had on the field twelve full regiments of infantry, two hundred and sixty cavalry, and twenty-two guns, in all about 9500 men, with other re-enforcements approaching. Against these, upon their left, were advancing four brigades of the Federal army, with Ricketts's, Griffin's, and Arnold's batteries, sixteen guns. The brigades were those of Porter, of Hunter's division; Franklin and Wilcox, of Heintzelman's; and Sherman's, of Tyler's. Keyes's brigade, of Tyler's division, was engaged far to the left. In all,



ERASMUS D. KEYES.



THOMAS J. JACKSON.

13,000 men and sixteen guns were fairly in movement against the Confederates on the plateau.

The Federal right now moved confidently down along the Sudley road upon the Confederate left, sorely galled by the fire from the artillery, which was admirably served. But they pressed on up the slope, outflanked the enemy's line, and seized upon the upper edge of the plateau. Ricketts's and Griffin's artillery led, and took up position after position. The enemy's strongest position was on a swell west of the Henry house; a little to the south was another hill which commanded this. If that could be gained and held, the whole plateau would be commanded. The two batteries were ordered here, with the New York Eleventh as their support. Of this regiment, commonly designated as Ellsworth's Zouaves, high anticipations had been formed. Men had heard fabulous stories of the achievements of the French Zouaves in Algeria and the Crimea. Ellsworth had come from the West to New York at the head of a company whom he had trained to marvelous perfection in the Zouave drill. He had speedily recruited a regiment in New York, in a great measure of the class from which the French Zouaves were supposed to have been drawn. That they were not, when in camp, very pleasant neighbors, even to their friends, was admitted; but that they would be still less so to the enemy was sure. No one doubted that in action they would stand fire; and, above all, it was thought that every man of them was sworn to avenge the slaying of Ellsworth. The Zouaves went forward with bravado enough. Some of them had thrown off their gay jackets, that they might "fight freer." But when they came in sight of a Confederate regiment half hidden by a clump of pines, and at the same moment saw two mounted companies coming down upon them by a road through the woods, their courage vanished. They broke in utter confusion, and the cavalry rode straight through them, harming scarcely a man. A few of the Zouaves kept presence of mind enough to fire random shots at the horsemen, killing four, wounding one, and dispersing the whole body. But the regiment of Zouaves was scattered. Farnham, their colonel, and some of the officers, tried gallantly to stem the rout; many of the men fell in with other regiments, and did good service as skirmishers; but as a regiment it was wholly dispersed, not a few of the members heading the flight, and being among the first to bring to Washington and New York tidings of the rout, with wild stories of their own prowess on the fatal field, where they had shown themselves such arrant cowards.¹

At about the same time, a little past two, Keyes's brigade of Tyler's divi-

¹ This is the whole story of the famous charge of the "Black Horse Cavalry" upon the Zouaves, with accounts of which the newspapers of the day were filled. By way of sample, we quote, with abridgments, some paragraphs of these reports. One of the lieutenants of the regiment writes:

"The Zouaves rushed out of the woods only to find themselves the target for another body of infantry beyond, while the Black Horse Cavalry were seen charging full upon them. They formed hastily in line, kneeling, semi-kneeling, and standing, that, Ellsworth fashion, they might receive their enemies with successive volleys. On came the Horse, splendidly mounted. To an early discharge from the cavalry the Zouaves made no response, although several of the men were killed, but waited patiently until the enemy were almost upon them, when, in quick succession, the three ranks fired. The shock to the rebels was great; but they rallied, and attempted a renewal of the charge, for which they paid dearly. They were completely shattered, broken up, and swept away. Not more than a hundred of them rode off, and as they went their ears were saluted with 'One, two, three, four, five, six, seven, tigh, Zouave!'. . . . Another Zouave says: 'The Black Horse Guard came upon the Zouave regiment at a gallop, and were received by the brave firemen upon their poised bayonets, followed instantly by a volley, from which they broke and fled. They quickly returned, with their forces doubled—perhaps six or seven hundred—and again dashed, with fearful yells, upon the excited Zouaves, and the slaughter commenced. No quarter, no halting, no flinching now, marked the rapid and death-dealing blows of our men as they closed in upon the foe in their madness and desperation. Our brave fellows fell; the ranks filled up; the sabres, bowie-knives, and bayonets glistened in the sunlight; horse after horse went down; platoon after platoon disappeared—the rattle of musketry, the screams of the rebels, the shout of 'Remember Ellsworth!' from the lungs of the Zouaves, and the yells of the wounded and crushed belligerents, filled the air, and a terrible carnage succeeded. The gallant Zouaves fought to the death, and were sadly cut up; but of those hundreds of Black Horse Guards, not many left that bloody ren-



A DINGEE AT WASHINGTON RELATING HIS EXPLOITS AT BULL RUN.

sion, which had come upon the field just at the close of the Confederate repulse in the morning, was ordered forward. Crossing the turnpike, he marched straight up the northern slope of the plateau in front of the Robinson house. The Third Connecticut and Second Maine regiments charged up the hill, crowned its summit, brushed away the enemy, and for a moment held the house and field. Their position was, however, commanded by a battery in the rear, which poured in so hot a fire that a few moments' exposure to it would have annihilated the whole line; as it was, the Maine regiment lost fifteen killed and forty wounded. Keyes withdrew below the brow of the hill, around which he skirted in search of an opportunity to charge; but the light battery of the enemy, shifting front as he changed ground, was always in his front, ready to pour in its shot whenever the head of a column should appear above the crest. This movement, lasting for more than an hour, took Keyes clear around the eastern edge of the plateau, out of sight of the battle which was raging two miles to the west.

The great struggle of the day was going on at the western end of the plateau. A Confederate battery of thirteen guns, supported by Jackson's and Bee's brigades, had been posted in a small open field five hundred yards southeast of the Henry house, just below the crest of a low elevation. From this shelter it poured in a fierce fire upon the Federal column coming down southwardly along the Sudley road. But the column pressed on until its head, now the extreme Federal right, had outflanked the batteries, which, with their supports, formed the extreme Confederate left. Five hundred yards southeast of these—a thousand from the Henry house—a hill rises fifty feet above the general level, and half as much above the ridge behind which the Confederates were posted. From this hill the Confederate left could be completely enfiladed. It was the key of the position. Whoever held that hill with artillery, held the plateau. The hill had just been seized by the batteries of Griffin and Ricketts, and the Zouaves had been ordered up as supports, while the Federal column coming from the north had passed the Henry house, and was bearing down upon the Confederate position. It was now almost three o'clock. Beauregard, informed that re-enforcements were close at hand, pushed forward his whole line to recover the plateau. Jackson advanced his "stone wall" against Ricketts and Griffin. The Zouaves, catching sight of his line and the two companies of cavalry, broke and fled ignominiously. Heintzelman ordered up the First Minnesota, the nearest regiment, to take their place. As they emerged from the wooded road down which they had come, and passed the crest of the hill, they found themselves face to face within fifty yards of a body of troops. The two lines had now become so intermingled that from position alone neither could tell friend from foe. Gorman, the colonel of the Minnesota regiment, was at a loss; Griffin was equally uncertain; some one had told them that this was another of Heintzelman's regiments. Heintzelman, apparently also in doubt, dashed between the two regiments, within pistol-shot of either. The enemy hesitated in like manner for a few moments. But the pause was brief. Each caught sight at the same moment of the colors of the other, and poured in a deadly fire. The two Federal batteries offered a conspicuous mark. A third of the cannoneers and half of the horses were shot down at the first volley, and the batteries were disabled. They had played a conspicuous part in the action of the day, and now, when they were to be most wanted,

they were useless. The only question was who should have them. Jackson dashed forward and seized the guns, trying to drag them from the field. Fresh regiments on each side were brought up; the line wavered to and fro for an hour; the guns were taken and retaken three times, but at the last remained in the hands of the Federals, who were dragging them away.

All this time a fierce battle had been going on a little to the left of this hill, along the ridge held by the Confederate forces. Griffin's and Ricketts's batteries, which would have swept the position, were thrown out of service, and, though not taken, were rendered useless. A strong Federal column was directed upon this ridge. Regiment after regiment was brought up; each, one after the other, was hurled back, some in tolerable order, some in sheer disorder. In the confused melée of the next hour it is impossible to trace clearly the action of each regiment along that short line of barely half a mile from the Henry house to the hill. The First Minnesota fell back; the First Michigan was brought forward and driven off. The Fourteenth New York came on in gallant style, but, coming in sight of the enemy's line, broke and ran. "I considered it," says Heintzelman, "useless to attempt to rally them. The most of the men would run from fifty to several hundred yards to the rear, and continue to fire high in the air, compelling those in the front to retreat." The New York Thirty-eighth tried hard to save the battery; forced back, they dragged off three of Ricketts's guns, leaving them, as they thought, out of the enemy's reach. Rallying, they advanced, and for a few moments thought themselves in possession of the field; then, without knowing how, they found themselves opposed to a superior force, swept by musketry and pierced by artillery, from which they fell back in sudden panic. "This," says their colonel, "was the last rally made by my regiment." Close by, but a little to the left, the New York Seventy-ninth charged up the ridge upon the Confederate batteries. Receiving a severe fire, they broke; rallied, and finally broke again, and fell back, leaving their colonel, Cameron, brother of the Secretary of War, dead upon the field. The New York Sixty-ninth took their place. "Now, boys, is your time," shouted Corcoran, their colonel, as they rushed into action. They held the crest for barely a quarter of an hour, and then fell back in disorder.

The advantages gained by the Confederates had been dearly won. Bee and Bartow, who had been all day long in the thickest of the fight, fell almost side by side near the Henry house; Jackson was wounded, but still kept the field; many other of the best officers had been killed or wounded in the desperate struggle. In spite of these checks, the Federal generals were still confident of victory. "The enemy was evidently disheartened and broken," says McDowell. "Every thing was in favor of our troops, and promising decisive victory," says Burnside, at four o'clock. "The prestige of success had thus far attended the efforts of our gallant but inexperienced troops," says Porter. Single regiments had been sent forward to the ridge who had been driven back overmatched; but now a determined assault was to be made by a strong column. The flags of eight regiments, though borne somewhat wearily, were pointed to the hill from which the disordered masses of the Confederates were seen, or thought to be seen, hastily retiring. But before this final and decisive charge was made upon the crest near the Henry house, which had now become the centre of the field, the whole Federal right came rushing down in utter rout, men, horses,

and caissons mingled together in the wildest confusion. The instant that this hot torrent of fugitives touched a regiment which had before seemed solid, it melted away like a snow-bank before a jet of steam. The panic spread from regiment to regiment, and in a quarter of an hour the whole Federal force was transformed from an army into a frightened crowd.

To understand whence came the blow which so suddenly shattered the Federal right, we must go back to the Lewis house, where Johnston, with the whole field before him, was watching the progress of the fight in his front and the arrival of re-enforcements from his rear. All day long he had been harassed by groundless apprehensions that Patterson was close at hand. At ten o'clock he saw a column of dust rising up in the northwest, such as might be raised by an army on the march. This may have been a cloud blown up by a gust of wind, or have been raised by McDowell's columns near Sudley's Ford; but Johnston suspected that it indicated the approach of Patterson. Again, at two o'clock, an officer galloped up from Manassas with the report that a Federal force had reached the railway, and were now close upon the position which Beauregard was so stoutly defending. Upon the heels of this unwelcome messenger came another with tidings that this force was Kirby Smith's brigade of the Army of the Shenandoah. Johnston's course was now clear. An hour or two before he had ordered Coker to bring up his brigade from the edge of Bull Run; but, learning that this position was threatened from across the stream, he had countermanded the order. It was now repeated, and Coker's brigade, four regiments strong, came upon the field. In half an hour Fisher's North Carolina, and Cash's and Kershaw's South Carolina regiments, from Bonham's brigade, came up from below, followed almost at the same moment by Kirby Smith from Manassas with half of the long-awaited re-enforcements from Piedmont. Smith had started at daylight by rail, reaching the Junction at noon with four regiments and a battery. Leaving a weak regiment at the Junction, with the other three he had hurried across the fields to the Lewis house. Early's three regiments came up from their position down the Run just after Smith.

To the twelve regiments with which Beauregard had for two hours held the field, thirteen were now added. The re-enforcements were skillfully directed. A part were sent to strengthen Beauregard's line, which had just begun to advance. Among these were Smith's division. He himself was wounded, and the command devolved upon Elzey. A part made a circuit south and west to and beyond the Sudley road, outflanking the Federal right, fell upon its flank and rear, and hurled it in wild confusion upon the column just ready to assail the Confederate line near the Henry house. In fifteen minutes all was lost. The whole Federal force was swept clear off the plateau and up the slopes beyond the Sudley road, which swarmed with crowds of flying, disorganized troops, through whom dashed riderless horses and artillery teams driven at utmost speed. Regiments which a few minutes before stood firm, melted away at a touch. Some of the officers strove by entreaties and threats to rally their commands; but they would not stand even when beyond the reach of the Confederate fire. It was not a retreat; it was a flight; a rout as complete as any battle-field ever saw. Yet three regiments standing firm for half an hour, and presenting a "stone wall" behind which their broken comrades should rally, might even then have changed the issue of the day. A decisive victory could hardly have been won, but the Confederates could have been repulsed, and the result would have been a drawn battle. The odds were indeed at the moment against the Federals, but they were less than those against which the Confederates had held their ground for hours. McDowell had upon the immediate field 13,000 men. In half an hour he could have brought up Burnside's troops, who had been out of action since noon; Keyes's regiments, which were wholly intact; and Schenck's brigade, which had not been in action, but, having cleared away the abattis, were on the point of crossing the Stone Bridge—in all 7000 men, which would have given him 20,000. To oppose these the Confederates had 19,000. They had brought up every man who would be within reach for two hours. But no orders were given to bring up the Federal re-enforcements, and scarcely an attempt to present a front to the enemy. The New York Sixty-ninth, indeed, formed for a short time into an irregular square against a body of cavalry, and repelled their charge, but it soon broke and joined in the flight. Its colonel, Corcoran, became separated from his men, and was made prisoner. He was, by special order of the Confederate government, "confined in a cell appropriated to convicted felons," as hostage for certain privateers who had been captured by the Federals and put on trial for piracy. After a year's captivity he was exchanged, and was made brigadier general, his commission dating from the day of the battle of Bull Run.

The only real opposition to the pursuit of the Confederates was made by Sykes, with his eight companies of regulars, who marched to the right straight through the crowds of flying troops, vainly attempting to rally them, threw themselves in the way of the advancing enemy, whom they held in check until the broken regiments had gained a fair start. They then slowly retired, always showing a firm front, and covering the escape of those who were fleeing toward Sudley's and the fords below. They were the last to leave the field, and the only force opposed to the enemy in this quarter.

Jefferson Davis came upon the field just after the victory had been won. The Confederate Congress had been "allowed to meet at Richmond on the 20th." On that day the President had delivered his message, and in the evening had received tidings of the impending battle. He set out by railway for Manassas next morning, at the very moment when Tyler's first gun was fired, reached the Junction at four, mounted, and rode to Johnston's headquarters at the Lewis house, and thence to the battle-field in time to



MICHAEL CORCORAN.

see the broken regiments of the Federals flying in the distance. He sent a glowing dispatch to Richmond. "Night," he said, "has closed upon a hard-fought field. Our forces were victorious. The battle was fought mainly on our left. Our force was 15,000; that of the enemy estimated at 35,000." Writing before the smoke of battle had cleared away, it is not strange that he doubled the strength of the Federals, and diminished by one third that of the Confederates.

The victors were in no condition to make a vigorous pursuit. One half of their infantry had been for hours under fire; the other half were exhausted by their rapid march and strenuous assault. A few of the freshest regiments started in pursuit, but were soon recalled; none of them went a mile. The artillery, which all day long had played an important part, were, with the exception of a few light guns, equally unavailable. The rest, from their positions, played upon the fugitives with little effect. The pursuit devolved wholly upon the cavalry. Of the dozen companies nearly all were now at hand. Stuart, whose charge had scattered the Zouaves, went upon the heels of those who were flying toward the upper fords, but the firm line of Sykes's regulars in the rear forbade any serious attack. They picked up many stragglers who had fallen out of the line of flight, but accomplished no more. Radford, with six companies—barely five hundred men—crossed the Run below the Stone Bridge, came upon the turnpike, and pressed upon the rear of the Federals. Schenck had just cleared away the abattis at the bridge, when he received intelligence of the rout, and that the army was retreating. He fell back toward Centreville, leaving the road open for the light battery of the Confederates to come on behind.

By various routes the Federal troops had now crossed the Run and gained the turnpike, along which they pressed in one confused mass. Here and there a regiment presented something like a military form, but intermingled with these was a crowd of officers, soldiers, and civilians, on foot, mounted, and in carriages. When the tidings of an impending battle reached Washington, all the idlers in the capital rushed forward to see the sight. Congressmen, newspaper correspondents, and loungers of every grade besieged the livery-stables. The man who had a horse or carriage for hire was lucky; he could let it at a war risk. All that long July day a constant stream poured out from Washington. Encouraged by the reports of the morning's success, many had ventured beyond Centreville; some had even crossed the Run. There was no one to hinder, and they went where they listed. This advancing current met the receding one. The opposing streams made a whirlpool, the vortex of which was where the road crossed the narrow bridge over Cub Run. Just below another human stream had poured in down the forest road up which Hunter and Heintzelman had marched in the morning. Behind were the Confederate cavalry, their hundreds multiplied in apprehension to thousands. An occasional sharp report, and a shot dropping here and there, showed that the pursuers had artillery—how many guns no man could know. All struggled and fought to pass the narrow bridge, beyond which lay safety. The light guns of the pursuers came with in long range and opened fire. A shot struck a caisson on the bridge, over

BLENNER'S BRIGADE COVERING THE RETREAT NEAR CENTREVILLE.





THE BATTLE-FIELD OF BULL RUN.

This map shows the topography of the field, and the principal positions during the battle, Bull Run being about half a mile to the east. A A scene of the Confederate repulse in the morning. B B Confederate stand on the southern edge of the plateau. C C Burnside withdrawn from the action after the fight of the morning. D D general line of advance of the united columns of Porter, Heintzelman, and Sherman upon the Confederate right. E E Keyes's movement after the separation of his brigade from that of Sherman, of Tyler's division. H H final advance of the Confederates. K K advance of the last Confederate re-enforcements. M hill where Griffin's and Rickett's batteries were disabled. N Sykes's stand with the regulars after the rout. The figures denote the elevation above the level of Bull Run.

turned it, and blocked up the passage. The artillery horses were cut from their traces, and mounted by their drivers. Wagons loaded with ammunition, ambulances freighted with wounded, guns which had been dragged so far, were abandoned. A full third of the lost artillery was left here. The Confederate guns poured their shot into the writhing mass. Somehow the throng cleared itself; some got over the bridge; some crossed the stream above, some below. Once fairly beyond Cub Run, the fugitives found themselves in presence of Blenker's regiment, hastily drawn up in a firm line. Through this they were suffered to pass, and were beyond reach of harm. Almost twenty thousand men had been driven for miles by scarcely five hundred, and had left behind every thing but their lives. Evening had now closed in upon the rout. In the gathering darkness some squadrons of Confederate cavalry came up to Blenker's outposts. They were met by a fire, and wheeled back. For an hour or two they hovered around, and then retired across Bull Run.

Miles's division, 7000 strong, which had been left in reserve, had not been wholly inactive. Blenker's brigade was left in guard at Centreville. The brigades of Davis and Richardson marched down to Blackburn's Ford, near where the skirmish of three days before had been fought. A slow fire was opened upon the opposite bank, to which no reply was made, and no enemy was visible except at long distances until about eleven o'clock; then suddenly the opposite bank seemed full of them. They moved back and forth in a puzzling way. Now they seemed to be massing themselves as if to cross the Run in force; a small body was sent across who drove in the Fed-

eral skirmishers, but were in turn driven back by artillery. Then they appeared to be retreating—before the attack on their left, as Richardson supposed. Again the tide turned, and still larger masses were concentrated. These troops were the brigades of Jones and Longstreet, who had received the order to fall upon the Federal left, and were preparing to execute it, when it was countermanded because a similar order sent to Ewell had miscarried. The Federal commanders little knew the peril from which they had escaped. It was owing to sheer accident that they were not assailed by a threefold force, while the rest of the army was miles away, utterly beyond reach of giving them support.

So the day went on till past five o'clock, when an order came to retreat upon Centreville and endeavor to hold that position, for the attack upon the right had failed, and McDowell was retreating in utter rout. Richardson and Davis fell back, and took up a position to protect the retreating regiments from below, while Blenker guarded them in front.

The conduct of Miles, the commander of the division, had been singular all day. Several times he rode over to the posts of Davis and Richardson, changed the dispositions which they had made, countermanded the orders which they had given, and then hurried back to his quarters at Centreville. Toward evening Richardson had established his defensive line, when, returning to one of the regiments, he found that it had been entirely altered. He inquired by whose orders it had been done, and was told by Stevens, the colonel, that it was by express order of Miles. "Why the change was made," he added, "I do not know; but I have no confidence in Colonel

Miles, for he is drunk." Richardson replaced the regiment as before, and then reported to McDowell's aid that he had been interfered with all day in the disposition of his troops, and could not carry out the orders of the commanding general so long as he was under orders of a drunken man. He was directed to take the command. He began placing another regiment, when Miles met him and ordered him to form it in a different manner. Richardson replied that he should obey no more orders from him. Miles ordered him in arrest. Richardson paid no attention, and rode off. McDowell soon came up. Miles said the dispositions made were faulty, and asked to be allowed to remain in command of his division. The request was refused.

By nine o'clock the last of the fugitives from the battle-field were safely beyond the lines at Centreville. Beyond the cavalry chase, no attempt was made at pursuit from that quarter. Johnston ordered Longstreet's and Bonham's brigades to cross the Run below the bridge, and fall upon the Federals. They advanced some distance, but night coming on they were recalled, without coming near enough to be perceived by the Federal rear-guard. A brief and informal council was held, and it was resolved that Centreville should be abandoned, and the army fall back to Washington. But the routed regiments had waited for no orders. They were already far in the rear, hurrying forward in the same panic with which they had come in. They reached their camps at Vienna and Arlington before daylight the next morning. In less than six hours of darkness they had accomplished in their flight a distance which it had taken them more than forty hours to traverse in their advance. Scarcely a regiment which had been driven from the battle-field presented the slightest trace of military order. The regiments of the reserve followed on more leisurely, but long before night they were all back in front of Washington.

The Confederate loss in this battle was 378 killed, 1489 wounded, and 30 missing—1887 in all. Of these, 1262 were of the Army of the Shenandoah. As the re-enforcements brought up last were in action but a short time, the greater part of this loss—probably about 1100—fell upon Bee's and Jackson's brigades, which went into battle 6000 strong. The whole loss in the Army of the Potomac was 630. Not quite half of this army, 22,000 strong, was in action at all, and of these only Evans's half brigade of barely 1500 men, until afternoon; fully half the loss of the Army of the Potomac must have fallen upon them. Bee's brigade, 3000 strong, was the only part of the Army of the Shenandoah which took part in the bloody repulse of the morning; it was also engaged through the afternoon, and thus suffered more than Jackson's; it must have lost 700 men. Of the 4300 men which composed the commands of Bee and Evans, one man in four must have been killed or wounded.

The Federal loss is officially stated at 481 killed, 1011 wounded, and 1460 missing—3051 in all. This is probably a close approximation to the entire loss. But as all the dead were left on the field, and the greater part of those who were severely wounded fell into the hands of the enemy, their number can be given only by estimate. The estimates are certainly below the truth. The Confederate official report states that 1421 prisoners were sent to Richmond, of whom 871 were unwounded. Deducting these from the total loss, there remain 2180 killed and wounded. According to the usual ratio of casualties in battle, the Federal loss must have been about 550 killed and 1630 wounded. They lost 27 cannon, of which 10 were captured on the field, and the remainder abandoned in various stages of the pursuit—a large part of them at the crossing of Cub Run—besides 4000 muskets, 4500 sets of accoutrements, and a considerable quantity of ammunition.

We have described the battle of Bull Run in detail because it presents an epitome of the errors which marked the conduct of the Federals during the first months of the war. The conception was unwise; the plan faulty; the execution imperfect. The conception was unwise, because defeat was more than probable, and little real advantage could be gained by entire success. All that could be gained was a temporary interruption of railroad communications. When the second plan of operations was decided upon, which it was supposed would bring on a battle with an enemy presumed to be of not inferior force, strongly posted, McDowell still left one fifth of his army behind at Fairfax, more than ten miles from the battle-field, where they could be of no use. He could not expect to rout the Confederates, and either destroy their army or drive them from their strong post at Manassas. That point was to be carefully avoided in any case. If repulsed by surprise at Stone Bridge, the Confederates could at worst fall back behind the guns of Camp Pickens. The only real object sought to be gained by the battle of the 21st was to cut the railroad connection near Gainesville, ten miles in a straight line from Centreville, and thus break up the commu-

NOTE ON THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

SOURCES AND AUTHORITIES.—The main sources for the history of the battle of Bull Run are the reports of the commanders on both sides. The newspaper accounts, Northern and Southern, are of little value. The system of "War Correspondence," which furnishes abundant and valuable information respecting the later periods of the war, had not yet been fairly organized. The current accounts of the day abound in misapprehensions and exaggerations. In the Southern papers the number of the Federals is stated any where from 50,000 to 135,000, with from 75 to 150 guns, and regular cavalry by the thousand. The Northern papers were filled with accounts of heights stormed, intrenchments carried, and masked batteries encountered. But the battle was fought upon ground which neither side had anticipated. Until after ten o'clock in the morning there had not been a single soldier upon the plateau, and not a yard of intrenchment was thrown up, and, with the exception of the abattis at the Stone Bridge, there were no artificial defenses nearer than Camp Pickens, almost ten miles distant. Neither were there any masked batteries. The Confederate artillery was, indeed, very judiciously posted, every advantage being taken of the natural formation of the ground. Thus Imboden's battery of four guns was placed by Bee early in the day in a ravine running down the slope of the plateau in front of the Henry house, opening directly upon the road by which Porter's brigade and Heintzelman's division were advancing. Across the mouth of this ravine was a slight swell, behind the crest of which the guns were sheltered, and over which they played upon the Federal columns. When Bee and Evans were driven back, their line of retreat took them to the east of this battery, which was left wholly unsupported. For more than three hours Imboden never saw a Confederate except those belonging to his own battery. All this time he kept up a fire upon the Federal columns until his guns became so heated that it was dangerous to load them. During all this time he was fired upon by Griffin's

and Ricketts's batteries, but so well was he covered by the slight swell before him that only three men were harmed by fragments of exploding shells; and at last, when the Federal column was close upon him, by going up the ravine he carried away all his guns except one, which was disabled by the accidental breaking of the axle. This was the only semblance of a masked battery upon the field. Neither was there any hand-to-hand fighting. The battle was wholly an affair of artillery and musketry. It is doubtful whether, until the rout, there was a bayonet-thrust or a sword-cut given on either side. The misstatements of the newspapers have been reproduced and multiplied in most of the formal accounts of the battle. Thus a Colonel Estvàn, who professes to have been with the Confederate army, says that Beauregard had 65,000 infantry and 4000 cavalry, including Kirby Smith's corps of 30,000 men, which came up at the close of the action. He also a little more than doubles the Confederate loss. He brings General Scott on the battle-field, when he was never nearer it than Washington; describes the conduct of Ewell's, Holmes's, Longstreet's, and Jones's brigades, none of which were in the action; and narrates an interview on the field between Davis, Johnston, and Beauregard, at a moment when the first was half way between Richmond and Manassas, the second at the Lewis house, and only the third on the field. Estvàn's book was first published in England. It is false in every possible particular. Some American writers have given accounts hardly less incorrect.—McDowell's report of the battle itself is vague and indefinite. The reports of the division, brigade, and regimental commanders are mainly devoted to the special operations of their several commands; but by comparing and collating the whole, a fair idea may be gained of the phases of the action on the Federal side.—Johnston's report is, as far as it goes, clear and intelligible. It is chiefly valuable as affording means of correcting some important misstatements in that of Beauregard.—Beauregard's report, made out more than a month after the battle, is elaborate and minute. He, however, studiously exaggerates the force of the Federals at each important moment, and as studiously understates his own. But in

nication between the enemy's forces at Manassas and those in the Valley of Virginia. That he was not aware that this communication had already been made, and that Jackson, with half of his army, had already joined Beauregard, and that he would be followed by the other half before his detachment could by any possibility reach the road, is not to be laid to the charge of McDowell. He had every reason to suppose that Patterson was still holding Johnston in check at Winchester. But the fearing up of a few rods of railway by a force which must in any case be withdrawn at once, could only hinder, not prevent the junction of the two armies of the enemy. In the endeavor to accomplish even this McDowell divided his army, leaving one third around Centreville, hardly five miles from where he knew the centre of the main force of the enemy to be, and stretching the other over ten miles of road, with an interval between the wings so wide that either might have been crushed without the least possibility of aid from the other. Had the Confederate commanders understood the design of McDowell, their wisest course would have been to have allowed him to pass the Stone Bridge without opposition, and so separate Tyler, Hunter, and Heintzelman as widely as he pleased from Miles. Two courses would then have been open: to fall upon Miles and annihilate him; or to march up Bull Run on the precise route by which their re-enforcements actually were brought up, throw themselves between Miles and Tyler, and assail the rear of the latter. The advancing columns of the Federals would have been thus cut off by superior force from their base of supplies at Centreville. They had set out with rations for three days, and only ammunition for a single battle, with no provision for a renewal. The Federal army having been thus effectually divided by its commander, either part might have been attacked and destroyed. The Confederate generals, not dreaming that the great movement had so small a purpose, assumed that its design was to interpose between Manassas and their army lying along Bull Run. They therefore ordered the position at the Stone Bridge to be held at all hazards, and brought up their forces to repel what they presumed to be the movement upon Manassas. At the same time, as the most effective method of relieving their threatened left flank, they ordered a determined attack by their right and centre upon the rear and left flank of the Federals at Centreville. Had a successful attack been made here, as McDowell says, "our whole force would have been irretrievably cut off and destroyed." The accidental miscarriage of the order sent to Ewell was all that prevented this result.

The long withdrawal from action of Burnside's brigade is wholly inexplicable. The battle of the morning was over by noon. It had lasted less than two hours. Burnside had not suffered severely, and his men were in perfect order, and confident of victory. Their ammunition had indeed become well-nigh exhausted, and they were very properly withdrawn a little to the rear to replenish it. This was only partially accomplished at half past four, when Burnside received orders to protect the retreat. More than four hours were thrown away, while a fierce action was going on in plain sight at the distance of scarcely a mile.

Hardly less unaccountable is the long delay of Schenck's brigade at the Stone Bridge. From eight in the morning the passage was only obstructed by an abattis, and defended by four companies of infantry with two guns. This weakness could not, indeed, be known at once; but before eleven Tyler was assured that the enemy had no force in that quarter, and crossed the Run with Sherman's and Keyes's brigades. The weak guard at the bridge was swept away by noon, when Bee and Evans fell back, and very soon after Keyes marched clear above and beyond the vacant position which it had occupied. There was nothing in the way but the abattis, which could have been avoided by a slight detour on either side, or removed in a few minutes. No attempt to remove it was made for almost four hours, and then the removal was made just in time to open the road for a few Confederate guns to come down upon the rear of the flying army.

Keyes's movement also, though gallantly made, was without significance in the general result. Every step after the assault at the Robinson house took him farther and farther from the spot where he was wanted, clear out of sight of the battle, of the result of which he was ignorant until the order reached him to join in the retreat. As it was, he was almost cut off. The forces of Burnside, Schenck, and Keyes, or any one of them, at the hill, might probably have secured a victory, or, at all events, could have prevented the utter rout.

The Confederate commanders, who had held their position against great odds, threw a superior force at the decisive moment upon the decisive point, and so won a victory as decisive and complete as is recorded in the annals of war.

and Ricketts's batteries, but so well was he covered by the slight swell before him that only three men were harmed by fragments of exploding shells; and at last, when the Federal column was close upon him, by going up the ravine he carried away all his guns except one, which was disabled by the accidental breaking of the axle. This was the only semblance of a masked battery upon the field. Neither was there any hand-to-hand fighting. The battle was wholly an affair of artillery and musketry. It is doubtful whether, until the rout, there was a bayonet-thrust or a sword-cut given on either side. The misstatements of the newspapers have been reproduced and multiplied in most of the formal accounts of the battle. Thus a Colonel Estvàn, who professes to have been with the Confederate army, says that Beauregard had 65,000 infantry and 4000 cavalry, including Kirby Smith's corps of 30,000 men, which came up at the close of the action. He also a little more than doubles the Confederate loss. He brings General Scott on the battle-field, when he was never nearer it than Washington; describes the conduct of Ewell's, Holmes's, Longstreet's, and Jones's brigades, none of which were in the action; and narrates an interview on the field between Davis, Johnston, and Beauregard, at a moment when the first was half way between Richmond and Manassas, the second at the Lewis house, and only the third on the field. Estvàn's book was first published in England. It is false in every possible particular. Some American writers have given accounts hardly less incorrect.—McDowell's report of the battle itself is vague and indefinite. The reports of the division, brigade, and regimental commanders are mainly devoted to the special operations of their several commands; but by comparing and collating the whole, a fair idea may be gained of the phases of the action on the Federal side.—Johnston's report is, as far as it goes, clear and intelligible. It is chiefly valuable as affording means of correcting some important misstatements in that of Beauregard.—Beauregard's report, made out more than a month after the battle, is elaborate and minute. He, however, studiously exaggerates the force of the Federals at each important moment, and as studiously understates his own. But in

most cases he unintentionally furnishes the means of correcting his misstatements; and where these are wanting, Johnston's less elaborate report supplies the deficiency.

NAME OF THE BATTLE.—The Confederate writers usually call the action of the 21st "the battle of Manassas," styling the skirmish of the 18th "the battle of Bull Run." But as the battle of the 21st was fought some miles from Manassas, and close by the bank of the Run, the Northern designation seems the most appropriate.—The title of the battle of "Blackburn's Ford," applied to the action of the 18th, is really incorrect. The ford near which the action took place is Mitchell's, Blackburn's being a mile or more lower down the stream. But as the reports all give the name of the ford as Blackburn's, it is hardly worth while to correct the error. It is precisely like that which has given the name of the "Battle of Bunker's Hill" to the fight on Breed's Hill. This skirmish was wholly unimportant, though at the time much was made of it. The losses on both sides are given from official sources. Beauregard says that upon "a cursory examination" of one part of the field, "sixty-four corpses" of the Federals "were found and buried." But this statement is clearly erroneous.

PATTERSON AND JOHNSTON.—"About one o'clock on the morning of the 18th I received from the government a telegraphic dispatch, informing me that the Northern army was advancing upon Manassas. . . . The best service which the Army of the Potomac could render was to prevent the defeat of that of the Potomac. To be able to do this, it was necessary, in the first instance, to defeat General Patterson or to elude him. The latter course was most speedy and certain, and was therefore adopted. Our sick, nearly 17000 in number, were provided for in Winchester. For the defense of that place the militia of Generals Carson and Meem seemed ample; for I thought it certain that General Patterson would follow my movement as soon as he discerned it. Evading him by the disposition made of the advance guard under Colonel Stuart, the army moved through Ashby's Gap to Piedmont, a station on the Manassas Gap Railroad. Hence the infantry were to be transported by the railway, while the cavalry and artillery were ordered to continue their march. I reached Manassas about noon on the 20th." [Here follows a list of the troops with him, amounting to a little more than nine regiments, 6000 men, as stated by Beauregard.] "The president of the railroad company had assured me that the remaining troops" [elsewhere stated at 5000 men] "should arrive during the day. . . . I regarded the arrival of the remainder during the night as certain, and Patterson's, with the Grand Army, on the 22d as probable."—*Johnston's Report.*

Patterson, at a public dinner on the 16th of November, made a speech, explaining and vindicating his conduct. The following are the essential points, as given in the newspapers of the day. On the 12th of July he wrote to General Scott, proposing to go to Harper's Ferry and Charleston, and asking when Manassas would be attacked; he was informed that the attack would be on the 16th. On the 13th he was directed, "If not strong enough to beat the enemy early next week, make demonstrations to detain him in the valley of Winchester." He made the demonstrations, and, on the 16th, drove the enemy's pickets into the intrenchments at Winchester. Three days before he had written to General Scott, informing him that Johnston was in a position to have his strength doubled, and asked for instructions; but none came. On the 17th Scott telegraphed, "To-morrow the Junction will probably be carried." He supposed that he had detained Johnston the appointed time, and that the work of his column was done. On the 18th, at half past one in the morning, he telegraphed and asked, "Shall I attack?" but received no reply. He expected to be attacked where he was [Johnston was then on the point of setting out to join Beauregard]; and if Manassas was not to be attacked on that day, "he ought to have been ordered down forthwith to join in the battle, and the attack delayed until he came. He could have been there on the day the battle was fought, and his assistance might have produced a different result." On the 20th he heard that Johnston had marched with 35,000 Confederates and a large artillery force in a southeasterly direction. [This must have been at about the hour when Johnston reached Manassas, whither he had marched with a little more than 11,000 men.] He telegraphed the information to General Scott, and knew that the message was received the same day. In accordance with instructions, he came to Harper's Ferry on the 21st.—In a letter written on that day from Harper's Ferry, General Patterson states, "I could have turned Johnston's position, and have attacked him in the rear; but he had received large re-enforcements from Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia, a total force of over 35,000 Confederate troops and 5000 Virginia militia. My force is less than 20,000—nineteen regiments, whose term of service was up, or will be within a week. All refused to stay one hour over their time but four. Five regiments have gone home; two more go to-day; and three more to-morrow. To avoid being cut off, I fell back and occupied this place." At the time when Patterson with his 20,000 men was expecting to be attacked and cut off, the Confederates had near him only the Virginia militia, about 6000, and the 1700 sick at Winchester. All the others were then either at or near Manassas. Johnston had thus completely deceived Patterson both as to the number and position of his army.

THE FORCES.—"McDowell's army at Centreville numbered within a fraction of 30,000, with 55 pieces of artillery" [of these, six pieces, belonging to the New York Eighth, were thrown out of service, leaving 49 pieces.—*Report of Major Barry, Chief of Artillery.*] "A Pennsylvania regiment and a New York artillery company were discharged on the evening of the 20th, which, with the sick, reduced the effectives to about 28,000."—*Report of Major Barnard, Chief of Engineers.*

Beauregard, having mentioned that General Holmes had been directed to push forward his brigade from Fredericksburg, and that Hampton's legion of six companies of infantry, having arrived that morning by the cars from Richmond, was subsequently, as soon as it arrived, ordered forward," proceeds to give the following summary of his force: "The effective force of all arms of the Army of the Potomac on that eventful morning, including the garrison at Camp Picketts, did not exceed 21,833, and 29 guns. The Army of the Shenandoah ready for action on the field may be set down at 6000 men and 20 guns—that is, when the battle began; Smith's brigade and Fisher's North Carolina came up later, and made the total of the Army of the Shenandoah engaged, of all arms, 8334. Hill's Virginia regiment, 550, also arrived, but was posted as a reserve to the right flank. The brigades of General Holmes mustered 1265 bayonets, 6 guns, and a company of cavalry about 90 strong." It is not quite clear, from the foregoing statement, whether Beauregard includes Holmes's and Hampton's forces in the Army of the Potomac. We have assumed that they were included, making the entire Confederate force 31,000 effective men. If they are not included, the Confederate force would be raised to about 33,000.

A considerable part of the force on either side was not brought into actual service at any stage of the action. The battle presented three distinct periods, the precise time of which can not be given with absolute precision. As a general rule, the Confederate reports place them about half an hour earlier than those of the Federals. The exact moment is of little consequence. We give the time only by approximation. These periods are, *First*, The fight in the morning, from 10½ to 12, when the Confederates were repulsed. *Second*, The Confederate stand on the plateau from 12 to 3. *Third*, The advance of the Confederates and the rout of the Federals, from 3 to 4. The following is a statement of the forces actually engaged at each of these periods, gathered from the official reports on both sides. In all cases where actual numbers are furnished in the reports, these are given. In other cases, a "regiment" is assumed to have consisted of 750 effective men, and a "company," whether of artillery, cavalry, or infantry, of 75. Some were stronger and some weaker; but this is the average. The numbers given are those with which the regiments went into action; the losses at the several periods were so nearly equal as not materially to vary the general result.

1. The Fight in the Morning.

The Confederate force actually engaged consisted of Bee's brigade ["2732 bayonets," *Beauregard*, besides officers and artillery], 3000 men, and 11 companies of Evans's, with artillery, 900 men—in all, about 3900. The Federals actually engaged consisted of Burnside's brigade, four regiments, with two companies of artillery—3200 men in all, and Sykes's eight companies of regulars, 600 strong, together making 3800 men. Porter's artillery had begun to play upon the Confederates; his infantry regiments were also coming upon the field, when the Confederates broke. Sherman's brigade just then appeared, and aided in the repulse, when the Confederates, wholly outnumbered, fell back in confusion upon the plateau.

2. The Confederate Stand on the Plateau.

The Confederates, consisting of Bee's brigade, 3000 strong, and Evans's whole half brigade, 1300, fell back in confusion upon the plateau, where they met Hampton's legion, six companies, and Jackson's brigade ["2611 strong," *Beauregard*, besides artillery], about 2800—in all, about 7500 men were the forces on the plateau at the moment when Johnston and Beauregard came up. They were almost immediately followed by Smith's battalion of the Virginia Forty-ninth, and seven companies from Hunter's Virginia Eighth, ordered up from Cocks, and two additional regiments of the Army of the Shenandoah—Falkner's Second Mississippi and Fisher's North Carolina—which had just come up, 2500 men in all. The entire force which held the plateau was thus about 10,000, from which the losses must be deducted. Beauregard indeed says, after having enumerated all these regiments, "Confronting the enemy at this time my force numbered at most not more than 6500 infantry and artillery, with but thirteen pieces of artillery and two companies of cavalry. . . . The enemy's force, now bearing confidently down on our position, consisted of over 20,000 infantry, seven companies of regular cavalry, and 24 pieces of improved artillery." This is but a part of Beauregard's studious system of understating his own force, and overstating that of his opponents. The entire Federal force which crossed the Run was but 18,000; of these, at that moment, Burnside's brigade, with the exception of one regiment, was withdrawn, and Howard's brigade had not crossed the Run. These brigades numbered fully 5000, so that there remain but 13,000 Federals then "bearing down" upon the Confederate position; and these, according to Barnard, "were in a single column, strung along over several miles of road."—Johnston's report here furnishes additional means for correcting the error of Beauregard. Speaking of the time before the arrival of Fisher and Falkner, he says: "We had now

16 guns and 260 cavalry, and a little above nine regiments of the Army of the Shenandoah, and six guns and less than the strength of three regiments of that of the Potomac, engaged with about 35,000 United States troops, among whom were full 3000 men of the old regular army." Johnston here gives the Confederate force accurately, 12 regiments, equal to 9000 men, and 22 guns. He, however, more than doubles the Federal force.

3. The Confederate Advance and the Federal Rout.

Beauregard says: "By this time, between half past two and three o'clock P.M., our re-enforcements, pushed forward and directed by General Johnston to the required quarter, were at hand, just as I had ordered forward to a second effort for the recovery of the disputed plateau the whole line, including my reserves, which at this crisis of the battle I felt called upon to lead in person. The attack was general, and was shared in by every regiment then in the field." After enumerating the new re-enforcements, with less particularity than is done by Johnston, whose report we follow, he says: "About the same time, at three o'clock P.M., Brigadier General E. K. Smith, with some 1700 infantry of Elzey's brigade of the Army of the Shenandoah, and Beckham's battery, came upon the field from Camp Picketts, Manassas, where they had arrived by railroad at noon." This was the last re-enforcement; and the two reports enable us to give the number of the Confederates on the field, all of whom were in action at the time of the rout. These consisted of the 6000 men of the Army of the Shenandoah originally engaged; Evans's half brigade, 1300; Hampton's legion, 400; Kirby Smith's, 1700—9400 specially enumerated; with the following regiments of infantry, of which the numbers are not stated: Fisher's North Carolina, Falkner's Mississippi, of the Army of the Shenandoah; Cash's and Kershaw's, from Bonham's brigade; Cocks's whole brigade of five regiments; and Early's brigade of three regiments—in all, twelve regiments, equal to 9000 men, making 18,400 infantry. There is some obscurity in the enumeration of the cavalry and artillery; but at least ten companies are specially mentioned as engaged, which brings the entire Confederate force actually on the plateau at the time of the rout to a little more than 19,000 men. The remaining 11,000 (or perhaps 13,000) men not actually engaged consisted of Holmes's, Ewell's, Jones's, Longstreet's, and a part of Bonham's brigades. The Federal forces engaged, or in a position to be brought into action at the time of the rout, consisted, as stated in the text, of the 18,000 who crossed the Run, deducting Keyes's brigade of 2500, and an equal number of Burnside's brigade—5000 in all, leaving 13,000 at that moment on the field.

THE ZOUAVES.—"The evanescent courage of the Zouaves prompted them to fire perhaps a hundred shots, when they broke and fled, leaving the batteries open to a charge of the enemy's cavalry, which took place immediately."—*Porter's Report.* "As soon as the Zouaves came up, I led them forward against an Alabama regiment partly concealed in a clump of small pines in an old field. At the first fire they broke and fled to the rear, keeping up a desultory firing over the heads of their comrades in front; at the same moment they were charged by a company of secession cavalry on their rear, who came by a road through two strips of wood on our extreme right. The fire of the Zouaves killed four and wounded one, dispersing them. The discomfiture of this cavalry was completed by a fire from Captain Collum's company of United States cavalry, which killed and wounded several men. Colonel Farnham, with some of his officers and men, behaved gallantly, but the regiment of Zouaves, as a regiment, did not appear again on the field. Many of the men joined other regiments, and did good service as skirmishers. . . . Since the retreat more than three fourths of the Zouaves have disappeared."—*Heintzelman's Report.* "The new position [of Griffin's and Ricketts's batteries] had scarcely been occupied when a troop of the enemy's cavalry, debouching from a piece of wood close upon our right flank, charged down upon the New York Eleventh. The Zouaves, catching sight of the cavalry a few minutes before they were upon them, broke ranks to such a degree that the cavalry dashed through them without doing them much harm. The Zouaves gave them a scattering fire as they passed, which emptied five saddles and killed three horses. A few minutes afterward a regiment of the enemy's infantry presented itself in line at not more than 60 or 70 yards' distance, and delivered a volley full upon the batteries and their supports. The Eleventh and Fourteenth regiments instantly broke and fled in confusion to the rear, and refused to rally and return to the support of the batteries."—*Barry's Report.*

THE ROUT.—"The completeness of the rout is testified to in almost all the reports of the Federal commanders. *McDowell* says: "This soon degenerated into disorder, for which there was no remedy. Every effort was made to rally them, even beyond the reach of the enemy's fire, but in vain. The battalion of regular infantry alone moved up the hill, and there maintained itself until our men could get down to and across the Warrenton turnpike. The plain was covered with the retreating troops, and they seemed to infect those with whom they came in contact. The retreat soon became a rout, and this soon degenerated still farther into a panic. . . . I gave the necessary orders to protect their withdrawal, begging the men to form in line, and offer at least the appearance of organization. . . . Once on the road, and the different corps coming together in small parties, many without officers, they became intermingled, and all organization was lost. . . . In the panic [at the crossing of Cub Run] the horses hauling the caissons and ammunition were cut from their traces by persons to escape with, and in this way much confusion was caused, the panic aggravated, and the road encumbered. . . . By sundown most of our men had got beyond Centreville ridge, and it became a question whether we should or not endeavor to make a stand there. . . . The utter disorganization and demoralization of the mass of the army seemed, to all who were near enough to be consulted, to admit no alternative but to fall back. . . . On sending the officers of the staff to the different camps, they found that our decision had been anticipated by the troops, most of those who had come in from the front being already on the road to the rear, the panic with which they came in still continuing, and hurrying them along."

Porter says: "The slopes behind us were swarming with our retreating and disorganized forces, while riderless horses and artillery teams ran furiously through the flying crowd. All farther efforts were futile. The words, gestures, and threats of our officers were thrown away upon men who had lost all presence of mind, and only longed for absence of body. . . . The rear-guard [mainly Sykes's regulars] followed our panic-stricken troops to Centreville, resisting the attacks of the rebel cavalry and artillery, and saving them from the inevitable destruction which awaited them had not this body been interposed."

Heintzelman says: "Soon after the firing commenced, the Brooklyn Fourteenth broke and ran. I considered it useless to attempt to rally them. The want of discipline in these regiments was so great that the most of the men would run from fifty to several hundred yards in the rear, and continue to fire—fortunately for the braver ones—very high in the air, and compelling those in front to retreat. . . . Finding it impossible to rally any of the regiments, we commenced our retreat at about half past four P.M. There was a fine position a short distance in the rear, where I hoped to make a stand with a section of Arnold's battery and the United States cavalry, if I could rally a few regiments of infantry. In this I utterly failed, and we continued our retreat on the road we had advanced on in the morning. I sent forward my staff officers to rally some troops beyond the Run, but not a company would form. . . . Such a rout I never witnessed before. No efforts could induce a single regiment to form after the retreat had commenced."

McClellan says: "I assumed command of the troops in the vicinity of Washington on Saturday, July 27th, 1861, six days after the battle of Bull Run. I found no army to command; a mere collection of regiments, cowering on the banks of the Potomac, some perfectly raw, others dispirited by the recent defeat. . . . The city was almost in a condition to have been taken by a dash of cavalry."

THE PURSUIT.—"Early's brigade, etc., pursued the now panic-stricken, fugitive enemy. Stuart, with his cavalry, and Beckham, had also taken up the pursuit along the road by which the enemy had come upon the field in the morning; but, soon encumbered by prisoners who thronged the way, the former was unable to attack the mass of fast-fleeing, fugitive Federalists. Withers's, Preston's, Cash's, and Kershaw's regiments, Hampton's legion, and Kemper's battery, also pursued along the Warrenton road by the Stone Bridge, the enemy having opportunely opened a way for them through the heavy abatis which my troops had made on the west side of the bridge several days before; but this pursuit was soon recalled. . . . Colonel Radford, with six companies of Virginia cavalry, was ordered to cross Bull Run, and attack the enemy from the direction of the Lewis house. In the immediate vicinity of the Suspension Bridge [over Cub Run] he charged a battery with great gallantry, took Colonel Corcoran, of the 69th New York, prisoner, and captured the colors of that regiment. . . . Lieutenant Munford also led some companies of cavalry in hot pursuit, and captured prisoners, cannon, etc., abandoned in the flight."—*Beauregard's Report.* "Stuart pressed the pursuit of the enemy's principal line of retreat, the Sudley road. Four companies of cavalry, under Radford and Munford, were ordered to cross the stream to reach the turnpike, the line of retreat of the enemy's left. Our cavalry found the roads encumbered with dead and wounded (many of whom seemed to have been thrown from wagons), arms, accoutrements, and clothing. . . . Instructions were sent to Bonham to march by the quickest route to intercept the fugitives; and to Longstreet to follow as closely as possible upon the right. Their progress was checked by the enemy's reserve, and by night at Centreville."—*Johnston's Report.*

"The order [to take up a position in front of Centreville] was executed with great difficulty, as the road was nearly choked up by retreating baggage-wagons of several divisions, and by the vast number of flying soldiers belonging to various regiments. . . . Nevertheless, I was enabled to take a position which would prevent the advance of the enemy, and protect the retreat of the army. . . . The retreat of great numbers of flying soldiers continued until nine o'clock in the evening, the great majority in wild confusion, and but few in collected bodies. Soon afterward several squadrons of the enemy's cavalry advanced along the road, and appeared before the outposts. . . . The skirmishers fired, when the enemy turned around, leaving several killed and wounded on the spot. Afterward we were several times molested from various sides by the enemy's cavalry. At about midnight, the command to leave the position and march to Washington was given by General McDowell."—*Bleeker's Report.*