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MEMOIRS Gen. William T. Sherman BY HIMSELF. IN TVWO VOLUMVIES. VOLUME II. TO WHICH ARE ADDED CHAPTERS COMPLETING HIS LIFE, AND INCLUDING Ills FUNERAL OSsEQUIES. PRFPARD BY W. FLETCHER JOHNSON, Es. AND CAREFULLY REVIEWED BY MAJOR-GENERAL O. O. HOWARD, U. S. A. I LLUSTRATED. NEW YORK: D. APPLETON & COMPANY. A ~g~l f
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Entered according to Act of Congress, i the year 75 D. APPLETON & COMPANY, in the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at WashintonD.
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lI I I IHiIiII I l I 3 1199 00355 4675 CONTENTS. VOLUME IL ORAP. PA0a XV.-ATLANrA CAMPAIGN-NASIru AND CHArrANOOGA TOK horSAw MARCH, APRIL, AND MAY, 18t4 XVL-ArLANTA CAMPAIGN-BATrLs ABOUT KEXESAW MONTAIN-JCNE 1864 50 .g YIU-ATLANTA CAMPAIGN-BArLEs ABOUT ATLANTA-JCLY, 1864 65 XVIIL-CAPTUltE OF ATLANTA-AUGUST AND SEPTEMBE, 1861 .l -ATLANTA AND AFTER-PURSUIT OF HOOD-SEPTEMBER A :D O1O.ER 1864 .137 XX.-THE MARCH TO THE SEA -FiF ATLANTA TO SAVANNAH-I-NOyMER AND DECEMnER, 1864 1 11 XXI.-SACArt AND POCOTALIo-DCEMIDEnR, 1564, AND JAsUAnY, 15. 230 EXIL-CAMPAIGN OF THE CAROLINAS-FEBR ARY AND MARC1, 185 268 I-END OF THE WAR-FROM GOLDSBORO TO ALEGH AND A Tox-AwxL AN MAY, 1865 322 EIV.-COxcrUSoa -MrIAny LEsSoN oF E WA 31 Mm1FITARY MAP, SHW G THE MAREiS OF THE UNITED TATES FORCES UNDER GENERAL SHELM' COMMND At ud of Volaume (Inserted by the Publkers.) *1A; rlno : 4%
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Ono the way, toamil 1 a a 6 N-nthe gteelre e enl imn p en in th e w ingias te inomncei fted i n toiiiiiidiiiitiiniiiiiiiiiiito ie ti itr i slellaf o the B rni andFreiissn i e the Eai;ani Gtenraiilsw h bd inaAon... d anmo....tatte aGnt g iws nrdaonN N~:lsl~~~@ls~ ~" l"
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enable them to regain the influence they bad lest; anageneral reorganization of all the armieswas thennecessarydirected me to keep in mind espeally tbe claims of Genacommiands that would be as near their rank and dates of cmission as possible; but I was to do nothing until I hfuther fro hijm on the subject, as he explained that he wby a court of inquiry, touching their conduct of the campain Tennessee and Kentucky, that resulted in the battle of Peville, or Chaplin's Hills, October 8, 182, and they hadsubstantially acquitted; and, as it was manifest that we werhave some hard fighting, we were anxious to bring into harmoevery man and every officer of skill in the profession of arsOf these, Generas uell and McClellan were prominenrank, and also by reason of their fame acquired in Mexicowell as in the earlier partofthe civil war.After my return to Nashville I addressed myself to the taskrity of the vast region of the South which had been already cquered, more especially the several routes of supply and comnication with the active armies at the front, and to organizlarge army to move into Georgia, coincident with the adveof the Eastern armies against Richmond. I soon received foolonel J. B. Fry-now of the Adjutant-Geeras Departmbut then at Washington in charge of the Provost-Marshal-GeraFs office-a letter asking me to do something for GeneBuell. I answered him frankly, telling him of my understaing with enerl Grant, and that I was still awaitig thepected order of the War Department, assigning Gneral Bto my command. Colonel Fry, as General Buel's specia fricreplied that he was very anxious that I should make specifoplication for the services of General Buell by name, and inquiwhat I proposed to offer him. To this I answered that, afteragreement with General Grant that he would notify me frilii iAi
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.~ ~t5 ~tilati~ 5of.neral Buell should be assigned to me specilcally I was pre-red to assign himto command all the troops on the Missis-pi River from Cairo to Natchez, comprising about three divi-is, or the equivalent of a corps d'armie. General Grantnver afterward communicated to me on the subject at all; andIiferred that Mr. Stanton, who was notoriously vindictive inprejudices, would not consent to the employment of theseSoflleers. General Buell, toward the close of the war, pub-lsd a bitter politica letter, aimed at General Grant, reflectirwohis general management of the war, and stated that bothnerals Canby and Sherman had offered him a subordinatemand, which he had declined because e had once out-red us. This was not true as to me, or Canby either, Itik, for both General Canby and I ranked him at West Pointadin the old army, and he (General Buell) was only superiortus in the date of his commission as major-general, for a shortprod in 1862. This newspaper communication, though aimedatreneral Grant, reacted on himself, for it closed his militarycrer. General Crittendon afterward obtained authority forsrice, and I offered him a division, but he declined it for theran, as I understood it, that he had at one time commandedacrps. 1He is now in the United States service, commandingteSeventeenth Infantry. General McCook obtained a con-wad under General Canby, in the Department of the Gulf," whre he rendered good service, and he is also in the regularsevce,1lieutenant-colonel Tenth Infantry.Ireturned to Nashville from Cincinnati about the 25th ofMarh, and started at once, in a special car attached to the regu-la rain, to inspect my command at the front, going to Pulaski,Tenessee, where I found General G. M. Dodge ; thence toHutsville, Alabama, where I had left a part of my personalsafand the records of the department during the timle we hadbenabsent at Meridian; and there I found General McPher-_ owho had arrived frorn Vicksburg, and had assumed com-man of the Army of the Tennessee. General McPherson no-cupanied me, and we proceeded by the cars to Stevenson,Bigeport, etc., to Chattanooga, where we spent a day or two
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us to Chattanooga, stopping by the way a few hours at Londonwhere were the headquarters of the Fourth Corps (Major-General Gordom Granger). General Granger, as usual, was full ocomplaints at the treatment of his corps since I had left hith e0 ral Burnside, at Knoxville, the preceding Novemberand he ated to me personally that he had a leave of absence iais pocket, of which he intended to take advantage very soonAbout the and of March, therefore, the three army cornmanderand myself were together at Chattanooga. We had nothing lias soon as the spring was fairly open, we should have to movdirectly against our antagonist, General Jos. E. Johnston, thescurely entrenched at Dalton, thirty miles distant; and tpurpose of our conference at the time was to ascertain our owresources, and to distribute to each part of the army its approlikely to arise, and I simply instructed each army commander tthe distribution of supplies that were coring up by rail froNashville as equitably as possible. We also agreed on somsubordinate changes in the organization of the three separatiiiiiiiiiii iii ~~iiiiaiiiiiiiiiil !iii ~ aiiiiiiiit~iiiiii ii ni iiiiiii ii i~ iii i~iiiiiiiiiiiiii i i ii iiiii iii iii ii ilii iIii : Il~iii ,~~: l~: iiii i:
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.iiiisix bilesinrote omadv and veroot f the al nri en haty thie, othersa e s s, and thth to b eserlyguardeda nt the y of ubela o the ppliona's n haofGegies man t a ataeshd hof ve o adi then rd-w a l fch fthelgitheAm of the Tsen e d o n scor,p ar ytcommanderssona eu bf oti and oGsa t eahOnhmwewere ncere h comaelles brugt im f iiiiirengthd abhe r between fta ov y th sai od imiensGeoart iant, t a undoter ie he S e neali ly .deal Iof feeid i the A of y 1 ss e all thi s soal.t a shville neral o fi e going ,ank to iehand ~ ~ ~ i fuly I ie h.daeo a st hnalti shouldira ~ ~ ~ ~ ii heii inraies o h radfrad oeet adte etu ndtoN s vll ;G n ra c o i go i back i t Kn x ieiand ~ ~ ~ ~ i MhesntHutvleThmsraiig at Chatta-': oogiiiiiai.iiiiiiilillii~i ii~lii % ii~ iOn.t.e 2dii of Apr iiiiiiii~i"iiiiiiiiiiii~iii==ii ii =iiliii at~ili Nashvillei Ili wrot to ii Generl Grantii iiii i=iii ith n a ahi g o ,rp rtnioh mth eut f y vstttheseerl rmesiad skd iscoset o heserl canepropoed, hich as p otly g ie b te grp .I theni ad-
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portation and suppliesIfod the pacity of the raifrom Nashville forward to Decatur, and to Chattanooga, sosmall, especially in the number of locomotives and cars, that itwas clear that they were barely able to supply the daily wants ofthe armies then dependent on them, with no power of accumu-lating a surplus in advance. The cars were daily loaded downwith men returning from furlough, with cattle, horses, etc. ; andreason of the previous desolation of the country betweenChattanooga and Knoxville, General Thomas had authorized theissue of provisions to the suffering inhabitants.We could not attempt an advance into Georgia without food,ammunition, etc.; and ordinary prudence dictated that we shouldhave an accumulation at the front, in case of interruption to therailway by the act of the eiemy, or by common accident. Ac-cordingly, on the 6th of April, I issued a general order,1inutingthe use of the railroad-cars to transporting only the essentialarticles of food, ammunition, and supplies for the army proper,forbid ing any further issues to citizens, and cutting off all civiltraic requiring the commanders of posts within thirty milesof Nashville to haul out their own stores in wagons; re-quiring all troops destined for the front to march, and all beef-cattle to be driven on their own legs. This was a great help,but of course it naturally raised a howL Some of the poor,Union people of East Tennessee appeled President Lin nwhose kind heart responded promptly to their request. Hetelegraphed me to know if I could not modify or repeal my orders; but I answered him that a great campaign was impend-ing, on which the fate of the nation hung; that our railroadshad but a limited capacity, and could not provide for the neces-sities of the army and of the people too; that one or the othermust quit, and we could not until the army of Jos. Johnstonwas conquered, etc., etc) Mr. Lincoln seemed to acquiesc, andI advised the people to obtain and drive out cattle from Ken-tucky, and to haul out their supplies by the wagon-road fromthe same quarter, by way of mnberland Gap. By thesechanges I nearly or quite doubled our daily accumulation ofiiiiii~i i~i
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.. .. ..rlSracc haalog r i t e i hia eri of traniJ. te. supplyso, En wthe thise c eaonl A cout noctkmChttoo a ino d aor athe hundred mus or menda t th rtik th uson oth e aing p or hcausiexpecteimted itoud Gera at tht e and hi of te osleSto e Ch attanooga a be on anad eq ar10su aly ,1veavig th becatleto be die notheNashil Railradetectied w i wr i h i lli i ii~ iiiiiiiiii l, iiiiii
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Jeffersonville, Indiana. He and Goneral Robert Allento transfer the trains over the Ohio River from Jeffersonviliiievery road at the North; months afterward I was amusedaway down in Georgia, cars marked "Pittsburg & Fort WDelaware & Lackawanna," "Baltimore & Ohio," andwith the names of alnost every rairoad north of the OhioRthis fact, as much as to any other single fact, I attribute tfeet suess which afterward attended our campaigns; andalways felt grateful to Mr. Guthrie, of Louisville, who hadenough and patriotism enough to subordinate the intehis railroad company to the cause of his country.About this time, viz., the early part of April, I wasdisturbed by a bold raid made by the robel General Fortbetween the Mississippi and Tennessee Rivers. He reachOhio River at Paducah, but was handsomely repulsed bynel Hicks. H then swung down toward Memphis, assand carried Fort Pillow, massacring a part of its garrisoposed wholly of negro troops. At first I discredited thof the massacre, because, in preparing for the Meridiapaign, I had ordered Fort Pillow to be evacuated, but ipired afterward that General Hurlbut had retainedgarrison at Fort Pillow to encourage the onlistmentblacks as soldiers, which was a favorite political policyday. The massacre at Fort Pillow occurred April 12and has been the subject of congressional inquiry. NoiiForrest's men acted like a set of barbarians, shooting dohelpless negro garrison after the fort was in their possbut I am told that Forrest personally disclairs any actiticipation in the assault, and that he stopped the firingas he oould. I also take it for gated that Forrest dlead the assault in person, and consequently that he wasrear, out of sight if not of hearing at the time, and I
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Fre ponlyonmo n that wully yd Ail tohey mr toout o desperted erfelow e h, and i th sher tmyaenlsod othof ker tBnkor to General .SMith andv le, e oe wih h i:ince tahIcEAQUATER wull ainpwi F th e phereP, f mniivi iTiENiiiiIp A the wil Rivera ei e the 1th insta t I send wh tilSl erl orr e t era A. J. Smithil ngivdS ee, d on frne m pen d t hi be c h is ary tcm n Gm ay seouad eai nr i tofrheabsence of our furloug hedme noandn to deetchment Aith u eioneralA. 0 at Pl bt the wnst oi and aithtilEnd it cane direchio s destined poi nt, ut th is pan iharl y ct; helingere abon vh acIhothantI hearq othemat atouitschles b a;mo alhearIcanleans ofae yr a ton btei altp;i= i == ii == i ii ...i iiiiiilliiiii iiii fiiiiiiiiiiiiii iiiiii iii ilili ii== @@ =ii i=iii~ i iili iliiiiiiiiiil iiiiiil! i t Iiiiiiiiil i iilliiiiiii
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14 ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. [186,you and the navy, but, as I before stated, I must have A. J. Smith's troopsthey have used up Red River, as it will save the io otherwise con-sumed in transfer to other boats.Mobile our forces will again act toward the same end, though from distantS ints. General iGrant, now having lawful control, will doubtless s thatminor obects are disregarded, and that all the armies act on a commonplan.Hoping, when this reaches you, that you will be in possession of Shreve-port, I am, with great respect, etc.,Rumors were reaching us thick and fast od defeat and disas-ter in that quarter; and I feared then, what afterward actuallyhappened, that neither General Banks nor Admiral Portercould or would spare those two divisions. On the 23d of April,General Corse returned, bringing full answers to my letters, andI saw that we must go on without them. This was a seriousloss to the Army of the Tennessee, which was also short by twoother divisions that were on their veteran furlough, and wereunder orders to rendezvous at Cair, before embarking for Clito on the Tennessee River.On the 10th of April, 1864, the headquarters of the threeArmies of the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Ohio, were at Chat-tanooga, Huntsville, and Knoxville, and the tables on page 16,et seg., give their exact condition and strength. The Department of the Arkansas was then subject to my com-mand, but General Fred Steele, its coinmander, was at LittleRock, remote from me, acting in eoperation with General anks,and had full employment for every soldier of his emmand; sothat I never depended on him for any men, or for any participa-tion in the Georgia campaign. Soon aftelr, i., May 8th, thatdepartment was transferred to the Military Division of "theGulf," or Southwest," Major-General E. R. S. Canby com-manding, and General Steele served with hin in the subsequentmovement against Mobile.iii iil $ il liiiiiii iiiiiiii illiiiii iiiiiiiiiiiiiiliiiiiiiiiiiiiii.i ii iiiiii iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiniii liiiiiilliiIiiiiiiiiiiiiiiI i iiiiiii iiiiiil ii i i iiiiiiiiiii iiiiiii iiiiiiilii ii Ii iiii l iil iiiiiiiil ii l = i =!iiii Iii .= i ii QiiB=I i ii !'iI ii ii i ii iiir~i~iii i i i iiii~iiiiiiii"' iili i iiioiii i i ii i i i i i i i i i i i i iii i i ii i liii i i ii i i i i i i iii il~ iii i iii........ ....... .... .= ; ===!iii~:I :" I !!iiii iii ii:;
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mandes ofarmies, except that each possessed special qualitiesofmn n of character which fitted them in the highest de-I~ ii iiiiHoo ,HH,,,., iwork then in contemplation.'4; $::2 N:returns of April 10, 1864, it will be seen that theeCumberland had on its muster-rolls-Men.P ee tand absent .............. ................ 171,4500P e e tfor duty ............. .. ......... 88,883Te Ay of the Tennessee-Men.P ee tand absent ............ .. ........... 134,763P ee tfor duty ............. .. .......... 64,957Th ry of the Ohio-Men.P ee tand absent. .. .............. ......... 46,052P e e tfor duty ............. .. ........... 26,242Th eartment and army commanders had to maintainstrng arrsons in their respective departments, and also toguar thir espective lEnes of supply. I therefore, in my mind,aimd t prpare out of these three armies, by the 1st of May,pact army for active operations in Georgia, ofabou the 1ol0wing numbers :Men.A m of the Cumberland ............. ........ 50,000A m of the Tennessee. .............. .. ...... 35,000Aryof theOhio. ....... ....... 15,000I4ii:il8; :; ITotal. .......... .. ........ 100,000andto akethose troops as mobile as possile, I made thestrible orders in relation to wagons and all species ofis and impedimenta whatever. Each oficer and sol-r idierw qired to carry on his horse or person food and cloth-ingenoghfor fhe days. To each regiment was allowed butonewagn nd one ambulance, and to the officers of each com-pany one pack horse or mule.; .N ~ 2~E,, l""iE :"N~ i" il irr"
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Transcript from the Tri-X1onthly 1Return of the Departmnt of the Cumberland, com manded .>yMajor-Ocneral TiiomAs, for April 10, 1864.Specal, ~x-A-, OnDetaheh -1Wlth Leave. DDpparrrewnt Depat ..t U is n rn a e nr0ro): 2< m los .o a is a s.......n ff............ .... ... .... 8 19 ... 2 ...... .. ... 22 4Fourth i iii~~~i~iiiiii~i~iii]iiii~ii ~ Army. ...... .................. Cor s ... ... .. 7 7i G 17 82i84i1682i1611i8i1,6 6 7 1 1 i 8 1 ,59 8 1i448 96 8S 78 i8,2iiG rd tl -.... ............. 2 2. .. 8 1 b11...Caal om an ........ *228 1 '42 65 Cono t n Twet4h 2628 6 64i0 18 85 4 67 .. ... .1 Potoihtanoiii.....iii28 17 188iiiii6 6 6 0 8,0 8 5417 7 1 82Br nierd n aty"4 2.,5 8 1 6 .149 1 6 1 6 4 2........ ................................... .. 2 8 6 ...... ]... 5 6........
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S i .IU.11try, Cavalry. Aitery.W COMMANDS.D a n .L. 27 .... ......... .............. Bri Gen.W .D. W hipple,y piiiisi4,40 9 8996i 18 ,406 ...., .2, 702 6r.iiiiiiii,Four th ..... 4Ann ,25 11 8a1 1,18 40 8,09 1 2 8, 0 2 7 14,110 ... ...... 12 801 2 25 24Mnt-Gen. O.O. Howard.Fouteenth A1rty .op f 6U 0m 80Ll 0S 3 5% i 840. i 2Mj-e.J .amrE yyr a p n3 17 11 1 1 r 18,217 1 60 5 0Y8 802 44 62 Mal.-Gen. J. Hooker.Distrlct of N astrifll..... 7i -N ,7 1 3,0 61 1i4 86 '14 81 .1 1 7 T Mo 10 G6 Maj,-Gen. L. H ouseau. -Cavalry Cmmnd 44 2,9' 17 2.7 1,062 292.002 22 214 1,87 7 6 4 1 Brig Gen. K M.1 rr.E t l iiiviiiit iy ..ii. 1 119 49i 170 1,82i .0.4 .. .. ..... 27 940 4-. .. ForhOi harp shoot-r ... 4i 2 48 2 8 4 7 99 0 80 590......... .. .. ... Capt. G. M. arbor.Pnst of Cliatt onGa..... 61 31 8 2 5 3 M 1 .... .20 1, 1 ...... 89 lJ. Gen. J. 1. 2teednan. E11 2 8 .1. 0 9 7. .O. e Infantry.... 1 24 1 4. 191 4,811 4,792 4,010 0 61t ...7..-.-. .. .... .... ... Muj Gen. Carl sehb rS Cav ry........ 171 ... 7U 112 2,527 2,089 2,20 ....... 78 1,204 .... GG 55 Wu 8) 0In e ofAtillry. 8 8 1,172 1,1 1 .... 20 871 54 11 i i tiii' M1 p s ... 1 2e 178 201 19' 1 ..Fi n e.. ...1 1I 1 -IT 1 TO .. .... ..... ... .. .. ..... Capt. P .B ab ock, Jr.Grand Total. 201 14D 124 1,90 u, 163,142 42171,50 179,98 J,987 0,00 445 8,129 165 8,9 12,730 2 d6 8Official: E. I. TowSEND, Adjuta n-General. GEO. I. THOMJAS, la)j r-Oen!er commanding.ii!iiiiii~iiii] i ii i iiiii i ] i l ii ii i i~i i~ i i ..
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Transcript from the 71ilont/Jy Return of the Department anl Army of the Tennessee, commandedby IL jorGeneral MCPni:usox, for April 10, 1864.PRESENT. ABET6perloI, E.In A-t On D~l 1,,S-1With Leave. 61ckFo, Doty. tra, or Deily hick. or _________Duty fi' Witb. h Witbout the De( artmuvt. Depntm.ovt.COMMANDS.5 o I 8 E zD epartm ent S a t .......... ...... .1 4 ...... 6 ..... 6 .... .... .5 ..........FYfeenth ArumyCorps....... SG 571 9 18 75 6011,919 16,0 94 1,92 2 1,3020 1 1019201 215 8,055102 84 94 5,069 66 8,816 .Sixteenth Army Corps....... 7 611 S10 85 1,5 1,400 81,45 82,713 169 4,402 81 8,N2 2 193 40,6M5 299 8,191 195 1,50 494i 8,298 84 4,058 Seeteth Arm~y Corps.... 58 627 G0 D 59 634 15,890 16,524 76 2,184 58 2,4 U5 00 21,251 461 7,60 128 631 000 10,]1JS 2 1,655ft mnO Detachment ............ .. .. ... ... 1 18 14 ..... ...... ... ... ... 14 1 7 1 2 1 .... .. ..Total Frrc<-D TpartmentandAr cy of the Tnesse... 185 2,09 26 62 2,681 2,700 62,187 L57 889 8,461 191 6,692 45 441 1,1261976 18,918 426 2,450 1,549 28,511163 8,99+ + + + +++++ ++ ++++ +++ : ++; +++ ++ + + ++ + + + +: ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ + : : ++++ ++ + ; ++ ++ + Co
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r A'"SENT. PRESENT Felt DUTY El UIP EU. AuthoritInfo try. Cavalry. Artillery.(v.M1TANDS.0 o a otaf 0 0 sIkpartnent Staff .......... .... ... G .. ... 5 5 .... ... ... ... .. ... ... ...... ... Colonel W T. Clark. 1Fiftenth Army Corps...... 1 262 1,0 3;54 82,18 81,522 0 111,08 7 0 81 1,1 1,6 243 Major-General J. A. Logan.Bixtoenth Army Corps .. 90 2,7G8 07,05 00,28 58,24) 55411,107 132 8,681 80 2,540 5,779 1,064171 Majur-General G M. DMoge.Sventeanth n Arny Carp ... 14 101 2,6P 40,10 42,83P 42,!0, 400 8,840 01 2,187 r 1,800 2,811 1,010 -Major-General Frank R Blar.Bna29 ta 2hment .7 4 ...... .... .. ... 81 ........ Captain 0. 11. HowardTotal Fore-D pnartmnt ad Avy of the 'I e1ne11ee..3 1,00,8 1222 1,8 2,7 1,80,8 270 8,1808t 10 ,010 9, 2,82 28Official: E. D. TuoSOON, Adjutant-General. J. B. MO H ESON, AfMajor-Gener al comnanding.
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0Transcript from the Tri-Mfonthly Return of the Department of the Ohio, command ed by -3ajor-General SCOF1rLD, for April 10, 1864.P7, NT. dOENT.Spycr1, ErInArt no Detache Service. With Leave. Slk. For Dy.y S D yenty-third AO.y rps...... t2l4 h 67t 6614 t h ,I~ ITotal 8orce8,eparn 88et of 8 8 t2 8 1thou 2 lo... ............... 4 61 81 2 0 6 4 1C avalr o ..................4172 1 4.14 7 1 .87 69141 ,088 14 S 32 840 2 1,8T4 cp tth li ..... ..... 4 7 16 1 ,F8 ,0 519 6e213 8,1 8 270 837 273 42 ,08 8 6 9 84 2 44x
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Transcript fro the Trionthly Retun of the Dpartmet o the Oho-(Continue.)ABoT. .Ru..NT FORn DUTY quIrEnhex IT AND ABS"T. nny vaAuthorty. I~eM". Cnulry. Ar lelry.COMMANDS o aTwonty-third Army Corps...... 18 970 1,141 25,822 27,033 26,229 84M 11,890 7 1,180 40 1,814 427 67 ... Major-General J. D. o.x,Cavalry Corps ................. 9 814 664 10,10 10,84 1,S44 67 1,181 125 2,017 ... 11 1,8.2 MajorGeneral .Stonenan.Ditrict of the Clinch,.......... 1 878 119 2,853 2,472 2,47 104 807 16 2-4 9 291 8 ... ... Brig-General T. T. Garrard,Defensus of KnoxL .... 3 23 1 ,410 6,618 5,613 21 468........ 6 1,9 4 12 ...00 B OrOgadir-General D. T 0n.Nowport Bacs ..8........ 10 90 224 .. ... ColonelJ. P. SandeonTotal Force-Department othe 01i.....I .. ...... 20 1,757 1,064 44,081 48,052 46,18 677 14,086 217 4,842115 8,70 2,032 491 602Official: E. D. TOWNSEND, jutant-General. J. M. SCOIELD, affjor-Genera commanding,toN
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22 ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. [14.Each division and br.oade was provided a fair propotion ofwagons for a supply-train, and these were ilited in their loadsto carry food, ammunition, and clothing. Tents were forbiddento all save the sick and wounded, and one tent only was allowedto each headquarters for use as an office. These orders were notabsolutely enforced, though in person I set the example, nd didiit have a tent, nor did any officer about me have one but wehadwall tent-flies, without poles, and no tent-furniture of any kind.We usually spread our flies over saplings, or on fence-rails or postsimprovised on the spot. Most of the general officers, exceptThomas, followed my example strictly; but he had a regularheadquarters-camp. I frequently called his attention to the or-ders on this subject, rather jestingly than seriously. He wouldbreak out against his officers for having such luxuries,butneed-ing a tent himself, and being good-natured and slow to act, henever enforced my orders perfectly. n addition to his regularwagon-train, he had a big wagon which could be convan office, and this we used to call Thomas's ircus." Severaltimes during the campaign I found quartermasters hid away insome comfortable nook to the rear, with tent and mess-fixtureswhich were the envy of the passing oldiers; and I frequentlybroke them up, and distributed the tents to the surgeons of bri-gades. Yet my orders actually reduced the transportation, sothat I doubt if any army ever went forth to battle with fewerimpedimenta, and where the regular and necessary supplies offood, ammunition, and clothing, were issued, as called for, soregularly and so well.My personal staff was then composed of Captain J. C. McCoy, aide-de-camp; Captain L. .Dayton, aide-de-camp; Captain J.C. Audenried, aide-de-camp; Brigadier-General J. D. Webster,chief of staff; Major R. M. Sawyer, assistant adjutant-general; Captain Montgomery Rochester, assistant adjutant-general.Theselast three were left at Nashville in charge of the office,and were empowered to give orders in my name, communicationbeing generally kept up by telegraph.Subsequently were added to my staff, and iccompanied mein the field, Brigadier-General W. F. Barry, chief of artillery;
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1864. ATLANA AMA .23Colonel O. M. Foe, chief of engineers; Colonel L. C. Easton,chief quartermaster; Colonel Amos Bookwith, chief commissa-ry; Captain Thos. G. Baylor, chief of ordnance; Surgeon E. D.Kittoe, medical director; Brigadier-General J. M. Corse, in-spector-general; Lieutenant-Colonel C. Ewing, inspector-gen-eral; and Lieutenant-Colonel Willard Warner, inspector-general.These officers constituted my staff proper at the beginning ofthe campaign, which remained substantially the same till theclose of the war, with very few exceptions; viz.: Surgeon JohnMoore, United States Army, relieved Surgeon Kittoe of the vol-unteers (about Atlanta) as medical director; Major Henryitchock joined as judge-advocate, and Captain G. Ward ich-Sreported as an extra aide-de-camp (after the fall of Atlanta)at Gaylesville, just before we started for Savannah.During the whole month of April the preparations for activewar were going on with extreme vigor, and my letter-book showsan active correspondence with Generals Grant, Halleck, Thomas, McPherson, and Schofield on thousands of matters of detail andarrangement, most of which are embraced in my testimony beforethe Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. i., Appendix.When the time for action approached, viz., May 1, 1904, the,actual armies prepared to move into Georgia resulted as fol-lows, present for battle:Army of the Cumblerland, Major-Gewral TO MAS.Mon Infantry.............................. 6Artillery ............ ....Cavalry...........Aggregate .. .. .. .. .. .60,773Numer of tield-guns, 130.Army of the Tennessee, Major-General McPuaRsos.MenInfantry ............ ...... .... 22,437Artillery............Cavalry ...... 62-4Aggregate. ............ ..... .21,404Gnns 96.
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24 ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. [1864.Armyof the Oio, Major-General SOUDLELn.Infantry.... ..... ......... 11,183Cavalry .............................. ....,1,697Aggregate .................. .......... 1 3,559Gun?, 28.Grand aggregate, 98,97 men ad 254 guns.These figures do not embrace the cavalry divisions whichwere still incomplete, viz., of General Stoneman, at Lexington,Kentucky, and of General Garrard, at Columbia, Tennessee, whowere then rapidly collecting horses, and joined us in the earlystage of the campaign. General Stonenan, having a divisionof about four thousand men and horses, was attached to Scho-field's Army of the Ohio. General Garrard's division, of aboutfour thousand five hundred men and horses, was attached toGeneral Thomas's command; and he had another irregular divi-sion of cavalry, commanded by Brigadier-General E. McCook.There was also a small brigade of cavalry, belonging to theArmy of the Cumberland, attached temporarily to the Army ofthe Tennessee, which was commanded by Brigadier-GeneralJudson Kilpatrick. These cavalry commands changed constantly in strength and numbers, and were generally used on the ex-treme flanks, or for some special detached service, as will behereinafter related. The Army of the Tennessee was still shortby the two divisions detached with General Banks, up RedRiver, and two other divisions on furlough in Illinois, Indiana,and Ohio, but which were rendezvousing at Cairo, under Gen-erals Leggett and Crocker, to form a part of the SeventeenthCorps, which corps was to be commanded by Major-GeneralFrank P. Blair, then a member of Congress, in Washington.On the 2d of April I notified him by letter that I wanted himto join and to command these two divisions, which ought to beready by the 1st of May. General Blair, with these two dvisions, constituting the Seventeenth Army Corps, did not actuallyovertake us until ve reached Acworth and Big Shanty, in Geor gia, about the 9th of June, 1S4.
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1864.1 ATLANTA CAMPAGN 25In my letter of April 4th to General John A. Rawlins, chief of staff to General Grant at Washington, I described at lengthall the preparations that were in progress for the active cam-paign thus contemplated, and therein estimated Shofield attwelve thousand, Thomas at foty e thousand, and McPher-son at thirty thousand. At first I intended to open the campaignabout May st, by moving Schofield on alton from Cleveland,Thomas on the same objective from Chattanooga, and McEPher-son on Rome and Kingston from Gunter's Landing. My inten-tion was merely to threaten Dalton infront, and to -direct -Pherson to act igorously against the railroad below Resaca,far to the rear of the enemy. But by reason of his beingshort of his estimated strength by the four divisions beforereferred to, and thus being reduced to about twenty-four thou-sand men, I did not feel justified in placing him so far awayfrom the support of the main body of the army, and thereforesubsequently changed the plan of campaign, so far as to bringthat army up to Chattanooga, and to direct it thence throughShip's Gap against the railroad to Johnston's rear, at or nearResaa, distant from Dalton only eighteen miles, and in fullcommunication with the other armies by roads behind Rocky-face Ridge, of about the saine length.On the 10th of April I received General Grant's letter ofApril 4th from Washington, which formed the basis of all thempaigns of the year 154, and subsequently received anotherof April 19th, written from Culp epper, Virginia, both of whichare now in my possession, in his own handwriting, and are heregiven entire. These letters embrace substantially all the ordershe ever made on this particular subject, and these, it will beseen, devolved on me the details both as to the plan and ex-ecution of the campaign by the armies under my immediatecommand. These armies were to be directed against the rebelarmy co anded by General Joseph E. Johnston, then lyingon the defensive, strongly intrenched at Dalton, Georgia; and Iwas required to folow it up losely and persistently, so that inno event could any part be detached to assist General Lee inVirginia; General Grant undertaking in like manner to keepI U ~~~Be: ~/k
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2f :ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. [18E4.Lee so busy that he could not respond to any cals of help byJohnston. Neither Atlanta, nor Augusta, nor Savannah, wasthe objective, but the "army of Jos. Johnston," go where itmight.[RIVAr AN CONTrESNPAL.]Jifajor-Geiicral W. T. iSHRMAix, commanding Military Division of the Mis-sissipi.GENERAL: It is my design, if the enemy keep quiet and allow me totake the initiative in the spring campaign, to work all parts of the armytogether, and somewhat toward a common centre. For your infratioSnow write you my programme, as at present determined upon.I have sent orders to Banks, by private messenger, to nish up his pres-ent expedition against Shreveport with all dispatch; to turn over the de-fense of Red River toGeneral Steelandthe navy, and to return yourtroops to you, and his own to ew Orleans; to abandon all of Texas, ex-cept the Rio Grande, and to old that with nt to exceed four thousandmen; to reduce the number of troops on the Mississippi to the lowest num-ber necessary to hold it, and to collect from iscommandnotlessthantwenty-five thousand men. To this I will add fvethousand from Missouri.With this force he is to commence operations against Mobile as soon as hecan. It will be impossible for him to commence too early.Gillmore joins Butler with ten thousand men, nd the two operat againstRichmond from the south side of James River. This will give Butler thirty-three thousand men to operate with, W F. Smith commanding the rightwing of his forces, and Gillmore the left wing. I will stay with the Armyof the Potomac, increased by Burnside's corps of not less than twenty-fivethousand effective men, and operate directly against Lees army, whereerit may be found.Sigel collects all his available force in two columns one, under Ord andAverill, to start from Beverly, Virginia, and the other, under Crook, to start from Charleston, on the Kanawha, to move against the Virginia & Tennes-see Railroad.Crook wil have all cavalry, and will endeavor to get in about Saltville,and move east from there to join Ord. His force will be all cavalry, whileOrd will have from ten to twelve thousand men of all arms.You I propose to move against Johnston's army, to break it up, and toget into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inlicting allthe damage you can against their war resources.I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but simply tolay down the work it is desirale to have done, and leave you free to exe- ,]C
PAGE 23
e it in your own way. Submit tome, however, as early as you can, yourAs stated, Banks is ordered to commence operations as soon as he can.imore is ordered to report at Fortress Monroe by the 18th inst., or ason thereafter as practicable. Sigel is concentrating now. None willove from their places of rendezvous until direct, except Banks. I wantbe ready to move by the 2h inst., if possible; but all I cannow directthat you get ready as soon as possible. I know you will have difficultiesencounter in getting through the mountains to where supplies are abun-dt, but I believe you will accomplish it.From t expedition from the Department of West Virginia I do not culate on very great results;but it is the oly way I can take troopsom there. With the long line of railroad Sigel has to protect, he canre no troops, except to mov directly to his front. In this way he mustthrough to inflict great damage on the enemy, or the enemy must detachm one of his armies a large force to prevent it. In other words, if Sigeln't skin himself, he can hold a leg while some one else skins.I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,U. S. GANT, Lieutenant-GeneraLIIAUoaArTnas MILITAR Divsox or wex Mrssissirrr,utenat-General U. S. GRArT, Commander-i-Chi, Tashington, D. C.DEAR GENEAL our two lettersofApril4th are now before 0e, andrd me infinite satisfaction. That we are now all to t on a commonn, converging on a common centre, looks like enlightened war.Lik yourself, you take the biggest load, and from me you shall haverough and hearty coperation. I will not let side issues draw me offm your main plans in which I am to knock Jos. Johnston, and to do asch damage to th resources of the enemy as possible. I have heretoforeitten to enerl awlins and to Colonel Comstock (of your staff) some-at of the method in which I propose to act. I have seen all my army,psanddivision commanders, and have signified only to the former, viz.,ofield, Thomas, and McPherson, our generl plas, which I inferred m the purport of our converation here and at Cincinnati. FirstIam pushing stores to the front with all possible dispatch, andcompletingthe army organization according to the orders from Wash-,whichare ample and perfectly satisfactory.It will take us all o April to get in our furloughed veterans, to bring up.J.Smith'scommandand to collect provisions and cattle on the line ofTennessee.Eachof the armies will guard, by detachments of its own,Srear communications.select
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28 ATLANTA CAMPAiGN [16i: iKnoxville and Loudon, with twelve thousand mn will drop down to theIliawassee, and march against Jo ton's right by the old Federal road.Stoneman, now in Kentucky, organizing the cavalry forces of the Armyof the Ohio, will operate with Schofield on his left front-it may be, push-ing a select body of about two thousand cavalry by Ducktown or Elijahtoward Athens, Georgia.Thomas will aim to have forty-five thousand men of all arms, and moIstraight against Johnston, wherever he maybe, fightin him cautiouslyper-sistenly, and to the best advantage. He will have to divisions of cavalry,to take advantage of any offering.McPherson will have nine divisions of the Army of the Tennessee, if A.J. Smith gets here, in which case he will have full thirtythousand of the bestmen in America. He will cross the Tennessee at Decaturand Whiteburgmarch toward Rome, and feel for Thomas. If Johnston falls behind theCoosa, then McPherson will push for Rome; and if Johnston falls behindthe Chattahoochee, as I believe e will, then McPherson will cross over andjoin Thomas.McPherson has no cavalry, but I have taken one of Thomas's divi-sions, viz., Garrard's, six thousand strong, which is at Columbia,mounting, equipping, and preparing. I design this division to operate onMcPherson's right, rear, or front, according as the enemy appears. Butthe moment I detect Johnston falling behind theto cast off the effective part of this cavalry division, after crossing theCoosa, straight for Opelika, West Point, Columbus, orup the road between Montgomery and Georgia. If Garrard can do this work well, he can return to the Union army; but should a superior forceinterpose, then he will seek safety at Pensaclaand join Banks, or, aftrest, will act against any force that he can find est of Mobile, till such timeas he can reach me.Should Johnston fall behind the Chattahoochee, I will fign to theright, but pass to the left and act against Atlanta orits eastern communia-tions, according to developed facts.This is about as far ahead as I feel disposed to look, but I w everbear in mind that Johnston is at all times to be kept so busy that he cannotin any event send any part of his command aganst you or Banks.If Banks can at the same time carry Mobile and open up the AlabamaRiver, he will in a measure solve the most difficult part of my problem,viz., "provisions." But in that I must venture. Georgia has a millin ofinhabitants. If they can live, we should not starve. If the eney interrupt our communications, I will be absoled from all obligations to subsiston our own resources, and will feel perfectly justified in taking wateverand wherever we can find.I will inspire my command, if successful, with the feeling that beef and
PAGE 25
1864. ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. 29salt are all that is absolutely necessary to life, and that parched corn onceAs ever, your friend and servant,W. T. Sanum.1x, Major-GeneralHEAnQUARERS AnIEs IN THE FIELD,CIPEPPR COUTHUSE, VUlNA, ApruN 1), 121.ajor-Geral W. T. Saxr, command ing Military Division of thelis i ossippt.GENERAL: Since my letter to you of April 4th I have seen no reason tochange any portion of the general plan of campaign, if the enemy remainstill and allow us to tak the initiative. Rain has continued so uninterrupt-edly until th last day or two that it will be impossible to move, however,before the 27tevenifnomoreshould fa in the mean time. I think Sat-urdaythe30th, will obaby be the day for our general moe.Colonel Comstock, who will take this, can spend a day with you, and illup many little gaps f nfrmation not given in any of my letters.What I now want more particularly to say is, that if the two mainattacksyours and the one from here, hold promise great success, theenemy may, in a fit of desperation, abandon one part of their line of defense,and throw their whole strength upon the other, believing a single defeatwithout any victory to sustain them better than a defeat all along theirline, and hoping too, at the same time, that the army, meeting with no re-sitance, will rest perfectly satisfied with their laurels, having penetratedto a given point south, thereby enabling them to throw their force firstupon one and then on the other.With t majority of military commanders they might do thisBut you have had too much experience in traveling light, and subsistingupon the country, to be caught by any such ruse. I hope my experience1notbeen thrown away. y directions, then, would be, if the enemy inyour front show signs of joining Lee, follow him up to the full extent ofyour ability. I will prvent the concentration of Lee upon your front, if itis in the power of this army to do it.The Arny of the Potomac looks well, and, so far as I can judge, oficersand men feel well. Yours truly, iuntHIEAUArRas MIuraRY DivI Sor o rE MISISP,NIsnvzuz, TmENSr, -April 24, 164.LieutenaGeneral GN, comanding Armies of the United States,GEEAL: I0whave, at s b1ds of Colonel Comstock, of your staff,the ltter of April 19th, and am as far prepared to assume the offensive asBI: i~li~l ~4
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30 ATLLANTA UAi'AIUN. [1864.possible. I only ask as muchtime as you think proper, to enable me to getup McPherson's two divisions frm Cairo. Their furloughs will expire about this time, and some of them should now be in motion for Clifton,whence they will march to Decatur, to jin General Dodge.McPherson is ordered to assemble the Fifteenth Corps near Larkin's,and to get the Sixteenth and SeventeenthDecatur at the earliest possible moment.From these two points he willdirect his forces on Lebanon, SummervilleandLafayettewherehewillact-uinst Johnston, if he accept battle at Dalton; or move in the direction ofRome, if the enemy give up Daltn, and fall behind the ostnul orEtowah. I see that there is some risk inand Shofield will have strength enough to cover all the valleys as far asDalton ; and, should Johnston turn his whole force against McPherson, thelatter will have his bridge at Larkin's, and the rout to Chattanooga viaWills's Valley and the Chattanooga Crek, open for retreat; and if Johnstonattempt to leave Dalton, Thomas will have force enough to push on through Dalton to Kingston, which will checkmate .My own opinion is thatJohnston will be compelled to hang to his railroad, the only possible avenueof supply to his army, estimated at from forty-five to sixty thousand men.At Lafayette all our armies will be together, and if Johnston stands atDalton we must attack him in position. T feels certain thatno material increase of force, and that he has not sent away Hardee, or anypart of his army. Supplies are the great question. I have materiallyincreased the number of cars daily. When I got here, the average wasfrom sixty-five to eighty per day. Yeterday the report was one hundredand ninety-three; to-day, one hundred and thrty-our; and my estimate isthat one hundred and forty-five cars per ay wil give usaday'ssupply anda day's accumulation.McPherson is ordered to carry in wagons twenty day's rations,and torely on the depot at Ringgold for the renewal of his bread. Beeves arenow being driven on the hoof to the front; and the commissary, ColonelBekwith, seems fully alive to the importance of the whole matter.Our weakest point will be from the direction of Decatur, and I will beforced to risk something from that quarter, depending on the fact that thenemy has no force available with which to threaten our communications from that direction.Colonel Comnstock will explain to you personally much that I cannotcommit to paper. I am, with great respect,W. T. SrRAN, Cr-G eralOn the 8th of April I removed my headquarters to Chat-tanooga, and prepared for taking the field in person. General
PAGE 27
188! AlTLNTA CAM1PAIN. 31ant had first indicated the 30th of April as the day for themultaneous advance, but subsequently changed the day to Mayh. McPherson's troops were brought forward rapidly toattanooga, partly by rail and partly by marching. Thomnas'sops were already in position (his advance being out asas Ringgold ighteen miles), and Schofield was narchingn by Cleveland to Red Clay and Catoosa prings. On theSof May, Thomas was in person at Ringgold, his left at Ca-sa, and his right at Leet's Tan-yard. Schofield was at Redy, closing upon Thomas's left; and McPherson was movingidly.into Chattanooga, and out toward Gordon's Mill.On the 5th I rode out to Ringgold, and on the very day ap-at campaign was begun. To give all the minute details willolve more than is contomplated, and I will endeavor only toe the principal events, or rather to reord such as weighedviest on my own mind at the time, and which now remainst fixod in my memory.My general headquartors ad official records remained backNashville, and I had near me only my personal staff and in-tors-general, with about half a dozen wagons, and a singlecpany of Ohio sharpshooters (commanded by LieutenantCrory) as headquaters or camp guard. I also had a smallc pany of irregular Alabama cavalry (commanded by Lieu-ant Snelling), used mostly as orderlies and courirs. o-tents were allowed, only the flies. OUr mess establishmentless in bulk than that of any of the brigade commanders;was this from an indifference to the ordinary comforts ofbut because I wanted to set the example, and gradually tovert all parts of that army into a mobile machine, willinga able to start at a minute's notice, and to subsist on theatiest food. To reap absolute success might involve theessity even of dropping all wagons, and to subsist on theance food which the country was known to contain. I hadtained not only the United States census-tables of 1880, butompilation made by the Controller of the State of Georgiathe purpose of taxation, containg in considerable detail
PAGE 28
32 ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. 1864the "population and statstis" of every county in Georgia.One of my aides (Captain Dayton) acted as assistant adjutant-general, with an order-book, letter-book, and writing-paper, thatfilled a small chest not much larger than an ordinary candle-box.The only reports and returns called for were the ordinary tri-monthly returns of "effective strength." As these accumulatedthey were sent back to Nashille, and afterward were embracedin the archives of the Military Division of theMississippichanged in 1865 to the Military Division of the Missouri, and Isuppose they were burned in the Chicago fire of 1870. Stillduplicates remain of all essential papers in the archives of thWar Department.The 6th of May was givento Schofield and herson toget into position, and on the 7th General Thomas moved inforce against Tunnel Hill driving off a mere picket-guard of theenemy, and I was agreeably surprised to find that no damage hadbeen done to the tunnel or the railroad. From Tunnel 1il1 Icould loo into the gorge by which the railroad passed througha straight and well-defined range of ountains, presenting sharppalisade faces, and known as "Rocky Face." The gorge itselfwas called the "Buzzard Roost." We could pinly see theenemy in this gorge and behind it, and Mill Creek which formedthe gorge, flowing toward Dalton, had been dammed up, makinga sort of rregular lake, flling the road, thereby obstructing itand the enemy's batteries crowned the clifs on eitherside. Theposition was very strong, and I knew that such a general as wasmy antagonist (Jos. Johnston), who had been there six monthshad fortified it to the maximum. Therefore I had no intentionto attack the position seriously in front, but depended on MePherson to capture and hold the rairoa to its rar, whichwould force Johnston to detach largely against him, or rather, asI expected, to evacuate his position at Dalton altogether. Myorders to Generals Thomas and Schofield were merely to presstrongly at all points in front, ready to on first ap-pearance of "l et go," and, if possible, to atch our enemy in theconfusion of retreat.All the movements of the th and th were made exactlyas
PAGE 29
iiiiiiiiiii i iiiiiiiiiiiiiintinghby J. E. Taylor. dARMY AND CORP COMMANDERS OF THE ARMY OF THE TES rman. Logso. Grant Ddge. ltr. MPhen Hward.
PAGE 30
~(XP"IXii;""i"l"rlR: I~Oxi~' i "rO ':' ~";:lnli~n _,,,,,,:: a ;~ i ,, ;I",';i;i;iEE I:i",;; n'"':'":":i; ;l~~li;' p,~" r, it ;; ;;ic:i:,ii ;i;'; : x:r r p a, IIs .u:l rl
PAGE 31
1864 ATLATA C AIGN.ordered, and the enemy scored quiescent, acting purely on theI had constant communication with all parts of the army, and on the 9th McPherson's head of column entered and passedcomplete surprise to the enemy. At its farther dbouclh hemet a cavalry brigade, asily driven, whih retreated hstilynorth toward Dalton, and doubtless carried to Johnston the firstserious intimation that a heavy force of infantry and artillerywas to his rear and within a few miles of his railroad. I gotashort note from McPherson that day (written at 2 r. m., whenhe was within a mile and a halt of the railroad, above and nearResaca), and we all felt jubilant. I renewed orders to Qommasand Schofield to be ready for the instant pursuit of what I ex-pected to be a broken and disordered armny, forced to retreat byroads to tbo east of Resaca, which were known to be very roughand impracticable.That night Ireceived further notice from McPherson thathe had found Resaca too strong for a surprise; that in conse-quence he had fallen back three miles to the mouth of Snake-Creek Gap, and was there fortified. I wrote him the next daythe following letter, copies of which are in my letter-book; buthis to me were mere notes in pencil, not retained:H..U TRS MI TARY Dr7MIvs OF HE X;ssisspxI N FIELD, TUeNEL FHli, (4EOaL ff3/' 11, 15G Muoreieg,laor-General 3ePuEnso, commanding Army of t k Tennese, SugarGENE~L: received by courier (in the night) yoursof5 and 6.0 P. M.You now have your twenty-three thousand men, and General Hooker isin close support, so that you can hobld all of Js. Johnston's army in checkshould he abandon Dalton. He cannot afford to abandon Dalton, for hehas xed it up on purpose to receive us, and be observes that we are closeat hand, waiting for him to quit. He cannot afford a detachment strongenough to fight you, as his army will not admit of it.Strengthen your position; fight any thing that comes; and threaten thesafety of the railroad all the time. But, to tell the truth, I would ratherthe enemy would stay in Dalton two more days, when he may find in his29 ;~~~
PAGE 32
then choose our own ground, andhe willbeforedto movet of his. I do not intend to put a columninto Buzzard RoosGap at present.See that you are in easy communication with me and with all hee~bafeat onGeneral McPEsoN, Sugar Valley.GENPAL: The indications are that Johnston is evacuating Daltonfollow your route. I will be down early in the morning.Try to strike him if possible about the forks of the road.f Hopker must be with you now, and you may send General GarrardSummerville to threaten Rome and that fank. will cause all the linesbe felat once.McPherson had startled Johnston in his fancied security, buhad not done the full measure of his wort He had in hantwenty-three thousand of the best men of the army, and couldhave walked into Resaca (then held only by a small brigadeor he could have placed his whole force astride the railroaabove Resaca, and there have easily withstood the attack of aiof Johnston's a with the knowledge that Thomas and SchJohnston would not have ventured to attack him in positiobut would have retreated castward by Spring Place, and w1Iixiicziiiiiiiiii~~ili~~~~i~i!iiii~ll~~ iiii iisii ii~ !=iiiiiiiiiii iiiiiiiliii ii = ==== = = =. = iiiii iiiii=iiiiiiii i!iiiiiiiiiil i i i ii ii... iiii =iiiiiiiii i ii
PAGE 33
neman's cavalry, known to be near at hand, so as to securefull advantages of victory, of which I felt certain. Hooker'sentieth Corps was at once moved down to within easy sup-ting distance of Mcherson; and on the 11th, perceivings of evacuation of Dalton, I gave all th or s for the gen-Smovement, leaving the Fourth Corps (Howard) and Stone-n's cavalry in observation in front of Thuzzard-Roost Gap,d lirecting all the rest of the army to march through Snake-ek Gap, straight on Resaa. The roads were only such ascountry afforded, mere rough wagon-ways, and these con-ged to the single narrow track through Snake-Creek Gap;during the 12th and 13th the bulk of Thomas's and Secho-d's armies were got through, and eployed against a,Pherson on the right, Thomas in the centre, and Schofieldthe t. Johnston, ans I anticipated, had abandoned allwell-prpared defenses at Dalton, and was found inside ofsaa with the bulk of his army, holding his divisions wellhand, acting purely on the defensive, and fighting well atpoints of conit. A complete line of intrrencmients wasund covering the place, and this was strongly manned at allnts. On the 14th we closed in, enveping the town on itsth and west, and during the 15th we had a day of continualttle and skirrish. At the same time I caused two pontoon-dges to be laid across the Oostenaula River at Lay's Ferry,out three miels below the town, by which we could threatenhoun, a station on the railroad seven miles below Resaca.the same time, May 11th, I dispatched General Garrard,h his cavalry division, down the Oostenaula by the Romed, with orders to cross over, if possible, and to attack oreaten the railroad at any point below Calhoun and aboveDuring the 15th, without attempting to assault the fortifiedrks, we pressed at all points, and the sound of cannon andsketry rose adayto the dignity of a attle. Toward even-SMcPherson moved his whole line of battle forward, tillhad gained a ridge eorlooking the town, from which hisid-artilery could reach the railroad-bridge across the Ooate-i
PAGE 34
36 ATLANTA CAMPAT [naula. The enemy made several attempts to drive him awayrepeating the sallies several times, and extending them into t night; but in every instance he was repulsd with bloody loss.Hover's corps had also some heavy and handsome htinthat aternoon and night on the left, where the Dalton rentered the intrenchments, eapturing a four-gun intrenchedatter, with its men and guns; and generally all our menshowed the finest fighting qualities.oward's corps had followed Johnston down from Dalton,and was in line; Stoneman's division of cavalry had also gotup, and was on the extreme left, beyond the Oostenaula.On the night of May 15th Johnston got his army acrossthe bridges, set the on fire, and w entered Rsaca at day-light. Our loss up to that time was about six hundred deadand thirty-three hundred and seventyive wounded-mostlylight wounds that di not nessitate sending the men to therear for treatment. That Johnston had deliberately designedin advance to give up such strong positions as Dalton and Re-saca, for the purpose of drawing us farter south, is simplyabsurd. Had he remained in Dalton another hour, it wouldhave been his total defeat, and he only evacuated Resaa be-cause his safety demanded it. The movement by us throughSnake-Creek Gap was a total surprise to him. My army aboitdoubled his in size, but he had all the advantages of natunapositions, of artificial forts and roads, and of concentrated action.We were compelled to grope our way through forests, acrossmountains, with a large army, necessarily mere or less dispersed. Of course, I was disappointed not to have crippled his armymore at that particular stage of the game; but, as it resulted,these rapid successes gave us the initiative, and the usual in-pulse of a conquering army.Johnston having retreated in the night of May 15th, iningdiate pursuit was begun. A division of infantry (Jef. C. Davis')was at once dispatched down the valley toward Rome, to sup-port Garrard's cavalry, and the whole army was ordered topursue, McPherson by Lay's Ferry, on the right, Thomas di-reetly by the railroad, and Schofeld by the left, by the old+8: r + + : + : + :+ :: ++ : + : ++ +++n ++ :+ ++, : + .... + ++ +++ +:+: : ,::::-++++ ::: : ... +: .+;+ +++ +::
PAGE 35
Ilex i,: a'14.] ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. 37ad that crosse the ostenaulaabove Echota or ewtown.e hastiy repaired the railroad-bridge at saca, which haden partially burned, and built a temporary floating-bridge outtimber and materials found on the spot; so that Thomas gots advance corps over during the 16th, and marched as farCalounwherehecme into communication with Ph ern's troops, which had crossed the Ostenaula at Lay's Ferryour pontoon-bridges, previously laid. Inasmuh as theidge at Resaca was overtaxed, ooker's Twentieth Corpsas also diverted to cross by the fords and ferries above Resaca,the neighborhood of Echota.On the 17th, toward evening, the head of Thomas's column,wton's division, encountered the rear-guard of Johnston'smy near Adairsville. I was near the head of column at thee, trying to get a view of the position of the enemy fromSelevation in an open field. My party attracted the fire of attery; a shell passed throgh the group of staff-oficers andurst just beyond, which scattered us promptly. The nextorning the enemy had disappeared, and our pursuit was con-tned to Kingston, which we reached during Sunday forenoon,.From Resaea the railroad runs nearly due south, but atingston it makes junction with another railroad from Rome,d anges direction due east. At that time McPherson's headlcolumn was 'bout four miles to the west of Kingston, at auntry plae called "Woodlawn; Shofield and Hooker weren the direct roads leading fromT Newtown to Cassville, diagonalthe route fllowed by Thomas. Thomas's head of column,wich had followed the country roads alongside of the railroad,as about four miles east of Kingston, toward Cassville, whenout noon I got a message from him that he had found theemy, drawn up in line of battle, on some extensive, openound, about half-way between Kingston and Cassville, andat appearances indicated a willingness and preparation forHurriedly sending orders to McPherson to resume the march,hasten forward by roads leading to the south of Kingston,
PAGE 36
38 ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. [1864so as to leave for Thomas's troops and trains the use of the mainroad, and to come up on his right, I rode forward rapidly, oversome rough gravel hills, and about six miles from Kingstonfound General Thomas, with his troops deployed; but he re-ported that the enemy had fallen back in echelon of divisions,steadily and in superb order, into Cassville. I knew that theroads by which Generals Hooker and Schofield were approach-ing uld lead them to a seminary near Cassville, and that itwas all-important to secure the point of junction of these roadswith the main road along which we were marching. ThereforeI ordered General Thomas to push forward his deployed lines asrapidly as possible; and, as night was approaching, I ordered two field-batteries to close up at a gallop on some woods which lay between us and the town of Cassville. We could not seethe town by reason of these woods, but a high range of hillsjust back of the town was visible over the tree-tops. On thesehills could be seen fresh-mnade parapets, and the movements ofmen, against whom I directed the artillery to fire at long range.The stout resistance made by the enemy along our whole front ofa couple of miles indicated a purpose to fight at Cassville; and, as the night was closing in, General Thomas and I were together,along with our skirmish-lines near the seninary, on the edge ofthe town, where musket-bullets from the enemy were cutting theleaves of the trees pretty thickly about us. Either Thomas or Iremarked that that was not the place for the two senior officers ofa great army, and we personally went back to the battery, wherewe passed the night on the ground. Thiring the night I had reports from McPherson, Hooker, and Schofield. The formerwas about tive miles to my right rear, near the "nitre-caves;Schoield was about six miles north, and Hooker between s,within two miles. All were ordered to close down on Cass-ville at daylight, and to attack the enemy wherever found. Skirmishing was kept up all night, but when d:y broke the nextmorning, May 20th, the enemy was gone, and our cavalry wassent in pursuit. These.reported him beyond the Etowah River.We were then well in advance of our railroad-trains, on whichwe depended for supplies; so I determined to pause a few days
PAGE 37
Sthe railroad, which had been damaed but little, exceptridge at Resaca, and then to go anyrly all the peopo of the country seemed to have flthhnston's army; yet some few families remained, andSof them I procured the copy of an der which John-Sade at Adairsville, in which he recited that he hadd for battle at Cassville. The newspapers of the South,which we found, were also loud in denunciation ofn's falling back before us without a serious battle, simplyby his skirrish-lines and by his rear-guard. Tht hiSproclaimed that it was all snategic; that he was delib-irawing us farther and farther into the moses, farther andway from our base of supplies, and that in due season heo it was to my interest to bring him to battle as soon as when our nu rical superiority was at the greatest; forpicking up his detac ments as he fell back, whereas I aplled to rtake silar and stronger detachments tothe railroads aswe advanced, and to guard them. I foundSille many evidences of preparation for a grand battle,them a long line of fresh intrenchments on the hill te-1 e town, extending nearly three miles to the south, ethe railroad-crossing. I was also convince that theeof Polk's corps had joined Johnstn from Mississippi,at he lad in hand three ful o viz., Hood's, Polks,n imagine why he had declined battle, and did not learnthe autumn of 1865, when in command of the Milita-
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40 ATLANTA CAMPAIGI. [186Thomas, and gaiee n timethe ridge, just beind Cassvlle; nd it was t his corps which General Thd deployed, and whose handsome movement in retreahe had reported in such complimentary terms. Johnston described how he had placed Hood's corps on tho right, Polk'sin the centre, and 1THardee's on the left. He said be aridden over the ground, given to eah corps commander his position, and orders to throw up parapets during t night; that hewas with Hardee on his extreme left as the night closed in, and as Hardee's troops fell back to thoposition assigned them for theintended battle of the next day; and that, after giving Hardesome general instructions, he and his staff rode back to Cassville.As he entered the town, or village, h met Generals Hood andolk. ood inquired of him if he ad had any thing to eatandlie saidno,that was ed oth hungry and ired, when Hoodinvited him to go and share a supper which had been preparedfor him at a house close by. At the supper they discussed thechances of the impendin bttle, when Hood spoke of the groundassigned him as being enfiladed by our (Union) artillery, whichJohnston disputed, hen General olk chimed in with the re-mark that General ood was right; that the cannon-shots firedby us at nightfall had enfiladed their general line of battle, andthat for this reason he feared they could not hold their men.General Johnston was surprised at this, for he understood General Hood to be one of those who professed to criticise his strategy, contending that, instead of retreating, he should have riskeda battle. General Johnston said he was provoked, acused themof having been in conference, with beingbeatenbeforebattleandaddedthathe was unwilling to engage in a critical batlewith an army so superior to his own in numbers, with two ofhis three corps commanders dissatisfed with the ground andpositions assigned them. le then and there made up his mind
PAGE 39
64.] ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. 41retreat still farther south, to put the Etowah River and thelatoona range between us; and he at once gave orders to re-This was my recollection of the substance of the conversa-n, of which I made no note at the time; but, at a meeting ofSSociety of the Army of the Cumberland some years after, atleveland, Ohio, about 1868, in a short after-dinner speech, Iated this conversation, and it got into print. Subsequently,g the halt at Cassville, the general orders for battle on thatround, and the meeting at supper with Generals Johnstonnd Polk, when the chances of the battle to be fought the nexty were freely and fully discussed; and he stated that he hadgued against fighting the battle purely on the defensive, butd asked General Johnston to permit him with his ownrps and part of Polk's to quit their lines, and to march rapidlySattack and overwhelmn Schofield, who was known to be sepa-ted from Thomas by an interval of nearly five miles, claimingat he could have defeated Schofield, and got ack to his posi-Sin time to meet General Thomas's attack in front. He alsosted that he had then contended with Johnston for the "offient en-e-defensive" game, instead of the "pure defensive," as pro-sed by General Johnston and e said that it was at thisno that General Johnston had taken offense, and that it wasSthis reason he had ordered the retreat that night. As sub-quent events estranged these two officers, it is very naturaley should now differ on this point; but it was suncient for usat the rebel army did retreat that night, leaving us mastersall the country above the Etowah River.For the purposes of rest, to give time for the repair ofe railroads, and to replenish supplies, we lay by some fewys in that quarter-Schof with Stoneman's cavalry hold-g the ground at Cassvill Depot Cartersville, and the Etowaridge; Thomas holding his ground near Cassville, and Me-
PAGE 40
Pherson that near Kingston. The oier intrusted with therepair of the railroads was Colonel W. W. Wright, a railroad-engineer, who, with about two thousand men, was so industriousand skillful that the bridge at Resaca was rebuilt in three days,and cars loaded with stores came forward to Kingston on the24th. The telegraph also brought us the news of the bloody and desperate battles of the Wilerness, in Virginia, and thatUencrel Grant was pushing his operations against Lee with ter-rife energy. I was therefore resolved to give my enemy no rest.In early days (1844), when a lieutenant of the Third Artil-lery, I had been sent from Charleston, South Carolina, to Ma-rietta, Georgia, to assist Inspector-General Churchi to take tes-timony concerning certain losses of horses and aoutrementsby the Georgia Volunteers during the Florida War; and aftercompleting the work at Marietta we transferred our party overto Bellefonte, Alabama. I had ridden the distance on horseback, and had noted well the topography of the country, es-pecially that about Kenesaw, Altoona, and the Etowah iver.On that occasion I had stopped some days with a Colonel Tumlin, to see some remarkable Indian mounds on the EtowahRiver, usually called the I therefore knew thatthe Allatoona Pass was very strong, woul be hard to force, andresolved not even to attempt it, but to turn the position, bymoving from Kingston to Marietta via Dallas; accordingly Imade orders on the 20th to get ready for the march to begin onthe 23d. The Army of the Cunberland was ordered to marchfor Dallas, by Eubarlee and Stilesboro'; Davis's division, thenin Rome, by Van Wert; the Army of the Ohio to keep on theleft of Thomas, by a place called Eurnt Hickory; 4nd theArmy of the Tennessee to march for a position a little to thesouth, so as to be on the right of the general army, whemgrouped about Dallas.The moement contemplated leaving our railroad, and to de-pend for twenty days on the contents of our wagons; and asthe country was very obscure, mostly in a state of nature, dense-ly wooded. and with few roads, our movements were necessarily
PAGE 41
.We crossed the Etowah by several bridges and fords,ok as many roads as possible, keeping up communicationqu ly the main column, or column of direction." The severalms followed generally the valley of the Euharlee, a tribu-coming into the Etowah from the south, and graduallyed over a ridge of mountains, parts of which had once beened over for gold, and were consequently full of paths anded wagon-roads or tracks. A cavalry picket of. the enemyurnt Hickory was captured, and had on his person an or-rom General Johnston, dated at Allatoona, which showedtoe had detected my purpose of turning his position, andordingly became necessary to use great caution, lest someae minor columns should fall into ambush, but, luckily they was not much more familiar with that part of the coun-han we were. On the other side of the Allatoona range,Puopkin-Vine Creek, also a tributary of the Etowah, flowedand west; Dallas, the point aimed at, was a small townt other or east side of this creek, and was the point ofentration of a great many roads that led in every direc-i ts possession would be a threat to Marietta and At-, but I could not then venture to attempt either, till Iha ained the use of the railroad, at least as far down as itscMU from the Allatoona range of mountains. Therefore,moverent was chiefly designed to compel Johnston to give n the 25th all the columns were moving steadily on DallasPherson and Davis away of to the right, near Van Wert;mas on the main road in the centre, with Hooker's Twen-Corps ahead, toward Dallas; and Schofield to the left rear.the convenience of march, Hooker had his three divisionsparate roads, all leading toward Dallas, when, in the after-, as he approached a bridge across Pumpkin-Yine Creek,ound it held by a cavalry force, which was driven off,btthenidge was on fre. This fre was extinguished, and.i ii iiiiiiiiP! iiiiiiiii i iiii iiii ~ iiiiii iiiiiiiii ... .. .. .. ..... .. ... .. ... ... .......... ....... ............... .... .............. iiiiii ii .. .. .. ...... ..... .... ..... ii! i iiiiiii @ iiuiii iiii:iiiii i i iii iiiiiiiiiiiii iiiii ~ iiii ;iiiiiiiiii .......... i i iiiiioiiiiiiiiiiil @ iiiiiiii riasiiiiii~ as;;iii iiiiii ~sii!!i;iiiii iiiii~ iii~ iii iii~, iiiiii~iIi """ii":'~:ii iiliailil~ii~iii iiiiiiii
PAGE 42
44 ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. [1804.cavalry on a road leading due east toward Marietta, insteadof Dallas. This leading division, about four miles out fromthe bridge, struck a heavy infantry force, which was mov-ing down from Allatoona toward Dallas, and a sharp battle en-sued. I came up in person soon after, and as my map showedthat we were near an important cross-road called "New Hope,"from a Methodist meeting-house there of that nare, I orderederl oker to secure it if possile that night. He askedfor a short delay, till he could bring up his other two divisions,viz., of Butterfield and Williams, but before these divisionshad got up and were deployed, the enemy had also gained corre-sponding strength. The woods were so dense, and the resist-ance so spirited, that Hooker could not carry the position,though the battle was noisy, and prolonged far into the night.This point, ew Hope," was the accidental intersection of theroad leadin from Allatoona to Dallas with that from anWert to Marietta, was four miles northeast of Dallas, and fromthe bloody fighting there for the next week was called by thesoldiers Hel-Hole."The night was pitch-lark, it rained hard, and the conver-gence of our columns toward Dallas produced much confu-sion. I am sure similar confusion existed inthe army opposed to us, for we were all mixed up. I slept on the ground,without coer, alongside of a log, got little sleep, resolved atdaylight to renew the battle, and to make a lodgment on theDallas and Allatoona road if possible, but the morning revealeda strong line of intrenchments facing us, with a heavy force ofinfantry and guns. The battle was renewed, and without success. Mcoherson reached Dallas that morning, viz., the 2tand deployed his troops to the southeast and east of th own,placing Davis's divsion of the Fourteenth Corps, which had joined him on the road from Rone, on his left; but this stillleft a gap of at least three miles between Davis and ooker.Meantime also, General Schofield was closin up on Thoas'sleft.Satisfied that Johnston in person was at New Hope withall his army, and that it was so much nearer my "objctive,"
PAGE 43
1864 ] ATLAITA CAMPAIUN. 45the railroad, than Dallas, I concluded to draw McPherson fromDallas to Hooker's right, and gave orders accordingly; butMcPherson also was confronted with a heavy force, and, as hebegan to withdraw according to his orders, on the morning ofthe th he was fiercely assailed on his right; a bloody battleened, in which he repulsed the attack, inflicting heavy losson his assailants, and it was not until the 1st of June thathe was enaled to withdraw from Dallas, and to effect a closejunction with Hooker in front of New Hope. MeantimeThomas and Schoi were ompleting their deployments,gradually overlapping Johnston on his right, awl thus extend-ing our left nearer and nearer to the railroad, the nearest pointof which was Acworth, about eight miles distant. All this timea continual battle was in progress by strong skirmish-lines,taking advantage of every species of cover, and both partiesfortifying each night by rifle-trenches, with head-logs, many ofwhich grw to e as formidable as first-class works of defense.Ocasionally one party or the other would make a dash in thenature of a sally, but usually it sustained a repulse with greatloss of life. I visited personally all parts of our lines nearlyevery daywas constantly within musket-range, and though thefire of musketry and cannon resounded day and night alongthe whol line, varying from six to ten miles, I rarely saw adozn ofi the enemy at any one time; and these were alwaysskiishers dodging from tree to tree, or behind logs on theground, or who occasionally showed their heads above the hastily-constructed but remarkably strong rifle-trenches. On the oc-asion of my visit to McPherson on the 30th of May, whilestanding with a group of officers, among whom were GeneralsMcPhrson, Logan, Barry, and Colonel Taylor, my former chiefof t ry, a Mini-ball passed through Logan's coat-sleeve,scratching the skin, and struck Colonel Taylor square in thebreast luckily he had in his picket a famous memorandum-bookinwhichhekept a sort of diary, about which we usedto joke him a good deal ; its thickness and size saved his life,breaking the fore of the ball, so that after traversing the bookit only pntrated the breast to the ribs, but it knocked him
PAGE 44
46 ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. [1864.down and disabled him for the rest of the campaign. He wasa most competent and worthy offioor, and now lives in povertyin Chicago, sustained in part by his own labor, and in part by a pitiful pension recently granted.On the 1st of June General McPherson closed in upon theright, and, without attempting further to carry the enemy'sstrong position at New Hope Church, I held our general right in dose contact with it, gradually, carefully, and steadily work-ing by the left, until our strong infantry-lines had reachedand secured possession of all the wagon-roads between NewHope, Allatoona, and Acworth, when Idispatched.Generals Gar-rard's and Stoneman's divisions of cavalry into Allatoona, thefirst around by the west end of the pass, and the latter by thedirect road. Both reached their destination without opposi-tion, and orders were at once given to repair the railroad forwardfrom Kingston to Allatoona, embracing the bridge across theEtowah River. Thus the real object of my move on Dallas wasaccomplished, and on the 4th of June I was preparing to drawoff from Now Hope Church, and to take position on the rail-road in front of Allatoona, when, General Johnston himselfhaving evacuated his position, we effected the change withoutfurther battle, and moved to the railroad, occupying it fromAllatoona and Aceworth forward to Big Shanty, in sight of thefamous Kenesaw Mountain.Thus, substantially in the month of May, we had steadilydriven our antagonist from the strong positions of Dalton, Re-saca, Cassville, Allatoona, and Dallas; had advanced our linesin strong, compact order from Chattanooga to Big Shanty, nearlya hundred miles of as difficult country as was ever fought overby civilized armies; and thus stood prepared to go on, anxiousto fight, and confident of success as soon as the railroad commu-nications were complete to bring forward the necessary sup-plies. It is now impossible to state urately our loi ss of lifeand men in any one separate battle; for the fighting was cotinuous, almost daily, among trees and bushes, on ground whereone could rarely see a hundred yards ahead.The aggregate loss in the several acorps for the month of Mayon u" Ii" i i l i iii;"iii iii; i i i ii i i i ii ii i iii i i i i i i i i iii i, iii"iii ii i ii iiiiii i==
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reported as follows in the usual monthly returns sent to thedjutant-General's offce, which are, therefore, official:sualties during the onth fMay, 1864 (ajor-Genral SM CO-ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND (MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS).COR K led and Mig. W do4. TodLudrteenth (Palmer) 147Total.......... .... ......... 1,294 5,562 6ARMY OF TIE TENNESSEE (MAJOR-GE'ERAL McPHER ON).CORKlld M5 a Mluang. Woode. Tol.enteenth (Blai ........ ........... (Not t Total................ 21 105 1,2A.MY OF TE O oO (MAJOR-GENERAL SCHOFIELD).Ki il d MI l .in, W.od.. T L.enty-third (Scho ild) .22 7alry... ....... 2 11Total ..........................ad ag regate............ ....... 1,868 >,5 9,29General Joseph E. Johnston, in his Narrative of his Mili-ry Operations," just published (March 27, 1874), gives thefetive strength of his army at and about Dalton on the 1st ofay, 1864 (page 302), as follows:Artillery ............... 2, 12Total... ...... .42,856
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48 ATLANTA AMPAIGN. [1864.During May, and prior to reaching Cassville, he was furtherreenforced (page 352):Polk's corps of three divisions................... 12,000Martin's division of cavalry...................... 3,500Jackson's division of cavalry...................... 3,906And at New Hope Church, May 26th:Brigade of Quarles.............. .............. 2,200Grand total............... ............. 64,456His losses during the month of May are stated by him, astaken from the report of Surgeon Foard (page 325):FROM DALTON TO CAS8YILLE.CORPS. Killed. W dd. Tot. Hardee'e............................. 116 850 966H oudx s............................... 2 1,564 1,841olks ................. ... ...... .... .46 529 575,Tota ............... ............. 445 2,943 8,3AT NEW HOPE CIURCH PAGE 335.)CORPS. KUled. Wouded. T"ta.Hardee's .................. .......... 156 879 1,035I ds.... .. ................... ...... 03 756 9 Polk's............................. .. 17 94 111 Total....................... 276 1,729 2,005Total killed and wounded during Miy.. 721 4,62 5,893These figures include only the killed and wounded, whereasmy statement of losses embraces the "missing," which are usu-ally "prisoners," and of these we captured, during the whole cam-paign of four and a half months, exactly 12,983, whose names,rank, and regiments, were officially reported to the Commissary-General of Prisoners; and assuming a due proportion for themonth of May, viz., one-fourth, makes 3,245 to be added to thekilled and wounded given above, making an aggregate loss in
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81ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. 4n's army, from Dalton to New Hope, inclusive, of S,638,agis urs of 9,299.Theefore General Johnston is greatly in error, in his esti-Spage 357, in stating our loss, as co ared with his, atsi rfn to one.ways estimated my force at about double his, and couldafodt lose two to one without disturbing our relative pro-but I also reckoned that, in the natural strength of theiiiin the abundance of mountains, streams, and forests,hehda fair offset to our numerigal superiority, and thereforeenevred to act with reasonable caution while moving on the' offensive."h the drawn battle of New Hope Church, and our occu-ptoof the natural fortress of Allatoona, terminated the monthoMaand the first stage of the campaign.30i ,ii ,, ""'~~i! i i..
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CHAPTER XVI.ATLANTA CAMPAIGN-BA'lTLES ABOUT EENESAW MOUNTAIN.JUNE, 18E4.ON the 1st of June our three armies were well in hand, inthe broken and densely-wooded country fronting the enemy in-trenched at New Hope Church, about five miles north of Dal-las. General Stoneman's division of cavalry had occupied Alla-toona, on the railroad, and General Garrard's division was at thewestern end of the pass, about Stilesboro'. Colonel W. W.Wright, of the Engineers, was busily employed in repairing therailroad and rebuilding the bridge across the Etowah (or High-tower) River, which had been destroyed bv the enery on hisretreat; and the armies were engaged in a general and constantskirmish along a front of about six miles-McPherson the right,Thomas the centre, and Schofield on the left. By graduallycovering our front with parapet, and extending to the left, weapproached the railroad toward Acworth and overlapped theenemy's right. By the 4th of June we had made such progressthat Johnston evacuated his lines in the night, leaving us mas-ters of the situation, when I deliberately shifted MePherson'sarmy to the extreme left, at and in front of Acworth, withThomas's about two miles on his right, and Schofield's on hisright-all facing east. Heavy rains set in about the 1st of Junemaking the roads infamous; but our marches were short, as weneeded time for the repair of the railroad, so as to bring sup-plies forward to Allatoona Station. On the 6th I rode back toAllatoona, seven miles, found it all that was expected, and gaveorders for its fortitication and preparation as a "secondary base."i~i~i i i i ii i ii. .....laz=r Wd D8.E, ofa; @ @ = : ~ ll ::::::::::::::::::::::: og"ii iio f iii o iii i
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Gener air arrived at Acworth on the thi with his two divi-sions of the Seventeenth Corps-the same which had been oniveteran furlough-had come up from Caro by way of Clifton,on the Tennessee River, and had followed our general route toAllatoona, where he had left a garrison of about fifteen hundredmen. His effective strength, as* reported, was nine thousand.battle, sickness, and by detachments; so that the three armiesMountain. On each of these hills the enemy had signal-stationsand fresh lines of parapets. Heavy masses of infantry coulid bedistinctly soon with the naked eye, and it was manifest thatJohnston had chosen his ground well, and with deliberation adprepared for battle; but his line was at least ten miles in ex-tent-too long, in my judgment, to be held suecessfully by bisforce, then estimated at sixty thousand. As his position, how-over, gave hhn a perfet view over our field, we had to pro-ceed with due caution. NPherson had the left, followingthe railroad, which curved around the north base of Kenesaw;Thomas the centre, obliqued to the right, deploying below Ken-esaw and facing Pine Hill; and Schofield, somewhat refused,was on the general right, looking south, toward Lost Mountain.On the1th the Etowah bridgewas done; the railroad wasrepaired up to our very skirmish-line, close to the base of ene-saw, and a loaded train of cars came to Big Shanty. The loco-motive, detached, was run forward to a water-tank within therange of the enemy's guns on Kenesaw, whence the enemyopened fire on the locomotive; but the engineer was not afraid,went on to the tank, got water, and returned safely to his train,answering the guns with the screas of his engine, heighteiinedThe rains continued to pour, and made our developmentsii4i;iii ii ii i iliiii ~; ;-; iii ii-i i i !iiw iii i'~ii ii~~~iiiiiiiiiiiiiiii iiiiii !iiiiii~ iiiiii~ ~ i~iii l r iliil~iiiiilii !iiiliiiiiiiiiii i o l i iiii iii1iii~~i~ii~iiiiiii i i ilii ii~ ili i~~i ii! iii i~iiiiiI~iiilllii il~ii iiiiii.Uld OU" ll iis i~ o i 1iii ,iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii.................................. iii iii i iiiiiiii Iii iiiiiiiiiii i i "" ...... ... ......... ....... .....................................................iii li ii~ ~ ~ ~ii ;ii~ iii~iiiiiiiiiiiiiI i iii ~ ~ ~~~~iii@ iiiiii ;i iirii! ii~~~iiii~i~iii ii i~ iii iiIlii iiiiiiQiB:oiB18iiiiiiiiiii~iiiii@ ii iiiiii iii ii iii l iiiiiiiiiiiii i~iiiii !biiii iiii iiiii~ iiiie iiiiiiiiiiiiiii "" ii"'"i '", ..................... Idna iiiaioi~ii i~ iiiiiilii=,; ja, iiiiii iiii !iiil iIi'=,=''i v===== === ]] == :
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52 ATLANTA CAMI. [alow and dilatory, for there were no roads, and these had tobe improvised by each division for its own supply-train fromthe depot in Big Shanty to the camps. Meantime each armywas deploying carefully before the enemy, intrenching everycamp, ready as against a sally. The enemy's cavalry was alsobusy in our rear, compeling us to detach cavalry all the way>ack as far as Resaca, and to strengthen all the infantry postsas far as Nashville. Besides, there was great danger, alwaysin ry mind, that Forrest would collect a heavy cavalry com-mand in Mississippi, cross the Tennessee River, and break upour railroad below Nashville. 'In anticipation of this very dan-ger, I had sent General Sturgis to Memphis to take command ofall the cavalry in that quarter, to go out toward Pontoto, n-gage Forrest and defeat him; but on the 14th of June I earnedthat General Sturgis had himself been defeated on the 10thofJune, and had been driven by Forrest back into Memphis inconsiderable confusion. I expected that this would soon be fol-lowed by a general raid on all our roads in Tennessee. GeneralA. J. Smith, with the two divisions of the Sixteenth arid Seven-teenth Corps which had beenith General Banks up Red River,had returned from that ill-fated expedition, and had been orderedto General Canby at New Orleans, who was making a diversionabout Mobile; but, on hearing of General Sturgis's defeat, Iordered General Snith to go out from Memphis and renew theoffensive, so as to keep Forrest off our roads. This he didfinally, defeating Forrest at Tupelo, on the 13th, 14th, and 15th days of July; and he so stirred up matters in North Mississippithat Forrest could not leave for Tennessee. This, for a time,leftr me only the task of eovering the roads against such minordetachments of cavalry as Johnston could spare from his imme-diate army, and I proposed to keep these too busy in their owndefense to spare detachments.By the 14th the rain slackened, and we occupied a continu-ous line of ten miles, intrenched, conforming to the irregularposition of the enemy, when I reconnoitred, with a view tomake a break in their line between Kenesaw and Pine Moun-tain. When abreast of Pine Mountain I noticed a rebel battery4 'iilili;ililiii iiiii i
PAGE 51
,ATLANTA CAMPAGN. 53s crest, with a continuous line of fresh rifle-trench about-way down the hill. Our skirmishers were at the time en-I estimated the distance to the battery on the crest at about hthundred yards. Near it, in plainview, stood a group ofnemy, evidently observing us with glasses. General How-ittention to this group, and ordered him to compel it top behind, its cover. 1H replied that his orders from Gen-Thomasweretospareartillery-ammuniton. This wast, according to the general policy, but I explained to himwe must keep up the morale of a bold offensie, that heSuse his artillery, force the enemy to remain on the timide volleys. I continued to ride down our line, and soon d, in quick succession, the three volleys. The next divisionrder was Geary's, and I gave him similar orders. Generalk, n my opmion, was killed by the second volley fired fromIa conversation with General Johnston, after the war, heained that on that day he had ridden in person from Ma-a to Pine Mountain, held by ates's division, and was a-panied by Generals Hardee and olk. When on ine oun-, reconnoitring, quite a group of soldiers, belonging to the ry close by, clustered about him. He noticed the prepara-s of our battery to fire, and cautioned these men to scattery did so, and he likewise hurried behind the parapet, fromch he had an equally good view of our position; but Generalk, who was dignified and corpulent, walked back slowly, noting to appear too huried orutios in the presence of then, and was struck across the breast by an unexploded shell,ch killed him instantly. This is my imoren y of the con-ation, and it is confirmed by Johnston himself in his "Nar-ve," page 337, except that he edlculated the distance of ourbry at six hundred yards and says that P olk was killed bySthird shot; I know thatour guns fired by volley, and be-ie that he was hit by a shot of the second volley. It hasi i i i
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54 ATLANA CAMtAIGN. [1864.been asserted that I fired the gun which killed General Polk,and that I knew it was direoted against that general. The factis, at that distance we could not even tell that the group weroof, before my orders to tire were executed, had no idea that ourshot had taken effect, and continued my ride down along theline to Schofield's extreme flank returning late in the eveningto my headquarters at Big Shanty, where I occupied an aban-doned house. In a cotton-field back of that house was our sig-nal-station, on the roof of an old gin-house. The signal-offeerreported that by studying the enemy's signals he had learned the"key," and that he could read their signals. He explained tome that he had translated a signal about noon, from Fine Moun=tain to Marietta, Send an ambulance for General Polk'sbody;" and later in the day another, "why don't you sendan ambulance for General Polk? From this we inferred thatGeneral Polk had been killed, but how or where we knew not;and this inference was confirmed later in the same day by thereport of some prisoners who had been captured.On the 15th we advanced our general lines, intending toattack at any weak point discovered between Kenesaw andPine Mountain; but Pine Mountain was found to be abandoned,and Johnston had contracted his font somwhat, on a directline, connecting enesaw with Lost Mountain. Thomas andSchoield thereby gained aout two miles of most difcountry, and McPherson's left lapped vell around the northend of Kenesaw. We captured a good many prisoners, amongthem a whole infantry regiment, the Fourteenth Alabama, threehundred and twenty strong.On the 16th the general novement was continued, whenLost Mountain was abandoned by the enemy. Our right nat-urally swung round, so as to threaten the railroad below Ma-rietta, but Johnston had still further contracted and strength-ened his lines, covering Marietta and all the roads below.On the 17th and 18th the rain again fell in torrents, mak-ing army movements impossible, but we devoted the time tostrengthening our positions, more especially the left and cntre,
PAGE 53
th a view gradually to draw from the left toadd to therightard against a ally from Knesaw againstour depot at Biganty. Garrard's division of cavalry was kept busy on our, McPherson had gradually ehis right, enablingThas to do the same still farther; but the enemy's positions so very strong, and everywhere it was covered by intrench-t We in like manner covered our lines of battle by similarorks, and even our skirishers learned to cover their bodiesthe simplest and best forms of defensive works, such as railslogs, piled in the form of a simple lunette, covered on theThe enemy and ourselves used the same form of rifle-trench,ried according to the nature of the ground, viz.: the trees,dbusheswere cut away for a hundred yards or more in front,ving as an abatis or entanglement; the parapets varied fromor to _six fot high, the dirt taken from a ditch outside andma covered way inside, and this parapet was surmounted byhead-og," composed of the trunk of a tree from twelve towenty inches at the butt, lying along the interior crest of therapet and rest inn nothes cut in other trunks which ex-nded back, forming an inclined plane, in case the head-logould be knocked inward by a cannon-shot. The men of bothmies became extremely skillful in the construction of theserks, becane each man realized their value and importance tomself, so that it required no orders for their construction. Ason as a regiment or brigade gained a position within easy dis-:ce for a sally, it would set to work with a will, and wouldstruct such a parapet in a single night; but I endeavored toare the soldiers this hard labor by authorizing each divisionomrander to organize out of the freedmen who escaped to uspioneer corps of two hundred men, who were fed out of theglar army supplies, and I promised them ten dollars a month,der an existing act of Congress. These pioneer detachmentscame very useful to us during the rest of the war, for theyuld work at night while our men slept; they in turnawere not
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the eu ofth ag f ie byepoigthem tfrtfyanstrengten the position to teir rear next to be occupied in theirgeneral retrograde. During this campaign hundreds if notthousands of miles of similar intrenchments were built bybethb armies, and as a rule whichever party attaced one ofthean got the worst of it.On the 19th of June the rebel army again fell back on itsflanks, to such an extent that for a time I supposed it had re-treated to the Chattahoochee River, fifteen miles distant; butas we pressed forward we were soon undeceived, for we foundit still more concentrated, covering Marietta and the railroad:These successive contractions of the enemy's line encouragedus and discouraged him, but were doubtless justifled by sound reasons. On the 20th Johnston's position was unusuallystrong. Kenesaw Mountain was his salient ; his two flankswere refused and covered by parapets and by Noonday andNose's Creeks. His left flank was his weak point, so longas he acted on the defensive," whereas, had he designed tocontract the extent of his line for the purpose of gettingin reserve a force with which to strike "offensively" from hisright, he would have done a wise act, and I was compelledto presume that such was his object. We were also so far fromNashvillo and Chattanooga that we were naturadly sensitive forthe safety of our railroad and depots, so that the left (Mc-Pher-son) was held very strong.-About this time came reports that a large cavalry force of'the enemy had passed around our left flank, evidently to strikethis very railroad somewhere below Chattanooga. I thereforereinforced the cavalry stationed from Resaca-to Cassville, andordered forward from Huntsville, Alabama, the infantry divi-sion of General John E. Smith, to hold Kingston securely.While we were thus engaged about Kenesaw, Gcnoral Granthad his hands full with Lee, in Virginia. General Halleck wasthe chief of staff at Washington, and to him I communicated almost daily. T fnd from my 1etter-hook that om the 21st
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ne I reported to him trsely and truly the condition ofect of fair weather is as far off as ever. The roads aresble; the fields and woods become quagmires after a fewas have crossed over. Yet we are at work all the time.toment the weather and roads will permit troops and artil-Sweather has a wonderful effect ontrops: in action ande march, rain is favorable; but in the woods, where all isand uncertain, it seems almost impossible for an armying ten miles of front to act in concert during wet andty weather. Still I pressed operations with the utmostestness, aiming always to keep our fortified lines in abso-contact with the enemy, while with the surplus force weorward, from one flank or the other, for his line of com-cation and retreat. On the 22d of June I rode the whole and ordered General Thomas in person to advance his ex-right corps (Hooker's); and instructed General Schofield,ter, to keep his entire army, viz., the Twenty-third Corps,strong right flank in close support of Hooker's deployedDuring this day the sun came out, with some promise ofweather, and I had got back to my bivouac about dark,a signal message was received, dated-IULP HutUE, 5.30 P. M.G Z SHEEMAN :W have repulsed two heavy attacks, and feel confident, our only appre-n being from our extreme right flank. Three entire corps are in frontAMajor-General THooxE.ooker's corps (the Twentieth) belonged to Thomas's army;mas's headquarters were two miles nearer to Hooker thanl and Hoamri bwn an o1 y officer, knew that he
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58 ATLANTA CAMPAICN. [1864.should have reported this fact to Thomas and not to me; I was,oreover, specially diturbed by the assrtion inhis report thathe was uneasy about his right ank, when Schofield had beenspecially ordered to protect that. I first inquired of my adju-taunt, Dayton, if he were certain that General Schofield had re-ceived his orders, and he answered that the envelope in which he had sent them was receipted by General Schofield himself.I knew, therefore, that General Schofield must be near by, inclose support of Hooker's right flank. General Thomas hadbefore this occasion complained to me of General ooker's dis-position to "switch off," leaving wide gaps in his line, so as tobe independent, and to make gory on his own account. Ithere-fore resolved not to overlook this breach of discipline and prpriety. The rebel army was only composed of three corps; Ihad that very day ridden six miles of their lnes, found themeverywhere strongly occupied, and therefore Hooker could nothave encountered "three entire corps." Both Pherson andHooker to widen the gap between his ownarmy (Thomas's), so as to come into closer contact with one orother of the wings, asserting that he was the senior by com-mission to both Pherson and Schofield, and that in theevent of battle he should assume command over ther, by virtuoof his older commission.that day some cannonading and heavy firing down toward the"Kulp House," which was about five miles southeast of whereJ was, but this was nothing unusual, for at the same momentthere was firing along our lines full ten miles in extent. Earlythe next day (23d) I rode down to the "Kulp House," whichwas on a road leading from Powder Springs to Marietta, aboutthree miles distant from the latter. n the way I passedthrough General Butterfield's division of ookes cops, which I learned had not been engaged at all in the battle of the daybefore; then I rode along Geary's and Ward's divisions, whichoccupied the field of battle, and the men were engaged in buy-ing the dead. I found General Schofields corps on the
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i l3gg:.. .. ATLANTA AMPAGNrings road, its head of column abreast of ooker's right,erefore constituting "a strong right flank," and I met Gen-Smoment, we passed into a little church standing by theadide, and I there showed Gneral Schofield Hooker's sig--message of the day before. He was very angry, and prettyarp words passed between them, Schoeld saying that hisad of column (Hascals division) had been, at the time of thettle, actually in advance of Hooker's line ; that the attack orlly of the enemy struck his troops before it did Hooker's;at General Hooker knew of it at the time; and he offeredtoSout and show me that the dead men of his advance divisionascals)were lying farther out than any of Hooker's. Gen-al Hooker pretended not to have known this fact. I thenked him why he had called on me for help, until he bad usedl of his own troops; asserting that I had just seen Butter-fld's division, and had learned from him that he had noteen engaged the day before at all; and I asserted that thenemy's sally must have been made by one corps (Hood's), inlace of three, and that it had fallen on Geary's and Williams'sivisions, which had repulsed the attack handsomely. As wexde away from that church General Hooker was by my side,ad I told him that such a thing must not occur again; inther words, I reproved him more gently than the occasionemanded, and from that time he began to sulk. GeneralHooker had come from the East with great fame as a ighter,"ad at Chattanooga he was glorified by his "battle above thelouds," which I fear turned his head. He seemed jealous of,1 the army commanders, because in years, former rank, andpRience, he thought he was our superior.On the 2d of June I telegraphed to General Halleck thissummary, which I cannot again better state:We continue to press forward on the principle of an advance againstortified positions. The whole country is one vast fort, and Johnston mustave at least fifty miles of connected trenches, with abatis and finishedatteries. We gain ground daily, fighting all the time. On the 21st Gen-ral Stanley gained a position near the south end of Kenesaw, from whichr.ff;
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Yesterday the extreme right (Hooker and Schofield) advanced onder Sprins road to within three miles of aritta. The enemstrong offort to drivo them away, but failed signally, leaving morehundred dead on the field. Our lines are now in close contactfighting is incessant, with a good deal of artillery-fire. As fast ato let go Keaonesaw, which is the key to the whole country. Theis now better, and the roads are drying up tst. Our losses are linotwithstanding the repeated beeks of the road tq our rear, suDuring the oth and 25th of Juno GeneralSchofieldethis right as far as prudent, so as to compel the enemyiout his lines correspondingly, with the intention to mstrong assaults at points where suc tess would give us theSchofield, and we all agreed that we could not with pstretch out any more, and therefore there was no alternato attack "fortified lines," a thing carefully avoided uptime. I reasoned, if we cul a breach anywherethe one urietyof ofur arry we could hold in check thsp nding wing of the enemy, and with tlfe other sweepand overwhelm the other half. The 27th of June wasthe day for the attempt, and in order to oversee the whto bsese counication with all parts of the army,a place cleared on the top of a hill to the rear of Thornsdemonstration as possible. About 9 A. M. of the day appthe troops moved to the assault, and all along our lines... iiiiiiiiiii iil iiili iii iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii iii iiiiiii iiiiil iiiiiiii................ i .............. ....... l=. ....... ....... .... .... .... ... ...... ........ .. ................ ... .... ...... ..... ..... ..... .. ...= i i ii i i i i i i".Ibi Iii iiiiiiiiIiiil iiiii iiiiiiii iiiiiiii iii iiiiii iiiii iii ii i iiiiiii iiiiii;
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1864.] ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. 01ig column reached the parapet, where Brigadier-General Iar-ker was shot down mortally wounded,. and Brigadier-Generalaniel McCook (my old law-partner) was desperately wounded,rom the clects of which he afterward died. By 11.30 the as-ault was in fact over, and had failed. We had not broken therebel line at either point, but our assaulting columns held theirround within a few yards of the robel trenches, and there cov-ered themselves with parapet. Mcherson lost about five hun-red men and several valuable oflicers, and Thomas lost nearlytwo thousand men. This was the hardest fight of the campaignp to that date, and it is well described by Johnston in his "Nar-tive" (pages 32, 33), where he admits his loss in killed andwounded as-Mon.Hood's corps (not reported).. .H ardee's corps.. .. ... ...................... 286Loring's (Folk's) .............. .. .. ......... 622Total. ............. .. .......... 808This, no doubt, is a true and fair statement ; but, as usual,ohnsto overestimates our loss, putting it at six thousand,hereas our entire loss was about twenty-five hundred, killedad wounded.While the battle was in progress at the centre, Schofieldcrossed 01ey's Creek on the right, and gained a position threat-ening Johnston's line of retreat; and, to increase the effect, Irdered Stoneman's cavalry to proceed rapidly still farther tohe right, to Sweetwater. Satisfied of the bloody cost of at-acking intrenched lines, I at once thought of moving the wholermy to the railroad at a point (Fulton) about ten miles belowarietta, or to the Chattahoochee River itself, a movement sim-lar to the one afterward so successfully practised at Atlanta.Lll the orders wore issued to bring forward supplies enough toill our wagons, intending to strip the railroad back to Alla-oona, and leave that place as our depot, to be covered as well asossible by Garrard's cavalry. General Thomas, as uisual, shookis head, deeming it risky to leave the railroad; but something
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my dispath to General alleck on July st:General Schoeld is now south of 011y's Creek, and on the head ofNickajack.i I have been hurrying down provisions and forag, and to-morrow night propose to move McPherson from the left to the extreme right,back of General Thomas. This will bring my right within threo miles ofthe Chattahoochee River, and about five miles from the railroad. By thismovement I think I can force Johnston to move his whole annydownfromKenesaw to defend his railroad and the Chattahooche, when I will (by theleft flank) reach the railroad below Maritta; but in this I ust cut loosefrom the railroad with ten days' supplies in wgons. Johnston may comeout of his intrenchments to attack Thomas which is exactly what I want,for General Thomas is well intrenched on a lino parallel with the enemysouth of Kenesaw. I think that Aatoon and the line of the Etowah astrong enough for me to venture on this move. The movement is substantially d n the andtown road straight for Atlanta.McFherson drew out of his lines during the night of July2d, leaving Garrard's cavalry, dismounted, occupying his trenches,and moved to the rear of the Army of the Cumberland, stretch-ing down the Nickajack; but Johnston detected the movement,and promptly abandoned Maritta and Knesaw. I expectedas much, for, by the earliest dawn of the 3d of July, I was upat a large spy-glass mounted on a tripod, which Colonel Poe,United States Engineers, had at his bivouac close by our camp.I directed the glass on Kenesaw, and saw some of our picketscrawling up the ill cautiously; soon they stoodii upon the verytop, and I could plainly see their movements as they ran alongthe crest just abandoned by the enemy. In a minute I rousedmy staff, and started them off with orders in every direction fora pursuit by every possible road, hoing to catc Johnston inthe confusion of retreat, especially at the crossing of the Chat-tahoochee River.I must close this chapter here, so as to give the actual lossesduring June, which are compiled from the ofiial returns bymonths. These losses, from June 1st to July 3d, were all sub-stantially sustained about Kenesaw and Marietta, and it wasreally a continuous battle, lasting from the 10th day of June tillhi ii! ii~ i~! 1 ii...
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ARMY OF THE CITMBELAND.CORPS Killed nd Mining. Wound f. T tFourth (THoward)............... ...... 602 1,62 214urteenth (Pahmer).................. 8,5 TAGTwentieth ( ooker) ....... ........... 822 1,246 ,6Total, Army of te Cmbeland.... 1,277 4,251 5,531ARTAY OF THE TENNESSEE.CORPS. Klk end Mli ng. Woudd TtlFifteenth (Logan) ............ 7 56teenth (Dod1e) ................09.. 52Seventeenth (Blar) .......... ........ 4T 2 j5Total Army of the Tenemes..... 278 1,050 1,34 AM Y OF THE OHIO.CORPS. Killed ad MiWeg. Woundd. T eal.Twenty-third (Schoflell).......... .... 105 64T Cavalry ..... .... ... ... .. 1 06 iTotal Army of the Ohio........... 235I,8 in June, agg7, 3ate0..Johnston makes his statement of losses from the report of is surgeon Foard, for pretty much the same period, viz., fromune 4th to July 4th (page 576):tCORPK. %illud. Wounde.4 Total.ard '..200 1,43 1,Hod9.....'........... 140 1,121 1,261olk' ... 1,N4Total.....4.......... ........ 40 8,9In the tabular statement the 11 missing" embraces the prison-ers; and, giving two thousand as a fair proportion of prisoners>1
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CHAPTER XVII.ATLANTA CA=MPAIGN-BATTLES ABOUT ATLANTA.JULY, 1664.As before explained, on the 3d of July, by moving Mcher-san's entire army from the extreme left, at the base of Kene-saw to the right, below Olley's Creek, and stretching it downthe Nickajack toward Turner's Ferry of the Chattahoochee,we forced Johnston to choose between a direct assault onment on his railroad below Marietta, or even to cross the Chat-tahoochee. Of course, he chose to let go Kenesaw and Ma-rietta, and fall back on an intrenched camp prepared by hisorders in advance on the north and west bank of the Chatta-hoochee, covering the railroad-crossing and his several pontoon-bridges. I confess I had not learned beforehand of the exist-ence of this strong place, in the hature of a tte-du-pont, andhad counted on striking him an effectual blow in the expectedconfusion of his crossing the Chattahoochee, a broad and deepriver then to his rear. Ordering every part of the army topursue vigorously on the morningof the 3d of July, I rode intoMarietta, just quitted by the rebel rearguard, and was terriblyangry at the cautious pursuit by Garrard's cavalry, and even bythehead of our infantry columns. But Johnston had in advancecleard and multiplied his roads, whereas ous had to cross atright angles from the direction of Powder Springs toward Ma-rietta, producing delay and confusion. By night Thomas's head ofcolumn ran up against a strong rear-guard intrenched at Smyrnacamp-ground, six miles below Marietta, and there on the next31jI ~~l;9thm~.ha;~
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66 ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. L1ou4.day we celebrated our Fourth of July, by a noisy but not adesperate battle, designed chiefly to hold the enemy there tillGenerals McPherson and Schofield could get well into positionbelow him, near the Chattahoochee crossings.It was here that General Noyes, late Governor of Ohio, losthis leg. .I came very near being shot myself while reconnoi-tring in the second story of a house on our picket-linewhichwas struck several times by cannon-shot, and perfectly riddledwith musket-balls.During the night Johnston drew back all his army andtrains inside the tete-duaont at the Chattahoohee, which provedone of the strongest pieces of field-fortification I ever saw.losed up against it, and were promptly met bysevere fire. Thomas was on the main road in immediate pur-suit; next on his right was Schofield; and McPherso onextreme right, reaching the Chattahoochee Rive below Turner'sFerry. Stoneman's cavalry was still farther to the rightalongdown the Chattahoochee River as far as opposite Sandtown; andon that day I oIordered Garrard's division of cavalry up the rivereighteen miles, to secure posseson of thfatoies at Roswell,as well as to hold an important bridge and ford at that place.About three miles out from the Chattahoochee the main roadforked, the right branch following substantially the railroad, andthe left one leading straight for Atlanta, viI Paice's Ferry andBuckhead. We found the latter unoccupied and unguarded,and the Fourth Corps (Howard's) reached the river at Paice'sFerry. The right-hand road was perfectly covered by the tite-du-pont before described, where the resistance was very severe,and for some time deceived rne, for I was pushing Thomaswith orders to fiercely assault his enemy, supposing that hwasmerely opposing us to gain time to get his trains and troopsacross the Chattahoochee; but, on personally reconnoitring, Isaw the abatis and the strong redoubts, which satisfied meof the preparations that had been made by Johnston in anticipation of this very event. While I was with General Jeff. C.Davis, a poor negro came out of the abatis, blanched withright, said he ha en hildden under a log all day, with a er-.. ..... + +
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1864.] ATLANTA CAMPAIG'T. 6feet storm f hot, shells, and musket-balls, passing over him,till a short Jull had enabled him to creep out and make him-self known to our skirmishers, who in turn had sent him backto where we were. This negro explained that he with about a thousand slaves had been at work a month or more on thesevery lines, which, as he explained, extended from the rfver abouta mile above the railroad-bridge to Turner's Ferry below, beingin extent from five to six miles.Therefore, on the 5th of July we had driven our enemy tocover in thevalley of the Chattahoochee, and we held possessionof the rivr aove for eighteen miles, as far as Roswell, andbelow ten miles to the mouth of the Sweetwater. Moreover,we held the high ground and could overlook his movements,instead of his looking down on us, as was the case at Kenesaw.From a hill just back of Vining's Station I could see thehouses in Atlanta, nine miles distant, and the whole interveningvalley f the hattahoochee; could observe the preparationsfor our reception on the other side, the camps of men and largetrains of covered waons; and supposed, as a matter of course,that Johnston had passed the river with the bulk of his army,and that he had only left on our side a corps to cover hisbridges; but in fact he had only sent across his cavalry and trains.Between oward's corps at Paice's Ferry and the rest ofThomas's army pressing up against this tote-dupont, was aspace concealed by dense woods, in crossing which I came nearriding into a detachment of the enemy's cavalry; and later insame day Colonel Frank Sherman, of Chicago, then oaeneral oward's staff, did actually ride straight into theenemy's camp, supposing that our lines were continuous. Hewas carried to Atlanta, and for some time the enemy supposedthey were in possession of the commander-in-chief of the op-I knew that Johnston would not remain long on the westbank of the Chattahoochee, for I could easily practise on thatground to better advantage our former tactics of intrenchinga moiety i his front, and with the rest of our army cross theriver and threaten either s rear or the city of Atlanta itself
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8 ATLANTA CA1PAII. [164.which city was of vital importance to the existence not only ofhis own army, but of the Confederacy itself. In my dispatchof July 6th to General lalleck, at Washington, I state that-Jonston (in his retreat from Kenesa) ha left two breaks in therailroade above Marietta and one near Vining's tation. The formeris already repaired, and Johnstons army has eard he sound of our loco-motives. The telegraph is finished to ining's tation, and the feld-wrehas just reached my bivouac, and will be ready to convey this message assoon as it is written and translated into cipher.I propose to study the crossings of the Chattahoochee andwhenallisready, to move quickly. As a beginning, I will kep the troops and wagonswell back from the river, and only display t the enemy our picket-line,with a few field-batteries along at random. I have already shifted Scho-field to a point in our left rear, whence e can in a singl move reach theChattahoochee at a point above the railroad-bridge, where there is a ford.At present the waters are turbid and swollen from recent rains; but if thepresent hot weather lasts, the water wil run down very fast. We havepontoons enough for for bridges,ut, as our rossing wll be resisted, wemust manoeuvre some. All the regular crossing-places are covered by forts,apparently of long construction; but we shall cross in due time, and, insteadof attacking Atlanta direct, or any of its forts, I propose to mk a circuit,destroying all its rairoads. This is a elicat ement and st be donewith caution. Our army is in good conditionand fll of confdenc;butthe weather is intensely hot, and a good many men have falen with sun-stroke. The country is high and healthy, and the sanitary condition ofthe army is good.right, pretending to be searching the river below Turner's Ferryfor a crossing, and was watched closely by the enemy's cavalyon the other side. fcPherson,n the right, was equally demon-strative at and near.Turner's Ferry. Tho sfaced substantiallythe intrenched tte-unt, and had his left on the Chattahochee River, at Paice's Ferry. Garrard's cavalry was up awell, and MCook's small division of cavalry was ntermediabove Soap's Creek. Meantime, alsothe railroad-constructionparty was ard at work, repairing the railroad up to our campat Vining's Station.Of course, I expected every possible resistance in crossingle Chattahoochee River, and had made up my mind to feign on
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e right, but actually to cross over by the left. We had alreadycured a crossing-place at Roswell, but one nearer was advisa-e;Gneral Schofld had examined the river well, found aiace just below the mouth of Soap's Creek which he deemed vantagos, and was instructed to effect an early crossingere, and to intrench a good position on the other side, viz.,Seas bank. But, preliminary thereto, I had ordered Gen-al Rousseau, at Nashville, to collect, out of the scatteredtachents of cavalry in Tennessee, a force of a couple of thou-nd men, to rendezvous at Decatu, Alabama, thence to makerapid march for Opelika, to break up the railroad-links be-een Georgia and Alabama, and then to make juncetion withe about Atlanta; or if forced, to go on to Pensaola, or evenswing across to some of our posts in Mississippi. Generaloussea aked leave to ommand this expedition himself, tohich I consented, and on the.th of July e reported that heas all ready a Decatr, and I gave him orders to start. Heoved p pty on the th, crossed the Coasa below the Tenlands" and the Tallapoosa below "Horseshoe Bend," havingssed through Tallega. He struck the railroad west of Ope-a, tore it up for twenty mils, then turned north and came toarietta on the 2d of July, whence e reported to me. This ex-dition was in the nature of a raid, and must have distubed theny somewhat; but, as usual, the cavalry did not work hard,teir destruction of the railroad was soon repaired. Rous-July, stated his entire loss to have been only twelve kiledd thirty wounded. He brought in four hundred captured mlesid three hundred horses, and also told me a good story. He saide was far down in Alabmna, below Talladega, one hot, dustyy, when the blue clothing of his men was gray with dust; heShalted his column along a road, and he in person, with hisaff, had gone to the house of a planter, who met him kindlythe front-porh. He asked for water, which was brought,dasthepartysat on the porch in conversation he saw, instable-yard across the road, quite a number of good mules.remarkedtothe planter "My good sir, I fear I must take
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70 ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. [1864.some of your mules." The planter remonstrated, saying he hadalready contributed liberally to the good ause; that it wasonly last week he had given to General Roddy ten mules:Rousseau replied, ell, in this war you hould e at leastneutral-that is, you should be as liberal to us as to Roddy" (areel cavalry general). "Well, ain't you on our side? No,"said Rousseau; "I am General Rousseau, and all thesemen yousee are Yanks." Great God I is it possible Are theseYanks? Who ever supposed they would come away down herein Alabama ?" Of course,Rousseau took his ten mules.Schofield effected his crossing at oap's Creek very hand-somely on the 9th, capturing the small guard that was watchingthe crossing. By night he was on the high grond beyond,strongly intrenched, with two good pontoon-bridges finished,and was prepared, if necessary, for an assault by the whole Con-federate army. The same dayGarrard's cavary also crossedover at Roswell, drove away. the cavalry-pikets, andground till relieved by ewton's division of Howard's corps,which was sent up temporarily, ,till it in turn wasDodge's cors (Sixteenth) of the Army ofthe Tennessee, whichwas the advance of the whole of that army.That night Johnston evacuated his trenches crossed over theChatta)oochee, burned the railroad-bridge and his pontoon andtrestle bridges, and left us in.full possession of the north or west* bank-besides which, we had already secured possession of thetwo good crossings at Roswell and Soap's Creek. I have alwaysthought Johnston neglected his opportunity there, for he hadin comparatively idle while we got control of both banks ofthie river above him.On the 13th I ordered McPherson,th the Fifteenth Corps,to move up to Roswell, to cross over, prepare good bridgesandto make a strong tete-dupont on the farther side. Sto had been sent down to Campbellton, with orders to cross overand to threaten the railroad below Atlanta, if he could do swithout too much risk; and General Blair, with the SeventeenthCorps, was to remain at Turner's Ferry, demonstrating as muchas possible, thus keeping up the feint below while we were actu-
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64.] ATLANTA CAMPAIG N1aly crossing above. Thomas wis also ordered to prepare hisidges at Powers's and Paic's Ferries. By crossing the Chat-hoochee above the railroad-bridge, we were better placed tover our railroad and depots than below, though a movementross the river below the railroad, to the south of Atlanta,ight have been more decisive. But we were already so faro home, and would be compelled to accept battle wheneverered, with the Chattaoochee to or rear, that it became im-rative for me to take all prudential measures the case ad-itted of, and I therefore determined to pass the river abovee railroad-bridge-M on on the left, Schofield in thentre, and Thomas oon the right.On the 13th I reported to General Halleck as follows:Allis well. I have now accumulated stores at Allatoona and Mari-t, both forted and garrisoned points. Have also three places at whichcross the Chattaoche in our possession, and only await General Stone-an's return from a trip down the river, to cross the army in force andStonen s now out two days, and ad orders to be back on the fourthfifth day at furthest.Fron the 10th to the 15th we were all busy in strengthen-g the several points for the proposed passage of the' Chatta-chee, in increasing the number and capacity of the bridges,arranging the garrisons to our rear, and in bringing forwardrry, and Blair, with the Seventeenth Corps, was ordered upRoswell to oin McPherson.On the 17th we began the general moveent against Atlanta,omascrossing the Chattaoochee at Powers's and Paice's, bytoon-bridges; Schofield moving out toward Cross Keys, andcPherson toward Stone Mountain. We encountered but littleposition except by avalry. On the 18th all the armies moveda general right wheel, Thomas to ukhead, forming line ofttle facing Peach-Tree Creek; Schofield was on his left, andcPherson well over toward the railroad between Stone Moun-/*I AL.
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72. ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. [1864.tain and Decatur, which he reached at 2 r. m. of that day, aboutfour miles from Stone Mountain, and seven miles east of Deca-tur, and there he turned toward Atlanta, brealing up the rail-road as he progressed, his advance-guard reching ecatur aboutnight, where he came into communicatio with Schofield'stroops, which had also reached Decatur. About 10 A. M. of thatiday (July 18th), when the armies were all in motion,oneofGeneral Thomas's staff-officers brought me a citizen, one of ourspies, who had just come out of Atlanta, and had brought anewspaper of the same day, or of the day before, containingJohnston's order relinquishing the command of the Confederateforces in Atlanta, and Hood's order assumingthe command. Iimmediately inquired of General chofeld, who was his class-mate at West Point, about Hood, as to his generaletc., and learned that he was bold even to rashness, and courgeous in the extreme; I inferred that the change of commandersmeant fight." Notice of this important change was at oncesent to all parts of the army, and every division commander wascautioned to be always prepared for battle in any shape. Thiswas just what we wanted, viz., to fight in open ground, on anything like equal terms, instead of being fored to run up againstprepared intrenchments; but, at the same time, the enemy hav-ing Atlanta behind him, could choose the time and place ofattack, and could at pleasure mass a superior force on our weak-est points. Therefore, we had to be constantly ready forsallies.On the 19th the three armies were converging toward At-lta, meeting such feeble resistance that I really thought theenemy intended to evacuate the place. cPherson was moving astride of the railroad, near Decatur; Schofield along a roadleading toward Atlanta, by Colonel Howard's house and thedistillery; and Thomas was crossing Peach-Tree in line ofbattle,-building bridges for nearly every division as deployed.There was quite a gap between Thomas and Schofield, which Iendeavored to close by drawing two of Howard's divisionsnearer Schofield. On the 20th I was with General Schofieldnear the centre, and soon after noon heard heavy firing in front,. s
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1864.] ATLANTA CA311'AIGA gof Thomas's right, which laste an hor or so, and then ceased.Ssoon learned that the enemy had made a furious sally, theblow falling on Hooker's corps (the Twentieth), and partially onJohnson's division of the Fourteenth, and ewton's of theFourth. The troops had crossed ach-Tree Creek, were de-ployed, but at the time were resting for noon, when, withoutnotice, the enemy came pouring out of their trenches down uponthem, they became commingled, and fought in many places handto hand. General Thoas happened to be near the rear ofNewton's division, and got some feld-btteries in a good posi-ion, on the north side of Peach-Tree Creek, from which hedirected a furious fire on a mass of the enemy, which was pass-ing aro Newtn's left and exposed flank. After a couple ofhours of har and lose conflict, the enemy retired slowly withinhis trenches, leaving his dead and many wounded on the field.Johnson's and Newton's losses were light, for they had partiallycovered their fronts with light parapet; but Hooker's wholec fought in open ground, and lost about fifteen hundrednen. He reported four hundred rebel dead left on the ground,and that the rebel wounded would number four thousand; butthis was conjetural,for most of them got back withn their ownlines. We had, however, met succesfully a bold sally, had re-polled it handsomely, and were also put on our guard; and theevent illustrated the future tactics of our enemy. This sallycame the Peach-Tree line, which General Johnston hadcarefully prepared in advance, from which to fight us outside ofAtlanta. We then advanced our lines in compact order, closeup to these finished intrenhments, overlapping them on our left.From various parts of our lines the houses inside of Atlantawere plainly isible, though between us were the strong parapets,with ditch, fraie, e defrise, and abatis, prepared long inby Colonel Jeremy F. Gilmer, formerly of the UnitedStates Engineer. McPherson had the Fifteenth Corps stridethe Augusta Railroad, and the Seventeenth deployed on itsleft.Schofieldwas net on his riht, then came Howard's,Hooker's, and Palmer's corps on the extreme right. Eachcorps was deployed with strong reserves, and their trains wereA0
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74 ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. [1864.parked to their rear. MPherson's trains were in Decatur,guarded by a brigade commanded by Colonel Sprague of theSixty-third Ohio. The Sixteenth Corps (Dodge's) was crowdedout of position on the right of McPherson's line, by the con-traction of the circle of investment; and, during the previousafternoon, the Seventeenth Corps (Blair's) had pushed its opera-tions on the farther side of the Augusta Railroad, so as tosecure possession of a hill, known as Leggett's Hill, becauseGeneral Leggett's division had carried it by assault. Giles A.Smith's division was on Leggett's left, deployed with a weakleft flank in air," in military phraseology. It was in carryingthis hill that General Gresham, a great favorite, was badlywounded; and there also Colonel Tom Reynolds, now ofMadison, Wisconsin, was shot through the leg. When thesurgeons were debating the propriety of amputating it in hishearing, he begged them to spare the leg, as it was veryvaluable, being an "imported leg." He was of Irish birth, andthis well-timed piece of wit saved his leg, for the surgeonsthought, if he could perpetrate a joke at such a time, they wouldtrust to his vitality to save his limb.During the night, I had full reports from all parts of ourline, most of which was partially intrenched as against a sally,and finding that McPherson was stretching out too much on hisleft flank, I wrote him a note early in the morning not to ex-tend so much by his left; for we had not troops enough to com-pletely invest the place, and I intended to destroy iutterly allparts of the Augusta Railroad to the east of Atlanta, thento withdraw from the left flank and add to the right. In thatletter I ordered McPherson not to extend any farther to theleft, but to employ General Dodge's corps (Sixteenth), thenforced out of position, to destroy every rail and tie of the rail-road, from Decatur up to his skirmish-line, and I wantedhim (McPherson) to be ready, as soon as General Garrard re-turned from Covington (whither I had sent him), to move tothe extreme right of Thomas, so as to reach if possible the rail-road below Atlanta, viz., the Macon road. In the morning wefound the strong line of parapet, 1" Peach-Tree line," to the
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front of Schofield and Thomas, abadoned, and our lines wereadvanced rapidly close up to Atlanta. For some moments Isupposed the enemy intended to evacuate, and in person wasvanced in front of the Howard House to some open ground,from which we could plainly see the whole rebel line of para-pets, and I saw their men h'agging up from the interveningvalley, by the dstillery, trees and saplings for abatis. Ourskirmishers found the enemy down in this valley, and we couldsee the rebel main line strongly manned, with guns in positionat intervals. Schofield was dressing forward his lines, and Icould hear Thomas farther to the right engaged, when GeneralMcPherson and his staff rode up. We went back to the HowardHouse, a double frame-building with a porch, and sat on thesteps, discussing the chances of battle, and of Hood's generalcharacter. McPherson had also been of the same class at WestPoint with Hood, Schofield, and Sheridan. We agreed thatwe ought to be unsually cautious and prepared at all times forsallies and fr ard fighting, because Hood, though not deemedmuch of a scholar, or of great mental capacity, was undoubtedlybrave, determined, and rash man; and the change of command-rs at that particular crisis argued the dipleasure of the Con-federate Government with the cautious but prudent conduct ofGeneral Jos. Johnston.Mcherson was in excellent spirits, well pleased at the prog-ress of events so ar, and ad come over purposely to see meabout the order I had given him to use Dodge's corps to breakup the railroad, saying that the night before he had gained a position on Leggtt's Hill from which he could look over therbel parapt, and see the high smokestack of a large foundery in Atlanta; that before receiving my order he had divertedDodge's two divisions (then in motion) from the main road,aone that led to his extreme left flank, thenheld by Giles A. Smith's division (Seventeenth Corps), for thepurpose of strenthenin that ank; and that he had sent someintrencng-tools there, to re some batteries from which heintended to knock down that foundery, and otherwise to dam- iA:: ~I ...... R : :. .. ..
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76 ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. [1864.I had proposed to do with General Dodge's two divisions. Ofcourse I assented at once, and we walked down the road ashort distance, sat down by the foot of a tree where I had myman p, and on it pointed out to him Thomas's position and hisown. I then explained minutely that, after we had sufficientlybroken up the Augusta road, I wanted to shift his hole armyaround by the rear to Thomas's extreme right, and hoped thusto reach the other railroad at East oint. While we satthere we could hear lively skirmishing going on near us (downabout the distillery), and occasionally round-shot from twelve ortwenty-four pound guns came through the trees in reply to thoseof Schofield, and we could hear similar sounds ll along downthe lines of Thomas to our right, and hisown to the left; butpresently the firing appeared a little more brisk (especially overabout Giles A. Smith's division), and then we heardan occasionalgun back toward Decatur. I asked him what it meant. Wetook my pocket-compass (which I always carried), and by notingthe direction of the sound, we becae satisfied that the firingwas too far to our left rear to be explained by known fats, andhe hastily called for his horse, his staff, and his orderlies.McPherson was then in his prime (about thirty-four yearsold), over six feet high, and a very handsome man in everyway, was universally liked, and had many noble qualities.He had on his boots outside his pantaloons, gauntlets on hishands, had on his major-general's uniform, and wore a sword-belt, but no sword. le hastily gathered his papers (save one,which I now possess) into a pocket-book, put it in his breast-pocket, and jumped on his horse, saying e wuld hurrydown his line and send me back word what these sounds meant.His adjutant-general, Clark, Inspector-General Strong, and hisaides, Captains Steele and Gile, were with him. Althoughthe sound of musketry on our left grew in volume, I wasnot so much disturbed by it as by the sound of artillery backtoward Decatur. I ordered Schofield at once to send a bri-gade back to Decatur (some five miles) and was walking up and
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4] ATLANTA, CAMPAIGN.own the porch of the Howard louse, listening, when oneMcPherson's staff, with his horse covered with sweat, dashedSto the porh, and reported that General M herson washer "killed or a prisoner." explained that when theyad left me a few minutes before, they had ridden rapidlyross to the railroad, the sounds of battle increasing as theyared the position occupied by enral Giles A. Sith's divi-n, and that McPherson had sent first one, then another ofs staff to bring some of the reserve brigades of t the Fifteenthrps over tio the exposed left flank; that he had reached thead of Dodge's corps (marching by the flank on the diagonal ad as described), and had ordered it to hurry forward to theme point; that then, almost if not entirely alone, he had fol-wed this road leading across the wooded valley behind the Sev-tnth Corps, and had disappeared in these woods, doubtlessith a sense of absolute security. The sound of musketryas there heard, and McPherson's horse came back, bleeding,ounded, and riderless. I ordered the staff offlcer who broughts message to eturn at once, to find General Logan (the senior er present with the Army of the Tennessee), to report thee facts to him, and to instruct him to drive back this sup-d small foe, which had evidently got around the Seven-enth Corps through the blind woods in rear of our left flank.dispatched one of my own staf (McCoy, I think) to Gen-al Loan wh similar orders, telling him to refuse his leftankand to ight the battle (holding fast to Leggett's Hill) withSArmy of the Tennessee; that I would personally look toecatur and to the safety of his rear, and would reinforce hinthe needed it. I dispatched orders to General Thomas on ourght, telling him of this strong sally, and my inference thatin his front had evidently been weakened by reasond that he ought to take advantage of the opportu-ty to make a odgment in Atlanta, if possible.Meantime the sounds of the battle rose on our extreme leftore and more furious,extending to the place where I stood, atSHoward House. Within an hour an ambulance came inattended Colonels Clark and Strong, mnd Captains Steele and
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S ATLANTA CAMPAIuN. L .Gile), bearing McPherson's body. I had it carried inside of theHoward House, and laid on a door wrenched from its hinges. Dr.Hewitt, of the army, was there, and I asked him to examine thewound. He opened the cot and shirt, saw where the ball had ntered and where it came out, or raher lodged under the skin,and he reported that McPherson must have died in a few secondsafter being hit; that the ball had ranged upward across his body,and passed near the heart. He was dressed just as he left me, withgauntlets and boots on, but his pocket-book was gone. On fr-ther inquiry I learned that his body must have been in possessionof the enemy some minutes, during which time it was rifled ofthe pocket-book, and I was much concerned lest the letter I hadwritten him that morning should have fallen into the hands ofsome one who could read and d understand its meaning. Fortu-nately the spot in the woods where McPherson was shot wasregained by our troops in a few minutes, and the pocket-bookfound in the haversack of a prisoner of war captured at the time,and it and its contents were secured by one of Mcherson's stafWhile we were examining the body inside the house, thebattle was progressing outside, and mny shots struck the build-ing, which I feared wold take ; o I ordered Captains Steele and Gile to carry the body to Maritta. Theyreachedthat place the same night, and, on application, I ordered his per-sonal staff to go on and escort the body to is hoe, in Clyde, Ohio, where it was received with great honorand it is nowburied in a small cemetery, close by his mother's house, whichcemetery is composed in part of the familyorchard, in which heused to play when a boy. The foundation is ready laid for theequestrian monument now in progress, under the auspies ofthe Society of the Army of the Tennessee.The reports that came to me from all partsof the d revealed clearly what was the game of my antagonist, and theground somewhat favored him. The railroad and wagon-roadfrom Decatur to Atlanta lie along the s from which thewaters flow, by short, steep valleys, into the "Peach-Tree" andChattahoochee, to the west, and by other valleys, of gentlerdecliity, toward th east (or ulgee). The ridges nd le
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T S 4{DI'IATY. OF (;ErN .1. 1;. D1cPIlEP..SUVI"; i iinB nr S, 2. 'i': lnr. JUL?' IhG i.
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"i;'"'" r~"Fl '":I n ,~,,r : ls .I ss1'IrsII I I ,,, : :, ;i; ; ~:;s
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1864.] ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. 79ground were mostly alred, and had been cultivated as corn orcotton fields; but where the valleys were broken, they were leftin a stat of nature-wooded, and full of undergrowth. Mc-Pherson's line of battle was across this railroad, along a generalridge, with a gentle but cleared valley to his front, between himand the defenses of Atlanta; and another valley, behind him,was clear of timber in part, but to his left rear the country washeavily wooded. Hood, during the night of July 21st, hadwithdrawn from his Peah-Tree line, had occupied the forti-fed line of Atlanta, facing north and east, with Stewart's-formerly Polk's-corps and part of ardee's, and with G. W.Smith's division of militia. His own corps, and part of Har-dee's, had mached out to the road leading from McDonough toDecatur, and ahad turned so as to strike the left and rear of Mc-Pherson's line in air." At the same time he had sent Wheel-er's division of cavalry against the trains parked in Decatur.Unluckily for us, I had sent away the whole of Garrard's divi-sion of cavalry during the night of the 20th, with orders to pro-ceed to Covington, thirty miles east, to burn two importantbridges across the Ulofauhatchee and Yellow Rivers, to tear upthe railroad, to damage it as much as possible from Stone Moun-tain eastward, and to be gone four days; so that McPherson hadno cavalry in hand to guard that flank.The enemy was therefore enabled, under cover of the forest,.to approach quite near before he was discovered; indeed, hisskirmish-line had worked through the timber and got into thefield to the rear of Giles A. Smith's division of the SeventeenthCorps unseen,had captured Murray's battery of regular artillery,moving through these woods entirely unguarded, and had gotpossession of several of the hospital camps. The right of thisrebelline struck Dodge's troops in motion; but, fortunately, this corps (Sixteenth) had only to halt, face to the left, and wasin line of battle; and this corps not only held in check the ene-my, but drove him back through the woods. About the sametime this same force had struck General Giles A. Smith's leftflank, doubled it back, captured four guns in position and theparty engaged in builing the very battery which was the spe.4F u ; 8
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80 ATLATA CAMPAIGN. [1864.cial object of McPherson's visit to me, and almost envelopedthe entire left flank. The men, however, were skillful andbrave, and fought for a time with their backs to Atlanta.gradually fell back, compressing their own line, and gainingstrength by making junction with Leggett' division of theSeventeenth Corps, well and strongly posted on the hill. Oneor two brigades of the Fifteenth Corps, ordered by McPherson,came rapidly across the open field to the rear, from he direc-tion of the railroad, filled up the gap from Blair's new left tothe head of Dodge's column-now facing to the general left-thus forming a strong left flank, at right angles to the originalline of battle. The enemy attacked, boldly and rpeatedlythewhole of this flank, but met an equally fierce resistance; andon that ground a bloody battle raged from little after noon tillinto the night. A part of Hood's plan of action was to-sallyfrom Atlanta at the same moment; but this sally was not, forsome reason, simultaneous, for the first attack on our extremeleft flank had been checked and repulsed before the sally camefrom the direction of Atlanta. Meantime, ColonelDecatur, hadgot his teams harnessed up, and safely conductedhis train to the rear of Schofield's position, holding in checkWheeler's cavalry till he had got off all his trains, with the ex-ception of three or four wagons. I remained near the HowardHouse, receiving reports and sending orders, urging Generals Thomas and Schofield to take advantage of the absence from.their front of so considerable a body as was evidently engagedon our left, and, if possible, to make a lodgment in Atlantaitself; but they reported that the lines to their front, at allaccessible points, were strong, by nature and by art, and wfully manned. About 4 P. M. the expected sally came frAtlanta, directed mainly against Leggett's Hill and along theDecatur road. At Leggett's Hill they were met and bloodily re-pulsed. Along the railroad they were more successfu Sweep-ing over a small force with two guns, they reached our mainline, broke through it, and got possession of D Gress's batteryof four twenty-pound Parrotts, killing every horse, an turningthe guns against us. General Charles R. Wood's division of
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r81864.] ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. 3Fifteenth Corps was on the extreme right of the Army ofSTennessee, between the railroad and the Howard House,erheconnectedwith Schofield' troops. He reported toe in person that the line on his left had been swept back, andt his connection with General Logan, on Leggett's ill waskn. I ordered him to wheel his brigades to the left, to ad-vce in chelon, and to catch the enemy in flank. Generalofield brought forward ll his available batteries, to theber of twenty guns, to a position to the left front of theward House, whence we could overlook the field of action,Sdirected a heay fie over the heads of General Wood's meninst the enemy; and we saw Wood's troops advance and en-uter the enemy, who had secured possession of the old lineparapt which had been held by our men. His right crosseds parapet,which he swept back, taking it in flank; and, atsame time, the division which had been drive thn back alongrailroad wa rallied by General Logan in person, and foughttheir former ground. These combined forces drove themy into Atlanta, recovering the twenty-pound aratt gunsut one of them was found "bursted while in the possessionfthe enemy. The two six-pounders farther in advance were,vever, Jost, and had been hauled back by the enemy intolanta. Poor Captainde Gress came to me in tears, lamentingloss of his favorite guns; when they were regained he hada few men left, and not a single horse. He asked an order a r uiment, but I told him he must beg and borrow ofers till he could restore his battery, now reduced to threes. Iow he did so I do not know, but in a short time heget horses, men, and nally another gun, of the same specialternand served them with splendid effect till the very closee war. This batteryhad also been with me from Shilohthat te.The battle of July 22d is usually called the battle offrom the Howard House to General GilesSmith's position, about a mile beyond the Augusta ailroad,Sthen back towad Decatur, the whole extent of groundngfullysevenmles. In part the ground was clear ad in
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82 ATLANrTA CAMPAIGN. [1864.part densely wooded. I rode over the whole of it the next day,and it bore the marks of a bloody conflct. The enemy hadretre during the night inside of tlant, ad we remainedmasters of the situation outside. Ipurposely allowed the Armyof the Tennessee to fight tis battl almost unaided, save bdemonstrations on the part of General Schofield and Thomaagainst the fortified lines to their immediate fronts, and by de-tacing, as described, one of Schofield's brigades to Detr,because I knew that the attacking force could only be a part ofHood's, army, and that, if any assistance were rendered by eitherof the other armies, the Army of the Tennessee would bejealous. Nobly did they do their wrk that day, and terriblewas the slaughter done to our enemy, though at sad cost to our-selves, as shown by the following reports :General IIAu.Eas, WaAington, 1). C.Yesterday morning the enemy fell back to the intrenchments proper ofthe city of Atlanta, which are in a general circle, with a radius of one anda half miles, and we closed in. While we were forming our lines, and s-lecting positions for our batteries, the enemy appeared suddenly out of thedense woods in heavy masses on our extreme left, andstruck the Seven-teenth Corps (General Blair) in flank, and was forcing it back, when theSixteenth Corps (General Dodge) came up and checked the movement, butthe enemy's cavalry got well to our rear, and into Decatur, and for somehours ur left flank was completely enveloped. The fight that resulted wascontinuous until night, with heavy loss on both sides. The enemy tookone of our batteries (Murray's, of the Regular Army) that wamarchinginits place in column in the road, unconseou of danger. About 4 P. .theenemy sallied against the division of Generl Morgan L Smith, of theFifteenth Corps, which ccupied an abandoned line of rifle-trench near therailroad east of the city, and forced it back some four hundred yardsleaving in his hands for the time two batteris, but the grond and batterieswere immediately after recovered by the same troops renfored. I can-not well approximate our loss, which fell heavily on th Fifenth andSeventeenth Corps, but count it as three thousand; I know that, being onthe defensive,we have inflicted equally heavy loss on the enemy.General 1McPherson, when arranging his troops about A. m., andpassing from one column to another, incautiously rode upon an ambuscade P ~~ ~~~~~ ~~ (~~er
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.1864.] ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. 83without appresion, at some istance ahead of his staff and orderlies, andwas shot dead.W. T. SHsEAN, ajor-General commanding.McPherson's sudden death, and Logan succeeding to the command as itwere in the midst of battle, made some confusion on our extreme left ; butit soon recovered and made sad havoc with the enemy, who had practisedone of his favorite games of attaking our left when in motion, and beforeit had time to cover its weak flank. After riding over the ground and hear-ing the varying statements of the actors, I directed General Logan to makean oflicial report of the actual result, and I herewith inclose it.Thugh the number f dead rebels seems excessive, I am disposed togive full credit to the report that our loss, though only thirty-five hundredand twenty-one killed, wounded, and missing, the enemy's dead alone onthe field nerly equaled that number, viz., thirty-two hundred and twenty.Happening at that pointof the line when a flag of truce was sent in toask permission for each party to bury its dead, I gave General Logan au-thority to permit a tempo y truce on that flank alone, wle our laborsand fighting proceeded at all others.I also send you a copy f General Garrard's report of the breaking ofthe railroad toward Augusta. I am now grouping my command to attackthe Macon road, and wth that view will intrench a strong line of circum-vallation with anks, so as to have as large an infantry column as possible,with alth cavalry to swing round t to the south and east, to strike thatroad at or below East Point.I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,W. T. Smiss, Major-General commanding.HIFn uAarsn~s DEP x RxiNT AnD Aa=OFTv OTERNE SSe,Mo-Genrul W. T. SansE::, commanding Mfilitarg Diision of the Mis-eiasipp GENEAL: the to eport the following general summary ofthe result of the attack of the enemy on this ariy on the 22d inst.Total loss, killed, wounded, and missing, thirty-five hundred and twenty-one, andl t en pieces of artillery.We have buried and deliverd to the enemy, under a flag of trucesent inI~~ B ~ v e o~~ s~nttv~tg-. 4
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g4 ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. [1884,by themin front of the Third Division, Seventeenth Corps, one thousandof their killed. The number of their dead in front of the ourth Division of the samecorps, including those on the ground not now occupied by our troops, Gen-eral Blair reports, will swell the number of their dead on his front to twthousand.The number of their dead buried in frontof the Fifteenth Corps, up tothis hour, is three hundred and sixty, and the commandingthat at least as many more are yet unburied, burying-parties being still atwork.The number of dead buried in front of the Sixteenth Corps isdred and twenty-two. We have over one thousand of their wounded inour hands, the larger number of the wounded being carried off during thenight, after the engagement, by them.We captured eighteen stands of colors, and have them now. We alsocaptured five thousand stands of arms.The attack was made on our lines eve times, and was even tes re-pulsed. Hood's and Hardee's corps and Wheeler's cavalry engaged us.We have sent to the rear one thousand prisoners, including thirty-threecommissioned officers of high rank.We still occupy the field, and the troops are in fine spirits. A detailedand full report will be furnished as soon as completed.RecapitulationOur total loss ............. ........ ... ............ 3,21Enemy's dead, thus far reported, buried, and deliveredto them.............. .. ........... 3,220Total prisoners sent North ............. .......... 1017.Total prisoners, wounded, in our hands 1.0..... .:... 1,000Estimated loss of the enemy, at least..... .... .10,000Very respectfully, your obedient servant,Jom A. Lousx, ajor-General.On the 22d of July General Rousseau reached Marittahaving returned from his raid on the Alabama road at Opelika,and on the next day General Garrard also returned from Cov-ington, both having been measurably successfl. The formerwas about twenty-five hundred strong, the latter about four thousand, and both reported that their horses were jaded andtired, needing shoes and rest. Bt, aboutthis time, was ad-vised by General Grant (then investing Richmond) that the* 4 4I., 4iii; 4~4~li, 4' i ii i~lii~ ~ i ii ii il ii~i
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bel Government had become aroused to the critic conditionfthings about Atlanta, and that Imust look out for Hood beinggreatly renforced. I therefo rwa resolved to push matters,nd at once set about the original purpose of transferring thewhole of the Army of the Tennessee to our right flank, leavingofield to stretch out so as to rest his left on the Augustaoad, then torn up for thirty miles eastward; and, as auxiliaryheret, I ordered all the cavalry to be ready to pass aroundtlant on both flanks, to break up the Macon road at somepointbelow, so as to cut off all supplies to the rebel army inside,nd thus to force t to evauate or come out and figt us onBut it fist became necessary to settle the important questionSw hoiold succeed General McPherson? General Logand taken command of the Army of the Tennessee by virtue ofis seniority, and had done well; but I did not consider himtequtote commnd of three corps. Between him and Genral Blair there existed a natural rivalry. Both were men of greatrage and talent, but were politicians by nature and experience,ndit may be that for this reason they were mistrusted by regu-ar offeorsike Generals Schofield, Thomas, and myself. It was-important that there should exist a perfect understandingaong the army commanders, and at a conference with Generaleorge H. Thomas at the headquarters of General Thomas J.Woods, comianding a division in the Fourth Corps, he(Thoras) remonstrated warmly against my recommending thateneral Logan shoud regularly assigned to the command ofyhe Arn of the Tennessee by reason of his accidental seniority.We discussed fully the merits and qualities of every officer ofhigh rank in the army, and inally settled on Major-General O.O. Howard as the best officer who was present and available forthe purpose; on the 24th of July I telegraphed to General Hal-leck this preference, and it was promptly ratified by the Presi-dent. Generaloward's place in command of the Fourth Corpswas filled by General Stanley, one of his division commanders,on the recommendation of General Thomas. All these promotions happened to fall upon West-Pointers, and doubtless Logan
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86 ATLANTA CAMPA1iii [1864.and Blair had some reason to beieve that we intended to monopolize the higher honors of the war for the regular o ers. I re-member well my own thoughts and feelings at the time, and feelsure that I was not intentionally partial to any class. I wantedto succeed in taking Atlanta,andneeded com nders who werepurely and technically soldiers, men who would obey orders andexecute them promptly and on time; for I knew that we wouldhave to execute some most delicate manouvres, reiring the ut-most skill, nicety, and precision. I believed that General Howard would do all these faithfully and well, and I thinkhas justified my choice. I regarded both Generals Loan andBlair as "volunteers," that ooked to personal fame and gloryas auxiliary and secondary to their political ambition, and notas professional soldiers.As soon as it was known that General owrdadbeenchosen to command the Army of the Tennessee General Hookerapplied to General Thomas to be relieved of thethe Twentieth Corps, and General Thomas forwarded his application to me approved and earty recommended. I at oncetelegraphed to General 1Hallek, recommendingcum (then at icksbrg) to be his successor, because Shad been displaced from the command of his corps at the timewhen the Eleventh and Twelfth were united and made theTwontieth.General Hooker was offended because he was not chosen tosucceed McPherson ; but his chances were not even consideredindeed, I had never been satisfied with him since his affair at thKulp House, and had been more than once disposed to relievehim of his corps, because of his repeated attempts to interferewith Generals McPherson and Schofield. I am told that he saysthat Thomas and I were jealous of him; but ths is hardlyprobable, for we on the spot did not rte his ghting qualitiesas high as he did, and I am, moreover, convined that bothand General Butterfield went to the rear for personal reasons.We were then two hundred and fifty miles in advance of ourbase, dependent on a single line of railroad for our dailyWe had a bol, determined foe in our immediate front, stro ly
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ntrenchedwith communication open to his rear for supplies andreinforcements, and every soldier realized that we had plentyof hard fighting ahead, and that all honors had to be fairlycarned. General Hooker, moreover, when he got back toCincinnati, reported ( was told) that we ad run upagainst arock at Atlanta, and that the country ought to be prepared tohear of disaster from that quarter.Until General Slocum joined (in the latter part of August),the Twentieth Corps was commanded by General A. S.Williams,the senior division co and present. On the 25th of July thearmythereforestood thus the Army of the Tennessee (Ge al O. Howard coumanding) was on the left, pretty much on thesamne ground it had occupied during the battle of the 22d, allready to move rapidly by the rear to the extreme right beyondProctor's Creek; the Army of the Ohio (General Schofield)was next in order, with its left flank reaching the AugustaRailroad; next in order, conforming closely with the rebel in-trenchments of Atinta, was General Thomass Army of theCumberland, in the order of-the Fourth Corps (Stanley's),the Twentieth Corps (Williams's), and the Fourteenth Corps(Pahner's). Paner's right division (Jefferson C. Davis') wasstrongly refused a ongProctor's Creek. This line was about fiveiles long, and was intrenhed as against a sally about as strongas was our enemy. The cavalry was assembled in two strongdivisions; that of McCook (including the brigade of Hlarrisoawhich had been brought in from Opelika by General Rousseau)numbered about thirty-flive hundred effective eavalry, and wasposted to our right rear, at Turner's Ferry, where we hada good pontoon-bridge; and to our left rear, at and about Decatur, were the two c avalry divisions of Stoneman, twenty-five hundred, and Garrard, four thousand, united fqr the teand occasion under the command of Major-General GeorgeStoneman, a caar-o er of high repute. My plan o actionwas to move the Army of the Tennessee to the right rapidlyand boldly against the railroad below Atlanta, and at the sametime to send all the avalry around by the right and lft tmake a lodgent on the road about Jonesboro.R + : + s+ : + + :[ 1 + A
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88 ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. [864,All the orders were given, and the m toie~ ng 2th wasfixed for commencing the movement. On the 6th I receivedfrom General Stoneman a note asking permission (after havingaeeomplished his orders to break up the railroad at Jonesboro') toon to Macon to rescue our prisoners of war known to be heldthere, and then to push on to Andersonville, where was the greatdepot of Union prisoners, in which were penned at one time asany as twentythree thousand of our men, badly fed and harshlytreated. I wrote him an answer consenting substantially to hisproposition, only modifying it by requiring him to send backGeneral Garrard's division to its position on our left flank afterhe had broken up the railroad t Jonesboro'. Promptly, and ontime, all got off, and General Dodge's corps (the Sixteenth, of theArmy of the Tennessee) reached its position across Protor'sCreek the same evening, and early the next morning (the 28th)Blair's corps (the Seventeenth) deployed on his right, both corpscovering thpir front with the usual parapet; the Fifteenth Corps(General Logan's) came up that morning onti e of Blair,strongly refused, and began to prepare the usual cover. AsGeneral Jeff. C. Davis's division was, as it wr, left out ofline, I ordered it on the evening before to march down towardTurner's Ferry, and then to take a road laid down on our mapswhich led from there toward East Point, ready to engage anyenemy that might attack our general right fiank, after the samemanner as had been done to the left flank on the 22d.Personally on the morning of the 28th I followed the move-ment, and rode to the extreme right, where we could hear someskirmishing and an occasional cannon-shot. As we approachedthe ground held by the Fifteenth Corps, a cannon-ball passedovermy shoulder and killed the horse of an orderly behind; and seeing that this gun enfiladed the road by which'we were riding,we turned out of it and rode down into a valey, where we leftour horses and walked up to the hill held by Morgan L. Smith'sdivision of the Fifteenth Corps. Near a house I met GeneralsHoward and Logan, who explained that there was an intrenchedbattery to their front, with the appearance of a strong infantrysupport. I then walked up to the ridge, where I found Gen;l;;a +=++ + +. ++ +; ++++:+,++g+ + + + + & + + ; +: : +, :+ + + + + :+ ++ :+ +:+++++ ++++/ + ++ -+ +, + ++ + + + : + + + +:+ + + + +++ ++::+:++/:+++;++@i~ + + : + + +++++ +++++ ++ ++ ++ +++
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eral Morgan L Smith. His men were deployed and engagedin rolling logs and fence-rails, preparing a hasty cover. Fromthis ridge we could overlook the open fields near a meet-ing-house known as Ezra Church," close by the Poor-House.We could see the fresh earth of a parapet covering some guns(that fired an occasional shot), and there was also an ppear-ance of activity beyond. General Smith was in the act ofsending forward a reg ent from his right flank to feel theposition of the enemy, when I explained to him and to GeneralsLogan and Howard that they must look out for General Jeff.C.Davis'sdivision, which was coming up from the direction off Turner's Ferry.As the skirmish-fire warmed up along the front f Blair'scorps, as well as along the Fifteenth Corps (Logan's), I becameconvinced that Hood designed to attack this right flank, to pre-vent, if posible, the extension of our line in that diretion. Iregained my horse, and rode rapidly back to snee that Davis'sdivision hadbeen dispatched as ordered. I found General Davisin person, who was unwell, and had-sent his division that morn-ing early, under the command of his senior brigadier, or-gan; but, as I attached great importance to the movement, hemounted his horse, and rode away to overtake and to hurry for-ward the movement, so as to come up on the left rear of theenomy, during the expected battle.By this time the sound of caunnon and musketry denoted asevero battle as in progress, which began seriously at l1 A. x,and ended substantially by 4 .It was a fierce attack by theenemy on our extreme right flank, well posted and partiallyovered. The moat authentic account of the battle is given byGeneral Logan, who commanded the Fifteenth Corps, in hisofcial report to the Adjutant-General of the Army of the Ten-HEJQARTERS F=TE1T ARM CRPS,EEoRE ATLANTA, GEO Juy 2, 184.iutercant-Colonel WILLf T. CLARK, Assistant Adjutant-General, ArmyCOLONEL: I h1ave the honor to report that, in pursuance of orders, I
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moved my command into position on the right of the Seventeenth Corpswhich was the extreme right of the army in the field, during the night ofthe 27th and morning of the S2th; and, while advancing in line of battleto a more favorable position, we were met by the rebel infantry of ardee'sand Lee's corps, who made a determined and desperate attack on us at 11jA. M. of the 28th (yesterday).y lines were only protected by logs and rails, hastily thrown up infront of them.The first onset was received and checked, and the battle commencedand lasted until about three o'clock in the evening. During thatsuccessive charges were made, which were six times gallantly repuled,time with fearful loss to the enemy.Later in the evening my lines were several times assaulted vigorously,but each time with like result.The worst of the fighting occurreon General Harrow's and Morgan L.Smith's fronts, which formed the centre and right of the corps.The troops could not have displayed greater courage, nor greater determination not to give ground; had they shown less, they would have beendriven from their position.Brigadier-Generals C. R. Woods, Harrow, and Morgan L. Smith, divisioncommanders, are entitled to equal credit for gallant conduct and skill inrepelling the assault.My thanks are due to Major-Generals Blair and Dodge for sending mreinforcements at a tie when they were much needed.My losses were fifty killed, four hundred and forty-nine wounded, andseventy-three mising: aggregate, five hundred and seventy-two.The division of General Harrow captured five battle-flags. The wereabout fifteen hundred o two thousand muskets left on the groundOne hundred and six prisoners were captured, exclusive of seventy-threewounded, who were sent to our hospital, and are being cared for by oursurgeons.Five hundred and sixty-five rebels have up to this time been buried,and about two hundred are supposed to be yet unburied.A large number of their wounded were undoubtedly carried away inthe night, as the enemy did not withdraw till near daylight. The enemy'sloss could nothave been less than six or seven thousand men.A more detailed report will hereafter be made.I am, very respectfully,Your obedient servant, 'Aljor-General, commanding fteenth A y Corps.eneral Howard, in transmitting this report, added:2> l
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-1864.] ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. 91I wish to express my high gratification with the conduct of the troopsengaged. I neve saw btter onduct in battle. General Logan, though illand much worn out, was indefatigable, and the success of the day is asmuch attributable to him as to any one man.This was, of course, the first fight in which General Howardhad commanded the Army of the Tennessee, and he evidentlyaimed to reconcile General Logan in his disappointment, and togain the heart of his army, to which he was a stranger. Hevery properly left General Logan to fight his own corps, butexposed himslf freely; and, after the firing had ceased, in theafternoon e walked the lines; the men, as reported to me,gathered about him in the most affectionate way, and he atonce gained their respect and onfdence. To this fact I at thetime attached much importance, for it put me at ease as to thefuture conduct of that most important army.At no instant of time did I feel the least uneasiness aboutthe result on the 28th, but wanted to reap fuller results, hopingthat Diavis's division would come up at the instant of defeat,nd catch the enemy in flank; but the woods were dense, theroads obscure, and as usual this division got on the wrong road,and did not come into position until about dark. In like man-ner, I thought that Hood had greatly weakened his main linesinside of Atlanta, and accordingly sent repeated orders to Scho-field and Thomas to make an attempt to break in; but bothreported that they found the parapets very strong and fullmanned.Our men were unusually encouraged by this day's work,for they realized that we could compel Hood to come outfrom behind his fortified lines to. attack us at a disadvantage.In conversation with me, the soldiers of the Fifteenth Corps,with whom I was on the most familiar terms, spoke of theaffair of the 28th as the easiest thing in the world; that, infact it was a common slaughter of the enemy; they pointedout where the rebel lines had been, and how they themselveshad fired deiberately, had shot down their antagonists, whosebodies stilay unburied, and marked plainly their lines ofbattle, which must have halted within easy musket-range of4~-r 4
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92 ATLANTTA CAMPAIGN, [1864.our men, who were partially protected by their improvised lineof logs and fence-rails. All bore willing testimony to the cotr-age and spirit of the foe, who, though repeatedly repulsed,came back with increased determination some six or moretimes.The next morning the Fifteenth Corps wheeled forward tothe left over the battle-field of the day before, and Davis's di-vision still farther prolonged the line, which reached nearly tothe ever-to-be-remembered Sandtown road."Then, by further thinning out Thomas's line, which waswell intrenched, I drew another division of Palmer's corps(Ward's) around to the right, to further strengthen that flank.I was impatient to hear from the cavalry raid, thenfour daysout, and was watching for its effect, ready to ake a bold pushfor the possession of East Point. General Garrards division re-turned to Decatur on the 31st, and reported that General Stone-man had posted him at Flat Rock, while he (Stoneman) went on.The monh of July therefore closed with our infantry line strong-ly intrenched, but drawn out from the Augusta road on the leftto the Sandtown road on the right, a distance of full ten measuredmiles.The enemy, though evidently somewhat intimidated by theresults of their defeats on the 22d and 28th, still presented abold front at all points, with fortified lines that defied a directassault. Our railroad was done to the rear of our camps, ColonelW. W. Wright having reconstructed the bridge across the Chat1tahoochee in six days; and our garrisons and detachments to therear had so effectually guarded the railroad that the trains fromNashville arrived daily, and our substantial wants were wellsupplied.The month, though hot in the extrme, hadbeen one ofconstant conflict, without intermission, and on four several oc-casions-viz., July 4th, 20th, 22d, and 28th-hese airs damounted to real attles, with casualty lists by the thousands.Ass ing he correctness of the rebel surgeon Foard's report,on page 577 of Johnston's "Narrative," commencing with July4th and terminating with July 31st, we have
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1864.] ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. 93CORPS. a Knled. -&Ta. k.............................. 1528 2774 8,297-9 158; 1 sLee's... 81 2 2Btewarts.. ..... .............. 436 2,141 5TW heelersCavalry .................... 29 156 >Engineers.................. ...... 2 21 2:3Total .............. ..... ... 1,841 7 41To these I add as prisoners, at least... 2,000Aggregate loss of the enemy in July, 184............ 10,841Our losses, as compiled from the official returns for July,1564, are :ARMY OF TE CUMBERLA\D.CORPS, KUM and M ling. Wounded. T.alFourth ......................... .... 116 432 49Fourt nth............................ 817 1,401Twentieth.... .. ... .... 1 .92, 1Total, Army of the C umberland.... 974 2,99 8-90ARMY OF THE TEITN'ESSEE.CORPS, KflMe end M1..frng. F~o.,nde. Total.Fiftenth ... 1, 21,teenth1Sevente th .. 1 2,4Tota, Aruy of the Tennessee..... 2,240 2,71 4,961ARMY OF THE OHIO.CORPS. Kh1oKed and Mnslvg. Wod. Totnb.Twenty-third.... 95 167 262 8valry ... 2Toba, Army ofthe Ohio .90 198 78 Aggregat ofrJuly............ 8, 4 ,915 9,71In this table the column of "killed and missin g" embracesthe prisoners that fell into the hands of the enemy, mostly lostin the Seventeenth Corps, on the 22d of July, and does not
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g4 ATLANTA CAfPAIGN. [1864.embrace the losses in the cavalry divisions of Garrard andMlcCook, which, however, were small for July. In all otherrespects the statement is absolutely correct. I am satisfied,however, that Surgeon Foard could not have been in possessionof data sufficiently accurate to eiable him to report the losses inactual battle of men who never saw the hospital. During thewhole campaign I had rendered to me tri-monthly statements of"effective strength," from which I carefully eliminated thefigures not essential for m conduct, so that at all times I knewthe exact fighting-strength of each corps, division, and brigade,of the-whole army, and also endeavored to bear in mind ourlosses both on the several fields of battle and by sickness, andwell remember that I always estimated that during the monthof July we had inflicted heavier lss on the enemy than wehad sustained ourselves, and the above figures prove it conclu-sively. Before closing this chapter, I must recor on or twominor events that occurred about this time that may jprointerest.On the 24th of July I received a dispatch from InsGeneral James A. Hardie, then on duty at the War Depart-ment in Washington, to the effect that Generals Osterhaus andAlvan P. Ilovey had been appointed major-generals. Both ofthese had begun the campaign with us in command of divisions,but had gone to the rear-the former by reason of sickness, andthe latter dissatisfied with General Schofield' and myself aboutthe composition of his division of the Twenty-hird Corps.Both were esteemed as first-class officers, who had gained specialdistinction in the Vicksburg campaign. But up to that time,when the newspapers announced daily promotions elsewhere,no prominent officers serving with me had been advanced a peg,and I felt hurt. I answered Hardie on the 25th, in a dispatchwhich has been made public, closing with this language: "If te rear behe rear be the post of honor, then we had better all changefront on Washington." To my amazement, in a few days Ireceived from President Lincoln imself an answer, in whichhe caught me fairly. I have not preserved a copy of that dis-patch, and suppose it was burned up in the Chicago fire; but it
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was characteristic of Mr. Lincoln, and was dated the 260t or2th day of July, contained unequivocal expressions of respectfor those who were fghting hard and unselfishly, offering usa full share of the honors and rewards of the war, and sayingthat, in the cases of Ilovey andOsterhaus, he was influencedmainly by the recommendations of Generals Grant and Sher-man. On the 27th I replied direct, apologizing somewhat formy message to Geneal ardi, saying that I did not supposesuch messages ever reached him personally, explaining thatGeneral Grant's and Sheran's recommendations for Hovey andOsterhaus had been made when the events of the Vicksburgcampaign were fresh with us, and that my dispatch of the 25thto General ardie had reflected chiefly th feelings of theofcersthen present with me before Atlanta. The result of allthis, however, was good, for another dispatch from Generalardie, of the 28th, called on me to nominate eight colonels forpromotion as brigadier-generals. I at once sent a circular noteto the army-cormanders to nominate two colonels from theA y of the Ohio and threefrom each of the others; and theresult was, that on the 29th of July I telegraphed the names of-Colonel William Gross, Thirty-sixth Indiana; Colonel CharlesC. Walcutt, Forty-sixth Ohio; Colonel James W. Riley, OneHundred ad Furth Ohio; Colonel L. P. Bradley, Fifty-firstinoi; Colonel J. .Sprague, Sixty-third Ohio; ColonelJoseph A. Cooper Sixth East Tennessee; Colonel John T.Croxton, Fourth entuky; Colonel William W. Belknap, Fif-teeth Iowa. These were promptly appointed brigadier-gen-rl, were already in command of brigades or divisions; and Idoubt if ight promotions were ever made fairer, or ere morehonely earned, during the whole.war.
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CHAPTER XVII1.CAPTURE OF ATLANTA.AUGUST AND SEPTEMBEI, 1864.THE month of August opened hot and sultry, but our po-sition before Atlanta was healthy, with ample supply of wood,water, and provisions. The troops had become habituated tothe slow and steady progress of the siege; the skirish-lineswere held close up to the enemy, were covered by rifle-trenchesor logs, and kept up a continuous clatter of musketry. Themain lines were held farther back, adapted to the shape of theground, with muskets loaded and stacked for instant use. Thefield-batteries were in select positions, covered by handsomeparapts, and occasional sots from them gav lif and anationto the scene. The men loitered about the trenches carelessly,or busied themselves in constructing ingenious huts out of theabundant timber, and seemed as snug, confortable, and happy,as though they were at home. General Schofield was still onthe extreme left, Thomas in the centre, and Howard on theright. Two divisions of the Fourteenth Corps (Baird's and Jeff.C. Davis's) were detached to the right rear, and held in reserve.I thus awaited the effect of the cavalry movement againstthe railroad about Jonesboro', and .had heard from GeneralGarrard that Stoneman had gone on to Macon; during thatday (August 1st) Colonel Brownlow, of a Tennessee cavalryreiment, came in to arietta from General McCook and re-ported that McCook's whole division had bn overwhelmed,defeated, and captured at Newnan. Of course, I ws disturbedby this wild report, though I discredited itbutmade all ssible
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1864.] CAPTURE OF ATLANTA.reparationstostrengthen our guads along the railroad to therear, on the theory that the force of cavalry which had defeatedCook would at once be on the railroad about Marietta. Athe same time Garrard was ordered to occupy the trenches onur left, while Schofield's whole army moved to the extremeightandextendedthe line toward East Point. Thoas wasso ordered still further to thin out his lines, so as to set freehe other division (Johnson's) of the Fourteenth Corps (Palm-r's), which was moved to the extreme right rear, and held ineserve ready to make a bold push from that flank to secure aooting on the Macon Railroad at or below East Point.These changes were effected during the Ed and 3d days ofAugust,-when General McCook came in and reported the actualesults of his cavalry expedition. e had crossed the Chatta-oochee River below Campbellton, by his pontoon-bridge; hadhen mared rapidly across to the Macon Railroad at Lovejoy'station, where he had reason to expect General Stoneman; but,not hearing of him, he set to work, tore up two miles of track,burned two trains of cars, and cut away five miles of telegraph-wire. He also found the wagon-frain belonging to the rebelrmy in Atlanta, burned five hundred wagons, killed eight hun-red ules, and captured seventy-two officers and three hundrednd fifty men. Finding his progress eastward, toward Mc-onough, barred by a superior force, he turned back to Newnan,hre he found himself completely surrounded by infantry andavalry. He had to drop his prisoners and fight his way out,osing about six hundred men in killed and captured, and theneturned with the remainder to his position at Turner's Ferry. This was bad enough, but not so bad as had been reported byColonel Brownlow. Meantime, rumors came that GeneralStoneman was down about Macon, on the east bank of the Oc-ulgee. On the 4th of August Colonel Adams got to Mariettawith his small brigade of nine hundred men belonging to Stone-'s cavalry, reporting, as usual, all the rest lost, and this waspartiallyconfirmedby a report which came to me ll the wayround by General Grant's headquarters before Richmond. Aw days afterward Colonel Capron also got in, with another33h :1 1e1 spstina unesFlFCam+ o m te aers b:ore Ichmon
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small brigade perfectly demoralized, and confirmed the reportthat General Stoneman had covered the escape of these twosmall brigades, himself standing with a reserve of seven hundredmen, with which he surrendered to a Colonel Iverson. Thusanother of my cavalry divisions was badly damaged, and out ofthe f ragments we hastily reorganized three small divisions underrigadier-Generals Garrard, MCook and Kilpatrick.Stoneman had not obeyed his orders to attack the railroadfrst before going to Macon and Andersonville, but had crossedthe Ormulgee River high up near Covington, and had gonedown that river on the est ank. reached Clinton, andsent out detachments which struck the railroad leading fromMacon to Savannah at Griswold Station, where they foundand destroyed seventeen locomotives and over a hundredars; then went on and burned the bridge across the Ocone,and reunited the division before Macon. Stoneman shened thetown across the river, bhut could not cross over by the bridge, and returned to Clinton, where he found his retreat obstructedas he supposed, by a superior force. There be came bewil-ered, and sacrificed himselffor the safety of hiscommand.Heoccupied the attention of his enemy by a small force of sevenhundred men, giving Colonels Adam and Capron leave, withtheir brigades, to cut their way bck to me at Atlanta.Theformer reached us entire, but the latter was struck and sat-tered at some place farther north, and came in by detachments.Stoneman suriendered, and remained a prisoner until he wasexchanged some time after, late in September, at Rough andReady.I now became satisfied that cavalry could not, or would not,make a sufficient lodgment on the railroad below Atlanta, andthat nothing would suffice but for us to reach it with the mainarmy. Therefore the most urgent efforts to that end were made,and to Schofield, on the right, was committed the charge ofthis special object. Hie had his own corps (the Twenty-third),composed of eleven thousand and seventy-ive infantry andeight hundred and eighty-five artillery, with McCook's brokenlivision of cavalry, seventeen hundred lland fifty-four men and
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1864.1 CAPTURE OF ATLANTA. 99horses. For this purpose I also placed the Fourteenth Corps(Paer) unde s orders. This corps numbered at the timeseventeen thousand two hundred and eighty-eight infantryand eight hundred and twenty-six artillery; but GeneralPalmer claimed to rank General Scofield in the date of hiscommission as major-general, and denied the latter's right toexercise command over him. Geeral Palmer was a man ofabilitybutwas nt enterprising. His three divisions werecompact and stong, well commanded, admirable on the defen-sivebutslow to move or to act on the offensive. His corps(the Fourteenth) had sustained, up to that time, fewer hardknocks than any other corps in the whole army, and I wasanxious to give it a chance. I always expected to have a des-perate fight to get possession of the Macon road, which wasthen the vital objective of the campaign. Its possession by uswould, in my judgment, result in the capture of Atlanta, andgive us the fruits ofvictory, although the destruction of Hood'sarmy was the real object to be desired. Yet Atlanta was knownas the Gate-City of the South," was full of founderies, arse-nals, and machine-shops, and I knew that its capture would bethe death-kne of the Southern Confederacy.On the 4th of August I ordered General Schofield to makea bold attack on the railroad, anywhere about East Point, andordered General Palmer to report to him for duty. He atonce denied General Schofield's right to command him; but,examining the dates of their respective commissions, andhearingtheir argument, I wrote to General Palmer.August 4th--10.45 P. t.From the statements made by yourself and General Schofield to-day,my decision is, that he rnks you as a major-general, being of the samedate of present commission, by reason of his previous superior rank asbrigadier-general. The moemets of o-morrow are so important that theorders of the superior on that flank must be regarded as military ordersandnotinthe nature of coperation. I did hope that thtre would be nonecessity for my making this deision; but it is better for all parties inter-estedthatnoquestion of rank houl occur in actual battle. The Sand-town road, and the railroad, if possible must be gained to-morrow, if it
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costs half your command. I regard the loss of time this afternoon as eqalS to the loss of two thousand men. .I also communicated the substance of this to General Thom-as, to whose army Palmer's corps belonged, who replied onthe 5th:Sregre to hear that Palmer has taken the course e has, and I knowthat he intends to offer his resignation as soon as he can properly do so. .recommend that his application be granted.And on the 5th I again wrote to General Palmer, arguingthe point with him, advising him, as a friend, not to resign atthat crisis lest his motives might be misconstrued, and becauseit mightdamage his future career in ciil life; but, at t sametime, I felt it my duty to him that the operations on thati ankduring the 4th and 5th, had not been satisfactory-notimputing to him, however, any want of energy or skill, but in-sisting that "the events did not keep pace with my desires."General Schofield had reported to me that night:I am compelled to acknowledge that I have totally failed to make anyaggressive movement with the Fourteenth orp. I have ordered GeneralJohnson's division to replace General Hascl's this evening, and I proposeto-morrow to take my own troops (Twenty-third Corp) to th rightandtry to recover what has been lost by two days'elay. The force maylikely be too small.I sanctioned the movement, and ordered two of Palmerdivisions-Davis's and Baird's-to follow en 6odon in sup-port of Schofield, and summoned General almer to meet mein person. Hie came on the 6th to my headquarters, and in-sisted on his resignation being accepted, for which formal act Ireferred him to General Thomas. He then rode to GeneralThoma's camp, where he made a written reigation of his oficeas commander of the Fourteenth Corps, nd was granted theusual leave of absence to go to his home in Illinois, there toawait further orders. General Thomasrecommended that resignation be accepted; that Johnson, the senior division com-mander of the corps, should be ordered back to Nashville~l~~ j~~i4
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64.] CAPTURE OF.ATLANTA 101hief of cavalry, and that Brigadier-General Jefferson C. Davis,e next in oer, should be promoted major-general, and as-gned to co and the corps. These changes had to be referredSthe President, in Washington, and were,induetime,ap-oved and executed; and thenceforward I had no reason tocnplain of the slowness or inactivity of that splendid corps.thad bon originally formed by General George H. Thomas,d been commanded by him in person, and had imbibed some-hat his personal character, viz., steadiness, good order, andliberation-nothing hasty or rash, but always safe, "slow, andOn August 7th I telegraphed to General Halleck :Have received to-day the dispatehes of the Secretary of War and oferal Grant, which are very satisfactory. We keep hammering awaythe teand there is no peace, inside or outside of Alanta. To-dayneral Schofield got round the line which was assailted yesterday byGnn Reilly's brigade, turned it and gained the ground where the as-It 1ad been made, and got possession of all our dead and wounded.cotinued to press on that fank, and broug ht on a noisy bugnot aody battle. drove the enemy behind his main breastworks, whichver the railroad from Atlanta to East Point, and captured a good manythe skirmishers, who are of his best troops-for the militia hug thestworks close. I do not deem it prudent to extend any more to thehtbutwill push frward daily by parallels, and make the inside of At-tatoo hot to be endued. I have sent back to Chattanooga for tworty-pond rrtts, with which we can pick out almost any house inIam too impatnt for a siege, and don't now bt know ut this is as goodac to ght it out on, as frther inland. One thing is certain, whetheret ide of 'Atlanta or not, it will b1 a used-up community when wea done with it.In Schoield's extension on the 5th, General Reilly's brigaded struck an outwork, which he promptly attacked, but, asal, got entangled in the trees and bushes which had beenled, and lost about five hundred men, in killed and woundedt, as above report, this outworkwas found abandoned thet ay, and we could see from it that the rebels were extend-ther es, parael wih the railroad, about as fast as weuld add to our line of investment. On the 0th of August;'~ '~~~ 05s~ i~3d~lt ~W nt bigisgS Od iA
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102 CAPTURE -)F ATLANTA. (186Lthe Farrott thirty-pounders were received and placed in posi-tion; for a couple of days we kept up a sharp re from allour batteries converging on Atlanta, and at every available pointwe advanced our infantry-lines, thereby shortening and strength,ening the investment; but I was not willing to order a directassault, unless some accident or positive neglect on the part ofour antagonist should reveal an opening. However, it wassecure behind his strong defenses. He had repelled ourcavalryattacks on his railroad, and had damaged us seriously thereby,so I expected that he would attempt the same game against ourrear. Therefore I made extraordinary exertions to recomposeour cavalry divisions, which were so essential, both for defenseand offense. Kilpatrick was given that on oursupport of Schofield's exposed flank; Garrard retained that onour general left; and McCook's division was held somewhat inreserve, about Marietta and the railroad. On the 10th, havingoccasion to telegraph to General Grant, then inused this language:,Since July 28th Hood has not attempted to meet us outside his parapetsIn order to possess and destroy effectually his communications, ay hato leave a corps at the railroad-bridge, well intrnchedan cut loose withthe balance to make a circle of desolation around Atlanta. I do not propose to assault the works, which ar too strong, nor to proceed y regularapproaches. I have lost a good many regiments, and will lose more, by theexration of service; and this is the only reason why I want reinforce-ments. We have kiled, crippled, and captured more of the enemy thanwe ave lost by his acts.On the 12th of August I heard of the success of A iralFarragut in entering Mobile Bay, which was regarded as a ostvaluable auxiliary to our operations at Atlanta; and learned thatI had been commissioned a major-general in the regular army,which was unexpected, and not desiredcessful in thecapture of Atlanta. These did not chainge the fact that we wereheld in check by the stubborn defense of the place, and a coviction was forced on my mind that our nemy would hold fast,even though every house in the town should be battered do
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1864.] CAPTURE OF ATLANTA. 103by our artilery. It was evident that we must decoyhim outto fght us on something ike equal terms, orelse, with the wholearmy, raise the siege and attack his comnunications. Accord-t ingly, on the 13th of August, I gave general orders for the Twentieth Corps to draw back to the railroad-bridge at the Chat-tahoochee, to protect our trains, hospitals, spare artillery, and therailroad-depot, while the rest of the army should move bodily tosome point on the Macon Railroad below East Point.Luckily, I learned just then that the enemy's cavalry, nder,had made a wide circuit around our left flank,and had actually reached our railroad at Tilton Station, aboveResaa, captued a drove of one thousad of our beef-cattle,and was strong enough to appear before Dalton, and demand ofits commander, Clonel Raum, the surrender of the place. Gen-eral John E. Smith, who was at Kingston, collected together acouple thousand men, and proceeded in ars to th relom ef ofDalton, when Wheeler retreated northward toward Cleveland. On the 16th another detachment of the enemy's cavalry appearedin force about Allatoona and the Etowah bridge, when I be-aefne fullv convinced that Hood had sent all of his cavalry to raid upon our railroads. For some days our communicationwith Nashill was nterrpted by the destruction of the tele-graph-lines, as well as railroad. I at once ordered strong re-connoissances forward fro our flanks on the left by Garrard,and on the right by Kilpatrick. The former moved with somuch cation that I was displeased; but Kilpatrick, on the con-trary, displayed so much zeal and activity that I was ttractedto him at once. He reahed airburn Station, on the Westad, and tore it up, returning safely to his position onour right flan. I summoned him to me, and was so pleasedwith his spirit and confidence, that I concluded to suspend thegeneral movement of the main army, and to send lin with hisall division of cavalry to break up the acon road aboutJonesboro', in the hopes that it would force lood to evacuateAtlanta, and that I sould thereby not only secure possessionof the city itself, but probably could atch Hood in the con-fusion of retreat; and, frther to increas the chances of success,
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104 .CAPTURE OF ATLANTA. :184.I ordered General Thomas to detach two brigades of Garrard'sdivision of eavalry from the left to the right rear, to act as a'reserve in support of General Kilpatrick. Meantime, also, theutimost activity was ordered along our whole front by the in-fantry and artillery. Kilpatrick got off during the night of the18th, and returned to us on the 22d, having made the com-plte circuit of Atlanta. reported that he had destroyedthree miles of the railroad about Jonesboro', which he reckodedwould take ten days to repair; that e had encountered a divi-sion of infantry and a brigade of cavalry (Ros's); that he hadcaptured a battery and destroyed three of its guns, bringingone in as a trophy, and he also brought in three batseventy prisoners. On the d, hwever, we saw trains coinginto Atlanta from the south, when I became more than ever con-vinced that cavalry could not or would not work hard enough todisable a railroad properly, and therefore resolved at once toproceed to the execution of my original plan. Meantime, thedamage done to our own railroad and tlegraph by Wheeler, about Resaca and Dalton, ad been repaired, and Wheeler him-self was too far away to be of any service to his own army, andwhere he could not do us much harm, viz., up about the Iwassee. On the 24th I rode down to the Chattahooch bridgeto see in person that it could be properly defended by thesingle corps proposed to be left there for that purpose, and found'that the rebel works, which had been built by Johnston to resistus, could be easily utilized against themselves; and on returningto my camp, at 7.15 P. r. that same evening, I tgraphed toenral Halleck as follows:Heavy fires in Atlanta all day, caused by our artillery. I will be allready, and will commence the movement around Atlanta by the south, to-morrow night, and for some time you will hear little of us. I will keepopen a courier line back to the Chattahoochee bridge, by way of Santown.The Twentieth Corps will hold the railroad-bridge, and I will move withthe balance of the army, provisioned for twenty days.MLeantime General Dodge (commanding the Sixteenth Corps)had been wounded in the forehead, had gone to the rear and hisKA
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1864.] CAPTURE OF ATLAiNT. 5two divisins were distributed to the Fifteenth and SeventeenthCorps. The real movement commenced on the 25th, at night.The Twentieth Corps drew back and took post at the railroad-bridge, and the Fourth Corps (Stanley) moved to his right rear,closing up with the Fourteenth Corps (Jeff. C. Davis) near UtoyCreek; at the same time Garrard's cavalry, leaving their horsesout of sight, occupied the vacant trenhes, so that the enemydil not detect the change at all. The next night (26th) theFifteenth and Seventeenth Corps, composing the Army of theTenness (Howard), drew out of their trenches, made a widecircuit and came up on the extreme right of the Fourth andFourteenthCorp ofthe rmy of the CumberlLnd (Thomas)alongUto Creek, facing south. The enemy seemed to sus-pect something that night, using his artillery pretty freely; butI think he supposed we were going to retreat altogether. Anartillery-shot, fred at random, killed one man and woundedanother, and the next morning some of his infantry came' out ofAtlanta and fnd our camps abandoned. It was afterward re-lated that there was great rejoicing in Atlanta "that the Yankeeswere gone the fact was telegraphed all over the South, andseveral trains of cars (with ladies) came up from Macon to assistin the celebration of their grand victory.On the 28th (making a general left-wheel, pivoting on Scho-field) both Thomas and Howard reached the West Point Railroad,extending from East Point to Red-Oak Station and Fairburnwhere we spent the next day (29th) in breaking it up thoroughly.The track was heaved up in sections the length of a regiment,then separated rail by rail; bonfires were made of the ties andof fence-rails on which the rails were heated, carried to trees ortelegraph-poles, wrapped around and left to cool. Such railscould not be used again; and, to be still more certain, we 01ledup many deep cuts with trees, brush, and earth, and commingledwith them loaded shells, so arranged that they would explodeon an attempt to haul out the bushes. The explosion of onesuch shell would have demoralized a gang of negroes, and thuswould have prevented even the attempt to clear the road.Metime Schofield, with t Twenty-third Corps, presented
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106 CAPTURE OF ATLANTA. [1864.a bold front toward East Point, daring and inviting the enemyto sally out to attack him in position. His first movement wason the 30th, to Mount Gilead Church, then to Morrow's Mills,facing Rough and Ready. Thomas was on his right, withineasy support, moving by cross-roads from Red Oak to theFayetteville road, extending from Couch' to enfrew's; andHoward was aiming for Jonesboro'.I was with General Thomas that day, which was hot butotherwide very pleasant. We stopped for a short noon-rest neara little church (marked on our maps as Shoal-Creek Church)which stood back about a hundred yards from the road, in agrove of native oaks. The infantry column had halted in theroad, stacked their arms, and the men were scatteresome lying in the shade of the trees, and others were bring-ing corn-stalks from a large corn-eld across the road to feedour horses, while still others had arms fll of the roasting-ears, then in their prime. Hundreds of fires were soon startedwith the fence-rails, and the men were busy roasting he ears.Thomas and I were walking up and down he road which ledto the church, discussing the chancesof the ovement, which hethought were extra-hazardous, and our path carried us by a fireat which a soldier was roasting his corn. The fire was builtartistically; the man was stripping the ears of their husks,standing them in front of his fire, watching them carefully,and turning each ear little by little, so as to roast it nicely.He was down on his knees intent on his business, paying littleheed to the stately and serious deliberations of his leaders.Thomas's mind was running on the fact that we had cut loosefrom our base of supplies, and that seventy thousand men werethen dependent for their food on the supplies ofcountry (already impoverished by the requisitions of the enemy),and on the contents of our wagons. Between Thomas and hismen there existed a most kindly relation, and he frequentlytalked with them in the most familiar way. Pausing awhile,and watching the operations of this man roasting his orn, hesaid, "What are you doing" The man looked up smilingly"Why, general, I am laying in a suppy of rovisions." That
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184.] CAPTUtfE OF ATLANTA. 107is right, my but don't waste your provisions." As we re-sued our walk, the manremarked, in a sortof musing way, butloud enough for e to ear: "here he gos, there goes the oldan, conomizing as usual." "Economizing" with corn, whichcost only the labor of gathering and roasting!As we walked, we could hear General Howard's guns atintervalsaway off to our right front, but an ominous silencecontinued toward our left, where I was expecting at each mo-ent to hear the sound of battle. That night we 'reachedRenfrew's, and had reports from left to ~right (from GeneralS ld, about, lrrow's Mills, to General Hl ward, withina couple of miles of Jonesboro'). The next morning (August31st)all moved straight for the railroad. Schofield reached itnear Rough and Rady, and Thomas at two points betweenthere and Jonesboro Howard found an intrenched foe (Har-e's corps) covering Jonesboro', and his men began at oncetodig their accustomed rifle-pits. Orders were sent to GeneralsThomas and Schofield to turn straight for Jonesboro', tearing upthe railroad-track as they advanced. About 3 P. u. the enemysallied from Jonesboro' against the Fifteenth corps, but waseasily repulsd, and driven back within his lines. All handswere kept busy tearing up the railroad, and it was not untiltoward evening of the 1st day of September that the Four-teenth Corps (Davis) closed down on the north front of Jones-oro',connecting on his right with Howard, and his left reaching the railroad, along which General Stanley was moving, followedbySchofild. General Davis formed his divisionsin line about.swept forward over some old cotton-fields in full view,and went over the rebel parapet handsomely, capturing the whole's brigade, with to field-batteries of ten guns. Beingon the spot, I checked Davis's movement, and ordered GeneralHoward to send the two divisions of the Seventeenth Corps(Blair) round by his right rear, to get below Jonesboro', and toreach the railroad, so as to cut off retreat in that diection. Ialso dispatched orders after orders to hurry forward Stanley, soas to laaround Jonesbor' on the east, hoping thus to capturethe whole of Hardee's rps. I sent first Captain Audenried
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10S CAPTURE ATATA. [1.(aide-do-camp), then Colonel Poe, of the Engineers, and lastlyGeneral Thomas himself (and that is the only time ddring thecampaign I can recall seeing General Thomas urge his horse intoa gallop). Night was approaching, and the country on the far-ther side of the railroad was densely wooded. General Stanleycoe up on the left of Davis, and was deploying, thoughthere could not have been on his front more than a skirmish-line. Had he moved straight on by the flank, or by a slightcircuit to his left, he would have inclosed the whole groundoccupied by Hardee's corps, and that corps could not have es-caped us; but night came on, and Hardee did escape.Meantime General Slocum had reached his corps (theTwentieth), stationed at the Chattahoochee bridge, had reievedGeneral A. S. Williams in command, and orders had been sentback to him to feel forward occasionally toward Atlanta, to oserve the effect when we had reached the railroad. That nightI was so restless and impatient that I could not sleep, and aboutmidnight there arose toward Atlanta sounds of shells exp ing,and other sound like that of musketry. I walked to the houseof a farmer close by my bivouac, called him out to listen to thereverberations which came from the direction of Atlanta (twentymiles to the north of us), and inquired of him f he had residedthere long. He said he had, and that these sounds were justlike those of a battle. An interval of quiet then ensued, whenagain, about 4 A. r., arose other similar explosions, but I stillremained in doubt whether the enemy was engaged in blowingup his own magazines, or whether General Slocum had not feltforward, and become engaged in a real battle. The next morning General Hardee was gone, and we allpushed forward along #e railroad south, in close pursuit, till wran up against his lines at a point just aboe ovejoy's Station.While bringing forward troops and feeling the new positi ofour adversary, rumors came from the rear that the enemy hadevacuated Atlanta, and that General Slocum was in the city.Later in the dayI received a note in S m's own handwritinstating that he had beard during the night he very sounds thatI have referred to; that he had moved rapidly up from the
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8G4] CAYLR, U ATLATA. 10 0idge about daylight, and had entered Atlanta unopposed.tter was dated inside the city so there was no doubt ofSfact. General Thoas's bivouac was but a short distancefm mine, and, before giving notice to the army in generalders, I sent one of my staff-oieers to show him the note. Infew minutes the offcer returned, soon followed by Thomasmself, who again examined the note, so as to be perfectlyrtain that it was genuine. The news seemed to him tooIod to be true. He snapped his fingers, whistled, and almosted, and, as th news spread to the army, the shouts thatose from our men, the wild hallooing and glorious laughter,wre to us a full reompense for the labor and toils and hardshipsrough which we had passed in the previous three months.A courierline wa at once organized, messages were sentck and forth from our camlp at Lovejoy's to Atlanta, and to ourlegraph-station at the Chattahoochee bridge. Of ourse, thead tidings flew on the wings of electricityto all parts of theusbands, sons, and brothers, away down in Dixie Land;" andongratulations came pouring back full of good-will and patriot-.This victoy was most opportune; Mr. Lincoln himselftd me afterward that even he had previously felt in doubt,r the summer was fast passing away; that General Grantemed to be check~nated about Richmond and Petersburg,Smy army seemed to have run up against an impassablerrier, when, sddenly and unepectedly, came the news thatAtlanta was ours, and fairly won." On this text many a fineh was made, but none more oquent than that by Edward, in Boston. A presidential election then agitated theorth r. Lincoln represented the natioal cause, and GeneralClellan had accepted the nomination of the Democratic party,hose platform was that the war was a failure, and that it wastter to allow the South to go free to establish a separateovernment, whose corner-stone should be slavery. Success tour arms at that instant wa therefore a political necessity; andhold occur before the lection in ovember. The brilliant
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110 CAPTURE OF ATLANTA. [1864.success at Atlanta filled that requirement, and made the electionof Mr. Lincoln certain. Among the many etters of congratultion received, those of Mr. Lincoln and General Grant seemmost important:WAsIvaTN, D. C., S r 3, 1864.Snational thanks are rendered the President to M -General W.T. hermn and the gallant oficers and soldiers of his command beforeAtlanta, for the distinguished ability and perseverance displayed in thecampaign in Georgia, which, under Divine favor, has resulted inthecaptureof Atlanta. The marches, battles, sieges,and other ilitary operations,that have signalized the campaign, must render it famous in the annals ofwar, and have entitled those who have participated therein to the applauseand thanks of the nation. AnxAi LINOr,President of the United StatesCITY PoNT, vGIN, em 4 186P .jIoor-Gencral SHERMAn : I have just received your dispatch announcing the capture of Atlanta.In honor of your great victory, I have ordered a salute to be fired withshotted guns from every battery bearing upon the enemy. The salute willbe fired within an hour, amid great rejoicing.U. S. Gnao, Lieutenanteneral.These dispathes were co unicate to the ary in generalorders, and we all felt duly encouraged and elated by the praiseof those competent to bestow it.The arny still remained where the news of success had firstfound us, viz., Lovejoy's; but, after due reflection, I resolvednot to attempt at that time a further pursuit of Hood's army,but slowly and deliberately to move back, occupy Atlanta, enjoya short period of rest, and to think well over the next step re-quired in the progress of events. Orders for this movementwere made on the 5th September, and three days were given foreach army to reach the place assigned it, viz.: the Army of theCumberland in and about Atlanta; the Army of the Tennessee at East Point; and the Army of the Ohio at Decatur.Personally I rode back to Jonesboro' on the 6th, and thereinspected the rebel hospital, full of wounded officers and menleft by Hardee in his retreat. The next night we stopped at
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rom aTT F ATLANTA
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'l';'i;:"l"';'";i"~:r,,a ii ii lii rrrs:lH'I; .,,,,, B~i, ;'~ z g I; ~ ,,:s ~r:~ ,rr,
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1864.] CAPTURE OF ATLANTA. 11Rouh and Ready, and on the 8th of September we rode intoAtlanta, then occupied by the Twentieth Corps (General Sl-cum). In the Court-House Square was encamped a brigade,embracing the Massachusetts Second and Thirty-third Regi-ments, which had two of the finest bands of the army, andtheir musicwas to us all a source of infnite pleasure dur-ing our sojourn in that city. I took up my headquarters inthe house of Judge Lyons, which stood opposite one cornerof the Court-House Square, and at once set about a measurealready ordered, of which I had thought much and long, viz.,to remove the entire civil population, and to deny to all civiliansfrom the rear the expected profits of civil trade. Hundredsof sutlers and traders were waiting at Nashville and Chatta-nooga, greedy to reach Atlanta with their wares and goods, withwhich to drive a protable trade with the inhabitants. I gaveositive orders that none of these traders, except three (onefor each separate army), should be permitted to come nearerthan Chattanooga; and, moreover, I peremptorily required thatall the citizens ad families resident in Atlanta should go away,giving to each the ption to go south r north, as their interestsor feengdictated. I was resolved to make Atlanta a puregarrison or depot, with no civil population to influencemilitary measures. I had seen Memphis, icksburg, Natchez,and New Orleans, all captured from the enemy, and each at oncewas garrisoned by a full division of troops, if not more; so thatsuccess was actually crippling our armies in the field by detach-mnts to guard and protect the interests of a hostile population.I gave notice of this purpose, as early as the 4th of September,to General Hallek, in a lettr concluding with these words:If the people raise a howl against my barbarity and cruelty, I willa at war is war, and not popularity-seeking. If they want peace,they and their relatives must stop the war.Iknew of ourse, that such a measure would be strnglyriticised, but ade up my mind to do it with the absolutecertainty of its justness, and that time would sanction its wis-dom. I know that the peole of the South would read in
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112 CAPTURE OF ATLANTA. [1864.this measure two important conclusions: one, that we were inpopular clamor to ie in the last itch," that the opportunitywould soon come.Soon after our reaching Atlanta, General ood had sent iny a flag of truce a proposition, ofering a general exchange ofprisoners, saying that he was authorized to make such an ex-change by the Richmond authorities, out of the vast n ber ofour men then held captive at Andersonvill, the same whomGeneral Stoneman had hoped to recue t the time of his raidSome of these prisoners ad already escaped and got in, haddescribed the pitiable condition of the remainder, and, al-though I felt a sympathy for their hardships and sufferingsas deeply as any man could, yet as nearly all the prisoners whohad been captured by us during the campaign had beon sent, asfast as taken, to the usual depots North, they were then beyondmy control. There were still about two thousand, rostly capstured at Jonesboro', who had been sent -back by cars, but hadnot passed Chattanooga. These I ordered tack, and offeredGeneral Hood to exchange them for Stoneman, Buell, and suchof my own army as would make up the equivalent; but Iwould ot exhang for his prisoners generally, because I knew.these would have to be sent to their own regiments, away frommy army, whereas all we could give him could at once be putto duty in his immediate army. Quite an angry correspondencegrew up between us, which was published at the time in thenewspapers, but it is not to be found in any book of which Ihave present knowledge, and therefore is given here, as illus-trative of the events referred to, and of the feelings of the actors in the game of war at that particular crisis, together with cer-tain other original letters of Generals Grant and Halleek, neverhitherto publisbed.HEA1DQUARTERs ARMIE OF THE UNITED STATEs,CITY POINT, VIa, Septr 1864.Hlajor-General W. T. SmiERMAS, commanding Mitary Division of theAlis-GENERAL: I send Lieutenant-Colonel TP ter, f my ithB @
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1864.] CAPTURE OF ATLANTA 113ths. Colonel Porter will explain to you the exact condition of affairs here,better than I can do in the limits of a letter. Although feel myself strongenough now for offensive peratons, I am holding on quietly, to get advan-tage of recruits and convalescents, who are coming forward very rapidly.fy lines are necessarily very long, extending from Deep Bottom, north ofthe James, across the peninsula formed by the ppomattox and the James,and south of the Appomattox to the Weldon road. This line is verystrongly fortified, and can be held with comparatively few men; but,from its great length, necessarily takes many in the aggregate. I propose,when I do move, to extend my left so as to control what is known as theSouthside, or Lynchburg & Petersburg road; then, if possible, to keep theDanvilleroadcut. At thesame time this move is made, I want to send aforce of from six to ten thousand men against Wilmington. The way I propose to do this is to land the men north of Fort Fisher, and hold thatpoint. At the same time a large naval fleet will be assembled there, andthe iron-clads will run the batteries as they did at Mobile. This will give usthe same control of the harbor of Wilmington that we now have of theharbor of M .What you are to do with the forces at your command,I do not exactly see. The difculties of supplying your army, except when they are constantly moving beyond where you are, I plainly see. If it hadnot been for Price's movement, Canby could have sent twelve thousandmore men to Mobile. From your command on the Mississippi, an equalnumber co hve been taken. With these forces, my idea would havebeen to divide the, sending one-half to Mbile, and the other half toSavannah. You could then move as proposed in your telegram, s as tothreaten Macon and Augusta equally. Whichever one should be abandonedb nemy, you could take and open up a new base of supplies. My object'now in sendinga staf-oicer to you is not so much to suggest operationsfor you asto gt your views, and to have plans matured by the time everything can be got ready. It would probaly be the 5th of October beforea plans here indicated will be executed. If you have any promo-tions to recommend, send the names forward, and I will approve them.In conclusion, it is hrdly necessary for me to say that I feel you have accomplished the most gigantic undertaking given to any general in thiswar, and with a skill and ability that will be acknowledged in history asif not unequaled. It gives me as much pleasure to recordthis in your favor as it would in favor of any living man, myself included.Truly yours, U. S. GuAr, LieutenanGnera.InogEArAnnEs MiriAnr DrvisioN oF TE Mr sIssIPrI,I rHE FIE.LI, ATLANTA, GEORGLA, Septemb.r 2., 1820.Lieutenant-General U. S.GRANT, Commner-in-Chief, City Point, Virginia.GEnAL: I h1Rv l)th hoor to a ckIowlege, at the hands of Lie1tenant-34
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Colonel Porter, of your staff, your letter of September 12th, and acceptwith thanks the honorable and kindly mention of the services of this arryin the great cause in which we are all engaged.I send by Colonel Porter all official reports which are completed, andwill in a few days submit a list of names which are deemed worthy of promotion. I think we owe it to the President to save him the invidious task of s-lection among the vast number of worthy applicants, and have ordered myarmy commanders to prepare their lists with great care, and to express theirpreferences, based upon claims of actual capacity and services rendered.These I will consolidate, and submit in such a form that, if mistakes aremade, they will at least be sanctioned by the best contemporaneous evidenceof merit, for I know that vacancies do not exist equal in number to that ofthe officers who really deserve promotion.As to the future, I am pleased to know that your army is being steadilyreenforced by a good class of men, and I hope it will go onutil you havea force that is numerically double that of your antagonist, so that with onepart you can watch him, and with the other push out boldly from your leftflank, occupy the Southside Railroad, compel him to attack you in posi-tion, or accept battle on your own terms.We ought to ask our countryfor the largest possiblearmies that can beraised, as so important a thing as the self-existence of a great nation shouldnot be left to the fickle chances of war.Now that Mobile is shut out to the commere of oin emy, it calls forno further effort on our part, unless the capture of the city can be followedby the tccupation of the Alabama River and the railroad to Columbus,Georgia, when that place would be a magnificent auxiliary to my furtherprogress into Georgia; but, until General Canby is much reinforced, anduntil he can more thoroughly subdue the scattered armies west of the Mis-sissippi, I suppose that much cannot be attempted by him against the Ala-bama River and Columbus, Georgia.The utter destruction of Wilmington, North Carolina, is of importanceonly in connection with the necessity of cutting off all foreign trade to ourenemy, and if Admiral Farragut can get across the bar, and move quickly,I suppose he will succeed. From my knowledge of the moth of CapeFear River, I anticipate more difficulty in getting the heavy ships acrossthe bar than in reaching the town of Wilmington but, of course, thesoundings of the channel are well known at Washington, as well as thedraught of his iron-clads, so that it must be demonstrated to be feasible, orelse i would not be attempted. If successful, suppose that Fort Caswellwill be occupied, and the fleet at once sent to the Savaah iver. Ththe reduction of that city is the next question. It once in our possession,and the river open to us, I would not hesitate to crss the State of Georgia"~ B~p BpO O ;~~.
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1864] CAPTURE OF ATLAINTA* 115had our boats in the Savannah River I could rapidly mov to illedgeville,remainingin the Sout, or let us hae the use of the Savannah River.Either horn of the dilema will be worth a atle. I would prefer hisholdingAugusta (as the probablities are); for then, with the SavannahRiver in our possession, the taking of August would be a mere matter oftime. This canpaign can be made in the winter.But the more I study the game, the more am I convinced that it woulde wrong for us to pentrate farther into Georgia without an objective eyond. It would nt be productive of much good. I can start east andmake a circuit south and bak, doin vast amage to the State, but result-ing in no permanent good; and by mere threatening to do so, I hold a rodover the Georns, who are not over-loyal to the South. I will thereforegive it as y pion that your army and Canbys should be reinforced toSmaxim that, after you gt Wilmington, you should strike for Savah and it river; that General anby should hold the Mississippi River,and send a force to take Columbus, Georgia, either by way of the Alabamaor Appaachicla River; that I should keep ood employed and put myary in fine order for a march on Augusta, Columbia, and Charleston; andsoon as Wilminton is sealed to commerce, and the city of Saan-nah is in our possession.I think it will be found that the movements of Price and Shelby, west ofthe Mississippi, are mere diversions. They cannot hope to enter Missouriexcept as raiders; and the truth is, that General Rosecrans should beshamed to take my troops for such a purpose. If you will secure Wil-mington andthe city of Savannah from your centre, and let General Canbyhave command over the Mississippi River and country west of it, I willsendaforc the Alabama and Appalcicola, provided you give me onehundred thousand of the drafted men to fill up my old regiments; and ifou w fxadayto be in Savannah, I will insure our possession of Maconand a point on below Augusta. The possession of the SavannahRiver is more than fatal to the possibility f Southern independence. of Richmond, but not of all Georgia.I will have a long talk with Colonel Porter, and tell him eovery thingthat may occur to me of interest to you.~wpi ; :~,'I': I ':: ,8 rpl~ i840
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116 CAPTURE OF ATLANTA. [1864.tic, I think Uncle Abe will give us a twenty days' leave of absence to seethe young folks. Yours as ever,W. T. S a Major-Gnral.General W. T. SnmENs, Atlanta, deorgia.MY DEAH GrERAL : Your very interesting letter of the 4th is just r-ceived. Its perusal has given me the greatest pleasure. I have not writ-ten before to congratulate you on the capture of Atlanta, the objectivepoint of your brilliant campaign, for the reason that I have been sufferingfrom my annual attack of "coryza," or hay-col. It affects my eyes somuch that I can scarcely see to write. As you suppose,.I have watchedyour movements most attentively and critically, and I do not hesitate tosay that your campaign has been the most brilliant of the war. Its resultsare less striking and less complete than those of eneral Grantat Vicks-burg, but then you have had greater difficulties to encounter, a longer lineof communications to keep up, and a longer and more continuousstrainupon yourself and upon your army.You must have been very considerably annoyed bythe Stat negro re-cruiting-agents. Your letter was a capital one and did much good. Thelaw was a ridiculous one; it was opposed by the ar D rtmentbutpassed through the influence of Eastern manufacturers, who hoped toescape the draft in that way. They were making immense fortunes outof the war, and could well afford to purchase negro recruits, and thus savetheir employes at home.I fully agree with you in regard to the policy of a tringent draft; but,unfortunately, political influences are against us, and I fear it wil notamount to much. Mr. Seward's speech at Auburn, again prophesying, forthe twentieth time, that the rebellion would be crushed in a few months,and saying that there would be no draft, as we now ad enough soldiers toend the war, etc., has done much harm, in a militarypoint of view. I have seen enough of politics here to last me for life. You are right in avoidingthem. McClellan may possibly reach the White House, but he will lose therespect of all honest, high-minded patriots, by his affiliation with suchtraitors and Copperheads as B, V, W, S-, & Co.would not stand upon the traitorous Chicago platform, but had not themanliness to oppose it. A major-general in the United States Army, andyet not one word to utter against rebels or the rebellion! I had muchrespect for McClellan before he became a politic but very little aftereading )is letter accepting the nomination. ... .. ... .3
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1864. CAPTURE OF ATLANTA. 117ookr certinly made a mistake in leaving before the capture of At-lant. I understand that, when here, he said that you would fail; yourhis abuse of me. I inclose you a specimen of what he publishes in North-rn papers, wherever he goes. They are dictated by himself and writtenby W. B. and such wrthies The fnny part of the business is, that I hadnothing whatever to do with his being relieved on either occasion. re-over, I have never said any thing to the President or Secretary of War toinjure him in the slightest degree, and he knows that perfectly well Hisanimosity arises from another source. He is awarethat I know somethings about his character and conduct in California, and, fearing that I may use that information against him, e seeks to ward off its effect bymaking it appear that I am his personal enemy, am jealous of him, etc. Iknow of no other reason for his hostlity to me. He is welcome to abuseme as much as he pleases; I don't think it will do him much good, or memuch harm. I know very little of General Howard, but believe him to bea true, honorable man. Th as is also a noble old warhorse. It is true,as o say, that he is slow, but he is always sure.I have not seen General Grant since the fall of Atlanta, and do notknow what instructions e has sent you. I fear that Canby has not themeans to do much by way of Mobile. The military effects of Banks's dis-aster are now showing themselves by the threatened operations of Price &Co.toward Missouri thus keeping in check our armies west of the Missis-With many thanks for your kind letter, and wishes for your future suc-cess, your truly, H. W. HA .IELDQUARTE1Rs MILITAY Dr sioH or THE Mis1s7sIPPI,ATLANTA, Groear, Sepitemer 20, 1864.aor-General HArzE, i ofStff, Fasingto, D. C.: Ihave the honor herewith to submit copies of a correspond-ence between General Hood, of the Confederate Army, the Mayor of At-antaandmysef, touching the removal of the inhabitants of Atlanta.In explanation of the tone which marks some of these letters, I will onlycall your attention to he fact that, after I had announced my determina-tionGeneralHood took upon himself to question my motives. I could nottamely submit to such impertinence; and I have also seen that, in violationoe, he has published in the Macon newspapers such partsof the correspondence as suited his purpose. This could have had no otherobject than to create a feeling on the part of the people; but if he expectsto resort to such artifces, I think I can meet him there too.It is su ient for my Goverinwnt to know that the removal of the in-habitants has been made with liberality and fairness, that it has been at-
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tended with no force, and that no women or children ha suffered, lessfor want of provisions by their natural protectors and friends.My real reasons for this stop were:We want all the houses of Atlanta for military storage and occupation.We want to contract the lines of defense, so as to diminish the garrisonto the limit necessary to defend its narrow and vital parts, instead of em-brcing, as the lines now do, the vast suburbs. This contraction of thelines, with the necessary citadels and redoubts, will make it necessary todestroy the very houses used by families as residences.Atlanta is a fortified town, was stubbornly defended, and fairly capturedAs captors, we have a right to it.The residence here of a poor population would compel us, sooner orlater, to feed them or to see them starve under our eyes.The residence here of the families of our enemies would e a tempta-tion and a means to keep up a correspondence dangerous and hurtful toour cause; a civil population calls for provost-guards, and absorbs the attention of officers in liteing to everlasting compaints and special grieances that are not military.Thes are my reasons; and, if satisfactory to the Governmentof the United States, it makes no difference whether it pleases General Hood andhis people or not. I am, with respect your obedient servant,W. T. SnA-,, Major-General commanding.J1EADru:AaTzE MnRisr DisioN of na Mrsswr1,iN THE FEa>, ArTLAsm, G Iouou, &p e* 7, 186.Gencral HOOD, commanding Cofederat Army.GE(nAL: I have deemed it to the interest of the United States that thecitizens now residing in Atlanta should remove, those who prefer it to gosouth, and the rest north. For the latter I can provide food and transpor-tation to points of their election in Tennessee, Kentucky, or farther north.For the former I can provide transportation by cars as far as RoughandReady, and also wagons; but, that their removal maybe made with asdiscomfort as possible, it will be necessary for you to help the failes fromRough and Ready to the cars at Lovejoy's. If you consent, I will under-take to remove all the families in Atlanta who prefer to go south to Roughand Ready, with all their movable effects, viz., clothing, trunks, reasonablefurniture, bedding, etc., with their servants, wite and lack, with the pro-viso that no force shall be used toward the blacks, one way or the other.If they want to go with their masters or mistresses, they may do so; otherwise they will be sent away, unless they be en they may be em-ployed by our quartermaster. Atlanta is no place for families or non-com-batants, and I have no desire to send them north if you will assist in con-veying them south. If this proposition meets your views, I will consent to
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1864. CAPTRE OF ATLANTA. 119a truce in the neighborhood of Rough and ady stipulating that anywagons, horses, animals, or persons sent there for the purpses hereinstatedshallinno er be harmed or molsted; you in your turn agree-ing that any cars, wagons, or carriags, persons or animals sent to the same pointsall not interfered with. Each of us might send a guard of, say,one hundred men, to maintain order, and limit the truce to, say, two daysI have authorized the mayor to choose two citizens to convey to youthis letter, with such documents as the mayor may forward in explanation,and sll await your reply. I have the honor to be your obedient servant,W. T. SHERmAN, -Major-General commantiin(.HI nQuiAAnas Assy oF TENssEE,OiCE rz STA F, Spntemer 9, 1864Mfajor-General W. T. SHEDMAN, conmanding United State3 Fores inGENERAL: Your letter of yesterday's ate, borne by James M. Ball andJames Crew citiens of Atlanta, is received. You say therein, "I deemit tbe to the interest of the United States that the citizens now residingin Atlanta should remove," etc. I do not consider that I have any alter-nativein this matter. I therefore accept your proposition to declar a truceof two days, or such time as may be necessary to accomplish the purposementioned, and shall render all assistance in my power to expedite thetransportation of citizens in this direction. I suggest that a staffofficer beappointed by you to superintend the removal from the city to Rough andRead, while I appoint a like officer to control their removal farthersouth; that a guard of one hundred men be sent by either party as youproposeto maintain order at that place, and that the removal begin onAnd now, sir, permit me to say that the unprecedented measure youpropose transcends, in studied and ingenious cruelty, all acts ever beforebrought to my attention in the dark history of war.In the name of God and humanity, I protest, believing that you wi findthat you ar expelling from their homes and firesides the wives and childrenofbrave people. I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,J. B. OOD, General..HEADQUARTERS MLITARY DivIsION or MIswi,i LE FIELD, ATLATA, GECO.IA, Sptembr 10, 1864.General J. B. HOOD, commanding Ary of Tenneasee, Confederate Army.GENERAL: I ve the onor to acknowledge the receipt of your letterof this date, at the hands of Messrs. Ball and Crew, consenting to the ar-ralgements I had proposed to facilitate the removal south of the people of
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120 CAPTURE OF ATLANTA. [1864.Atlanta, who prefer to go in 'that direction. I inclose you a copy of myorders, which will, I am satisfied, accomplish my purpose perfectly.You style the measures proposed nprecedented," and appeal to thedark history of war for a parallel, as an act of studied and ingeniouscruelty." It is not unprecedented; for General Johnston himself verywisely and properly removed the families ll the wy fro Dalton down,and I see no reason why Atlanta should be excepte. Nor is it necessaryto appeal to the dark history of ar, when recent and modern examples areso handy. You yourself burned dwelling-houses along your parapet, and Ihave seen to-day fifty houses that you have rendered uninhabitable becausethey stood in the way of your forts and men. You defended Atlanta on aline so close to town that every cannon-shot and many musket-shots fromour line of investment, that overshot their mark, went into the habitationsof women and children. General Hardee did the same at Jonesboro', andGeneral Johnston did the same, last summer, at Jackson, Mississippi. I have not accused you of heartless cruelty, but merely intane these casesof very recent occurrence, and could go on and enumerate hundreds ofothers, and challenge any fair min to judge which of us has the heart ofpity for the families of a brave people."I say that it is kindness to these families of Atlanta to remove themnow, at once, from scenes that women and children should nt be exposedto, and the "brave people" should scorn to commit their wivs and childrento the rude barbarians who thus, as you say, violate the laws of war, asillustrated in the pages of its dark history.In the name of common-sense, I as you not to appeal to a jst God insuch a sacrilegious manner. You who, in the midst of peace andprosperity,have plunged a nation into war-dark and cruel war-who dared and bad-gered us to battle, insulted our flag, seized our arsenals and forts that wereleft in the honorable custody of peaceful ordnance-sergeants, seized andmade "prisoners of war" the very garrisons sent to protect your peopleagainst negroes and Indians, long before any overt act was committed by* the (to you) hated Lincoln Government; tried to force Kentucky and Mis-souri into rebellion, spite of themselves; falsfied the vote of Louisiana;turned loose your privateers to plunder unarmed ships; expeled Unionfamilies by the thousands, burned their houses, and declared, by an actyour Congress, the confiscation of all debts due rthern men for goodshad and received! Talk thus to the marines, but not to me, who have seenthe things, and who will this day make asmuchsacrce for thepeaceand honor of the South as the best-born Southernr amongyou! If wemustbe enemies, let us be men, and fight it out as we propse to do, and notdeal in such hypocritical appeals to God and God will judgein due time, and he will pronounce whether it be more humane to fightwith a town full of women and the families of a brave people at ur back,4, '4'
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1864.] CAPTURE OF ATLANTA. 121r to remove them in time to places of safety among their own friends andople. I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,W. T. SHERMAN, tMajor-General commanding.IIEADQUAETERs ARmy OF TENxEssEE,&gatember 12, 184. fIfajor-General W. T. SrKE.Ax, commanding Military Division of the Mis-GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letterf the 9th inst., with its inclosure in reference to the women, children, andther, who you have thought proper to expel from their homes in theity of Atlanta. Had you seen proper to let the mattes rest there, I wouldladly have allowed your letter to close this correspondence, and, withoutour expressing itin words, would have been willing to believe that, whilethe interests of the United States," in your opinion, compelled you to ant of barbarous cruelty, you regretted the necessity, and we would haveipped the subject; but you have chosen to indulge in statements whichfeel compelled to notice, at least so far as to signify my dissent, and notw sience in regard to them to be construed as acquiescence.I see nothing in your communication which induces me to modify theanguage of condemnation with which I characterized your order. It buttrengthens me in the opinion that it stands preminent in the dark his-ryof war for studied and ingenious cruelty." Your original order was tripped of all pretenses; you announced the edict for the sole reason thatwasto th interest of the United States." This alone you offered to usad the civilized world as an all-sufficient reason for disregarding the lawsand man. You say that" General Johnston himself very wifely androperly removed the families all the way from Dalton down." It is dueSthat gallant soldier and gentleman to say that no act of his distinguished reer gives theeast color toyour unfounded aspersions upon his conduct.e depopulated no villages, nor towns, nor cities, either friendly or hostile.offeredand extended friendly aid to his unfortunate fellow-citizens whoesired to flee from your fraternal embraces. You are equally unfortunateyour attempt to find a justification for this act of cruelty, either in theefense of Jonesboro', by General Hardee, or of Atlanta, by myself. Gen-ral arde defended his position in front of Jonesboro' at the expense ofjury to t houses; an ordinary, proper, and justifiable act of war. Ifended Atlanta at the same risk and cost. If there was any fault in eitherse, i was your own, in not giving notice, especially in the case of Atlanta,your purpose to shell the town, which is usual in war among civilizedations. No inhabitant was expelled from his home and fireside by therders of General Harde o myself, and therefore your recent order can nd no support from the conduct of either of us I feel no other emotion
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other than pain in reading that portion of your letter which attempts to jus-tify your shelling Atlanta without notice under pretense that I defended At-lanta upon a line so close to town that every cannon-Shot and many mus-ket-balls from your line of investment, that overshot their markwentintothe habitations of women and children. I made no complaint of your frnginto Atlanta in any way you thought proper. make none nowbutthereare a hundred thousand witnesses that yo fired into the habitations of women and children for weeks, ring far above and miles beyond my lineof defense. I have too good an opinion, founded both upon observationand experience, of the skill of your artilerists, to credit the insinuationthat they for several weeks unintentionally fre too high for my modestfield-works, and slaughtered women and chldren by accident and want ofThe residue of your letter is rather discussion. It opens awiefieldforthe discussion of questions which I do not feel are co itted to me. I amonly a general of one of the armies of the Confederate Stateschargedwithmilitary operations in the field, under the direction of my superior officrs,and I am not called upon to discuss with you the causes of tb present war,or the political questions which led to or resulted fro it. Tese grave andimportant questions have been committed to far abler hands than mine,and I shall only refer to them so far as to repel any unjust conclusion whichmight be drawn from my silence. You charge my country withdaringand badgering you to battle." The truth is, we sent commissioners to you,respectfully offering a peaceful separation, before the first gun was fired oneither side. You say we insulted your flag. The truth is, we fired uponit, and those who fought under it, when you came to our doors upon themission of subjugation. You say we seized upon your forts nd arsenals,nd made prisoners of the garrisons sent to protect us against negroes andIndians. The truth is, we, by force of arms, drove out insolent intrudersand took possession of our own forts and arsenals, to resist your claims todominion over masters, slaves, and Indians, all of whom re to this day,with a unanimity unexampled in the history of the world, warring againstyour attempts to become their masters. You say that we tried to forceMissouri and Kentucky into rebellioin spite of themselves. The truth is,my Government, from the beginning of this struggle to this hour, has againand again offered, before the whole world, to leave it to the uniased wilof these States, and all others, to determine for themselves whether theywill cast their destiny with your Government or ours; and your Governmenthas resisted this fundamental principle of free institutions with the bayo-net, and labors daily, by force and fraud, to fastn its ateful tyrannythe unfortunate freemen of these States. YoLouisiana. The truth is, Louisan not only separated rself from yourGovernment by nearly a unanimous vote of her people, but has vindicated
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i t Ss: hasthe act upon every battle-field from Gettysburg to the Sabine, and has ex-hibited an h ic devotion to her decision which challenges the admirationand respect of every man capable of feeling sympathy for the opprssed oradmiration for heroic valor. You say that we turned loose pirates to plun-der your unarmed ships. The truthis, when you robbed us of our part ofthe navy, we built nd bought a few vessls, hoisted the flag of our country,and swept the ses, in efance of your navy, around the whole circumfer-ence of the globe. You say we have expelled Union families by thousands.The truth is not a single family has been expelled from the ConfederateStates, that I am aware of; but, on the contrary, the moderation of ourGovernment towrd traitors has been a fruitful theme of denunciation byits en ies and well-meaning friends of our cause. You say my Govern-by acts of Congress, has confiscated "all debts due Northern menfor goods sold and delivered." The truth is, our Congress gave due andample tim to your merchants and traders to depart from our shores withtheir ships goods, and effects, and only sequestrated the property of ournemiesin retaliation for their acts-declaring us traitors, and confiscatingour property wherever their power extended, either in their country or ourown. Such are your accusations, and such are the facts known of all me~to be true.You order into exile the whole population of a city; drive men,women, and children from their homes at the point of the bayonet, underthe plea that it is to the interest of your Government, and on the laimthat it is an act of "kiidness to these families of Atlanta." Butler onlyanished from New Orleans the registered enemies of his Government, andacknowledged that he did it as a punishment. Yon issue a sweeping edict,covering the inhabitants of a city, and add insult to the injury heaped upon the defensless by assuming that you have done them a kindness.This you follow by the assertion that you will "make as much sacrifice forthe peace and honor of the South as the best-born Southerner." And, be-I characterize what you call a kindness as being real cruelty, you pre-sume to sit in judgment between me and my God; and you decide that myearnest prayer to the Almighty Father to save our women and childrenfrom what you call kindness, is a sacrilegious, hypocritical appeal."Youce into our country with your army, avowedly for the purposting free white men, women, and children, and not only intendto rle over them, but you make negroes your allies, and desire to placeover us an infor race, which we have raised from barbarism to its presentposition, which is the highest ever attained by that race, in any country, inall time. I must, therefore, decline to acept your statements in referenceto your kindness toward the people of Atlanta, and your willingness to sac-rifice every thing for thepeae and honor of the South, and refuse to begoverned by your decision in regard to matters between myself, my coun-try, and my Goda j. ... ... ,, Om U ] 1 1 i
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124 CAPTURE OF ATLANTA. .1864LYou say, "Let us fight it out like men." To this my reply isr my-country-we will fight you to the death! Better die a thousand eathsthan submit to live under you or your Government and your negro alliesl"Having answered the points forced upon me by your letter of the 9thof September, I close this correspondence with you; and, notwithstandingyour comments upon my appeal to God in the cause of humanity, I againhumbly and reverently invoke his almighty aid in defense of justic andright. Respectfully, your obedient servant,J. B. Iloo, GeneralATur.L-, GEOuLA, Sefmber 11, 186.Major-General W. T. SaiAn.Sin: We the undersigned, Mayor and two of the Council for the city of Atlanta, for the time being the only legal organ of the people of the saiditytoexpress their wants and wishes, ask leave most earnestly but re-spectfully to petition you to reconsider the order requiing them to leaveAtlanta.At first view, it struck us that the measure would involve extraordi-nary hardship and loss, but since we have seen the practical execution ofso far as it has progressed, and the individual condition of the people, andheard their statements as to the inconveniences, loss, and suffering attend-ing it, we are satisfied that the amount of it will involve in the aggregat consequences appalling and heart-rending.Many poor women are in advanced state of pregnancy, others now hav-ing young children, and whose husbands for the greater part are either inthe army, prisoners, or dead. Some say: "I have such a one sick at myhouse; who will wait on them when ain gone?" Others say: "What are weto do? We have no house to go to, and no means to buy, build, or rent any; no.parents relatives, or friends, togo to." Another says: "I will try and take thisor that article of property, but such and such things I must leave behind,though I need them much." We reply to them: "General Sherman will carryyour property to Rogh and Ready, and General Hood will take it thenceon." And they will reply to that: "But I want to leave therailrad at such a place, and cannot get conveyance from there on." aWe only refer to a few facts, to try to illustrate in part how this meas-ure will operate in practice. As you advanced, the people north of thisfell back; and before your arrival here, a large portion of the people adretired south, so that the country south of this is already crowded, andwithout houses enough to accommodate the people, and we ar informedthat many are now staying in churches a other ot-buildings.This being so, how is it possible for the people stillher (mstly women and children) to find any shelter? And how can they live through the
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1864.] CAPTURE OF ATLANTA. 125winter in the woods-no shelter or subsistence, in the midst of strangerswho know them not, and without the power to assist them cb, if theywere willing to do so?This is but a feeble picture of the consequences of this measure. Youknow the woe, the horrors, and the suffering cannot be described by words;imagination can only conceive of it, and we ask you to take these thingsW your mind and time are constantly occupied with the duties ofyour command, which almost deters us from asking your attention to thismatter, but thought it might be that you had not considered this sub-ject in all of its awl onsequenes, and that on more reection you, wehope, woulnot make this people an exception to all mankind, for weknow of no such instance ever having occurred-surely never in the UnitedStates-and what has this Alpas people done, tbht they should be drivenfrom their homes, to wander strangers and outcasts, and exiles, and to sub-We do not know as yet the number of people still here ; of those whoarhere, we are satisfied a respectable number, if allowed to remain at home, could subsist for several months without assistance, and a respect-able number for a much longer time, and who might not need assistance atany time.In conclusion, we most earnestly and solemnly petition you to reconsider this order, or modify it, and suffer this unfortunate people to remainat home, and njoy what little means they have. Respectfully submitted :JAMEs .CALHO, Mayor.E. E. RAW Sw, Councilman.S. C. WEuLLs, Councilman.HEAnQRuArsxs Mmnrr DivisioN o e MzrnE 11ss:rIN THE Fi.T, ATLANTA, GEoRGA, Sep e 12, 186-.JAr M. CAror, 1ayor, E. E. EAwors and S. C. WELLS, represent-ing City Council of Atlanta.N:Ihave your letter of the 11th, in the nature of a petitionto revoke my orders removing all the inhabitants from Atlanta. I havey, and give full credit to your statements of the distressthat will be occasioned, and yet hall not revoke my orders, because theywere not designed to meet the humanities of the case, but to prepare forin which millions of good people outside of Atlantahave dp interest. We must have peace, not only at Atlanta, but in allAmerica. To s re this, we must stop the war that now desolates ouronce happy and favored ountry. To sto war, we must defeat the rebelarmies which are arrayed gainst the laws and Constitution tha at ll mustvl
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respect and obey. To defeat those armies, we must prepare the way toreach them in their recesses, provided with the arms and instruments whichenable us to accomplish our purpose. Now, I know the vindictive na-ture of our enemy, that we may have many years of military operationsfrom this quarter; and, therefore, deem it wise and prudent to prepare intime. The use of Atlanta for warlike purposes is inconsisteut with itsranter as a home for families. There will be no manufactures, cor e, or agriculture here, for the maintenance of famlies, and sooner orlater want will compel the inhabitants to go. Why not go now, when allthe arrangements are completed for the transfer, instead of waiting tillthe plunging shot of contending armies will renew the scenes of the pastmonth? Of course, I do not apprehend any such thing at thismomentbutyou do not suppose this arm will be here until the war is over. I cannotdiscuss this subject with you fairly, because I cannot imp to you what wepropose to do, but I assert that our military plans make it necessary forthe inhabitants to go away, and I can only renew y offer of services tomake their exodus in any direction as easy and comfortable as possible.You cannot qualify war in harsher terms thanI will. Waris cruelty,and you cannot refine it; and those who brought war into our country de-serve all the curses and maledictions a people can pour out. I know Ihadno hand in making this war, and I know I will make more sacrifices to-daythan any of you to secure peace But you cannot hae peace nd a divisionof our country. If the United States submits to a division now, it will notstop, but will go on until we reap the fate of Mexico, hi s rnal war. The United States does and must assert its authority wherever it once hadpower; for, if it relaxes one bit to pressure, it is gone, and I belve thatsuch is the national feeling. This feeling assumes various shapes, but alwayscomes back to that of Union. Once admit the Union, once more aknowl-edge the authority of the national overnment, and, instead of devotingyour houses and streets and roads to the dread uses of war, I and thisarmy become at once your protectors and supporters, shielding you fromdanger, let it come from what quarter it may. I know thata fewindividu-ials cannot resist a torrent of error and passion, such as swept the South into rebellion, but you can point out, so that we may know those who desirea government, and those who insist on war and its desolation.You might as well appeal against the thnder-storas gainst theseterrible hardships of war. -They are inevitable, and the only way the people of Atlanta can hope once more to live in peace and quiet at hoe,istostop the war, which .can only be done by admitting that it bean in errorand is perpetuated in pride.We don't want your negroes, or your horses, or your houses, or yourlands, or any thing you have, but we do want and wihave a just obedience to the laws of the United States. That we will have, andifit involves the destruction of our improvements, we cannot help it.
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1864.] CAPTURE OF ATL ANTA. 127You have hertofore read public sentimet i your newspalfs, that liveby falsehood and excitement; And the quicker you seek for truth in otherqI repeat then that, by the original compact of Gov-ernmenttheUnited States had certain rights in Geogia, which have neverbeen relinquished and never will be; that the Southbegan war by seizingfortsarsnals, mints, custo-houses, etc., etc., long before Mr. Lincoln wasinstalledandbefre the South had one jot or tittle of provocation. Imyself have sn in Missouri, Kntuky, Tennessee, and Mississippi, hun-dreds and thousands of women and children fleeing from your armies anddesperadoes, hungry and with bleeding feet. In Memphis, Vicksburg, andMississippiweed thousands upon thousands of the families of rebel soldiersleft on our hands, and whom we could not see starve. Now that war comeshome to you you fl very different. You deprecate its horrors, but did notfeel them when you sent car-loads of soldiers and ammunition, and mouldedshesand shot, to carr war into Kentucky and Tennessee, to desolate thehomesofhundreds and thousands of good people who only asked to live inpeace at their old homes, and under the Government of their inheritance.But these comparisons are idle. I want peace, and believe it can only bereached throh union and war, nd I will ever cnduct war with a vieto perfect and early success.But, my deasirs, when peace does come, you may call on me for anything. Then wil I share with you the last cracker, and watch with youto shield your homes and families against danger from every quarter.Now you must g, and tak with you the old and feeble, feed and nursethemandbuild for the, in more quiet places, proper habitations to shieldtheaginst the weather until the mad passions of men cool down, andallow the nion and peace once more to settle over your old homes at At-lanta. Yours in haste, W. T. SExrAV, jor-Genera commanding.HEADQUARaiTERS MriLvar DIv oc oE THEf MisssPpi,vI TH HE, AT A, GoaA, Septermbr 14, 1864.eneraJ. B. oon, commanding Army of Tenese, ConfedrateGExEn: Yours of September 12th is received, and has been carefullyperused. I agree with you that this discussion by two soldiers is out ofplace, and proftless; but you must admitthat you began the controversyby characterizing an official act of mine in unfair and improper terms. I reiterate my forer answer, and to the only new matter contained in your rejoinder add: We have no "negro alles" in this army; not a single nerosoldier left Chatooga th this army, or is with it now. There are afew guarding Chatt ga, which Geeral Steedan sent at one time tdrive Wheolor out of Dalton.~~1 8~i,;i ft
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125 CAPTURE OF ATLANTA. [184.I was dt bound by the laws of war to give notice of the shelling ofAtlanta, a "fortified town, with magazines, arsenals, founderies, and publicstores;" you were bound to take notice. See the books.This is the conclusion of our correspondence, which I did not begin,and terminate with satisfaction. I am, with respect, your obedientW. T. SHERMAN, sif0T-7HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARaxY,WASHINGTON, September 28, 1864,Alajor-General SnEEMAx, Atlnta, Georgia.GEN:PAT.: Your communications of the 20th in regard to the removal offamilies from Atlanta, and the exchange of prisoners, and also the officialreport of your campaign, are just received. I have not had time as yet toexamine your report. The course which you have pursued in removing rebelfamilies from Atlanta, and in the exchange of prisoners, i flly approved bythe War Department. Not only are you justified by th laws and usagesofwar in removing these people, but I think it was your duty to your ownarmy to do so. Moreover, I am fully of opinion that the natre of yourposition, the character of the war, the conduct of the enemy(and especiallyof non-combatants and women of the territory which we have heretoforeconquered and occupied), will justify you in gathering up the forage andprovisions which your army may require, both for a siege of Atlanta andfor your supply in your march farther into the enemy's country. Let thedisloyal families of the country, thus stripped, go to their husbands, fathers,and natural protectors, in the rebel ranks; we have tried three years of con-ciliation and kindness without any reciprocation; on the contrary, thosethus treated have acted as spies and guerrillas in our rear and within ourlines. The safety of our armies, and a proper regard for the lives of oursoldiers, require that we apply to our inexorable foes the severe rules ofwar. We certainly are not required to treat the so-called non-combatantrebels better than they themselves treat each other. Even here inVirginia,within fifty miles of Washington, they strip their own families of provisileaving them, as our army advances, to be fed by us, or to starve withinour lines. We have fed this class of people long enough. Let them gotheir hsbands and fathers in the rebel ranks ; and if they won't go, we mustsend them to their friends and natural protectors. I would destroy every mill and factory within reach which I did not want for my own use. Thisthe rebels have done, not only in Maryland and Pennsylvania, but also inVirginia and other rebel States, when compelled to fall back befre ourarmies. In many sections of the country they have not left a mill to grindgrain for their own suffering families, lest we might use them to supply ourarmies. We must do the same.I have endeavored to impress these views upon our comanders for the
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1864 CAPTURE OF ATLANTA. 29last two years. You are almost the only one who has properly appliedthem. I do not approve of General Hunter's course in burning privatehouses or uselessly destryin private property. That is barbarous. ButI approve of taking or destroying whatever may serve as supplies to us orto the enemy's army.H. W. HALLEs Jajor-General Clief of StaffIn order to effet the exchange of prisoners, to facilitate theexodus of the people of Atanta, and to keep open communicationwith the South, we established a neutral camp, at and about therailroad-station next south of Atlanta, known as Rough andReady," to which point I dispatched Lieutenant-Colonel Wil-lard Warner, of my staff, with a guard of one hundred men,and General Hood sent Colonel Clare, of his staff, with a simi-lar guard; these officers and men harmonzed perfectly, andparted good friends when their work was done. In te meantime I also had reconnoitred the entire rebel lines about At-lanta, which were well built, but were entirely too extensive tobe held by a ingle corps or division of troops, so I instructedColonel Po United States Engineers, on my staff, to lay offan innerand shorter line, susceptible of defense by a smaller gar-rison.By the middle of September all these matters were inprogress, the reports of the past campaign were written up anddispatched to Washington, and our thoughts began to turntoward the future. Admiral Farragut had boldly and success-fully run the forts at the entrance to Mobile Bay, which re-sulted in the capture of Fort Morgan, so that General Canbywas enabled to begin his regular operations against Mobile City,with a view to open the Alabama River to navigation. Myfirst thoughts were to concert operations with him, either byway of Montgomery, Alabama, or by the Appalachicola; but solong a line, to be used as a base for further operations eastward,was not advisable, and I concluded to await the initiative of theenemy, supposg that he would be forced to resort to somedesperate campaign bythe clamorraised at the South on accountof the great loss to them of the city of Atlanta.
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130 CAPTURE OF ATLAN TA.General Thomas occupied a house on Marietta Street, whichhad a veranda with high pillars. We were sitting there oneevening, talking about things generally, when General Thomasasked leave to send his trains back to Chattanooga, for the con-venience and economy of forage. I inquired of him if he sp-posed we would be allowed much rest at Atlanta, and he saidhe thought we would, or that at all events it would notdent for us to go much farther into Georgia because of our al-ready long line of communication, viz., three hundred milesfrom Nashville. This was true; but there we were, and wecould not afford to remain on the defensive, simply hoAtlanta and fighting for the safety of its railroad. I insistedon his retaining all trains, and on keeping all his divisions readyto move at a moment's warning. All the army, officers andmen, seemed to relax more or less, and sink into a conditionof idleness. General Schofield was permitted to go to Knox-ville, to look after matters in his Department of the Ohio; andGenerals Blair and Logan went home to look after politics.Many of the regiments were entitled to, and laimed, their dis-charge, by reason of the expiration of their term of serviceso that with victory and success came also many causes of dis-integration. The rebel General Wheeler was still in Middle Tennes-see, threatening our railroads, and rumors came that Forrestwas on his way from Mississippi to the same theatre, forthe avowed purpose of breaking up our railroads and compel-ling us to fall back from our conquest. To prepare for this,or any other emergency, I ordered Newton's division ofFourth Corps back to Chattanooga, and Corse's division ofSeventeenth Corps to Rome, and instructed General Rou at Nashville, Granger at Decatur, and Steadman at Chatta-nooga, to adopt the most active measures to protect and insure the safety of our roads.Hood still remained about Lovejoy's Station, and, up to the15th of September, had given no signs of his future plans; sothat with this date I close the campaign of Atlanta, with thefollowing review of our relative losses during the months of, :
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August and September, with a summary of those for the wholecampaign, beginning May 6 and ending September 15, 1864.The losses for August and September are added together, so asto include those about Jonesboro':ARMY OF THE 1CUMBERLAND-(MAJOR-GENE1RAL THOMAS.)CORPS. Klled and Missing. Wounded. Tot.Fourth(taney)................... 166 41 52Fourteenth (Davis, Palmer)............ 444 1,N19 2,2!3Total.... ........... ...... 61 2 14 8,095ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE-MAJOR-GEVERAL O. O. HOWARD.)CORPS. Killed and Mh.idng. Wounded. Tot.LFi enth (COgn) ..................... 146 409 453Si ateenth(Dodge)..................... 41 217 254Total...... ............ ......... 21,58 91 | ,190iood's losses, as reported for the same period, page 577,Johnston's Narrative:"COP. K.kd. Wonded. Total.Hardee's............................. 141 1.018 1,159ee's................................. 248 1.31 1,879tewar ............................. 98 574 667 Total............... 482 8,22 ,705To which should be added :
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132 CAPTURE OF ATLANTA.Prisoners captured byus.......... .. ..... ....... 3,738Giving his total loss ......................... 7,443On recapitulating the entire losses of each army during theentire campaign, from May to September, inclusive, we have, inthe Union army, as per table appended:Killed .................................. 4,423Wounded ............ ................22,822Missing.... ............................ 4,442Aggregate loss........... ........... 31,687In the Southern army, according to the reports of SurgeonFoard (pp. 576, 577, Johnston's "N:arrative ):Killed (Johnston)................. ........... 1,221" (Hood) ............. .............. 1,823Total killed.................. ....... 3,044Wounded (Johnston)............. .......... 8,229S (Hood) ......................... 10,723Total killed and wounded ................... 21,996Add prisoners captured by us, and officially reportedat the time (ee table) ......... ....... ....... 12,983Aggregate lossto Southern army........... 34,979The foregoing figures are official, and are very nearly cor-rect. I see no room for error save in the cavalry, which wasvery much scattered, and whose reports are much less reliablethan of the infantry and artillery; but as Surgeon Fotables do not embrace Wheeler's, Jackson's, and Martin's divi-sions of cavalry, I infer that the comparison, as to avalry losses,is a "stand-off."I have no doubt that the Southern officers flattered them-selves that they had killed and crippled of us two and even sixto one, as stated by Johnston; but they we simply mistaken,and I herewith submit official tabular statements made up fromthe archives of the War Department, in proof thereof:
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1864.] CAPTURE OF ATLANTA. 133a ag emOA fi ~(''q G74.bwC7 m a.d'O c$ N311}C os o .aoCi G, c+ 'c qD ArC A.,y h-'A G,co3 v"ala8aa88Q n "c 1 ci w l a N N w V C .Gti w a o m B AU TaP=OA& moy c ,a"ao{ee{pQ ao p.IITH Muy H E g ~I -w a bYQxs Qr-1 .y ..1 'o m .g mi +o Pal[S% N" I W ati ao3 c.d qI v a.^9goo'O r m "papvaa"11 m "' I ~ I w tl m c i4 w .G. Ao r oS 1 u "poP 11i o Pallm .v i C !. G mo 6 d bI nom m .. .v c Leo Gi a' "2oFeeRq m PaR{% w n C "y r I N, c c .8vpsrpi io mrx w C w : I m.N[ M Ca =C q JmbyC p0 -A -Cl P CJmimN bA d e HF a G C ACJ d o C2+ c G Fr A p .q p d a ~Nd1 O a V O 9 a Ff mco maWWEl Fj md'.Q67t
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134 CAPTURE OF ATLANTA. 164.1EA)QUARTERS MILITARY DIVsioI OF THE MISSISSIPPI,IN THE .IELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 15, 1864. JPrisoners and Deserters taken by "Army in the Fied," ilitary Divisionof tie ississippi, during fay, .Tune, July, and August, 1864.PPsosRB. DESERTERS.COMMANDS. {[ COmmf.ned Entiated Men. Commtulaned En11sted Men.Army of otheh Ohio.............. 16 Tl 1 292 1,090Total.................... 270 j 7,210 21 2,411 9,91sTo which add the prisoners and desertersk t tken by theArmy of the Cumberland, September 1st to 20th.. 3,065Making aggregate ............ ......... 12,983Reports from armies of the Tennessee and Ohip include the whole campaign, to September 15, 1864.W. T. SImx,Major-General United States Army commanding.I have also had a careful tabular statement compiled fromofficial records in the adjutant-general's office, giving the ef-fective strength" of the army under my command for eachof the months of May, June, July, August, and September,1804, which enumerate every man (infantry, artillery, andcavalry) for duty. The recapitulation clearly exhibits the actualtruth. We opened the campaign with 98,797 (ninety-eightthousand seven hundred and ninety-seven) men. Blair's twodivisions joined us early in June, giving 112,819 (one hun-dred and twelve thousand eight hundred and nineteen), whichnumber gradually became reduced to 106,070 (one hundred andsix thousand and seventy men), 91,675 (ninety-one thousand sixhundred and seventy-five), and 81,758 (eighty-one thousandseven hundred and fifty-eight) at the end of the campaign.This gradual reduction was not altogether owing to death andwounds, but to the expiration of service, or by detachmentssent to points at the rear.
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1864.] CAPTURE OF ATLANTA. 135P wo .: .ten j-Ego Paaasmmc I ro I I I I I I'WS I Pa1ai[-. q;0 Paolsemm .;" I I -"-mom Ia I Po Pa}ssro $H w IQ Pa7al[ ANN jN j c j 11 m.. 'j j m00 G v vIPO Paoae,.mno I f, 1a a O S -Iou Pa,esmm m v I n c ci j .j I 'aaN Pal lla3 _4 vaIBI]Pauo mud .ac ci i o rnw w ti-IV PIM-aj jl 1 I :'Iyr'O, v 'a1ti P49I wm I N+[i G .( I I N (tda a m0 PaIaalm"i.:) cv cx ca m w w oa.o toe 74Pal ia3 ( I vV ^ e I I 1 I3aigo Yalaam P a34 Pafs a .aaoP-J.,,mmaa I !I I I.g ~( 'a Fe., .oFrUP' H u 'd Fa p, CCU a ,V n m 6u C C pay c a g pC EE El
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136 CAPTUJRE OF ATLANTA. [8RECAITULATION-ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. I nfaty ........... 04,310 8,9,096 75,659 T64caaly ............ 12,903 12,039 10,517 ,9A r t0Iw............ 5,601 6,945 5,4994,9Aggregate ........ 112,819 106,010 91,073 81,758ss~r~rr;:i~.J I;: '"k
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CHAPTER XIX.ATLANTA AND AFTER-PURSUrr OF BOOD.SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, 1864.BY the middle of September, matters and things had settleddown in Atlanta, so that we felt perfectly at home. The telegraphand railroads were repaired, and we had uninterrupted commu-nication to the rear. The trains arrived with regularity anddispatch, and brought us ample supplies. General Wheeler hadbeen driven out of Middle Tennessee, escaping south across theTennessee River at Bainbridge ; and things looked as thoughwe were to have a period of repose.One day, two citizens, Messrs. Hill and Nelson, came intoour lines at Decatur, and were sent to my headquarters. Theyrepresented themselves as former members of Congress, andparticular friends of my brother John Sherman; that Mr. Hillhad a son killed in the rebel army as it fell back before us some-where near Cassville, and they wanted to obtain the body,having learned from a comrade where it was buried. I gavethem permission to go by rail to the rear, with a note to thecommanding officer, General John E. Smith, at Cartersville,requiring him to furnish them an escort and an ambulance forthe purpose. I invited them to take dinner with our mess, andwe naturally ran into a general conversation about politics andthe devastation and ruin caused by the war. They had seen apart of the country over which the army had passed, and couldeasily apply its measure of desolation to the remainder of theState, if necessity should compel us to go ahead.Mr. Hill resided at Madison, on the main road to Au.iu3;;
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138 ATLANTA AND AFTER. [1864.gusta, and seemed to realize fully the danger; said that furtherresistance on the part of the South was madness, that he hopeGovernor Brown, of Georgia, would so proclaim it, and with-draw his people from the rebellion, in pursuance of wknown as the policy of separate State action." I told him,if he saw Governor Brown, to describe to him fully what hehad seen, and to say that if he remained inert, I would be com-pelled to go ahead, devastating the State in its whole length andbreadth; that there was no adequat force to stop us, etc.; butif he would issue his proclamation withdrawing his State troopsfrom the armies of the Confederacy, I would spare the State, and in our passage across it confine the troops to the main roads,and would, moreover, pay for all the corn and food we needed.I also told Mr. Hill that he might,in my name, invite GovernorBrown to visit Atlanta; that I would give him a safeguard,and that if he wanted to make a speech, I wouldghim as full and respectable an audience as any he had everspoken to. I believe that Mr. Hill, after reaching his home atMadison, went to Milledgeville, the capital of the State, anddelivered the message to Governor Brown. I had also sentsimilar messages by Judge Wright of Rome, Georgia, and byMr. King, of Marietta. On the 15th of September I telegraphed to General Halleck as follows :My report is done, and will be forwarded as soon as I get in a few moreof the subordinate reports. I am awaiting a courier from General Grant.All well; the troops are in good, healthy camps, and supplies are comingforward finely. Governor Brown has disbanded his militia, to gather thecorn and sorghum of the State. I have reason to believe that he andStephens want to visit me, and have sent them a hearty invitation. I willexchange two thousand prisoners with Hood, but no moreGovernor Brown's action at that time is fully explained bythe following letter, since made public, which was then onlyknown to us in part by hearsay:ExECnvE DEPAENEN\T,MIsLLEDGEVILLE, Goni, Septembr 10, 1864.)General J. B. B. oo, commanding Army of Tennessee.Gna aRA. As the militia of the State were called out for the defensof
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184.] ATLANTA AND AFTER. 139Atlanta during the campaign against it, which has terminated by the fallof the city into the hands f the enemy, and as many of these left theirhomes without preparation (expecting to be gone but a few weeks), whohave remained in service over three months (most of the time in thetrenches), justice requires that they be permitted, while the enemy are pre-paring for the winter campaign, to return to their homes, and look for atime after important interests, and prepare themselves for such service asmay be required when another campaign commences against other impor-tant points in the State. I therefore hereby withdraw said organizationfrom your command... JosEPH C. Bow.This militia had composed a divis'on under command ofMajor-General Gustavus W. Smith, and were thus dispersed totheir homes, to gather the corn and sorghum, then ripe andready for the harvesters.On the 17th I received by telegraph from President Lincolnthis dispatch:WAsHaixaro, D. C., piembr 17, 18641-10 A. a.1yiajor-General SHERMAN :Ifeel great interest in the subjects of your dispatch, mentioning corn andsorghum, and the contemplated visit to you.A. LICOLN, President of the United States.I replied at once:HEADQUARTERS MLrARY DrvIsioN OF THE MISSISeP,IN TaE FIELD, ATLATA, GEOaGIA, S pter 17, 1864President Lisot, Wahington, D. .:I will keep the department fully advised of all developments connectedwith the subject in which you feel interested.Wright, former member of Congress from Rome, Georgia, andM of Marietta, are now going between Governor Brown and myself.I have said to them that some of the people of Georgia are engaged in rebellion, begn in error and perpetuated in pride, but that Georgia canow save herself from the devastations of war preparing for her, only bywithdrawing her quota out of the Confederate Army, and aiding me to expelood from the borders of the State; in which event, instead of desolating the land as we progress, I will keep our men to the high-roads andcommons, and pay for the corn and meatwe need and take.fully conscious of the delicate nature of such assertions, but itwould be a magnificent stroke of policy if we could, without surrenderingprinciple or a' foot of ground, arouse the latent enmity of Georgia againstDavis.
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140 ATLANTA AND AFTER. [1864The people do not hesitate to say that Mr. Stephens was and is a Unionman at heart; and they say that Davis will not trust him or let him havea share in his Government. W. T. SHERMAN, Afor-Geal.I have not the least doubt that Governor Brown, at thattime, seriously entertained the proposition; but he hardly feltready to act, and simply gave a furlough to the militia, andcalled a special session of the Legislature, to meet at Milledgeville, to take into consideration the critical condition of affairsin the State.On the 20th of September Colonel Horace Porter arrived from General Grant, at City Point, bringing me the letter of Sep-tember 12th, asking my general views as to what shoulddone. He staid several days at Atlanta, and on his return carried back to Washington my full reports of the past campaign,and my letter of September 20th to General Grant in answer tohis of the 12th.Aboutthis time we detected signs of activity on the part ofthe enemy. On the 21st Hood shifted his army across fromthe Macon road, at Lovejoy's, to the West Pint road, at Pal-metto Station, and his cavalry appeared on the west side of theChattahoochee, toward Powder Springs; thus, as it were, stepping aside, and opening wide the door for us to enter CentralGeorgia. I inferred, however, that his real purpose was toassume the offensive against our railroads, and on the 24th aheavy force of cavalry from Mississippi, under General Forrest,made its appearance at Athens, Alabama, and captured its gar-rison.GeneralNewton's division (of the Fourth Corps), and Corse's(of the Seventeenth), were sent back by rail, the former toChattanooga, and the latter to Rome. On the 25tl~I telegraphedto General Halleck : Hood seems to be moving, as it were, to the Alabama ine, leaving openthe road to Macon,as also to Augusta; but his cavalry is busyon all ourroads. A force, number estimated as high as eight thousand, are reported to have captured Athens, Alabama ; and a regiment of three hundred andfifty men sent to its relief. Ihave sent Newton's division up to Chattanooga
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in cars, and will send anoter division to Rome. If I were sure that Savan-nah would soon be in our possession, I should be tempted to march forMilledgeill and Augusta; but I must first secure what I have. Jeff. Davisis at Macon. -W. T. Summx, Hlajor-General.On the next day I telegraphed further that Jeff. Davis waswith Hood at Palmetto Station. One of our spies was thereat the time, ho came in the next night, and reported to me thesubstance of his speech to the soldiers. It was a repetition ofthose he had made at Columbia, South Carolina, and Macon,Georgiaon hi way ot, which I had seen in the newspapers.D seemed to be perfectly upset by the fall of Atlanta, andto have lost all sense and reason. He denounced General Jos.Joston ad Governor Brown as little better than traitors; at-tributed to them personally the many misfortunes which hadbefallen their cause, and informed the soldiers that now thetables were to be turned; that General Forrest was already onour roads in Middle Tennessee; and that Hood's army wouldsoon be there. He asserted that the Yankee army would have to retreat or starve, and that the retreat would prove more dis-astrous than was that of Napoleon from Moscow. He promisedhis Tennessee and Kentucky soldiers that their feet should soontread their "native soil," etc., etc. He mead no concealmentof these vainglorious boasts, and thus gave us the full key tohis future designs. To be forewarned was to be forearmed,and I thik we took full advantage of the occasion.Onhe 26th I received this dispatch:Crrr POINT, VI Setember 26,1864-10 A. aajor-General SHEnMANY, Atlanta:It will be better to drive Forrest out of Middle Tennessee as a first step,and any thin se you may feel your force sufficient for. When a move-ment is made on any part of the sea-coast, I will advise you. If Hood goesline, will it not be impossible for him to subsistis army?U. .G Lieutenant-Genera.HEAnQu ns MILITArY DIVSIrO or TE MrsIssm,IN THE FIELD, ATLAsTA, GEOIA, September 26 164GENERA:I your dispatchf to-day. I have already sent onedivision (Newton's) to Chattanooga, and anothr Cors's) to Rome.1 YV
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142 ATLANTA AND AFTER. Our armies are much reduced, and if I send back any more, I will notbe able to threaten Georgia much. There are men enough to the rear tohp Forrest, but they are necessarily scattered to defend the roads. Can you expedite the sending to Nashville of the recruits that areinIndiana and Ohio? They could occupy the forts.Hood is now on the West Point road, twenty-four miles south of this,and draws his supplies by that road. Jefferson Davis is ther to-day, andsuperhuman efforts will be made to break my road.Forrest is now lieutenant-general, and commands all the enemy's cav-alry. W. T. SHRMAN, ajor.General Grant first thought I was in error in supposing thatJeff. Davis was at Macon and Palmetto, but on the 27th I re-ceived a printed copy of his speech mad at Macon on the 22d,which was so significant that I ordered it to be telegraphedentire as far as Louisville, to be sent thence by ail to Wash-ington, and on the same day received this dispatch:WASHINGTON, D: C., Sffeptmbe 27, 18G4-A. ILMajor-General SuExux, Atlanta:You say Jeff. Davis is on a visit to General Hood. I judge that Brand Stephens are the objects of his visit.A. LIxcorN, President of the United States.To which I replied :IranUans MILITARY DIVISIoN OF THE 1MIssI9IPPi,IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GRA,I Sepe 25, 1864.President LycoLs, Washington, D. U.:I have positive knowledge that Mr. Davis made a speech at Macon, onthe 22d, which I mailed to General Halleck yesterday. It was bitter againstGeneral Jos. Johnston and Governor Brown. The militia are on furloBrown is at Milledgeville, trying to get a Legislature to meet next mbut he is afraid to act unless in concert with other Governors. JudgeWright, of Rome, has been here, and Messrs. Hill and Neln, former mem-bers of Congress, are here now, and will go to meet Wright at Rome, andthen go back-to Madison and Milledgeville.Great efforts are being made to reenforce Hood's army, and to break upmy railroads, and I should have at once a good reserve force at Nashvill.It would have a bad effect, if I were forced to send back any considerablepart of my army to guard roads, so as to weaken me to an extent that Icould not act offensively if the occasion calls for it.W. T. SnxaRN, Major-General.
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164.] ATLA1TA AND AFTER. 143All this time Rood and I were carrying on the foregoing cor-respondence relating to the exchange of prisoners, the removalof the people from Atlanta, and the relief f our prisoners fwar at Andersonville. Notwithstanding the severity of theirimprisonment, some of these men escaped from Andersonville,and got to me at Atlanta. They described their sad condition:more than twenty-five thousand prisoners confined in a stockadedesigned for only ten thousand; debarred the privilege ofgathering wood out of which to make huts; deprived of suffi-cient healthy food, and the little stream that ran through theirprison-pen poisoned and polluted by the offal from their cookingand butcherig houses above. On the 22d of September I wroteto General Hood, describing the condition of our men at An-dersonville, purposely refraining from casting odium on him orhis associates for the treatment of these men, but asking his consent for me to procure from our generous friends at theNorth the articles of clothing and comfort which they wanted,viz., under-clothing, soap, combs, scissors, etc.-all needed tokeep them in health-and to send these stores with a train, andan officer to issue them. General Hood, on the 24th, promptlyconsented, and I telegraphed to my friend Mr. James E. Yeat-man, Vice-President of the Sanitary Commission at St. Louis,to send us a all the under-clothing and soap he could spare, speci-fying twelve hundred fine-tooth combs, and four hundred pairsof shears to cut hair. These articles indicate the plague thatmost afflicted our prisoners at Andersonville.Mr. Yeatman promptly responded to my request, expressedthe articles, but they did not reach Andersonville in time, forthe prisoners were soon after removed; these supplies did,however finay overtake them at Jacksonville, Florida, justbefore the war closed.On the 28th I received from General Grant two dispatches:CrTY PoiNT, VEIRGINIA, Spteer 27, 15-8.30 A. M.It is evident, from the tone of the Richmond press and from othersource of information that the enemy intend making a desperate effort to
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144 ATLANTA AND AFTER. [1864;drive you from where you are. I have directed all new troops from theWest, and from the East too, if necessary, in ase none are ready in theWest, to be sent to you. If General Burbridge is no too far on his way toAbindon, I think he had better be recalled and his surplus troops sentinto Tennessee. U. S. G Lieutenant-GeneralCIrry PoeT, VranuA, Sepmber 27, 186-&10.30 A. M.ajo rGeneral SERMAN:I have directed all recruits and new troops from all the Western Statesto be sent to Nashville, to receive their further orders from you. I wasmistaken about Jeff. Davis being in Richmond on Thursday last. Hethen on his way to Macon. U. S. GnAT, Lieutenant-General.Forrest having already made his appearance in Middle Ten-nessee, and Hood Hoevidently edging off in that direction, satsfedme that the general movement against our roads had begun. Itherefore determined to send General Thomas back to QChatta-nooga, with another division (Morgan'sof the Fourteenth Corps),to meet the danger in Tennessee. General Thomas went up onthe 29th, and Morgan's division followed the same day, alsoby rail. And I telegraphed to General Halleck:I take it for granted that Forrest will cut our road, but think we caprevent him from making a serious lodgment. His cavalry will travel ahundred miles where ours will ten. I have sent two divisions up to Chatta-nooga and one to Rome, and General Thomas started to-day to drive Forrestout of Tennessee. Our roads should be watched from the rear, and Iam glad that General Grant has ordered reserves to Nashville. I pre-fer for the future to make the movement on Milledgeville, Millen, and Sa-vannah. Hood now rests twenty-four miles south, on the Chattahoochee,with his right on the West Point road. He is removing the iron of theMacon road. I can whip his infantry, but his cavalry is to be feared.There was great difficulty in obtaining correct informationabout Hood's movements from Palmetto Station. I could notget spies to penetrate his camps, but on tie 1st of October I wassatisfied that the bulk of his infantry was at and across theChattahoochee River, near Campbellton, and that his cavalrywas on the west side, at Powder Springs. On that day I tele-graphed to General Grant:
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1864.] ATLANTA AND AFTER. 145Hood is evidentlyacross the Chattahoochee, below Sweetwater. If hetries to get on our road, this side of the Etowah, I shall attack him;but if he goes to the Sma & Talladega road, why will it not do toleae Tennessee to theforces which Thomas has, and the r veerves soonto come asville, and for me to destroy Atlanta and. march acrossGeorgiatoSavannah or Charleston, breaking roads and doing irreparabledamage e cannot remain on the defensive.The ena & Talladega road herein referred to was an un-finished railroad from Selma, Alabama, through Talladega, toBlue Mountain, a terminus sixty-five miles southwest of Romeand about fifteen miles southeast of Gadsden, where the rebelarmy ld be supplied from the direction of Montgomeryand Mobile, and from which point Hood could easily threatenMiddle Tennessee. My first impression was, that Hood wouldmake for that point; but by the 3d of October the indicationswere tha he would strike our railroad nearer us, viz., aboutKingston or Marietta.Orders were at once made for the Twentieth Corps (Slo-cum's) to hold Atlanta and the bridges of the Chattahoochee,and the other corps were put in motion for Marietta. The army had undergone many changes since the capture ofAtlanta. General Schofield had gone to the rear, leaving Gen-eral J. D. Cox in command o the Army of the Army of the Ohio (Twenty-third Corps). General Thomas, also, had been dispatched toChattanooga, with ewton'. division of the Fourth Corps andMorgan's of the Fourteenth Corps, leaving General D. S.the senior major-general of the two corps of his Armyof the Cumberland, remaining and available for this move-met,viz., the Fourth and Fourteenth, commanded by himselfand Major-General Jeff. C. Davis; and after General Dodge,his corps (the Sixteenth) had been broken up, andits two divisions were added to the Fifteenth and SeventeenthCorps, constituting the Army of the Tennessee, commanded byMajor-General O. .Howard. Generals Logan and Blair hadgone home to assist in the political canvass, leaving their corps,viz., the Fif nth and Seventeenth, under the command ofMajor-Generals Osterhaus and T. E. G. Ransom.
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140 ATLANTA AND AFTER. L1864,These five corps were very much reducein strength, by de-tachments and by discharges, so that for the purpose of fightingHood I had only about sixty thousand infantry and artillery,'with two small divisions of cavalry (Kilpatrick's and GaGeneral Elliott was the chief of cavalry to the Army of theCumberland, and was the senior officer of that arm of seivicepresent for duty with me.We had strong railroad guards at Marietta and Allatoona, Etowah Bridge, Kingston, Rome, Resaca, Dalton,Ringgold, and Chattanooga. All the important bridges werelikewise protected by good block-houses, admirably consand capable of a strong defense against cavalry or infant; andat nearly all the regular railroad-stations we had smaller detach-ments intrenched. I had little fear of the enemy's cavadamaging our roads seriously, for they rarely made a break which could not be repaired in a few days; but it wasabsolutelynecessary to keep General Hood's infantry off our main route ofcommunication and supply. Forrest had with him in MiddleTennessee about eight thousand cavalry, and Hood's army wasestimated at from thirty-five to forty thousand men, infantryand artillery, including Wheeler's cavalry, then about threethousand strong. We crossed the Chattahoochee River during the 3d and 4th ofOctober, rendezvoused at the old battle-field of Smyrna Camp, and the next day reached Marietta and Kenesaw. The tele-graph-wires had been cut above Marietta, and learningheavy masses of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, had been seenfrom Kenesaw (marching north), I inferred that Allatoona wastheir objective poiin; and on the 4th of October I sifrom Vining's Station to Kenesaw, and from Kenesaw to Allatoona, over the heads of the enemy, a message for General Corse,at Rome, to hurry back to the assistane of the garrison atAllatoona. Allatoona was held by a small brigade, commandedby Lieutenant-Colonel Tourtellotte, my present aide-de-camp.lie ad two small redoubts on either side of the railroad, olooking the village of Allatoona, and the warehouses, in whichwere stored over a million rations of bread.
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4] ATLANTA AND AFTER. 147eaching Kenesa Mountain about 8 A. .of October 5th(a beautfulday), I had a superb view of the vast panorama to thenorth and west. To the outhwest, about Dallas, could be seenthe smoke of camp-fre, indicating the presence of a large forcef the enemy, and the whol line of railroad from Big Shantyup to Alatoona (full fifteen miles) was marked by the fires ofthe burning railroad. We could plainly see the smoke of battleabout Allatoon, and hear the faint reverberation of the cannon.From Kenesaw I ordered the Twenty-third Corps (GeneralCo) to march due west on the Burnt Hickory road, and toburn houses or piles of brush as it progressed, to indicate thehead of colun, hoping to interpose this corps between Hood'smain army at Dallas and the detachment then assailing Allatoo-na. The rest of the armnny was directed straight for Allatoona,northwest, distant eighteen miles. The signal-officer on Kenesawreported that since daylight he had failed to obtain any answerto his call for Allatoona; but, while I was with him, he caughta faint glimpse of the tell-tale flag through an embrasure, andafter much time he made out these letters" C.," R.I, S.,""X.," "I, E.," "I R.," and translated the message-"Corseis here." It was a source of great relief, for it gave me the firstassurance that General Corse had received his orders, and thatthe place was adequately garrisoned.I watched with painful suspense the indications of the battleraging there, and was dreadfully impatient at the slow progressof the leving column, whose advance was marked by thesmokes which were made according to orders, but about 2 P. u.I noticed with satisfaction that the smoke of battle about Alla-toon grew less and less, and ceased altogether about 4 P. r.For a time I attributed this result to the effect of General Cox'smarch, but later in the afternoon the signal-flag announced thewelcome tidings that the attack had been fairly repulsed, butthat General Corse wa wounded. The next day my aide, Colo-nel Dayton, eceived this characteristic dispatch:AL-ATooSA, GxoneA, Ocober 6, 184--2 ..Captain L. M. DAYTo Aide-de-Camp:I am short a cheek-bone and an ear, but am able to whip all h-1 yet!,"""
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148 ATLANTA AND AFTER. [1864My losses are very heavy. A force moving from Stilesboro'to ingtongives me some anxiety. Tell me where Sherman is.Jon L COsE, Brigadier-General.Inasmuch as the enemy had retreated southwest, ad wouldprobably next appear at Rome, I answered General Corse withorders to get back to Rome with his troops as quickly as possible.General Corse's report of this fight at Allatoona isfull and graphic. It is dated Rome, October 27, 184; recitesthe fact that he received his orders by signal to go to the assiance of Allatoona on the 4th, when he telegraphed to Kings for cars, and a train of thirty empty cars was started for him,but about ten of them got off the track and caused delay. By7 P. ar. he had at Rome a train of twenty cars, which he loadedup with Colonel Rowett's brigade, and part of the Twelfth Illi-nois Infantry; started at 8 r. Y., reached Allatoona (distantthirty-five miles) at 1 A. M. of the 5th, and sent the train backfor more men; but the road was in bad order, and no more mencame in time. He found Colonel Tourtellotte's garrison com-posed of eight hundred and ninety men; his re6nforcement was one thousand ad fifty-four: total for the defense, nineteen hun-dred and forty-frty-four. The outposts were already engaged, andas soon as daylight came he drew back the men from the village to the ridge on which the redoubts were built.The enemy was composed of French's division of three bri-gades, variously reported from four to five thousand strong.This force gradually surrounded the place by 8 A. M., whenGeneral French sent in by flag of truce this note:AROUe1 ALLATOONA, October 5, 18Commanding Offier, >United States Forces, Allatoona:I have placed the forces under my command in such positions that youare surrounded, and to avoid a needless effusion of blood I call on you tosurrender your forces at once, and unconditionally. Five minutes will be allowed you to decide. Should you accede to this, you will be treated in the most honorable manner as prisoners of war.I have the honor to be, very respectfully yours,6. G. FREno,Major-General commanding forces Confederate States.= ~
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1864.] ATLANTA AND AFTER. 149General Corse answered immediately:EAnQUARas Foum DIVISION, FrFTEENri Cor01,ALLAToon, GEORGIA, 8.30 a. M. Otolr 5, 1864.ajor-General S. G. FRNCi, Cofderate States, etc.:Your communication demanding surrender of my command I acknowl-edge receipt of, and respectfully reply that we are prepared for the "need-less effusion of blood" whenever it is agreeable to you.I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,JOm If. CORsE,Brigadier-General commanding forces United States.Of course the attack began at once, coming from front, flank,and rear. There were two small redoubts, with slight parapetsand ditches, one on each side of the deep railroad-cut. Theseredoubt had been located by Colonel'Poe, United States En-gineers, at the time of our advance on Kenesaw, the previousJune. Each redoubt overlooked the storehouses close by therailroad, and each could aid the other defensively by catching inflank the attacking force of the other. Our troops at frst en-deavored to hold some ground outside the redoubts, but weresoon driven inside, when the enemy made repeated assaults, butwere always driven back. About 11 A. M., Colonel Redfield, ofthe Thirty-ninth owa, was killed, and Colonel Rowett waswounded, but never ceased to fight and encourage his men. Colo-nel Tourtellotte was shot through the hips, but continued toc d. General Corse was, at 1 P. M., shot across the face,the ball cutting his ear, which stunned him, but he continued toencourage his men and to give orders. The enemy (about 1.30P. .) made a last and desperate effort to carry one of the re-but was badly cut to pieces by the artillery and infantry fire from the other, when he began to draw off, leaving his deadand wounded on the ground.Before finally withdrawing, General French converged aheavy f of his cannon on the block-house at Alatoona Creek,about two miles from the depot, set it on fire, and captured itsgarrison, consisting of four officers and eighty-five men. By4 P. M. s in full retreat so n the Dalias road, and gotbeforethe hea of General Cos colunn had reached it;iI~ll~l iW ~: P~:R~~I~~I,~ ':,~~" :,,'~li ~
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150 ATANTA AND AFTER.186still several ambulances and stragglers were picked up by thiscommand on that road. Geneal Corse reported two hundredand thirty-one rebel dead, four hundred and eleven prisoners,three regimental colors, and eight hundred muskets captured.Among the prisoners was a Brigadier-General Young, whothought that French's aggregate loss would reach two thColonel Tourtellotte says that, for days after General Corse hadreturned to Rome, his men found and buried at least amore dead rebels, who had doubtless been wounded, and diedin the woods near Allatoona. I know that when IAllatoona, on the 9th, I saw a good many dead men, whichbeen collected for burial.Corse's entire loss, officially reported, was:GA RRISON. KI d. WoundLd. isg. Total.86 2 68Total........... 142 8T8O 21 TOI esteemed this defense of Allatoona so handsome and im-portant, that I made it the subject of a general order, viz., No.86, of October 7, 1864:The general commanding avails himself of the opportunity, in thehandsome defense made of Allatoona, to illustrate the most importantprinciple in war, that fortified posts should be defended to the last, re-gardless of the relative numbers of the party attacking and attacked. .The thanks of this army are due and are hereby accorded to General CColonel Tourtellotte, Colonel Rowett, oficers, and men, for their deter-mined and gallant defense of Allatoona, and it is made an example to illus-trate the importance of preparing in time, and meeting the danger, whenpresent, boldly, manfully, and well.Commanders and garrisons of the posts along our railroad are herebyinstructed that they must hold their posts to the last minute, sure that thetime gained is valuable and necessary t their comrades at the front. By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman,L. M. DAYroN, Aide-de-Camp.The rebels had struck our railroad a heavy blow, burning* 4
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41 ATLANTA AND AFTER. 151every tie, bending the rails for eight miles, from Big Shanty toabove Acworth, so that the estimate for repairs called for thirty-five thousand new ties, and six miles of iron. Ten thousandmen were distributed along the break to replace the ties, and toprepare the road-bed, while the regular repair-party, under ColonelW. W. Wright, came down from Chattanooga with iron, spikes,etc., and in about seven days the road was all right again. Itwas by such acts of extraordinary energy that we discouragedour adversaries, for the rebel soldiers felt that it was a waste oflabor for them to march hurriedly, on wide circuits, day anidnight, to burn a bridge and tear up a mile or so of track, thenthey knew that we could lay it back so quickly. They sup-posed that we had men and moneyZvithout limit, and that wealways kept on hand, distributed along the road, duplicates ofevery bridge and culvert of any importance.A good story is told of one who was on Kenesaw Mountainduring our advance in the previous June or July. A groupof rebels lay in the shade of a tree, one hot day, overlookingour camps about Big Shanty. One soldier remarked to hisfellows:"Well, the Yanks will have to git up and git now, for Iheard General Johnston himself say that General Wheeler hadblown up the tunnel near Dalton, and that the Yanks wouldhave to retreat, because they could get no more rations.""Oh, hell!" said a listener, "don't you know that old Sher-man carries a duplicat tunnel along? "After the war was over, General Johnston inquired of mewho was our chief railroad-engineer. When I told him that itwas Colonel W. W. Wright, a civilian, he was much surprised,said that our feats of bridge-building and repairs of roads hadexcited his admiration; and he instanced the occasion at Kene-aw in June, when an oicer from Wheeler's cavalry hadreported to him in person that he had come from GeneralWheeler, who had made a bad break in our road about TiltonStation, which he said would tke at least a fortnight to repair;and, while they were talking, a train was seen coming down theroad whh had passed that very and ad reak, ached me at
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152 ATLANTA AND AFTER. [1864.Big Shanty as soon as the fleet horseman had reached him (Gen.eral Johnston) at Marietta !I doubt whether the history of war can furnish more exam-ples of skill and bravery than attended the defense of the rail-road from Nashville to Atlanta during the year 1864.a munted regiment of Ilinois Infantry, could feel the countrysouth of Rome about Cedartown and Villa Rica and reportedthe enemy to be in force at both places. On the 9t I tele-graphed to General Thomas, at Nahville, as follows:I came up here to relieve our road. The Twentieth Corps remains atAtlanta. Hood reached the road and broke it up between BigShantyandAcworth. He attacked Allatoona, but was repulsed. W have plenty ofbread and meat, but forage is scarce. I want to destoy all the road belowChattanooga, including Atlanta, and to make for the sea-coast. We annotdefend this long line of road.And on the same day I telegraphed to General Grant, at CityPoint:It will be a physical impossibility to protect the roads, now that Hood,Forrest, Wheeler, and the whole batch of devils, are turned loose withouthorne or habitation. I think Hood's movements indicate a diversion to theend of the Selma & Talladega road, at Blue Mountainu, about sixty milessouthwest of HRome, from which he will threaten Kingston, Bridgeport, andDecatur, Alabama. I propose that we break up the railroad from Chatta-nooga forward, and that we strike out with our wagons for Milledgeville Millen, and Savannah. Until we can repopulate Georgia, it is useless forus to occupy it; but the utter destruction of its roads, houses, and people, will cripple their military resources. By attempting to hold the roads, wewill lose a thousand men each month, and will gain no result. I can makethis march, and make Georgia howl I We have on and over eight thousandhead of cattle and three million rations of bread, but no corn. We can findplenty of forage in the interior of the State.iehantime the rebel General Forrest had made a bold circuitin Middle Tennessee, avoiding all fortified points, and breaking9 9 4ff
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4i1864. ATLANTA AND AFTER. 153up the railroad at several places; but, as usual, he did his workso hastily and carelesly that ou engineers soon repaired thedamage-then, retreating before General Rousseau, he left theState of Tenessee, crossing the river near Florence, Alabama,and got off unharmed.On the 1Ath of October the enemy appeared south of theEtowah River at Rome, when I ordered all the armies to marchto Kingston, rode myself to Cartersville with the Twenty-thirdC s (General Co), and telegraphed from there to GeneralThomas at Nashville:It looks to me as though Hood was bound for Tuscumbia. He is nowcrossing the Coosa River below Rome, looking west. Let me know if youcan hold him with your forces now in Tennessee and the expected re-enforcements, as, in that event, you know what I propose to do.I will be at Kingston to-morrow. I think Rome is strong enough toresist any attack, and the rivers are all high. If he turns up by Summer-ville,I will get in behind him.And on the same day to General Grant, at City Point :Hood is now crossing the Coosa, twelve miles below Rome, bound west.If e passes over to the Mobile & Ohio Railroad, had I not better executethe'plan of my letter sent you by Colonel Porter, and leave GeneralThomas, with the troops now in Tennessee, to defend the State He willhave an ample force when the reonforcements ordered reach Nashville.I found General John E. Smith at Cartersville, and on the11th rode on to Kingston, where I had telegraphic communica-tions in all directions. General Corse, at Rome, I learned that Hood's armyhad disappeared, but in what direction he was stillin doubt; andI was so strongly convinced of the wisdom of my proposition tochange the whole tactics of the campaign, to leave Hood toGeneral Thomas, and to march across Georgia for Savannah orCharleston, that I again telegraphed to General Grant:We cannot now remain on the defensive. With twenty-five thousandinfantry and the bold cavalry be has, Hood can constantly break my road.I would infinitely prefer to make a wreck of the road and of the countryB J J
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154 ATLANTA AN AFTER. [18.from Chattanooga to Atlanta, including the latter city; send back all mywounded and unserviceable men, and with my effective army move throughGeorgia, smashing things to the sea. Hood may turn into Tennessee andKentucky, but I believe he will be forced to follow me. Instead of beingon the defensive, I will be on the offensive. Instead of my guessing atb hat he means to do, he will have to guess at my plans. The differncein war would be fully twenty-five per cent. I can make Savannah, Charles-ton, or the mouth of the Chattahoochee (Appalachicola). Answer quick,as I know we will not have the telegraph long.I received no answer to this at the time, and the next daywent on to Rome, where the news came that Hood had madehis appearance at Resaca, and had demanded the surrender ofthe place, which was commanded by Colonel Weaver, reinforcedby Brevet Brigadier-General Raum. General Hood had evident-ly marched with rapidity up the Chattooga Valley, by Summer-ville, Lafayette, Ship's Gap, and Snake-Creek Gap, and hadwith him his whole army, except a small force left behind towatch Rome. I ordered Resacato be further renforced by railfrom Kingston, and ordered General Corse to make a bold re-connoissance down the Coosa alley, which captured and broughtinto Rome some cavalrymen and a couple of field-guns, withtheir horses and men. At first I thought of interposing mywhole army in the Chattooga Valley, so as to prevent Hood'sescape south; but I saw at a glance that he did not mean tofight, and in that event, after damaging the road all he could,he would be likely to retreat eastward by Spring Place, whichI did not want him to do; and, hearing from General Raumthat he still held Resaca safe, and that General Edward McCookhad also got there with some cavalry reenforcements, I t all the heads of columns for Resaca, viz, General Cox's,fromRome ; General Stanley's, from McGuire's; and General How-ard's, from Kingston. We all reached Resaca during that night,and the next morning (13th) learned that Hood's whole armyhad passed up the valley toward Dalton, burning the railroadand doing all the damage possible., On the 12th he had demanded the surrender of Resaca inthe following letter :
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1864.] ATLANTA AND AFTER. 15HEADQUARTERs Amor OF TErNNEssEE,N THE FIELD, October 12, 1864.To the Offier commanding the United StatesForces at Resaca, Georgia.Sm: I demand the immediate and unconditional surrender of the postand garrison under your command, and, should this be acceded to, all whiteofficers and soldiers will be parolled in a few days. If the place is carriedby assault, no prisoners will be taken. Most respectfully, your obedientservant, J. .HooD, General.To this Colonel Weaver, then in command, replied:H EADQUARTEs SEconD BRIGADE, TmHIR Dis IsI, F FTEE Co PS,s. .c ESAoA, GEORGLA, ctober 12, 18-4.To General J. B. HOOD:Your communication of. this date just received. In reply, I have tostate that I am somewhat surprised at the concluding paragraph, to theeffect that, if the place is carried by assault, no prisoners will be taken. Inmy opinion I can hold this post. If you want it, come and take it.I am, general, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,CLARK R. WEAVER, Commandling Oficer.This brigade was very small, and as Hood's investment ex-tended only from the Oostenaula, below the town, to the Con-nesauga above, he left open the approach from the south, whichenabled General Raum and the cavalry of General EdwardMcCook to renforce from Kingston. In fact, Hood, ad-monished by his losses at Allatoona, did not attempt an assaultat all, but limited his attack to the above threat, and to someskirmishing, giving his attention chiefly to the destruction ofthe railroad, which he accomplished all the way up to TunnelHill, nearly twenty miles, capturing oute the regiment ofblack troops at Dalton (Johnson's Forty-fourth United Statescolored). On the 14th, I turned General Howard throughSnake-Creek Gap, and sent General Stanley around by Tilton,with orders to cross the mountain to the west, so as to capture,if possible, th force left by the enemy in Snake-Creek Gap.We found this gap very badly obstructed by fallen timber, butgot through that night, and the next day the main army was atVillanow. On the morning of the 16th, the leading division ofGeneral Howard's column, commanded by General Charles R.~ 11~i~ ~ ~~ ~ 8~18 o ~t~y
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[56 ATLANTA AND AFTER. 186Woods, carried Ship's Gap, taking prisoners part of the Twen-ty-fourth South Carolina Regiment, which had been left thereto hold us in check.The best information there obtained located Hood's army atLafayette, near which place I hoped to catch him and force himto battle; but, by the time we had got enough troops across themountain at Ship's Gap, Hood had escaped down the valley ofthe Chattooga, and all we could do was to follow him as closely as possible. From Ship's Gap I dispatched couriers to Chanooga, and received word back that General Schofield was thereendeavoring to coperate with me, but Hood had broken up thtelegraph, and thus had prevented quick communication. Gen-eral Schofield did not reach me till the army had got down toGaylesville, about the 21st of October.It was at Ship's Gap that a courier brought me the ciphermessage from General Halleck which intimated that the au-thorities in Washington were willing I should undertake themarch across Georgia to the sea. The translated dispatch named Horse-i-bar Sound as the point where the fleet wouldawait my arrival. After much time I construed it to mean," Ossabaw Sound," below Savannah, which was correctOn the 16th I telegraphed to General Thomas, at ashville:Send me Morgan's and Newton's old divisions. Reestablish the road,and I will follow Hood wherever he may go. I think he will move to BlueMountain. We can maai n our men and animals on the country.General Thomas's reply was:NhVaILLE, Ocober 17, 1864-10.830 A. x.fiajor-General Srnm MANYour dispatch from Ship's Gap, 5 P. M. of the 16th, just received.Schofield, whom I placed in command of the two divisions (Wagner's andMorgan's), was to move up Lookout Valley this A. M., to intercept Hood,should be be marching for Bridgeport. I will order him to join you withthe two divisions, and will reconstruct the road as soon as possible. Will alsoreorganize the guards for posts and block-houses.... Mower and Wilsonhave arrived, and are on their way to join you. I hope you will adopt Grant'sidea of turning Wilson loose, rather than undertake the plan of a march
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1864. ATLANTA AND AFTER. 157with the whole force throug Georgia to the sea, inasmuch as GeneralGrant cannot coperate with you as at first arranged.GEORGE H. THOMAS, Major-General.So it is clear that at that date neither General Grant norGeneral Thomas heartily favored my proposed plan of cam-paign. On the same day, I wrote to General Schofield at Chat-Hood is not at Dear Head Cove. We occupy Ship's Gap and Lafayette.Hood is moving south i Summerville, Alpine, and Gadsden. If he entersTennessee, it will be to the west of Huntsville, but I think he has given up all such idea. I ant the road repaired to Atlanta; the sick and woundedien sent north of the Tennessee; my army recomposed; and I will thenmake the interior of Georgia feel the weight of war. It is folly for usto be moving our armies on the reports of scouts and citizens. We must maintain the offensive. Your first move on Trenton and Valley Head wasright -the move to defend Caperton's Ferry is wrong. Notify GeneralThomas of these my views. We must follow Hood till he is beyond thereach of mischief, and then resume the offensive.The correspondence between me and the authorities at Wash-Sington, as well as with the several army commanders, given atlength in the report of the Committee on the Conduct of theWar, is full on all these points.After striking our road at Dalton, Hood was compelled togo on to Chattanooga and Bridgeport, or to pass around by De-catr and abandon altogether his attempt to make us let goour hold of Atlanta by attacking our communications. It wasclear to me that he had no intention to meet us in open battle,and the lightness and celerity of his army convinced me that I could not possibly catch him on a stern-chase. We thereforequietly followed him down the Chattooga Valley to the neigh-borhood of Gadsden, but halted the main armies near the CoosaRiver, at the mouth of the Chattoo, dawing our supplies ofcorn ad meat from the farms of that comparatively rich val-ley and of the neighborhood.eneral Slocum, in Atlanta, had likewise sent out, understrong escort, large trains of wageons to the east, and brought.
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158 ATLANTA AND AFTER. [1864.back corn, bacon, and all kind of rovisions, so that Hood'efforts to cut off our supplies only reacted on his own people.So long as the railroads were in good order, our supplies camefull and regular from the orth; but when the enemy brokeour railroads we were perfectly justified in stripping theitants of all they had. I remember well the appeal of a veryrespectable farmer against our men driving away his fineflock of sheep. I explained to him that General Hood had broken our railroad; that we were a strong, hungry crowd,and needed plenty of food; that Uncle Sam was deeply inter-ested in our continued health and would soon repair these roads,but meantime we must eat; we preferred Illinois beef, butmutton would have to answer. Poor fellow I don't believe hewas convinced of the wisdom or wit of my explnation. Verysoon after reaching Lafayette we organied a line of supplyfrom Chattanooga to Ringgold by rail, and thence by wagonsto our camps about Gaylesville. Meantime, also, ood hadreached the neighborhood of Gadden, and drew his suppliesfrom the railroad at Blue Mountain.On the 19th of October.I telegraphed to eneral Halleck, atWashington:Hfood has retreated rapidly by all the roads lading south. Our advance columns are now at Alpine and Melville Post-Ofice. I shall pursue him asfar as Gaylesville. The enemy will not venture toward Tennessee exceptaround by Decatur. I propose to send the Fourth Corps back to GeneralThomas, and leave him, with that corps, the garrisons, and new troops, todefend the line of the Tennessee River; and with the rest I will push inthe heart of Georgia and come out at Savannah, destroying all the rroads of the State. The break in our railroad at Big Shanty isrepaired, and that about Dalton should be done in ten days. We fndabundance of forage in the country.On the same day I telegraphed to General L. .Easton,chief-quartermaster, who had been abent on a visit to Missouri,but had got back to Chattanooga:Go in person to superintend the repairs of the railroad, and make allorders in my name that will expedite its completion. I want it finished, tobring back from Atlanta to Chattanooga the sick and wounded men and!,i
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84.] ATLANTA AND AFTER. 159surplus stores. On the 1st of November I want nothing in front of Chat-tanooga except what we can use as food and clothing and haul in our wagons.There is plenty of corn in the country, and we only want forage for theposts. I allow ten days for all this to be done, by which time I expect tobe at or near Atlanta.I telegraphed also to General Amos Beckwith, chief-commis-sary in Atlanta, who was acting as chief-quartermaster duringthe absence of General Easton:Hood will escape me. I want to prepare for my big raid. On the 1stof November I want nothing in Atlanta but what is necessary for war.Se all trash to the rear at once, and have on hand thirty days' food andbut little forage. I propose to abandon Atlanta, and the railroad back toChattanooga, to sally forth to ruin Georgia and bring up on the sea-shore. Make all dispositions accordingly. I will go down the Coosa untilI am sure that Hood has gone to Blue Mountain.On the 21st of October I reached Gaylesville, had my bivouacin an open field back of the village, and remained there till the28th. During that time General Schofield arrived, with the twodivisions of Generals Wagner (formerly Newton's) and Morgan,which were returned to their respective corps (the Fourth andFourteenth), and General Schofield resumed his own commandof the Army of the Ohio, then on the Coosa River, near CedarBluff. General Joseph A. Mower also arrived, and was assignedto command a division in the Seventeenth Corps; and GeneralJ. H. Wilson came, having been sent from Virginia by GeneralGrant, for the purpose of commanding all my cavalry. I firstintended to organize this cavalry into a corps of three smalldivisions; to be commanded by Genaeral Wilson; but the horseswere well run down, and, at Wilson's instance, I concluded toretain only one division of four thousand five hundred men,with selected horses, under General Kilpatrick, and to sendGeneral Wilon back with all the rest to Nashville, to be re-organized and to act under General Thomas in the defense ofTennessee. Orders to this effect were made on the 24th of Oc-tober.General Grant, in designating General Wilson to command
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160 ATLANTA AND AiFTER. 1864.my cavalry, predicted that he would, by his personal activity, in-crease the effect of that arm "fifty per cent.," and he advisedthat he should be sent south, to accomplish all tha I had pro-posedto do with the main army; but I had not somuchcavalry as he had, and preferred to adhere to my original intention of going myself with a competent force.About this time I learned that General Beauregard hadreached Hood's army at Gadsden; that, without ssuming di-rect command of that army, he had authority from the Con-federate Government to direct all its movments, an to calltohis assistance the whole strength of the South. His orders, onassuming command, were full of alarm and desperation, dated-HEADQUARTERS I1LITARVY DIVIsON OF THE WaS,October 17, iiasIn assuming command, at this critical juncture, of the Military Divisionof the West, I appeal to my countrymen, ofall classes and sectonsfor their generous support. In assigning me to this responsible position, the Presi-dent of the Confederate States has extended to me the assurance of hisearnest support. The Executives of your States meet me with similar ex-pressions of their devotion to our cause. The noble army incomposed of brave men and gallant officers, are strangers to me, but Iknow they will do all that patriots can achieve. .The army of Sherman still defiantly holds Atlanta. 'e can and mustbe driven from it. It is only for the good people of eorgia and surround-ing States to speak the word, and the work is done. We have abundant,provisions. Therere e men enough in the country, liable to and able forservice, to accomplish the result... .My countrymen, respond to this call as you have done in days that arepast, and, with the blessing of a kind and overruling Providence, the eneshall be driven from your soil. The security of your wives and daughtersfrom the insults and outrages of a brutal foe shll be established soon, andbe followed by a permanent and honorable peace. The claims of home andcountry, wife and children, uniting with the demands of honor and patriot-ism, summon us to the field. We cannot, dare not fail to respond.Full of hope and confidence, I come to join you in your struggles, sharingyour privations, and, with your brave and true men, tstrike the blow thatshall bring success to our arms, triumph to our cause, and peace to ourcountry!G. T. BaaUEARD, Geeral.4" i ;i~~II~
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1864.] ATLAITA AND AFTER. 161Notwithstanding this somewhat boastful order or appeal,General Beauregard did not actually accompany General Hoodon his disastrous march to Nashville, but took post at Corinth,Mississippi, to control the movement of his supplies and towatch me.At Gaylesville the pursuit of Hood by the army under myimmediate command may be said to have ceased. During this pursuit, the Fifteenth Corps was commanded by its senior major-general present, P. J. Osterhaus, in the albsence of General JohnA.Logan; and the Seventeenth Corps was commanded by Briga-dier-General T. E. G. Ransom, the senior officer present, in theabsence of General Frank P. Blar.General Ransom was a young, most gallant, and promis-ing officer, son of the Colonel Ransom who was killed at Cha-pultepec, in the Mexican War. H had served with the Army ofthe Tennessee in 1862 and 1863, at Vicksburg, where he wasseverely wounded. He was not well at the time we startedfrom Atlanta, but he insisted on going along with his command.His symptoms became more aggravated on the march, and whenwe were encamped near Gaylesville, I visited him in companywith Surgeon John Moore, United States Army, who said thatthe case was one of typhoid fever, which would likely prove fatal. A few days after, viz., the 28th, he was being carried ona litter toward Rome; and as I rode from Gaylesville to Rome,I passed him by the way, stopped, and spoke with him, butdid not then suppose he was so near his end. The next day,.howeer, his escort reached Rome, bearing his dead body. Theofficer in charge reported that, shortly after I had passed, hissymptoms became so much worse that they stopped at a farm.house by the road-side, where he died that evening. His body.was at once sent t Chicago for burial, and a monument habeen ordered by the Society of the Army of the Tennessee to,be erected in his memory.On the 26th of October I learned that Hood's whole armyhad made its appearance about Decatur, Alabama, and at oncecaused a strong reconnoissancbe e down the to be made down the Coosa to near Gadsden, which revealed the truth that the enemy was_ goue37
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162 ATLANTA AND AFTER. [1864.except a small force of cavalry, commanded by General Wheeler, which had been left to watch us. I then finaly resolved onmy future course, which was to leave Hood to be encounteredby General Thomas, while I should carry into full effect thelong-contemplated project of marching for the sea-coast,andthence to operate toward Richmond. But it it was all-importantto me and to our cause that General Thomas should have anample force, equal to any and every emergency.Hle then had at Nashville about eight or ten thousand newtroops, and as many more civil employes of the Quartermaster'sDepartment, which were not suited for the field, but would bemost useful in manning the excellent forts that already coveredNashville. At Chattanooga, he had General Steedman's divi-sion, about five thousand men, besides garrisons for Chatta-nooga, Bridgeport, and Stevenson; at Murfreesboro' he also hadGeneral Rousseau's division, which was full five thousand strong,independent of the necessary garrisons for the railroad. AtDecatur and Huntsville, Alabama, was the infantry division ofGeneral R. S. Granger, estimated at four thousand; and nearFlorence, Alabama, watching the rossigs of the Tennessee,were General Edward Hatch's division of cavalry, foursand; General Croxton's brigade, twenty-five hundred; andColonel Capron's brigade, twelve hundred; besides which,General J. H. Wilson had collected in Nashville about tenthousand dismounted cavalry, for which he was rapidly collect-ing the necessary horses for a remount. All these aggregatedabout forty-five thousand men. General A. J. Smith t thattime was in Missouri, with the two divisions of the SixtCorps which had been diverted to that quarter to assist GeneralRosecrans in driving the rebel General Price out of Missouri.This object had been accomplished, and these troops, numberingfrom eight to ten thousand, had been orde to Nashville. Tothese I proposed at first to add only the Fourth Corps (GeneralStanley), fifteen thousand; and that corps was ordered fromGaylesville to march to Chattanooga, and thence report for or-ders to General Thomas; but subsequently, on the 30th of Oc-tober, at Rome, Georgia, learning from General Thomas that
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1864. ATLANTA AND AFTER 163the new troops promised by General Grant were coming forwardvery slowly, I concluded to further redenforce him by GeneralSchofield's corps (Twenty-third), twelve thousand, which corpsaccordingly marched far Resaca, atnd there took the cars forChattanooga. I then knew that General Thomas would havean ample force with which to encounter General Hood any-where in the open field, besides garrisons to secure the rail-road to his rear and as far forward as Chattanooga. And, more-over, I was more than convinced that he would have ample timefor preparation; for, on that very day, General R. S. Grangerhad telegraphed me from Decatur, Alabama:I omitted to mention another reason why Hood will go to Tuscumbiabefore crossing the Tennessee River. He was evidently out of supplies.His men were all grumbling; the first thing the prisoners asked for wassomething to eat. Hood could not get any thing if he should cross thisside of Rogersville.I knew that the country about Decatur and Tuscumbia, Ala-bama, was bare of provisions, and inferred that General Hood would have to draw his supplies, not only of food, but of stores,clothing, and ammunition, from Mobile, Montgomery, and Selma,Alabama, by the railroad around by Meridian and Corinth, Mis-sissippi, which we had most effectually disabled the previouswinter.General Hood did not make a serious attack on Decatur, buthung around it from October 26th to the 30th, when he drewoff and marched for a point on the south side of the TennesseeRiver, opposite Florence, where he was compelled to remainnerly a month, to collect the necessary supplies for his contem-plated invasion of Tennessee and Kentucky.The Fourth Corps (Stanley) had already reached Chattanooga,and had been transported by rail to Pulaski, Tennessee; and General Thomas ordered General Schofield, with the Twenty-third Corps, to Columbia, Tennessee, a place intermediate be-tween Hood (then on the Tennessee River, opposite Florence)and Forrest, opposite Johnsonville.On the 31st of October General Croton, of the cavalry, re
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164 ATLANTA AND AFTER. [1864.ported that the enemy had crossed the Tennessee Rivermiles above Florence, and that he had endeavored to stop him,but without success. Still, I was convinced that Hood's armywas in no condition to march for ashville, and that a good dealof further delay might reasnably be counted o. I also restedwith much confidence on the fact that the Tennessee iver belowMuscle Shoals was strongly patrolled by gunboats, and that thereach of the river above Muscle Shoals, from Decatur as high up as our railroad at Bridgeport, was also guarded by gunboats, sothat Hood, to cross over, would be compelled to select a pointinaccessible to these gunboats. He actually did choose such aplace, at the old railroad-piers, four miles above Florence, Ala-bama, which is below Muscle Shoals and above Colbert Shoals.On the 31st of October Forrest made his appearance on theTennessee River opposite Johnsonville (whence a new railroadled to ashville), and with his cavalry and field-pieces actuallcrippled and captured two gunboats with five of our transports,a feat of arms which, I confess, excited my admiration.There is no doubt that the month of October closed t uslooking decidedly squally; but, somehow, I was sustained ithe belief that in a very few days the tide would turn.On the 1st of November I telegraphed very fully to GeneralGrant, at City Point, who must have been disturbed by the wildrumors that filled the country, and on the 2d of November re-ceived (at Rome) this dispatch: .CITY PoN, Ni ember 1, 1864-6 p. 3I.Major-General SHERMAN:Do you not thinkit advisable, now that Hood has gone so far north,tirely ruin him before starting on your proposed campaign? With H destroyed, you can go where you please with impunity. I believed and still believe, if you had started south while Hood was in the neighborhoodof you, he would have been forced to go after you. ow that he is faraway he might look upon the chase as useless, and he will go in one direc-tion while you are pushing in the other. If you can see a chance ofdestroying Hood's army, attend to that first, and make your other moveseonay. U. S. ~ GRa, Lieutena t-General.My answer is dated-
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1864.] ATLANTA AND AFTER. 165RorE, GEORGIA, Njvembr 2, 1864.Lieutenant-General U. S. Gnei', ity Point, Virginia:Your dispatch is received. If I could hope to overhaul Hood, I wouldturn against hiim with my whole force; then he would retreat to the southwest, drawing me as a decoy away from Georgia, which is his chief object.If he ventures north of the Tennessee River, I may turn in that direction,and endeavor to get below him on his line of retreat; but thus far hehas not gone above the Tennessee River. General Thomas will have a forcestrong enough to prevent his reaching any country in which we have aninterest; and he has orders, if Hood turns to follow me, to push for Selma,Alabama. No single army can catch Hood, and I am convinced the best results will follow from our defeating Jeff. Davis's cherished plan of makingme leave Georgia by manouvring. Thus far I have confined my efforts tothwart this plan, and have reduced baggage so that I can pick up and startin any direction; but I regard the pursuit of Hood as useless. Still, if heattempts to invade Middle Tennessee, I will hold Decatur, and be preparedto move in that direction; but, unless I let go of Atlanta, my force will notbe equal to his. W. T. SHERMAN, Majorqeneral.By this date, under the intelligent and energetic action ofColonel W. W. Wright, and with the labor of fifteen hundredmen, the railroad break of fifteen miles about Dalton was re-paired so far as to admit of the passage of cars, and I transferredmy headquarters to Kingston as more central; and from thatplace, on the same day (November 2d), again telegraphed toGeneral Grant.Kcesron, GEOGIA R Novmrr 2,1864.Lieutenant-General U. S. GRAT, City Point, Virginia:If I turn back, the whole effect of my campaign will be lost. By mymovements I have thrown Beauregard (Hood) well to the west, and Thomaswill have ample time and sufficient troops to hold him until the reenforce-ments from Missouri reach him. We have now ample supplies at Chat-tannooga and Atlanta, and can stand a month's interruption to our com-munications. I do not believe the Confederate army can reach our rail-road-linesexcept by cavalry-raids, and Wilson will have cavalry enough tocheckmate them. I am clearly of opinion that the best results will followmy contemplated movement through Georgia.W. T. SnERx ajor-General.That same day I received, in answer to the Rome dispatch,sn ': ~~~ ~w ~~t,~ ~tb ~lalorOf e~~~d:a
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16 ATLANTA AND AFTER. [1 .Crr PPndt, VMisUANembr, 121864--11.30 A. m.Your dispatch of 9 A. M. yesterday is just received. Ithe same date, advising that 11od's army, now tbat it had worked so farnorth, ought to be looked upon now as the object." With the force, however, that you have left with General Thomas, he must be able to take careof Hood and destroy him.I do not see that you can withdraw from where you are to follow Hood,without giving up all we have gained in territory. I say, then, go on as youpropose. U. S. GRANr, Lieutenant-General.This was the first time that General Grant assented to the"march to the sea," and, although many of his warm friends andadmirers insist that he was the author and projector of thatmarch, and that I simply executed his plans, General Grant hasnever, in my opinion, thought so or aid so Th truth is fullygiven in an original letter of resident Lincoln, which I receivedat Savannah, Georgia, and have at this instant before me,every word of which is in his own familiar handwriting. It isdated-When you were about leaving Atlanta for the Atlantic coast, I wasanxious, if not fearful ; but, feeling that you were the better judge, and re-membering "nothing risked, nothing gained," I did not interfere. Nowthe undertaking being a success, the honor is all yours; for I believe noneof us went further than to acquiesce; and, taking the work of GeneralThomas into account, as it should be taken, it is indeed a great success. Notonly does it afford the obvious and immediate military advantages, but, inshowing to the world that your army could be divided, putting the strongerpart to an important new service, and yet leaving enough to anquish theold opposing force of the whole, Hood's army, it brings those whodarkness to see a great light. But what next? Isuppose it will be safeif I leave General Grant and yourself to decide. A. L N.Of course, this judgment, made after the event, was ex-tremely flattering and was all I ever expected, a recognition ofthe truth and of its importance. I have often been asked,by well-meaning friends, when the thought of that march firstentered my, mind. I knew that an army which had pne-trated Georgi as far as Atlanta could not turn bak. It must
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go ahead, but when, hw, ndwhere, depended on many con-siderations. As soon as Hood had shifted across from Love-joy's to Palmetto, I saw the in my "mind's eye ;" and,after Jeff.Dvis's speech at Palmetto, of September 26th, I wasmore positive inmy conviction, but was in doubt as to thetime and manner. When General Hood first struck our rail-road above Marietta, we were not ready, and I was forcedto watch his movements further, till he had carromed" ofto the west of Decatur. Then I was perfectly convinced, andhad no longer a shadow of doubt. The only possible questionwas as to Thomas's strength and ability to meet Hood in theopen field. I did not suppose that General lood, though rash,would venture to attack fortified places like Allatoona, Resaca,Decatur, and Nashville; but he did so, and in so doing he playedinto our hands perfectly.On the 2dof November I was at Kingston, Geogia, and myfour corp-the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Fourteenth, and Twen-tieth-with one division of cavalry, were strung from Rome toAtlanta. Our railroads and telegraph had been repaired, and Ideliberately prepared for the march to Savannah, distant threehundred miles from Atlanta. All the sick and wounded men hadbeen sent back by rail to Chattanooga; all our wagon-trains hadbeen carefully overhauled and loaded, so as to be ready to starton an hour's notice, and there was no serious enemy in our front.General Hood remained still at Florence, Alabama, occupy-ing both banks of the Tennessee River, busy in collecting shoesand clothing for his men, and the necessary ammunition andstores with which to invade Tennessee, most of which had tocome from Mobile, Selma, and Montgomery, Alabama, overrailroads that were still broken. Beauregard was at Corinth,hastening forward these necessary preparations.General Thomas was at Nashville, with Wilson's dismountedcavalry and a mass of new troops and quartermaster's em-ploys amply sufficient to defend the place. The Fourth andTwenty-third Corps, under Generals Stanley and Schofield,were posted at Pulaski, Tennessee, and the cavalry of Hatch,Croxton, and Capron, were about Florence, watching flood.
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16S ATLANTA AND AFTER. [1864Smith's (A. J.) two divisions of the Sixteenth Corps were stillin Missouri, but were reported as ready to embark at Lexingtonfor the umberand River and Nashville. Of coursGeneralThomas saw that on him would likely fall the real blow, andwas naturally anxious. He still kept Granger's division at De-catur, Rousseau's at Murfreesboro', and Steedman's at Chatta-nooga, with strong railroad guards at all the essential pointsintermediate, confident that by means of this very railroad hecould make his concentration sooner than Hood could possiblymarch up from Florence. Meantime, General F. P. Blair had rejoined his corps (Seven-teenth), and we were receiving at Kingston recruits and returnedPaymasters had come down to pay of our men before theirdeparture to a new sphere of action, and commissioners werealso on hand from the several States to take the vote of our menin the presidential election then agitating the country.On the 6th of November, at Kingston, I wrote and tele-graphed to General Grant, reviewing the whole situation, gave4im my full plan of action, stated that I was ready to march assoon as the election was over, and appointed November 10th asthe day for starting. On the 8th I received this dispatch.CI rosr, VIacsUs, November 7, 1864-10.30 p. x.Major-General SuERAN::Your dispatch of this evening received. I see no present reason forchanging your plan. Should any arise, you will see it, or if I do I w inform you. I think every thing here is favorable now. Great godfortunattend you! I believe you will be ominentlysuccessful, and, at worstcanonly make a march less fruitful of results than hopedfor.U. S. Gua.r, Lieutenant-GeneralMeantime trains of cars were whirling by, carrying to therear an immense amount of stores which had accumulated at At-lanta, and at the other stations along the railroad; and GeneralSteedan had come down to Kingston, to take charge of thefinal evacuation and withdrawal of the several garrisons belowChattanooga.~rr~llWIA
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Onthe 10th of November the movement may be said tohave fairly begn. All the troops designed for the campaignwere ordered to march for Atlanta, and General Corse, beforeevacuating his posat Rome, was ordered to burn all the mills,factories, etc., etc., that could be usful tothe enemy,should heundertake to pursue us,.or resume military possession of thecountry. This was done on the night of the 10th, and next dayCorse reached Kingston. On the 11th General Thomas and Iinterchanged full dispatches. He had heard of the arrival ofGeneral A. J. Smith's two divisions at Paducah, which wouldsurely reach Nashille much sooner than General Hood couldpossibly do from Florence, so that he was perfectly satisfiedwith his share of the army.On the 12th, with a full staff, I started from Kingston forAtlanta; and about noon of that day we reached Cartersville,and sat on the edge of a porch to rest, when the telegraph op-erator, Mr. Van Valkenburg, or Eddy, got the wire down fromthe poles to his lap, in which he held a small pocket instrument.Calling Chattanooga," he received this message from GeneralThomas, dated-INle IVTLLE, V'ev ',r 12, 1 -85.30. A.. M.Your dispatch of twelve o'clock last night is received. I have no fearsthatBeauregard can do us any harm now, and, if he attempts to follow you,I will follow him as far as possible. If he does not follow you, I will then thoro ly organize my troops, and believo shall have men enough toruin him unless he gets out of the way very rapidly.The country of Middle Alabama, I learn, is teeming with supplies thisyearwhic will be greatly to our advantage. I have no additional newsto report from the direction of Florence.I am now convinced that the greater partof Beauregard's army is nearFlorence and Tscumbia, and that you will have at least a clear road beforeyou for several days, and that your success will fully equal your expecta-tions. GEOGE I. ToAs, Major-Genera: I answered simply: Dispatch received-all right." Aboutthat instant of time, some of our men burnt a bridge, which severed th telegraphwire, and all communication with the rearceased thenceforth.
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170 ATLANTA AND AFTER. 1864.As we rode on toward Atlanta that night, I remember therailroad-trains going to the rear with a furious speed; the en-gineers and the few men about the trains waving us an affectionate adieu. It surely was a strange event-two hostile armiesmarching in opposite directions, each in the full belief that itwas achieving a final and conclusive result in a great war; andI was strongly inspired with the feeling that the movement onour part was a direct attack upon the rebel army and the rebelcapital at RIichmond, though a full thousand miles of hostilecountry intervened, and that, for better or worse, it would endthe war.4 :;88
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CHAPTER XX.THE MARCH TO THE SEA-FROM ATLANTA TO SAVANNAH.NOVEIEER AND DEOEMBER, 1864.ON the 12th of November the railroad and telegraph com-munications with the rear were broken, and the army stood de-tached from all friends, dependent on its own resources and supiplies. No time was to be lost; all the detachments were orderedto march rapidly for Atlanta, breaking up the railroad en route,and generally to so damage the country as to make it untenableto the enemy. By the 14th all the troops had arrived at or nearAtlanta, and were, according to orders, grouped into two wings,the right and left, commanded respectively by Major-GeneralsO. O. Howard and II. W. Slocum, both comparatively youngmen, but educated and experienced officers, fully competent totheir command.The right wing was composed of the Fifteenth Corps, Ma-jor-General P. J Osterhaus commanding, and the SeventeenthCorps, Major-General Frank P. Blair commanding.The left wing was cmposed of the Fourteenth Corps, Major-General Jefferson C. Davis commanding, -and the TwentiethCorps, Brigadier-General A. S. Williams commanding.The Fifteenth Corps had four divisions, commanded byBrigadier-Generals Charles .Woods, W. B. azen, John E.Smith, and John M. Corse.The Seventeenth Corps had three divisions, commanded by
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172 THE MARCH TO IiE SEL [1860Major-General J. A. Mower, and Bridier-Geeals .D.Leggett and Giles A. Smith.The Fourteenth Corps had three divisions, comranded byBrigadier-Generals W. P. Carlin, James D. Morgan, and A.Baird.The Twentieth Corps had also three divisions, co andedby Brigdier-Generals _. J. Jackson, John W. Geary, andW. T. Ward. The cavalry division was held separate, subject to my owners. It was commanded by Brigadier-General Judson K-ptric', and was composed of two brigades, o anded byColoneu s Eli H. Murray, of Kentneky, and Smith D. Atkins, ofIllinois. The strength of the army, as officially reported, is given inthe following tables, and shows an aggreato of fiftydive thousand three hundred and twenty-nine infantry, five housand andsixty-three cavalry, and eighteen hundred and twelve artillery-in all, sixty-two thousand two hundred and four offkers andmen. (Sc table for December 1st.)EECAPITTT.AT1IO-ATLANTA TO SATANNAH.AR31. Nov. r 1. D 1. In~ lnr M.The n t extraorlnary efforts had been made to purge thisarmy of non-ombatants and of sick men, for we knew wellthat there was to be no place of safety save with th anny itself;our wagons were loaded with ammunition, provisions, and for-age, and we could ill afford to haul even sick en in the am-bulances, so that all on this exhibit may be assumed to havebeen able-bodied, experienced soldiers, well armed, well equippedand provided, as far as human foresight could, with all theessentials of life, strength, and vigorous action.t e|:,
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1864.] THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 173'za1H Pololi"3 w e I ci i c n W i II vnO PuuoFa.ImmoJ h ~ I .. I I (V >. vayq 1'+1*I1u3 a m nG .n I ati a o P"^ P*fmm O I I" I Itiazp7 tl Q+A"i Paini _CI1 D7 a a c vo 2'-ADO P-.Vq..Oa.j i woyPO Pauoi3rmmoO .: o I .. .. I m nCd e RPo1 iN3 I _tl O nm0 PavaivlmmaJ I I N I _' y vAO peoopnmma7 '" a I .. v ^ mom. Y I 7 VOai + m F c 9 4 9W m W F
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1 i 4 THE MARCH TO THE SPA. a [18646The two general orders made for this march appear to ve,even at this late day, so clear, emphatic, and well-igested, thatno account of that historic event is perfect without them, andI give them entire, even at the seeming appearance of repe-tition; and, though they called for great saerifice and labor onthe part of the othcers and men, I insist that these orders wereobeyed as well as any similar orders ever were, by an army oper-atin, wholly in an enemy's country, and dispersed, as we neces-aarily were, during the subsequent period of nearly six months.[SpedaI Field Orders o. 119]IaExADrARus MiIDTARy Dtvislov ov THE MtissiosPI,Lv mya Fisco, K-y oe, GEoRGL V oember 6, 1864.The general commanding deems it proper at this time to inform tofficers and men of the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and TwentiethCorps, that he has organized them into an army for a special purpose, wellknown to the War Department and to General Grant. It is sufcient foryou to know that it involves a departure from our present base, and a longand dificult march to a new one. All the chances of war have been con-sidered and provided for, as far as human sagacity can. All he asks of youis to maintain that discipline, patience, and courage, which have character-ized you in the past; and he hopes, through you, to strike a blow at ourenemy that will have a material effect in producing what we all so muchdesire, his complete overthrow. Of all things, the most important is, thatthe men, during marches and in camp, keep their places and do not scatterabout as straclers or foragers, to be picked up by a hostile people in detail.It is also of the utmost importance that our wagons shoald not be loadedwith any thing but provisions and ammunition. All surplus servants, non-combatants, and refugees, should now go to the rear, and none should be en-couraged to encumber us on the march. At some future time we will beable to provide for the poor whites and blacks who seek to escape thebondage under which they are now suffering. With these few simple can-tions, he hopes to lead you to achievements eqnal in importance to thoseof the past.By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman,L ML DArros, Aide-Je-Camp.[gpwial Fi1d orders No. 170.]}hotADrxAnus -MILITARY VISO sOFo THE 3Mismm,is Tam FrELD, Kinno'Px, Gacal, i cember 9, 1864L1. For the purpose of military operations, this army is divided into twowinc viz.**
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1864.THEMARCH TO THE SEA. 175The right wing, Major-General O. O. Howard commanding, composedof the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps; the left wing, Major-GeneralH. W. Slocum commanding, composed of the Fourteenth and TwentiethCorps.2. The habitual order of march will be, wherever practicable, by fourroadsas nearly parallel as possible, and converging at points hereafter to beindicated in orders. The cavalry, Brigadier-General Kilpatrick command-ing, will reeive special orders from the commander-in-chief.3. Ther will b no general train of supplies, but each corps will haveits amm ition-train and provision-train, distributed habitually as follows:Behind each regiment should follow one wagon and one ambulance; be-hind each brigade should follow a doe proportion of ammunition-wagons,provision-wagons, and ambulances. In case of danger, each corps corn-mander should change this order of march, by having his advance andrear brigades unencumbered by wheels. The separate columns will starthabitually at 7 A. M., and make about fifteen miles per day, unless other-wise fixed in orders.4. The army will forage liberally on the country during the march. Tothis end, each brigade commander will organize a good and suffcient forag-ing party, under the command of one or more discreet officers, who willgather near the route traveled, corn forage or forage met of any kind, meat of anykind, vegetables, corn-eal, or whatever is needed by the command, aim-ingat all times to keep in the wagons at least ten days' provisions for his command, and three days' forge. Soldiers must not enter the dwellingsof the inhabitants, or commit any trespass; but, during a halt or camp,they may be permitted to gather turnips, potatoes, and other vegetables,and to drive in stock in sight of their camp. To regular foraging-partiesmust be intrusted the gathering of provisions and forage, at any distancefrom the road traveled..To corps commanders alone is intrusted the power to destroy mills,houses, cotton-gins, etc.; and for them this general principle is laid down:In districts and neighborhoods where the army is unmolested, no destruc-tion of such property should be permitted; but should guerrillas or bush-whackers molest our march, or should the inhabitants burn bridges, ob-strt roads or otherwise manifest local hostility, then army commanders should order and enforce a devastation more or less relentless, accordingto the measure of such hostility..As for horses, mules, wagons, etc., belonging to the inhabitants, thecavalry and artillery may appropriate freely and without limit; discrimi-nating, however, between the rich, who are usually hostile, and the poorand industrious, usually neutral or friendly. Foraging-parties may also takemulesor horses, to replace the jaded animals of their trains, or to serve aspack-mules for the regiments or brigades. In all foraging, of whatever.~ ,, ', ;' '~ I ~ R
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176 THE MARCH TO THIE SEA. [1864.kind, the parties engaged will refrain from abusive or threatening language,and may, where the officer in command thinks proper, give written certifi-cates of the facts, but no receipts; and they will endeavor to leave witheach family a reasonable portion for their maintenance,7. Negroes who are able-bodied and can be of service to the severalcolumns may be taken along; but each army commander will bear inmind that the question of supplies is a very important one, and that his firstduty is to see to those who bear arms.8. The organization, at once, of a good pioneer battalion for each armycorps, composed if possible of negroes, should be attended to. This bat-talion shoald follow the advance-guard, repair roads and double them ifpossible, so that the columns will not be delayed after reaching bad places. Also, army commanders should practise the habit of giving the artillery andwagons the road, marching their troops on one side, and instruct theirtroops to assist wagons at steep hills or bad crossings of streams.9. Captain O. M. Poe, chief-engineer, will assign to each wing of thearmy a pontoon-train, fully equipped and organized; and the commanderthereof will see to their being properly protected at all times.By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman,L. M. DATroN, Aide-de-Camp.The greatest possible attention had been given to the artil-lery and wagon trains. The number of guns had been reducedto sixty-five, or about one gun to each thousand men, and thesewere generally in batteries of four guns each.Each gun, caisson, and forge, was drawn by four teams ofhorses. We had in all about twenty-five hundred wagons, withteams of six mules to each, and six hundred ambulances, withtwo horses to each. The loads were made comparatively light,about twenty-five hundred pounds net; each wagon carryingin addition the forage needed by its own team. Each soldiercarried on his person forty rounds of aununition, and in thewagons were enough cartridges to make up about two hundredrounds per man, and in like manner two hundred rounds of as-sorted ammunition were carried for each gun.The wagon-trains were divided equally between the fourcorps, so that each had about eight hundred wagons, and theseusually on the march occupied five miles or more of road.Each corps commander managed his own train; and habitu-ally the artillery and wagons had the road, while the men, withd """"
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1864.] THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 1 9the exception of the advance and rear guards, pursued pathsimprovised by the side of the wagons, unless they were forcedto use a bridge or causeway in common.I ached Atlanta during the afternoon of the 14th, andfound that all preparations had been made-Colonel Decwith,chief commissary, reporting on million two hundred thousandrations in possession of the troops, which was about twentydays' supply, and he had on hand a good supply of beef-cattleto be driven along on the hoof. Of forage, the supily waslimited, being of oats an corn enogh for five days, but Iknew that within that time we would reach a country wellstocked with corn, which had been gathered and stored in criebs,seemingly for our use, by Governor Brown's militia.Colonel Poe, United States Engineers, of my staff, had eenbusy in his special task of destruction. 1e had a large force atwork, had leveled the great depot, round-house, and the ma-ichine-shops of the Georgia Railroad, and had applied fire tothe wreck. One of these machine-shops had been used by therebels as an arsenal, and in it were stored piles of shot and shell,some of which proved to be loaded, and that night was madehideous by the bursting of shells, whose fragments came un-comfortably near Judge Lyon's house, in which I was quartered.T fire lso reahed the block of stores near the depot, and theheart of the city was in flames all night, but the fire did notreach the parts of Atlanta where the court-house was, or thegreat mass of dwelling-houses.The march from Atlanta began on the morning of 1overm-er 15ththe right wing and cavalry following the railroadsoutheast toward Jonesboro', and General Slocum with theTwentieth Corps leading off o the east by Decatur and Stone Mountain, toward Madison. These were divergent lines, de-signed to threaten oth Maco and Augusta at the same time,so as to prevent a concentration at our intended destination,or "objective," Milledgville, the capital of Georgia, distantsoutheast about one hundred miles. The time allowed eachcolumn for reaching Milledgevill was seven days. I remainedin Atlanta during the 15th with the Fourteenth Corps, and thef.} ? i,;Ui ;
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17 6 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. [1864.kear-guard of the right wing, to complete the loading of thetrains, and the destruction of the buildings of Atlanta which could be converted to hostile uses, and on the morning of the*16th started with my personal staff, a company of Alabamacavalry, commanded by ieutenant Snlling, and an infantryompany, commanded by ieutenant MCrory, which guardedour small train of wagons. My staff was then composed of Major L. M. Dayton, aide-de-camp and acting adjutant-general, Major J. C. McCoy, andMajor J. C. Audenried, aides. Major Ward Nichols hadjoined some weeks before at Gaylesville, Alabama, and was at-taced as an acting aidede-camp. Also Majr enry Hitch-cock had joined at the same time as judgeadvocate. ColonelCharles Ewing was inspector-general, and Surgeon John Mooremedicl director. These constituted our mess. We had notents, only the flies, with which we nightly made bivouacs withthe assistance of the abundant pine-boughs, which made excel-lent shelter, as well as beds.Colonel L. C. Easton was chief-quartermaster; Colonel AmosBeckwith, chief-commissary; Colonel O. M. Poe, chief-engineer;and Colonel T. G. Baylor, chief of ordnance. These invariablyrode with us during the day, but they had a separate camp andmess at night.General William F. Barry had been chief of artillery in theprevious campaign, but at Kingston his face was so swollenwith erysipelas that he was reluctantly compelled to leave usfor the rear, and he could not, on recovering, rejoin us till wehad reached Savannah.About 7 A.i. x. of November 16th we rode out of Atlanta bythe Decatur road, filled by the marching troops and wagons ofthe Fourteenth Corps; and reaching the hill, just outside ofthe old rebel works, we naturally paused to look back upon thescenes of our past battles. We stood upon the very groundwhereon was fought the bloody battle of July 22d, and couldsee the copse of wood where McPherson fell. Behind uslay Atlanta, smouldering and in ruins, the black smoke risinghigh in air, and hanging like a pall over the ruined city. Away I
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1804] TIE MARCH TO THE SEA. 179off in the distance, on the McDonough road, was the rear ofHoward's colunn, the gun-barrels glistening in the sun, thewhite-topped wagons stretching away to the south; and right be-fore us the Fourteenth Corps, marching steadily and rapidly,with a cheery look and swinging pac, that made light of thethousand miles that lay between us and Richmond. Someband, by accident, struck up the anthem of "John Brown's soulgoes marching on;" the men caught up the strain, and neverbefore or since have I heard the chorus of "Glory, glory, halle-lujah!" done with more spirit, or in better harmony of time andThen we turned our horses' heads to the east; Atlanta wassoon lost behind the screen of trees, and became a thing ofthe past. Around it clings many a thought of desperate bat-tle, of hope and fear, that now seem like the memory of adream; and I have never seen the place since. The day wasextremely beautiful, clear sunlight, with bracing air, and an un-usual feeling of exhilaration seemed to pervade all minds-afeeling of something to come, vague and undefined, still full ofventure and intense interest. Even the common soldiers caughtte inspiration, and many a group called out to me as I workedmy way past them, "Uncle Billy, I guess Grant is waiting forus at Richmond!" Indeed, the general sentiment was that wewere marching for Richmond, and that there we should end thewar, but how and when they seemed to care not; nor did theymeasure the distance, or count the cost in life, or bother theirbrains about the great rivers to be crossed, and the food re-quired for man and beast, that had to be gathered by the way.There was a "devil-may-care" feeling pervading officers andmen, that made me feel the full load of responsibility, for sue-cess would be accepted as a matter of coure, whereas, should we fail, this "march" would be adjudged the wild adventureof a crazy fool. I had no purpose to march direct forRichmond by way of Augusta and Charlotte, but always de-signed to reach the sea-coast first at Savannah or Port Royal,South Carolina, and even kept in mind the alternative of Pen-
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SO THE MARH TO THE SEA.XThe first night out we camped by the road-side near Lithonia.Stone Mountain, a mass of granite, was in plain view, cut out inclear outline against the blue sky; the whole horizon was luridwith the bonfires of rail-ties, and groups of men all night werecarrying the heated rails to the nearest trees, and bending themaround the trunks. Colonel Poe had provided tools for rippingup the rails and twisting themwhen hot ; but the best and easiestway is the one I have described, of heating the iddle of theiron-rails on bonfires made of the cross-ties, and then windingthem around a telegraph-pole or the trunk of some convenientsapling. I attached much importance to this destruction of therailroad, gave it my own personal attention, and made reiteratedorders to others on the subject.The next day we passed through the handsome town ofCovington, the soldiers closing up their ranks the color-bear-ers unfurling their flags, and the bands striking up patriotic airs.The white people came out of their houses to behold the sig:t,spite of their deep hatred of the invaders, and the negroes weresimply frantic with joy. Whenever they heard my name, theyclustered about my horse, shouted and prayed in their peculiarstyle, which had a natural eloquence that would have moved astone. I have witnessed hundreds, if not thousands, of suchscenes; and can now see a poor girl, in the very ecstasy of theMethodist "shout," hugging the banner of one of the regiments,and jumping up to the feet of Jeu~s."I remember, when riding around by a by-street in Covington,to avoid the crowd that followed the marching column, that someone brought me an invitation to dine with a sister of Sam. An-derson, who was a cadet at West Point with me; but the mes-senger reached me after we had passed the main part of thetown. I asked to be excused, and rode to a place desig-nated for camp, at the crossing of the ofauhachee River,about four miles to the east of the town. Here we made our bivouac, and I walked up to a plantation-house close by, wherewere assembled many negroes, among them an old, gray-hairedman, of as fine a head as I ever saw. I asked him if he under-stood about the war and its progress. He said he did; that he
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1864.] THE ARCH TO THE SEA. 181had been looking for the "angel of the Lord" ever since he wasknee-high, and, though we professed to be fighting for the Union,he supposed that slavery was the cause, and that our success wasto be his freedom. I asked him if all the negro slaves compre-hended this fact, and he said they surely did. I then explainedto him that we wanted the slaves to remain where they were, andnot to load us down with useless mouths, whish would eat upthe food needed for our fighting-men; that our success was theirassured freedom; that we could receive a few of their young,hearty men as pioneers; but that, if they followed us in swarmsof old and young, feeble and helpless, it would simply load usdownandcrippleusinourgreattask. I think Major HenryHitchcock was with me on that occasion, and made a note ofthe conversation, and I believe that old man spread this messageto the slaves, which was arried from mouth to mouth, to the very end of our journey, and that it in part saved us from thegreat danger we incurred of swelling our numbers so that faminewould have attended our progress. It was at this very planta-tion that a soldier passed me with aham on his musket, a jug ofsorghum-molasses under his arm, and a big piece of honey inhis hand, from which he was eating, and, catching my eye, heremarked sotto voce and carelessly to a comrade, Forage liber-ally on the country," quoting from my general orders. On thisoccasion, as on many others that fell under my personal ob-servation, I reproved the man, explained that foraging mustbe limited to the regular parties properly detailed, and that allprovisions thus obtained must be delivered to the regular com-missaries, to be fairly distributed to the men who kept theirFrom Covington the Fourteenth Corps (Davis's), with whichIg,turned to the right for Milledgeville, via ShadyDale. General Slocum was ahead at Madison, with the Twentieth Corps, having torn up the raiload as far as that place, andthence had sent Geary's division on to the Oconee, to burn thebridges across that stream, when this corps turned south byEatonton, for Milledgeville, the common objective" for thefirst stage of the "march." We fund abundance of corn, me
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1.2 THE MARCH TO THE SE bA. [184.many cows And oxen, and a large number of mules. In all thesethe country was quite rich, never before having been visitedby a hostile army; the recent crop had been excellent, hadbeen just gathered and laid by for the winter. As a rule, wedestroyed none, but kept our wagons full, and fed our teamsbountifully.The skill and success of the men in colleting forage was oneof the features of this march. Each brigade comander hadauthority to detail a company of foragers, usually about fiftymen, with one or two commissioned officers selected for theirboldness and enterprise. This party would b dispatched beforedaylight with a knowledge of the intended day's march andcamp; would proced on foot five or six miles from the routetraveled by their brigade, and then visit every platation andfarm within ange. They would usually procure a wagon orfamily carriage, load it with bacon, corn-meal, tureys, chick-ens ducks, and every thing that could be used as food orforage, and would then regain the main road, usually in ad-vance of their train. When this came up, they would deliverto the brigade commissary the supplies thus gathered by theway. Often would I pass these foraging parties at the road-side, waiting for their wagons to come up, and was amusedat their strange collections-mules, horses, even cattle, packedwith old saddles and loaded with hams, bacon, bags of corn-meal, and poultry of every character and description. Al-though this foraging was attended with great danger and hardwork, there seemed to be a charm about it that attracted thesoldiers, and it was a privilege to be detailed on such a party.Daily they returned mounted on all sorts of beasts, whichwere at once taken from them and appropriated to the gen-eral use; but the next day they would start out again on foot,only to repeat the experience of the day before. No doubt,many acts of pillage, robbery, and violence, were committed bythese parties of foragers, usually called "bummers;" for I have since heard of jewelry taken from women, and the plunder ofarticles that never reached the commissary; but these acts were
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1864. THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 183exceptional and incidental. I never heard of any ases of mr-der or rape; and no army could have carried along sufficientfood and forage for a march of three hundred miles; so thatforaging in some shape was necessary. The country was sparselysett, with no magistrates or civil authorities who could re-spond to requisitions, as isdone inall the wars of Europe; sothat this system of foraging was simply indispensable to oursuccess. By it our men were well supplied with all the essen-tials of life and health, while the wagons retained enough incase of unexpecter delay, and our animals were well fed. Indeed,when wereached Savannah, the trais were pronounced by experts to be the finest in flesh and appearance ever seen withany army.Habitually each corps followed some main road, and theforagers, being kept out on the exposed flank, served all themilitary uses of flankers. The main columns gathered, by theroads traveled, much forage and food, chiefly meat, corn, andsweet-potatoes, and it was the duty of each division and brigadequarteraster to fill his wagons as fast as the contens werOfissued to the troops. The wagon-trains had the right to theroad always, but each wagon was required to keep closed up, soas to leave no gaps in the column. If for any purpose'anywagon or group of wagons dropped out of place, they had towait for the rear. And this was always dreaded, for eachbrigade commander wanted his train up at camp as soon afterreaching it with his men as possible.I have seen much skill and industry displayed by thesequartermasters on the march, in trying to load their wagonswith corn and fodder by the way without losing their place incolumn They would, while marching, shift the lads ofwagons, so as to have six or ten of them empty. Then, ridingwell ahead, they would secure possession of certain stacks offodder near the road, or cribs of corn, leave some men in charge,then open fences and a road back for a couple of miles, returnto their trains, divert the empty wagons out of column, and con-duct them rapidly to their forage,load up and regain their placein olumn without Ioing distance. On one occasion I remen-
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18T THE MARCH TO THE SEA. [1864.ber to have seen ten or a dozen wagons thus loaded with cornfrom two or three full cribs, almost without halting. Thesecribs were built of logs, and roofed. The train-guard, by alever, had raised the whole side of the crib a foot or two; thewagons drove dose alongside, and the men in the crs, lying ontheir backs, kicked out a wagon-load of corn in the time I havetaken to describe it.In a well-ordered and well-disciplined army, these thingsmight be deemed irregular, but I am convinced that the ingenuity of these younger officers accomplished many things farbetter than I could have ordered, and the marehes were thusmade, and the distances were accomplished, in the most admira-le way. Habitually we started from camp at the earliest breakof dawn, and usually reached camp soon after noon. Themarches varied from ten to fifteen miles a day, though some-times on extreme fanks it was necessary to make as much astwenty, but the rate of travel was regulated by the wagons; and,considering the nature of the roads, fifteen miles per day wasdeemed the limit.The pontoon-trains were in like manner distributed in aboutequal proportions to the four corps, giving each a section ofabout nine hundred feet. The pontoons were of the skeletonpattern, with cotton-canvas covers, each boat, with its proportion of balks and chesses, constituting a loadfor one wagon. Byuniting two such sections together, we cold make a bridge of .eighteen hundred feet, enough for any river we had to traverse;but habitually the leading brigade would, out of the abundanttiber, improvise a bridge before the pontoon-train could comeup, unless in the cases of rivers of considerable magnitude, suchas the Ocmulgee, Oconee, Ogeechee, Savannh, etc.On the 20th of November I was still with the FourteenthCorps, near Eatonton Factory, waiting to hear of the Twentieth Corps; and on the 21st we camped near the house of a mannamed Vann; the next day, about 4 P. m., General Davis hadhalted his head of column on a wooded ridge, overlooking anextensive slope of cultivated country, about ten miles short ofMilledgeville and was deploying his trops for camp when I got
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1864.] THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 18up. There was a high, raw wind blowing, and I asked him whyhe had chosen so cold and bleak a position. He explained that he had accomplished his full distance for the day, and had therean abundance of wood and water. He explained further thathis advance-guard was a mile or so ahead; so I rode on, askinghim to let his rer division, as it came up, move some distanceahead into the depression or valley beyond. Riding on somedistance to the border of a plantation, I turned out of the mainroad into a cluster of wild-plum buhes, that broke the force ofthe cold ovember wind, dismounted, and instructed the staffto pick out the place for our camp.The afternoon was unusually raw and cold. My orderly wasat hand with his invariable saddle-bags, which contained a changeof under-clothing, my maps, a flask of whiskey, and bunch ofcigars. Taking a drink and lighting a cigar, I walked to a rowof negro-huts close by, entered one and found a soldier or twowarming themselves by a wood-fire. I took their place by thefire, intending to wait there till our wagons had got up, anda camp made for the night. I was talking to the old negrowoman, when some one came and explained to me that, if Iwould come farther down the road, I could find a better place.So I started on foot, and found on the main road a good dou-ble-hewed-log house, in one room of which Colonel Poe, Dr.Moore, and others, had started a fire. I sent back orders to the"u. pm-bushes" to bring our horses and saddles up to this house,and an orderly to conduct our headquarter wagons to the samneplace. In looking around the room, I saw a small box, like acandle-box, marked "Howell Cobb," and, on inquiring of anegrofound that we were at the plantation of General HowellCobb, of Georgia, one of the leading rebels of the South, thena general in the Southern army, and who had been Secretaryof the United States Treasury in Mr. Buchanan's time. Ofcourse, we confiscated his property, and found it rich in corn,beans, peanuts, and sorghum-molasses. Extensive fields were all round the house; I sent word back to General Davis to ex-plain whose plantation it was, and instructed him to sparenothing. That night huge bonfres consumed the fence-rails,
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186 THE MARH i TO T1E SEA. [1864.kept our soldiers warm, and the teamsters and men, as well asthe slaves, carried off an immense quantity of corn and provi-sions of all sorts.In due season the headquarter wagons came up, and we tsupper. After supper I sat on a chair astride, with my back toa good fire, musing, and became conscious that an old negro,with a tallow-andle in his hand, was scanning my face closely. I inquired, "What do you want, old man ?" He answered,"Dey say you is Massa Sherman." I answered that such wasthe case, and inquired what he wanted. le only wanted tolook at me, and kept muttering, "Dis nigger can't sleep disnight." I asked him why he trembled so, and he said that hewanted to be sure that we were in fact "Yankees," for on aformer occasion some rebel cavalry had put on light-lue overcoats, personating Yankee troops, and many of the negroswere deceived thereby, himself among the number-had shownthem sympathy, and had in consequence been unmercifllybeaten therefor. Thistime he wanted tobe certain before comitting himself ; so I told him to go out on the poreh, fromwhich he could see the whole horizon lit up with camp-fires, andhe could then judge whether he had ever seen any thing like itbefore. The old man became convinced that the "Yankees"had come at last, about whom he had been dreaming all hislife; and some of the staff-officers gave him a strong drink ofwhiskey, which set his tongue going. Lieutenant Snelling, whocommanded my escort, was a Georgian, and recognized in this oldnegro -a favorite slave of his uncle, who resided about six milesoff; but the old slave, did not at firt recognize his youngter in our uniform. One of my staff-oicers asked whathad become of his young master, George. He did not know,only that he had gone off to the warand he supposed himkilled, as a matter of course. His at n was then drawn to,Snelling's face, when he fell on his knees and thanked God thathe had found his young master alive and along with theYankees. Snelling inquired all about his uncle and the famiasked my permission to go and pay his uncle a visit, which I granted, of cours, and the next morning he described to me
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184.] THE MARCH TO THE SEA 187s visit. The uncle was not cordial, by any means, to find hisnephew in the ranks of the host that was desolating the land,and Snelling came back, havin exchanged his tired horse for afresher one out of his uncle's stables, explaining that surelysome of the bummers" would have got the horse had he not.The next morning, November 23d, we rode into Milledge-ville, the capital of the State, whither the Twentieth Cors hadpreceded us; and during that day the left wing was all united,in and around Milledgeville. From the inhabitants we learnedthat soe of Kilpatrick's cavalry had preceded us y a coupleof days, and that all of the right wing was at and near Gordon,twelve miles off, viz., the place where the branch railroad cameto Milledgeville from the Macon & Savannah road. The firststage of the journey was, therefore, complete, and absolutelyGeneral Howard soon reported by letter the operationsof his right wing, which, on leaving Atlanta, had substan-tially followed the two roads toward Macon, by Jonesboro' andMcDonough, and reached the Ocmulgee at Flanters' Factory,hich they crossed, by the aid of the pontoon-rain, during the18th and 1th of November. Thence, with the SeventeenthCorps (General Blair's) he (General Howard) had marched viaMonticello toward Gordon, having dispatched Kilpatrick's cav-alry, supported by the Fifteenth Corps (Osterhaus's), to feign onMacon. Kilpatrick met the enemy's cavalry about four milesout of Macon, and drove them rapidly back into the bridge-de-fenses held by infantry. Kilpatrick charged these, got insidethe parapet, but could not hold it, and retired to his infantrysupports, near Griswold Station. The Fifteenth Corps tore upthe railroad-track eastward from Griswold, leaving Charles P.Wood's division behind as a rear-guard-one brigade of whichwas intrenaced across the road, with some of Kilpatrick's cav-alry on the flanks. On the 22d of November General G. W.Smith, with a division of troops, came out of Macon, attackedthis brigade (Walcutt's) in position, and was handsomely re-pulsed and driven back into Macon. This brigade was in partarmed with Spencer repeating-rifles, and its fire was so rapid
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gg THE MARCH TO THE bEA. [lit.that General Smith insists to this day that he encountered awhole division; but he is mistaken; he was beaten by one brig-ade (Walcutt's), and made no frther effort to molest ouroperations from that direction. General Walcutt was wounded inthe leg, and had to ride the rest of the distance to Savannah ina carriage.Theefore, by the 23d, I was in illedgeville with the leftwinL, and was in full communication with the right wing atGordon. The people of Milledgeville remained at home, exceptthe Governor (Brown), the State officers, and Legislature, whohad ignominiously fled, in the utmost disorder and confusion;standing not on the order of their going, but going at once-some by rail, some by carriages, and many on foot. Some ofthe citizens who remained behind described this flight of the"brave and patriotic" Governor Brown. He had occupied apublic building known as the Governor's Masion," and hadhastily stripped it of carpets, curtains, and furniture of allsorts, which were removed to a train of freight-cars, whichcarried away these things-even the cabbages and vegetablesfrom his kitchen and cellar-leaving behind muskets, ammuni-tion, and the public archives. On arrival at Milledgeville Ioccupied the same public mansion, and was soon overwhelmedwith appeals for protection. General Slocum had previouslyarrived with the Twentieth Corps, had taken up his quartersat the Milledgeville Hotel, established a good provost-guard, and excellent order was maintained. The most frantic appealshad been made by the Governor and Legislature for helpfrom every quarter, and the people of the State had beencalled out en masse to resist and destroy the invaders of their.homes and firesides. Even the prisoners and convicts of thepenitentiary were released on condition of serving as soldiers,and the cadets were taken from their military college for thesame purpose. These constituted a small battalion, under Gen-eral Harry Wayne, a former officer of the United States Army,and son of the then Justice Wayne of the Supreme Court. But these hastily retreated east across the Oconee River, leaving usa good bridge, which we promptly secured.~rlB~i~~li~~g ~ I
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18(4. THE 1ARCH TU T11 SEA. 189At illedgeville we found newspapers from all the South,and learned the consternation which had filled the Southernmind at our temerity; many charging that we were actuallyfleeing for our lives and seeking safety at the hands of our fleeton the sea-coast. All demanded that we should be assailed,front, flank, and rear;" that provisions should be destroyed inadvance, so tha we would starve; that bridges shuld beburnedroadsobstructedand n mercy shown us. Judgingfrom the tone of the Southern press of that day, the outsideworld must have supposed us ruined and lost. I give a fewof these appeals as samples, which today must sound strange tothe parties who made the :CORNH, MISsIssr, fowmierr 18, 1S64-To the People of Georgia:Arise for the defense of your native soil! IRally around your patrioticGovernor and gallant soldiers! Obstruct and destroy all the roads in Sherman's front, flank, and rear, and his army will soon starve in your midst.Be confident. Be resolute. Trust in an overruling Providence, and suc-ess will soon crown your efforts. I hasten to join you in the defense ofyour homes and firesides. G. T. BEAUREGAED.EcrlosnD, aocemkr 18, 1864.To the People of Georgia:You have now the best opportunity ever yet presented to destroy theenemy. Put very thing at the disposal of our generals; remove all provisions from the path of the invader, and put all obstructions in his path.Every citien with his gun, and every negro with his spade and axe,can do the work of a soldier. You can destroy the enemy by retarding his Georgiansbe firm! Act promptly, and fear not!B. II. HILu, Senator.I most cordialy approve the above.JAMES A. SEDDO, Scretary of W Tr.RXcuMDZD, Noember 19, 1364.We have had aspecial conference with President Davis and the Secretaryof War, and are able to assure you that they have done and are still doingall that can be done to meet the emergency that presses upon you. Letevery man y to arms! emove your negroes, horses, cattle, and provisionsfrom Sherman's army, and burn what you cannot carry. Burn all bridges," 4sr 16. ...:3 : : :> @$~1~1,1~
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190 THE MARCH TO TT E [1864and block up the roads in his route. Assail the invadr in front, flank, andrear, by night and by day. Let him have no rest.JULIAN HARTRIDGE, MARK BLAUFOP.D,J. IL REYNOLDs, General N. LESTERJosR T. SHOEMAKER, JOSEPH N. SMra, members of Congress.Of course, we were rather amused than alarmed at these thurets, and made light of the feeble opposition offered to ourprogress. Some of the officers (in the spirit of mischief) gatheredtogether in the vacant hall of Representatives elected a Speaker,and constituted themselves the Legislature of the Stte ofGeorgia! A proposition was made to repeal the ordinance ofsecession, which was well debated, and resulted in its repeal bya fair vote I was not present at these frlics, but heard of themat the time, and enjoyd the joke.entime orders were made for th t total destruction of thearsenal and its contents, and of suh public buildings as couldbe easily converted to hostile uses. But little or no damage wasdone to private property, and General Slocum, with my approval, spared several mills, and many thousands of bales of cottontaking what he knew to be worthless bonds, that the cottonshould not be used for the Confederacy. Meantime the rightwing continued its movement along the railroad toward Savan-nah, tearing up the track and destroying its iron. At the Oconeewas met a feeble resistance from Harry Wayne's troops, but soonthe pontoon-bridge was laid, and that wing crossed over. Kil-patricks cavalry was brought into Milledgeville, and crossethe Oconee by the bridge near the town; and on the 23d I madethe general orders for the next stage of the march as far asMillen. These were, substantially, for the right wing to followthe Savannah Railroad, by roads on its south; the left wing wasto move to Sandersville, by Davisboro' and Louisville, whilethe cavalry was ordered by a circuit to the north, and to marchrapidly for Millen to rescue our prisoners of war confiped there.The distance was about a hundred miles.General Wheeler, with his division of rebel cavalry, had suc-ceeded in getting ahead of us between Milledgeville and Augusta4+ +++ : ::y +:~ : +,
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1864.] THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 191and General W. J. Hardee had been dispatched by GeneralBeauregard from Hood's army to oppose our progress directlyin front. He had, however, brought with him no troops, butrelied on his influence with the Georgians (of whose State hewas a native) to arouse the people, and with them to annihilateSherman's army !On the 24th we reneived the march, and I accompanied theTwentiethCorp, which took the direct road to Sandersville,which we reached simultaneously with the Fourteenth Corps,on the 2th. A brigade of rebel cavalry was deploed beforethe town, and was driven in and through it by our skirmish-line. I myself saw the rebel cavalry apply fire to stacks of fod-der standing in the fields at Sandersville, and gave orders toburn some unoccupied dwellings close by. On entering the town,I told certain citizens (who would be sure to spread the report)that, if the enemy attempted to carry out their threat fo burntheir food, corn, and fodder, in our route, I would most undoubtedly execute to the letter the general orders of devastationmade at the outset of the campaign. With this exception, andone or two minor cases near Savannah, the people did notdestroy food, for they saw clearly that it would be ruin to them-At Sandersville I halted the left wing until I heard that thewing was abreast of us on the railroad. During theevening a negro was brought to me, who had that day beento thestation (Tenille), about six miles south of the town. I in-quired of him if there were any Yankees there, and he an-swered,"Yes" He described in his own way what he had seen."First, there come along some cavalry-men, and they burned'the depot; then come along some infantrymen, and they toreup the track, and burned it;" and just before he left they had"sot fire to the well! "The next morning, viz., the 27th, I rode down to the sta-tion, and found General Corse's divion (of the Fifteenth Corps) engaged in destroying the railroad, and saw the well which my negro informant had seen burnt." It was a square pitabout twenty-five feet deep, boarded up, with wooden steps lead-
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192 THE MARCHi TO THE SEA. [16.ing to the bottom, wherein was a fine copper pump, to liftthe water to a tank above. The soldiers had broken up thepump, heaved in the steps and lining, and set fire to the massof lumber in the bottom of the well, which corroborated thenegros description. From this point Blair's corps, the Seventeenth, took up thework of destroying the railroad,.theFiftenth Corps following an-other road leading eastward, farther to the south of te railroad.While the left wing was marching toward Louisville, north ofthe railroad, Geneal Kilpatrick had, with his cavalry division,moved rapidly toward Waynesboro', on the branch railroad lead-ing from Millen to Augusta. He found Wheeler's di on ofrebel cavalry there, and had considerable skirmishing with it;but, learning that our prisoners had been removed two days be-fore from Mlillen, he returned to Louisville on the 29th, wherehe found the left wing. Here he remained a couple of days torest hishorses, and, receiving orders from me to engage Wheelerand give him all the fighting he wanted, he procured fromGeneral Slocum the assistance of the infantry division of GeneralBaird, and moved back for Waynesboro' on the 2d of December,the remainder of the left wing continuing its march on towardand driven through the town and beyond Brier Creek, towardAugusta, thus keeping up the delusion that the main army wasmoving toward Augusta. General Kilpatrick's fighting andmovements about Waynesboro' and Erier Creek were spirited,and produced a good effect by relieving the infantry column andthe wagon-trains of all molestation during their march on Millen.Having thus covered that flank, he turned south and followedthe movement of the Fourteenth Corps to Buckhead Church,north of Millen and near it.On the d of December I entered Millen with the ven-teenth Corps (General Frank P. Blair), and there paused one day,to communicate with all parts of the army. a General Howardwas south of the Ogeechee River, with the Fifteenth Corps,opposite Searboro'. General Slocum was at Buckhead Church,four miles north of Millen, with the Twentieth Corps. Them..
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Fourteenth (General Davis) was at Lumpkin's Station, on theAugustaroadabut tn miles north of Millen, and the avalrydivision was within easy support of this wing. Thus the wholearmy was in good position and in good condition. We hadlargely subsisted on the country; our wagons were full offorage and provsion; but, as we approached the sea-coast, thecountry became more sandy and barren, and food became morescarce; still, with little or no loss, we had traveled two-thirds ofour distance, and I concludedto push on for Savannah. AtMillen I learned that General Bragg was in Augusta, and thatGeneral Wade Hampton had been ordered there from Rich-mond, to organie a large avaly force with which to resist ourGeneral Hardee was ahead, between us and Savannah, withMcLaw's division, and other irregular troops, that could not, Ifelt assured, exceed ten thousand men. I caused the fine depotat Millen to be destroyed, and other damage done, and then re-, sunmedthe march directly on Savannah, by the four main roadsThe Sventeenth Corps (General Blair) followed substantially therailroad, and, along with it, on the 5th of December, I reachedOgeechee Church, about fifty mile from Savannah, and foundthere fresh earthworks, which had been thrown up by McLaw'sdivision; but he must have s that both his flanks were beingturnedand prudently retreated to Savannah without a fight.All the umna then pursued leisurely their march toward Sa-vannah, corn and forage becoming more and more scarce, butrice-fields beginning to occur along the Savannah and OgeecheeRivers, which proved a good substitute, both as food and forage.The weather was fine, the roads good, and every thing seemedto favor us. Never do I recall a more agreeable sensation thanthe sight of our camps by night, lit up by the fires of fragrantpine-knots. The trains were all in good order, and the menseemed to march their fifteen miles a day as though it werenothing. No enemy opposed us, and we could only occasionallyhear the faint reverberation of a gun to our left rear, where weknew that General Kilpatrick was skirmishing with Wheeler'scavalry, which persistently followed him. But the infantry col-39
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194 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. [1864.umns had met with no opposition whatsoover. McLaw's divi-sion was falling back before us, and we occasinally picked up afew of his men as prisoners, who insisted t we would meetwith strong opposition at Savannah.On the 8th, as I rode along, I found the column turned outof the main road, marching through the fields. Close by, inthe corner of a fence, was a group of men standing around ahandsome young officer, whose foot had been blown to piecesby a torpedo planted in the road. He was waiting for a sur-geon to amputate his leg, and told me that he was ri ding alongwith the rest of his brigade -staff of the Seventeenth Corps,when a torpedo trodden on by his horse had exploded, killingthe horse and literally blowing off all the flesh from one of hislegs. I saw the terrible wound, and made full inquiry into thefacts. There had been no resistance at that point, nothing togive warning of danger, and the rebels had planted eight-inchshells in the road, with friction-matches to explode them bybeing trodden on. This was not war, but murder, and it mademe very angry. I immediately ordered a lot of rbel prison-ers to be brought from the provost-guard, armed with picks and spades, and made them imarch in close order along theroad, so as to explode their own torpedoes, or to discover anddig them up. They begged hard, but I reiterated the order, and could hardly help laughing at their stepping so gingerlyalong the road, where it was supposed sunken torpedoes mightexplode at each step, but they found no other torpedoes till nearFort McAllister. That night we reached Pooler's Station, eightmiles from Savannah, and during the next two days, Decem-ber 9th and 10th, the several corps reached the defenses of Sa-vannah-the Fourteenth Corps on the left, touching the river;the Twentieth Corps next; then the Seventeenth; and the Fif-teenth on the extreme right; thus completely investing the city.Wishing to reconnoitre the place in person, I rode forward by the Louisville road, into a dense wood of oak, pine, and cypress,left the horses, and walked down to the railroad-track, at a placewhere there was a side4rack, and a cut about four feet deep.From that point the railroad was straight, leading into Savan.ii~iiiii~ili i~i ii i iii i~iiii i 9 i
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18e.] THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 195 na, and about eight hundred yards off were a rebel parapetand battery. I could see the cannoneers preparing to lire, andcautioned the ofers near me to scatter, as we would likelyattract a shot. Very soon I saw the white puff of smoke, and,watching close, caught sight of the ball as it rose in its fight,and, finding it coming pretty straight, I stepped a short distanceto one side, but noticed a negro very near me in the act of cross-ing the track at right angles. Some one called to him to look out; but, before the poor fellow understood his danger, the ball(a thirty-two-pound round shot) struck the ground, and rose inits first ricochet, caught the negro under the right jaw, and liter-ally carried away his head, scattering blood and brains about.A soldier close by spread an overcoat over the body, and we allconcluded to get out of that railroad-cut. Meantime, Generalower's division of the Seventeenth Corps had crossed thecanal to the right of the Louisville road, and had found theline of parapt continuous; so at Savannah we had again run upagainst the old familiar parapet, with its deep ditches, canals,and bayous, full of water; and it looked as though anothersiege was inevitable. I accordingly made a camp or bivouacnear the Louisvlle road, about five miles from Savannah, and.tproceeded to invest the place closely, pushing forward recon-noissances at every available point.As soon as it was demonstrated that Savannah was well for-tifiedwith a good garrison, commanded y General William J.Hardee, a competent soldier, I saw that the first step was toopen communication with our fleet, supposed to be waiting forus with supplies and clothing in Ossabaw Sound.General Howard had, some nights previously, sent one of hisbest scouts, Captain Duncan, with two men, in a canoe, to driftpast Fort MlAl1ster, and to convey to the fleet a knowledge ofour approach. General Kilpatrick's cavalry had also been trans-ferred to the south bank of the Ogeechee, with orders to opencommunication with the fleet. Leaving orders with GeneralSlocum to press the siege, I instructed General Howard to senda division with all his engineers to King's Bridge, fourteen anda half miles southwest from Savannah, to rebuild it. On the
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196 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. [1864.evening of the 12th I rode over myself, and spent the night atMr. King's house, where I found General Howard, with Gen-eral azen's division of the Fifteenth C s. His engineerswere hard at work on the bridge, which they finished thatand at sunrise Hazen's division passed over. I gave GeneralH azen, in person, his orders to march rapidly down the rightbank of the Ogeechee, and without hesitation to assault andcarry Fort McAllister by storm. I knew it to be strong inheavy artillery, as against an approach from the sea, but believedit open and weak to the rear. I explained to General IIazen,fully, that on his action depended the safety of the wholearmy, and the success of the campaign. Kilpatrik ad alreadyfelt the fort, and had gone farther down the oast to KilkennyBluff, or St. Catharine's Sound, where, on the same day, he hadcommunication with a vessel belonging to the blockading fleet;but, at the time, I was not aware of this fact, and trusted en-tirely to General azen and his division of infnt, the Secondof the Fifteenth Corps, the same old division which I had com-manded at Shiloh and Vicksburg, in which I felt a special prideand confidence.Having seen General Iazen fairly off, accompanied by Gen-eral Howard, I rode with my staff down the left bank of theOgeechee, ten miles to the rice-plantation of a Mr. Ceeves, whereGeneral Howard had established a signal-station to overlook thelower river, and to watch for any vessel f the blockadingsquadron, which the negroes reported to be expecting us, be-cause they nightly sent up rockets, and daily dispatched a steam-boat up the Ogeechee as near to Fort McAllister as it was safe.On reaching the rice-mill at Cheeves's, I found a guard anda couple of twenty-pound Parrott guns, of De Gres's battery,which fired an occasional shot toward Fort McAllister, plainlyseen over the salt-marsh, about three miles distant. Fort Mc-Allister had the rebel flag flying, and occasionally sent a heavyshot back across the marsh to where we were, but otherwiseevery thing about the place looked as peaceable and quiet as onthe Sabbath.The signal-officer had built a platfor on the ridge-pole of.... t
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1864] THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 197the rice-mill. Leaving our horses behind the stacks of rice-straw,we all got onthe roof of a shed attached to the mill, where-from I could communicate with the signal-oficer above, and atthe same time look out toward Ossabaw Sound, and across theOgeechee River at Fort McAllister. About 2 ..we observedsigns of commotion in the fort, and nticed one or two guns firedinland, and some musket-skirmishing in the woods close by.This betokened the appoach of azen's division, whichhad been anxiously expected, and soon thereafter. the signal-ofer discovered about three miles above the fort a signal-flag,with which he conversed, and found it to belong to Generalazen, who was preparing to assault the fort, and wanted toknow if I were there. On being assured of this fact, and that Iexpeted the fort to be carried before night, I received by sig-nal the assurance of General Hazen that he was making hispreparations, and would soon attempt the assault. The sun wasrapidly declining, and I was dreadfully impatient. At thatvery moment some one discovered a faint cloud of smoke, andan object gliding, as it were, along the horizon above the tops ofthe sedge toward the sea, which little by little grew till it waspronounced to be the smoke-stack of a steamer coing up theriver. "It must be one of our squadron!" Soon the flagof theUnited States was plainly visible, and our attention was dividedbetween this approaching steamer and the expected assault.When the sun was about an hour high, another signal-messagecame from Gereral Hazen that he was all ready, and I repliedto go ahead, as a friendly steamer was approaching from below.Soon we made out a group of officers on the deck of thisvessel, signaling with a flag, "Who are you? The answer wentback promptly, General Sherman." Then followed the question,"Is Fort McAllister taken?" "Not yetbut it will be in aminute" Almost at that instant of time, we saw Hazen'stroops come out of the dark fringe of woods that encompassedte fort, the ines dressed as on parade, with colors flying, andmoving forward with a quick, steady pace. Fort McAllisterwas then all alive, its big guns belching forth dense clouds ofsmoke, which soon enveloped uasalting lines. One color
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198 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. [i864.wet down, but was up in a oment. On he lines advanced,faintly seen in the white, sulphurous smoke; there was a pause,a cessation of fire; the smoke cleared away, and the paraptswere blue with our men, who tired their muskets in the air, andshouted so that we actually heard them, or felt that we did.Fort McAllister was taken, and the good news was instantly sentby the signal-officer to our navy friends on the approaching gun-boat, for a point of timber had shut out Fort McAllister fromtheir view, and they had not seen the action at al, but musthave heard the cannonading.During the progress of the assault, our little group onCheeves's mill hardly breathed; but no sooner did we see ourflags on the parapet than I exclaimed, in the language of thepoor negro at Cobb's plantation, This nigger will have nosleep this night!"I was resolved to communicate with our fleet that night,which happened to be a beautiful moonlight one. At the wharf belonging to Cheeves's mill was a small skiff, that hadbeen used by our men in fashing or in gathering oysters. Iwas there in a minute, called for a volunteer crow, when severalyoung officers, Nichols and Merritt among the number, saidthey were good oarsmen, and volunteered to pull the boat downto Fort McAlister. General Howard asked to accompany me;so we too seats in the stern of the oat, and our crew of o erspulled out with a will. The tide was setting hi strong, and theyhad a hard pull, for, though the distance was but three miles inan air-line, the river was so crooked that the actual distancewas fully six miles. On the way down we passed the wreck ofa steamer which had been sunk some years before, during anaval attack on Fort McAllister.Night had fairly set in when we discovered a soldier on thebeach. I hailed him, and inquired if he knew where General Hazen was. He answered that the general was at the house ofthe overseer of the plantation (McAllister's), and that he couldguide me to it. We accordingly landed, tied our boat to a drift-log, and followed our guide through bushes to a frane-house,standing in a grove of live-oaks, near a row of negro quarters.A iii~iii~iii! i~i~ e r ii iil i iiiii iiiii i i i i
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186.1 TKHE MARCH TO THE SEA. 199General H en was there with his staff, in the act of getting sup-per; he invited us to join them, which we accepted promptly, forwe were really very hungry. Of course, I congratulated Iazenmost heartily on his brilliant success, and praised its executionvery highly, as it deserved, and he explained to me more in de-tail the exact results. The fort was an inclosed work, and itsland-front was in the nature of a bastion and ertains, with goodparapet, ditch, fraise, and ch deise, made out of thelarge branches of live-oaks. Luckily, the rebels had left thelarger and unwieldy trunks on the ground, which served as agood cover for the skirmish-line, which crept behind these logs,and frorn themr kept the artillerists from loading and firing theirThe assault had been made by three parties in line, one frombelow, one from above the fort, and the third directly in rear;along the capital. All were simultaneous, and had to pass agood abatis and line of torpedoes, which actually killed moreof the assailants than the heavy guns of the fort, which gener-ally overshot the mark. Ilazen's entire loss was reported, killedand wounded, ninety-two. Each party reached the parapetabout the sane time, and the garrison inside, of about two hun-dred and fifty men (about fifty of them killed or wounded), werein his power. The commanding officer, Major Anderson, wasat that moment a prisoner, and General Hazen invited him into take supper with us, which he did.Up to this time General flazen did not know that a gun-boat was in the river below the fort; for it was shut off fromsight by a point of timber, and I was determined to board herthat night, at whatever risk or cost, as I wanted some news ofwhat was going on in the outer world. Accordingly, aftersupper, we all walked down to the fort, nearly a mile from thehouse where we had been, entered Fort McAllister, held by aregiment of Hazen's troops, and the sentinel cautioned us tobe very careful, as the ground outside the fort was ful of torpe-does. Indeed, while we were there, a torpedo exploded, tear-ing to pieces a poor fellow who was hunting for a dead com-rad. Inside the fort lay the dead as they had fallen, and theym~.'li~~T ~e
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could hardly be distinguished from their living comrades, sleep-ing soundly side by side in the pale moonlight. In the river,close by the fort, was a good yawl tied to a stake, but the tidewas high, and it required some time to get it in to the bank; thecommanding offier, whose name I cannot recall manned theboat with a good crew of his men, and, with General Howard,I entered, and pulled down-stream, regardless of the warningsof -all about the torpedoes.The night was unusually bright, and we expected to find thegunboat within a mile or so ;.but after pulling down the riverfilly three miles, and not seeing the gunboat, I began to thinkshe had turned and gone back to the sound; but we kept on,following the bends of the river, and about six miles below -Allister we saw her light, and soon were hailed by the vessel atanchor. ulling alongside, we announced ourselves, and werereceived with great warmth and enthusiasm on deck by half adoen naval officers, among them Captain WilliamsonUnitedStates Navy. She provedtobetheDan ion,atend of theregular gunboat Flag, posted at the mouth of the O chee.All sorts of questions were made and answered, and we arnedthat Captain Duncan had safely reached the squadrn, had com-municated the good news of our approach, and they ad beenexpecting us for some days. They explained that AdmiralDahlgren commanded the South-Atlantic Squadron, which wasthen engaged in blockading the coast from Charleston south,and was on his flag-ship, the Harvest Mloon, lying in WassawSound; that General J. G. Foster was in command of the De-partment of the South, with his headquarters at Hilton Head;and that several ships loaded with stores for the army were lyingin Tybee Roads and in Port Royal Sound. From these officersI also learned that General Grant was still besieging Petersburgand Richmond, and that matters and things generally remainedpretty much the same as when we had left Atlanta. All thoughtsseemed to have been turned to us in Georgia, cut off from allconuunication with our friends; and the rebel papers had re-ported us to be harassed, defeated, starving, and fleeing for safetyto the coast. I then asked for pen and paper, and wrote sev
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18&.] THE MARC TO THE SEA. 201eral hasty notes to General Foster, Admiral Dahlgren, GeneralGrantandtheSecretary of War, giving in general terms theactual state of affairs, the fact of the capture of Fort Mc-Allster, and of my desire that means shold be taken to estab-lish a line of supply from the vessels in port up the Ogeecheeto the rear of the army. As a sample, I give one of these notes,addressed to the Secretary of War, intended for publieation torelievethe anxiety of our friends at the North generaly:0 BOARD DANDE.LON, OsSABnw SoLIo, December 13, 15G1-11.50 r. M.To Hon. E. M. Srro, Secretary of War, Wasingfon, 1. C.: To-day, at .M., Generallazen's division of the Fifteenth Corps carried Fort McAllister by assault, capturing its entir garrison and stores. Thisopened to us Ossabaw Sound, and I pushed down to this gunboat to co-municate with the fleet. Before opening communication we had completelydestroyed all the railroads leading into Savannah, and invested the city.Thleft of te army is on the Savannah River three miles above the city, and the right on the Ogeechee, at King's Bridge. The army is in splen-did order, and equal to any thing. The weather has been fine, and supplieswere abundant. Our march was most agreeable, and we were not at allmolested by gnerrillas.We reached Savannah three days ago, but, owing to Fort McAllister,could not om nicate; but, now that we have McAllister, we can goWe have alreay aptured two boats on the Savannah ERiver, and pre-vented their gunboats from coming down.I estimate the population of Savannah at t enty-five thousand and thegarrison at fifteen thousand. General ardee commands.We have not lost a wagon on the trip; but have gathered a largesupply of negroes, mules, horses, etc., and our teams are in far better con-dition than when we started.st duty will be to clear the army of surplus negroes, mues andhorses. We have utterly destroyed over two hundred miles of rails, andconsumed stores and provisions that were essential to nLe's and Hood'sThe quick work made with McAllister, the opening of communicatioUwith our fleet, and our consequent independence as to supplies, dissipate alleir boasted threats to head us off and starve the army.I regard Savannah as already ined. Yours truly,W. T. SHERMAN, ajorG 'eneral.By this time the night was well advanced, and the tide wasA:,,
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202 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. [1864.running bb-strong; so I asked Captain WilliRamson to tow s upas near Fort cAllister as he would venture for the torpedoes,of which the navy-officers had a wholesome dread. The Dande-lion steamed up some three or four miles, till the lights of FortMcAllister could be seen, when she anchored, and we pulled tothe fort in our own boat. General Howard and I then walkedup to the McAllister House, where we found General Hazen andhis officers asleep on the floor of one of the rooms. Lying down on the floor, I was soon fast aslep, but shortly became cop-seious that some one in the room was inquiring for me amongthe sleepers. Calling out, I was told that an officer of GeneralFoster's staff had just arrived from a steamboat anchored belowMcAllister; that the general was extremely anxious to see meon important business, but that e was lame from an old Mexi-can-War wound, and could not possibly come to me. I wasextremely weary from the incessant labor of the day andnight before, but got up, and again walked droad to McAllister, where I found a boat awaiting us, which ar-ried us some three miles down the river, to the steamer W. W.Coit (I think), on board of which we found General Foster. He had just come from Port Royal, expecting to find AdmiralDahlgren in Ossabaw Sound, and, hearing of the capture ofFort McAllister, he had come up to see me. He described fullythe condition of affairs with his own command in South Caro-lina. He had made several serious efforts to effect a lodgnenton the railroad which connects Savannah with Charleston nearPocotaligo, but had not succeeded in reaching the railroad itself,though he had a full division of troops, strongly intrenched, nearBroad River, within cannon-range of the railroad. H ex-plained, moreover, that there were at Fort Roya abundant sup-plies of bread and provisions, as well as of clothing, designedfor our use. We still had in our wagons and in camp abun-dance of meat, but we needed bread, sugar, and coffee, and itwas all-important that a route of supply should at once beopened, for which purpose the aid and assistane of the navywere indispensable. We accordingly steamed down the OgeehRiver to Ossabaw Sound, in hopes to meet Admiral Dahlen,
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but he was not there, and we contined on by the inland an-nel to Wassaw Sound, where we found the harvest Moon, andAdmiral Dahlgran. I was not personally acquainted with himat the time, but he was so extremely kind and courteous thatI was at once attracted to him. There was nothing in hispower, he said, which he would not do to assist us, to make ourcampaign absolutely successful. He undertook at once tofindvessels of light draught to carry our supplies from Port RoyaltoCheve' Mill, or to King' Bridge above, whence they couldbe hauled by wagons to our several camps; e offered to returnwith me to Fort McAllister, to superintend the removal of thetorpedoes, and to releve e of all the detil of tmost dificultwork. General Foster then concluded to go on to Port Royal,to send back to us six hundred thousand rations, and all therifled guns of heavy calibre, and ammunition on hand, with whichI thouht we could reach the city of Savannah, fro the posi-tions already secured. Admiral Dahlgren then returned withmeinthe Harvest Moon to Fort McAllister This consumed allof the 14th of Decmber; and by the 15th I had again reahedChves's Mill where my horse awaited m, and rode on to Gen-eral Howard's headquarters at Anderson's plantation, on theplank-roadabout ght miles bak of Savanna. reachedthis place about noon, and immediately sent orders to myown headquarters, on the Louisville road, to have them broughtover to the plank-road, as a place more central and convenient;gave written notice to Generals Slocum and Howard of allthe stps taken, and ordered them to get ready to receivethe siege-guns, to put them in position to bombard Savannah,and to prepare for the general assault. The country back ofSavannah is very low, and intersected with innumerable salt-water creeks, swamps, and rice-fields. Fortunately the weatherwas good and the roads were passable, but, should the winterrains set in, I knew that we would be much embarrassed. There-fore, heavy details of men were at once put to work to preparea wharf and depot at King's Bridge, and the roads leading theretowere corduroyed in advance. The Ogeechee Canal was alsoclcared out for use; and boats, such as were common on the river
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204 THE MARC TO THE SEA. [1864.plantations, were collected, in which to foat stores from our proposed base on the Ogeechee to the points most convenit tothe several camps.Slocum's wing extended from the Savannah River to thecanal, and Howard's wing from the canal to the extreme right,along down the Little Ogeechee. The enemy oeupied notonly the city itself, with its long line of outer works, but themany forts which had been built to guard the approachesfrom the sea-such as at Beaulieu, Rosedew, White Bluff,Bonaventura, Thunderbolt, Cansten's Blf, Forts Tatnall,Boggs, etc., etc. I knew that General Hardee could not have agarrison strong enough for all these purposes, and I was there-fore anxious to break his lines before he ould receive rforcemets from Virginia or Augusta. General Slocum hadalready captured a couple of steambats trying to pass downthe Savannah River from Augusta, and had established some ofbis men on Argyle and Hutchinson slands above the city, andwanted to transfer a whole corps to the South Carolina bank;but, as the enemy had iron-clad gunboats in the river, I did notdeem it prudent because the same result could better accom-plished f om General Foster's position at Broad River.Fort McAllister was captured as described, late in theevening of December 1th, and y the 1th many steamboatshad passed up as high as ing's Bridge; among them onewhich General Grant had dispatched with the mails for thearmy, which had accumulated since our departure from Atlanta,under charge of Colonel A. H. Markland. These mails weremost welcome to all the officers and soldiers of the army, whichhad been cut off from friends and the world for two months, and this prompt receipt of letters from home had an excellenteffeet, making us feel that home was near. By this vessel alsocame Lieutenant Dunn, aide-de-camp, with the following letterof December 3d, from General Grant, and on the next dayColonel Babcock, United States Engineers, arrived with the let-ter of December 6th, both of which are in General Grant's ownhandwriting, and are given entire:
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E ADQUARTERS AILS OF THE UNITED STAES,CIr or, Vrm eber 8,14.VaorGenwral W. T. SHERMAN, commandin Armies near Savannah,Georgia.GENEAL: The little information gleaned from the Southern press ndi-catingnogreat obstacle to your progress, I have directed your mails (whichhad been previously collected in Baltimore by Coloel Markand, specialagent of the Post-Oic Departent) to be sent as far as the blockadingsquadron off Savannah, to be forwarded to you as soon as heard from onNot liking to rejoice before the victory is assured, I abstain from con-gratulating yu and hos under your ommand, until bottom has beenstruck. I have never had a far, however, for the result.Since you left Atlanta no very great progress has been made here.The enemy has been closely watched, though, and prevented from detachingagainst you. Ithink not one an has gone from here, except some twelveor fifteen hundred dismounted cavalry. Bragg has gone from Wimhningtn.I am trying to tak advantage of his absence to get possession of that place.Owing to some preparations Admiral Porter and General Butler are makingto blow up Fort Fisher (which, while hoping for the best, I do not believe a partilein, there is a delayin getting this expedition off. I hope theywill b ready to start by the 7th, and that Bragg will not have started by-In this letter I do not intend to give you any thing like dirtons forafter you have established yourself on the sea-coast. Wih your veteranI hope to get control of the only two through route from east to westpossessed by the enemy before the fall of Atlanta. condition will belled byholding Savannah and Augusta, or byholdg any ther port to theeast of Savannah and ranville. If Wilmingtfalls, a force from there can cooperate with you.Thomas has got back into the defens of Nashville, with Hood closeupon him. Decatur has been abando and so have all the roads, exceptthe main one leading to Chattano Part of this faling back was un-doubtedly necessary, and all of it may have been. It did not look so, how-evertome. n my opinion Tomas far outnumbers ood in infantry. Incavalry Hood has the advaag in ra and numbers. I hope yet thatood will be badly rip-ed, if ot droyed. The general news youwill learn from the parers better than I cn give it.After all beomes quiet, and roads become so bad up here that there islikely to be a week or two when nothi can be done, I will run down theast to see .If you desire it, Iwillask Mrs. Sherman to go with me.ours truly, A. S. GANT, Liu ant-General.
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Major-General W. T. SHuRMAN, con ing Military Diision of the Mis-GENERAL: 1On ref.ection since sending my lotter by the ns of L1u-tenant Dunn, I have concluded that the most important operation towardlosing ot the rebellion will be to close out Lee and his army.You have now destroyed the roads of the South so that it will probablytake them three months without interruption to reestablish a through linefrom east to west. In that time I think the job here will be effectuallycompleted.My idea now is that you establish a base on the soa-coast, fortify andleave in it all your artillery and cavalry, and enough infantry to protectthem, and at the same time so threaten the interior that the militia of the South will have to be kept at home. With the balance of your command come here by water with all dispatch. Select yourself theoficer to leaveincommand, but you I want in person. Unless you see objections to this planwhich I cannot see, use every vessel going to you for purposes of trans-portation.Hood has Thomas close in Nashville. I have said all I can to forcehim to attack, without giving the positive orderuntil to-day. To-day, how-baupr, I could stand it no longer, and gave the order without any reserve. Itbinahe battle will take place to-morrow. The result will probably beknown iQ New York before Colonel Babcock (the bearer of this) will leaveit. Colon Babcock will give you fil information of all operations now inprogress. Wey respectfully your obedient servant,The contents of these letters gave me great uneasiness, for Ihad set my heart on the capture of Savannah, which I believedto be practicable, and to be near; for me to embark for Vir-ginia by sea was so conplete a change from what I had sup-posedwold be the cours of eventsthat I was very much con-cerned. I supposed, as a Matter of -ourse, that a flcot of vesselswould soon pour in, ready to convey the army to Virginia, andas General Grant's orders eontomplated y leaving the cavalry;trains, and artillery, behind, I judged Fort McAllister to be hebest place for the purpose, end sent my chie sengineer, ColonelPoe, to that fort, to reconnoitre the ground, 4ad to prepareit so as to make a fortified camp large enough eommo-date the vast herd of mules and horses that wou hus eiiii i briii tiiif iiiiiiii~ iiii iii iii l iii ~' iii~i !iii~ iiiiiii~ ii!! ii ~ iiiiiii iijiiii i ........iiiiiiii iiiiii~~iiiii~~iii iiii i ~ ~ .~iiiiiiiiiiiii ii~ iii liiililiii~ il~ ili~ ii i iiiiiii @iiiiii~iiiii~iiiiililii iii ii~Jb~ i i iiii i ii iiiiii! ii iiiiii iiiiiiiiiiiilii ~ ii! n i! iii~ iiiiii;iiii iliiiiiii i i!iliiiiiiiiiiiiiiiilii~ iiiii~iiiii o iiii li iii;iili ..
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1884.] THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 2(07left behind. And as some time might e required to collect thenecessary shipping, which I estiated at little less than ahundredsteamers and sailing-vessels, I determined to push operations,in hopes to secure the city of Savannah before the necessaryfleet could be available. All thse ideas are given in m y answerto General Grant's letters (dated December 16, 1861) herewith,which is a little more full thn th one printed in the report ofthe Committee onhe Condut of th War, because in that copyI omitted the matter oncerning General Thomas, which nowneed no longer be withheld:IacUrsus M. &rY DivIsion or TmE MIssissipiteixx TH FIEaLn, NE.L SAVAhnaI, Deom<'Or 16, 1864.Lieutenant-Generl U. S. Co ander-in-Chi Cit Point, irENKHAL : I roceived, day before yesterday, at the hands of Lieutenantunn your letter of December d, and lst night, at the ands of ColonelBabcock, that of December 6th I ad previously mad you a hasty srawlfrom the tugboat Dandelion, in Ogeechee River, advising you that thearmy had reached the sea-cost destroying all the railroads across thState of Georgia, investing closely the city of Savannah, and had made con-Since writing that note,I have in person met and conferred with GeneralFoster and Admiral Dahigren, and made all the arrangements which wereY deemed essential for reducing the city of Savannah to our possession. But,since the receipt of yours of the 6th, I have initiated measures lookingprincipally to coming to you with fifty or sixty thousand infantry, and ini-dentally to capture Savannah, if time will allow.At the time we carried Fort McAllister by assault so handsonely, withits twenty-two guns and entire garrison, I was hardly aware of its iropor-tance; but, since passing down the river with General Foster and up withAdmiral Dahigren, I realize how admirably adapted are Ossabaw Soundand Ogeechee River to supply an army operating against Savannah. Sea-going vessels can easily come to King's Bridge, a point on Ogeechee River,fourteen and a half miles due west of Savannah, from which point we haveroads leading to all our camps. The country is low and sandy, and cut upwith marshes, which in wet weather will be very bad, but we have been sofavored with weather that they are aH now comparatively good, and heavydetails are constantly employed in double-corduroying the marshes, so thatI have no fears even of bad weather. Fortunately, also, by liberal andjudicious foraging, we reached the sea-coast abundantly supplied withforage and provisions, needing nothing on arrival except bread. Of this we
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2 T:iHEMARCH TO THE SEA. [ 186.started from Atlanta, with from eight to twenty days' supply per corps,and some of the troops only had one day's issue of bread during the tripof thirty days; yet they did not want, for sweet-potatoes were very abun-dant, as well as cornmeal, and our soldiers took to them naturally. Westarted with about fve thousand head of cattle, and arrived with overten thousnd, of course consuming mostly turkeys, chickens, sheephogs,and the cattle of the country. As to our mules and horses, we left Atan-ta with about twenty-five hundred wagons, many of which were drawnby mules which bad pot recovered from the Chattanooga starvation, lof which were replaced, the poor mules shot, and our transportation isnow in superb condition. I have no doubt the State of Georgia has lost, byour operations, fifteen thousand first-rate mules. As to horses, Kilpat-rick collected all his remnounts, and it looks to me, in riding along ourcolumns, as though every oficer had three or four led horses, and eachregiment seems to be followed by at least fifty negroes and foot-soresoldiers, riding on orses and mules. The custom was for each brigade tosend out daily a foraging-party of about fifty men, on foot who invariablyreturned mounted, with several wagons loaded with poultry, potatoes, etc.,and as the army is composed of about forty brigades, you can estimate ap-proximately the number of horses collected. Great numbers of these wereshot by my order, because of the disorganizing effect on our infantry ofhaving too many idlers mounted. General Easton is now engaged in col-lecting statistics on this subject, but I know the Government will never re-ceive full accounts of our captures, althogh the result aid at was fullyattained, viz., to deprive our enemy of them. All thesesent to Fort Royal, or collected behind Fort McAlister to be used by General Saxton in his farming operations, or by the Quartermaster's Depart-ment, after they are systematically accouteed for. While General Eastonis collecting transportation for my troops to James River, I will throw toPort Royal Island all our means of transportation I can, and collect the rest near Fort McAllister, covered by the Ogeechee River and intrench-ments to be erected, and for which Captain Poe, my chief-engineer, is nowreconnoitring the ground, but in the mean time will act as I have begn, asthough the city of Savannah were my objective: namely, the troops will con-tinue to invest Savannah closely, making attacks and feints wherever wehave fair ground to stand upon, and I will place some thirty-pnd arrottwhich I have got from General Foster, in position, near enough to reachthe centre of the city, and then will demand its surrendr. If GeneralHardee is alarmed, or fears starvation, he may surrender; otherwise I willbombard the city, but not risk the lives of our men by assaults across thenarrow causeways, by which alone I can now reach it.If I had time, Savannah, with all its dependent fortifications, wouldsurely fall into our possession, for we hold all its avenues of supply... ... .. i ul
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_ ....we,?,}7,1 -. t 5 rTr, gan v wNewcastleeHo ti IC~ f_ .a OUCrsrcf -Old P ,._1 E 1. Y ti -S o -iinI, land _\\ -ap""Il ch.New Kent C.R.', f Oo ,PS o-epecEOh" Est.Fetersb.Bef (%"=o ., f Chp > "As /" O Livwre Croas Rd'sweb /adga m or //Shady Grove 61. 'am ,. @. A\ Skcoman"'Place } "'x-t. u Ji W ColdH.v. > c rai f/'s ON Trnro. t. 6 lam-I 1 tunes -, ry \ IZr chtlmos A,rer'e TI R> ottom Br, Lei yap 1aa mrie iat.las^ picador sta. ones.Dr.ow-'19 tt6 1j a o : o sr,. ol~ ts:ass Long Br.,.co t/ p 8 c Pm[3'hete Oak Br. WlLl1ARSBU110 Hv 4 y e1 r nea, "r S SGMarys Ch., .a Q oO Cka z Ctty Boada s j -P -Chen i., 0 CH, -.DCar4t Rd1, l7 Li iii?Lt rerr~ IB udalNudrely (.' yRYCBM.OND AND THE PE'INSDLA.
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1864.] THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 0The eemy has made two desperate efforts to get boats from above tothe city, in both of which he has been foiled-General Slocum (whose leftflank rests onthe river) capturing and burning the frst boat, and in thesecond instance driving back two guniboats and capturing the steamer Res-ote, with seven navl officers and a crew of twenty-five seamen. GeneralSlocum occupies Argyle Island and the upper end of Hutchinson Island, andhas a brigade on the South Carolina shore opposite, and is very urgentto pss one of his corps ver to that shore. But, in view of the change ofplan made necessary by your order of the 6th, I wfl maintain things inau qutill I have got all my transportation to the rear and out of theway, and until I have sea-transportation for the troops you reqire at JamesRiver, which I will accompany and command in person. Of course, I willleave Kilpatrick, with his cavalry (say five thousand three hundred), and, itmay be, a division of the Fifteenth Corps; but, before determining on this, I must see General Foster, and may arrange to shift his force (now over above the Charleston Railroad, at the head of Broad River) to the Ogeechee,where, in cooperation with Kilpatrick's cavalry, he can better threaten theState of Georgia than from the direction of Port Royal. Besides, I wouldmuch prefer not to detach from my regular corps any of its veteran divisionand would even prefer that other less valuable troops should be sent to re-enforce Foster from some other quarter. My four corps, full of experienceand full of ardor, coming to you en masse, equal to sixty thousand fighting-men, will be a renforcement that Lee cannot disregard. Indeed, with mypresent command, I had expected, after reducing Savannah, instantly tomarch to Columbia, South Carolina; thence to Raleigh, and thence to re-port to you. But this would consume, it maybe, six weeks' time after thefall of Savannah whereas, by sea, I can probably reach you with my menand arms before the middle of January.I myself am somewhat astonished at the attitude of things in Tennessee.I purposely delayed at Kingston until General Thomas assured me that hewas all ready, and my last dispatch from him of the 12th of November wasfull of confidence, in which he promised me that he would ruin Hood if he dared to advance from Florence, urging me to go ahead, and give myself no concern about Hood's army in Tennessee.Why he did not turn on him at Franklin, after checking and discomn-iting him, surpasses my understanding. Indeed, I do not approve ofhis evacuating Decatur, but think e should have assumed the offensiveagainst Hood from Pulaski, in the direction of Waynesburg. I know fullwell that General Thomas is slow in mind and in action; but he is judicious and brave, and the troops feel great confidence in him. I still hope he willoutmainnuvre and destroy Hood. As to matters in the Southeast, I think Hardee, in Savannah, has goodartillerists, somefive or six thousand good infantry, and, it may be, a mongrel40
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210 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. [1864Lmass of eight to ten thousand militia. In all our marchingthroughGeora,he has not forced us to use any thing but a skirmish-line, though at severalpoints e had erected fortification and tried to alarm s by bombastithreats. In Savannah be has taken refuge in a line constructed behindswamps and overflowed rice-fields, extending from a point on the SavannahRiver about threoe miles abovo the city, around by a branch of the LittleOgeechee, which stream is impassable from its alt-marshes nd boggyswamp, crossed only by narrow causeways or co on corduroy-roads.There must be twenty-five thosad citizens, en, women, and childrenin Savannah, that must also be fed, and how he is to feed th beyond afew days I cannot imagine. I know that his requisitions for corn on the interior counties were not filled, and we are in possession of the rice-ieldsand mills, which could alone be of service to hi in thisneighborhood.H can draw nothing from South Caolina, save from a small corner downin the southeast, and that by a disusd wagn-oad. I could easily g possession of this, but hardly deem it worth the rik of making a detach-ment, which would be in danger by its islation from the main army.Ourwhole army is in fine condition as to health, and the weather is splendid.For that eason alone I feel a personal dislike to turning northward. I willkeep Lieutenant Dunn here until I know the result of my demand for thesurrender of Savannah, but, whether successful or not, ha not delay myexecution of your order of the 6th, which will depend alone upon the timeit will require to obtain transportation by sea.Iam, with respect, etc., your obedient servant,W. T. SnEnxx, ajor-General United States Army.Having concluded all needful preparations, I rode from myheadquarters, on the plank-road, over to General Slocum's head-quarters, on the Macon road, and thence dispatched (by flag oftruce) into Savannah, by the hands of Colonel Ewing, inspector-general, a demand for the surrender of the place. The followingletters give the result. General Hardee refusd to surrender,and I then resolved to make the attempt to rea hislneofdefense at several places, trusting that some one would sH:ADQrARITERS 11L.TRY DIVISlof or THE MiArsissIGeneral WILLIAM J. IIAnDEE, commonding Confederate Forcea in Saannah.GnnuL: You have doubtless observed, from your station at RosedOwthat sea-going vessels now come through Ossabaw Sound and up the Oge-chee to the rear of my army, giving me abundant supplies of all kinds, and more especialy heavy ordnance necessary for the reduction of Savannah. I0 sBp8 1 ;: ,,,~~~";;';
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18.] THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 211alreadyreceived guns that can cast eavy and destructive shot as farour city; also, I have for some days held and controlledevery avenue by which the pope and garrison of Savannah can be sup-pliedand Iam terefore justified in demanding the surrender of the cityof Savannahand its dependent forts, and shall wait a reasonable time for your answer, before opening with heavy ordnance. Should you entertainthe poposition I am prepared to grant liberal terms to the inhabitants andgarrison but should I be forced to resort to assault, or the slower and surerprocess of starvtion, I shall then fel justified in resorting to the harshestmeasures, and shall make little effort to restrain my army-burning to avengethe national wrong which they attach to Savannah and other large citieswhich have been so prominent in dragging our country into civil war. Iinclose you a copy of General Hood's demand for the surrender of the townof Resaca, to be used by you for what it is worth. I have the honor to be your obedient servant,W. T. SHnEMAN, f jor-Gencal.HIeADQUIA.RTERS DEPARTMENT SOcUr CAROLINA, GsOxA, AND FLORDAS,SAvAxII, GEORGIA, 1ECP/llber 1 1864.Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, comandriny Federal 7rces near& In ,GiNERA I have to acknowledge the receipt of a communication from you of this date, in which you demand "the surrender of Savannah and its dependentforts," onthe ground that you "have received guns that cancast heavy and destuctive shot into the heart of the city," and for thefurther reason that you" have, for some days, held and controlled everyavenue by which the people and garrison can be supplied." You add that,should you be "forced to resort to assault, or to the slower and surer pro-cess of starvation, you will then feel justified in resorting to the harshestmeasures, and will make little effort to restrain your army," etc., etc. Theposition of your forces (a halfmile beyond the outer line for the land-de-fenseof Savanna) is, at the nearest point, at least four miles from the heartof the city. That and the interior line are both intact.Your statement that you have, for some days, held and controlled everyavenue by which the people and garrison can be supplied, is incorrect. Iam in free and constant communication with my department.for the surrender of Savannah and its dependent forts isrefused.With respect to the threats conveyed in the closing paragraphs of yourletter (of what may be expected in case your demand is not complied with),I have to say thatI have hitherto conducted the military operations intrustedto my direction instrict ccordance with the rules of civilized warfare, and Ishould deeply regret the adoption of any course by you that may force me
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212 T1E MAR l TO THE S A. [18to deviate from them in future. I have the honor to be, very respectf/y,your obdient servant,W.for e r of the itrE, an t-Geyal.Tho.u.BE.s MIunx, Thnsti nF T ble ISIPI/ :Iant-OGeneral U. S. GRANr, City Point, Firginia.-Generad Hardee for the surrender of the ciy of Savannah, and today re-ceived his answer-refusing; copies of both letters are herewith inclosed.You will notice that I claim that my lines are within easy cannon-range ofthe heart of Savannah; but General Hardee asserts that we are four and ahalf miles distant. But I myself have been to the iof thCharleston and Georgia Central Railroads, and the three-mile post is buta few yards beyond, within the line of or ikets. Th enemy has nopickets outside of his fortified line (which is a fll quarter of a mile withinthe three-mile post), and I have the evidence of Mr. R.R. Cuyler, Presidentof the Georgia Central Railroad (who was a prisoner in our hand), that themile-postmare measured from the Exchange, which is but two squares backfrom the river. By tomorrow morningIwillhave six thirty-pound Parrottsin position, and General Hardee will learn whether I am right or not. Fromthe left of our line, which is on the Savannah River, the spires can be plainlyseen; but the country is so densely wooded it pine and ive-oak, and iesso fiat, that we can see nothing from any other portion of our lines. Gen-eral Slocum feels confident that he can make a sucessful assaultatone ortwo points in front of General Davis's (Fourteenth) corps. All of GeneralHpoward's troops (the right wing) lie behind the Little Ogeechee, and I doubtif it can be passed by troops in the face of an enemy. Still, we can makestrong feints, and if I can get a sufficientnumber of boats, I shall make a cooperative demonstration up Vernon River or Wassaw Sound. I shouldlike very much indeed to take Savannah before coming to you; but, as Iwrote to you before, I will do nothing rash or ay, nd will embark forthe James River as soon as General Easton (who is gone to Port Roy forthat purpose) reports to me that he has an approxmate number offor the transportation of the contemplated force.I fear even this willcost more delay than you anticipate, for already the movement of our transports and the gunboats has required more time than I had expected. W have had dense fogs; there are morore mnd-banks in the Ogeehee than werreported, and there are no pilots whatever Admiral agren promisedto have the channel.buoyed and staked, but it is not done yet. We findonly six feet of water up to King's Bridge at low tide, about ten feet up tothe rice-mill, nd sixteen to Fort McAlister. All these points may be used
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1864.] THE ARCH TO THE SEA. 213war, sick, etc., en route for ort Royal. In relation to Savannah, you willremark that General Hardee refers to his still being in communication withhis department. This language he thought would deceive me; but Iam confirmed in the belief that the route to which he refers (the UnionPlank-road on th South Carolina shore) is inadequate to feed his army andthe people of Savannah, and General Foster assures me that he has his forceon that very road, near the head of Broad River, so that cars no longer runbetween Charleston and Savannah. We hold this end of the CharlestonRailroad and have destroyed it from the three-mile post back to the bridge(about twelve miles). In anticipation of leaving this country, I am con-tinuing the destruction of their railroads, and at this moment have twodivisions and the cavalry at work breaking up the Gulf Railroad from theOgeechee to the Altamaha; so that, even if I do not take Savannah, I will leave it in a bad way. But I still hope that events will give me time totake Savannah, even if I have to assault with some loss. I am satisfied that,unless we take it, the gunboats never will, for they can make no impres-sion upon the batteries which guard every approach from the sea. I havea faint belief that, when Colonel Babcock reaches you, you will delay oper-ations long enough to enable me to succeed here. With Savannah in our possession, at some future time if not now, we can punish South Carolina asshe deserves, and as thousands of the people in Georgia hoped we would do.I do sincerelyh believe that the whole United States, North and South, wouldrejoice to have army this army turned loose on South Carolina to devastate thiatState in the manner we have done in Georgia, and it would have a direcand immediate bearing on your campaign in Virginia.I have the honor to be your obedient servant,W. T. SuEEMAN, f fajor-G encrl tnfited Stt78 Army.As soon as the army had reached Savannah, and had opene tcommunication with the fleet, I endeavored to ascertain what had transpired in Tennessee since our departure. We receive 1our letters and files of newspapers, which contained full a:-counts of all the events there up to about the 1st of December.As before described, General Hood had three full corps of infan-try-S Lee's, A. P. Stewart's, and Cheathan's, at Florence,Alabama-with Forrest's corps of cavalry, numbering in theaggregate about forty-ive thousand men. General Thomas wasin Nashville, Tennessee, quietly engaged in reorganizing his
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army out of the somewhat broken forces at his disposal. Hehad posted his only two regular corps, the Fourth and Twenty-third, under the general command of Major-General J. M. Sco-field, at Pulaski, directly in front of Florence, with the thrbrigades of cavalry (Hatch, Croxton, and Capron), commandedby Major-General Wilson, watching closely for ood's initiative.This force aggregated about thirty thousand men, was there-fore inferior to the enemy; and General Schofield was in-structed, in case the enemy made a general advance, to fallback slowly toward Nashville, fighting, till he should be re-enforced by General Thomas in person. Hood's movement wasprobably hurried by reason of my advance into Georgia; foron the 17th his infantry columns marched from Florence inthe direction of Waynesboro', turning Schofeld's poston atPulaski. The latter at once sent his trains to the rear, and onthe 21st fell back to Columbia, Tennessee. General Hood fol-lowed up this movement, skirmished lightly with Schofeld atColumbia, began the passage of Duck River, below the town,and Cheatham's corps reached the vicinity of Spring Hill, whither General Schofield had sent General Stanley, with twoof his divisions, to cover the movement of his trains. Duringthe night of November 29th General Schie passed SpringHill with his trains and army, and took post at Franklin, on thesiuth side of Harpeth River. General Hood now attachesserious blame to General Cheatham for not attacking GeneralSchofield inflank while in motion at Spring Hill, for he wasbivouacked within eight hundred yards of the road at the timof the passage of our army. General Schofield reached Franklin on the morning of November 30th, and posted his army infront of the town, where some rile-intren nts had been con-structed in advance. He had the two corps of Stanley and Cox(Fourth and Tenty-third), with Wilson's cavalry on hisand sent his trains behind the Harpeth.General Hood closed upon him the same day, and assaultedhis position with vehemence, at one time braking the line andwounding General Stanley seriously; but our men were veterans,cool and determined, and fought magnificently. The re
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1864.] THE MARCH TO TE SEA. 215oficers led their men in person to the several persistent assaults,continuing the battle far into the night, when they drew off,Their loss was very severe, especially in general officers ;among them Generals Cleburn and Adams, division commanders.Hood'loss onthatay was afterward ascertained to be (Thomas'sreport): Buried on the field, seventeen hundred and fifty; leftin hospital at Franklin, thirty-eighthundred; and seven hundredand two prisoners captured and held: aggregate, six thousandtwo hundred and ifty-two. General Schofield's loss, reportedofficially, was one hundred and eighty-nine killed, one thousandand thirty-three wounded, and eleven hundred and four prisonersor msing : aggregate, twenty-three hundred and twenty-six.The next day General Schofield crossed the Iarpeth withouttrouble, and fell back to the defenses of Nashville.Meantime General Thomas had organized the employes ofthe Quartermatr's Department into a corps, commanded bythe chief-quarternaster, General J. L. Donaldson, and placedthem in the fortifications of Nashville, under the general di-rection of Major-General Z. B. Tower, now of the UnitedStates Engineers. He had also received the two veteran dvi-sions of the Sixteenth Corps, under General A. J. Smith, longabsent and long expected; and he had drawn from Chattanoogaand Decatur (Alabama) the divisions of Steedman and of R. S,Granger. These, with General Schofield's army and about tenthousand good cavalry, under General J. .lson, constituteda strong army, capable not only of defending Nashville, but ofbeatingHood in the open field. Yet Thomas remained insideof Nashville, seemingly passive, until General Hood had closedupon him and had intrenched his position.General Thomas had furthermore held fast to the raihroaaleading from Nashville to Chattanooga, leaving strong guards atits principal points, as at Murfreesboro', Deckerd, Stevenson,SWhiteside, and Chattanooga. At Murfreesboro't division of Ro ea was renforced andstrengthened up toAt that time the weather was cold and sleety, the ground4 5~
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16 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. [186was covered with ice and snow, and both parties for a timerestedi on the defensive. Thus matters stood at ashnile, whilewe were closing down on Savumah, in the early part of Decem-ber, 1864; and the country, as well as General Grant, wasalarmed at the seeming paosive cnduct of General Thomas; andG(orl Grant at one time consideredthe situation so dangerous.h Le thought of going to Nashville in person, but GeneralJohn A. Logn, happening to be at City Point, was sent out tosupersede General Thomas; lnkily for the latter, he acted intime, gined a Ins-iicent victory, and thus esc apel co terriblea to c se.urOn the ath of Dee aber, at my cunp by the side of theplank-road, rm es back of Savannah, I received GeneralIrdee' it r declinin to surrender, w hen nothing remainedbut tosonta. The nd was diicult, and, as all foer asinults L So:thd a oody, I concluded tomike one moreefort to o epletely surroind Savannah on all side so as furthertoexcite Halee' s fear, and, in case of sucess, to Gapture the:hale of 10s anny. We had already completely invested thephae o the ,o wet, and s th, but there reanined to theenemy, set the east, tine use of the old dike or plank-roadl lead-in= into South C arolina and I knew that Hardee would have apontoon-brikdge aero the river. On examining my maps. Ithought that the division of John F. Hatch, blonging to Gen-eral Foster', command, iiht be moved from its then positionat Broad River, by water, down to Bluffton, from which it couldreach this plank-road, fortify and hold it-at some risk, ofcourse, because Hr dee could avil himself of his central poi-tion to fall on this d achment with his whole army. I did notwant to make a istake like "IBal's Bluff" at that period ofthe war; so, takin one or two of my personal taff, I rode backt King's Bridge, leaving with Generals Howard and Slocunorders to make all possible prquanions, but not to attack, dur-ing my two or three d v aence and there I tk a boat forWassaw Sound, whence Admiral Dhgren conveyed me in hisown boat (the Harvest Moon) to Hilton Head, where Irepresentedthe matter to Genera Foster, and be promptly agreed to give
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1 1 TH MARCH TO TIE SEA. 217his personal attention to it. During the night of the 20th westarted back, the wind blowing strong, Admiral Dahigrenordered the pilot of the Harvest :Moon to run into Tybee, andto work his way through to Wassaw Sound and the OgeecheeRiver by the Romney Marshes. We were caught by a low tidend stuck inthe mud. After laboring some time, the admiralordered out his barge; in it we pulled through this intricateand shallow channel, and toward evening of December 21st wediscovered, coing toward us, a tug, called the Red Lcs, be-longing to the Quartermaster's Department, with a staff-officeron board, bearing letters from Colonel Dayton to myself and theadmiral, reporting that the city of Savannah had been foundevacuated on the morning of December 21st, and was then inour possession. General Hardee had crossed the Savannah Riverby a pontoon-bridge, carrying off his men and light artillery,blowing up is iron-clads and navy-yard, but leaving for us allthe heavy guns, stores, cotton, railway-cars, steamboats, and animmens, amount of public and private property. AdmiralDahlgren concluded to go toward a vessel (the Sonoma) of hisblockading fleet, which lay at anchor near Beaulieu, and Itransferred to the Red Legs, and hastened up the OgeecheeRiver to King's Bridge, whence I rode to my camp that samenight. I there learned that, early on the morning of December21st, the skirmishers had detected the absence of the enemy, andhad occupied his lines simultaneously along their whole extent; but the left flank (Slocum), especially Geary's division of theTwentieth Corps, claimed to have been the first to reach theheart of the city.Generals Slocum and Howard moved their headquarters atonce into the city, leaving the bulk of their troops in campsoutside.On the morning of December 22d I followed withmy own headquarters, and rode down Bull Street to the cus-tom-house, from the roof which we had an extensive vew overthe city, the river, and the vast extent of marsh and rice-fieldson the South Carolina side. The navy-yard, and the wreck ofthe iron-clad ram Savannah, were still smouldering, but all elselooked quiet enough. Turning back, we rode to the PulaskiII~I
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218 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. [1864,Hotel, which I had known in years long gone, and found itkept by a Vermont man with a lame leg, who used to be a clerkin the St. Louis Hotel, New Orleans, and I inquired about thecapacity of his hotel for headquarters. He was very anxious tohave us for boarders, but I soon explained to him that we had afull mess equipment along, and that we were not in the habit ofpaying board; that one wing of the building would suffice forour use, while I would allow him to keep an hotel for the accom-modation of officers and gentlemen in the remainder. I thendispatched an officer to look around for a livery-stable thatcould accommodate our horses, and, while waiting there, an Eng-lish gentleman, Mr. Charles Green, came and said that he hada fine house completely furnished, for which he had no use,and offered it as headquarters. He explained, moreover, thatGeneral Howard had informed him, the day before, that I wouldwant his house for headquarters. At first I felt strongly dis-inclined to make use of any private dwelling, lest complaintsshould arise of damage and loss of furniture, and so expressedmyself to Mr. Green; ut, after riding about the city, and find-ing his house so spacious, so convenient, with large yard andstabling, I accepted his offer, and occupied that house-during our stay in Savannah. He only reserved for himself the use ofa couple of rooms above the dining-room, and we had all else,and a most excellent house it was in all respects.I was disappointed that iardee had escaped with his army,but on the whole we had reason to be content with the sub-stantial fruits of victory. The Savannah River was found tobe badly obstructed by torpedoes, and by log piers stretchedacross the channel below the city, which piers were filled withthe cobble stones .that formerly paved the strees. Admiral Dahlgren was extremely active, visited me repeatedly in thecity, while his fleet still wathed Charleston, and all the avenues,for the blockade-runners that infested the coast, which were notoriously owned and managed by Englishmen, who used theisland of New Providence (Nassau) as a sort of entrepot. Oneof these small blockade-runners came into Savannah after wewere in full possession, and the master did not discover his mis-
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186d.] THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 2191take till he came ashore to visit the custom-house. Of coursehis vessel fell a prize to the navy. A heavy force was at onceset to work to remove the torpedoes and obstructions in themain channel of the river, and, from that time forth, Savannahbecame the great depot of supply for the troops operating inMeantime, on the 15th and 16th of December, were fought,in front of Nashville, the great battles in which GeneralThomas sonoly fufilled his promise to ruin ood, the detailsof which are fully given in his own oficial reports, long sincepublished. Rumors of these great victories reached us at Sa-vannah by picemeal, but his official report came on the 24thof December, with a letter from General Grant, giving in gen-eral terms the events up to the 18th, and I wrote at oncethrough my chief of staff, General Webster, to General Thomas,complimenting him in the highest terms. His brilliant victoryat Nashville was necessary to mine at Savannah to make a com plte whole, and this fact was perfectly comprehended by Mr.Lincoln, who recognized it fully in his personal letter of Decem-ber 26th, hereinbefore quoted at length, and which I also claimedat the time, in my Special Field Order No. 6, of January 8,1865, here given :special Fie ld Order Ner 6.]HEADQUARTER MILITAT DliVISION OF THIE Mies:IeuI,IN Tme FIELD, SAV.eriA, FORGuA, Januany 8, latI.The general commanding announces to the troops composing the Mili-tary Division of the Mississippi that he has received from the President ofthe United States, and from Lieutenant-General Grant, letters conveyingtheir high sense and appreciation of the campaign just closed, resulting in the capture of Savannah and the defeat of Hood's arny in Tennessee.In order that all may understand the importance of events, it is proper to revert to the situation of affairs in September last. We held Atlanta, acity of little value to us, but so important to the enemy that Mr. Davis, the head of the rebellious faction in the South, visited his army near Pal-netto, and commanded it to regain the place and also to ruin and destroyus, by a series of measures which he thought would be effectual. Thatarry, by a rapid march, gained our ralroad near Big Shanty, and afterward about Dalton. We pursued it, but it moved so rapidly that we couldnot overtake it, and General Hood led his army successfully far over" i :, 'A
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220 THE MARCH T THE SEA. 186toward Mississippi, in hope to decoy us out of Georgia. But we wthus to be led away by him, and preferred to lead and control events our-selves. Generals Thomas and Schofield, commanding the departments toour rear, returned to their posts and prepared to decoy General Hotheir meshes, while we came on to complete the original journey.quietly and deliberately destroyed Atlanta, and all the railroads whichenemy had used to carry on war against us, occuped his State capital,andthen captured his commercial capital, which had been so strongly fortifiefrom the sea as to defy approach from that quarter. Almost at the mo-ment of our victorious entry into Savannah came the welcome and expectednews that our comrades in Tennessee had also fulfilled nobly and well theirpart, had decoyed General Hood to Nashville and then turned on him, defeat-ing his army thoroughly, capturing all his artillery, great numbers of prison-ers, and were still pursuing the fragments down in Alabama. So complete asuccess in military operations, extending over half a contnent,is an achieve-ment that entitles it to a place in the military history of the world. Thearmies serving in Georgia and Tennessee, as well as the local garrisons ofDecatur, Bridgeport, Chattanooga, and Murfreesboro', are alik entitled tothe common honors, and each regiment may inscribe on its colors, at pleas-ure, the word "Savannah" or "Nashville." The general commandingembraces, in the same general success, the operations of the cavalry underGenerals Stoneman, Burbridge, and Gillem, that penetrated into SouthwestVirginia, and paralyzed the efforts of the enemy to disturb the peace andsafety of East Tennessee. Instead of being put on the defenive, we haveat all points assumed the bold offensive, and have completely thwarted thedesigns of the enemies of our country.By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman,L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp.Here terminated the "March to the Sea," and I only add afew letters, selected out of many, to illustrate the general feelingof rejoicing throughout the country at the time. I only re-garded the march from Atlanta to Savannah as a "shift ofbase," as the transfer of a strong army, which had no opponent,and had finished its then work, from the interior to a point onthe sea-coast, from which it could achieve other important re-sults. I considered this march as a means to an end, and not asan essential act of war. Still, then, as now, the march to thesea was generally regarded as something extraordinary, some-thing anomalous, something out of the usual order of events; whereas, in fact, I simply moved from Atlanta to Savannah, a
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184.] MARCH TO TE SEA. 221one step m the direction of Richmond, a movement that had tobe met and defeated, or the war was necessarily at an end.Were I to express my measure of the relative importance ofthe march to the sea, and of that from Savannah northward, Iwould place the former at one, and the latter at ten, or theI now close this long chapter by giving a tabular statementof the losses during the march, and the number of prisonerscaptured. The property captured consisted of horses and mulesby the thusand, and of quantities of subsistence stores thataggregate very large, but may be measured with sufficientaccuracy by assuming that sixty-five thousand men obtainedabundant food for about forty days, and thirty-five thousandanimals were fed for a like period, so as to reach Savannahin splendid flesh and condition. I also add a few of the moreimportant letters that passed between Generals Grant, HaIlleck,and myself, which illustrate our opinions at that stage of thewar:STATEMENT OF CASUALTIES AND PRISONERS CAPTURED BY THE ARMY INTHE FIELD, CAMPAGN OF GEORGIA.ILLED. W'UNDID. MISSI,. CAPTU D.Eht Wing, Army of the Tennessee, Major-eneralOO.owar commandig...... 5 85 11 1 ... 19242 84 2LetWinFourteenth and Twentieth Corps,o lH.W.ocum ommandig.2: 23 8 112 1 259 402 30 409 489patrickconunand ... i.... 8 85 T 120 ....... 120 13 0 2Total............................... 10 93 24 4A 1 277 761 77 1,261 1,88SL. M. DAYTON, Assistant Adjutant-General.HEADQuARTERS o THE ARMy,WASl GT Dcember 16, 1804.Afaor-General SHmEAN (via Hilton Hear).NERL: Lieutenat-Geeral Grnt informs me that, in his last dispatchent o oheuggested the trnsfer your infantry to Richmond. He++++ +:+++++++ +a
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222 TIE MARCH O THE SEA. [18t4.now wishes me to say that you will retain your entire forc, atleast for thepresent, and, with such assistance as may be given you by General Fosterand Admiral Dablgren, operate from such base as you may establisthe coast. General Foster will obey such instructions as may be given you.Should you have captured Savannah, it is thought that by transfthe water-batteries o t land side that place may be made a good depotand base of operations on Augusta, Branchville, or Charleston. If Sa-vannah should not be captured, or if captured and not deemed suitablefor this purpose, perhaps B3eanfort would serve as a depot. As the rebelshave probably removed their most valuable property from Augusta, perhapsBranchville would be the most important point at which to strike in orderto sever all connection between Virginia and the Southwestern Railroad.General Grant's wishes, however, are, that this whole matter of yourfuture actions should be entirely left to your discretion.We can send you from here a number of complete batteries of field-artillery, with or without horses, as you may desire; also, as soon asGeneral Thomas can spare them, all the fragments, convalescents, and fur-loughed men of your army. It is reported that Thomas defeated Hoodyesterday, near Nashville, but we have no particulars nor official reports,telegraphic communication being interrupted by a heavy storm.Our last advices from you was General Howard's note, annoncing hisapproach to Savannah. Yours trulyII. W. HAuEOK, H jor-Geeral, Chieffof-StgY.HaEADQuARTERs OF TnE ARy, (Wanixes'os, December 18, 184..fajr-General W. T. SHERMAN, Saranna (via Hilton Head).Mr nAR GE NaAL: Yours of the 18th, by Major Anderson, is just re-ceived. I congratulate you on your splendid success, and shall very soonexpect to hear of the crowning work of your campaign-the capture ofSavannah. Your march will stand out prominently as the great one of thisgreat war. When Savannah falls, then for another wide swath throughthe centre of the Confederacy. But I will not anticipate. General Grantis expected here this morning, and will probably write you his own views.I do not learn from your letter, or from Major Anderson, that you arein want of any thing which we have not provided at Hilton Head. Think-ing it probable that. you might want more field-artillery, I had preparedseveral batteries, but the great difficulty of foraging horses on the sea-coastwill prevent our sending any unless you actually need them. The hay-cropthis year is short, and the Quartermaster's Department has great difficultyin procurin, a supply for our animals.General Thomas has defeated Hood, near Nashville, and it is hoped thatC 'I 8;s"i 8~~i l~iii
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1864. THE MA CH TO THIE SEA. 223be will completely crush his army. Brekenridge, at last accounts, wastrying to form a junction near Murfreesboro', but, as Thomas is betweenthem, Breckenridge must either retreat or be defeated.General Rosecrans made very bad work of it in issouri, allowing Pricewith a small force to overrun the State and destroy millions of property.Orders have been issued for all officers and detachments having threemonths or more to serve, to rejoin your army ia avan .Those havingless than three months to serve, will be retained by General Thomas.Should you capture Charleston, I hope that by som acident the placemay be destroyed, and, if a little salt should be sown upon its site, it mayprevent the growth of future crops of nullification and secession.Yours truly,H. W. HALLECK, aj0r-General, Chief-of-Staff[CONvInETIAL.]HEADQUARTERS AuEs OF THE UNITED STATES,WAsINoToN, D. C., December 18, 18l4.To ajor-General W. T. SHERAN, cO nn2ding I litry Division of thefississippi.MY DEAR GsEEAL: I have just received and read, I need not tell youwith how much gratification, your letter to General Halleck. I congratulateyou and the brave officers and men under your command on the successfultermination of your most brilliant campaign. I never had a doubt of theresult. When apprehensions for your safety were expressed by the Presi-dent, I assured him with the army you had, and you in command of it,there was no danger but you would strike bottom on salt-water some place;tha Iwould not feel the same same security-in fact, would not have intrustedthe expedition to any other living commander.It has been very hard work to get Thomas to attack Hood. I gave himthe most peremptory order, and had started to go there myself, before he gotoff. He has done magnificently, however, since he started. Up to lastnight, five thousand prisoners and forty-nine pieces of captured artillery,besides many wagons and inpumerable small-arms, had been received in Nashville. This is exclusive of the enemy's loss at Franklin, whichamounted to thirteen general officers killed, wounded, and captured. Theenemy probably lost five thousand men at Franklin, and ten thousand inthe last threedays' operations. Breckenridge is said to be making for Mur-I think he is in a most excellent place. Stoneman has nearly wiped outJohn Morgan's old command, and five days ago entered Bristol I didthink the best thing to do was to bring the greater part of your army here,and o turn affairs no seem ton be taking has shaken me
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221 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. [1864.in that opinion. I doubt whether you may not accomplish more towardthat result where you are than if brought here, especially as Ia informed,since my arrival in the city, that it would take about two months to getyou here with all the other calls there are for ocean transportation.I want to get your views about what ought to be done, and what canbe done. If you capture the garrison of Savannah, it certainly will com-pel Lee to detach from Ryhmond, or give us nearly the whole South. Myown opinion is that Lee is averse to going out of Virginia, and if the causeof the South is lost he wants Richmond to be the last place surrendered.If he has such views, it may be well to indulge him until we get everything else in our hands.Congratulating you and the army again upon the splendid results ofyour campaign, the like of which is not read of in past history, I subscribemyself, more than ever, if possible, your friend,U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.IIEADQrARTERs ArnEs OF THE OIrrn STATS, )CITY Po1T, V moerua, December 26, 1864. Major-6eneral W. T. SE1YAN, & Sannah, Georgia.GENERAL: Your very interesting letter of the 22d inst., brought by Major Gray, of General Foster's staff is just at hand. As the major startsback at once, I can do no more at present than simply acknowledge itsreceipt. The capture of Savannah, with all its immense stores, must tellupon the people of the South. All well here.Yours truly, U.S. GRAT,Lieutenant-General.FeDCARTERS MILITARY .DIVIsON OF TE MISSISSIPPI,5AvxH, GEonRA, I ecrnber 24, 1x84.Lieutenanteneral U. S. G GT, City Point, Virginia.GENERA: Your letter of December 18th is just received. I feel verymuch gratified at receiving the handsome commendation you pay myarmy. I will, in general orders, convey to the officers and men the sub-stance of your note.I am also pleased that you have modified your former orders, for I feared that the transportation by sea would very much disturb the unityand morale of my army, now so perfect.The occupation of Savannah, which I have heretofore reported, com-pletes the first part of our gene, and fulfills a great part of your instruc-tions; and we are now engaged in dismantling the rebel forts which bearupon the sea-channels, and transferring the heavy ordnance and ammu-nition to Fort Pulaski and Hilton Head, where they can be more easilyguarded than if left in the city.
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1864.] TIE MARCH TO THE SEA. 225The rebel inner lines are well adapted to our purpose, and with slightmodifications cn be held by a comparatively small force; and in about tendays I expect to be ready to sally forth again. I feel no doubt whatever asto our future plans. I have thouht them over so long and well that theyappear as clear as daylight. left Augusta untouched on purpose, becausethe enemy wil be in doubt as to my objective point, after we cross the Sa-vantnh River, whether it be Augusta or Charleston, and will naturallydivide his fores. I will then move either on .Branchville or Columbia, byany curved line that gives us the best supplies, breaking up in our courseas much railroad as possible; then, ignoring Charleston and Augusta both, Iwould occupy Columbi and Camden, pausing there long enough to observethe effect I would then strike for the Charleston & Wilmington Railroad,wherbetween the Sante and Cape Fear Rivers, and, if possible, com-municate with the fleet under Admiral Dahlgren (whom I find a mostagreeable gentleman, accomodating himself to our wishes and plans).Then I would faor an attack on Wilmington, in the belief that Porter andButler will fail in their present undertaking. Charleston is now a meredesolated wreck, and is hardly worth the the it would take to starve it out. Still, I am aware that, historically and politically, much importance isat-taced to the place, and it may be that, apart from its military importance,both you and the Administration mayprefer I should give it more attention;and it would be well for you to give me some general idea on that subject,for otherwise I would treat it as I have expressed, as a point of little impor-tance, after all its railroads leading into the interior have been destroyed oroccupied by us. But, on the hypothesis of ignoring Charleston and takingWilmington, I would then favor a moveent direct on Raleigh. The gameis then up with Lee, unless he comes out of Richmond, avoids you andfights me; in which ase I hould reckon on your being on his heels. Nowthat Hood is used up by Thomas, I feel disposed to bring the matter to anissue as quick as pssible. I feel confident that I can break up the wholerailroad system of South Carolina and North Carolina, and be on the Ro-anokeeitherat Rleigh or Wldon, by the time spring fairly opens; and, ifyou feel co nt thatyou can whip Lee outside of his intrenchments, Ifeel equally confident that I can handle him in the open country.One reason why Iwold ignore Charleston is this: that I belive Hardeewgarrison to a small force, with plenty of provisions; I knowthat the neck back of Carleston can be made impregnable to assault, andwe will hardly have time for siege operations.I will have to leave in Savannah a garrison, and, if Thomas can sparethem, I would like to have all detachments, convalscents etc., belonging tothese four corps, sent forward at once. I do not want to cripple Thomas,because I eard his operations as l-important, and I have ordered him topursue Hood down into Alabama, trusting to the country for supplies.m~sg
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I reviewed one of my corps to-day, and shall continue to review thewhole army. I do not like to boast, but believe this army has a confi-dence in itself that makes it almost invincible. I wish you could run down and see us; it would have a good effect, and show to both armiesthat they are acting on a common plan. The weather is now cool andW. T. SHEMAN, Major-neral.IN THE FELD, SAVANNAH, Dcemer 24, 186 4Major-General H. W. HIALLECK, Chief-of-Sta, IVahington, D. C.GENERAL.: I had the pleasure of receiving your two letters of the 16thand 18th instant to-day, and feel more than usually flattered by the highencomiums you have passed on our recent campaign, which isnow completby the occupation of Savannah.I am also very glad that General Grant has changed his mind aboutembarking my troops for James River, leaving me free to make the broadswath you describe through South and North Carolina, and still more grat-ifiel at the news from Thomas, in Tennessee, because it fulfills my plans,which contemplated his being able to dispose of Hood, in case he ventrednorth of the Tennessee River. So, I think, on the whole, I can chuckleover Jeff. Davis's disappointment in not turning my Atlanta campaign intoa "Moscow disaster."I have just finished a long letter to General Grant, and have explainedto him that we are engaged in shifting our base from the Ogechee tothe Savannah River, dismantling all the forts made by the enemy to bear upon the salt-water channels, transferring the heavy ordnance, etc., to FortPulaski and Hilton Head, and in remodeling the enemy's interior linesto suitour future plans and purposes. I have also laid down the programme for acampaign which I can make this winter, and which will put me in the springon the Roanoke, in direct communication with General Grant on JamesRiver. In general terms, my plan is to turn over to General Foster thecity of Savannah, to sally forth with my army resupplied, cross the Savan-nah, feign on Charleston and Augusta, but strike between, breaking en routethe Charleston & Augusta Railroad, also a large part of that from Branch-ville and Camden toward North Carolina, and then rapidly to move for sopoint of the railroad from Charleston to Wilmington, between the Santee and Cape Fear Rivers; then, communicating with the fleet in the neighbor-hood of Georgetown, I would turn upon Wilmington or Charleston, accord-ing to the importance of either. I rather prefer Wilmington, as aplive place,over Charleston, which is deadand unimportant when its railroad commu-nications are broken. I take itfor granted thatthe present movement onWiinton will fai Ifshould deterine to tak Charleston I would
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1864.] THE MfARC TO THE SEA. 227turn across the country (which I have unted oer many a time) from Santeeto M nt Pleasant, throwing one wing on the peninsula between the Ashleyand Cooper. After accomplishing one or other of these ends, I would makea bee-line for Raleigh or Wldn, when Lee would be forced to come outof Richmond, or acknowledge himself beaten. He would, I think, by theuse of the Danville Railroad, throw himself rpidly between me and Grant,leaving Ric ond in t hands of the latter. This would not alarm me,for I have an army which I think ca manuvre, and I would force him toattack meat a disadvantage, always under the supposition that Grant wouldbe on his heels; and, if the worst come to the worst, I can fight my waydown to Albermarle Sound, or ewbrn.I think the time has come now when we should attempt the boldest,and my experience is, that they are easier of execution than moretimid ones, because the enemy is disconcerted by theu-as, for instance, my recent campaign.I also doubt the wisdom of concentration beyond a certain extent, for theroads of this outry limit the amount of men that can be brought to bearin any one battle, and I do not believe that any one general can handleI think our campaign of the last month, as well as every step J take fromthis point northward, is as much a direct attack upon Lee's army as thoughwe were operating within the sound of his artillery.I a very anxious that Thomas should follow up his success to the veryUtmost point. My orders to him before I left Kingston were, after beating Hood, to folow him as far as Columbus, Mississippi, or Selma, Alabama,both of which lie in ditricts of country which are rich in corn and meat.I attach more importance to these deep incisions into the enemy's,because this war differs from European wars in this particular: weare not only fighting hostile armies but a hostile people, and must make oldand young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war, as well as their organ-ized armies. I know that t his recent movement of mine through Georgiahas had a wonderfl effet in this respect. Thousands who had been de-their lying newspapers to believe that we were being whipped allthe time now realize the truth, and have no appetite for a repetition of thesame experience. To be sure, Jeff. Davis has his people under pretty gooddI think faith in him is much shaken in Georgia, and beforewe have done with her South Carolina will not be quite so tempestuous. I in ind your hint as to Charleston, and do not think "salt"will be necessary. When I move, the Fifteenth Corps will be on the rightof the rght wng, and their position will naturaly bring them into C harles-n frst; and f you have watched the history of that corps, you will haveremarked that they generally do their work pretty well. The truth is, the whole army is burning with an insatable desire to wreak vengeance
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228 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. [186upon South Carolina. I almost tremble at her fate, but feel that she de-serves all that seems in store for her.Many and many a person in Georgia askedme why we did not go to SouthCaroelina; and, when I answered that we were en route for that State, thenvariable reply was, "Well, if yo will make those people fee the utmostseverities of war, we will pardon you for your desolation of Georgia."Slook upon Columbia as quite as bad as harleston, and I doubt if weshall pare the public buildings there as we did at Milledgeville.I have been so busy lately that I have not yet made my official report,and I think I had better wait until I get my subordinate reports beforeatempting it, as I am anxious to explain leay not oly the reasons for every step, but the amount of execution done, and this I cannot do until Iget thesubordinate reports; for we marched the whole distance in four or morcolumns, and, of course, I could only be present with one, and generallythat one engaged in destroying railroads. This wok of destruction wasperformed better than usual, because I had an engineer-regiment, pridedwith claws to twist the bars after being eated. Such bars can never beused again, and the only way in which a railroad line can be reconstructedacross Georgia is, to make a new road from Fairburn Station (twenty-fourmiles southwest of Atlanta) to Madison, a distance of one hundred miles;and, before that can be done, I propose to be on the road from Augusta toCharleston, which is a continuation of the same. I felt somewhat disap-pointed at ardee's escap, but really am not to blame. I moved asquickly as possible to close up the "Union Causeway," but interveningobstacles were such that, before I could get troops on the road, Harhad slipped out. Still, I know that the men that were in Savannah will belost in a measure to Jeff. Davis, for the Georgiatroops, under G. W. Smith,declared they would not fight in South Carolina, and they have gone north,en route for Augusta, and I have reason to believe the North Carolnatroops have gone to Wilmington; in other words, they are scattered. Ihave reason to believe that Beauregard was present in Savannah at theof its evacnation, and think that he and Harde are now in Charleston,making preparations for what theysuppose will be my next step.Please say to the President that I have received his kind message(through Colonel Markland), and feel thankful for his high favor. If Idisappoint him in the future, it shall not be from want of zeal or love to thecause.From you I expect a full and frank criticism of my plans for the future,which may enable me to correct errors before it is to late. I do not wishtobe rsh,but wat to give myrebel friends no chance to accuse us ofwant of enterprise or courage.Assrin you of my high personalrspet, I remain, as ever, your friend,W. T. sHEEafN, Ma/jor-G1ea 8
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1864THEMARCH T THE SEA. 229[General Order No. a.]WAR DPnrmr, AnUTrr-GF I
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CHAPTER XX I.SAVANNAH AND POCOTALIGO.8DECEBER, 1864, AND JANUARY, 1865.T city of avannah was an ld place, and usly ac-counted a handsome one. Its houses were of brick or frame,with large yards, ornamented with shrubbery and flowers; itsstreets perfectly regular, crossing each other at right angles; andat manv of the intersections were small inclosueres in the natureof parks. These street and parks were lined with the hand-soest shade-trees of which I have knowledge, vi., theillow-leaf live-oak, evergreens of exquisite beauty; and these certainlyentitled Savannah to its reputation as a handsome town morethan the homes, which, though comfortable, would hardly makea display on Fifth Avenue or the Boulevard Haussmann of Paris.The city was built on a plateau of sand about forty feet above thelevel of the sea, abutting against the river, leaving room alongits margin for a street of stores and warehouses. The custom-house, court-house, post-office, etc., were on the plateau above.In rear of Savannah was a large park, with a fountain, and be-tween it and the court-house was a handsome monument, erectedto the memory of Count Pulaski, who fell in 1779 in the assaultmade on the city at the time it was held by the English duringthe Revolutionary War. Outside of Savannh there was verylittle to interest a stranger, except the cemetery of Bonaven-tura, and the ride along the Wilmington Channel by way ofThunderbolt, where might be seen some groves of the majesticlive-oak trees, covered with gray and funereal moss, which were;; ,,i ll
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1 I4-'. AAi]i AND OOTAGO. 231truly sublime in grandeur, but gloomy after a few days' camp-ing under them.Within an hour of taking up my quarters in Mr. Green'shouse, Mr.A.G. Browne, of Salem, Massachusetts, United States Treasury agent for the Department of the South, made his ap-pearance to claim possession, in the name of the Treasury De-partment, of all captured cotton, rice, buildings, etc. Havingiuse for these articles ourselves, and having fairly earned them, Idid not feel inclined to surrender possession, and explained tohim that the quartermaster and commissary could manage themmore to my liking than he; but I agreed, after the proper in-which we had no special use, I would turn it over to him. It wasthen known that in the warehouses were stored at least twenty-ive thousand bales of cotton, and in the forts one hundred andfifty large, heavy sea-coast guns; although afterward, on a morecareful count, there proved to be more than two hundred and fiftysea-coast or siege guns, and thirty-one thousand bales of cotton.At that interview Mr. Browne, who was a shrewd, clever Yankee,told me that a vessel was on the point of starting for Old PointComfort, and, if she had good weather off Cape Hatteras, wouldreach Fortress Monroe by Christmas-day, and he suggested thatI right make it the occasion of sending a welcome Christmasgift to the President, Mr. Lincoln, who peculiarly enjoyed suchpleasantry. I accordingly sat down and wrote on a slip ofpaper, to be left at the telegraph-office at Fortress Monroe fortransmission, the following :SAVAEA, GEORGIA, December 22, 1864.Tois Ecellency Preiden$ L Was einiton, D. C.:I beg to prsent you as a Christmas-gift the city of Savannah, with onehundred and fifty heavy guns and plenty of ammunition, also about twenty-five thousand bales of cotton. W. T. S MajorGeneral.This message actually eahed him on Christas-eve, wasexensivly published in the newspapers, and made many a house-hold unusually happy on that ftive day; and it was in thtE{{Eco~.W T f [ ~I
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answer to this lispatch that Mr. Lincoln wrote me the letterof December 28th, already given, beginning with the words,any, many thanks" et., which he sent at the hands of Gen ral John A. Logan, who happened to be in Wasington, andwas comig to Savannah, to rejoin his command.On the 23d of December were made the folowing eneralorders for the disposition of the troops in and about Sannah[Special Fild Order No. 1 .]Savannah, being now in our possession, the river partially cleared out,and measures having been taken to remove all obstructions, wil at oncebe made a grand depot for future operations:1. The chief-quartermaster, General Easton, will, after giving the neces-sary orders touching the transports in Ogeechee River and Ossabaw Sond,come in person to Savannah, and take possession of all public buildis,vacant storerooms, warehouses, etc., that may be now or hereafter neededfor any department of the army. No rents will be paid by the Governmentof the United States during the war, and all buildings must be distributedaccording to the acstomed rules of the Quartermaster's Department, asthough they were public property.2. The chief commissary of subsistence, ColonelA. Beckwith, will trans-fer the grand depot of the army to the city of Savannah, secure possessionof the needful buildings and offices, and give the necessary orders, to theend that the army may be supplied abundantly and well.3. The chief-engineer, Captain Poe, will at once direct which of theenemy's forts are to be retained for our use, and which dismantled anddestroyed. The chief ordnance-officer, Captain Baylor, will in like mannertake possession of all property pertaining to his department captured fromthe enemy, and cause the same to be collected and conveyed to points ofsecurity; all the heavy coast-guns will be dismounted and carried to FortPulaski.4. The troops, for the present, will be grouped about the city of Savan-nab, looking to convenience of camps; General Socum taking from theSavannah River around to the seven-mile post on the canal, and Gen-eral Howard thence to the sea; General Kilpatrick will hold King's Bridgeuntil Fort McAllister is dismantled, and the troops withdrawn from thesouth side of the Ogeechee, when he will take post about Anderson's plan-tation, on the plank-road, and picket all the roads leading from the northand west.5. General Howard will keep a small guard at Forts Rosedale, Beaulieu,
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.SAVANNA AND POCOTALIGO. 233Skidaway Island to be examined very closely, with a view to finding manyand convenient ponts for the embarkation of troops and wagons on sea-By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman,L. M. DArTo, AidedeCan.[Special Fiekd Order No. 1e.]HEADQUImART R MiTARY DIrvisION oB THAE tMi issirPi, tSir F ie, SAAvAvAn, GsoR e, Deenker 2 -, 1884.postandadaptedto future military uses, but as it contains a population ofsome twenty thousand people, who must be provided for, and as othercitizns may come, it is proper to lay down certain general principles, thatall within its military jurisdiction may understand their relative duties1. During war, the military is superior to civil authority, and, whereinterests clash, the civil must give way; yet, where there is no conflict,every encouragement should be given to well-disposed and peaceful in-habitants to resume their usual pursuits. Families should be disturbed aslittle as possible in'their residences, and tradesmen allowed the free use oftheir shops, tools, etc.; churches, schools, and all plact s of amusement andrecreationshould be encourage, and streets and roads made perfectly safeto persons in their pursuits. Passes should not be exacted within the lineof outer pikets, but if any person shall abuse these privileges by communi-cating with theney or oin any act of hostility to the Government of thenited States, he or she will be punished with the utmost rigor of the law. Commerce with the outer world will be resumend to an extent commensuratewith the wants of the citizens, governed by the restrictions and rules of thoTreasury Department.chief quartermaster and cosiissary of the army may givesuitable empoyment to the people, white and black, or transport them tosuch points as they may choose where employment can be had; and mayextend temporary relief in the way of provisions and vacant houses to the worthy and needy, until such time as they can help themselves. They willselect first the buildings, for the necessary uses of the army; next, a snffi-cient number of stores, to be turned over to the Treasury agent for trade-stores. Avacant storehouses or dwellings, and all buildings belonging toabsent rebels, will be construed and used as belonging to the United States,until such time as their titles can e settled bythe courts of the United3.TheMayorand City Council of Savanah will continue to exercisetheir functions, and will, in concert with the commanding officer of the postg ,rl~11 1 I,;W 8Q:;';Qi~: ia,;8iiu I i= = = = = i = = = i i ~ i== =i=il~ii=/ = = i = = I i~i
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234 SAVAINNAi AND) OI'UUTALIG .[1864-i5and the chief-quaftermaster, see that the fire-companies are kept in organ.ization, the streets cleaned and lighted, and keep up a good understandingbetween the citizens and soldiers They will ascertain and report to thechief commissary of subsistence, as soon as possible, the names andof worthy families that need assistance and support. The mayor will forthwith give public notice that the time has come when all must choose theicourse, viz., remain within our lines, and conduct themselves as good citi-zens, or depart in peace. He will ascertain the names of all who hoose toleave Savannah, and report their names and residence to the chief-quarter-master, that measures may be taken to transport them beyond our lines. 4. Not more than two newspapers will be published in Savannah; theireditors and proprietors will be held to the strictest accountability, and willbe punished severely, in person and property, for any libelous publication,mischievous matter, premature news, exaggerated statements, or any com-ments whatever upon the acts of the constituted authorities; thy will beheld accountable for such articles, even though copied from other papers.By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman,It was estimated that there were about twenty thousand in-habitants in Savannah, all of whom had participated more or lessin the war, and had no special claims to our favor, but I regardedthe war as rapidly drawing to a close, and it was becoming a polit-ical question as to whatwas to be done with the people of theSouth, both white and black, when the war was actually over.I concluded to give them the option to remain or to join theirfriends in Charleston or Augusta, and so announced in generalorders. The mayor, Dr. Arnold, was completely "subjugated,"and, after consulting with him, I authorized him to assemblehis City Council to take charge generally of the interests of thepeople; but warned all who remained that they must be sly subordinate to the military law, and to the interests of theGeneral Government. About two hundred persons, mostly thefamilies of men in the Confederate army, prepared to follow thefortunes of their husbands and fathers, and these were sent in asteamboat under a flag of truce, in charge of my aide CaptainAudenried, to Charleston harbor, and there delivered to anofficer of the Confederate army. But the great bulk of theinhabitants chose to remain in Savannah, generally behaved
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1864-85.] SAVANNAH AND POCOTALIGO. 735with propriety, and good social relations at once arose betweenthem and the army. Shortly after our occupation of Savannah,Slady was announed t my headquarters by the orderly orsentinel at the front-door, who was ushered into the parlor, andproved to be the wife of General G. W. Smith, whom I hadknown about 1850, when Smith was on duty at West Point.She was a native of New London, Connecticut, and very hand-some. She began her interview by presenting me a letter fromher husband, who ten commanded a division of the Georgiamilitia in the rebel army, which had just quitted Savannah,which letter began, SFR N : The fortunes of war, etc.,compel me to leave my wife in Savannah, and I beg for her yourcourteous protection," etc., etc. I inquired where she lived, andif anybody was troubling her. She said she was boarding witha lady whose husband had, in like manner with her own, goneoff withfardee's army; that a part of the house had been takenfor the use of Major-General Ward, of Kentucky; that her landlady was approaching her confinement, and was nervous at thenoise which the younger staff-officers made at night, etc. I ex-plained to her that I could give but little personal attention tosuch matter, and referred her to General Slocum, whose troopsoccupied the city. I afterward visited her house, and saw, per-sonally, that she had no reason to complain. Shortly afterwardMr. Hardee, a merchant of Savannah, came to me and presenteda letter from his brother, the general, to the same effect, alleg-ing that his brother was a civilian, had never taken up arms, andasked of me protection for his family, his cotton, etc. To himthe general assurance that no harm was designed to anyof the people f Savannah who would remain quiet and peace-able, but that I could give him no guarantee as to his cotton, forover it I ad no absolute control; and yet still later I receiveda note from the wife of General A. P. Stewart (who commandeda corps in Hood's army), asking me to come to see her. This Idid, and found her to be a native of Cincinnati, Ohio, wantingprotection, and who was naturally anxious about the fate of herhusband, known to be with General Hood, in Tennessee, re-treating before General Thomas. I remember that I was able
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235 SAVANNAH AND POCOTALIGO. [laws,to assure her that he had not been killed or captured, up tothat date, and think that I advised her, instead of attempting togo in pursuit of her husband, to go to Cincinnati, to her uncle,Judge Storer, there await the issue of events..e. our army as simply infamous; that we respected neitherage nor sex; that we burned every thing we came across-manner of outrages on the inhabitants. Therefore it struck meas strange that Generals Hardee and Smith should commit theirfamilies to our custody, and even bespeak our personal care andattention. These officers knew well that these reports were ex-in the extreme, and yet taeitly assented to these tsepublicatios, to arous the drooping energies of the people of thegovernor. very soon established a ood pice, maintainedadmirable order, and I doubt if Savannah, either before orsince, has had a better government than during our stay.The guard-mountings and prades, as well as the greater re-views, became the daily resorts of the ladies, to hear the mu-sic of our excellent hands; schools were opened, and thechurles every Sunday were well filled with most devout andrespectful congreations; stores were reopened, and marketsfor provisions, meat, wood, etc., were estaished, so that eachfunily, regardless of race, color, or opinion, could procure allthe necessaries and even luxuries of life, provided they hadmoney. Of course, many families were actually destitute ofthis, and to these were issued stores from our own stock of sup-plies. I remember to have given to Dr. Arnold, the mayor, anorder for the contents of a large warehouse of rice, which heconfided to a committee of gentlemen, who went North (to Bos-toni', and soon returned with one or more cargoes of flour, hams,s~;;~iU ~~iiiis;i
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18 6. SAVANNAT AD POCOTALIGO. .28sugar, coffee, etc., for gratuitous distribution, which relievedthe most pressing want until the revival of trade and businessenabled the people to provide for themselves.A lady, whom I had knon in former years as MissJosephine Goodwin, told me that, with a barrel of flour andsome sugar which she had received gratuitously from the com-missary, she had baked cakes and pies, in the sale of which sheeantne Colonel Poe had reconnoitred and laid off newlines of parapet, which would enable a comparatively smallgarrison to hold the place and a heavy detail of soldiers wasput to work thereon; Generals Easton and Beckwith had organized a complete depot of supplies; and, though vesselsarrived almost daily with mails and provisions, we were hardlyready to initiate a new and hazardous campaign. I had not yetreceived fromGeneral Grant or General Ialleck any modifica-tion of the orders of December 6, 184, to embark my commandfor Virginiaby sea; but on the d of January, 185, GeneralJ. G. Barnard, United States Engineers, arrived direct fromGeneral Grant's headquarters, bearing the following letter, inthe general own handwriting, which, with my answer, is herebgv en given, the f:HADQUARTEsR ARmIEs O THE UNaITED CTATSCITY POINT, VIEMNlA, as it wee, tod4.Major-General W. T. SHEUAN, commending filitary ivi)io, of theisisippi.GENER,: Before writing you definite instructions for the next campaign, I wanted to receive your answer to my letter written from Wash-ington. Your confidence in being able to march up and join this armypleases re, and I believe it can be done. The effect of such a campaign will be to disorganize the South, and prevent the organization Cof newarmies from their broken fragments Hood is now retreatin, with hisarmy broken and demoralized. His loss in men has probably not been farfrom twenty thousand, besides deserters. If time is given, the fragmentsmay be collected together and many of the deserters reassembled. If wecan, we should act to prevent this. Your spare army, as it were, movingas proposed, will do it.In addition to holding Savannah, itlooks to me that an intrenhed campought to be held on the railroad between Savannah and Charleston. Your
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23S SAVANNAH AND POOTALIGO. [1864-65movement toward Branchville will probably enable Foster to reach thiswith his own force. This will give us a position in the South from whichwe can threaten the interior without marching over long, narrow cause-ways, easily defended, as we have heretofore been compelled to do. Couldnot such a camp be established about Pocotaligo or CoosawhatchieI have thought that, Hood being so completely wiped out for presentharm, I might bring A. J. Smith here, with fourteen to fifteen thmen. With this increase I could hold my ines, and move out with a greaterforce than Lee has. It would compel Lee to retain all his present force inthe defenses of Richmond or abandon them entirely. This latter contin-gency is probably the only danger to the easy success of your expedition.In the event you should meet Lee's army, you would be compelled to beatit or find the sea-coast. Of course, I shall not let Lee's army escape if I canhelp it, and will not let it go without following to the best of my ability.Without waiting further directions, thn, you may e our prepara-tions to start on your northern expedition without delay. Break up therailroads in South and North Carolin, and join the armies operating againstRichmond as soon as you can. I will leave out all suggestions about the route you should take, knowing that your information, gained aily in thecourse of events, will be better than ny that can be obtained now.It may not be possible for you to march to the rear of Petersburg;but, failing in this, you could strike either of the sea-coast ports in NorthCarolina held by us. From there you could take shipping It would bedecidedly preferable, however, if you could march the whole distance.From the best information I have, you will find no difficulty in supplying your army until you cross the Roanoke. From there here is but a fewdays' march, and supplies could be collected south of the river to bring youthrough. I shall establish communication with you there, by steamboat and gunboat. By this means your wants can be partially supplied. I shallhope to hear from you soon, and to hear your plan, and about the time ofPlease instruct Foster to hold on to all the property in Savannah, andespecially the cotton. Do not turn it over to citizens or Treasury agentswithout orders of the War Department.Very respectfully, your obedient servant,U. S. Gan, Lieutenant-General.DQUAnRTek R MILITARY Disi OF THE laxhIstssHuIuIN THE FIELD, SAVANeNH, GEOR(A, anuary 2, 1865.Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, City Point.GENERAL: I have received, by the hands of General Barnard, your noteof 26th and letter of 25th December.
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1864-'61] SAVANNAH AND POCOTALIGO. 239I herewith inclose to you a copy of a proct which I have this morning,inisc ed with my immediate commanders.Sshall need, however, lrger supplies of stores, especially grain. I willinclose to you, with this, letters from General Easton, quartermaster, andColonel Beckwith, commissary of subsistence, setting forth what will berequired, and trust you will forwrd them to Washington with your sanc-tionsothatthe necessary steps maybe taken at once to enable me to carryout this plan on time.I wrot you very fully on the 24th, and have nothing to add. Everythinghere is quiet, and if I can get the necessary supplies in our wagons,shall be ready to start at the time indicated in my projet (January 15th).Butuntilthose spples are in hand, I can do nothing; after they are, I shall be ready to move with great rapidity.I have heard of the affair at Cape Fear. It has turned out as you willI have furnished General Easton a copy of the dispatch from the See-retary of War. He will retain possession of all cotton here, and ship it asfast as vessels can be had to New York.I shall immediately send the Seventeenth Corps over to Port Royal, byboats, to be furnished by Admiral Dahlgren and General Foster (withoutinterfering with eneral Easton's vessels), to make a lodgment on the rail-road at Pocotaligo.General Barnard will remain with me a few days, and I send this by astaff-ofcer, who can return on one of the vessels of the supply-fleet. Isuppose that, now that General Butler has got through with them, you canspare them to us.My report of recent operations is nearly ready, and will be sent yon in aday or two, as soon as some further subordinate reports come in.I am, with great respect, very truly, your friend,W. T. SHEeMAs, Major-General,tENrMurY coNmm ENT.]PROJET FOR JANUARY.SRight wing to move men and artillery by transports to head of BroadRiver and Beaufort; retabsh Port Royal Ferry, and mass the wing ator in the neighborhood of PocotaligoLeft wing and cavalry to work slowly across the causeway toward Har-deevieto open a road by which wagons can reach their corps aboutBroad River;lso, by a rapid movement of he left, to secure Sister'sFerryandA sta road out to Robertsville.In the ean time, allguns,sot, shell, cotton, etc., to be moved to a safeplace easy to ard, and provisions and wagons got ready for another
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wath aiming to have our army in hand about the head of Broad River, say Pocotaligo, Robertsvie, and Coosawatchie, by t th January.2. The whole army to move with loaded wagons by the roads leading in the direction of Columbia, which affrd the best cance of forage andprovisions. Howard to be at Pocotaligo by the 15th January, and Slouto be at Robertsvile, and Kilpatrick at or near Coosawathie about thesa date. General Foster' troops to occupy Savannah, and gunboats toprotect the rivers as soon as Howard gets Pootaligo.W. T. SH.MAN, -Mor-GerlTherefore, on the 2d of January, I was authorized to marchwith my entire army north by land, and concluded at once tosecure a foothold or starting-point on the South Carolina side,selecting Pocotaligo and ardevile as the points of rendez-vous for the two wings; but I still remained in doubt as to thewishes of the Administration, whether I should take Charlestonen route, or conine my whole attention to the incidental ad-vantages of breaking up the railways of Soutand North Caro-lina, and the greater object of uniting my army with that ofGeneral Grant before Richmond.General Barnard remained with me several days, and wasregarded then, as now, one of the first egineers of the ag, per-fectly competent to advise me on the strategy and objectsofthe new campaign. He expressed himself delighted with thehigh spirit of the army, the steps already taken, by which wehad captured Savannah, and he personally inspected some of theforts, such as Thunderbolt and Causten's Bluff, by which theenemy had so long held at bay the whole of our navy, and haddefeated the previous attempts made in April, 1862, by the armof General Gillmore, which had bombarded and captured FortPulaski, but had failed to reach the city of Savannah. I thinkGeneral Barnard expected me to invite him to accompany usnorthward in his official capacity; but Colonel Poe, of my stahad done so well, and was so perfectly competent, that I thoughtit unjust to supersede him bya senior in his own corps. I there'fore said nothing of this to General Barnard, and soon after hereturned to his post with General Grant, at ty Point, bearingletters and full personal messages of our situation and wants.
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18'.] SAVANNAH AND POCOTALIGO. 241We were verymuch in want of light-draught steamers foravigatig the shallowwaters of the coast, so that it took theSeventeenth Corps more than a week to transfer from Thunder-bolt to Beaufort, outh Carolina. Admiral Dahigren had sup-plied the Harvest Moon and the Pontia and General Fostergave us a couple of hired steamers; I was really aroused atthe efet this short ta-voyage hbad on our men, most of whomad never before looked upon the ocean. Of course, the werefit subjects for sea-sikness, and afterward they begged me neveragain to send them to sea, saying they would rather marcha thousand miles on the worst roads of the South than tospend a single night on the ocean. By the 10th General Howardhad coleted the bulk of the Seventeenth Corps (General Blair)on Beaufort Island, and began his march for Pocotaligo, twenty-five miles inland. They crossed the channel between the islandand main-land during Saturday, the 14th of January, by a pon-toon-bridge, and arched out to Garden's Corners, where therewas some light skirmishing; the next day, Sunday, they con-tined on to Pocotaligo, finding the strong fort there abandoned,and accordingly made a lodgment on the railroad, having lostonly two officers and eight men. About the same time General Slocum crossed two divi-sions of the Twentieth Corps over the Savannah River, abovethe city, occupied Hardeeville by one division and Purysburgbyanothe. Thus, by the middle of January, we had effected a lodg nt in South Carolina, and were ready to resume themarch northward; but we had not yet accumulated enoughprovisions and forage to fill the wagons, and other causes ofdelay occurred, of which I will make mention in due order.On the last day of December, 1864, Captain Breese, UnitedStates Navy, flag-officer to Admiral Porter, reached Savannah,bringing the first news of General Butler's failure at FortFisher, and that the general had returned to James River withhis land-orceseaving Admiral Porter's fleet anchored off Cape Fear, in that tempestuous season. Captain Breese brought mea letter fr the admirl, dated eceber 29th, asking me tosend him from Savannah one of rny old divisions, with which
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242 SAVANNAH AND POCOTALIGO. [1864-'65.he said he would make short work of Fort Fisher; that he had already bombarded and silenced its guns, and'that General But-ler hadfailed because he was afraid to attack, or even give theorder to attack, after (as Porter insisted) the guns of Fort Fisherhad been actually silenced by the navy.I answered him promptly on the 31st of December, that Iproposed to march north inland, and that I would prefer toleave the rebel garrisons on the coast, instead of dislodging andpiling them up in my front as we progressed. Fromthe hances,as I then understood them, I supposed that Fort Fisher was gar-risoned by a comparatively small force, while the whole divi-sion of General oke remained abou the city f Wilmington;and that, if Fort Fisher were captured, it would leave GeneralIloke free to join the larger force that would naturally be col-lected to oppose my progress northward. I acordingly answeredS Admiral Porter to this effect, declining to loan him the use ofone of my divisions. It subsequently transpired, however, that,as soon as General Butler reached City Point, General Grantwas unwilling to rest under a sense of failure, and accordinglydispatched back the same troops, renforced and commanded byGeneral A. H. Terry, who, on the 15th day of January, suc-cessfully assaulted and captured Fort Fisher, with its entiregarrison. After the war was over, about the 20th of May, whenI was giving my testimony before the Congressional Committeeon the Conduct of the War, the chairman of the committee, Sen-ator B. F. Wade, of Ohio, told me that General Butler had beensummoned before that committeeduring the previous January,and had just finished his demonstration to their entire sation that Fort Fisher could not e carried by assault, whentheyheard the newsboy in the hall crying out an "extra." Callinghim in, they inquired the news, and he answered, ">Fortdone took!" Of course, they all laughed, and none moreheartily than General Butler himself.On the 11th of January there arrived at Svannah a revenue-cutter, having on board Simeon Draper, Esq., of New YorkCity, the Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War, Quartrster-General Meigs, Adjutant-General Townsend, and a retinue of
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1864-'65.] SAVANNAH AND POCOTALIGO. 243 civilians, who had come down from the North to regulate theSwas instructed by r. Staton to transfer to Mr. Draper the custom-house, post-office, and such other public buildingsas these civilians needed in the execution of their office, andto cause t be delivered into their custody the captured cotton.This was accomplished by-[Special Field Orders, No. 10]IEADQUARTERS MILITA DAvITov OF THE M rISSISIPPIIN THE FIELD, SAVANAH, GEosOLA, JanUaryf 12, 18E5.S1 Brevet Brigadier-General Easton, chief-quartermaster, will turn overto Simeon Draper, Esq., agent of the United States Treasury Department,all cotton now in the city of Savannah, prize of war, taking his receipt forthe same in gross, and returning for it to the quartermaster-general. Hewill also afford Mr. Draper all the facilities in his power in the way oftransportation, labor, etc., to enable him to handle the cotton with expe-dition.2. General Easton will also turn over to Mr. Draper the custom-house,and such other buildings in the city of Savannah as he may need in theexecution of his office.By order f General W. T. Sherman,L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Cemp.Up to this time all the cotton had been carefully guarded,with orders to General Easton to ship it by the return-vesselsto New York, for the adjudication of the nearest prize-court,accompanied with invoices and all evidence of title to owner-ship. Marks, numbers, an other figures, were carefully pre-served on the bales, so that the court might know the history ofbale. But Mr. Stanton, who surely was an able lawyer,all this, and ordered the obliteration of all the marks ;so that no man, friend or foe, could trace his identical cotton.I thought it strange at the time, and think it more so now ; forI am assured that claims, real and fictitious, have been proveup against this identical cotton of three times the quantityactually captured, and that reclamations on the Treasury havebeen aowed for more than the actual quantity captured, viz.,thirty-one thousand bales.
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244 SAVANNAH AND rOCOTALIGO.Mr. Stanton staid in Savannah several days, and seemedvery curious about matters and things in general. I walkedwith him through the city, especially the bivouacs of the sev-eral regiments that occupied the vacant squares, and he seemedparticularly pleased at the ingenuity of the men in constructingtheir temporary huts. Four of the "dog-tents," or tentesd'abri, buttoned together, served for a roof, and the sides weremade of clapboards, or rough boards brought from demolishedhouses or fences. I remember his marked admiration for thehut of a soldier who had made his door out of a handsomeparlor mirror, the glass gone and its gilt frame serving for hisdoor.He talked to me a great deal about the negroes, the formerslaves, and I told him of many interesting incidents, illustratingtheir simple character and faith in our arms and progress. Heinquired particularly about General Jeff. C. Davis, who, he said,was a Democrat, and hostile to the negro. I assured him thatGeneral Davis was an excellent soldier, and I did not believe hehad any hostility to the negro; that in our ary we had nonegro soldiers, and, as a rule, we preferred white soldiers, butthat we employed a large force of them as servants, teamsters,and pioneers, who had rendered admirable service. He thenshowed me a newspaper account of General Davis taking up hispontoon-bridge across Ebenezer Creek, leaving sleeping negromen, women, and children, on the other side, to be slaughteredby Wheeler's cavalry. I had heard such a rumor, and advisedMr. Stanton, before becoming prejndiced, to allow me to sendfor General Davis, which he did, and General Davis explainthe matter to his entire satisfaction. The truth was, that, asweapproached the seaboard, the freedmen in droves, old and young,followed the several columns to reach a place of safety. It sohappened that General Davis's route into Savannah followedwhat was known as the "River-road" and he had to make con-stant use of his pontoon-train-the head of his column reachingsome deep, impassable creek before ithe rear was fairly overanother. He had occasionally to use the pontoons both day andnight. On the occasion referred to, the bridge was taken u
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S1864'65.] SAVANNAH AND POCOTALIGO. 245from Ebenezer Creek while some of the camp-followers re-maed aslp on the farther side, and these were picked up byWheeler's cavalry. Some of them, in their fright, were drownedin trying to swim over, and others may have been cruelly killedby Wheelr's men, but this was a mere supposition. At allevents, the same thing might have resulted to General Howard,or to any other of the many most humane commanders whofilled the army. General Jeff. C. Davis was strictly a soldier,and doubtless hated to have his wagons and columns encumberedby these poor negroes, for whom we all felt sympathy, but a sym-pathy of a different sort from that of Mr. Stanton, which wasnot of pure humanity, but of politics. The negro question wasbeginning to loom up among the political eventualities of theday, and many foresaw that not only would the slaves securetheir freedom, but that they would also have votes. I did not dream of such a result then, but knew that slavery, as such, wasdead forever, and did not suppose that the former slaves wouldbe suddenly, without preparation, manufactured into voters,equal to all others, politically and socially. Mr. Stanton seemeddesirous of coming into contact with the negroes to confer withthem, and heased me to arrange an interview for him. I ac-cordingly sent out and invited the most intelligent of the ne-groes, mostly Baptist and Methodist preachers, to come to myrooms to meet the Secretary of War. Twenty responded, andwere received in my room up-stairs in Mr. Green's house, whereMr. Stanton and Adjutant-General Townsend took down theconversation in the form of questions and answers. Each ofth twenty gave his name and partial history, and then selectedGarrison Frazier as their spokesman:First Qution. State what your understanding is in regard to the actsof Congressnd President Lincoln's proclamation touching the coloredpeople in the rebel States? Anucer. So far as I understand President Lincoln's proclamation to therebel States, it is, that if they will lay down their arms and submit to thelaws of the United States, before the t of January, 1863, all should bewell; but if they did not, then all the slaves in the Southern States shouldbe fr eeforth nd forever. That s hat I understood.
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24 6 SAVANNAH AND POCOTALIGO. [16'8.Second Question. State what you understand by slavery, and the free-dom that was to be given by the President's proclamation?Answer. Slavery is receiving by irresistible power the work of anotherman, and not by his consent. The freedom, as I understand it, prby the proclamation, is taking us from under the yoke of bondage andplacing us where we can reap the fruitof our own labor, and take care ofourselves and assist the Government in maintaining our freedom.Fourth Question. State in what manner you would rather lve-ivwhetherscattered among the whites, or in colonies by yourselves ?Answer. I would prefer to live by ourselves, for there is a prejudiceagainst us in the South that will take years to get over but I do not knowthat I can answer for my brethren.(All but Mr. Lynch, a missionary from the North, agreed with Frazier,but he thought they ought to live together, along with the whites.)Eighth Question. If the rebel leaders were to arm the slaves, whatwould be its effect ?Answer. I think they would fight as long as they were before the"bayonet," and just as soon as they could get away they would desert, inmy opinion. Tenth Qution. Do you understand the mode of enlistment of coloredpersons in the rebel States by State agents, under the act of Congress; ifyes, what is your understanding ?Answer. My understanding is, that colored persons enlisted by Stateagents are enlisted as substitutes, and give credit to the State and do notswell the army, because every black man enlisted by a State agent leaves awhite man at home; and also that larger bounties are given, or promised, by the State agents than are given by the United States. The great objectshould be to push through this rebellion the shortest way; and there seemsto be something wanting in the enlistment by State agents, for it don'tstrengthen the army, but takes one away for every colored man enlisted.Eleventh Question. State what, in your opinion, is the best way to enlistcolored men as soldiers?Answer. I think, sir, that all compulsory operations should be put a stopto. The ministers would talk to them, and the young men would enlist. Itis my opinion that it would be far better for the State agents to stay athome and the enlistments be made for the United States under the directionof General Sherman.Up to this time I was present, and, on Mr. Stanton's inti-mating that he wanted to ask some questions affecting me, Jwithdrew, and then he put the twelfth and last question
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1864-'65.] SAVANNAH AND POCOTALIGO. 247el Question. State what is the feeling of the colored people towardGeneral Sherman, and how far do they regard his sentiments and actionsas friendly to their rights and interests, or otherwise?A er. We looked upon General Sherman, prior to his arrival, as aman, in the providence of God, specially set apart to accomplish this work,and we unanimously felt inexpressible gratitude to him, looking upon himas a man who should be honored for the faithful performance of his duty.Some of us called upon him immediately upon his arrival, and it is probablehe did not meet he secretary with more courtesy than he did us. His con-duct and deportment toward us characterized him as a friend and gentle-man. We have confidence in General Sherman, and think what concernsus could not be in better hands. This is our opinion now, from the shortacquaintance andintercourse we have had,It certainly was a strange fact that the great War Secretaryshould have catechized negroes concerning the character of ageneral who had commanded a hundred thousand men in battle,had captured cities conducted sixty-five thousand men success-fully across four hundred miles of hostile territory, and had justbrought tens of thousands of freedmen to a place of security;but because I had not loaded down my army by other hundredsof thousands of poor negroes, I was construed by others as hos-tile to the black race. I had received from General Hlalleck, atWashington, a letter warning me that there were certain influ-ential parties near the President who were torturing him withsuspicions of my fidelity to him and his negro policy; but I shall always believe that Mr. Lincoln, though a civilian, knewbetter, and appreciated my motives and character. Though thisletter of General Halleck has always been treated by me as con-fidential, I now insert it here at length:HEADQeARTERB OF THE ARMY,WAmG D. C., Decenm~r 30, 1864.Major-General W. T. SHEnmAN, Savannah.MY DEA GENERAL I take the liberty of calling your attention, in thisprivateand frienly way, to a matter which'may possibly hereafter be ofmore importance to you than either of us may now anticipate.While almost every one is praising your great march through Georgia,nd the captre of Savann, there is a certain class having now great in-n h the entnd very probably anticipating still more on a
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248 SAVANNAH A&ND 4P CTAflGO. [18A4 '65change of cabinet, who are decidedly disposed to make a point against you.I mean in regard to inevitable Sambo." They say that you have mani-fested an almost criminal dislike to the negro, and that you are not willingto carry out the wishes of the Governent in regard to him, but repulsehim with contept They sy you might have brought with you to Sa-vannah more than fifty thousand, thus stripping Georgia of that number oflaborers, and opening a road by whi as many ore could have escapedfrom their masters; but that, instead of this, you drove them from yourranks, prevented their following you by cutting the bridges in your rear,and thus caused the massacre ofarge numbers by Wheeler's cavalry.To those who know you as I do such accusation will pass as the idlewinds, for we presume that you discouraged the negroes from followingyou because you had not the means of supporting them, and feared theymight seriously embarrass your march. But there are others, and amongthem some in high authority, who think or pretend to think otherwise, and they are de dly disposed to make a point against you.I do not write this to induce you to conciliate this class of men by doingany thing which you do not deen right and proper, and for the interest ofthe Government andthecountry; but simply to call your attention to c Ir-tain things which are viewed here somewhat differently than from yourstand-point. I will explain as briefly as possible:Some here think that, in view of the scarcity of laborin the South, andthe probability tha a part, at least, of the able-bodied laves will be calledinto the military service of the rebels, it is of the greatest importance to open outlets by which these slaves can escape into our lines, and they saythat the route you have passed over should be made the route of escape,and Savannah the great place of refuge. These, I know, are the views ofsome of the leading men in the Administration, and they now express dis-saction that you did not carry them out in your great raid.Now that you are in possession of Savannah, and there can be no fur-ther fears about supplies, would it not be possible for you to reopen theseavenues of escape for the negroes, without interfering with your military operations? Could not such escaped slaves find at least a partial supplyof food in the rice-fields about Savannah, and cotton plantations on thecoast?I merely throw out these suggestions. I know that such a coursewould be approved by the Government, and I believe that a manifestationon your part of a desire to bring the slaves within our lines will do muchto silence your opponents. You will appreciate my motives in writing this private letter. Yours truly, HII. W. IIA.racK.There is no doubt that Mr. Stanton, when he reached Savannah, shared these thoughts, but luckily the negroes them-a; ~l~~
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164-'65. SAVANNAH AND POCOTALIGO. 249selves convinced him that he was in error, and that they under-stood their own interests far better than did t1le men in Wash-ington, who tried to make political capital out of this negroquestion. The idea that such men should have been permittedthe officers who were toiling with the single purpose to bringthe war to a successful end, and thereby to liberate all slaves, isa fair illustratin of the influences that poison a political capital. My aim then was, to whip the rebels, to humble their pride,to follow them to their inmost recesses, and make them fear anddread us. "Fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom." Idid not want them to cast in our teeth what General Hood hadonce done in Atlanta, that we had to cal on their slaves to helpus to subdue them. But, as regards kindness to the race, encour-aging them to patience and forbearance, procuring them foodand clothing, and providing them with land whereon to labor, Issert that no army ever did more for that race than the one Icommanded in Savannah. When we reached Savannah, wewere beset by ravenous State agents from Hilton Head, who en-ticed and carried away our servants, and the corps of pioneerswhich we had organized, and which had done such excellentservice. Qn one occasion, my own aide-de-camp, ColonelAiden ied, found at least a hundred poor negroes shut up in ahouse and pen, waiting for the night, to be conveyed stealthilyto Hilton Head. They appealed to him for protection, alleg-ing that they had been tlold that they must be soldiers, thatMassa Lincoln" wanted them, etc. I never denied the slavesa full opportunity for voluntary enlistment, but I did prohibitforce to be used, for I knew that the State agents were more in-fluenced by the profit they derived from the large bounties thenbeing paid than by any love of country or of the colored race.In the language of Mr. Frazier, the enlistment of every blackman did not strengthen the army, but took away one whiteman from the ranks."During Mr. Stanton's stay in Savannah we discussed thisnegro question very fully; he asked me to draft an order onthe subject in acordance with my own views, that would meet
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250 SAVANNAH AND POCOTALIGO. [1864'65.the pressing necessities of the case, and I did so. We wentover this order, No. 15, of January 16, 1865, very carefully.The secretary made some verbal modifications, when it wasapproved by him in all its details, I published it, and it wentinto operation at once. It provided fully for the enlistment ofcolored troops, and gave the freeimen certain possessoryrights to land, which afterward became matters of judicial inquiry and decision. Of course, the military authorities at thatday, when war prevailed, had a perfect right to grant the possession of any vacant land to which they could extend militaryprotection, but we did not undertake to give a fee-simple title;and all that was designed by these special field orders was tomake temporary provisions for the freedmen and their familiesduring the rest of the war, or until Congress should take ac-tion in the premises. All that I now propose to assert is, thatMr. Stanton, Secretary of War, saw these orders in the rough,and approved every paragraph thereof, before they were madepublic :1Srpecial Field Orders, No. 15.]IIrADQtIARTERS M IiunrruRI DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,LN THE FIE.a 8AVANNAH, GEORGIA, J/anuay 16, 1865.1. The islands from Charleston south, the abandone rice-felds alongthe rivers for thirty miles back from the sea, and the country ordering theSt. John's River, Florida, are reserved and set apart for the settlement ofthe negroes now made free by the acts of war and the proclamation of the President of the United States.2. At Beaufort, Hilton Head, Savannab, Fernandina, St. Augustine, andJacksonville, the blacks may remain in their chosen or accustomed voca-tions; but on the islands, and in the settlements hereafter to be established,no white person whatever, unless military officers and soldiers detailed forduty, will be permitted to reside; and the sole and exclusive managementof affairs will be left to the freed people themselves, subject only to theUnited States military authority, and the acts of Congress. By the laws ofwar, and orders of the President of the United States, the negro is free, andmust be dealt with as such. He cannot be subjected to conscription, orforced military service, save by the written orders of the highest militaryauthority of the department, under such regulations as the President orCongress may prescribe. Domestic servants, blacksmiths, carpenters, andother mechanics, will be free to select their own work and residence, butthe young and able-bodied negroes must be encouraged to enlist as soldier
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in the service of the United States, to contribute their share toward main-taining their own freedom, and securing their rights as citizens of theUnited States.Negroes so enlisted will be organized into companies, battalions, andregimentsunder the orders of the United States military authorities, andwill be paid, fed, and clothed, cording to law. The bounties paid on en-listment may, with the consent of the recruit, go to assist his family andsettlement in procuring agricultural implements, seed, tools, boots, clothing,and other articles necessary for their livelihood.3. Whenever three respectable negroes, heads of families, shall desire tosettle on land, and shall have selected for that purpose an island or a localityclearly defined within the limitsbove designated, the Inspector of Settlements and Plantations will himself, or by such subordinate officer as hemay appoint, give them a license to settle such island or district, and affordthem such assistance as he can to enable them to establish a peaceable agri-cultural settlement. The three parties named will subdivide the land, underthe supervision of the inspector, among themselves, and such others as maychoose to settle near them, so that each family shall have a plot of not morethan forty acres of tillable ground, and, when it borders on some water-channel, with not more than eight hundred feet water-front, in the posses-sion of which land the military authorities will afford them protection untilsuch time as they can protect themselves, or until Congress shall regulatetheir title. The quartermaster may, on the requisition of the Inspector ofsettlements and Plantations, place at the disposal of the inspector one ormore of the captured steamers to ply between the settlements and one orI ore of the commercial points heretofore named, in order to afford thesettlers the opportunity to supply their necessary wants, and to sell theproducts of their land and labor.4. Whenever a negro has enlisted in the military service of the UnitedStates, he may locate his family in any one of the settlements at pleasure,and acquire a homestead, and all other rights and privileges of a settler, asthough present in person. In like manner, negroes may settle their familiesand engage on board the gunboats, or in fishing, or in the navigation of theinland waters, without losing any claim to land or other advantages de-rived from this system. But no one, unless an actual settler as abovedefinedorunless absent on Government service, will be entitled to claimany right t land or property in any settlement by virtue of these orders.5. In order to carry out this system of settlement, a general officer willbe detailed as Inspector of Settlements an lantations, whose duty it shallbe to visit the settlements, to regulate their police and general arrangement, and who will furnish personally to each head of a family, subject tothe approval of the President of the United States, a possessory title inwriting, giving as near as possible the description of boundaries; and who4'il;l: "" I
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252 SAVANNAH AND TOCOTALIGO. [1884-'65.shall adjust all claims or conflicts that may arise under the same, subject tothe like approval, treating such titles altgether as possessory.Thesamegeneral officer will also be charged with the enlistment and orgathe negro recruits, and protecting their interests while absent from theirsettlements; and will be governed by the rules and regulations prescribedby the War Department for such purposes.G. Brigadier-General R. Saton is hereby appointed spector of Settle-ments and Plantations, and will at once enter on the performance of hisduties. No change is intended or desired in the settlement now onBeau-fort Island, nor will any rights to property heretofore acquired be affectedthereby.By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman,L. M. DAroN, Assistant AdjutantGeneral.I saw a good deal of the secretary socially, during the timeof his visit to Savannah. He kept his quarters on the revenue-cutter with Simeon raper, sq., which cutter lay at a wharfin the river, but he came very often tomy quarters at Mr.Green's house. Though appearing robust and strong, he com-plained a good deal of internal pains, which he said threat-ened his life, and would compel him soon to quit public office.He professed to have come from Washington purposely for restand recreation, and he spoke unreservedly of the bickerings andjealousies at the national capital; of the interminable quarrelsof the State Governors about their quotas, and more particularly of the financial troubles that threatened the very existence ofthe Government itself. He said that the price of every thinghad so risen in comparison with the depreciated money, thatthere was danger of national bankruptcy, and he appealed tome, as a soldier and patriot, to hurry up matters so as to the war to a close.He left for Port Royal about the 15th of January, and prom-ised to go North without delay, so as to urry back to me thsupplies I had called for, as indispensable for the prosecution ofthe next stage of the campaign. I was quite impatient to get offmyself, for a city-life had become dull and tame, and we wereall anxious to get into the pine-woods again, free from the im-portunities of rebel women asking for protection, and of thecivilians from the North who were coming to avannah for cot-ton and all sorts of profit.
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18 65.] SAV ANNAH AND POCOTALIGO. 253On the 18th of January General Slocum was ordered toturn over the city of Savannah to General J. G. Foster, com-manding the Department of the South, who proposed to retainhis own headquarters at Hilton ead, and to occupy Savannahby General Grover's division of the Nineteenth Corps, just ar-rived from James River; and on the next day, viz., January 19th, I made the first general orders for the move. These were substantially to group the right wing of thearmy at Pocotaligo, already hld by theSeventeenth Corps, andthe left wing and cavalry at or near Robertsville, in South Caro-lina. The army remained substantially the same as during themarch from Atlanta, with the exception of a few changes in thecommanders of brigades and divisions, the addition of some menwho had joined from furlough, and the loss of others from theexpiration of their term of service. My own personal staff re-mained t e same, with the exception that General W. F. Barryhad rejoined us at Savannah, perfectly recovered from lis attackof erysipelas, and continued with us to the end of the war.Generals Easton and Beckwith remained at Savannah, in chargeof their respective depots, with orders to follow and meet us bysea with supplies when we should reach the coast at Wilmingtonor Newbern, North Carolina.Of course, I gave out with some ostentation, especially among the rebels, that we were going to Charleston or Augusta;but I had long before made up my mind to waste no time oneither,further than to pla off on their fears, thus to retain fortheir protecion a force of the enemy which would otherwiseconcentrate in our front, and make the passage of some of thegreat rivers that crossed our route more difficult and bloody.Having accomplished all that seemed necessary, on the 21st ofJaary, with my entire headquarters, officers, clerks, orderlies,etc., with wagons and horses, I embarked in a steamer for Beau-fort, South Carolina, touching at Hilton Head, to see GeneralFoster. The weather was rainy and bad, but we reached Bean-fort safely on the 23d, and found some of General Blair's troopshere. The bul of his corps (Seventeenth) was, however, up onthe railroad about Pocotaligo, near the head of Broad River, to4, 4,,
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254 SAVANNAH ANI) POCOTALIGO. [1864-'65.which their supplies were carried from Hilton Head by steam-boats. General Hatch's division (of General Foster'swas still at Coosawhatchie or Tullafinny, where the Char& Savannah Railroad crosses the river of that name. All thecountry between Beaufort and Pootaligo was low alluvial landcut up by an infinite number of salt-water sloughs and fresh-water creeks, easily susceptible of defense by a small force; andwhy the enemy had allowed us to mae a lodgment at Pocotal-igo so easily I did not understand, unless it resulted from fearor ignorance. It seemed to me then that the terrible energythey had displayed in the earlier stages of the war was begin-ning to yield to the slower but more certain industry and disci-pline of our Northern men. It was to me manifest that thesoldiers and people of the South entertained an undue fear ofour Western men, and, like children, they had invented suchghostlike stories of our prowess in Georgia, that they werescared b their own inventions. Still, this ws a power,andIintended to utilize it. Somehow, our men had got the idea thatSouth Carolina was the cause of all our troubles ; her peoplewere the first to fire on Fort Sumter, had been in a greathurry to precipitate the country into civil war; nd thereforeon them should fall the scourge of war in its worst form. Taunt-ing messages had also come to us, when in Georgia, to the effectthat, when we should reach South Carolina, we would find apeople less passive, who would fight us to the bitter end, daringus to come over, etc.; so that I saw and felt that we would notbe able longer to restrain our men as we had done in Georgia.Personally I had many friends in Charleston, to whom Iwould gladly have extended protection and mercy, but theywere beyond my personal reach, and I would not restrain thearmy lest its vigor and energy should be impaired; and I had every reason to expect bold and strong resistance at the manybroad and deep rivers that lay across our path.General Foster's Department of the South had been enlargedto embrace the coast of North Carolina, so that the few troopsserving there under the command of General Innis N. Palmer,at Newbern, became subject to my command. General A. IL: + ::W+ B
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18665.] SAVANNAH AND POCOTAIUGO. 255Terry held Fort Fisher, and a rumor came that he had taken theity of Wilmington; but this was premature. e had abouteigt thou men. General Schofield was also known to been route from Nashville for North Carolina, with the entireTwenty-third Corps, so that I had every reason to be satisfiedthat I would receive additional strength as we progressed north-ward, and before I should need it.General W. J. Hardee commanded the Confederate forcesin Charleston, with the Salkiehatchie River as his line of de-fense. It was also known that General Beauregard had comefrom the direction of Tennessee, and had assumed the general command of all the troops designed to resist our progress.The heavy winter rains had begun early in January, ren-dered the roads execrable, and the Savannah River became soswollen that it filled its many channels, overflowing the vastextent of rice-fields that lay on the east bank. This flood delayedour departure two weeks; for it swept away our pontoon-bridgeat Savannah, and came near drowning John E. Smith's divisionof the Fifteenth Corps, with several heavy trains of wagons thatwere en route from Savannah to Pocotaligo by the old causeway.General Slocum had already ferried two of his divisionsacross the river, when Sister's Ferry, about forty miles aboveSavannah, was selected for the passage of the rest of his wingand of Kilpatrick's cavalry. The troops were in motion for thatpoint before I quitted Savannah, and Captain S. B. Luce, Unitedtates Navy, had reported to me with a gunboat (the Pontiac) anda couple of tranports, which I requested him to use in protectingSister's Ferry during the passage of Slocum's wing, and to facil-itate the passage of the troops all he could. The utmost activityprevailed at all points, but it was manifest we could not get offmuch before the 1st day of February; so I determined to go inperson to Poctaligo, and there act as though we were bound forCharleston. On the 24th of January I started from Beaufortwith a part of my staff, leaving the rest to follow at leisure,rode across the island to a pontoon-bridge that spanned thechannel between it and the main-land, and thence rode byGardens Corners to a lantation not far from Pocotaligo, ou-
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avenue of lve-oaks, whose mbs had been cut away by thetroops for firewood, and desolation marked one of those splendidSouth Carolina estates where the proprietors formerly had dis-pensed a hospitality that distinguished the old rgim of thatproud State. I slept on the foor of the house, but the nightwas sobitter cold thatgot up by the fire several times,when it burned low I rekindled it with an old mantelockand the wreck of a bedstead which stood in a corner of theroom-the only act of vandalism that I recall done by myselfpersonally during the war.The next morning I rode to Pecotaligo, a1nd thence recon-noitred our entire line down to Cosawhatchi. octalo Fortwas on low, alluvia ground, and near it began the sandy pine-land which connected with the firm ground extending inland,constituting the hief reason for its capture at the very frst stageof the campaign. 1atch's division was ordered to that pointfrom Coosawbatchie, and the whole of Howard's right wing wasbrought near by, ready to start by the 1st of February. I alsoreconnoitred the point of the Salkehathi River, where theCharleston Railroad crossed it, found the bridge protected bya rebel battery on the farther side, and could see a few menabout it; but the stream itself was absoutely impassable, forthe whole bottom was overfiowed by its swollen waters to thebreadth of a full mile. Kevertheless, a division (Mower's) ofthe Seventeenth Corps was kept active, seemingly with theintention to cross over in the direction of Charleston, and thusto keep up the delusion that that city was our immediate "ob-jective." Meantime, I had reports from General Slocum of theterrible difficulties he had encountered about Sister's Ferry, wherethe Savannah River was reported nearly three miles wide, and itseemed for a time almost impossible for hito span it at all withhis frail pontoons. About this time (January th), the weathercleared away bright and cold, and I inferred that the river wouldsoon run down, and enable Slocun to pass the river beforeFebruary 1st. One of the divisions of the Fifteenth Corps(Corse's) had also been cut off by the loss of the pontoon-bridgeA,,,,A4Bil;~~~8 """
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out w itwasnotprdent for me to i gurate thng stores and making final preparations, until the 1st ofbruary, whenI learned that the cavahy and two divisions ofBefore closing thin chapter, I will add a few original lettersSbear directly on the subject, and tend to illustrate it:Majr-General W. T. STIERMA, com7man g filiary Divi2ion 7f a iMi-ENAL: ur letters oughtby Generalarard were receivePoint, and read with interest. Not having them with me, however, Inot say that in this I will be able to satisfy you on all points of recom-Smean time spent over three hours with the secretary and Generalock, I must be brief. Before your last request to have Thonas make apaign into the heart of Alabama, I ad ordered Schofield to Annapolis,ylandwithhiscorps.The dvane (sixthusand) will reach the sea-rd by the 23, the remainder following as rapidly as railroad transporta-can be procured from Cincinati. The corps numbers over twenty-omas is stll left with a sufficient force, surplus to go to Selma underenergetic leader. He has been telegraphed to, to know whether hed go, and, if so, by which of several routes he would select. No replyet received. Canby has been ordered to act offensively from the sea-st to the interior, tward ontgomery and Selm. Thoma's forces willme from tbe north at an early day, or some of his troops will be sent tonby. Without further reAnforcement Canby will have a moving columneight thousand effective. At Newbern about half the number. It isrored, through deserters, thatilmington also has fallen. I am inclinedbeleve the rumor, because on the 17th we knw the enemy were blow-up their works about Fort Caswell, and that on the 18th Terry moved43oii i i] iiiiii
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If Wilmingtom is captured, Schofield will go there. If not, he will besent to Newbern. In either event, all the surplus forces at the two pointswill move to the interior, toward Goldsoro', in coperation with yourmovements. From either point, railroad communications can be run out,there being here abundance of rolling-stock suited to tbo gaugo of those roads.There have been about sixteen thousand men sent from Lee's army south.Of these, you will have fourteen thousand against you, if Wilmington isnot held by the enemy, casualties at Fort Fisher having overtaken abouttwo thousand.All other troops are subject to your orders as you come in comnica-tion with them. They will be so instructed.From about Richmond I willwatch Lee closely, and if he detaches many men, or attempts to evacuate,willpitch in. In the mean ime, should you be brought to a halt anywherI can send two corps of tirty thousand effective men to your support, fromthe troops about Richmond.To resume: Canby is ordered to operate to the interior from the Onlf. A. J. Smith may go from the north, but I think it doubtful A force oftwenty-eight or thirty thousand will cooperate with you from Newbern orWilmington, or both. You can call for reinforcements.This will be banded you by Captain Hudson, of my staff, who will returnwith any message youmayhavefor me. f there is any thing I can do foryou in the way of having supplies on shipboard, at any point on the sea-coast, ready for you, let me know it.Yours truly,[ U. S. GRANT, Li NitenanTG .neIN TuE FIELD, PocorTALIo, SoCni CAosINA, anary 2, 1865.Lieutenant-General U. S. GOarr, City Point, Virginia.DEAR GENERAL: Captain Hudson has this moment arrived with yourletter of January 21st, which I have read with intrest.The capture of Fort Fisher has a mot important bearing on my ampaign, and I rejoice in it for many reasons, because of its intrinsic importance, and because it gives me another point of security on the seaboard. Ihope General Terry will follow it up by the capture of Wilmington, althoughI do not look for it, from Admiral Porter's dispatch to me. I rejoice thatTerry was not a West-Pointer, that he belonged to your army, and that hehad the same troops with which Butler feared to make the attempt.Admiral Dahlgren, whose fleet is renfred by some more iron-lads,wants to make an assault d la Fisher on Fort Moultrie, but I withhold myconsent, for the reason thatthe capture of all Sullivan's Island is not con-alusive ar to Charleston; the capture of James Island would be, but all pro-
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nounce that imposible at this time. Therefore, I am moving (as hithertodesigned) for the railroad west of Branchville, then will swing across toOrangoburg, which will interpose my army between Charleston and theinterior. Contemporaneous with this, Foster will demonstrate up theEdisto, and afterward make a lodgment at Bull's Bay, and occupy the com-non road which leads from Mount Pleasant toward Georgetown. When Iget to Columbia, I think I shall movo straight for Goldsboro', via Fayette-ille. By this circuit I cut all roads, and devastate the land; and the forcesalong the coast, commanded by Foster, will follow my movement, takingany thing the enemy lets go, or so occupy his attention that he cannot de.tach all his forces against me. I feel sure of getting Wilmington, and maybe Charleston, and being at Goldsboro', with its railroads finished back toMorehead City and Wilingtoen, I can easily take Raleigh, when it seems thatLee mustcome out. If Schofield comes to eanfort, e shoutld be pushedout to Kinston, on the Noeuse, and may be Golds oro' (or, rather, a pointon the Wilmington road, south of Goldsboro'). It is not necessary to stormGoldsboro', because it is in a distant region, of no importance in itself, and, ifits garrison is forced to draw supplies fro itsnorth, it will be eating up thesame stres on which Lee depends for his comand.I have no doubt Hood will bring his army to Augusta. Canby andThomas should penetrate Alabama as far as possible, to keep employed atleast a part of Hood's army; or, what would accomplish the same thing,Thomas might reoccupy the railroad from Chattanooga forward to theEtowa, viz, Rome, Kingston, and Allatoona, thereby threatening Georgia.I know that the Georgia troops are disaffected. At Savannah I met dele-gates from several counties of the southwest, who manifested a decided-ly hostile spirit to the Confederate cause. I nursed the feeling as far aspossible, and instructed Grover to keep it up.Af l0ft wing must now be at Sister's Ferry, crossing the Savannah Riverto the east bank. Slocum has orders to be at Robertsville to-morrow, pre-pared to move on Barnwell. Howard is here, all ready to start for the Augusta Railroad at Midway.We find the enemy on the east side of the Salkiehatchie, and cavalryi.our front; but all give ground on our approach, and seem to be merelywatching us. If we start on Tuesday, in one week we shall be near Orange-burg, having broken up the Augusta road from the Edisto westward twentyor twenty-ve miles. I will be sure that every rail is twisted. Should weencounter too much opposition near Orangeburg, then I will for a time neg-lect that branch, and rapidly move on Columbia, and fill up the triangleformed by the Congaree and Wateree (tributries of the Santee), breakingUp that great centre of the Carolina roads. Up to that point I feel full con-dnce, but from there may have to manceuvre some, and will be guided1i:l~w
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d tawill kp ops e in haif t s llthat this trip is necessary;i it must be made sooner or later; I am on time,and in the right position for it. My army is large enough for the purpose,up at all other points, so that concentration against me may not be universal.I expect that Jefr. Davis will move heaven and earth to catch me, forsuccess to this column is fatal to his dream of empire. Richmond is notmore vital to his cause thand the heart of South Carolina.If Thomas will not move on Selma, order him to occupy Rome, Kings-ton, and Allatoona, and again threaten Georgia in the direction of Athens.I think tbo "poor white trash" of the South are falling out of theirranks by sickness, desertion, and every available means; but there isalargeclass of vindictive outherners who will fight to the last. The squabbles inRichmond, the howfs in Charleston, and the disintegration elsewhere, areall good omens for us; we must not relax one iota, but, on the contrary, pilethe rice-fields of th Savannah, swept away our causeway (which had been*carefully corduroyed), and made the swamps hereabout more lakes of slimymud. The weather is now good, and I have t a y on terra fra.I will issu instructions to General Foster, based on the renforenentsof North Carolina; but if Schofield come, you had better relieve Foster,orders to seeuo Coldsboro' (with its railroad communicatioin back to Beau-I will start with my Atlanta army (sixty thousand), supped as before,they gave np PocotE 1i0iwithout a fight when they heard that the attacking............................. i iio o i !i l i ~ ~ i i ii "iiiii iiiiiiiiiii i~ i : : :::::::::: : iii i .....iiii lllill~liiiiiiiiii i ii ii iiii~ iii~ i~ i i i ........ ................. ..=, iiiil:liiiiiiliiiliiiiiiiiii~ ii ii~ ii iiii iia i iii iiiiii iiiiiiiii i~ ii l'ii~ l ii2 ii iiiii iiiiiiiiiili~iiliiiii~iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii iii i ii iiii .... iiiii i =ii i iiiiiiiii i
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:1664265.1 SAVANNAH AND POCOTALIGO. 261forcebelgeo my army. I w tryand p tat feeling, which isW. T. SEEMAN, Major-General commandng.P. S.-I leave my chief-quartermaster and commissary behind to followcoastwise. W. T. S.Hon. Glozox WELL a, Secretary of the zYcy.Sm: I have already apprised the Department that the army of GeneralSherman occupied the city of Savannah on the 21st of December.The rebel army, hardly respectable in numbers or condition, escaped bycrossing the river and taking the Union Causeway toward the railroad.I have walked about the city several times, and can affirm that its tran-limits are as order as if they were in Nw York or Boston.... Oneeffect of the march of General Sherman through Georgia has been to satisfythe people that their credulity has been imposed upon by the lying asser-tions of the rebel Government, affirming the inability of the United StatesGovernment to withstand the armies of rebeldom. They have seen the oldflag of the United States carried by its victorious legions through theirState, almost unopposed, and placed in their principal city without a blow.Since the occupation of the city General Sherman has been occupied i,making arrangements for its security after he leaves it for the march that hemeditates. My attention has been directed to such measures of couperationas the number and quality of my force permit.On the 2d I arrived here from Charleston, whither, as I stated in mydispatch of the 29th of December, I had gone in consequence of informationfrom the senior o icer there that the rebels contemplated issuing from theharbor, and his request for my presence. Having placed a force there of seven monitors, uffient to meet isuch an emergency, and not perceivingany sign of the expected raid, I returned to Savannah, to keep in cormu-nication with General Sherman and be ready to render any assistance thatmight be desired. General Sherman has fully informed me of his plans,and, so far as my means permit, they shall not lack assistance by water.On the 3d the transfer of the right wing to Beaufort was begun, and theonly suitable vessel I had at hand (the Harvest Moon) was sent to Thunder-bolt to receive the first embarkation. This took place about 3 P. s., andwas witnessed by General Sherman and General Barnard (United StatesEngineers) and myself. The Pontiac is ordered around to assist, and thearmy transports also followed the first move by the Harvest Moon.I could not help remarking the unbroken silence that prevailed inr ,~iii~
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--b, -----the large array of troope; not a roe was to le heard.as they galhereddamanes on tne bluff to look at the ressels The oates of a solitary bmgleialone came fro their midstGeneral Barnard made a brief visit to one of the rebel works (sastan'sBl.uR) that dominated this water-course-the bet approach of the kind toI a collecting datal that will full exhibit to the Department the pow-erful character of the defenses of the city and its approache& GeneralGeneral Foster stil holds the poition near the Tullny. With his Ihave returned to their vessels. The exebley t service performed by this de-Senossed by General Sheman.will eventuate.Ill~~lllii iiiiiiiiiIwii i i i ii i
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as no reason to move in baste, but can choose such objects as be prefers,etter addressed by him to General Halk, which he read to me a fewI have the honor to be, verywespectfully, your obedient servant,HAnAXrTER MLinAri DIsoiO Tor MIe saISj,TN THE Fmi, POCUTALIGO, SOTH CAROLINA anatory 29 1W5.hat Schofield's corps (the T ientyhird), twenty-one thousand strong, is>rdered east from Tennessee, and will be sent to Beaufort, North Carolina.That is well; I want that force to secure a point on the railroad aboutbe too strong to carry by a rapid movement, then a point near the Neuse,south of Goldsboro', will answer, but the bridge and position about Kinston,hould be held and fortifed strong. The movement should be maskedbythe troops already at Neborn. Please notify General Palmer that thesetroops are coning, and to be prepared to receive them. Major-General-ehofield will command in person, and is admirably adapted for the work.If it-is possible, I want him to secure Goldsboro', with the railroad back to*Morehead City and Wilmington. As soon as General Schofleld reachesFort Macon, have him to meet some one of your staff, to explain in full theetails of the sitation of affairs with me; and you can give hin the chiiefommand of all troops at Cape Fear and in North Carolina. If he finds theenemy has all turned south aganlst me, he need not follow, but turn his at-tention against Raleigh; if he can secure Goldsboro' and Wilmington,it will be as much as I expect before I have passed the Santee. Send himall detachmehts of men that have come to join my army. They can be soorganized and oiered as to be efficient, for they are nearly all old soldierswho have been detached or on furlough. Until I pass the Santee, youcan better use these detachments at Bulls Bay, Georgetown, etc.I will irstruet General McCallum, of the Railroad Department, to takebis men up to Beanfort, North Carolina, and employ them on the road out.I d not know pat he n use them on any road here. I did instructhim, while awaiting information from North Carolina, to av thebuild a good trestle-bridge across Port Royal ferry but I now supposet pontoon-bridge will do. If you move the pontoons, e sure to imake an's Corners, and mark itwit sign-bords-obi i~ ~ iiiii illi iiiiiiiiiii18:Iiii i li i iiiiiiiiiiiiii
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264 SAYANNAH AND POCOTALIGD. [1a-t 6I prefer that Hatch's force should not be materially weakened until I amCharleston. If you can. break the railroad between this and Charleston,then this force could be reduced.IN TE FIELD, SAVANNAH, Janua/ 19, 1865.HEo. Enwrx KL STANToN, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.Si: When you left Savannah a few days ago, you forgot the map whichGeneral Geary had prepared for you, showing the rot by which his dsion entered the ciby of Savannah, being the first troops to occupy that city.I now send it to you. I avail myself of the opportunity also to inclose you copies of allmy official orders touching trade and intercours with the people ofGeorgia, as well as for the establishment of the negro settlements.Delegations of the people of Georgia continue to come in, and I am satis-fied that, by judicious handling and by a little respect shown to theirprejudices, we can create a schism in Jeff. Davis's dominions. All thatI have conversed with realize the truth that slavery as an institution isdefunct, and th.only questions that remain are what disposition shall bemade of the negroes themselves. I confess myself unable to offer a completesolution for these questions, and prefer to leave it to the slower operationsof time. We have given the initiative, and can afford to await the workingof the experiment.As to trade-matters, I also think it is to our interest toi keep the Southernpeople somewhat dependent on the articles of cornmerce to which theyhave hitherto been accustomed. General Grover is now here, and will, Ithink, be able to handle this matter judiciously, and may gradualy relax,and invite cotton to come in win large quantities. But at first we shouldmanifest no undue anxiety on that score; for the rebels would at once makeuse of it as a power against us. We should assume a tone of perfect qon-tempt for cotton and every thing else in comparison with the great objectof the war-the restoration of the Uion, with all its rights and power. If the rebels burn cotton as a war measure, they simply play into our handsby taking away the only product of value they have to exchange in foreignports for war-ships and munitions. By such a course, also, they alienatethe foelings of a large class of small farmers who look to their little parcelsof cotton to exchange for food and clothing for their families. ,hop theGovernment will not maniest too much anxiety to obtain cotton in-laeliii i i iil i i i=iiiiiiiiii~ I~ iiiiiiiii~iii iiiitfiiiiiii~i i ii g 8gi i it! iJ i iiililiiiii. ili..
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titi, a that the President wlnot indorse the contractsfor the purchase of large quantities of cotton. Several contracts, involvingfrorn six to ten thousand bales, indorsed by Mr. Lincoln, have been shownme, but were not in such a form as to amount to an order to compel me toAs to Treasury agents, and agents to take charge of confiscated andabandoned property, whose salaries depend on their fees, I can only saythat, as a general rule, they are mischievous and disturbing elements to amilitary government, and it is almost impossible for us to study the law andregulations so as to understand fully their powers and duties. I ratherthink the Quartermaster's Department of the army could better fulfill alltheir duties and accomplish all that is aimed at by the law. Yet on thissubject I will leave Generals Foster and Grover to do the best they can.1 am, with great respect, your obedient servant,W. T. SnraorN, M ajor-General commanding.TnAgQAnTERS MIUHARY DmIOS OF THE MISI i,j vuH FIELD, SAvANA X, GDOElA, .TuesGy 2, 18.Ion. EDWI f. STAroN, Secretary of War, Washington, D. 0.S: I have just received from Lieutenant-General Grant a copy of thatpart of your telegram to hi of ecember 26th relating to cotton, a copyof which has been immediately furnished to General Easton, chief-quarter-master, who will strictly governed by it.I had already been approached by all the consuls and Lalf the peopleof Savannah on this cotton question, and my invariable answer was thatall the cotton in Savannah was prize of war, belonged to the United States,and nobody should recover a bale of it with my consent; that, as cottonhad been one of the chief tauses of this war, it should help to pay itsexpenses; that all cotton became tainted with treason from the hour thefirst act of hostlity was committed against the United States some time inDecember, 1860; and that no bill of sale subsequent to that date could con-My orders were that an oficer of the .Quartermaster's Department,United States Army, might furiish the holder, agent, or attorney, a merecertteate of the fact of seizure, with description of the bales' marks, etc.,the cotton then to be turned over to the agent of the Treasury Department,to be shipped to New York for sale. But, since the rceipt of your dispatch,I have ordered General Easton to make the shipmnt himself to the uarter-master at New Yrkwhereyoucan dispose of it at pleasure. 1 donothink the Treasury Departmentought to bother itself with the prizes orMr. Barclay, former consul at New York, representing Mr. Molyneux,former-onsul here, but absent a long time, called on me with referencef!i' ii ii o iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii Fii il i= 11 == ; Ua ii~ i ii 11i iiii~ o _=:iiii i!!: i = ii~ii ii~iiiiilii~iii~iilii1i"liiiii
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to cotton claimed by English subjects. He seemed amazed when L toldhim I shouid pay no respect t consular certificates, that noeventwoI treat an English subject with more favor than one of our own deludedcitizens, and that for my part I was unwilling to fght for cotton forthe benefit of Englishmen openly engaged in smuggling arms and instruments of war to kill us; that, on the contrary, it would afford me greatsatisfaction to conduct my army to Nassau, and wipe out that nest ofpirates. I explained to him, however, that 1%vas not a diplomatic agent ofthe General Government of the United States, but that ry opinion, so 4frankly expressed, was that of a soldier, which it would be well for him toheed. It appeared, also, that be owned a plantation on the line of invest-ment of Savannah, which, of course, was pillaged, and for which he ex-pected me to give some certificate entitling him to indemnification, whichI declined emphatically.I have adopted in Savannah rules concerning property-severe but just-founded upon the laws of nations and the practice of civilized govern-ments, and am clearly of opinion that we should claim all the belligerentrights over conquered countries, that the people may realize the truth thatwar is no child's play.I embrace in this a copy of a letter, dated Dember 31, 184, in ans werto one from Solomon Cohen (a rich lawyer) to General Blair, his personalfriend, as follows:Major-General F. P. Burk, connanding Seventeenth -Any Corps.GE:NERA: 'Your note, inclosing Mr. Cohen's of this date, is received, andI answer frankly through you his inquiries. 1. No one can practise law as an attorney in the United States withoutacknowledging the supremay of our Government. If I am not in error,an attorney is as much an officer ofthe court ps the clerk, and it would bea novel thing in a government to have a court to adinister law which deniedthe supremacy of the government itself.21 No one will be allowed the privileges of a merchant, or, rather, to tradeis a privilege which no one should seek of the Government without in likemanner acknowledging its supremacy. 3. If Mr. Cohen remains in Savannah as a denizen, his property, realand personal will not be disturbed unless its temporary use e necessaryfor the military authorities of the city. Te title to property will not bedisturbed in any evet, unil adjudicated by t corts of the United States.4. If Ir. Cohen leaves Savannah under my Special Order No. 14, is apublic acknowledgmeunt that he 1adheres to the enemies of the UnitedStates," and all his property becomes forfeited to the.United States. But,as a matter of favor, he will be allowed to carry with him clothing andfurniture for the use of himself, his family, and servants, and will be trans-portd within the enemy's lines, but not by way of ort yal.These rules will apply to all parties, and from the no exception will be made.I have the honor to be, general, your obedient servant,i i ii!I i.............................. ........ e"s ~
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thepoitsand soul I eav bfor myordrsare executed, I ill en~-deaor o ipres uon y sccesor Geera Fser, their wisdom andI hoe te curseI hve ake in hes mater wi met your approba-tio, ad tat he resden wil nt rfun to parties claiming cotton orothr popetywihou th stongstevienc ofloalty and friendship onthepat o te caiant o unes soe the psitveend isto begaied.W. T.SagnuN, Mjor-.Geeal cammanidin'g.I4ma4"iO 2<"I B~l l8i~i ~~
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CHAPTER XXHI.CAMPAITN OF THE CAROLINAS.FEBRUARY AND MARCH, 185.O the 1st day of February, as before explained, the armdesigned for the active campaign from Savannah northward wascomposed of two wings, commanded respectively by Major-Generals Howard and Slocum, and was substantially the samethat had marched from Atlanta to Savannah. The same generalorders were in force, and this campaign may properly be classedas a continuance of the former.The right wing, less Corse's division, Fifteenth Corps, wasgrouped at or near Pocotaligo, South Carolina, with its wagonsfilled with food, ammunition, and forage, all ready to start, andonly waiting for the left wing, which was detained by the floodin the Savannah River. It was composed as follows:Fiteenth Corps, fajor-General JoN A. LoAN.First Division, Brigadier-General Charles R. Woods; Second Division,Major-General W B. Hazen; Third Division, Brigadier-General John E.Smith; Fourth Division, Brigadier-General John M. Corse. Artierybrigade, eighteen guns, Lieutenant-Colonel W. .Ross, First Michigan Ar-tillery.Seventeenth Corps, _f1jor-General Fro P. BLuR, JR.First Division, Major-General Joseph A.Mower; Second Division, Brigadier-GeneralM. F. Force; Fourth Division, Brigadier-General Giles A.Smith. Artillery brigade, fourteen guns, Major A. C. Waterhouse, FirstIllinois Artillery.The leftwing, with Corse's division and ilpatrick's cavalry,was at and near Sister's Ferry, forty miles above the city ofi4 iiiii iiiiiiiiiliiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii~ ~lillliiiii iliil iilliiiiiiliii~ iii!i=ii iiiiii iiiii =i l~ iiiii iii iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii
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a APAIGN OF THE CAROLINAS. 269engged in rossing the river, thn much swollen. Itwsc posed as follows:Fourteenth Corps, Major-General JEFF. C. DAVIS.Firt Diviin, Brigadier-General W. Carlin; Second Division, Brigadier-General John 1. Morgan; Third Division, Brigadier-General A.Baird Artillery brigade, sixteen guns, Maor Charles loughtaling, FirstTcenticth Corps, Erigadier-Gencral A. S. WaILuIs.First Division, Brgadier-General .I. Jackson; Second Division,York Artillery.Cavalry Divi ion, Brigadier-General Json ELne.First Brigade, Coonel T. J. Jordan, Ninth Pennsylvania Cavalry;Becond Brigade, Colone S. D. Atkins, Ninety-second Illinois Volunteers; Third Brigade, Colonel Georgo E. Spencer, First Alabama Cavalry. OneThe actual strength of the arrny, as given in the followingofficial tabular statements, was at the time sixty thousand andseventy-nine men, and sixty-ight guns. The trains were madeup of about twenty-five hundred wagons, with six mules to eachwagonan about sx hundred ambulances, with two horses each.The contents of the wagons embraced an ample supply of am-munition for a great battle; forage for about seven days, andprovisions for twenty days, mostly of bread, sugar, coffee, andsalt, depending laely fr fresh meat on beeves driven on thehoof and such cattle, hogs, and poultry, as we expected to gatheralong our lineof march.RECAPITU.ATION-OAMPAIGN OF THE OAROLINAB.Infantry.......... .. 5,9 1 61,594,10.Cavalry ............ ... 4..3 4,011,Artiery.. ..... 171,672,26 2,44L 'si; i aa 5,24ssa=i~~;
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Efective Strength of the Army under General W. T. Sun oi during the Campaign of the oCarolinas, 1865.FEBRUAuRY 1 M.ArO n 1 APRIL 1. APRIL 10wInfnalry. CnvIry Art11ery. Infantry. C vetrq. Ar0try. 011 try. C Velry. A tllry. lInfntry, C, yr A 111 ery.T o al oi h W n 1 15 2 E 0 7 to k 1, 7 M 5 A 94 10 61 1 92 4]22 6 O 2 6 8 1 1 2 3 0 2 Irwfent AryCrp. 720 14,6882 1410 871 .14 48 4 14,69.. .... 7 1,6 2 2 8-Total,LfgtWing. 1,166 25,8G G016 62 1,171 24,761 .. .419 614 1,180 2G82 6t .82 .. 8 1,B 26,91 4 .4 21 618 Te t brm C1 p ..... ..... 872 0,841 15 550 8 124 892 11,89 ... 6 866E. patrickaCav'ry. ...... ....... 18 ,0 4 04 .. .... 173 4,168 4 91 ........ 165 3,993 4 77 ..... ... 1i .. 5,80 70..tGranyAf gregate. 2,861 al,668ise 4,252 6o 1,668 2,855 49,24a no 4222 58 1,624 8,m7 708817 ss 657 2osc ,198 8,419 769 i2 5,s6 e9s 9,87 00_,&
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The enemy occupied the cities of Charleston and Augusta,with garrisons capable of making a respectable if not successfuldefense, but utterly unable to meet our veteran columns in theopen field. To resist or delay our progress north, GeneralWheeler had his division of cavalry (reduced to the size of a brigade by his hard and persistnt fighting ever since the begin-ning of the Atlanta campaign), and General Wad Hamptonhad been dispatched from the Army of Virginia to his nativeState of South Carlina, with a great flourish of trumpets, andextraordinary powers to raise men, money, and horses, withwhich "to stay the progress of the invader," and "to punishus for our insolent attempt to invade the glorious State of SouthCarolina!" He was supposed at the time to have, at and nearColumbia, two small divisions.of cavalry coh us anded by himselfand General Butler.Of course, I had a species of contempt for these scatteredand inconsiderble forces, knew that they could hardly delays an hour; and the only serious question that occurred to mewas, would General Lee sit down in Richmond (besieged byGeneral Grant), and permit us, almost unopposed, to passthrough the States of South and 1orth Corolina, cutting of andconsing the very supplies on which he depended to feed hisy in irgnia, r would he make an effort to escape fromGeneral Grant, and endeavor to catch us inland somewherebetween Columbia and Raleigh? I knew full well at the time that the broken fragments of Iood's army (which had escapedfrom Tennessee) were being hurried rapidly across Georgia, byAugusta, to make junction in my front; estimating them at themaximum twenty-five thousand men, and Hardee's, Wheeler's,and Hampton's forces at fifteen thousand, made forty thou-d; whichif handled with spirit and energy, would constitutea formidable force, and might make the passage of such riversas the Santee and Cape Fear a diflicult undertaking. There-fore, I took all possible precautions, and arranged with AdmiralDahlgren and General Foster to watch our progress inland byall the means possible, and to provide for us points of securityia lon e oast;as, Bulls Bay, Georgetown, and the month
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27i28 CAMPAIGN OF THE CAROuNA, [a86.of Cape Fear River. Sti, it was extremely desirable in onemarch to reach Goldsbro'inthe State of North Carolina(distant four huindred and twenty-five miles), a point of greatconvenience for ulterior operations, by reason of the two rail-roads which meet there, coming from the sea-coast at Wilningtonand Newbern. Before leaving Savannah 1had sent to NewbernColonel W. W. Wright, of the Engineers, with orders to look tothese railroads, to collect rolling-stok, and to have the roadsrepaired out as far as possible in six weeks-the time estimatedas necessary for us to march that distance.he question of upplie remined still the one of vitalimpor-tance, and I reasoned that we might safely rely on the country fora considerable quantity of forage and provisions, and that, if theworst came to th e wort, w could live several months on theules and horses of our trins. Nevertheless, time was equallymaterial, and the moment I heard that General Slocum had fin-ished his pontoon-bridge at Sister's Ferry, and that Kilpatrick'scavalry was over the river, I gave the general orders to march,and instructed all the columns to aim for the South CarolinaRailroad to the west of Branchville, about Blackville and1idway.The right wing moved up the Salkiahatchie, the SeventeonthCorps on the right, with orders on reaching Rivers's Bridge tocross over, and the Fifteenth Corps by Hickory Hill to Bean-fort's Bridge. Kilpatrick was instructed to march byway ofBarnwell; Corse's division and the Twentieth Corps to takesuch roads as would bring thern into communication with theFifteenth Corps about Beaufort's Bridge. All these columnsstarted promptly on the 1st of February. We encounteredWheeler's cavalry, which had obstructed the road by fellng trees,but our men picked these up and threw them aside, so that thisobstruction hardly delayed us an hour. In person I accompaniedthe Fifteenth Corps (General Logan) by McPhersonville andHickory Hill, and kept couriers going to and fro to GeneradSlocum with instructions to hurry as much as possible, so as tomake a junction of the whole army on the South Carolina Rail-road about Blackville.ii i iii iiiiiiiiiiiii liiiiii !!!iliii~ ii~iili I iiiiiiii i 'i~ iiiii iilSi i..................iiliiiiiiiiiiiiii ii~ii iiii~iS iiiii ~ u iiiii ii!iiiiiiiii iiiiiiii~ i iiiiiii iiiii iiiiiii iiiiiiii i!iiiiiiiiiii 1i ii ii:iiiiiiiiiiiiili1i e iiiiii iil=i iiiiiiiiiiiiii~iii= iiliii ii
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185.] CAMPAIGN OF THE AOLINAS. 23I spent the night of February 1st at Hickory Hill Post-Office, and that of the 2d at Duck Branch Post-Office, thirty-one miles out from Poctaligo. On the 3d the SeventeenthCorps was opposite Rivers's Bridge, and the Fifteenth approachedeaufort's Bridge. The Salkiehathi was still over its banks,and presented a most formidable obstacle. The enemy ap-peared in some force on the opposite bank, had cut awayall the bridges whih spanned the many deep channels of theswollen river, and the only available passage seemed to be alongthe narrow causeways which constitut the common roads. At's Bridge Generals Mower and Giles A. Smith led theirheads of coumn through this swamp, the water up to theirshoulders, crossed over to the pine-land, turned upon the rebelbrigade which defended the passage, and routed it in utter dis-order. It was in this attack that General Wsger Swayne lostis leg, and he had to be conveyed back to Pocotaligo. Still,the loss of life was very small, in proportion -to the advantagesgained, for the enemy at once abandoned the whole line of theSleh hie, and the Fifteenth Corps passed over at Beaufort'sridge, without opposition.On the 5th of February I was at Beaufort's Bridge, bywhich time General A. S. Willams had got up with fivebrigades of the Twentieth Corps; I also heard of GeneralKilpatrick's being abreast of us, at Barnwell, and then gaveorders for the march straight for the ralroad at Midway. Istill remaine with the Fifteenth Corps, which, on the 6th ofFebruarywas five miles from Bamberg. As a matter of course,I expected severe resistance at this railroad, for its loss woulde communications of the enemy in Charleston withEarly on the 7th, in the midst of a rain-storm, we reachedthe railroad, almost unopposed, striking it at several points.General Howard told me a good story concerning this, whichwill bear repeating: 1He wa with the Seventeenth Corps,marching straight for Midway, and when about five milesdistant he began to deploy the leading division, so as to beready for battle. Sitting on his horse by the road-side, while
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274 'CAMPAIGN OF THE CAROLiNAS. [16,the deployment was making, he saw a man coming down theroad, riding as hard as e could, and as he approached he recog-nized him as one of his own "foragers," mounted on a whitehorse, with a rope bridle and a blanket for saddle. As he camenear he called out, Hurry up, general; we have got the rail-road !" So, while we, the generals, were proceeding deliberate-ly to prepare for a serious battle, a parcel of our foragersinsearch of plunder, had got ahead and actually captured the South Carolina Railroad, a line of vital importance to the rebelGovernment.As soon as we struck the railroad, details of men were set towork to tear up the rails, to burn the ties and twist the bars.This was a most important railroad, and I proposed to destroyit completely for fifty miles, partly to prevent a possibility of itsrestoration and partly to utilize the time necessary for GeneralSlocum to get up.The country thereabouts was very poor, but the inhabitantsmostly remained at home. Indeed, they knw ot where to go.The enemy's cavalry had retreated before us, but his infantrywas reported in some strength at rancille, on the fartherside of the Edisto; yet on the appearance of a mere squad ofour men they burned their own bridges-the very thing Iwanted, for we had no use for them, and they had.We all remained strung along this railroad till the 9th ofFebruary-the Seventeenth Corps on the right, then the Fif-teenth, Twentieth, and cavalry, at Blackville. General Slocumreached Blackville that day, with Geary's division of the Twen-ieth Corps, and reported the Fourteenth Corps (General Jeff.C. Davis's) to be following by way of iarnwell. On the 10th Irode up to Blackville, where I conferred with Generals S umand Kilpatrick, became satisfied that the whol army would beready within a day, and accordingly made orders for the nextmovement north to Columbia, the right wing to strike Orange-burg en route. Kilpatrick was ordered to demonstrate stronglytoward Aiken, to keep up the delusion that we might turn toAugusta; but he was notified that Columbia was the next ob-jective, and that he should cover the left flank against Wheeler,
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who hung around it. I wanted to reach Columbia before anypart of ood's army could possibly get there. Some of themwere reported as having reached Augusta, under the commandHavingsufentdamagedthe railroad, and effected thejunction of the entire army, the general marh was resumed onthe 11h, each corps crossing the South Edisto by separatebridges, with orders to pause on the road leading from Orange-burg to Augusta, till it was certain that the Seventeenth Corpsad got possession of Orangeburg. This place was simply in-portant as its occupation would sever the communications between Charleston and Columbia. All the heads of columnreached this road, known as the Edgefleld road, during the12th, and the Seventeenth Corps turned to the right, againstOrageburg. When I reahed the head of column oppositeOrangeburg, I found Giles A. Smith's division halted, with abattery unlimbred, exchaging shots with a party on the oppositeside of the Edisto. He reported that the bridge was gone, andthat the river was deep and impassable. I then directed Gen-eral Blair to send ower's division below the town, some fouror ive miles, to ffect a crossing there. He laid his pontoon-bridge, but the bottom on the other side was overflowed, and themen had to wade through it, in places as deep as their waists. I was with this division at the time, on foot, trying to pick myway aross the overflowed bottom; hut, as soon as the head ofcolumn reached the sand-hills, I knew that the enemy would notlong remain in Orangeburg, and accordingly returned to my ore, on the west bank, and rode rapidly up to where I had leftGiles A. Smith. I found him in possession of the brokenbridge, abreast of the town, which he was repairing, and I wasamong the first to cross over and enter the town. By and be-fore the time either owr's or Giles A. Smith's skirmishersentered the place, several stores were on fire, and I am surethat some of h towns-people told me that a Jew merchanthad set fire to his own cotton and store, and from this the firehead. This, owever, was soon put out, and the Seven-nh r ral i) occupied the place during that
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276 CAMPAIGN OF THE CAROLINAS. [1865,night. I remember to have visited a large hospital, on the hillnear the railroad depot, which was ocupied by the orphan childrenwho had been removed from the asylum in Charleston. Wegave them protection, and, I think, ome provisions. The rail-road and depot were destroyed by order, and no doubt a good dealof cotton was burned, for 'we all regarded cotton as hostileproperty, a thing to be destroyed. General lair wasordred tobreak up this railroad, forward to the point where it rossed theSantee, and then to turn for Columbia. On the morning of the13th I again joined the Fifteenth Corps, which e~ossed theNorth Edisto by Snilling's Bridge, and moved straight for Co-lumbia, around the head of Caw-Caw Swamp. Orders 'sent to all the columns to turn for Columbia, where it was sup-posed the enemy had concentrated all the men they uldfromCharleston, Augusta, and even from Virginia. That night Iwas with the Fifteenth Corps, twenty-one miles from Columbi,where my aide, Colonel Audenried, piked up a rebel oficer onthe road, wh, supposing him to be of the sae service withhimself, answered all his questions frankly, andtruth that there was nothing in Columbia except Hampton'scavalry. The fact was, that General Harde, in Charleston,took it for granted that we were after Charleston; the rebeltroops in Augusta supposed they were" our objective; so theyabandoned poor Columbia to the care of Hanpton's cavalry,which was confused by the rumors that poured in on it, so thatboth Beauregard and Wade Hampton, who were in Colbuia,seem to have lost their heads.On the 14th the head of the Fifteenth Corps, Charles I.Woods's division, approached the Little Congree, a broad, deepstream, tributary to the Main Congree, six or eight miles blow Columbia. On the opposite side of this stream was a nconstructed fort, and on our side a wide extent of old tton-fields, which had been overowed, ad was covered with a ideep slime. General Woods had deployed his leading brigade,which was skirmishing forward, but he reported that the bridgewas gone, and that a considerable force of the enemy was onthe other side. I directed General Howard or Logan to send
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1865.] CAMPAIGN OF THE CAROLINAS 277a brigade by a circuit to the left, to see if this stream could notbe crossed higher up, but at the same time knew that GeneralSlocum's rout would bring himi to Columbia behind this stream,and that his approach would uncover it. Therefore, there wasno need of exposing much life. The brigade, however, foundmeanstocrossthe Little ongaree, and thus uncovered the pas-sage by the main road, so that General Woods's kirishes atoncpassed over, and a party was set to work to repair the bridge,which occupied less than an hour, when I passed over withmy whol staf. I found the new fort unfinished and unoccu-edbut fro its parapet could see over some old fields boundedto the north and west by hills skirted with timber. There wasa plantation to our left, about half a mile, and on the edge of thetimber was drawn up a force of rebel cavalry of about a regi-ment, which advanced, and charged upon some of our foragers,who were plndering the plantation; my aide, Colonel Auden-ried, who ad ridden forward, came back somewhat hurt andbruised, for, observing this charge of cavalry, he had turned forus, and his horse fel with him in attempting to leap a ditch.General Woods's skirmish-line met this harge of eavalry, anddrove it back into the woods and beyond. We remained onthat ground during the night of the 15th, and I camped on thenearet dry ground behind the Little Congaree, where on thanext morningwere made the written orders for the governmentof the troops while occupying Columbia. These are dated Feb-ruy l6, 1865, in these words:General Howard will cross the Saliuda and Broad Rivers as near theirnths as possible, occupy Columbia, destroy the publie buildings, railroadproperty, manufacturing and machine shops; but will spare libraries, asy-lums, and private dwellings. le will then move to Winnsboro', destroyingrn route utterly that section of the railroad. 11e will also cause all bridges,trstles, watertanks, and depots on the railroad back to the Watere to beburned, switches broken, and such other destructionas he can fid time tocopsh consistent with proper celerity.These instrucions were embraced in General Order No. 26,whicp-r-scibed the routes of rarch for the several columns as
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278 CAMPAIGN OF THE CAROLINAS. [1865.far as Fayetteville, North Carolina, and is conclusive that I then regarded Columbia as simply one point on our general route ofmarch, and not as an important conquest.During the 16th of February the Fifteenth Corps reachedthe point opposite Columbia, and pushed on for the Saluda Fac-tory three miles above, crossed that stream, and the head ofcolumn reached Broad River just in time to find its bridge inflames, Butler's avalry having just passed over into Columbia.The head of Slocu's colum also reached the point opposite Columbia the same morning, but the bulk of his ary wasback at Lexington. I reached this place early in the morningf the 1th, met General locu there, and explained to himthe purport of General Order No. 26, which contemplated thepassage of his army ros road River at Alston, fteen miesabove Columbia. Riding down to the rive-bank, I saw thewreck of the large bridge which had been burned by the enemy,ith its any stone piers still standing, but the superstructuregone. Aross the Congaree River lay the city of Columbia,in plain, easy view. I could see the unfinished State-House,a handsome graite structure and the ruins of the railroaddepot, which were still smouldering. Ocesionly a few citi-zens or cavalry could be seen running across the streets, andquite a number of negroes were seemingly busy in carrying offbags of grain or meal, which were piled up near the burnedCaptain De Gres had a section of his twenty-pound Parrottguns unlimbered, firing into the town. I asked him what hewas firing for; he said he could see some rebel cavalry occasion-ally at the intersections of the streets, and he had an idea thatthere was a large force of infantry concealed on the oppositebank, lying low, in case we should attempt to cross over directlyinto the town. I instructed himnt to fire any more into thetown, but consented to his bursting a few shells near the depot, to scare away the negroes who were appropriating the bags ofcorn and meal which we wanted, also to fire three shots at theunoccupied State-House. I stood by and saw these fired, andthen all firing ceased. Although this matter of firing into Co-
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lumbia has been the subject of much abuse and investigation, IColumbia by our cannon. On the other hand, the night before,when Woods's division was in camp in the open fields at LittleCongaree, it was shelled all night by a rebel battery from theother side of the river. This provoked me much at the time,for it was wanton mischief, as Generals Beauregard and Hamp-ton must have been onvined that they could not preventour entrance into Columbia. I have always contended that Iwould have been justified in retaliating for this unnecessaryact of war, but did not, though I always characterized it as itdeserved.The night of the 16th I camped .near an old prison bivouacopposite Columbia, known to our prisoners of war as "CampSorghum," where remained the mud-hovels and holes in theground which our prisoners had made to shelter themselvesfrom the winter's cold and the summer's heat. The FifteenthCorps was then ahead, reaching to Broad River, about four miles above Columbia; the Seventeenth Corps was behind, on the riverbank opposite Columbia; and the left wing and cavalryhad turned north toward Alston.The next morning, viz., February 17th, I rode to the head ofGeneral Ioward's column, and found that during the night hehad ferried Stone's brigade of Woods's division of the FifteenthCorps across by rafts made of the pontoons, and that brigadewas then deployed on the opposite bank to cover the construe-tion of a pontoon-bridge nearly finished.I sat with General oward on a log, watching the men laythis bridge; and about 9 or 10 A. M. a messenger came fromColonel Stone on the other side, saying that the Mayor of Colum-come out of the city to surrender the place, and askingfor orders. Isimply remarked to General oward that he hadhis orders, to let Colonel Stone go on into the city, and thatwe would follow as soon as the bridge was ready. By this samemessenger I receied a note in pencil from the Lady Superioressof a convent or school in Columbia, in which she claimed tohave been a teacher in a convnt in Brown County, Ohio, at the4~l;,, ~;;;"I;a
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280 CAMP\IGN OF TTE CAROLINAS. [1861ic my daughter Minnie was a pupil there, and therefore ask-ing special protection. y recollection is, that I gave the noteto y brotherin-law, Colonel Ewing, then inspector-general onm staff, with instructions to see this lady, and assure her thatwe contemplated no destruction of any pivat property in ColJumbia at all.As soon as the bridge was done I ld my horse over it, followed by my whole staff. General Howard accompanied mewith his, and General Logan was next in order, followed byGeneral C. R Woods, and the whole of the Fifteenth Corps.Ascending the hill, we soon emerged into a broad road leadinginto Columbia, between old fields of corn and cotton, and, enter-ing the city, we found seemingly all its population, white andblack, in the streets. A high and boisterous wind was prevailing from the north, and flakes of Ecotton were flying about inthe air and lodging in the limbs of the trees, reminding us ofa Northern snow-storm. Near the market-square we foundt one's brigade halted, with arms stacked, and a large detail ofhis men, along with some citizens, engaged withanoldfir-engine,trying to put out the fire in a long pile of burning cotton-bales,which 'I was told bad been fired by the rebel cavalry on with-drawing from the city that morning. I know that, to avoidthis row of burning cotton-bales, I had to ride my lhors onthe sidewalk. In the market-square had collected an immensecrowd of whites and blacks, among whom was the mayor of thecity, Dr. Goodwin, quite a respectable old gentleman, who wasextremely anxious to protect the interests of the citizens. 1ewas on foot, and I on horseback, and it is probable I told himthen not to be uneasy, that we did not intend to stay long, andhad no purpose to injure the private citizens or priv-ate property.About this time I noticed several men trying to get throughthe crowd to speak with me, and called to some black peopleto make room for them; when they reached me, they explainedthat they were officers of our army, who had been prisoners, had escaped from the rebel prison and guard, and were of courseoverjoyed to find themselves safe with us. I told them that, assoon as things settled down, they should report to General How-s
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1866.] CAMPAIGN UF THE AROLINAS. 2S1ard, who would provide for their safety, and enable them totravel with us. One of them handed me a paper, asking me toread it at my leisure; I put it in my breast-pocket and rode on.General Howard was still with me, and, riding down the streetwhich led by the right to the Charleston depot, we found it anda large storehouse burned to the ground, but there were, on theplatform and ground near by, piles of cotton bags filled withcorn and corn-meal, partially burned.A detachment of Stone's brigade was guarding this, andseparating the good from the bad. We rode along the rail-road-track, some three or four hundred yards, to a large foundery,when some man rode up and said the rebel cavalry were closeby, and he warned us that we might get shot. We accordinglytuned back to the market-square, and on route noticed thatseveral of the men were evidently in liquor, when I called General Howard's attention to it. He left me and rode towardGeneral Woods's head of column, which was defiling throughthe town. On reaching the market-square, I again met Dr.Goodwin, and inquired where he proposed to quarter me,and he said that he had selected the house of Blanton Duncan,Esq., a citizen of Louisville, Kentucky, then a resident there,who had the contract.. for manufacturing the Confederate money,and had fled with Hanpton's cavalry. We all rode some six oreight squares back from the new State-House, and found a veryod modern house, completely furnished, with stabling and alarge yard, took it as our headquarters, and occupied it duringour stay. I considered General Howard as in command of theplace, and referred the many applicants for guards and protec-tion to him. efore our headquarter-wagns had got up, Istrolled through the streets of Columbia, found sentinels postedat the principal intersections, and generally good order prevail-ing, but did not again return to the main street, because it wasfilled with a crowd of citizens watching the soldiers marching by.During the afternoon of that day, February 17th, the wholeof the Fifteenth Corps passed through the town and out on theCamden and Winnsboro' toads. The Seventeenth Corps did notenter t t, t bu crossed directly over to the Winnsboro'
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282 CAMPAIGN OF THI CAROITAS.road from the pontoon-bridge at Broad River, which wasaranda received during the day, and found the paper whichbeen given me, as described, by one of our escaped prisonerproved to be the song of Sherran's March to the Sea," vIowa Infantiy, when a prisoner in the asylum at Columwhich bad been beautifully written off by a fellow-prisoiii d handed to me in person. Ths appeared to me sothat I at once sent for Byers, attached him to my staff, proville, North Carolina, whence he was sent to Washingtcbeareir of dispatches. He is now United States consul at ZuSwitzerland, where I have sineo been his guest. I insert thehere for convenient reference and preservation. Byers saidthere was an excellent glee-club among the prisoners in Cobia, who used to sing it well, with an audience often of rSITERIAN'S 1ARCH TO THE SEA.Composed by Adjutant B s, Fifth Ioa Infantry. Arranged and sung by theie in umbia liai iiiOur camp-fires shone bright on the mountain That frowned on the river below,As we stood by our guns in the morning,And eagerly watched for the foe;When a rider came out of the darknessThat hung over mountain and tree,And shouted, "oys, up and be ready!For Sherman will mar thThen sang we a song of our chieftaThat echoed over river and lea; And the stars of our banner shone brighterWhen Sherman marched down to the se!AE "X' iii iiii!ii i i 1riil iiliii ii=U ii i ii iiiliiiiiiliiiii iiiiiiiiililiiiiiii ; ri=!ii =ii= i i = i = i i =ii! =iiii i= !i !ii =ili = =; = ::::: :::::: : :::::::: ::::: :::: :: : : : : z=0 :.. ] i i iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii+ = .....::::::::::::::::::: .......................................................... = ...................... ............... = ,= "==iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiL i = =% A = = = TG == ==? = == iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii~ i~i~ iiii i~ i~ iiiiiii~i~ ii~ ii~ i iisi.iiiii ....... ............................ ......... .... .............. .@~~~ i~~lI;'l :
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00, "NA 3VUCAOGTt ]OG4JfIS
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i~~ 1~ '' 'II'~" ;''';~%'' :"1"' F""~"'''"'I;: "ii ; IE, _r 1; _r ,IiI '1s,~r: Il~i~~ll r rl r Iirri ,, .II:3"~I~I"x"Ii"i'i'""" El oi -"X~" r
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1865.1 CAMPAIGN UF THE UAROuINAS8II.Then cheer upon cheer for bold ShermanAnd the bugles reechoed the musicThen sang we a song, etc.III.Then forward, boys! forward to battle!We marched on our wearisome way,We stormed the wild hills of ResacaGod bless those who fell on that day IThen Kenesaw frowned in its glory,Frowned down on the flag of the free ;But the East and the West bore our standard,And Sherman marched on to the sea IThen sang we a song, etc.Iv.Still onward we pressed, till our bannersSwept out from Atlanta's grim walls,And the blood of the patriot dampened The soil where the traitor-flag falls;But we paused not to weep for the fallen,Who slept by each river and tree,Yet we twined them a wreath of the laurel,As Sherman marched down to the sea 1 Then sang we a song, etc.v.Oh, proud was our army that morning,That stood where pine darkly towers,When Sherman said, Boys, you are weary,S But to-day fair Savannah is ours! Then sang we the song of our chieftain,That echoed over river and lea,And the stars in our banner shone brighterWhen Sherman camped down by the seal
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284 CAMPAIGN OF THE CAROLINAS. [1865Toward evening of February 17th, the mayor, Dr. Good-win, came to my qurters at Duncan's house, and remarked thatthere was a lady in Columbia who professed to be specialfend of mine. On his giving her ame, I could not recall it,ut inquired as to her maiden or family name. He answeredPoyas. It so happened that, when I was a lieutenant at Fort Moultrie, in 184-'46, I used very often to visit a family of thatname on the east branch of Cooper River, about forty milesfrom Fort Moultrie, and to hunt with the son, Mr. James Poyas,an elegant young fellow and a fine sportsman. His fathermother, and sveral sisters, composed the family, and were ex-tremely hospitable. One of the ladies was very fond of paint-ing in water-colors, which was one of my weaknesses, and onone occasion I had presente her with a volume treating of water-colors. Of course, I was glad to renew the acquaintance, andproposed to Dr. Goodwin that we should walk to her house andvisit this lady, which we did. The house stood beyond theCharlotte depot, in a large lot, was of frame, with a highporch, which was reached by a set of steps outsid. Enterithis yard, I noticed ducks and chickens, and a general air oftime of universal desolation; the lady in question met us atthe head of the steps and invited us into a parlor which was per-fetly neat and well furnished. After inquiring aboutherfathermother, sisters, and especially her brother James, my specialfriend, I could not help saying that I was pleased to noticethat our men had not handled her house and premises as roughlyas was their wont. "I owe it to you, general," she answered."Not at all. I clid not know you were here till a few minutesago." S reiterated that she was indebted to me for the per-feet safety of her house and property, and added, "You remember, when you were at our house on Cooper River in 1845,you gave me a book; and she handed me the book in ques-tion, on the fly-leaf of which was written : To Miss -Poyas,with the compliments of W. T. Sherman, First-lieutenant ThirdArtillery." She then explained that, as our army apprachedColumbia, there was a doubt in her mind whether th errible
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r l l i F~ i++ + 8. /iji+ i+Sherman who was devastating the land were W. T. shermanuor T. W. Sherman, both known to be generals in the Northernarmy; but, on the supposition that he was her old acqaintance,when Wade Hapton's cavalry drew out of the city, callingout that the Yankees were coming, she armed hersef with thisbook, and awaited the crisis. Soon the ashouts about the market-house annoumeed that the Yankees had come; very soon menwere seen running up and down the streets; a parcel of thempoured over the fence, began to chase the chickens and ducks, and to enter her house. She observed one large man, with full beard, who exercised some authority, and to him she appealed in the name of "his general." What do you know of UncleBilly? Why," she said, when he was a young man he usedto be our friend in Charleston, and here is a g have meThe offier or soldier took the book, looked at the inscription,and, turning to his fellows, said : "Boys, that's so; that's UncleBilly's writing, for I have seen it often before." He at oncecommanded the party to stop pillaging, anC, left a man in"chargeof the house, to protect her until the regnla; provost-guard shouldbe established. I then asked her if the regular guard or son-tinel had been as good to her. She assured me that be was a very nic young man; that he had been telling her all about ifamily in Iowa; and that at that very nstant of time he was inanother room minding her baby. Now, this lady had good senseand tact, and had thus turned aside a party who, in five minutesmore, would have rifled her premise of all that was goo(d to eator wear. 1 made her a long socisi visit, and, beforo leavingColumbia, gave her a half-tierce of rice and about orie hundredpounds of ham from our own mess-stores.In like manner, that same evening I found in Mrs. Simonsanother acquaintance-the wife of the brother of 11o0. JamesSimons, of Charleston, who had been Mliss Wragg. When Colum-bia was on fire that night, and her house in Ganger, I had her family and effects carried to ry own headuarters, gave them my own room andbed, and, cn leaving (Alumbia the next day,supplied her with a half-barre1 of hams nd a half-tierce of rice.I mention these specific faets to show tA at, personally, I had nor+ / :i' :: :,
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malice or desire to destro that city or its inhabitants, as is gen-erally believed at the South.Having walked over muich of the suburs of Columbia in theafternoon, and being tired, I lay down on a bed in Blanton Duncan's house to rest. Soon after dark I became consciousthat a bright light was shining on the walls; and, calling someone of my stafl (Major Nichols, I think) to inquire the cause,hie said there seemed to be a house on fire down about the mar-ket-house. The same high wind still provated, and, fearing theconsequences, I bade him go in person to see if the provost-guard were doing its duty. He soon returned, and reported thatthe block of buildings directly opposite the burning cotton ofthat morning was on fire, and that it was spreading; but he hadfound General Woods on the ground, with plenty of men tryingto put the fire out, or, at least, to prevent its extension. Thefire continued to increase, and the whole heavens became urid.Logan, and Woods, ard received from them repeated assurancesthat all was being done that could be done, but that the highwind was spreading the flames beyond all controL These gen-prn1 officers were on the ground all night, and Hazen's divisionhad been brought into the city to assist Woods's division, alreadyth re. About eleven o'clock at night I went down-town -self, olonel Dayton with me; we walked to Mr. Sirons'shouse, from which I could see the flames rising high in the air,and cod hear the roaring of the flre. I advised the ladies tomove to my headquarters, had our own headquarter-wagonshitched up, and their effects carried there, as a place of greatersafety. The whole air was full of sparks and of fying masses of cotton, sbirles, etc., some of which were carried four or fveblecks, and started new fires. The men seemed generally undergood control, and certainly labored hard to girdle the fire, to pre-vent its spreading; but, so long as'he high wind prevailed, it wassimply beyond huma ossibility. Fortunately, about 3 or 4 A. M.,the wind moderated, aR t gradually thofre was got under control;but it had burnedout th vev heart of the city, embracing sev-eral churches, the old State-1ouse, and the school or asylum of] ] ...... ....................... ......................... ......... ....................... .... ...... .. ..... ...Iiiii d i il iAii~ !i @ i ii
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1865.] CAMPAIGN OF TI-HE CAROLINAS. S7that very Sister of Charity who had appealed for my personal protection. Nickerson's Hotel, in which several of my staff werequartered, was burned down, but the houses occupied by myself,Generals Howard and Logan, were not burned at all. Many ofthe people thought that this fire was deliberately planned andexecuted. This is not true. It was accidental, and in my judg-ment began with the cotton which General Hampton's men hadset fre to on leaving the city (wethe by his orders or not is notmaterial), which fre was partially subdued early in the day by our men; but, when night came, the high wind fanned it againinto full blaze, carried it against the frame-houses, which caughtlike tinder, and soon spread beyond our control.This whole subject has since been thoroughly and judiciallyinvestigated, in some cotton cases, by the mixed commission onAmerican and British claims, under the Treaty of Washington,which commission failed to award a verdict in favor of the English claimants, and thereby settled the fact that the destrue-tion of property in Columbia, during that night, did not resultfrom the aets of the General Government of the United States-that is to say, from my army. In my official report of this con-~ngration, I distinctly charged it to General Wade Hampton, andconfess I did so pointedy, to shake the faith of his people inhim, for he was in my opinion a braggart, and professed to bethe special champion of South Carolina.The morning sun )f February 18th rose bright and clear overa ruined ity. About half of it was in ashes and in smoulderingheaps. Many of the people were homuseless, and gathered in groupsin the suburbs, or in the open parks and spaces, around theirscantyples of'furniture. General Howard, in concert with themayor, did all that was possible to provide other houses forthem; and by my authority he turned over to the Sisters ofCharity the Methodist College, and to the mayor five hundredbeef-cattle to help feed the people; I also gave the mayor (Dr.Goodwin) one hundred muskets, with which to arm a guard tomaintain order after we should leave the neighborhood. Duringthe 18th and 19th we remained in Columbia, General Ioward'stroops engaged in tearing up and destroying the railroad, backi roiiiiiiig upI; ''~~
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ii owrd the W ree while a strong detail, under the immediatsupervision of Colonel O. M. Poe, United States Engineers,destroyed the State Arsenal, which was found to be well suppliedwith shot, shell, and ammunition. These were hauled in wagonstothe Saluda River, under the supervision of Colonel Baylor,chief of ordnance, and emptied into deep water, causing a veryserious accident by the bursting of a prussion-shell, as it struckanother on the margin of the water. The lame followed backa train of powder which had sifted out, reached the wagons,stillpartially loaded, and exploded them, killing sixteen men anddestroying several wagons and teams of mules. We also de-stroyed several valuable foundeies and the factory of Confderatemoney. The dies had been carried away, but about sixty hand-presses remained. There was also found an immense quantity .of money, in various stages of manufacture, which our menpent and gamled with in the most avish manner.Having utterly ruined Columbia, the right wing began itsmarch northward, toward Winusboro', on the 20th, whichwe reached on the 2lst, and found General Slocum, with theleft wing, who had come by the way of Alston. Thence theright wing was turned eastward, toward Cheraw, and Fayette-ville, North Carolina, to cross the Catawba River at Peay'sFerry. The cavalry was ordered to follow the railroad northas far as Chester, and then to turn east to Rocky Mount,the point indicated for the passage of the left wing. In per-son I reached Rocky Mount on the 22d, with the TwentiethCorps, which laid its pontoon-bridge and crossed over duringthe 23d. Kilpatrick arrived the next day, in the midst ofheavy rain, and was instructed to cross the Catawa at once, bynight, and to moe up to Lancaster, to make believe we werebound for Charlotte, to which point I heard that Beauregardhad directed all his detachments, including a corps of Hood'sold army, which had been marching parallel with us, but hadfailed to make junction with the forces immediately opposing us. Of course, I had no purpose of going to Charlott, for theright wing was already moving rapidly toward Fayettevle,North Carolina. The rain was so heavy and persistent that theiiiiiiliiiililiiiiiiiiii~iiliiiiiiiiiiii liiiiii !ili~ii i~i~ii i~iiiiii lii! !ilii ii!iiiiiiiiiiliii~iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii! iiii ~ ii~i iiilii~ iliii i liiii~ i~iiii i iili i ii
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1865. gAl.IG. O THEU CAROLI1NAlS. 2S9Catawba Rver rose fast, and soon after I had crossed thepontoon-bridge at Rocky Mount it was carried away, leavingGeneral Davis, with the Fourteenth Corps, on the west bank.The roads were infamous, so I halted the Twentieth Corps atHanging Rock for some days, to allow ti for the Fourteenthto get over.General Davis had infinite difulty in reconstructing hisbridge, and was compelled t use the fifth chains of hiswagonsfor anchor-chains, so thatwe were dlayed nearly a week in thatneighborhood. While in camp at Hanging Rock two prisonerswere brought to me-one a chaplain, the other a boy, son ofRichard Baeot, of Charleston, whom I had known as a cadet atWest Point. They were just from Charleston, and ad beensent away by General Hardee in advance, because he was, theysaid, evacuating Charleston. Rumors to the same effect hadreached me throgh the negroes, and it was, moreover, reportedthat Wilmington, North Carolina, was in possession of theYankee troops; so that I had every reason to be satisfied thatour march was fully reaping all the fruits we could possibly askfor. Charleston was, in fact, evacuated by General Hardee onthe 18th of February, and was taken possession of by a brigadeof General Foster's troops, commanded by General Schimmel-pfennig, the same day. Hardee had availed himself of his onlyremaining railroad, by Florence to Cheraw; had sent there muchof his ammunition and stores, and reached it with the effectivepart of the garrison in time to escape across the Fedee Riverbefore our arrival. Wilmington was captured by General Terryon tho 22d of February; but of this important event we onlyknew by the vague rumors which reached us through rebelGeneral Jef. C. Davis got across the Catawba during the27th; and the general march was resumed on Cheraw. Kilpat-rick remained near Lancaster, skirmishing with Wheeler's andHampton's cavalry, keeping up the delusion that we proposedto move on Charlotto and Salisbury, but with orders to watchthe progress of the Fourteenth Corps, and to act in concert withit, on its left rear. On the 1st of March I was at Finlay's
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Bridge across Lynch's Creek, the roads so bad that we had toordroy early every foot of the way; but I was in cmmuni-cation with all parts of the army, which had met no seriousopposition from the eemy. On thed of arh we enteredthe village of Chesterfield, skirmishing with Butler's cavalrywihich gave ground rapidly. There I received a messae fromGeneral Howard, who reported that he was already in Cherawwith the Seventeenth Corps, and that the Fifteenth was near ati wing in Cheraw. Early in the morning of the d of March Irode out of Chesterfield along with the Twentieth Corps, whichfilled the road, forded Thompson's Creek, an, at the top of thebill beyond, found a road branching off to the right, which cor-responded with the one on my map leading to Cheraw. See-ing a negro standing by the road-side, looking at the troopspassing, I inquired of him what road that was. "Him lead toCheraw, masterI" "Is it a good road, and how far?" "Avery good road, and eight or ten miles." Any guerrilas?"" Oh no, master, dey is gone two days ago; you could haveplayed cards on der coat-tails, dey was in Bich a 1urry Iwas on my Lexington horse, who was very handsome and restive,so I made signal to my staff to follow, as I proposed to gowithout escort. I turned my horse down the road, and the restof the staff followed. General Barry took up the questionsabout the road, and asked the same negro what he was doingthere. He answered, Dey say Massa Sherman will bealong soon!" "Why," said General Barry, that was GeneralSherman you were talking to." The poor negro, abmost ir theattitude of prayer, exclaimed: De great God just look at hishorse He ran up and trotted by my side for a mile or so,and gave me all the information ie possessed, but he seemed tcadmire the horse more than the rider.We reached Ciheraw in a couple of hours in a drizzlin rai
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, while waiting for owagonstocomeup,I staid with Gen.l Blair in a large house, the property of a blockade-runner,ose family remained. General Howard occupied anotherouse farther down-town. He had already ordered his pontoon-dge to be laid across t e edee, thre a larg, deep navigableh the enemy about two miles out. Cheraw was found to beu of stores which had been sent up from Charleston.prior toevacuation, and which could not be removed. I was satisfied,m inquiries, that General Iardee had with him only thearleston garrison, that the enemy had not divined our move-nts, and that consequently thy were still scattered fromarlotte around to Florence, then behind us. Having thusured the passage of he ede, I felt no uneasiness aboutfuture, because there remained no further great impedi-nt between us and Cape Fear River, which I felt assuredw by that time in possession of our friends. The day waswet that we all kept in-doors; and about noon Generalir invited us to take lunch with im. We passed downio the basement dining-room, where, the regular familyt was spread with an excellent meal; and during itsgrss I was asked to tke some wine, which stood upontable in venerable bottles. It was so very good that I in-red where it came from. General Blair simply asked, "Dolike it?" but I insisted upon knowing where he had gothe only replied by asking if I liked it, and wanted some.afterward sent to my bivouac a case containing a dozenttles of the finest madeira I ever tasted ; and I learnedat he had eptured, in Cheraw, the-wine of some of the oldstocratic families of Charleston, who had sent it up to Cherawr safety, and heard afterward that Blair had found aboutght wagon-10ads of this wine, which he distributed to the armyAfter finishing our lnch, as we passed out of the dining-om, General Blair asked me if I did not want some saddle-kets, or a rug for my tent, and, leading me into the hall toe under the stirwa ointed out a pile of carpets whicli
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had also been sent up fro Charleston for safety. After ourheadquarter-wagons got up, and our bivou was established in afield near by, I sent my orderly (Walter) over to Goneral Blair,and he came back staggering under a load of carpets, out ofwhich the officers and escort made excellent tent-rugs, saddlecloths, and blankets. There was an immense amount of storesin Cheraw, which were used or destroyed; among them twen-ty-four guns, two thousand muskets, and thirty-six hundredbarrels of gunpowder. By the carelessness of a solier, animmense pile of this powder was exploded, which shook thetown badly, and killed and maimed several of our men.We remained in or near Cheraw till the 6th of March, bywhich time the armyn was mostly across the ed River, and was prepared to resume the march on Fayetteville. In a housewhere General Hardee had been, I found a late New YorkTribune, of fully a month later date than any I had sn. Itcontained a mass of news of great interest to us, and one shortparagraph which I thought extremely mischievous. I think itwas an editorial, to the efect that at last the editor had thesatisfaction to inform his readers that General Sherman wouldnext be heard from about Goldsboro', because his supply-vesselsfrom Savannah were known to be rendezvousing at MoreheadCity. Now, I knew that General Hardee had read that samepaper, and that he would be perfectly able to draw his own inferences. Up to that moment I had endeavored so to feignto our left that we had completely misled our antagonists; butthis was no longer possible, and I concluded that we must beready for the concentration in our front of all the force subject to General Jos. Johnston's orders, for I was there also informedthat he had been restored to the full command of the Confede-rate forces in South and North Carolina.On the 6th of March I crossed the ede, and all the army marched for Fayettevile: the Seventeenth Corps kept well tothe right, to make room; the Fifteenth Corps marched by adirect road; the Fourteenth Corps also followed a direct roadfrom Sneedsboro', where it had crosed the edee; and theTwentieth Corps, which had come into Choraw for the conven-Inthi ~a
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ience of the pontoon-bridge, diverged to the left, so as to enterFayetteville next after the Fourteenth Corps, which was ap-pointed to lead into Fayettevill. ilpatrk hld his cavalry stilfarther to the left rear on the roads from Lancaster, by way ofWadesboro' and New Gilead, so as to cover our trains fromHarnpton's and Wheler's cavalry, who had first retreated towardtroops st be at Wilmington, I determined to send a messagethere; I called for my man, Corporal Pike, whom I had res-eued as before described, at Columbia, who was then travel-ing with our escort, and instructed him in disguise to work hisway to the Cape Fear River, secure a boat, and float down toWilmington to convey a letter, and to report our approach. Ialso called on General Howard for another volinteer, and hebrought me a very clever young sergeant, who is now a coni-missioned officer in the regular army. Each of these got offdluringthenight byseparate routes,bearing the following message,reduced to the same cipher we used in telegraphic messages:TTF.A UARTERS MrLTAR DvISIOV OF ]HE MISS1Se rx,IN TH FZELD, LAUREL HILL, d e, M k 8, 1865.Co anding fer, Winington, orth Carolina:We are marhing for Fayetteville, will be there Saturday, Sunday, andMonday, and will then march for Goldsaboro'.If possile, send a boat up Cape Fear River, and have word conveyedto General Scheld that I expect to meet hi about Goldsboro'. We areall well and have done finely The rains make our roads dificult, and maydelay us about Fayetteville, in which case I would like to have some bread,sugarandcoffee. We have abundance of all else. I expect to reach Goldsoro' by the 20th instant.W. T. Suxaxvis, iojor-General.On the 9th I was with the Fifteenth Corps, and towardevening reached a lttle church called Bthel, in the woods, inwhich we took refuge in a terrible storm of rain, which pouredall night, making the roads awful. Al the men were at workcorduroing the roads, using fence-rails and split saplings, andevery foot of the way had thus to be corduroyed to enable the
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artii llery and wagons to pass. On tIhe 1i. we mad some itleprogress; on the 11th I reached Fayetteville, and found thatGeneral Hardee, followed by Wade Hampton's cavalry, hadbarely escaped across Cape Fear River, burning the bridge whichI had hoped to save. On reaching Fayetteville I found Gen-eral Slocum already in possession with the Fourteenth Corps,and all the rest of the army was near at hand. A day or twobefore, General Kilpatrick, to our left rear, had divided his forceinto two parts, occupying roads bhind the Twentieth Corps,interposing between our infantry colunns and Wade Hampton'sScavalry. The latter, doubtless to make junction with General Hardee, in Fayetteville, broke across this line, capturedthe house in which General Kilpatrick and the brigade-com-inander, General Spencer, were, and for a time held possessionof the camp and artillery of the brigade. However, GeneralKilpatrick and most of his men escaped into a swamp with theirturn, scattered and drove them away, recovering most of hiscamp and artillery; but Hampton got off with Kilpatrick's pri-vate horses and a couple hundred prisoners, of which heboasted much in passing through Fayetteville.It was also reported that, in the morning after Hardee's armywas all across the bridge at Cape Fear River, Hampton, with asmall bodyguard, had remained in town, ready to retrit andburn the bridge as soon as our forces made their appearance.He was getting breakfast at the hotel when the alarm was given, when he and his escort took saddle, but son realized that thealarm came from a set of our foragers, who, as usal, wre ex-tremely bold and rash. On these he turned, scattered them,killing some and making others pisoners; among them GeneralHoward's favorite scout, Captain Duncan. Hampton then crossedthe bridge and burned it.I took up my quarters at the old United States Arsenal,which was in fine order, and had been much enlarged by theConfederate authorities, who never dreamed that an invadingarmy would reach it fromthewest; and I also found in Fayette-vile the widow and daughter of my first captain (Generali ii iiiiiiiliiiiiiiii !!'iii iiiiii iii
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Childs), of the Third Artillery, learned that her sin Fred hadbeen the ordnance-oficer in charge of the 4renal, and bad ofcourse fled with Hardee's army.During the 11th the whole army closed down upon Fayette-ville, and immediatepreparatnswereade to lay two pontoon-bridges, one near the burned ridge, and another about four milesSunday, arch 12th, was a day of Sabbath stillness in Fayette-ville. The people generally attended their churches, for theywere a very pious people, descended in a large measure from theold Scotch Covenanters, and our men too were resting from thetoils and labors of six weeks of as hard marching as ever fellto the lot of soldiers. Shortly after noon was heard in the dis-tance the shrill whistle of a steamboat, which came nearer andnearer, and soon a shout, long and continuous, was raised downby the river, which spread farther and farther, and we all feltthat it meant a messenger from home. The effect was electric,and no one can realize the feeling unless, like us, he has been forniontlis cut o from all communication with friends, and corlled to listen to the croakings and prognostications of openenemies. Ent in a very few minutes came up through the townto the arsenal on the plateau behind a group of officers, amongwhom was a large, florid seafaring man, naned Ainsworth,bearing a small mail-bag from General Terry, at Wilmington,having left at 2 P. t. the day before. Our couriers had gotthrough safe from Laurel Hill, and this was the prompt reply.As in the case of our former march from Atlanta, intenseanxiety had been felt for our safety, and General Terry hadbeen prompt to open communication. After a few minutesconference with Captain Ainsworth about the capacity of hisboatandthestate of facts along the river, I instrcted himto be ready to start back at 6 P. ., and ordered Cptain-yers to get ready to carry dispatches to Washington. I alsauthorized General Howard to send back by this opportunitysome of the fugitives who had traveled with his army all theway from Co bia, among whom were Mrs. Feater and hertwo beautif daughters.+R:+;;+/;+ +;+3+++++
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I immediately prepared letters for Secretary Stanton, Geierals Halleck nd rant, and General hofield, Foste Easton,and Beckwith, all of which have been published, but I includehere only those to the Secretary of War, and Generals Grantand Terry, as samples of the whole.Hon. E. M. STNTOaN, Secretary of War.DEA SI: know you will be pleased to hear that my ay has reachedthis point, and has opened communication with Wilmington. A tug-boatcame up this morning, and will start back at 6 P. Y.I have written a letter to General Grant, the substance of which he willdoubtess communicate, and it must sufice for e to tell you what knowwill give you pleasure-that I have done all that Iproposed, and the fruitsseem to me ample for the time employed. Charleston, Georgetown, and Wil-mington, are incidents, while the utter demolition of the railroad system ofSouth Carolina, and the utter destruction of the enemy's arsonals of Colur-hi, Cheraw, and Fayetteville, are the principals of the movement. Thesepoints were regarded as inaccessible to us, and now no place the Con-federacy is safe against the army of the West. Let Lee hold on to Rich-mond, and we will destroy his country; and then of whatuseis Richmondl1e must come out and fight us on open ground, and for that we must everbe ready. Let him stick behind his parapets, and he will perish.I remember well what you asked me, and think I am on the rightas full of coniden e iin itself and its leaders. It is utterly impossible forme to enumerafe what we have done, but I inclose a slip just handed me,which is but partial. At Columnbia and Cheraw we destroyed nearly all thegunpowder and cartridges which the Confederacy had in this part of thecountry. This arsenal is in fine order, and has been much enlarged. Icannot leave a detachment to hold it, therefore shall burn it, blow it upwith gunpowder, and then with rams knock down its wals. I take itI or granted the U nited States will never again trust North Corolina with anarsenal to appropriate at her pleasure.Hoping that good fortune may still attend my army, I renain yourservant, W. T. SHERMAN, .;ER OF-G rEArAnSn MILITAR DIVISION O TISSIN THE IELD, FAYEITEV1LLE, NORTH CAROLNA, arch 12 165.Lieutenant-General U. S.GRr, conmanding United States Army, CityPoint, Virgiha.DEAR GENERAL: We reached this place yesterday at noon; Iardee, as"i iiAiilil;l: lII .I'E;i I i~ i! lii ~iii i! ~!i iiii i ii iii ii~iiiiii~ i 1 111111111% 111 1 i ililii ~ i!iiili ii iiiiiii iiiilii
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usual, retreating across the Cape Fear, burning his bridges; but our pon-toons will be up to-day, and, with as little delay as possible, I wil be afterA tug has just come up from Wilmington, and before I get o from here,I hopo to get from Wilmington some shoes and stockings, sugar, coffee,and flour. We are abundantly supplied with all else, having in a measure The army is in spndid health, condition, and spirits, though we haead fol weather, and roads that would have stopped travel to almost anyother body of men I ever heard of.Our march was substantially what I designed-straight on Columbia,feigning on Branchville and Augusta. We destroyed, inpassing, the railroadfrom the Edisto nearly up to Aiken; again, from Orangeburg to the sCon-garee; again, from Columbia down to Kingsville on the Wateree, and uptoward Charlotte as far as the Chester lin; thence we turned east onCheraw and Fayetteville. At Columbia we destroyed immense arsenalsand raroad establishments, among which were forty-three cannon. AtCheraw we found also machinery and material of war sent from Charleston,among which were twenty-five guns and thirty-six hundred barrels ofpowder; and here we find about twenty guns and a magnificent UnitedWe cannot afford to leave detachments, and I shall therefore destroythis valuable arsenal, so the enemy shall not have its use; and the United States should never again confide such valuable property to a people whoI could leave here to-morrow, but want to clear my columns of the vast crowd of refugees and negroes that encumber us. Some I will senddown the river in boats, and the rest to Wilmington by land, under smallescort, as soon as we are across Cape Fear River.I hope you have not been uneasy about us, and that the fruits of thismarch will be appreciated. It had to be made not only to destroy the val-uable depots by the way, but for its incidents in the necessary fall of Charleston, Georgetown, and Wilmington. If I can now add Goldsboro' withouttoo much cost, I will be in a position to aid you materially in the springJos. Johnston may try to interpose between me here and Schofieldabout Newhern; but I think he will not try that, but concentrate his scat-tred armies at Rleigh, and I will go straight at him as soon as I get ourmen reclothed and our wagons reloaded.eep everybody busy, and let Stoneman push toward Greensboro' orCharlotte from Knoxville; even a feint in that quarter will be most im-The railroad from Charlotte to Danvill is all that is left to the enemy,
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and it will not do for me to go there, on accout of the red-elay hills which >are impassable to wheels in wet weather.I expect to make a junction with General Schofield in ten days.Yours truly, W. T. nmAr, ,ffjr-fGenera.HEADgrarTEs MiIurAY visioN o rnsH MISissIPrPIIN TE FIELD, FAr r EVILLE, INoRT CAROLINA, r 12, 1865.lajor-General TEnR, commanding United States Force& Wilmington,North Carolina.GENEaLt: I have just received your message by the tag which left Wil-mington at 2 P. a. yesterday, which arrived here without trouble. Thescout who brought me your cipher-message started back last night with myanswers, which are superseded by the fact of your opening the river.General Howard just reports that be has secured one of the enemy'ssteamboats below the city, General Slocum will try to secure two othersknown to be above, and we will load tem with refugees (white and black)who have clung to our skirts, impeded our movements, and consumed ourfood. We have swept the country well from Savannahtohere, and the men andanimals are in fine condition. Had it not been frthe foul weather, I wouldhave canght Hardee at Cheraw or here; but at Columbia, Cheraw, and,here, we hhve captured immense stores, and destroyed machinery, guns, am-munition, and property, of inestimable value to our enemy. At a1 pointshe has fled from us, "standing not on the order of his going."The people of South Carolina, instead of feeding Lee's army, will nowcall on Lee to feed them.I want yon tosendrue all the shoes, stockings, drawers, sugar, coffee, andflour, you can spare; finish the loads with oats or corn. Have the boats escorted, and let them run at night at any risk. We must not give timefor Jos. Johnston to concentrate at Goldsboro'. We cannot prevent his con-centrating at Raleigh, but he shall have no rest. I want General Schofieldto go on with his railroad from Newbern as far as he can, and you shoulddo the same from Wilmington. If we can get the roads to and secure Golds-boro' by April 10th, it will be soon enough; but every day now is worth amillion of dollars. I can whip Jos. Johnston provided he does not catchone of my corps in flank, and I will see that the arry marches hence toGoldsboro' in compact form.I must rid our army of from twenty to thirty thousan1 Useless mouths;as many to go down Cape Fear as possible, and the rest to go in vehiclesor on captured horses via Clinton to Wilmington.I thank yon for the energetic action that has marked your course, andshall be most happy to meet you. I am, truly your friend,W. T. SfHMAN, afazor-general,! N N
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.In quick succession I received other message s from GeneralpsTerry, of older date, and therefore superseded by that broughtby the tug Davidson, viz., by two navl oficers, who had comeup partly by canoes and partly by land; General Terry hadalso sent a cavalry regiment to search for us, under ColonelKerwinwhohad dipathed two oficers and fifty men, whoreached us at Fayetteville; so that, by March 12th, I was in fullcommunication with General Terry and the outside world. Still,I was anxious to reach Goldsboro', there to make junction withGeneral Schofield, so as to be ready for the next and last stageof the war. I then knew that my special antagonist, GeneralJos. Johnston, was back, with part of his old army; that bewould not e misled by feints and false reports, and wouldsomehow compel me to exercise more caution than Ihad hithertodone. I the over-estimated his force at thirty-seven thousandinfantry, suposed to be made up of S. .Lee's corps, fourthousd; Cheatham's, five thousand; Hoke's, eight thousand;Hardee's, ten thousand; and other detachments, ten thousand ;with Hampton's, Wheeler's, and Butler's cavalry, about eightthousand. Of these, only Hardee and the cavalry were imme-diately in our front, while the bulk of Johnston's army was sup-posed to be collecting at or near Raleigh. I was determined,however, to give him as little time for organization as possible,and accordingly crossed Cape Fear River, with all the army,during the 13th and 14th, leaving one division as a rear-guard,until the arsenal could be completely destroyed. This was de-liberately and eompletely leveled on the 14th, when fire wasapplied to the wreck. Little other damage was done at Fayette-On tho14th the tug Davidson again arrived from Wilning-ton, with General Dodge, quartermaster, on board, reportingthattherewas no clothing to be had at Wihnington; but hebrought up some sugar and coffee, which were most welcome,and some oats. 1e was followed by a couple of gunboats, undercommand of Captain Young, United States Navy, who reachedFayetteville after I had left, and undertook to patrol the riveras long as the stage of water woul permit ; and General Dodgae
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300 CAMPAIGN OF THE CAROLINAS. [86.also promised to use the eaptured steamboats for a like purpose.Meantime, also, I had sent orders to General Schofield, at Now-bern, and to General Terry, at Wilmington, to move with thei-effective forces straight for Goldsboro', where I expected tomeet them by the 20th of March.On the 15th of March the whole army was across CapeFear River, and at once began it march for Goldsboro' theSeventeenth Corps still on the right, theFifteenth next in order,then the Fourteenth and Twentieth on the extreme left; thecavalry acting in close concert with the left flank. With almosta certainty of being attacked on this flank, I had instructedGeneral Slocum to send his corps-trains under.strong escort by an interior road, holding four divisions ready for immediatebattle. General Howard was in like manner ordered to keephis trains well to his right, and to have four divisions unencumbered, about six miles ahead of General Slocum, within easysupport.In the mean time, I had dispatched by land to Wilming-ton a train of refugees who had followed the arimy all the wayfrom Columbia, South Carolina, under an escort of two hundredmen, commanded by Major John A. Winson (One Hundred andSixteenth Illinois Infantry), so that we were disncumbered,Fear River north, encountered pretty stubborn resistance byHardee's infantry, artillery, and cavalry, and the ground favoredour enemy; for the deep river, Cape Fear, was on his right, andNorth River on his left, forcing us to attack him square infront. I proposed to drive Hardee well beyond Averysboro',and then to turn to the right by Bentonsville for Goldsboro'.During the day it rained very hard, and I had taken refuge inan old cooper-sp, where a prisoner of war was brought to me(sent back from the skirmishline by General Kilpatrick), whoproved to be Colonel Albert Rhett, former cormander of FortSumter. He was a tall, slender, and handsome young man,
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1 65.] .CAMPAIGN UF TiE CAROL NA. 301dressed in the most approved rebel uniform, with high jack-boots beautifully stitched, and was dreadfully mortified tod himself a prisoner in our hands. General Frank BlairShappened to be with me at the moment, and we were muchamused at Rhett's outspoken disgust at having been capturedwithout a fight. He said he was a brigade commander, and thathis brigade that day was Hardee's rear-guard; that his connandwas composed mostly of the recent garrisons of the batteries ofCharleston Harbor, and had little experience in woodcraft; thathe was giving ground to us as fast as Harde's army to his rearmoved back, and during this operation he was with a single aidein the woods, and-was captured by two men of Kilpatrick's skir-ish-line that was following up his retrograde movemnent. Thesemen called on him to surrender, and ordered him, in languagemore forcible than polite, to turn and ride back. He first supposed these men to be of ampton's cavalry, and threatened toreport them to General Hampton for disrespectful language;but he was soon undeceived, and was conducted to Kilpatrick,who sent him back to General Slocum's guard.The rain was falling heavily, and, our wagons coming up, wewent into camp there, and had Rhett and General Blair to takesupper with us, and our conversation was full and quite interest-ing. In due time, however, Rhett was passed over by GeneralSlocun to his provost-guard, with orders to be treated with duerespect, and was furnished with a horse to ride.The next day (the th) the opposition continued stubborn,and near Averysboro' Hardee had taken up a strong position,before which General Slocum deployed Jackson's division (olthe Twentieth Corps), with part of Ward's. Kilpatrick was onhis right front. Coning up, I advised that a brigade shouldmake a wide circuit by the left, and, if possible, catch this linein flank. The movement was completely successful, the firstline of the enemy was swept away, and we captured the largerpart of Rhett's brigade, two hundred and seventeen men, in-cluding Captain Mabeth's battery of throe guns, and buriedThe poe nine(Wardsand Jacksons) pressed on, and
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foun d ain iofow hu he; but wegn iiaedlre a this Shile tserious loss, because every wounded man had to be carried inan ambulance. The rebel wounded (sixty-eight) were carried toa house near by, all surgical operations necessary were performedby our surgeons, and then these wounded men were left in careof an otficer and four men of the rebel prisoners, with a scantysupply of food, which was the best we could do for them. Jnperson I visited this house while the surgeons were at work,with arms and legs lying around loose, in the yard and onthe porch; and in a room on a bed lay a pale, handsome youngwere General Sherman. He then announced himself as CaptainMacbeth, whose battery had just ben captured; and said thathe remembered me when I used to visit his fathers house, inCharleston. I inquired about his family, and enabled him towrite a note to his mother, which was sent her afterward fromshoes or coat, ad his head bandaged by a handkerchief. He an-by Wade Harpton in Fayetteville, but had escaped; and, on@~l@~~ ri
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865] CAMPAIGN OF T1E CAROLINAS. 303et ot" of those fine boots, but restored them because nonef his own offiers had feet delicate enough to wear them. Ofourse, I know nothing ofthis personally, and have never seen hni by the cooper-shop; and suppose thatSis the editor who recently fought dul in Nw Orleans.From Averysboro' the left wing turned east, toward Golds-oro', the Fourteenth Corps leading. I remained with theising until the night of the 18th, when we were within twenty-even miles of Goldsboro' and five from Bentonsville; and,pposing that all danger was over, I crossed over to join How-rd's column, to the right, so as to be nearer to Generals Scho-eld and Terry, known to be approaching Goldsboro'. I over-ook General Howard at Falling-Creek Church and found isolun well drawn out, by reason of the bad roads. I hadeard some cannonading over t lums head of column,md supposed it to indicate about the same measure of opposi-tion Hardee's troops and Hampton's cavalry before experienced; but during the day a messenger overtook me, annotified that near entonsill General Slocum had run upagainst Johnston's whoe army. I sent back orders for him tofight defensively to save time, and that I would come up withreenforcements from the direction of Cox's Bridge, by the roadwhich we had reached near Falling-Creek Church. The countrywas very obscure, and the maps extremely defective. By this movement I hoped General Slocum would holdJohnston's army facing west, while I would come on his rearfrom the east. The Fifteenth Corps, less one division (1azen's),still well to the rear, was turned at once toward Bentonsville;Hazen's division was ordered to Slocum's flank, and orders werealso sent fr General Blair, with the Seventeenth Corps, to cometo the same destination. Meantime the sound of cannon camefrom the direction of Bentonsville.The night of the 19th caught us near Falling-Creek Church;but early the next morning the Fifteenth Corps, General C. R.Woods's division leading, closed down on Bentonsville, nearwhich it was brought up by encountering a line of fresh parapet,crossing the road and extending north, toward Mill Creek.Rs
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804 AMPGN OF THE CAROINAS. L8s.After deploying, Iordered General Howard to proceed witdue caution, using skirmishers alone, I he had made junctionwith General Slocum, n his left. These deploymentsoccupieall day, during which two divisions of the Seventeenth Corps.also got up. At that time General Jonton's army occupiedthe form of a Y, the angle reaching the road leading from Averys-boro' to Goldsboro', and the flanks resting on Mill Creek, hisline.s embracing the village of Bentonsville.General Slocum's wing faced one of these lines and GeneralHoward's the other; and, in the uncertainty of General John-ston's strength, I did not fel disposed to invite a general battle,for we had been out from Savannah since the latter part ofJanuary, and our wagon-trains contained bu little food. I hadalso received messages during the day from General Schofield,at Kinston, and General Terry, at Faison's Depot, approachingGoldsboro', both expecting to reach it by March 21st. Duringthe 20th we simply held our ground and started our trains backto Kinston for provisions, which would be needed in the eventof being forced to fight a general battle at Bentonsville. Thenext day (21st) it began to rain again, and we remained quiettill about noon, when General Alower, ever rash, broke throughthe rebel line on his extreme left flank, and was pushing straightfor lentonsville and the bridge across Mill Creek. I orderedhim back to connect with his own corps; and, lest the enemyshould concentrate on him, ordered the whole riebel line to beengaged with a strong skirmish-ire.I think I made a mistake there, and should rapidly havefollowed ower's lead wih thewhole of the right wing, whichwold have brought on a general battle, and it could not have resulted otherwise than succesflly to us, by reason of ourvastly superior numbers; but at the moment, for the reasonsgiven, I preferred to make junction with Gen s Terry andSchofield, before engaging Johnston's army, the strength ofwhich was uttrly unknon. The next day he gone, andhad retreated on Snithfield; and, the roads all being ear, ourary moved to Goldsboro'. The heaviest fghtingat Bentons-ville was on the first day, viz., the th, when Johnston's armyA' 0, }~i~
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1865.] CAMPAIGN OF THE CAOLINAS. 305struck the head of Slocur's columns, knocking back Carlin'sdivision; but as soon as General locu hadbrought up theiest of the Fourteenth Corps into line, and afterward the Twen-tieth on its left, he received and replsed all attacks, and heldhis ground as ordered, to await the coming back of the rightwing. His loss, as reported, was nine officers and one hundredand forty-five men killed, eight hundred and sixteen wounded,and two hundred and twenty-six missing. He reported havingburied of the rebel dead one hundred and sixty-seven, andcaptured throe hundred and thirty-eight prisoners.The loss of the right wing was two officers and thirty-fivemen killed, twelve officers and two hundred and eighty-ninemen wounded, and seventy missing. General Howard reportedthat he had buried one hundred of the rebel dead, and had cap-tured twelve hundred and eighty-seven prisoners.Our total loss, therefore, at Bentonsville was:Killed.. ...... .. 180......................................... .................... ____Total ........ .................... 23General Johnston, in his "Narrative" (p. 392), asserts thatcavalry, only amounted to fourteen thousand one hundred in-fantry and artillery; and (p. 393) states his losses as follows:DATE. ailod. Wto e. rDlg.fOn tbo 20th....On t 21t................ ........... Aggregate Lo...... ......................................... 24$Wide discrepancies exist in these figures: foinstance, G"l l~l
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306 CAMPAIGN OF THE CAROLINAS. [1865.eral Slocum accounts for three hundred and thirty-ight pris-oners captured, and General Howard for twelve hundred andeighty-seven, making sixteen hundred and twenty-five in a,to Johnston's six hundred and fifty-three-a difference of eighthundred and seventy-two. I have always accorded to GeneralJohnston due credit for boldness in his ttak on our exposedflank at Bentonsville, but I think he understates his strength, anddoubt whether at the time he had accurate returns from hismiscellaneous army, collected from Hoke, Bragg, Hardee, Lee,etc. After the first attack on Carlin's division, I doubt if thefighting was as desperate as described by him, p. 385, et se .Iwas close up with the Fifteenth Corps, on the 20th and 21st,considered the fighting as mere mishing, and know that myorders were to avoid a general battle, till we could be sure ofGoldsboro', and of opening up a new base of supply. Withthe knowledge now possessed of his small force, of course Icommitted an error in not overwhelming Johnston's army onthe 21st of March, 18. But I was content then to lt him go,and on the 22d of arch rodetoCox's Bridge, where I metGeneral Terry, with his two divisions of the Tenth Crp; andthe next day we rode into Goldsboro', where I found GeneralSchofield with the Twenty-third Corps, thus effecting a perfectjunction of all the armyat tat point, as originally contemplated.During the 23d and 24th the whole army was assembled atGoldsboro'; General Terry's two divisions encamped at Faison'sDepot to the south, and General Kilpatrick's cavalry at MountOlive Station, near him, and there we all rested, while I directedmy special attention to replenishing the army for the next andlast stage of the campaign. Colonel W. W. Wright had been soThus was concluded one of the longest and most importantmarches ever made by an organized anny in a civilized country.The distance from Savannah to Goldsboro' is four hundred and twenty-five miles, and the route traversed embraced five largonavigable rivers, viz., the Edisto, Broad, Catawa, Pedee, andCape Fear, at either of which a comnatively sma for well
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handled, should have ade the passage most difficult, if notimpossible. The country generally was in a state of nature,ith innumerable swamps, with simply mud roads, nearly everymile of which had to be cordroyed. In our route we had cap-tured Cohunbia, Cheraw, and Fayetteville, important cities anddepots of supplies, had compelled the evacuation of CharlestonCity and Harbor, had utterly broken up all the railroads of SouthCarolina, and had consumed a vast amount of food and forage,essential to the enemyfor the support of his own armies. We hadin mid-winter accomplihed the whole journey of four hundredand twenty-five miles in fifty days, averaging ten miles per day,allowingten lay-days, and had reached Goldsboro' with thearmy in superb order, and the trains almost as fresh as whenwe had started from Atlanta. hisIt was manifest to me that we could resume our march, andcome within the theatre of General Grant's field of operationsin all April, and that there was no mforce in existence that coulddelay our progress, unless General Lee should succeed in elud-ing General Grant at Petersburg, make junction with GeneralJohnston, and thus united meet me alone; and now that we1ad effected a junction with Generals Terry and Schofield, Ihad no fear even of that event. On reaching Goldsboro', Ilearned from General Schofield all the details of his operationsabout Wihnington and Newborn; also of the fight of the Twen-ty-third Corps about Kinston, with General Bragg. I alsofound Lieutenant Dunn, of General Grant's staff, awaiting me,with the general's letter of February 7th, covering instructionsto Generals Schofield and Thomas; and his letter of March16th, in answer to mine of the 12th, from Fayettevile.These are all given here to explain the full reasons for theevents of the war then in progress, with two or three lettersfrom myself, to f11 out the picture.iIEADQIIARTER AnwiE oT THE UNITED .. Fi; 1ajor-General W. T. SmnRMA, comnanding rilitary Division of the( GENERAL. Wihot mic expectation of it reaching you in time to be
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30S CAMPAIGN OF THE CAU LNAS. [185of any service, I have mailed to you copies of instructions to Schofield andThomas. I had informed Schofield by telegraph of the departure ofahone's division, south from the etersbug front. These troops marcheddown the Weldon road, and, as they apparently went without baggage, it isdoubtful whether they have not eturned. I was absent from here whenthey left. Just returned yesterday morning from Cape Fear River. I wentthere to determine where Schofield's corps had better go to operateWilmington and Goldsboro'. The instructions with this will inform you ofthe conclusion arrived at.Schofield was with me, and the plan of the movement against Wilming-ton fully determined before we started back; hence the absence of more detailed instructions to him. He will land one division at Smithville, andmove rapidly up the south side of the river, and secure the Wilmington &Charlotte Railroad, and with his pontoon train cross over to the islandsouth of the city, if he can. With the aid of the gunboats, there is nodoubt but this move will drive the enemy from their psition eight mileseast of the city, either back to their line or away altogether. There will bea large force on the north bank of Cape Fear River, ready to follow up andinvest the garrison, if they should go inside.The railroads of North Carolina are four feet eight and one-half inchesgauge. I have sent large parties of railroad-men there to build them up,and have ordered stock to run them. We have abundance f it idle fromthe non-use of the Virginia roads. I have taken every precaution to havesupplies ready for you wherever you may turn up. I did this before whenyou left Atlanta, and regret that they did not reach you promptly when youreached salt-water. ...Alexander Stephens, R. M. T. Hunter, and Judge Campbell, are now atmy headquarters, very desirous of going to Washington to see Mr. Lincoln,informally, on the subject of peace. The peace feeling within the rebellines is gaining ground rapidly. This, however, should not relax our ener-gies in the least, but should stimulate us to greater activity.I have received your very kind letters, in which you say you would de-cline, or are opposed to, promotion. No one would te more pleased atyour advancement than I, and if you should be placed in my position, andI put subordinate, it would not change our personal relations in the leastI would make the same exertions to support you that you have everto support me, and would do all in my power to make our cause win.Yours truly, U. S. GAr, Lieutenant-eeral.HEADQuARTERs ARRUES OF THE UNTED STATES,CITY OrwT, VIeGIniA, January 31, 165.tajor-General G. H. ToyAs, commanding Army of the Cumberland.GNERAL: With this I send you a letter from General Sherman. AtAc ~ a i ~nin ~~
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the time of writing it, General Sherman was not informed of the deple-tion of your command by my orders. It will be impossible at present foryou to move south as he contemplaited, with the force of infantry indicated.Gneral Slocum is advisd before this of the changes made, and that forthe winter you will be on the defensive. I think, however, an expeditionfrom East Tennessee, under General Stoneman might penetrate South Caro-in well down toward Columbia, destroying the railroad and militaryresources of the country, thus visiting a portion of the State which will notbe reached by Sherman's forces. He miht also be able to return to EastTennessee by way of Salisbury, orth Carlina, thus releasing some of ourprisoners of war in rebel hands.Of the praticabilty of doing this, General Stoneman will have to beto judge, making up his mind from information obtained while executingthe firt part of his instructions. Sherman's movements will attract theattention of all the force the enemy can collect, thus facilitating the execu-tion of this.Three thousand cavalry would be a sufficient force to take. This prob-ably can be raised in the old Department of the Ohio, without taking anynow under General Wilson. It would require, though, the reorganizationof the two regiments of Kentucky Cavalry, which Stoneman had in hisvery successfutl raid into Southwestern Virginia.It will benecessary, probably, for you to send, in addition to the forcenow in East Tennessee, a small division of infantry, to enable General Gil-lem to hold the upper end of Holston Valley, and the mountain-passes inrear of Stevenson.You may order such an expedition. To save time, I will send a copy ofthis to General Stoneman, so that he can begin his preparations withoutloss of time, and can commence his correspondence with you as to theseA this expedition goes to destroy and not to fight battles, but to avoidthem when practicable, particularly against any thing like equal forces, orwhere a great object is to be gained, it should go as light as possible.Stonman experence in raiding will teach him in this matter better thanhe can be directed.Let there be no delay in the preparations for this expedition, and keepme advised of its progress. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,(rr PoiuT, Vmoi_\-A, January 31, 1865U. T ue -Major-General J. M. SCnoIrnLD, coTmaning Army of th Ohio.SGENERAL: requeted y telegraph that, for present purposes,North Carolina be erected into a department, and that you be placed in4l ~~
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310, CAMPAIGN OF THE CAOL AS. L .command of it, subject to ajor-General Sherman's orders. Of course, youwill receive orders from me direct until such time as General Sherman getsn communicating distance of yon. This obviates the necessity ofSpublishing the order which I informed you would meet you at FortressMonroe. If the order referred to should not be published from the Adju-tant-Generals oflice, you will read these instructions as your authority toassume command of all the troops in orth Carolina, dating all oici com-munitions, "Headquarters Ary of the Ohio" Your headquarters willbe in the field, and with the portion of the army where you feel yourselfmost needed. In the first move you will go to Cape Fear River. Your movements are intended as cooperative with Sherman's movementthrouwen the States of South and orth arolina. The first pint to be obtained is to secure Wilmington. Goldsboro' will then be your objectivepoint, moving either from Wilmington or Newbern, or both, as you may deem best. Should you not be able to reach Goldsboro', you will advancenear to it as you can, building the road behind you. The enterprise under you has two objects: the first is, to give General Sherman material aid, ifneeded, in his march north; the second, to open a base of supplies for himon the line of his march. As soon, therefore as you can determine whichof the two points, Wilmington or Newbern, you can best use for throwingsupplies from to the interior, you will commence the accumulation oftwenty days' rations and forage for sixty thousand men and twenty thou-sand animals. You will get of these as many as you can house and pro-tect, to such point in the interior as you may be able to occupy.I believe General Innis N. Palmer has received some instructions directlyfrom General Sherman, on the subject of securing supplies for his army.You can learn what steps he has taken, and be governed in your requisitionsaccordingly. A supply of ordnance-stores will also be necessary.Make all your requisitions upon the chiefs of their respective depart-ments, in the field, with me at City Point. Communicate with me by everyopportunity, and, should you deem it necessary at any time, send a specialboat to Fortress Monroe, from which point you can comnunicate by tele-graph.The supplies referred to in these instructions are exclusive of those re-quired by your own command. The movements of the enemy may justify you, or even make it yourimperative duty, to cut loose from your base and strike for the interior, toaid Sherman. In such ease you will act on your own judgment, withoutwaiting for instructions. You will report, however, what you proposedoing. The details for carrying out these instructions are necessarily leftto you. I would urge, however, if I did not know that you are alreadyfully alive to the importance of it, prompt action. Sherman may be looke
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1865.] CAMPAIGN OF THE CAROLINAS 31for in the neighborhood of Goldsoro' any time from the 2d to the 28th ofFi ms ? yourtime very materially, .ferollg to is nt ist acured in the capture of Wilmington, it can beupliedffon. A~. large force of raibhpad-fn has already beenand other mechani will g to Fort Fisher in a day ortwo. )n this point I have informed you by telegraph.Very respectfully, your obedit ServatN, Lieutenant-General.EADQUART.. ARIEs OF T UITED STATES,GM .: Your interesting letter of the 12th inst. is just received. I have neve felt any unesiness for your safety, t I have felt great anxietyto know just how you were progressing. I knew, ou ght I dids that,with the magnificent army with you, you would come out safely somewhere.To secure certain success, I deemed the capture of Wi mington of thegasimportance. Btler came near losing that prize to us. But Terryand Shofeldv since retrieved his blunders, and I do not know but thefirst failure has been as vluable a success for the country as the capture ofFort Fisher. utler may not see it in that light.attenptingto get something done in the est, both to cooperate with youSto take advantage of the enemy's we ess there-to accomplish -stsfavorable to us. Knowing Thomas to be slow beyond excuse, I de-tleted his army to reenforce Canby, so that he might act from Mobile Bayon the interior. ith l I hae said, e had not moved at last advicesCanby was sending a cavalry force, of about seven thousand, from icks-Stoward elma. I ordered Thomas to send Wilson from Eastporttoid the ame point, and to get him off as soon after the 20th of Feb-ruay possible. He telegraphed me that he would be off by that date.e asot yet started, orhad not at last advices. I ordered him to sendfrom East Tennessee into Northwest South Carolina, to be thereo h my's cavalryfrom you, or would have succeeded in destroyingr lies, other material which you could not reach. At thatichmond papers were full of the accounts of your movements, andgave lyccounts of movements in West 1orth Carolina. I suppose d allthe as Stoneman. You may judge my surprise when I afterwardSStonma was still in Louisville, Kentucky, and that the troopslina were Kirk's forces In order that Stonean might getudlay, told Thomas that three thousand men would be uffi-4 ....
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312 CAMPAIGN OF THE CAROLINAS. [18 .cient for him to take. In the mean time I had direoted Sheridan to get hiscavalry ready, and, as soon as the snow in the mountains melted sufficiently,to start for Staunton, and go on and destroy the Virginia Central Railroadand anal. Time advanced, until he set the 28th of February for startingI informed Thomas, and directed him to change the course of Stonemantoward Lynchburg, to destroy the road in Virginia up as near to that plaeas possible. Not hearing from Thomas, I telegraphed to hin about tho12th, to know if Stoneman was yet off. He replied not, but that he(Thomas) would start that day for Knoxville, to get him off as soon as pos-sible.Sheridan has made his raid, and with splendid success, so far as heard.Iam looking for him at "White House" to-day. Since about the 20th oflast month the Richmond papers have been prohibited from publishingaccounts of army movements. We are left to our own reources, therefore, for information. You will see from the papers what Sheridan has doneif you do not, the officer who bears this will tell you all.Lee has depleted his army but very little rcetly and I learn of none going south. Some regiments may have been detached, but I think nodivision or brigade. The determination seems tobe to hold Richmond aslong as possible. I have a force sufficient to leave enouh to hold our lines(all that is necessary of them), and move out with plenty t whip his wholermy. But the roads are entirely impassable. Until they improve, I shallcontent myself with watching Lee, and be prepared to pitch intoattempts to evacuate the place. I may bring Sheridan over-think willand break up the Danville and Southside Railroads. These are the last avenues left to the enemy.Recruits have come in so rapidly at the West that Thomas has nowabout as much force as he had when he attaced Hood. I have stpped allwho, under previous orders, would go to him, except those from IlinoisFearing the possibility of the enemy falling back to Lynhburg, andafterward attempting to go into East Tennessee or Kentucky, Iave orderedThomas to move the Fourth Corps to Bull's Gap, and to fortify there, andto hold out to the Virginia line, if he can. He has accumulated a largeamount of supplies in Knoxville, and has been ordered not to destroyof the railroad west of the Virginia in e. I told him to get reay for acampaign toward Lynchburg, if it became necessary. He never can make one there or elsewhere; but the steps taken will prepare f any one elseto take his troops and come east or go toward e, whichever may benecessary. I do not believe either will.When I hear that you and Schofield are together, with your back uponthe coast, I shall feel that you are entirely afeagaint any hing the enemycan do. Lee may evacuate Richmond, but he cannot get there with forceenough to touch you. His army is nw demoralized and deserti very
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1865. CAMPAIGN OF THE CAROLINAS. 313fast, both to us and to their homes. A retrograde movement would costhim thousands of men, even if we did not follow.Five thousand men, belonging to the corps with you, are now on theirway to join you. If more reenforements are necessary, I will send them.My notion is that you should get Raligh as soon as possible, and hold therailroad from there back. This may take more force than you now have.From that point all North Carolina roads can be made useless to theenemy, without keeping up communications with the rear.Hoping to hear soon of your junction with the forces from Wilmingtonand Newern, I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.flEADQUARTERS MILITARY }vISION Cr rEE IS1SISs1T, IN THE FrELD,Cox's BmE, NEUS RivEs, NnTH CA LtA, iroh 2, 1865.Lieutenant-GeneralU. S. GRNT, Commander-in-Chif, City Point, Tirginia.GENERAL: I wrote you from Fayetteville, North Carolina, on Tuesday,the 14th instant, that I was all ready to start for Goldsboro', to which pointI had also ordered General Schofield, from Newbern, and General Terry,from Wilmington. I knew that General Jos. Johnston was supreme icommand against me, and that he would have time to concentrate a respect-able army to oppose the last stage of this march. Accordingly, GeneralSlocu was ordered to send his main supply-train, under escort of twodivisions, straight for Bentonsville, while he, with his other four divisions,disenumbered of all unnecessary wagons, should march toward Raleigh, by way of threat, as far as Averysboro'. General Howard, in like manner,sent his trains with the Seventeenth Corps, well to the right, and, with theSdivisions oftbhe Fifteenth Corps, took roads which would enable him to come promptly to the exposed left flank. We started on the 15th, butagain the rains set in, and theroads, already bad enough, became horrible.On Tuesday, the 15th, General Slocum found Hardees army fromCharleston, which had retreated before us from Cheraw, in position acrossthe narrow, swampy neck between Cape Fear and North Rivers, where theroad branches off to Goldsboro'. There a pretty severe fight occurred, inwhich General Slocum's troops carried handsomely the advanced line, heldby a outh Carolina brigae, commanded by a Colonel Butler. Its com-manderColonel Rhet, of Fort Sumter notoriety, with one of his staff, hadthe night before been captured, by Kilpatrik's scouts, from his very skirmish-line. The next morning Harde was found gone, and was pursuedthrough and byondAverysboro'. General lom buried one hundred andeight dead rebels, and captured and destryed three guns. Some eightywounded rebels were left in our hands, and, after dressing their wounds,we left them in a house, attended by a Confederate officer and four privates,detailed out of our prisoners and paroled for the purpose.
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314 CA1PAIGN OF THE CAROLINAS. [1865.We resumed the march toward Goldsboro'. I was with the left winguntil I supposed all danger had passed; but, when General Slocum's head of ceolumn was within four miles of Bentonsville, after skirmishing as usualwith cavalry, he became aware that there was infantry in his front. Hedeployed a couple of brigades, which, on advancing, sustained a partial re-(Morgan's and Carlin's) of Jeff. C. Davis's corps. The enemy attacked thosowith violence, but was repulsed. This was in the forenoon of Sunday, the19th. General Slocum brought forward the two divisions of the TwentithCorps, hastily disposed of them for defense, and General ilpatrik massedhis cavalry on the left.General Jos. Johnston had, the night before, marched his whole ary-Bragg, Cheatham, S. D. Lee, 1ardee, and all the troops he ad drawn fromevery quarter), determined, as he told his men, to crush one of or corps,and then defeat us in detail. He attacked General Scu in position from3 P. .on the 19th till dark; but was everywhere repulsed,and lost eav-ily. At the time, I was with the Fifteenth Crp, marching on a roadmore to the right; but, on hearing of General Sl 's danger, directedthat corps toward Cox's Bridge, in the night brought Blair's corps-over,and on the 20th marched rapidly on Johnston's fnk and rear. Westruck him about noon, forced him to assume the defensive, and to fortify.Yesterday we pushed him hard, and came very near crushing him, theright division of the Seventeenth Corps (Mower's) having broken in towithin a hundred yards of where Johnston himself was,at the bridge acrossMill Creek. Last night he retreated, leaving us in possession of the field,dead, and wounded. We have over two thousand prisoer frm his aairand the one at Averysboro', and I am satised that Johnston's army wroughly handled yesterday that we could march right on to aleigh; butwe have now been out six weeks, living prcariously upon the collectionsofour foragers, our men "dirty, ragged, and saucy," and we must rest andfix up a little. Our entire losses thus far (kiled, wounded, and prisowill be covered by twenty-five hundred, a great part of which are, asslight wounds. The enemy has lost more than doubles many, and whavein prisoners alone full two thousand.I limited the pursuit, this morning, to Mill Creek, and will fomarch the army to Goldsboro', there to rest, recothe, and get some rations.Our combinations were such that General Schofield ntered Goldsboro'from Newborn; General Terry got Cox'sr with pntos laid, anda brigade across Neuse River intrenched and wewhippedJs. Johnston-all on the same day.Aftr riding over the field of battle to-day, near Bentonsville, and akingthe necessary orders, IThave ridden down to this place (Co's Bridge) to seeGeneral Terry, and to-morrow shall ride into Goldsboro'.
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I propose to collect there my army propr; shall post General Terryabout Faison's Depot, and General Schofield about Kinaton, partly to protectthe road, but more to collect such food and forage as the country affords,until the railroads are repaired leading into Goldsboro'.I fear these have not been pushed with the vigor I had expected; but Iwill soon have them both going. I shall proceed at once to organize threearmies of twenty-fve thousand men each, and will try and be all ready tomarch to Raleigh or Weldon, as we may determine, by or before April 10th.I inclose you a copyof my ordersofto-day. I would lik to be morespecic, but have not the data. We have lost no general officers norany organization. General Slocum took three guns at Averysboro', andlost three others at the first dash on him at Bentonsville. We have all ourwagons and trains in good order.Yours truly, W. T. SR Majorg Genera.HEADQUARTERS M1LTARY D.E110 OF THIE ISSISSIPPI,TN THE FELD, GoLDSoao', NoRTH CAuoLisn, Zarch 3, 1.,Lieutenant-Gencral U. S. GRANT, commanding the Armies of the UnitedStates, City Point, Virginia.GENERAL:On reahing Goldsboro' this morning, I found Lieutenant Dunn awaiting me with your letter of March 16th and dispatch of the 17th.I wrote you fully from Co:'s Bridge yesterday, and since reaching Golds-oro' have learned that my letter was sent punctually to ewbern, whenceit will be dispatched to you.I am very lad to hear that General Sheridan did such good servicebetween Ricmond and Lynchburg, and hope he will keep the ball moving.I know that these raids and dashes disconcert our enemy and discourgeGeneral locu's two corps (Fourteenth and Twentieth) are now com-ing in. I will dispose of them north of Goldsboro', between the Weldonroad and Little River. General Howard to-day is marching south of theNeuseandto-morro will come in and occupy ground north of Goldsboro',extending from the Weldn Railroad to that leading to Kinston.I havordered all the provisional divisions, made up of troops belongingto the regular orps to be broken up, and the men to join their properegimentsandorganization; and have ordered eneral Schofield to guardthera adsbacktoNew rn and Wilmington, and to make up a movablecolumn equal to twenty-five thousand men, with which to take the field. His army willbe the contre, as on the Atlanta campaign. I do not think Iwant any more troops (other than absentees and recruits) to fill up the pres-ent regiments, and I can make up an army of eighty thousand men byApril th. I will post General Kilpatrick at Mount Olive Station on theWilminton ad and then alow the army some rest.
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310 CAMPAIGN OF TE CAR A. [1We have sent all our empty wagons, under escort, with the proper staff-officers, to bring up from Kinston clothing and provisions. As g aswe move we can gather food and forage; but, the moment we stop, troublebegins.I feel sadly disappointed that ur railoads are not done. I do not liketo say there has been any neglect until I make inquiries; but it does seen tome the repairs should have been made ere this, and th road properlysto cked. I can only hear of on locomotive (besides the four old ones) onthe Newborn road, and two damaged locomotives (found byGeneral Terry)on the Wilmington road. I left Generals Easton and Bekwith purposelyto make arrangements in anticipation of my arrival, and have heard fromneither, though I suppose them both to be at Morehead City.At all events, we have now made a junction of all the armies, and ifcan maintain them, will, in a short time, be in a position to mar againstRaleigh, Gaston, Weldon, or even Richmond, as you may determine.If I get the troops ll well plaed, and the supples working well, I mayrun up to see you for a day or two before diving again into the bowels ofthe country.I will make, in a very short time, accurat reports of our operations forthe past two months. Yours truly,HEiAQU Anus MIuARY DIVN so orM I,In THE FELD, GOLDSBORO', NETH CAROLINA, Jfarch 24, 1H5Liutenant-General U. S. GrrT City Point, Virginia.GENEiaL: I have kept Lieutenant Dunn over to-day that I might reportfurther. All the army is now in, save the cavalry (which I have postedat Mount Olive Station, south of the Neuse) and General Terry's command (which to-morrow will move from Cox's Ferry to Faison's Depot, also onthe Wilmington road). I send you a copy of my orders of this morningthe operation of which will, I think, soon complete our roads. Thb tle-graph is now done to Morehead City, and byit I larn that stores have beensent to Kinston in boats, and that our wagons are loading with rationsand clothing. By using the Neuse as high up as Kinston, hauling fromthere twenty-six miles, and by equipping the two roads to Morehead Cityand Wilmington, I feel certain we can not only feed and equip the army, butin a short time fil our wagons for another start. I feel certain, from thecharacter of the fighting, that we have got Johnston's army afraid of us.He himself acts with timidity and caution. His cavalry alone manifestsspirit, but limits its operations to our stragglers and foraging-parties. Mymarching columns of infantry do not pay the cavalry any attention, butwalk right through itI think I see pretty clearly how in one more move, we can checkmate
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186] CAMPAIGN O THE CAROLINS. 31Lee, forcing him to unite Johnston with him in the defense of Richmond, orto abandon the cae. feel certain, if he leaves Richmond, Virginia leavesthe Confederacy. I wil study my maps a little more before giving my posi-tive views. I want all possible information of te Roanoke as to naviga-bility, how far up, and with what draught.We find the country sandy, dry, with good roads, and more corn andforage than I d expected. The families remain, but I will gradually pushthem all out to Raleigh or Wilmington. We will need every house in thetown.Lieutenant Dunn can tell you of many things of which I need notwrite. Yours truly, W. T. SnEiRMAX, X(0TTGenera,HlEADQUARTERs MILITARY DivIsioN of THE iMssi1Pi,IN THE FIELD, GOLDSURO', NURTL1 CAROLINA, A r5 1b65. )ajor-General GEonR H. TnoMAS, commadi e g Department of the Cum-berland.DAn GENEAL: I can hardly help smiling when I contemplate my com-mand-it is decidedly mixed. I believe, but am not certain, that you arein my jurisdiction, but I certainly cannot help you in the way of orders ormen; nor do I think you need either. General Cruft has just arrived withhis provisional division, which will at once be broken up and the men sentto their proper regiments, as that of Meagher was on my arrival here.You may have some feeling about my asking that General Slocum shouldhave command of the two corps that properly belong to you, viz., the Four-teenth and Twentieth, but you can recall that he was but a corps com-mander, and could not legally make orders of discharge, transfer, etc.,which was imperativelynecessary. I therefre e asked that General Slocum should be assigned to command "an army in the field," called the Army of Georgia, composed of the Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps. The orderis not yet made by the President, though I have recognized it because bothGeneral Grant and the President have sanctioned it, and promised to havethe order made.My army is now here, pretty well clad and provided, divided into threepart, of two corps each-much as our old Atlanta army was.I expect to move on in a few days, and propose (if Lee remains in Rich-ond) to pass the Roanke, and open communication with the Chowanand Norfolk. This will bring me in direct communication with GeneralThis is an admirable point-countryopen, and the two railroads in goodorder back to Wilmington and Beaufort. We have already brought upstores enough to fllour wagons, and only await some few articles, and thearrival of some men who are marching up from the coast, to be off.General Grant explained to me his orders to you, which, of course, areall right. You can mak reports direct to Washington or to General Grant,2 Blii8:
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but keep me advised occasionally of the general state of affairs, that I mayknow what is happening. I must give my undivided attention to mattershere. You will hear from a thousand sources pretty fair accounts of ournext march. Yours truly, W T. jr-Genera[LEEaR FROm ADmiAL x.)AHLORENSoUrn-ATrra o esA Ofajor-General W. T. SmAN, commanding Armies f the Tennes,Georgia and Mississippi.]1Y DEAR GENERAL: I was much gratified by a sight of your 1and-writing, which has just reached me from Gldboro'; it was very suggestiveof a past to me, when these regions were the scene of your operations.As you progressed through South arolin, thee was no manifestationof weakness or of an intention to abandon harleston, until within a fewhours of the fact. On the 11th of February I was at Stono,andaspiriteddemonstration was made by General Schi pfennig and the vessels.drove the rebels from their rifle-pits in front of the lines, extending fromFort Pringle, and pushed them vigorously. The next day I was at Bul'sBay, with a dozen steamers, among them the finest of the squadron. Gen-eral Potter had twelve to ffteen hundred men, the object being to carry outyour views. We made as muchfuss as possible, and with better successthan I anticipated, for it seems that the rebs conceived Stono to be a feint,and the real object at Bull's Bay, spposing from the number of steamersand boats, that we had several thousand mn. Now came an aide fromGeneral Gillmore, at Port Royal, with your ciphr-dispatch from Midway,so I steamed down to Port Royal to see him. Next day was spent in vainefforts to decipher-finally it was accomplished. You thought that thestate of the roads might force you to turn upon Charleston; so I went thereon the 15th, but there was no sign yet of nching. Then I went to Bull'sBay next day (16th), and found that the troops were not yet ashore, owingto the difficulties of shoal water. One of the gunboats had contrived toup to within shelling range, and both soldiers and sailors were workinghard. On the evening of the 16th I steamed down to Stono to see howmatters were going there. Passing Charleston, I noticed two largwell inside-probably preparing to leave.On the 1th,in Ston,rumorswere flying about loose of evacuation. In course of the morning, GeneralShimmelpfennig telegraphed me, from Morris Island, that there were symp-tomns of leaving; that he would again make a push at Stone, and asked formonitors. G neral Sebimmelpfennig came down in the afternoon, and we metin the Folly Branch, near Secessionville. He was sure that the rebs wouldbe off that night, so he was to assault them in fron whle amonitorud gun-
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1865.] CAMPAIGN OF THE CAROLINAS. 319boats stung their flanks both sides. I also sent an aide to order my batteryof five eleven-inch guns, at Coumming's Point, to fire steadily all nightonSullivan's Island, and two montors to close up to the island for the sameobject. Net morning (18t) the rascals were found to be of, and we brokein from all directions, by land and water. The main bodies had left at eightor nine in the evening, leaving detachments to keep up a fire from the bat-teries. I steamed round quickly, and soon got into the city, threading thestreets with a large group of naval captains who had joined me. All wassilent as the grave. No one to be seen but a few firemen.No one can question the excellence of your judgment in taking the trackyou did, and I never had any misgivings, but it was natural to desire to gointo the place with a strong hand, for, if any one spot in the land was fore-most in th trouble, it was Charleston.Your campaign was the final blow, grand in conception, complete inexecutin; and now it is yours to secure the last army which rebeldompossesses. I hear of your being in motion by the 9th, and hope that theresult may be all that you wish.Tidings of the murder of the President have just come, and shockedevery mind. Can it he that such a resort finds root in any stratum of American opinion? Evidently it has not been the act of one man, nor of amadman. Who have prompted him ?I am grateful for your remembrance of my boy; the thought of him is ver nearest to my heart. Generous, brave, and noble, as I ever knew himto be, that e should close his young life so early, even under the acceptedconditions of a soldier's life, as a son of the Union, would have been griefsuicient for me to bear; but that his precious remains should have been sotreated by the brutes into whose hands they fell, adds even to the bitter-ness of death. I am now awaiting the hour when I can pay my last dutiesto his memory.J. A. D_ YInxauS.With my bestind sincer wishes, my dear nS[General Order No. 50.]happinVes Iamero, MmIrtr 27, 1865.Ordered-1. That at the hour of noon, on the 14th day of April, 1865,Brevet Major-General Anderson will raise and plant upon the ruins of Fortmter, in harleston Harbor, the saine Uited States flag which floatedver the battlements of that fort during the rebel assault, and which waslowered and saluted by him and the small force of his command when theworks were evacuated on the 14th day of April, 1861.2. That the flag, whn raised, be saluted by one hundred guns from
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that fired upon Fort Sumter, .3. That suitable ceremonies be bad upon the occasion, under the direc-tion of iujor-General William T. Sherman, whose military operations co-pelled the rebels to evacuate Charleton, or, in hi absence, under theclarge of Maior-General Q. A. Gillmore, commanding the depatment.Among the ceremonies will be the delivery of a public address by theRev. Henry Ward Beecher.4. That the naval forces at Charleston, and their commander on thatstation, be invited to participate in the ceremonies of the occasion. By order of the President of the United States,EDWI M. SurroN, Secretary of War.[Genea Order No. 41.]Friday next, the 14th inst, will be theforth anniversary of the cap-ture of Fort Sumter by the rebels. A befitting celebration on that day,in honor of its reoccupation by the national forces, has been ordered by thePresident, in pursuance of which Brevet Major-General Robert Anderson,United States Army, will restore to its original place on the fort the iden-tical flang which, after an honorable and gallant defense, he was compelledto lower to the insurgents in South Carolina, in April, 1861.The ceremonies for the occasion will commence with prayer, at thirtyminutes past eleven o'clock A. M.At noon precisely, the flag will be raised and saluted with one hundredguns from Fort Sumter, and with a national salute from Fort Moultrie andBattery Bee on Sullivan's Island, Fort Putnam on Morris Island, and FortJohnson on James's Island ; it being eminently appropriate that the placeswhich were so conspicuous in the inauguration of the rebellion should takea part not less prominent in this national rejoicing over the restoration ofthe national authority.After the salutes, the Rev. Henry Ward Becher will deliver an adThe ceremonies will close with prayer and a benediction.Colonel Stewart L. Woodford, chief of itaff under such verbal instructions as he may receive, is hereby charged with the details of the celebra-tion, comprising all the arrangements that it may be necessary to make forthe accommodation of the orator of the day, nd the comfort nd safety ofthe invited guests from the army and navy, and from civil life.By command of XMjor-General Q. A. Gilmore,W L. I. Bunor Asitant Adiutant-General
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Copy of Major ANrmsoN's Dispatch, announcing the Surrender of FortSTE Mmr L BAna S ANy %,AprilS, 1861, 10.3. A. Y.--ea NEil Yom8. )Honorable S. CAEN, Secretary of Tar, 1wahington:Having defended Fort Sumt for thrty-four hours, until the quarterswere entirely burned, the main gates destroyed by fire, the gorge-wallsseriously injured, the magazin surrounded by flames, and its door closedfrom the effect of eat, four barrels and three cartridges of powder onlybeing available, and no provisions remaining but pork, I accepted termsof evacuation offered by General Beauregard, being the same offered byhim on the 11th inst., prior to the commencement of hostilities, andmarched out of tbhe fort, Sunday afternoon, the 14th inst., with colors flyingand drums beating, bringing away company and private property, andsaluting my g with fifty guns.RoBrER ANDnsOE, Xajor First Artillery, commanding.471' ;: ~"~ ef B
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CHAPTER XXIII.END OF THE WAR.-FROM GOLDSBORO' TO RALIGSH AND WASHAPRIL i AD MAY, 8Ii5.As before described the armies commanded respectively byGenerals J. M. Schofield, A. H. Terry, and myself, effected ajunction in and about Goldsboro', North Carolina, during the22d and tad of March, 1865, but it required a few days for allthe troops and trains of wagons to reach their respective camps.In person I reached Goldsboro' on the 23d, and met GeneralSchofield, who described fully his operations in orth Carolinaup to that date; and I also found Lieutenant Dunn, aide-d-camp to General Grant, witha letter from hi of March th,giving a general description of the state of facts about CityPoint. The next day I received another letter, more full, datedthe 22d, which I give herewith.Nevertheless, I deemed it of great importance that I shouldhave a personal interview with the general, and determined togo in person to City Point as soon as the repairs of the railroad,then in progress under the personal direction of Colonel W. W.Wright, would permit:HRADQuARTRs ARes or THE UNrrvD STATES,Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the lis-ENERAL: Although the Richmond papers do not communicate the factyet I saw enough in them to satisfy me that you occupied Goldsboro' on the19th inst. I congratulate you and the army on what may be regarded as+++ ++"
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Ism] END IU i WR. 323the successful termination of the third campaign since leaving the TennesseeSince Sheridan's very successful raid north of the James, the enemy areleft dependent on the Southside and Danville roads for all their supplies.Thes I hope to cut nextweek. Sheridan is at "White House," shoeing upand resting his cavalry. I expect him to finish by Friday night and to startthe following morning, via Long Bridge, Newmarket, Bermuda Hundred,and the extrem left of the army around Petersburg. He will make no halt with the armies operating here, but will be joined by a division of cav-alry, five thousand five hundred strong, from the Army of the Potomac, andwill proceed directlyto the Southside and Danville roads. His instructionswill be to strike the Southside road as near Petersburg as he can, and de-stroy it so that it cannot be repaired for three or four days, and push on tothe Danville road, as near to the Appomattox as he can get. Then I wanthim to destroy the road toward Burkesville as far as he can; then push onto the Southside road, west of Burkesville, and destroy it effectually. Fromtht point I shall probably leave it to his discretion either to return to thisarmy, crossing the Danville road south of Burkesville, or go and join you,passing between Danville and Greensboro'. When this movement com-mences I shal move out byi my left, with all the force I can, holding presentintrenhed lines. I shall start with no distinct view, further than holdingLee's forces from following Sheridan. But I shall be along myself, and willtake advantage of any thing that turns up. If Lee detaches, I will attackor if he comes out of his lines I will endeavor to repulse him, and follow itup to the best advantage.It is most dificult to understand what the rebels intend to do; so farbut fw troops have been detached from Lee's army. Much machinery hasbeen removed, and material has been sent to Lynchburg, showing a dispo-sition to go thee. Points, too, havebeen fortified on the anville road.Lee' army is muc demoralized and great numbers are deserting.Probablyfrom returned prisoners, and such conscripts as can be picked up,his number may be kept up. I estimate his force now at about sixty-fivethousand men.Wilson started on Monday, with twelve thousand cavalry, from Eastport. Stonman started on the same day, from East Tennessee, towardLynchburg.Thomasismovig the Fourth Corps to Bull's Gap. Canby ismoving with a formidable force on Mobile and the interior of Alabama.I ordered Gilmore, as soon as the fll of harleston was known, to oldl important posts on the sea-coast, and to send to Wilmington all surplusforces. Thoas was also directed to forward to ewbern all troops be-longingtothecorpswith you. I understand this will oabout fivethousand men, beides those brought east by eagher.tel ing ener Meigs to hasten up locomotives and.
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824 END OF THE WAR. [1805.cars for you. General McCallum, he inform me, is attending to it. I fearthey are not going forward as fsas I would lik.Let me know if you want more troops, or any thing else.Very respectfully, your obedient servant,U. S: GRANT, Lieutenant-Gencral.The railroad was repaired to Goldsboro' by the evening ofMarch 25th, when, leaving General Schofield in chief command,with a couple of staff-officers I started for City Point, Virginia,on a locomotive, in company with Colonel Wright, the construct-ing engineer. We reached Kewbern that evening, which waspassed in the company of General Phnr and his accomplishedlady, and early the net morning we ontinued on to oreheadCity, where General Easton had provided for us the smallcaptured steamer Russia, Captain Smith. We put to s atonce and steamed up the coast, reahig FortressMonroeonthemorning of the 27th, where I landed and telgraphed to mybrother, Senator Sherman, at Washington, inviting him to codown and return with me to Goldsboro'. We proceeded on upnoon. I found General Grant, with his family and staff, occu-pying a pretty group of huts on the bank of James River, over-looking the harbor, which was full of vessels of all classes, bothwar and merchant, with wharves and warehouses on an exten-sive scale. The general received me most heartily, and wetalked over matters very fully. After I had been with himan hour or so, h remarked that the President, Mr. Lincoln,was then on board the steamer River Queen, lying at thewharf, and he proposed that we should call and see him. Wewalked down to the wharf, went on board, and found r. Lin-coln alone, in the after-cabin. H remembered me perfectly,and at once engaged in a most interesting conversation. He wasfull of curiosity about the many incidents of our great march,which had reached him officially and through the newspapers,and seemed to enjoy very much the more ludicrous parts-aboutthe bummers," and their devices to collet food and forage whenthe outside world supposed us to be starvin; but at the same
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1865.] EN TE; WAR. 325tine he expressed a good deal of anxiety lest some accidentmight happen to the army in North Carolina during my ab-sence. I explained to him that that army was snug and corn-some days to collect forage and food for another march; andthat General Sofield was fully competent to command it iny absence. Having made a good, long, social vsit, we tookour leave and returned to General Grant's quarters, where Mrs.ad provided tea. While at the table, Mrs. Grant inquired if we had seen rs. Lincoln. "No," said the general,I did not ask for her;" and I added that I did not even knowthat she was on board. Ms. Grant then exclaimed, Wel, youare a pretty pair and added that ourg net wa unpardon-able; when the general said we would eal again the next day,and ake amends for the unintended slight.Early the net day, March 28th, all the principal o h icers ofthe aryand navy called to see me, Generals eade, Ord, In-galls, etc., and Admiral Porter. At this time the River Queenwas at anchor out in the river, abreast of the wharf, and weagain started to visit Mr. and Mrs. Lincoln. Admiral Porteraccompanied us. We took a small tug at the wharf, whichconveyed us on board, where we were again received mostcourteously by the President, who conducted us to the after-cabin. After the general compliments, General Grant inquiredafter Mrs. Lincoln, when the President went to her state-room,returned, and begged us to excuse her, as she was not well.We then again entered upon a general conversation, duringwhich General Grant explained to the President that at thatvery instant of time General Sheridan was crossing James Riverfrom the north, bya pontoon-bridge below City Point; that he hadlarge, well-appointed force of avary, with which he proposedto strike the Southside and Danvll Railroads, by which aloneGeneral Lee, in Richmond, supplied his army; and that, in hisjudgmentatters were drawing to a crisis, his only apprehension being that Generl Le would not wait long enough. I alsoexplained that my army at Goldsboro' was strong enough toght Lee's army and Jonston's combined, provided that Gen-i....i:nl > '+
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eral Grant could come up within a day or so; that if L wouldonly remain in Richmond another fortnight, I could arch upto Burkesville, when Lee would have to starve inside of hislines, or come out fromn his intrenments and fight us on equalonce, that there had been blood enough shed, and asked uanother battle could not be avoided. I remember well to havesaid that we could not control that event; that this necessarilyrested with our enemy; and I inferred that both Jeff. Davis andGeneral Lee would be forced to fight one more desperate andbloody battle. I rather supposed it would fall onme, omewenear Raleigh; and General Grant added that, if Lee wouldonly wait a few more days, he would have his army so dis-posed that if the enemy should abandon Richmond, and attemptto make junction with General Jos. Johnston in North Carolina,he (General Grant) would be on his heels. Mr.Lincolnmorethan once expressed uneasiness that I was not with my army atGoldsboro, when I again assured him that General Schofield wasfuy ompetent to command in my abence; that I was goingto start back that very day, and that Admiral Porter had kiudlyprovided for me the steamer Bat, which he said was muchswifter than my own vessel, the Russia. During this interviewI inquired of the President if he was all ready for the end ofthe war. What was to be done with the rebel armies when de-feated? And what should be done with the political leaders, such as Jeff. Davis, etc.? Should we allow them to escape, etc.?le said he was all ready; all e wanted of uswas to defeatthe opposing armies, and to get the coposing the Con-federate armies back to their homes, at work on their farms and in their shops. As to Jeff. Davis, he was hardly at libertyto speak his mind fully, but intimated that he ought to clearout, "escape the country," only it would not d for him to sayso openly. As usual, he illustrated his meaning by a story:"A man once had taken the total-abstinence pledge. When visit
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165.] END OF THE W AR3a friend, he was invited to take a drink, but delined, on there of*his pledge; when his friend suggested lemonade,hich was accepted. In preparing the lemonade, the friendointed to the brandy-bottle, and said the lemonade would bealatable if he were to pour in a little brandy; when hisres if he could do so unbeknown' to him, he wouldobjt." From which illhstration I inferred that Ir. Lin-0oln wanted Davis to escape, unbeknown to him.I made no notes of this conversation at the time, but Admi-al Porter, who was present, did, and in 186 he furnished men account thereof, which I insert below,but the admiral de-cribes the first visit, of the 27 th, whereas my memory puts Ad-iral Porter's presence on the following day. Still he may bec1ieflv from memory. There were two distinct interviews; thefirst was late in the afternoon of March 27th, and the other aboutnoon of the 2;th, both in the after-cabin of the steam er RiverQueen; on both occasions \r. Lincoln was full and frank inis onveration assuring me that in his n was all readyrth civil reorganization of affairs at the South as soon as thewar was over; and he distinctly authorized me to assure Gov-ernor Vance and the people of North Carolina that, as soon as therbel armies laid down their arms, and resumed their civil pur-suits, thy would at once be guaranteed all their rights as citizensof a common country; and that to avoid anarchy the State gov-ernents then in existence, with their civil functionaries, wouldbe recognized by him as the government de facto till Congresscould provide others.I know, when I left him, that I was more than ever im-pressed by his kindly nature, his deep and earnest sympathywith the affietions of the whole people, resulting from the war,and by the march of hostle armies through the South; and thathis earnest desire seemed to be to end the war speedily, with-out more bloodshed or devastation, and to restore all the menof both sections to their homes. In the language of his secondinaugural address, he seemed to have charity for all, malicoe, and, above li, an absolute faith in the courage,
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manines, and integrity of the armies in the field. When at reor listening, his legs and arms seemed to ang almost lifelessand his face was care-worn and haggard but, the moment hebegan to talk, his face lightened up, his all form, as it wereunfolded, and he was the very impersonation of good-humoand fellowship. The lat wors I rell as addressed towere that he would feel better when I was back at GodsboroSWe parted at the gangway of the River Queen, about noon oMarch 28th, and I never saw him again. Of ll he men I ever et, he seemed to possess more of the eleents of greatnesscombined with goodness, than any other.ADMIRAL PORTER'S ACCOUNT OF THE INTERVIEW WITHMR. LINCOLN.The day of General Sherman's arrial at City Point thinkthe2t ofMarch, 1865), I accompanied hie and General Grant on board the Presi-dent's flag-ship, the Queen, where the President received us in the upper saloon, no one but ourselves being present.The President was in an exceedingly pleasant mood, and delighted tomeet General Sherman, whonm he cordially greeted.It seems that this was the first time he had met Sherman, to rememberhim, since the beginning of the war, and did not remember when he hadseen him before, until the general reminded him of the circumstances oftheir first meeting.This was rather singular on the part of Mr. Lincoln, who was, I think,remarkable for remembering people, having that kingly quality in an eni-nent degree. Indeed, such was the power of his memory, that he seemednever to forget the most minute circumstance.The conversation soon turned on the events of Sherman's campaignthrough the South, with every movement of which the President seemedfamiliar.He laughed over some of the stories Sherman told of his "bummers,"and told others in return, which illustrated in a striking manner the ideashe wanted to convey. For example, he would often express his wishes bytelling an apt story, which was quite a habit with him, and one that I thinkhe adopted to prevent his committing himself seriously. The interview between the two generals and the President lasted aboutan hour and a half, and, as it was a remarkable one, I jotted down what Iremembered of the conversation, as I have made a practice of doing duringthe rebellion, when any thing interesting occurred.
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1805] END OF THE WAR. 329I don't regret having done so, as circuntances afterward occurred(Statons ill-conduct toward Sherman) which tended to cast odiun onGeneral Sherman for allowing such liberal terms to os. Johnston.Could the conversation that ocurrd on board the Queen, betweenthe President and General Sherman, have been known, Sherman wouldnot, and could not, have been censured. Mr. Lincoln, had he lived, wouldhave acquitted the general of any blame, for he was only carrying out the My opinion is, that Mr. Lincoln came down to City Point with the most xliberal views toward the rebels. e felt confident that we would be suc-ssful, and was willing that the enemy should capitulate on the most favor-I don't know what the President would have done had he been left tohimself, and had our army been unsuccessful, but he was then wrought upto a high stat of excitement. THe wanted peace on almost any terms, andthere is no knowing what proposals he might have been willing to listen to.His heart was tenderness throughout, and, as long as the rebels laid downtheir arms, he daid not care how it was done. I do not know how far hewas influenced by General Grant, but I presume, from their long conferencesthat they must have understood each other perfectly, and that the termsgiven to Lee after his surrender were authorized by Mr. Lincoln. I knowthat the latter was delighted when he heard that they had been given, andexclaimed, a dozen times, Good! "All right! "Exactly the thing !and ther similr expressions. Indeed, the President more than once toldme whathe supposed the terms would be: if Lee and Johnston surrendered,he considered the war ended, and that all the other rebel forceswould laydown their arms at once.In this he proved to be right. Grant and Sherman were both of thesame opinion, and so was every one else who knew any thing about theWhat signified t terns to them, so long as we obtained the actual sur-render of people who only wanted a good a ood opportunity to give up gracefullyb ad fought "to the last ditch," and all that they had left themwas the hope of being handed down in history as having received honorableAfter hearing General Sheran's account of his own position, and thatof Johnston, at that time, the President expressed fears that the rebel gen-eral would escape south again by the railroads, and that General Shermanwouldhavtochase him anew, over the same ground; but the general pro-nonced this to be impracticable. He remarked: "I have him whee he cannotmove without breaking up his ary, which, once disbanded, cannever again be got together; and I have destroyed the Southern railroads,so that they cannt be used again for a ong time." General Grant re-a;i; ~i8c;l~~l 8 ,: I
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330 END OF THE WAR. [1865,marke, "What s to pevent their laying t rals again?" "Why," saidGeneral Sherman, "my 'bummers' don't do things by halves.. Every railafter having been placed over a hot fire, has been twisted as crooked as aram's-horn, and they never can be used again."This was the only remark made by General Grant during the interview,as he sat smoking a short distance from the President, intent, no doubt, onhis own plans, which were being brought to a successful termination.The conversation between the President and General Sherman, aboutthe terms of surrender to be allowed Jos. Johnston, continued. Shermanenergetically insisted that he could command his own terms, and thatJohnston would have to yield to his demands; but the President was verydecided about the matter, and insisted that the surrender of Johnston's armymust be obtained on any terms.General Grant was evidently of the same way of thinking, for, althoughhe did not join in the conversation to any xtent, yet hmadenoojctions,and I presume had made up his mind to allow the best terms hiself.Hle was also anxious that Johuston should not be driven into Richmond,to reenforce the rebels there, who, from behind their strong intrenchments,would have given us incalculable trouble.Sherman, as a subordinate officer, yielded his views to those of thePresident, and the terms of capitulation between iself and Johnstonwere exactly in accordance with Mr. Lincoln's wishes. Il could not havedone any thing which would have pleased the President better.Afr. Lincoln did, in fact, arrange the (so considered) liberal terms offeredGeneral Jos. Johnston, and, whatever may have been General Sheran'sprivate views, I feel sure that he yielded to the wishes of the President inevery respect. It was Mr. Lincoln's policy that was carried out, and, hadhe lived long enough, he would have been but too glad to have acknowledged it. HIlad Mr. Lincoln lived, Secretary Stanton would have issued nofalseo telegraphic dispatches, in the hope of kiling off another general inthe regular army, one who by his success had placed himself in the way ofhis own succession.The disbanding of Jos. Johnston's army was so complete, that the pensand ink used in the discussion of the matter were all wasted.It was asserted, by the rabid ones, that eneral Sherman ad given upall that we had been fighting for, had conced very thing to Jos. Johnston,and had, as the boys say, "knocked the fat into the fire; sober rletion soon overruled these harsh expressions, and, with ose whoGeneral Sherman, and appreciated him, e was still the great soldierpa-triot, and gentleman. In future times this matter will bloked at morecalmly and dispassionately. The bitter animsities that have been engen-dered during the rebellion will have died out for want of food on whichto live, and the very course Grant, Sherman, and other pursued, in grant~~~~~ A~dd ,f~l~5 ~ ~~ ~
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ing liberal terms to the defeated rebIes, will be applauded. The fact is,they met an old beggar in the road, whose crutches had broken from un-der him: the let him have only the broken crutches to get home with!I sent General Sherman back to Newbern, North Carolina, in theWhile he was absent fro his command he was losing no time, for hewas getting his army fully equipped with stores and clothing; and, whene returned, he had a rested and regenerated army, ready to swallow upJos. Johnston and all his ragamuffins.J was cornered, could not move without leaving every thingbehind im, and could not go to Richmond without bringing on a faminein that destitute city.I was with Dfr. Lincoln all the time he was at City Point, and until heleft for Washington. He was more than delighted with the surrender ofLeeand ith the terms rant gave the rebel general; and wuld havegiven Js. Johnston twice as much, had the latter asked for it, and could hehave been certain that the rebel would have surrendered without a fight.I again repeat that, had Mr. Lincoln lived, he would have shouldered allthe responsibility.One thing is certain: had Jos. Johnston escaped and got into Richmond,and caused a larger list of killed and wounded than we had, General Sher-man would have been blamed. Then why not give him the full credit ofcapturing on the best terms the enemy's last important army and its bestgeneral and putting an end to the rebellion ?It was a jue worthy of Sherman's great march through the swampsand deserts of the South, aarch not excelled by any thing we read of in(Written by the admiral in 1866, at the United States NavalAcademy at Annapolis, Md., and mailed to General Sherman atAs soon as possible, I arranged with General Grant forcertain changes in the organization of my army; and the gon-ral o undertook to send to North Carolina some tug-boatsand barges to carry stores from ewern up as far as Kinston,whence they could e hauled in wagons to our camps, thus re-living our railroads to that extent. I undertook to be readyto march north by April 10th, and then embarked on thesteamer Bt, Captain arnes, for North Carolina. We steameddown Jaes River, and at O Point Comfort took on board
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332 END OF THE WAR. [1865.my brother, Senator Sherman, and Mr. Edwin Stanton, son ofthe Secretary of War, and proceeded at once to our destination.On our way down the river, Captain Barnes expressed himselfextremely obliged to me for taking his vessel, as it had relievedhim of a most painful dilemma. He explained that he had beendetailed by Admiral Porter to escort the President's unarnedboat, the River Queen, in which capacity it became his specialduty to look after Mrs. Lincoln. The day before my arrival atCity Point, there had been a grand review of a part of the Armyof the James, then commanded by General Ord. The Presidentrode out from City Point with General Grant on horseback, accompanied by a numerous stff including Cptain arnes andMrs. Ord; but Mrs. Lincoln and Mrs. Grant had followed in acarriage.The cavalcade reached the review-ground some five or sixmiles out from City Point, found the troops all ready, drawn upin line, and after the usual presentation of arms, the Presidentand party, followed by Mrs. Ord and Captain arnes on horse-back, rode the lines, and returned to the reviewing stand, whichmeantime had been reached by Mrs. Lincoln and Mrs. Grant intheir carriage, which had been delayed by the driver taking awrong road. Mrs. Lincoln, seeing Mrs.Ord and Captain Barnesriding with the retinue, and supposing that Mrs. Ord had per-sonated her, turned on Captain Barnes and gave him a fearful scolding; and even indulged in some pretty sharp upbraidingsto Mrs. Ord.This made Barnes's position very unpleasant, so that he feltmuch relieved when he was sent with me to North Carolina.The Bat was very fast, and on the morning of the 29th wewere near Cape Hatteras; Captain Barnes, noticing a propellercoming out of Hatteras Inlet, made her turn back and pilotus in. We entered safely, steamed up Pamlico Sound intoNese River, and the next morning, by reason of ome derange-ment of machinery, we anchored about seven miles belowNewbern, whence we went up in Captain Barnes's barge. Assoon as we arrived at Newbern, I telegraphed p to GeneralSchofield at Goldsmoro' the fact of my return, and that I had
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the reorganization of the army and for the boats necessary tocarry up the provisions and stores we needed, prior to the re-newal of our march northward.These changes amounted to constituting the left wing a dis-tinct army, under the title of "the Army of Georgia," underconnand of General Slocum, with his two corps commandedby General J C. Davis and General Joseph A. Mower; theTnth and Twenty-third Corps already constituted another army," of the Ohio," under the command of Major-General Schofield,and his two corps were commanded by Generals J. D. Cox andA. H. Terry. These changes were necessary, because army com-the whole army for what seemed am g the probabilities of thetimeto fight both Lee's and Johnston's armies combined, incase their junction could be formed before General Grant couldpossibly follow Lee to North Carolina.General George I. Thomas, who still remained at Nashville,was not pleased with these changes, for the two corps withGeneral Slocum, viz., the Fourteenth and Twentieth, up to thattime, had remained technically a part of his "Army of the Cn-erand;" but he was so far away, that I had to act to the bestadvantage with the troops and general officers actually present.I had specially asked for General Mower to command theTwentieth Corps, because I regarded him as one of the boldestand best fighting generals in the whole army. His predecessor,General A. S. Williams, the senior division commander present,had commanded the corps well from Atlant to Goldsboro', andit may.have smed unjust to replace him at that precisemoment; but I was resolved to be prepared for a most desperateand, as then expected, a final battle, should it fall on me.I returned to Goldsboro' from Newbern by rail the eveningof March th, and at once addressed myself to the task of re-organization and replenishment of stores, so as to be ready tomarch by Anril 10th. the day agreed on with General Grant.
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The army was divided into the usual three part, right andleft wings, and centre. The tabular statements herewith willgive the exact composition of these separate armies which by the 10th of April gave the following effective strength :RIGHT WING-ARMY OF TUE TENZESSEE-GENERAL O. O. HOWARD.COMM NDS. Infty. Cavaly. Artillery.Fifteenth Corps............ 15,24423431 67Seventeenth Corp..... 1"i O211,6Aggregate............. 2. 117 53 66 23 1LEFT WUIG-ARMY OF GEORGIA-GENERAL H. W. SLOCUM.COMM \ ps Tafnrtry. Cavalry. ArtiMrey. Tow 1Fourteenth Crps......... 14645 Twentieth Corps........... 12 411Aggregpte ............ 27,124 ... ..... 939 23,06CENRE-ARMY OF THE OHIO-GENERAL J. M. SCHOFIELD. COM AINS. Inahtry. Canby. Arllery. Tol.n 372 1 12,099Tenth Corps ........ .44 .... .Twenty-thirdCorpo ,0000_0 ........ _293 14,2 __Aggregatate. .6CAVALRY DIVIIO-BRGADIER-GENERL J. ILPATRICK.at~r. C-ry .Artlery. Total. Aggregate .. .......... 5 -44 175 8,59Totals.Infantry .. .. .Artillery.. "" "" 2 T45,5 STCavlr .Aggregt n .of,948Total aiiober of gons, 91.
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18656.] END UF THE WARF. 30ARMY OF TlHE TENNESSEE.MAJOR-GENERAL O.O HOWARD COMMANDING.fifteenth Ary Corps-Major-General Jous A. LOGAN commanding.Brevet Alijor-Gneral C. R. Woons.First Brigad Second Brigade. Thir Brigade.Bret Brig.-Gen W. B. Woods. Colonel t. F. Catterson. Colonel G. A. Stone.27th Missouri Infantry. 40th Illinois Infantry. 4th Iowa Infantry.12thndiana Infantry 46th Ohio Infantry. 9th Iowa Infantry.76th Ohio Infantry. 103d Illinois Infantry. 25th Iowa Infantry.26th waInfantry. 6th Iowa Infantry 0th Iowa Infantry.31st Missouri Infantry. 97th Indiana Infantry. 31st Iowa Infantr.2d Missouri Infantry. 26th Illinois Infantry.100th Indiana Infantry.SECOND DIVISION.Major-General WLLIAM B. HAZEN.First Brigade. Second Brigade. Third Brigade.Colonel T. Jones. Colonel W. S3. Jones. Brgadtier-Generl J. M. Olvel.th Missouri Infantry. 87th Ohio Infantry, 1th Michigan Infantry56th Illinois Infantry. 47th Ohio Infantry. 70th Ohio Infantry.116th Illinois Infantry. Ohio Infantry. 48th Illinois Infantry.7th Illinois Infantry 4th Ohio Infantry. 90th Illinois Infantry.th Ohio Infantry. 83d Indiana Infantry. 99th Indiana Infantry.7th Ohio Infantry. 111th Illinois Infantry.HI DiVISION.Bretd Major-General J. E. SMITH.Firt Brigade. Second Brigade.Brigadier-General W. T. Clark. Colonel J. E. Tourteiotte18th Wisconsin Infantry. 6th Ilinois Infantry.th Indiana Infantry, 10th Iowa Infantry.3d Illinois Infantry. 80th Ohio Infantry.48.h Indiana Infantry, 17th Iowa Infantry.3d Illinois Infantry. Battalion 26th Missouri Infantry.Battalion 10th Missouri Infantry.4th Minnesota Infantry.FOURTH DIVISION.Briodier-General E. W. RiceFirstr .Second Brigade. Thir Brigade. Colonel N. Howard. ColoneR. N. Adms. Colonel F. J. Hurlbut.2d Iowa Infantry. 12th Illinois Infantry. 7th Illinois Infantry.7th Iowa Infantry. 6th Illinois Infantry. 39th Iowa Infantry.6th Indiana Infatry. 81st Ohio Infantry. 50th Illinois Infantry.d Illinois Innt7th Illinois Infantry110th U. S. Col'd Inf,
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DETACUMENTS.Artlilery Brigade.Lieutenant-Colonel WILLIAM I Ross.II, 1st Illinois Artillery. I, 1st Missouri Artillery.12th Wisconsin Battery. B, lst Michigan Artillery.29th Xlssouri Infantry.Signal Detachment.Srenteanth Arm Corps-ajor-Gneral F. P. BLAIR conmmanding.FIRST DIVISIO.Brigadier-Genera l. F. FORnE.First Brigade. Second Brgae. Third rigade.Brig.-Geral J. W. Fuler. Brig.-Gener l J. W. Sprague. Liet-Colonel J. S. Wright18th Missouri Infantry 25th Wisconsin Infantry. 10th IllinoisInf27th Ohio Infantry. 5th New Jersey Infantry. 2th Indana In try.39th Ohio Infantry. 4d Ohio Infantry. 2d WisconsInfantry64th Illinois Infantry. 68d Ohio Infantry.THIRD DIVISION.Brvet Major-General M. D. fLaGETT.First BrIgade. Second Brigade.Brigader-General Charles Ewing. BrigadierGeneral .Scott.16th Wisconsin Infantry. 20th Ohio Infantry.45th Illinois Infantry. 68th Ohio Infantry.31st Illinois Infantry. th Ohio Infantry20th Illinois Infantry. 19th Wisconsin Infatry80th Illinois Infantry.12th Wisconsin Infantry.FOURTH DIVISION.Breet MlfajorGeneral G. A. SMITH.First Brigade. Third Brigade. Brlgadler-General B. F. Potts. Brigadler-General W. W Qlknap.23d Indiana Infantry. 11th Iowa Infantry.2d Ohio Infantry. 13th Iowa Infantryd Indiana Infantry. 15th Iowa Infantry.4th Illinois Infantry. th owa Infantry.a5d Illinois Infantry. 32d Illinois I ntry.15th Illinois Infantry.DETACHMENTS.Artillery Brigade.Major FREERIC W.KER.C Battalion, 1st Michigan Artillery. 9th Illinois Mounted Infantry1st Minnesota Battery. G Company, 11th Ilinois Cavalry.15th Ohio Battery. Signal Detachment.
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MAJOR-GENERAL I. W. SLOCUM COMMANDIlNG.Fourteenth Army Corps-Brevet aor-Genural J. C. DAviS commanding.FIST DIVISION.Brigadier-General C. C. WALCOTFt Brigade. Second Brigade. Third Brigade.Brevet Brig.-General Hobart. Brevet Brig.-General ue. Colonel Habrig.21st Wisconsin Volunteers. 21st Michigan Volunteers,. 21st Ohio Volunteers.d Ohio Volunteers. 13th Mihigan Volunteers. 4th Ohio Volunteers.94th Ohio Volunteers. 69th Ohio Volunteers. 38th Pennsylvania Volun42d Indiana Volunteers. 799th Pennsylvania Volun.8th Indina Voluoteers.104th Itinois Volunteers.BrigadierGeneral J. D. MORAN.First Brigae. Second Brigada. Third Brigade.Brigadier-General Vandever. Brigadier-Gneral MitchtL Lieutenant-Colone: Langley.10th Michigan Volunteers. 121st Ohio Volunteers. 85th Illinois Volunteers.14th Michigau Volunteers. 113th OhioVolunteers. 86th Illinois Volunteers.16th Illinois Volunteers. 108th Ohio Volunteers. 110th Illinois Volunteers.0th lins Volunteers. 98th Ohio Volunteers. 12th Illnois Volunteers.17th New York Volunteers. 78th Illinois Volunteers. 52d Ohio Volunteers. 34th Illinois Volunteers. 22d Indian Volunteers. 37th Indiana (Det.) Volun.THIURD DIVISION.Brdevet 16jor-General A. BAn.Fit Brigade. Second Brigade. Third Brigade.Colonel M. C. Hunter. ILeutenant-Colonel Doan. Brig.-General George S. Greene,17th Ohio lunters. 2d Minnesota Volunteers. 14th Ohio Volunteers.31st Ohio Volunteers. 105th Ohio Volunteers. 38th Ohio Volunteers.th Ohio Volunteers. th Indiana Volunteers. 10th Kentucky Volunteers.2d Ohio onteers. 87th Indiana Volunteers. 18th Kentucky Volunteers.2d Indiana .101st Indina olunteers. 74th Indiana Volunteers.rth Ohio Vlnts.DETACIMENTS.Artiller Brigade.M ajOr CHALES HounT sn.attery I, 2d Illinois. 5th Wisconsin Battery.Battery 0, 1st linois. 19th Idiana Battery.48
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Twentieth .Army Corps-J3Ijor-General J. A. MowER CommandingBre el Major-General A. S. WILLIAM iFirst Brigade. Second Brigade. Thd Brigade.Colonel J. L. Selfridege. Colonel Willia Hawley. Brig.-General J. S. Robinson.4th Pennsylvania Volunt'rs. 2d Massachusetts Volun. 31stWisconsin olunteersth Connecticut Volunteers. 3d Wisconsin Volunteers. 1st Ohio Volunteers123d New York Volunteers. 1th New Jersey Volunt'rs. d Ohio Yolunteers.141st New York Volunteers. 10th New York Volunt'rs. 82d Illinois Volunteers.150th New York Volunt'rs. 101st Illinois onteers143 N ew York VolunBrevet Brig.-Gen. N. Fsrde, Jr. Colonel P. el. Jones. Brevet BrigGeneral arnu.th Ohio Volunteers. NewJersey Volnteers. 29th Pennsylvania Volun29th Ohio Volunteers. 73d Pennsylvania Volun. th Pennsylvania Vln,th Ohio Volunteers. 10th Pennsylvania Volun. th New York Volunteers28th ensylvania olun. 11th New Yok Volun. 102d New York Volunt'rs.17th Pennsylvania Volun. 184th New York Volun. 13th New YorkVolunt'rs.)etachment K. P. B. 154th New York Volun. 149th New York Volunt'rsTHIRD DIVISION.Breact Alakr-General W. T. WAn.First Brigade. Second rigade. Third Brigade.Colonel H. Case. Colotel Daniel Dustin. Brevet Brig.-eneral Cggswel70th Indiana Volunteers. 19th Michigan Volunteers. 20th Connecticut Volun.79th Ohio Volunteers. 22d Wisconsin Volunteers. 26th Wisconsin Volunt'rs102d Illinois Volunteers. 33d Indiana Volunteers. 33d Massachusetts Volun.105th Illinois Volunteers. S5th Indiana Volunteers. 65th Ohio Volunteers.129th Illinois Volunteers. 3d Ohio Volunteers.136th New York Volunt'rsDETACHUENTsArtillery Brigade.Captain WIncsEGAR.Battery I, 1st New York. Battery 1st Ohio.Battery M, 1st New York. Battery E, Independent Pennsylvania, Pontoniers, 58th Indiana Veteran Volunteers.Mechanics and Engineers, 1st Michigan.
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w, x ,i ~ssi Xi;" ~h" :*i,; Irr 6, I~i rl
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jX~E2;s~uai~ i~i -isrr.Ox;i'00;1 li" ,r ,sr:rr:nr :liil~El: lix 'Illii:AI,~B i; """":~ ~' -""~"; s;; :Bl;lsB l;sR; i ,l; _s:x::xx,,rsr:: AI I:,iAI:~p1~1~1i1~~.,,,,,,,r?-,l;",lluoIs:isiis;ri oisuaii.;i;aiiixc~' "'X""'""" -" ~": .i, ,, ;, ,g;liPI' oio~al ~ In, ~ENERAL SCHO~~IT.S. k ;X; ; u o~;;; ;; ;; i ,i ,.s si~l ;i'rrO Sils r ,, :,,, ,;, ~,, i;,,,i :"ilEI ;I n iiili~r
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165.E END ut TuE WAR. 339ARMY OF THE OHIO.MAJOR-GrNEEAL JOHN M. SCHOFIELD COMMANDING.Tenth rmy Corps-Major-Generl A. .TER commadi.FIRST DIVISION.Brev Anor-General H. W. En.First Brigade. Second Brigade. Third Brgde.Colonel H. D. Washburn. Colonel Harvey Graham. Colonel N. W. Day.th ndiana teers. 15th New York~Vounteers. 38th Massachusetts Vo.th Indiana Volunteers. 13th Connecticut Volhint'rs. 1356th New York Volun.9t# Connecticut Volunteers. 22d Iowa Volunteers. 128th New York Volun.14th New Hampshire Volun. 131st New York Volunteers. 175th New York Volun.12th Maine Volunt. 28th Iowa Volunteers. 176th New York Volun.th Maine Volunteers. 2th Iowa Volunteers.5th New York Volunteer.SECOID DivISION.Bret Maor-General A. AxEs.First Brigade. Second Brigade. Tbird Brigade.Colonel .ggett Colone l J. .Litte. Colonel G. .Gran.3dNew York Volunteers. 4th New York Vollnters. 4th New Hmpshire Vol.112th New York Volunteers. 4th New York Volunteers. th Maine Volunteers.117th New York olunters. 203 Pensvnia Volun. 13th Indiana Volunteers.142d New York Volunteers. 97th Pennsylvania Volun. 115th New York Volun. th Pennsylvania Volun. 169th New York Volun.Brigadier-General C. .PAINE.Brvet Brig.-General D. Bates. Brevet Brig-Gen. B. an. Colonel J .Holan.1stU.S.C.T. 4thU.S.C.T. 5thU.S.C.T.th .S. C. Tth .S. C. T. 2th .C.T.Brigade (not rsmbersd)revt Brigadier-General J. C. ABBon.3o New Hanpshire Volunteers. 6th Connecticut Voluteers.7th New Iampshire Volunteers. 7th Connecticut Volunteers.16th New York Heavy Artillery (six companies)16th New York Independent Battery.22d Indiana Battery.Lih Company E, 3d United Stats Artillery.Company A, 2d 'ennsylvania HeavyArtillery.Compne and K, 12th New York Cavalry.Detachment Signal Corps.xlIB~i~e;~P ~a'
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340 END OF THE VAR. [1865;. '" iiii7T enty-third Army Corps-ajor-General J. D. Cox comning.FIRST DIVISION,Briadier-General THOMAs IT. RGER.First Brigade. Second Brigade. Third Bade.ret Brig.-General J. N. Stiles. Colonel J. C McQuiston. Colel l. T. Tho .120th Indiana Vol. Infantry. 123d Indiana VoE Infantry. Sth Minnesota VolInfan124th Indiana Vol. Infantry. 129thIndiana Vol. Inn. 174th Ohio Vol. nfantry128th Indiana Vol. Infantry. I10th Indiana VoL Infan. 178th Ohio VL. Infantry180th Ohio Volun. Infantry. 28th Michigan VoL InfanBattery Elgin, Illinois VolunteeSECOND DIVISION.Major-General D. N Coucu.First Brgad Second Brigade. Third Brigade.Colonel 0. H. Moore. Colonel J. Mehringer. Colonel 6. A. Strikland.25th Michigan Vol. Infantry. 23d MichianVol. Infantry. 1st Indiana Vol. Infantry 26thKentu kyVol.Infantry. 80th Indiana Vol. Infantry. 183d Ohio .Inntry.118th Ohio Voi. Infantry. 181st Oio Vol. Infany.I0ith Illinois Vol. Infantry. 60th Ohio Vol Infantry.111th Ohio Vol. Infantry.109th Ohio Battery.THIRD DTTISON,Bri ir-General S. P. CaT.First Brigade. Second Brigade. Third BriadeColonel 0. W. SteeaL Colonel J. S. Casement. Colonel T. J. Henderson8th Tennessee Vol. Infantry. 177th Ohio Vol. Infantry. 112th 1llinois Vo1. Infan'y12th KentuckyyVol. Infantry. 6th Indiana Vol. Infantry. 634 Indiana Vol. InfantryI8th KentuckyVol. Infantry. 65th Illinois Vol. Infantry. 140th Indiana Vol. Infan'100th Ohio Volun. Infantry. 103d Ohio Voluu. InfantryS104Ith Ohio Volun. Infantry.Battery D) 1st Ohio Light Artillery.Cavalry Divionjo r-General JU E-o ILi'ATICK commanding.First Brigade. Second Brigade. Third Brigade Bmy. Brig,-Gen. Thos. J. Jordan. Brevet Brig.-Gen. S D. Atkin. Coonel Georbe E. Spencer.9th Pennsylvania Cavalry. 92d Illinois Mounted Infan. th Kentu CavalrySd Kentucky Cavalry. 10th Ohio Calry. th Ohio Cavalry.2d Kentucky Cavalry. 9th Ohio Cavalry. t Alab a Calr.8th Indiana Cavalry. 1st Ohio Squadro3d Indiana Cavalry. 9th Michigan Cavalry.C apin Y. .BEEBE.10th Wisconsin Battery.4Eb
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1865.i END : THE W 'A. 341The railroads to our rear had been repaired, so tha storeswere arriving very fast, both from Morehead City and Wil-ington. The country was so level that a single locomnotiveld haul twenty-fve and thirty ars to a train, instead of onlyen, as was the case in Tennessee and Upper Georgia.Byt th of April such prgres hd been made, that Issued the following Special Field Orders, o. 48, prescribingthe time and manner of the next narch[Special Field Odaers, No. 4a.].STE FLE, GOth oriO' NORat Cazre, Aprel 5 1 5.Co ential t Commander, Corps mmane rs, and Cr iven of StaffThe next grand objective is to place this army (with its full equipment)north of Roanoke River, facing west, with a base for supplies at Norfolk,and at Winton or Murfresboro' on the Chowan, and in full communicationwith the Army of the Potoac, about Petersburg; and also to do the enemysmuch harm as possible en a l p.STo accomplish this reait the following general plan will be followed,or dified only by written orders from these headquarters, should eventsrequire a change:(1 Monday the 10h of April, all preparat hions are presumed tobe complete, and the outlying detachments will be caled in, or given direc-tions to meet on te next march. All preparations will also be complete toplace the ralrad-tock back f Kinston on the one road, and below theNortheast Branch on the other.) On Tuesday, the 11th, the columns will draw out on their linesof march, say, about seven miles, and close up.(3.) On Wednesday the march will begin in earnest, and will be keptup at the rate, say, of about twelve miles a day, or according to the amountof resistance. All the coluus will dress to the left (which is the exposed11ank), and cormanders will study always to find roads by which they can,if necessary, perfo a general left wheel, he wagons to be Neuse id tosome place of security on the direct route of march. Foraging and otherdetails may continue as heretofore, only more caution and prudence shouldbe observed; and foragers should not go in advance of the advance-guard,but look more to our right rear for corn, bacon, and meal.2. The left wing (Major-General Slocum commanding) will aim straightfor the railroad-bridgo near Smithfield; thence along up the Neuse River tothe railroad-bridge over Nes River northeast of Raleigh (Powell's)thn to Wrenton, th general point of concentration.
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342 END OF THE WAR. [1865The centre (Major-General Schofeld commanding) will move to Whtley's Mill, ready t spport the left ntil it is past S ield, when it wilfollow up (substantially) Little River to about Rolesville, ready at al times to move to the support of Lhe left; after passing Tar River, to movet Warrenton.The right wing (Major-General Howard commanding), proceded by tlecavalry, will move rapidly on Pikeville and Nahamta, then swing across toBulah to Folk's Bridge, ready to inake junction with the other armies incase the enemy offers battle this side of Neuse River, about Smithfieldthence, in ase f no serious opposition on the left, will work up towarThe cavalry (General Kilpatrick comanding), leaving its encwith the right wing, will push as thongh straight for Weldon, until theenemy is across Tar River, and that bridge burned; then it will dedlcttoward Nashille and Warrenton, keeping up co unication with generalheadquarters.3. As soon as the army starts, the chief-quartermaster and commissarywill prepare a resupply of stores at some point on Parlico or AlbenarleSounds, ready to be conveyed to Kinston or Winton and Murfreesboro',according to developments. As soon as they have satisfactory informationthat the army is north of the Roanoke, they will forthwith establish a depotat Winton, with a sub-depot at Murfreesboro'. Major-General Schofieldwill hold, as heretofore, Wilmington (with the bridge across orthernBranch as an outpost), Newbern (and Kinston as its outpost), and willbe prepared to hold Winton and Murfreesboro'.as soon as the time arrivesfor that move. The navy has instructions from Admiral Porter to corp-erate, and any commanding officer is authorized to call on the navy forassistance and coperation, always in writing, setting forth the reasons, of which necessarily the naval commander must be the judige.4. The general-in-chief will be with the centre habitually, but may inperson shift to either flank where his presence may be needed, leaving astaff-offeer to receive reports. He requires, absolutely, a report of eacharny or grand detachment each night, whether any thing material has c-curred or not, for often the absence of an nemy is a very important factin military prognostication.By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman,L. M. DaYTON, Assistant Adjutant-General.But the whole problem became suddenly changed by thenews of the fall of Richmond and Petorsburg, which reachedas at Goldsboro', on the 6th of April. The Confederate Govern-ment, with Lee's army, had hastily abandoned Richmond, fled inii i i i iiiiii i i i = = ===M =~i~ ~ ~ i i~i ....................................... ... .......... ........................................................... ....................... ....................... ..... ................................ .... ... .... iiii s iiii iii iiiitiii iiiiiiiiii i'!ii~ iiiii iii iii~ iii~i o sii~ i i~ iiiii ii = o !iii iii! .................................. ....................... : :: ::: :::::::: .... .............................................. .....Ei ~ i 2 i ililiiiic iilii = =iii iiiiiiiil iiiliii ii i ii ~ ~ ii ii i == ii..... .. ..... ii iii ii iii iiii iii ii ii iii ii ii iii iiiii ii ii iii iiii iii ii iiU = iiiiiiiiii iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii~i! ii !i ;:iii !i 1iiiiiiii liiil ii~iiii iii ~ ii ;i;ii iiii ii i
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ould succeed in making junction with Goneral Johnston, withleast a fraction of his army, somewhere to my front. atce altered the foregoing orders, and prepared on the day apSAril 10th, to move straight on Raleigh, againstSGeneral Johnston, known to be at Smithfield, andosed to have about thirty-five thousand men. ade amp-cavalry was on his left front and Wheler's on his rightront, simply watcing us and awaiting our initiative. Mean-me the details of the great victories in Virginia eane thickad fast, and on the Sth I received from General Grant thismmunication, in the form of a ciphr-dispatchnn am AM5 O iiwm, 5W aso's' STAT o, Apri 5 1 G5.All indications now are that ee will attempt t re Danville with theSat f iim-horse foot and dragoons-at twenty thousandnuch demoralized. We hope to reduce this number one-half. I will pushue le, and, i standi s made at Danville, will, in a very fewfyou can possibly do so, puh on from where you are,Whether it better for you t strike for Greensboro' or nearer toDanville, you will be better able to judge when you receive this. Rebelaries now are the only strategic poits to s t..GRAlNTu, Liettenant-GenlI answered imnediately that we would move on the 10th,prepared to folow Johnston wherever he might go. Prompt-ly on Monday morning, April 10tb the army moved straighton Smithfield; the right wing making a circuit by the right,and the left wing, supported by the centre, moving on the twodirect roads toward Raleigh, distant fifty miles. General Terry'sand General Kilpatrick's troops moved from their positions onthe south or west bank of the Neuse River in the same generaldirection, by Cox's Bridge. On the 11th we reached Smith-Sned nJoaton's aimy, which had' ..... ... ... ... ........... .... ... .. .... .. ........................ : : ::::: :: :: ............................................ ... ... ... .. ......... .. ............ .......... ..... ... .... = = = = = = i i i i i i ii i i i i i i i.... iii~ iiiiii~iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii ~ i! iii ilii iii! iliiiiiiiiiiiiiiii
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retreated hastily on Raleigh, burning the bridges. To restorethese consumed the remainderof the day, and during that nightI received a message from General Grant, at Appomattox, thatGeneral Lehad surrendered to him hi whle army, which I atannounced to the troops in orders:[special Field Orders, No. N.]lhADQUARTERS MiLrTA.Yr IvIsio of THE orSrIm ssIPI,S FIELD, S f CAR L II Ail, 186.The general commanding announces to the army that he has oicialnotice from-General Grant that General Lee surrendered o him his entirearmy on the 9th inst., at Appomattox Court-House, Virginia.Glory to God and our country, and all honor to our comrades in arns,toward whom we are marching1A little more labor, a little more toil on our part, the great race is won,and our Government stands regenerated, after four long years of war.W. T. SaEumA, Hajor-Genral commanding.Of course, this created a perfect furore of rejoicing, and weall regarded the war as over, for I knew well that GeneralJohnston had no army with which to oppose mine. So thatthe only questions that remained were, would he surrender atbands, to "die in the last ditch," and entail on his country anindefinite and prolonged military occupation, and of consequentdesolation'? I knew well that Johnston's army could not becaught; the country was too open; and, without wagons, themen could escape us, disperse, and assemble again at some placeagreed on, and thus the war might be prolonged indefinitely.I then remembered ar. Lincoln's repeated expression thathe wanted the rebel soldiers not only defeated, but "back attheir homies, engaged in their civil purs'its." On the eveningof the 2th I was with the head of Slocum's column, at Gulley's,and General Kilpatrick's cavalry was still ahead, fghting Wade'Hfampton's rear-guard, with orders to push it through Raleigh,while I would give a more southerly course to the infantry col-unns, so as, if possible, to prevent a retreat southward. Onthe 13th, early, I entered Raleigh, and ordered the several headEof column toward Ashville, in the direction of Salisbury or
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1865.1' END OF THE WAE. 315Charlotte.BeforereachingRaleigha locomotive ca downthe road to meet me, passing through both Wade Hampton'and Kilpatrick's cavalry, bnging fur gentlemen, with letterfrom Governor Vance to me, asking protection for the citizensof Raigh.These gentlemn were, of course, dreadfully x-cited at the ngers through which they had passed. Amongthem w e-Senator Graham, r. Swain, president of ChapelHill University, and a Surgeon Warren, of the Confederatearmy. They had come with a flag of truce, to which they werenot entitled; still, in the interest of peace, I respected it, anditted them to return to Raleigh with their locomotive, toassure the Governor and the people that the war was substan-tialover, and that I wanted the civil authorities to remain inthe executin of their office till t pleasure of the Presidentcould be ascertained. On reaching Raleigh I found these samegent en, with Messrs. Badger, Bragg, Holden, and others,ebut Governor Yance had fled, and could not be prevailed onto return, because he feared an arrest and imprisonment. Fromthe Raleigh newspapers of the 10th I learned that GeneralStoneman, with his division of cavalry, had come across themountains from East Tennessee, had destroyed the railroadat Salisbury, and was then supposed to be approaching Greensboro'. I also learned that General Wilson's cavalry corps was"smashing things" down about Sehna and Montgomery, Ala-bama, and was pushing for Columbus and Macon, Georgia; andI also had reason to expect that General Sheridan would comedown from Appomattox to join us at Raleigh with his superbeavalry corps. I needed more cavalry to check Johnston's re-treat, so that I could come up to him with my infantry, andtherefore had good reason to delay. I odered the railroad tobe finished up to Raleigh, so that I couhd operate from it as aHEAQUARTERS MILITARIY DIVsIo OF THe MI1IPI,IN THE FIEL, EALEIGf, NORTH _ARO.LLA, Apri 14, 1565,The next movement will be on Ashboro', to turn the position of theenemy at the "
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Greensboro', and tocut off his only available line of retreat by Salisbuy1. General Kilpatiirik will keep up a show of purit in the directioof illsboro' and Grha, but be ready to cross aw River on GeneraHoward's bridge, near Pittsboro', and thence will operate toward Greensbiro', on the right front of the right wing.Chapel Hill Univrsy to act in onnetion with the cavalry; but the maicolumns and trains will move via ackney's Cross-Roads, and Trader'sittsro, St. Lawrence, etc, to be followed by the cavalry and lighdivision, as soon as the bridge is laid over IHaw River.3. The centre, Major-General Schofield counanding, will move viaHolly Springs, New Hill, Haywood, and Moftt's Mils.4. The left wing, Mjor-General Slocum commanding, wimove rapidlby the Aven's Ferry road, Carthage, Caledonia, and Cox's Mills.5. All the troops will draw well out onhe roadsdesignatedduringtoday and to-morrow, and on the following day will move with all possibrapidity for Ashboro'. No further destruction of railroads, mills, cotton, an
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GENERAL: I hav this moment reeived your communication of this-date. I am fully empowered to arrange with you any terms for the suspension of further hostilities between the armies commanded by you andend. 1 will limit the advance of my main column, to-morrow, to Morrisville,and the cavalry to tio university, and expeot that you wil also nunainthe present position of your forces until each has notice of a flure to agree.That a basis of action may be had, I undertake to abide by the sametenns and couditions as were made by Generals Grant and Lee at Appomat-tox Court-House, on the 9th instant, relative to our two armies; and, fur-thermore, to obtain from General Grant an order to suspend the movementsof any troops from the direction of Virginia. General Stoneman is undermy command, and my order will suspend any devastation or destructioncontemplated by him. I will add that I really desire to save the people ofNorth Carona the damage they would sustain by the march of this armythrough the central or western parts of the State.I am, with respect, your obedient servant,W. T. SHuMA, Vljor-GeneralI sent my aie-de-cap, Colonel McCoy, up to Durham'sStation with this letter, with instructions to receive the answer,to telegraph its contents back to me at Raleigh, and to ar-range for an interview. On the 16th I received a reply frontGeneral Johnston, agreeing to meet me the next day at a point midway between our advance at Durham and his rear at Hills-boro'. I ordered a car and locomotive to be prepared to conveyme up to Durham's at eight o'clo of the morning of April17th. Just as we were entering the ar, the telegraph-operat,whose o e was up-stairs in the depot-building, ran dwn to meand said that he was at that instant of time receiving a mostimportant dispatch in cipher from Morehead City, which Iought to see. I held the train for nearly half an hour, when hei! '! !!iiililili~ii' iiiIIIriiii ii~us iiiiii
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48 ND OF THE WAR. [1865.returned with the message translated and written out. It wasfrom Mr. Stanton, announcing the assssination of Mr. Lincoln,the attempt on the life of Mr. Seward and son, and a suspicionthat a like fate was designed for General Grant and all the prinal cers of the Government. Dreading the ffect of sucha message at that criticl instnt of time, I ased the operator ifany one besides himself had seen it; he answered no. I thenbade him not to reveal the contents by wrd or look til I cameback, which I proposed to do the same afternoon. The trainthen started, and, as we passed Morris's Station, General Logan,commanding the Fifteenth Corps, came into my car, and I toldhim I wanted to see him on my return, as I had something veryimportant to communicate. lie knew I was going to moetGeneral Johnston, and volunteered to say that he hoped I wouldsucceed in obtaining his surrender, as the whole army dreadedthe long march to Charlotte (one hundred and seventy-fivemiles), already begun, but which ad been interrupted by thereceipt of General Johnston's letter of the 13th. We reachedDurham's, twenty-six miles, about 10 A. m., where General Kil-patrick had a squadron of cavalry drawn up to receive me. Wepassed into the house in which e had his headquarters, andsoon after mounted some led horses, which he had prepared formyself and staff. General Kilpatrick sent a man ahead with awhite flag, followed by a small platoon, behind which we rode,and were followed by the rest of the escort. We rode up theHillsboro' road for about five miles, when our flag-bearer dis-covered another coming to meet him. They met, and word waspassed back to us that General Johnston was near at hand, whenwe rode forward and met General Johnston on horseback, ridingside by side with General Wade Hampton. We shook Lands,and introduced our respective attendants. I asked if there wasa place convenient where we could be private, and GeneralJohnston said he had passed a small farm-house a short dis-tance back, when we rode back to it together side by side, ourstaff-officers and escorts following. We had never ret before,though we had been in the regular army together for thir-teen years; but it so happened that we had never before come
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186 END OF THE WAR. 349togethe 1e was some twelve or more years my senior; butwe knew enough of each other to be well acquainted at once.We s ached the house of a Mr. Benett, dimounted, andleft oue hrses with orderlies in the road. Our officers, on foot,psed into the yard, and General Johnston and I entered thesal frame-house. We asked the farmer if we could have theuse of his house for a few minutes, and he and his wife with-drew into a ller og-hos, which stood close by.As soon as we were alone together I showed him the dis-patch announcing Mr. Lincoln's assassination, and watched hinmclosely. The perspiration came out in large drops on his fore-head, and he did not attempt to conceal his distress. He de-nounced the act as a disgrace to the age, and hoped I did notcharge it to the Confederate Government. I told him I couldnot believe that he or General Lee, or the officers of the Con-federate army, could possibly be privy to acts of assassination;but I would not say as much for Jeff. Davis, George Sanders,and men of that stripe. We talked about the effect of this acton the country at large and on the armies, and he realized thatit made my situation extremely delicate. I explained to hhnthat I had not yet revealed the news to my own personal staffor to the army, and that I dreaded the effect when made knownin Raligh. Mr. Lincoln was peculiarly endeared to the soldiers,and Ifeared that some foolish woman or man in Raleigh mightsay snnething or do something that would madden our men,and that a fate worse than that of Columbia would befall theI then told Johnston that he must be convinced that hecould not oppose my army, and that, since Lee bad surrendered,he could co the same with honor and propriety. He plainlyand repeatedly admitted this, and added that any further fight-ing would be murder; but he thought that, instead of surren-dering picemeal, we might arrange terms that would embraceall the Confederate armies. I asked him if he could controlother armies t1um his own; he said, not then, but intimated thathe conld procure authority from Mr. Davis. I then told himthat I had recently had an interview with General Grant andAt= = U
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President Lincoln, and that I was possessed of their views; thatwith ther and the people North there seemed to be no vindic-tive feeling against the Confederate a ies, but there was againstDavis and his political adherents; and that the terms thatGeneral Grant had given to General Lee's army were certainlymost generous and liberal. All this e admitted, but alwaysrecurred to the idea of a universal surrender, embracing his ownarmy, that of Dick Taylor in Louisiana and Texas, and ofAlaury, Forrest, and others, in Alabama and Georgia. GenoralJonston's account of our interview in his "Narrative" (page402, et sq.) is quite accurate and correct only I do not recallhis naming the capitulation of Loeben, to which he refers. Ouronveraton was very general and extremely cordial, satisfyingme that it could have but one result, and that which we alldesired, viz., to end the war as quickly as possible; and, beinganxious to return to Raleigh before the news of Mr. Lincoln's assassination could be divulged, on General Johnston's sayingthat he thought that, during the nigt, e could procure author-ity to act in the name of all the Confederate armies in existence,we agreed to meet again the next day at noon at the same place,and parted, he for Illsboro' and I for Raleigh. We rode hack to Durham's Station in the order we had come,and then I showed the dispatch announcing Mr. Lincoln's death.I cautioned the officers to watch the soldiers closely, to proventany violent retaliation by them, leaving that to the Governmentat Washington; and on our way back to Raleigh in the ears Ishi wed the same dispatch to General Logan and to several ofthe officers of the Fifteenth Corps that were posted at Morris-ville and Jones's Station, all of whom were deeply impressedby it; but all gave their opinion that this sad newswhould nothange our general course of action.As soon as I reached Raleigh I pubished the followingorders to the army, announcing the assassination of the Pressdent, and Idoubt if, in the whole land, there-were more sinceremourners over his sad fate than were then in and about Raleigh.I watched the effect closely, and was gratified that there was nosingle act of retaliation; though I saw and felt that one singleiiiii~ii~iiiiiiiiii~iiii !iiiii~ iiii i ii iiil iii=! iiiiiiiilliil~iiiiiii!!~iiii ii iii!i~ li~ ii i ii ii
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w by m ould have laid the city in ashes, and turned itsole popu on houseless upon the country, if not wrse :The general commanding announces, with pai an sorrow, that on theevening of the 14th instant at the theatre in Wa ington city, his Excel-lney the President of the United States, Mr. Lincoln, was assassinated by one who ttered the State motto of Virginia. Athesame time, the Sec-retary of State, Seward, while suffering from a broken arm, was sstabbed by another murderer in his own house, ut still urvives, and hisson was wounded, supposed fatally. It is believed, by persons capable ofjudging, that other high oficers were designed to share the same fato.Thus it senes that our enemy, despairing of meeting us in open, manly warfare, begins to resort to the assassin's tools.Your general does not wish you to infer that this is universal, for heknows that the rat mass of the Confederate army would scorn to san-tion such acts, but he believes it the legitimate consequence of rebellionagainst rightfl authrity.We have met every phase which this war has assumed, and must obe prepared for it in its last and worst shape, that of assassins and guerillas; but woe unto the people who seek to expend their wild passions insuch a manner, for there is but one dread result!By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman,L. I. DAYToN, Assiatant Ajutant-General.During the evening of the 17th and morning of the IthI saw nearly all the general officers of the army (Schofield, Slo-cum, Howard, Logan, Blair), and we talked over the matter ofthe conference at Bennett's house of the day before, and, withoutexception, all advised me to agree to some terms, for they alldreaded the long and harassing march in pursuit of a dissolv-ing and fleeing army-a march that might carry us back againover the thousand miles that we had just accomplished. We allknew that if we could bring Johnston's army to bay, we coulddestroy it in an hour, but that was simplyimpossible in the conn-try in which we found ourselves. We discussed all the probabil-ties, among which was, whether, if Johnston made a point of it, Ishould assent to the escape from the country of Jeff. Davis andp v rci~
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352 END OF THE WAlR. [1865.his fugitive cabinet; and some one of my general ocers, eitherLogan or Blair, insisted that, if asked for, we should even pro-vide a vessel to carry them to Nassau from Charleston.The next morning I again tarted in the cars to Durham'sSttion, accompanied by most of my personal staff, and by Gen-erals Blair, Barry, Howard, etc., and, reaching General Kilpat-rick's headquarters at Durham's, we again mounted, and rode,with the same escort of the day before, to Bennett's house,reaching there punctually at noon. General Johnston had notyet arrived, but a courier shortly came, and reported him as onthe way. It must have been nearly 2 r. a. when he arrived, asbefore, with General Wade Hampton. He had halted hisescort out of sight, and we again entered Bennett's house, and Iclosed the door. General Johnston then assured me that he hadauthority over all the Confederate armies, so that they woudobey his orders to surrender on thosame terms with his own, buthe argued that, to obtain so cheaply this desirable result, I oughtto give his men and officers some assurance of their politicalforce, enabled every Confederate soldier and officer, below therank of colonel, to obtain an absolute pardon, by simply layingdown his arms, and taking the common oath of allegine, andthat General Grant, in accepting the surrender of General Lee'sarmy, had extended the same principle to all the officer, iGen-eral Lee included; such a pardon, I understood, would restore tothem all their rights of citizenship. But he insisted that theoffcers and men of the Confederate army were unnecessarily alarmed about this matter, as a sort of bugbear. He then saidthat Mr. Breckenridge was near at hand, and he thought that itwould be well for him to be present. I objected, on the scorethat he was then in Davis's cabinet, and our negotiations shouldbe confined strictly to belligerents. He then said Breckenridgewas a major-general in the Confederate army, and might sinkhis character of Secretary of War. I consented, and he sentone of his staff-oficers iack, who soon returned with rcken-ridge, and he entered the room. General Johnstona I then
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18G5. END OF THE WAR.again went over the whle ground, and reckeridge confirmewhat he had said as to the uneasiness of the Southern officersand soldiers about their political rights in case of surrender.While we were in consultation, a messenger ame with a parcelof papers, which General Johnston said were from Mr. Reagan,Postmaster-General. 1He and Breckenridge looked over them,andaftersomesid cnversation, he handed one of the paperto me. It was in Reagan's handwriting, and began with a longpreamble and terms, o general and verbose, that I said theywere inadmissible. Then recalling the conversation of Mr.Lincoln, at City Point, I sat down at the table, and wrote offthe terms, which I thought concisely expressed his views andwishes, and explained that I was willing to submit these termsto the new President, Mr. Johnson, provided that both armiesshould remain instatu quo until the truce therein declared shouldexpire. I had full faith that General Johnston would reli-giously respect the truce, which he did; and that I would be thegainer, for in the few days it would take to send the papers toWashington, and receive an answer, I could finish the railroadup to Raleigh, and be the better prepared for a long chase.Neither Mr. reckenridge nor General Johnston wrote one.word of that paper. I wrote it myself, and announced it askthebest I could do, and they readily assented.While copies of this paper were being made for signature,the oflcer of our staffs commingled in the yard at Bennett'shouse, and were all presented to Generals Johnston and Breck-enridge. All without exception were rejoiced that the war wasover, and that in a very few days we could turn our faces toward home. I remember telling Breckenridge that he had betterget away, as the feeling of our people was utterly hostile to thepolitical element of the South, and to him especially, because hewas the Vice-President of the United States, who had as suchannounced Mr. Lincoln, of Illinois, duly and properly electedthe President of the United States, and yet that he had aft-ward openly rebelled and taken up arms against the Government. He answered me that he surely would give us no moretrouble, and intimated that he would speedily leave the country'"Z";i 0 II3 8,0 : +++:: +++++ +++++ + .... + ;+ ~ ~ ~ n +:+++++++ _C t .... ++/;++ + ++ +-
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5j END 'OF THE WAR. [1865forever. I mayhave also advised hint that Mr. Davis too shouldget abroad as soon as possible.The papers were duly signed; we parted about dark, andletters, and agreement with General Johnston, with instructionsto be very careful to let nothing escape him to the greedy news-paper correspondents, but to submit his papers to General Hal-leck, General Grant, or the Secretary of War, and to bring meback with all expedition their orders and instructions.On their face they recited that I had no authority to makefinal terms involving eivil or political questions, but that I sumitted them to the proper quarter in Washington for their -tion; and the letters fully explained that the military situationwas such that the delay was an advantage to us. I cared lttlewhether they were approved, modified, or disapproved in toto;only I wanted instructions. Many of my general offiers, awhom, I am almost positive, were Generals Logan and lair,urged me to accept the terms," without reference at all toWashington, but I preferred the latter course :LEAPQUAE.TER9 MILTAR DIVoSO Or THE MISSsSIPP,GeLeral 1. W. IHuzCx, C/ief of Stag[, Washington, 1. C,GRal L: I received your dispatch describing the man Clark, detailed to assassinate me. He had better be in a hurry or he will be too late.The news of r. Lincoln's death produced most e effect on ourtroops. At first I feared it would lead to excesses; but now it has softened down, and can easily be guided. None evinced morefeeling thanGeneral Johnston, who admitted that the act was calculated to stain hiscause with dark hue; and he contended that the loss a most serious tothe South, who had begun to realize that r. Lincoln was the best friendthey had.I cannot believe that even Mr. Davis was privy to the diabolical plot,but think it the emanation of a set of young men of the South, who arevery devils. I want to throw upon the South the care thi of men,who will soon be as obnoxious to their industrial classes asto usCI~p,;i~ 18 1
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18 ]END O(F THE WAR. 355Had I pushed Joston's armyto an extremity, it would have dispersed,and done infinite mischief. Johnston informed me that General Stone-man had been at Salisbury, and was now at Statesville. I have sent himorders to come to me.General Joston also informed me that General Wilson was at Colum-busGeorgiaand e wantedme to arrest his progress. I leave that to you.I f the President sanctions my agreement with Johnston, our in-terest is to cease all destruction.Please give all orders necessary according to the views the Executive am e, and influence him, if possible, not to vary the terms at all, for Ihave considered every thing, and believe that, the Confederate armies oncedispersed, we can adjust all else fairly and well. I am, yours, etc.,W. T. SnEiMAx, Mahor-Gcereral conmanding.1E.ADQUARTERS MILITARY DIvisioN OF THE MISsUsIrI,is THE FIELD, RALEIGH, OETH CARoLIA, prifl l8, 1888.LieutenantGeneral U. S. GRArT, or Major-General HALLEOC K, aVhing-ton, 1. C.GENERAL: I inclose herewith a copy of an agreement made this day be-tween General Joseph E. Johnston and myself, which, if approved by theresident of the United States, will produce peace from the Potomact to theRio Grande. Mr. Breckenridge was present at our conference, in the ca-pacity of major-general, and satisfied me of the ability of General Johnstonto carry out to their full extent the terms of this agreement; and if youwill get the President to simply indorse te copy, and commission me tocarry out the terms, I will follow them to the conclusion. You will observe that it is an absolute submission of the enemy to thelawful authoity of the United States, and disperses his armies absolutely;and the point to which I attach most importance is, that the dispersion and disbandment of these armies is done in such a manner as to prevent theirbreaking up into guerrilla bands. On the other hand, we can retain just asmuch of an army as we please. I agreed to the mode and manner of thesurrendr of arms set forth, as it gives the States the means of repressingguerrillas, which we could not expect them to do if we stripped them of all Both Generals Johnston and Breckenridge admitted that slavery wasdeadandI could ot insist on embracing it in such a paper, because it canbe made wit the States in detail. I know that all the men of substanceSouth sincerely want peace, and I do not believe they will resort to war aagain during this century I have no doubt that they will in the futurebe perfectly subordinate to the laws of the United States. The momentmy action in this matter is approved, I can spare five corps,. and willak for orders to leave General Schofield here with the Tenth Corps, and/li~r~i] l +~~
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856 END OF THE WAR. 1865.to march myself with the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-third Corps via Burkesville and Gordonsville to Frederickor Hagerstown, Maryland, there to be paid and mustered out.The question of finance is now the chief one, and every sldier andoficer not needed should be got home at work. I would like to be able tob egin ite march north by May 1st.I urge, on the part of the President, speedy action, as it is important toget the Confederate armies to their homes as well as our own.I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,W. T. SHERMAN, Major-Gener commandng.Memorandum, or Basis of Agreement, made this 18th day of April, A. D.1865, near Durham's Station, in the State of North Carolin, by andrbetween General JosrnE. Jon o, commandingthe Cofederate Army,and Mlajor-General WILA T. SamEMA, commanding the Army ofthe United States in North Carolina, both present:1. The contending armies now in the field to maintain the tatu quountil notice is given by the commanding general of any one to its opponent,and reasonable time-say, forty-eight hours-allowed.2. The Confederate armies now in existence to be disbanded andducted to their several State capitals, there to deposit their arms an pub-lic property in the State Arsenal; and each officer and man to execute andfile an agreement to cease from acts of war, and to abide the action of theState and Federal authority. The number of arms and munitions of warto be reported to the Chief of Ordnance at Washington City, subject to thefuture action of the Congress of the United States and, in the mean time, tobe used solely to maintain peace and order within the borders of th Statesrespectively.8. The recognition, by the Executive of the United States, of the severalState governments, on their officers and Legislatures taking the oaths pre-scribed by the Constitution of the United States, and, where confiictingState governments have resulted from the war, the legitimacy of all shallbe submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States.4. The reestablishment of all the Federal Courts in the several States,with powers s as defined by the Constitutionof the United States nd of theStates respectively." 5. The people and inhabitants of all the States to be guaranteed, so faras the Executive can, their political rights and franchises, as well as theirrights of person and property, as defined by the Constitution of the UnitedStates and of the States respectively.6. The Executive authority of the Gthe Governmen tof the United sto disturb any of the people by reason of the late war, so long as they live
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1865.] END ,. ,:iWA. 357in peace and quiet, abstain fro acts o armed hostility, and obey the lawsin existence at the place of their residence.7. In general terms-the war to ease; a general amnesty, so far as theExecutive ofthe United States can command, on condition of the disband-ment of the Confederate armies, the distribution of the arms, and the re-sumption of peaceful pursuits by the officers and men hitherto composingNot being fully empowered by our respective principals to fulfill theseterms, we individually and officially pledge ourselves to promptly obtain thenecessary authority, and to carry out the above programme.W. T. SHERmAN, ajor-General,'Commanding Army of the United States in North Carolina.J. E. JoUnsTON, General,Commanding Confederate States Army in North Carolina.Major Hitchcock got off on the morning of the 20th, and Ireckoned that it would take him four or five days to go toWashington and back. During that time the repairs on all therailroads and telegraph-lines were pushed with energy, and wealso got -possession of the railroad and telegraph from Raleighto Weldon, in the direction of Norfolk. Meantime the troopsremained state quo, our cavalry occupying Durham's Stationand Chapel Hill. General Slocum's head of column was atAven's Ferry on Cape Fear River, and General Howard's wasstrung along the railroad toward Hillsboro'; the rest of thearmy was in and about Raleigh.On the 20th I reviewed the Tenth Corps, and was muchpleased at the appearance of General Paaes's division of black troops, the first I had ever seen as a part of an organized army;and on the 21st I reviewed the Twenty-third Corps, which hadbeen with me to Atlanta, but had returned to Nashville,had formed an essential part fof the army which fought atFranklin, and with which General Thomas had defeated Gen-eral Hood in Tennessee. It had. then been transferred rapidlyby rail to Baltimore and Washington by General Grant's orders,and thence by sea to North Carolina. Nothing of interesthappened at Raleigh till the evening of April d, when MajorHitchcock reported by telegraph his return to Morchead City,and that would come up by rail during the night. He
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358 EN1 UF O T Y WA. [18.arrived at 6 A. ., April 24th, accompanied by General Grantand one or two officers of his staiff, who had not telegraphed thfat of their being on the train, for prudential reasons. Ofcourse, I was both surprised and pleased to see the general, soonlearned that my terms with Johnston d been disapprovewas instructed by him to give the forty-eight hours' notice re-quired by the terms of the truce, and afterward to proceed toattack or follow him. I immediately telegraphed to GeneralKilpatrick, at Durham's, to have a mounted courier ready tocarry the following message, then on its way up by rail, to therebel lines:HIonoARas MInrA DIvIsION OF THE ISSISSIPPI,I-l THE FIELD, RALEIGH, NOHTH CAROLNA, April 24, 1t5-6 A. M.General JonSTON, commanding Confederate Army, Greensboro': You wnill take notice that the truce or suspension of hostilities agreedto between us will cease in forty-eight hours after this ihis received at yourlines, under the first of the articles of agreement.W. T. SHERAN, 3/# oT-General.At the same time I wrote another short note to GeneralJohnston, of the same date:I have replies from Washington to my communications April 18th.I am instructed to limit my operations to your immediate command, andnot to attempt civil negotiations. I therefore demand the surrender ofyour army on the same terms as were given to General Lee at Appomattox,April 9th instant, purely.and simply.Of course, both these papers were shown to General Grantat the time, before they were sent, and he approved of them.At the same time orders were all parts of the rmto be ready to resume the pursuit of the enemy on the expira-tion of the forty-eight hours' truce, and messages were sent toGeneral Gillmore (at Hilton Head) to the same effect, with in-structions to get a similar message through to General Wilson,at Macon, by some means.General Grant had brought with him, from Washington,written answers from the Secretary of ar, and of himself, tomy communications of the 18th, which I still possess, and hereA.8
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165.] N O E W .359ive the originals. They embrace the copy of a dispatch madeby Mr. Stanton to General Grant, when he was pressing Lee atAppomattoxwhichdipath, if sent me at the same time (asshould ave been done), would have saved a world of trouble. Idid not understand that General Grant had come down to su-persede me in co and, nr did heintimateit, nor did Ireceive these communications as serious reproof, but promptlyacted on them, as is already shown; and in this connection Igive my answer made to General Grant, at aleigh, before I hadany answer from General Johnston to the demand forthe surrender of his own army, aswell as my answer to Mr. Stan-letter, of the same date, both written on the supposition thatI miht have to strt suddenly in pursuit of Johnston, and haveno other chance to explain.WA D mrn r, WASHINGTON CITY, Airi 21, 1565.Lieutenant-Gerneral GRANT.GE'ERAL. The memorandum or basis agreed upon between GeneralSherman and General Johnston having been submitted to the President,they are disapproved. You will give notice of the disapproval to GeneralSherman, and direct him to resume hostilities at the earliest moment.The instructions given to you by the late President, Abraham Lincoln,on the 3d of March, by my telegraph of that date, addressed to you, ex-press substantially the views of President Andrew Johnson, and will be ob-served by General Sherman. A copy is herewith appended. The President desires that you proceed immediately to the headquartersof Major-General Sherman, and direct operations against the enemy.Yours truly,EDwIN M. STAxTON, Secretal of Wr.The following telegram was received 2 P. x., City Point,March 4, 165 ( Washington, 12 ., March 3, 1865):[Cnrurn.]OFFICE UNITED STATES MIITARY TELEcRAPH,11HEADQUiTERs AwES OF THE U NITE STATES.. )Lieutenant-General GRANT:The President directs me to say to you that he wishes you to have noconference with Genera Lee, unless it be for the capitulation of Lee's armyor on s minor and purely military matters.
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360 END OF THE WAR. (185.He instructs me to say that you are not to decide, discuss, or conferupon any political question; such questions the President holds in his ownhands, and will submit them to no military conferenees or conventions.leantime you are to press to the utmost your military advantages.Enw M. STANTo, Secretary of ar.11EADQUARTEs ARms or TiE Uviu STATES,Major-General W. T. SnExMx, commanding Military Division of the As-GENmERAL : The basis of agreement entered into between yourself andGeneral J. E. Johnston, for the disbandment of the Southern army, and theextension of the authority of the General Government over all the territorybelonging to it, sent for the approval of the President, is received.I read it carefully myself before submitting it to the President and Sec-retary of War, and felt satisfied that it could not possibly be approved.My reason for these views I will give you at another time, in a more ex-tended letter.Your agreement touches upon questins of such vital importance that, as soon as read, I addressed a note to the Secretary of War, notifying him oftheir receipt, and the importance of immediate action by the President;and suggested, in view of their importance, that the entire Cabinet becaled together, that all might give an expression of their.opinions upon thematter. The result was a disapproval by the President of the basis laiddown; a disapproval of the negotiations altogether-except for the sur-render of the army commanded by General Jhnston, and directins to metonotify you of this decision. I cannot do so better than by sending you theinclosed copy of a dispatch (penned by the late President, though signed bythe Secretary of War) in answer to me, on sending a letter received fromGeneral Lee, proposing to meet me for the purpose of submitting the ques-tion of peace to a convention of officers.Please notify General Johnston, immediately on receipt of this, of thetermination of the truce, and resume hostilities against his army at the ear-liest moment you can, acting in good faith.HEADQuARTERS MILITARY lviIoN of THE Mfls stIPPI,IN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, A prl 25, 1865.Lieutenant-Gcncral U. S. GIRAT, present.GENERAL: I had the honor to receive your letter of April 21st, with &n-closures, yesterday, and was well pleased that you came along, as you mustti~~~~p.~ Ofp, i, O OfCg
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186.] END OF THE WAR. 361have observed that Iheld the military control so as to adapt it to any phasethe case might assume.It is but just I should record the fact that I made my terms with Gen-eral Johnston under the influence of the liberal terms you extended to the army of General Lee at Appomattox Court-House on the 9th, and theseeming policy of our Government, as evinced by the call of the VirginiaLegislature and Governor back to Richmond, under yours and PresidentLincoln's very eyes.It now appears this last act was done without any consultation withyou or any knowledge of Mr. Lincoln, but, rather in opposition to a previouspolicy well considered.I have not the least desire to interfere in the civil policy of our Govern-ment, but would shun it as something not to my liking; but occasions doarise when a prompt seizure of results is forced on military commandersnot in immediate communication with the proper authority. It is probablethat the terms signed by General Johnston and myself were not clearenough on the point, well understood between us, that our negotiations didnot apply to any parties outside the officers and men of the Confederatearmies, which could easily have been remedied.No surrender of any army not actually at the mercy of an antagonistwas ever-made without "terms," and these always define the militarystatus of the surrendered. Thus you stipulated that the officers and menof Lee's army should not be molested at their homes so long as they obeyedthe laws at the place of their residence.I do not wish to discuss these points involved in our recognition of theState governments in actual existence, but will merely state my conclusions,to await the solution of the future.Such action on our part in no manner recognizes for a moment the socalled Confederate Government, or makes us liable for its debts or acts. The laws and acts done by the several States during the period of re-bellion are void, because done without the oath prescribed by our Consti-tution of the United States, which is a "condition precedent."We have a right to use any sort of machinery to produce military re-suts; and it is the commonest thing for military commanders to use thecivil governments in actual existence as a means to an end. I do believewe could and can use the present State governments lawfully, constitu-tionally, and as the very best possible means to produce the object desired,viz., entire and complete submission to the lawful authority of the UnitedStates.As to punishment for past crimes, that is for the judiciary, and can in nomanner of way be disturbed by our acts; and, so far as I can, I will use myinfluence that rebels shall suffer all the personal punishment prescribed by law, as also ti civil liabilities arising from their past acts.
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362 END OF THE WAR. [1865.What we now want is the new form of law by which common menmay regain the positions of industry, so long disturbed by the war.I now apprehend that the rebel armies will disperse; and,insteadofdealing with six or seven States, we wi hae to deal with numberlessbandsof desperadoes, headed by such men as Mosby, Forrest, Red Jackson, andothers, who know not and care not for danger and its consequnces.I a, with great respect, your obedient servant,W. T. SuERMAN, Major-General commandingHEADQUARTERS AIrTARY DVISo or s THEMSSrS PPIIN THEs FwL, RIH, Nora CARouA, 4prIl 25, 155.Hon. E. M. S ATOx, Secretary of T War, WaslngtonDEan Sin: I have been furnished a copy of your letter of Apri t toGeneral Grant, signifying your disapproval of the terms on which GeneralJohnston proposed to disarm and disperse the insurgents, on condition of amnesty, etc. I admit my folly in embracing in a military convention anycivil matters; but, unfortunately, such is the nature of our situation that they seem inextricably united, and I understood from you at Savannah thatthe financial state of the country demanded military success, and wouldwarrant a little bending to policy.When I had my conference with General Johnston Iad the public ex-amples before me of General Grant's terms to ee's ary, and General Weitzel's invitation to the Virginia Leglature to assemble at Ricmod.I still believe the General Government of the nited Stateshasmadeamistake; but that is none of my businessine is a different task; nd Ihad flattered myself that, by four years of patient, unremittin, andful labor, I deserved no reminder such as i contained in the last paragraphof your letter to General Gran You may assure the President that I eedhis suggestion. I am truly, etc.,W. T. SHERMAN, lajor-General comanOn the same day, but later, I received an answer from Gen-out to Bennett's hou, where we we again met, and Generl John-ston, without hesitation, agreed to, and we executed, the follow-ing nal terms:*I i
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1865] EN U T WA. 363Terms of a Military Convention, entered into this 20th day of April, 1865,at Bennet ouse, near Durham's Station, North Carolina, betweenGeneral JOSEPH E. JoaxsoN, commanding the Confederate Army,and Major-Geeral W. T. Sau commanding the Unitecl States1. All acts of war on the part of the troops under General Johnston'scommand to cease from this date.2. All arms and public property to be deposited at Greensboro', anddelivered a ordnanc-oficer of the United States Army.3. Rolls of al the officers and men to be made in duplicate; one copyto be retained by the commander of the troops, and the other to be given toan oficer to be designated by General Sherman. Each officer and man togive his idividal obligation in writing not to take up as against theGovernment of the United States, until properly released from this obli-gation.4. The side-arms of officers, and their private horses and baggage, to beretained by them.5. This being done, all the officers and men will be permitted to returnto their homes, not to be disturbed by the United States authorities, so longa~ they observe their obligation and the laws in force where they may re-side. W. T. SHERMN, MajorGeneral,Commanding United States Force. in North Carolina.J. E. AnxsrovO, General,Commanding Confederate Stat Force in ort Carolin.Approved: U. S. GEenT, Lieutenant-General.I returned to Raleigh the same evening, and, at my request,General Grant wrote on these terms his approval, and then Ithought the matter was surely at an end. 1e took the originalcopy, on the 27th returned to Newbern, and thence went back toWashington.I ediately made all the orders necessary to carry ioefct the tearms of this convention, devolving on General Scho-eld the details of granting the parols and making the muster-rols of prisoners, inventories of property, etc., of General John-ston's a y at and about Greensboro', :North Carolina, and onGeneral Wilon the same duties in Georgia; but, thus far, Ihad n compelled to co unicate with the latter throughrebel sources, and General Wilson was necessarily confused bythe conflict of. orders and information. I deemed it of the
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; :4 END OF THE WAIL 1841unnozt inmportance to e;-talblish for hirn a more reliable base ofinformation and supply, and accordingly resolved to go in personto Savannah for that purposee. But, before starting, I receiveda _3e Yt1 k TelwK, of April 24th, containing the folowingv IDIBUDIitons :f:.;: Samoa.:Wu Den 5 r-* Wai"HLS6Ins, Apni 8, a]."IYIerday e: e:ig a bearer of disches arrived from Genera l 2rman.An fra -nn of h:o-ies and a memorandum of what isca'led a bsis for pace, had ten entered into on the lTth inst. by GeneralSherab, with the real General Jo hnon. Scadier-General Breckenridewas present at the conference.A Ca : Fee;:ti was ked at ei:Et oek in the evening at whiehthe ac-ion of Genera Shericn ws disapproved by the Preident, by theSce-y of Wa, b General Grant, and by ever member of the cabinet.(kners '_r::= was ord-red to restre hostlities irniediately, and wasfrece tLat the int~ai ven by the late President, in the idowingtloer wi was penned by Mr. Lincoln himsef at the CpitoL, on theng of the od f March, were approved by Presdent Andrew Johawn,I~ wea. re 0t to co; ern the secion of military commandersna the night of the Sd of Mach, while President Lincoln and his eab-met were a t p a telegra from General Grant was brouzht t0 thein :--in him that Generl Lee had requesed an inter-V'c : c shtomk an arrn an ent for terms of peace. The letterf Gera I. was p is hed in a letter to Davis and to the rebel Conges.Ge G t tga was btt e to Mr. Lincoln, who. after ponder-ing a fewm t-o up his pen ad wrote with his own hand the tol_ r ~E~E~r rslown r w he sbmit:ed to te Secen:y of State and Secretaryof War. I-t ws then dated, adred, and sEd, by the 'eretn ofWr sad Wteraphed to Gtene:l Grant:We-nvx. Ar l -1 P. x.Lieute-au-Gsnral GnanT :The Pre dent direets me to say to ye nthat he wishes you to have nocafrence with Generale L-e,.t uess i to for the eapituladion of GeneralL's army, or on se minor or purely mitary matter. He instructs meto say thst yen are not to decide, di-c or confer upon any politicaleao-Such e the Pry dt bds in hs own hand, and ilubmit them to no militry C ferences orconenions.Me::nme .u re to pre s to he utcr yor mrilitary advantE n L I. Scxretary or IWAr.
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1865.] EN O THE WRn. 365heorders of General Sherman to General Stoneman to withdraw fromSalisbury and join m will probably open the way for Davis to escape toMexico or Europe with his pluner which is reportd to be very large, in-cluding not only the plunder of the Richmond banks, but previous accumu-lations.A dispatch received by this department from Richmond says: "It isstated here, by respectble parties, that the amount of specie taken southby Jeff Davis and his partisans is very large, including not only the plunderof the Richmond bans, but previous accumulations. They hope, it is said,to make terms with eneral Sherman, or some other commander, by whichillbe permitte, with their effects, including this gold plunder, to goto Mexico or urope. Johnston's negotiations look to this end."After the cabinet meeting last night, General Grant started for NorthCarolina, to direct operations against Johnston's army.Enwix M. STANTON, Secretary of TFar.Here followed the terms, and Mr. Stanton's ten reasons forrejecting them.The publication of this bulletin by authority was an outrageon me, for Mr. Stanton had failed to communicate to me in ad-vane, as was his duty, the purpose of the Administration to limitour negotiations to purely military matters; but, on the contrary,at Savannah he had authorized me to control all matters, civiland military.By this bulletin, he implied that I had previously been fur-nished with a copy of his dispatch of March 3d to Generalrant, which was not so ; and he gave warrant to the impres-sion, which was sown broadcast, that I might be bribed by banker's gold to permit Davis to escape. Under the influenceof this, I wrote General Grant the following letter of April2th, which has been published in the Proceedings of the Comn-mittee on the Conduct of the War.I regarded this bulletin of Mr. Stanton as a personal andofficial insult, which I afterward publicly resented.HRnAQUARTERS MUITARY DIVISION Or THE MI1SISSIPPI,M THE FMLD, RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLIA, Apri 28, 1865.Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, Genera-in-CAief cskiigtof, D. C.GENEAL: Since you left me yesterday, I have seen the KYew YorkTimes of the 24th, containing a budget of military news, authenticated by:li~~lp4
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366 END OF THE AR. [16the signature of tho Secretary of War, 1on. E. M. Stanton, which isgrouped in such a way as to give the public very erroneous impressions.It embraces a copy of the basis of agreement between myselfJohnston, of April 18th, with comments, which it will be time enough to discuss two or three years hence, after the Government has experimented alittle mor in the machinery by which power eaches the scattered peopleof the vast country known as the "South."In the mean time, however, I did think that my rank (if not past ser-vices) entitled me at least to trust that the Secretary of War would keepsecret what was communicated for the use of none but the cabinfurther inquiry could be. made, instead of giving publicity to it alongwith documents which I never sa, and drawing therefrom inferences wideof the trth. I never saw or2had furnished ime a c f Lin-coin's dispatch to you of the d of arch, nor did Mr. Stanton or anyhuman being ever convey to me its substance, or any thing like it. On thecontrary, I had seen General Weitzel's invitation to the Virginia egisla-ture, made in Mr. Lincoln's very presence, and failed to discover any otherofficial hint of a plan of reconstruction, or any ideas calculated to allay thefears of the people of the South, after the deivil authorities would leave them without any government whatever.We should not drive a people into anarhy and it is simply impossiblefor our r military power to reach all the masses of their unhappy c I confess I did not desire to drive eneral Johnston's army into bandsof armed men, going about without purpose, and capabl onlyof infinitemischief. But you saw, on your arrival here, that I ad my army so dis-posed that his escape was only possible in a disorganized shape;andasyou did not choose to "direct military operations in this quarter," I in-ferred that you were satisfied with the military situation; at all events, theinstant I learned what \was proper enough, the disapproval of the President,I acted in such a manner as to compel the surrender of General Johston'swhole army on the same terms which you had prescried to Geral Lee'sarmy, when you had it surrounded and in your absolute power.Mr. Stanton, intating that my orders to General Stonman were likelyto result in the escape of "Mr. Davis to Mexico or Europe," is in deeperror. General Stonenan was not at "Salisbury," but ad gonebacktoStatesville." Davis was between us, and therefore Stoneman was beyondhim. By turning toward me he was approaching Davi, and, had inedme as ordered, I would have had a mounted force greatly needed ~rcapture, and for other purposes. Even now I don't know that Mr. Stantonwants Davis caught, and as my official papers, deemed sacred, re hastily' published to the world, it will be imprudent for me to state what has beenAs the editor of the Time has (it may be) logicall andfair drawn
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1865.] END OF THE WAR. 36?from this singular document the co usion that I am insubordinate, I canI have never in my life questioned or disobeyed an order, though manyand many a time have I risked my life, health, and reputatiohn, in obey-ingordersoreven hints to execute plans and purposes, not to my lik-ing. It is not fair to withhold from me the plans and policy of Government(if any there be), and expect me to guess at them; for facts and eventsappear quite diferent from different stand-points. For four years I havebeen in camp dealing with soldiers, and I ca assure you that the conclu-sion at which th cabinet arrived with such singular unanimity differs frommine. I onferred freely with the best officersin this army as to the pointsinvolved in this controversy, and, strange o sa, they were singularly unan-irous in the other conclusion. They will learn with pain and amaze-met tat I am deemed insubordinate, and wanting in common-sensethat I, who fr for years have labored day and night, winter and sum-mer, who have brought an army of seventy thousand men in magnificentcondition across a country hitherto deemed impassable, and placed it justwhereit was wanted, on the day appointed, have brought discredit on ourGoverinent! I do not wish to boast of this, but I do say that it en-titled me to the courtesy of being consulted, before publishing to theworld a proposition rightfully submitted to higher authority for adjudication, and then accompanied by statements which invited the dogs of the press to be let loose upon me. It is true that non-combatants, men whosleep in comfort and security while e watch on the distant lines, are bet-ter able to judge than we poor soldiers, who rarely see a newspaper, hardlyhear from our families, or stop long enough to draw our pay. I envy notthe task of "reconstruction," and am delighted that the Secretary of Warhas relieved me of it.Asyou did not undertake to assume the management of the affairs ofthis army, I infer that, on personal inspection, your mind arrived at a differ-ent conclusion fro that of the Secretary of War. I will therefore go onto execute your orders to the conclusion, and, when done, will with intense satisfaction lea the civil atherities the execution of the task o which they seem so jealous. But, as an honest man and soldier, I invite them togo back to ashville and follow my path, for they will see some things andhear some things that may disturb their philosophy.With sincere respect,W. T. SnusAN, iajor-General conimnding.P.S.-As Mr. Santon's most singular paper has been published, I de-mand that this also e made public, though I am in no manner responsito the press, but to the law, and my proper superiors.W. T. S., [ajor-General.~l" srsI~tllli l~l{
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368 END OF TIE WAR. [1565.On the 28th I summoned all the army and corps command-ers together at my quarters in the Governo's mansion atRaleigh, where every thing was explained to them, and all or-ders for the future were completed. Generals SchofeldTeryand Kilpatrick, were to remain on duty in the Department ofNorth Carolina, already commanded by General Schofield, andthe right and left wings were ordered to march under their re-spective commanding generals North by easy stages to Rich-mond, Virginia, there to await my return from the South.On the 29th of April, with a part of my personal staff, I proceeded by rail to Wilmington, North Carolina, where I found Generals Hawley and Potter, and the little steamer Russia,Captain Smith, awaiting me. After a short pause in Wilming-ton, we embarked, and proceeded down the coast to Port Royaland the Savannah River, which we reached on the st of May.There Captain Hosea, who had just come from General Wilsonat Macon, met us, bearing lettersfor me and General Grant, inwhich General Wilson gave a brief summary of his operationsup to date. Ie had marched from Eastport, ississippi, "hundred miles in thirty days, took six thousand three hundredprisoners, twenty-hree colors, and one hundred and fiftguns, defeating Forrest, scattering the militia, and destroyingevery railroad, iron establishment, and factory, in North Ala-bama and Georgia."He spoke in the highest terms of his cavalry, as cavalry,"claiming that it could not be xce~led, and, he regarded hiscorps as a model for modern cavalry in organization, armament,and discipline. Its strength was given at thirteenthousand fivehundred men and horses on reaching Macon. Of course I wasextremely gratified at his just confidence, nd sa that all bewanted for efficient action was a sure base of supply, so that heneed no longer depend for dothing, ammunition, food, andforage, on the country, which, now that war had ceased, it wasour solemn duty to protect, instead of plunder. I accordinglyordered the captured steamer Jeff. Davis to be loaded withstores, to proceed at once up the Savanh River to Augusta,with a small detachment of troops to occupy the arsenalandto
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1865.] END OF THE WAR. 369open communication with General Wilson at Macon; and onthe next day, May 2d, this steamer was followed by anotherwith a full cargo of cloting, suga coffee, and bread, sent fromHilton Head by the department commander, General Gillmore,with a stronger guard commanded by General Molineux.Leaving to General Gillmore, who was present, and in whosedepartment Genral Wilson was, to keep up the supplies atAugusta, and to facilitate as far as possible General Wilson'soperations inland, I began my return on the 2d of May. Wewent into Charleston Harbor, passing the ruins of old FortsMoultrie and Sumter without landing. We reached the cityof Charleston, which was held by part of the division of Gen-ral John P. Hatch, the same that we had left at Pocotaligo.We walked the old familiar streets-Broad, King, Meeting, etc.-but desolation and ruin were everywhere. The heart of thecity had been burned during the bombardment, and the rebelgarrison at the time of its final evacuation had fred the rail-road-depots, which fire had spread, and was only subdued byour troops after they had reached the city.I inquired for many of my old friends, but they were deador gone, and of them all I only saw a part of the family ofMrs. Pettigru. I doubt whether any city was ever more ter-ribly punished than Charleston, but, as her people had for yearsbeen agitating for war and discord, and had finally inauguratedthe civil war by an attack on the small and devoted garrison ofMajor Anderson, sent there by the General Government to de-fend them, the judgment of the world will be, that Charlestondeserved the fate that befell her. Resuming our voyage, wepassed into Cape Fear River by its mouth at Fort Caswell and Smithille, and ou by the new channel at Fort Fisher, andreached Morehead City on the 4th of May. We found there therevenue-cutter Wayanda, on board of which were the ChiefJustice, Mr. Chase, and his daughter Nettie, now rs. Hoyt.The Chief-Justice at that moment was absent on a visit to New-rn, but cameback the next day. Meantime, by means of theI was again in correspondence with General Schofieldat Raleigh. He had made great progress in parolling the oi
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370 END OF TH WA. [1865.cars and men of Johnston's army at Greensboro', but was em-arrassed by the utter confusion and anarchy that had resultedfrom a want of understanding on many minor points, and onthe political questions that had to be met at the instant. Inrcr to facilitate the return to their homes of the Confederateoaieers and men, he had been forced to make with GeneralJohnston the following supplemental terms, which were ofcourse ratified and approved :MILITARY CONVENTION OF APRIL 26, 1865.SUPPLEMENTAL TEEMS.1. The field transportation to be loaned to the troops for their march totheir homes, and for subsequent use in their industrial pursuits. Artillery-horses may be used in field-transportation, if necessary.2. Each brigade or separate body to retain a number of arms equal todepartment may direct.3. Private horses, and other private property of both officers and men,to be retained by them.4. The commanding general of the Military Division of West Mississippi,or-General Canby, will be requested to give transportation by water,from Mobile or New Orleans, to the troops from Arkansas and Texas.5. The obligations of ohfficers aend soldiers to be signed by their imme-diate commanders.included in the terms of this convention.J. M. Scuoiann, Majr-GenralCommending United States Forces in North Carolina.Commanding Confederate States Forces in North Caroline.fied, at Greensboro', North Carolina, as afterward officiallyreported, amounted to............ ...... ... ......... 30,817And the total number who surrendered in Georgia and Florida, asreported by General J. 1. Wilson, was........... ........ 52,453Aggregate surrendered under the capitulation of GeneralJ. E. Johnston ............................... 8,270On the morning of the 5th I also received from GeneralSchofield this dispatch:
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Sit seems, has been modied so as to IncludeS T .thinkit would be anactofwisdom toopent tat e at once.SGovernment will mke known its policy as to the 1 anso agovernment without delay. Affairs must necessarily be in a veryt tate until that is done. The people are nows in a moo to acceptgatanything which promises a definte settlement. "What is to be doneth freedmen?" is the question of all, and it is the sh-important quesi t requires prompt and wise action to prevent th negroes frotm be-o g a huge elephant on our ands. If I am to govern this State, it isortant fo me to know it at once. If another is to be sent ere, it can-e doe too soo for e probably wll undo the most that I a havedone. I sha be gul to hear from yeofully, when you have time to ritaeI will send your message to General Wilson at once.J. M. ScoFIEL, Mfajr-General.I was utterly without instructions from any source on thepoints of General Schofield's inquiry, and under the existingstate of facts could not even advise him, for by this time I wasin possession of the second bulletin of -r. Stanton, publishedin all the Northern papers, with comments that assumed that Iwas a common traitor and a public enemy; and :high officialshad even instructed my own subordinates to disobey my lawfulorders. General lalleck, who had so long been in Washingtonas the chief of staff, had been sent on the 21st of April toRi nd to command the armies of the Potomac and James,in place of General Grant, who had transferred his headquartersto the natinal capital, and e (eneral allek) was thereforein supreme command in Virginia, while my command overNorth Carolina a never been revoked or modified.[Seenod Bu11e5 HaWAR DEp:lfrT, WASHnGTON, Apri 27-.30 A. M.To iAjor-Genral Dx:The department has received the following dispatch from Major-Gen-ral Hallek, cmmndig the Military Division of the James. Generals
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872 END OF THE WAR. 1885.Canby and Thomas were instructed some days ago that Sherman's arrange-mets with Johnston wer disapproved by the President, and they wereordered to disregard it and push the enemy in very directidn.E. M. SrANON, SecretarU of War.Eiooniq-, YiserssA, April 2--30 P. MGenerals Mee, Sheridan, and Wright, are acting under orders to payno regard to any truce or orders of eneral Sherman respecting hostilities,on the ground that Sherman's agreement could bind his command only, and no other.They are directed to push forward, regardless of orders from any oneexcept from General Grant, and cut off Johnston's retreat.Beauregard has telegraphed to Danville that a new arrangement hasbeen made with Sherman, and that the advance of the Sixth Corps was tobe suspended until farther orders.I have telegraphed back to obey no orders of Sherman, but to push for-ward as rapidly as possible.The bankers here have information to-day that Jeff. Davis's specie ismoving south from Goldsboro', in wagons, as fast as possible.I suggest that orders be telegraphed, through General Thomas, thatWilson obey no orders from Sherman, and notifying him and Canby, andall commanders on the Mississippi, to take measures to intercept the rebelchiefs and their plunder.The specie taken with them is estimated here at from six to thirteenmillion dollars.Subsequently, before the Committee on the Conduct of theWar, in Washington, on the 22d of May, I testified fully on thiswhole matter, and will abide the judgment of the country onthe patriotism and wisdom of my public conduct in this connec-tion. General lalleck's measures to capture Gnral Johnston'sarmy, actually surrendered to me at the time, at Greensboro'onthe 26th of .April, simply excited my contempt for a judgmentsuch as he was supposed to possess. The assertion that JefE.Davis's specie-train, of six to thirteen million dollars, was re-ported to be moving south from Goldsboro' in wagons as fast aspossible, found plenty of willing ears, though my army of eightythousand men had been at Goldsboro' from March 22d to thedate of his dipatch, April 26th; and such a trainwouldhave
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been composed of from fifteen to thirty-two six-mule teams tohave hauled this specie, even if it all were in gold. I supposethe exact amount of treasure which Davis a with him is nowknown to a cent; some of it was paid to his escort, when it dis-anded at and near Washington, Georgia, and at the time of hiscapture h ad a small parcel of gold and silver coin, not to ex-ceed ten thousand dollas, which isnow retained in the nitedStates Treasury-vault at Washington, and shown to the curious.The thirteen millions of treasure, with which ef. Davis wasto corrupt our armies and buy his escape, dwindled down to thecontents of a hand-valise!To say that I was merely angry at the tone and substance ofthese published bulletins of the War Depart ent, would hardlyexpressthe state of my feelings. I was outraged beyond meas-ure, and was resoled to resent the insult, cost what it might. Iwent to the Wayanda and showed them to Mtir. Chase, with whomI had a long and frank conversation, during which hie explainedto me the confusion caused in Washington by the assassinationof Mr. Lincoln, the sudden accession to power of Mr. Johnson,who was then supposed to be bitter and evindictive in his feel-ings toward the South, and the wild pressure of every class ofpolitiians to enforce on the new President their pet schemes.He showed me a letter of his own, which was in print, datedBaltimore, April 11th, and another of April 12th, addressed tothe President, urging hi to recognize the freedmen as equal hnall respects to the whites. He was the first man, of any authori-tyor station, who ever infored me that the Government of theUnited States would insist on extending to the former slaves ofthe South the elective franchise, and he gave as a reason thefact that he slaves, grateful for their freedom, for which theywere indebted to the armies and Government of the North,would by their votes, offset the disaffected and rebel element ofthe white population of the South. At that time quite a stormwas prevailing at sea, outside, and our two vessels lay snug at thewharfat Morehead City. I saw a good deal of Mr. Chase, andseveral notes passed between us, of which I have the originalsyet. Always claiming that the South had herself freed all her
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37 FND OF THE WVAR. [186saves by rebellion, and that Mr. Lincoln's prolamation of free-don (of September 22, 62) was bindingon all oficers of theGeneral Government, I doubted the wisdom of at on clothingthem with the elective franchise, without some previoust and qualification; and the realized th national lss in thedeath at that critical moment of Mr. Lincoln, who had longpondered over the dificult questions nvolved, who, at allevents, world have been honest and frank and would not haveithheld from his army commanders at least a hint that wouldhave been to them a guide. It wa plain to me, therefore, thatthe manner of his assassination had stampeded the civiauthori-ties in Washington,had unnerved them, and tt they were thenundecided as to the measures indispensably necessary to prevent anarchy at the South.On the 7th of May the storm subsided, and we put to sea,Mr. Chase to the south, on his proposed tour as far as NOrleans, and I for James River. I reached Fortress Monroe onthe h, and thence telegraphed y arival to General Grant,asking f o rders. I found at Fortress onroa dispatch fromGeneral Ilalleck, professing great friendship, and inviting meto accept his hospitality at Richmond. I answered by a cipherdispatch that I ad seen his dispatch to r. S tanton, of April26th, embraced in the secod bulletin, which Ias in-sulting, declined his hospitality, and added that I preferedwe should not meet as I passed through Richmond. I thenceproceeded to City Point in the Russia, and on to Manchester,opposite Richmond, via Petersburg, by rail. I found that bothwings of the army had arrived from Raligh, and wre in cain and around Manchester, whence I again telegraphed GeneralGrant, on the 9th of May, for orders, and also reported my arri-val to General Halleck by letter. I found that GeneralHalleckhad ordered General Davis's corps (the Fourteenth) for reviewby himself. This I forbade. All the army knew of the insultthat had been made rne by the Secretary of War and GeneralHlalleek, and watched me closely to see if I would tamely sub-mit. During the 9th I made a full and complete report of allthese events, from the last report made at Goldsboro' up to
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181Q END OF TE WA. odate, and the next day received orders to continue the marchto Alexandria, near Ws hington.On the morning of the 11th we crossed the pontoon-bridgeat Richmond, marched through that city, and out on the Han-over Court-House road, General Slocum's left wing leading.The right wing (General Logan) followed the next day, viz.,the 12th. Meantime, General 0. Howard had been sum-moned to Washington to take charge of the new Bureau ofRefugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, and, from that timetill the army was finally disbanded, General John A. Loganwas in command of the right wing, and of the Army of theTennessee. The left wing marched through Hanover Court-Hoeand thence took roads well to the left by Chilesburg; theForteenth Corps by New Market and Culpepper, Manasas, etc.;the Twentieth Corps by Spotsylvania Court-House and Chan-clorsville. The right wing followed the more direct road byFredericksburg. On my way north I endeavored to see as muchof the battle-fields of the Army of the Potomac as I could, andtherefore shifted from one column to the other, visiting en routHanover Court-house, Spotsylvania, Fredericksburg, Dumfries,et., reaching Alexandria uring the afternoon of May 19th,and pitched my camp by the road-side, about half-way between Alexandria and the Long Bridge. During the same and nextdaythe whole army reached Alexandria, and camped round aboutit; General Meade's Army of the Potomac had possession of thecamps above, opposite Washington and Georgetown.The next day (by invitation) I went over to Washingtonand met many friends-among them General Grant and Presi-dent Joson. The latter occupied rooms in the house on thecorner of Fiftenth and Streets belonging to Mr. ooper.He was extremely ordial to me, and nowing that I was chafingunder the ensures of the War Department, especially of thetwo war bulletins of Mr. Stanton, he volunteered to say that heknew of neither of them till seen in the newspapers, and thatMr. Stanton had shown neither to him nor to any of his asso-ates in the cabinet till they were published. Nearly all themembers of the cabinet made similar assurances to me after-
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ward, and, as Mr. Stanton made no friendly advances, and offeredno word of explanation or apology, I declined General Grant's friendly offices fora recon ciliation, but, on the contrary, resolved to rent what I considered an insult, s publicly as it wasmade.My brother, Senator Sherman, who was Mr. Stanton's neighbor,ays insisted that Mr. Staton had been frightened by theintended assassination of himself, and had become embitteredthereby. At all events, I found strong military guards aroundhis house, as well as all the houses occupied by the cabinet andby the principal officers of Government; anda sense of insecutypervaded Washington, for which no reason existed.then near Washington; General Meade's to occur on Tuesday, May 23d, mine on Wednesday, the 2thb; and on the 20th Imade the necessary orders for my part. eantie I had alsoarranged (with General Grant's approval) to remove, after thereview, my armies from the south side of the Potomac to thenorth; both for convenience and because our men had foundthat the grounds assigned them had been used so long for campsthat they were foul and unfit.By invitation I was on the reviewing-stand, and witnessedthe review of the Army of the Potomac (on the 23d), com-inanded by General Meade in person. The day was beautiful,lnd the pageant was superb. Washington was full of strangers,who filled the streets in holidaydress, and every house was decorated with flags. The army marched by divisions in close co-umn around the Capitol, down Pennsylvania Avenue, past thePresident and cabinet, who occupied a large stand prepared forthe occasion, directly in front of the White House.I had telegraphed to Lancaster for Mrs. Shernan, who ar-rived that day, accompanied by her father, the Hon. ThomasEwing, and my son Tom, then eight years old.During the afternoon and night of the 23d, the Fifteenth,Seventeenth, and Twentieth Corps, crossed Long Bridge,bivouaceked in the streets about the Capitol, and th Fourteenth....
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1865] END OF THE WAR. 3 7Corps closed up to te bridge. The morning of the 24th wasextremely beautiful, and the ground was in splendid order for our review. The streets were filled with people to see thepageant, armed with bouquets of flowers for their favorite regi-ments or heroes, and every thing was propitious. Punctuallyat 9 A. m. the signal-gun was fired, when in person, attended byGeneral Howard and all my staff, I rode slowly down Pennsylvania Avenue, the crowds of men, women, and children, denselyliningthesidwalks, and almost obstructing the way. We werefollowed close by General Logan and the head of the FiteenthC When reached the Treasury-building, and looked back,the sight was simply magnificnt. The column was compact,and the glittering muskets looked like a solid mass of steel,moving with the regularity of a pendulum. We passed theTreasury-building, in front of which and of the White Housewas an immense throng of people, for whom extensive standshad been prepared on both sides of the avenue. As I nearedthe brick-house opposite the lower corner of Lafayette Square,some one asked me to notice Mr. Seward, who, still feeble andbandaged for his wounds, had been removed there that hemight behold the troops. I moved in that direction and tookof my hat to Mr. Seward, who sat at an upper window. Herecognized the salute, returned it, and then we rode on stead-ly past the President, saluting with our swords. All on hisstand arose and acknowledged the salute. Then, turning intothe gate of the presidential grounds, we left our horses withorderlies, and went upon the stand, where I found Mrs. Sher-, with her father and son. Passing them, I shook handswith the President, General Grant, and each member of thecabinet. As I approached Mr. Stanton, he offered me his hand,but I delined it publicly, and the fact was universally noticed.I then took my post on the left of the President, and for sixhours a bfstood,while the army passed in the order ofthe Fift th, Seventeenth, Twentieth, and Fourteenth Corps.It wasin my judgment, the most magnificent army in existence-sixty-five thousand men, in splendid pysique, who had justcomleted a marhof nearly two thousand miles in a hostile coun-
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37S END OF THE WAR. [185try, in good drill, and who realized that they were being closelyscrutinized by thousands of their fellow-countrymen and by foreigners. Division after division passed, each commander ofarmy corps or division coming on the stand during the passagef hi command, to be presented to the President, cabinet, aspectators. The steadiness and firmness of the tread, the carefuldress on the guides, the uniform intervals between the com-panies, all eyes directly to the front, and the tattered and bullet-riven flags, festooned with flowers, all attracted universal notice. Many good people, up to that time, had looked upon or West-ern army as a sort of mob; but the world then saw, and reo-nized the faet, that it was an ary in the proper sense, wellorganized, well commanded and disciplined and there wasno wonder that it had swept through the South like a tornado. For six hours and a half that strong tread of the Armyof the West resounded along Pennsylvania Avenue; not a soulof that vast crowd of spectators left his lace and, when therear of the column had passed by, thousands of the spectatorsstill lingered to express their sense of conidence in he strengthof a Government which could claim such an army.Some little scenes enlvened the day, and alled for thelaughter and cheers of the crowd. Each divis was followedby six ambulances, as a representative of its baae-train.Some of the division commanders had added, by way of variety,goats, milch-cows, and pack-mules, whose loads consisted ofgame-cocks, poultry, hams, ec., and some of them had thefamilies of freed slaves along, with the women leading theirchildren. Each division was preceded by its corps of blackpioneers, armed with picks and sp .These abin double ranks, keeping perfect dress and step, and added muchto the interest of the occasion. On the whole, the grand rviewwas a splendid success, and was a fitting conclusion to the ear-paign and the war.I will now conclude by a copy of my general orders takingleave of the army, which ended my connection with the war,thouh I afterward visited and took a more formal leave of theofficers and men on July 4, 1865, at Louisville Kentucky:
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1865.] END OFi THE WAR. 3[Special Field Orders, No. 76]lIEA.UAnraS MILTrrAY D1V18 o me issssspi,Lv THE FIELn, ABN.N, D. C., a 30, 186.The gener comanding announces to the Armis of the Tennessee andGeorgia that the time has coe for us to part. Our work is done and armed enemies no longer defy us. Some of you will go to your homes, and otherswillbe retained in military service till further orders.And now that we are allbouttoseparate, to inglwith the civil world, it becomes a pleasing duty to recall to mind the situation of national affairswhen, but little more than a year ago, we were gathered about the chlsof LookoutMountain, and all the future was wrapped in doubt and uncerThree armies had come together from distant field, with separate his-tories, yet bound by one common cause-the union of our country, and theperpetuation of the Government of our inheritance. There is no need torecall to your memories Tunnel Hill, with Rocky-Face Mountain and Buz-zard-Roost p, and the ugly forts of Dalton behind.We were in earnest, and paused not for danger and difficulty, but dashedthrough Snake-Creek Gap and fell oa Resaca; then on to the Etowah, toDallas Kenesaw and the heats of summer found us on the banks of theChatta efar from hoe, and dependent on a single road for supplies.Again we were n to e held back by any obstacle and crossed over andfoughtour ard battles for the possession of the citadel of Atlanta. Thatwasth crisis of our history. A doubt still clouded our future, but wesolved the problem, destroyed Atlanta, struck boldly across the State ofGorg severed i the main arteries of life to our enemy, and Christ-mas found us at Savannah.Waitingthere only long enough to fill our wagos, we ain beganmarch which, for peril, lbor and results, will compare with any ever adeby anThe floods of the Savannah, the swamps of theCo ee an Edisto, the gh hills" and rocks of the Santee, the flatquagmires of the ed and Cape Fear Rivers, were all pased in mid-winterwith its floo and rins, in the face of an acumulating enemy;and, after the btt of rsboro' and Bentonsville, we once more cameout of the wilderness, to meet our frien Eoldsboro. Even then wepaused only long enough to gt new clothing, o relad our wagons againpushed on to Raleigh and beyond, until we met our enemy suing forpeace, instead of war, and offering to submit to the injured laws of his andour country. As long as that enemy was dfiant, or mountains nor riversnor swamps, nor hungr, nor cold, ad checked us ; but when he, who hatfoght us hard and persitently, offered submission, your general tought itwrongtopursue hi farther,and negotiations followed, which esulted,How far the operations of this army contri buted to the final overthrow
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380 E11 E WVAR. [1OF56.of the Confederacy and th peace which nw wn upon us, bejudged by others, not by us; but that you av done all that en d dohas been admitted by those in athoity and we have a right to jointheuniversal joy that fills our land because the war is over, and our Governmentstands vindicated before the world by the joint action of the vonteer:les and navy of the United States.To such as remain in the service, your gneralned only r yothat success in the past was due to hard werk and discipline, and that thesame work and discipline are equaly important i the ture. To ch asgo home, he will only say that our favored country isso rand, so extenso diversified in climate, soil, and productions, that every man may find ahome and occupation suited to his tast; none ou yied to te nat-ural impatience sure to result from our pastlife of excment and dvent-re. You will be invited to seek new adventurs ab ; do not yieldto the temptation, for it will lead only to death an dispp tment.Your general now bids you farewell, with the full belief tat, as in waryou have been good soldiers, so in peace you will make goodif, unfortunately, new war hould arise in our countrySheman's army"will be the first to bckle on its old aror, and come frth defed andmaintain the Government of our inheritance.By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman,L. M. DAO, Assistnt Adjut t-Geral.tof the n States Forces under Command of ijor-enera W. T.SnxxSt, United States Army, during is Campaigns in 1863-4-'.I. il FFo Viksbrg to Meridian, and back... .5 .From ephtoChattnooa......... ......... From Chattanooga to Knoaville and back 1 .... 2Fom Chattanooga to Htvill (PaintRock Lngton, etc., and back ............... 4F Clifton to Rome ...... ............ .... .... .... ...rom chatanog to Atlanta4 .rage$diatance travereed in man. ).... .... 17S 5 17 5 5 07 1,0IPuruit of ood, and backto Atlata..........270 20 2 7FromAtlantatoSa.. ....................2553 260. .. .25 R'From Goldsboro' to washing ta, 0... ......... 4 -M .... .aTotal ditance in milea ............. 11 2 I 6 2,2 1 0 z1S 2,7er ,2Compiled from campaign maps at headquarters ilitry ivision of theMississippi, St. Louis, Missouri. WILLIA Ko SAex, CpaAdditional Adep Eniner uty.
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CHAPTER XXLV.CONCLUSION-TIIATARY LESSONS OF THE WAH.HAVnio thus recorded a summary of events, mostly undermy own personal supervision, during the years from 1846 to1865, it seems proper that I should add an opinion of some ofthe useful military lessons to be derived therefrom.That civil war, by reason of the existence of slavery, wasapprehended by most of the leading statesmen of the half-cen-tury preceding its outbreak, is a matter of notoriety. General Scott told me on my arrival at New York, as early as 1850, thatthe country was on the eve of civil war; and the Southern poli-ticians openly asserted that it was their purpose to accept as acass bell the election of General Frent in 186; but, fortu-tely or unfortunately, he was beaten by Mr. Buchanan, whichsimply postponed its occurrence for four years. Mr. Sewardhad also publicly declared that no government could possibly exist half slave and half free; yet the Government made nomilitary preparation, and the Northern people generally paidno attention, took no warning of its coming, and would notrealze it existence til Fort Sumter was fired on by batteries ofartillery, handled by declared enmies, from the surroundingislands and from the city of Charleston.General ragg, who certainly was a man of intelligence, and who, in earlylife, ridiculed a thousand times, in my hearing, thethreats of the people of South Carolina to secede from the Fed-oral Union, said to me in New Orleans, in February, 1861, thathe was convinced that the feeling between the slave and freeStates had become so embittered that it was better to part in
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382 MILITARY LESSONS OF THE WAR. [1861-T65.peace; better to part. anyhow; and, as a separation was in-evitable, that the South should begin at once, because the possi-ility of a successful effortwas earl lessened bytherapidandincreasing inequality between the two sections, from the factthat all the European immigrants were coming to the NorthernStates and Territories, and none ito the Southern.The slave population n 1860 was near four millions, andthe money value thereof not far from twenty-five hundred mill-ion dollars. Now, ignoring the moral side of the question, acause that endangered so vast a moneyed interest was an ade-quate cause of anxiety and preparation, and the Northern lead-ers surely ought to have foreseen the danger and prepared forit. After the election of Mr. Lincoln in 1860, there was noSouth. In Louisiana, as I have related, men were openly en-listed, oficers were appinted, and war was actually begun, inJanuary, 1861. The forts at the mouth of the Mississippi wereStates flag and hoisted that of the State. The United StatesArsenal at Baton Rouge was captured by New Orleans militia,its garrison ignominiously sent off, and the contents of thearsenal distributed. These were as much acts of war as was thesubsequent firing on Fort Surter, yet no public notice wastaken thereof ; and when, months afterward, I care North, Ifound not one single sign of preparation. It was for this reason,somewhat, that the people of the South became convinced thatthose of the North were pusillanimous and cowardly, and theSouthern leaders were thereby enabled to commit their peopleto the war, nominally in defense of their slave property. Upto the hour of the firing on Fort Sumter, in April, 1881, it doesseem to me that our public men, our politicians, were blamablefor not sounding the note of alarm.Then, when war was actually began, it was by a call forseventy-five thousand ninety-day" men, I suppose to fulfill Mr. Seward's prophecy that the war would last but ninety days.The earlier steps by our political Government were extremelywavering and weak, for which an excuse can be found in the.g iii i i
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fact that any of the Southern representatives remained inCongress, sharing in the public councils, and influencing legisla-tion. But as soon as Mr. Lincoln was installed, there was nolonger any reason why Congress and the cabinet should haveahesitated. They should have measured the cause, provided themeans, and left the Executive to apply the remedy.At the time of Mr. Lincoln's inauguration, viz., March 4,1861, the Regula Army, by law, consisted of two regiments ofdragoons, two regiments of cavalry, one regiment of mountedriles, four regiments of artillery, and ten regiments of infan-tr, admitting of an aggregate strength of thirteen thousandand twenty-four officers and men. On the subsequent 4th ofMay the resident, by his own orders (afterward sanctioned byCongress), added a regiment of cavalry, a regiment of artillery,and eight regients of infantry, which, with the former army,admitted of a strength of thirty-nine thousand nine hundredand seventy-three; but at no time during the war did the Rega-lar Arry attain a strength of twenty-five thousand men.To the new regiments of infantry was given an organizationdiffering from any that had heretofore prevailed in this country-of three battalions of eight companies each; but at no timedid more than one of these regiments attain its full standard;nor in the vast army of volunteers that was raised during thewar were any of the regiments of infantry formed on the three-battalion system, but these were universally single battalions often companies; so that, on the reorganization of the RegularArmy at the close of the war, Congress adopted the form ofStwelve companies for the regiments of cavalry and artillery, andthat of ten companies for the infantry, which is the presentInasmuch as the Regular Army will naturally form thestandard of organization for any increase or for new regimentsof volunteers, it becomes important to study this subject in thelight of past experience, and to select that form which is bestfor peace as well as war.A cavalry regiment is now composed of twelve companies,usually divided into six squadrons, of two companies each, or"
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384 MILITARY LESSONS OF THE WAR. [1861-65.better subdivided into three battalions of four companies eacThis is an excellent form, easily admitting of subdivision as wellas union into larger masses.A single battalion of four companies, it a feld-offcer,compose good body for a garriso, for a separate expe-dition, or for a detachment; and, in war, three regiments wouldcompose a good brigade, three brigades a division, and threedivisions a strong cavalry corps, such as was f ed and foughtby Generals Sheridan and Wilson during the war.In the artillery arm, the officers differ widely n their opinionof the true organization. A single company forms a battery,and habitually each battery acts separately, though sometimesseveral are united or massed" but theseal a t in concertwith cavalry or infantry.Kevertheless, the regimental organization for artillery hasalways been maintained in this country for classification andpromotion. Twelve companies compose a regiment, and, thoughprobably no colonel ever commanded his full regiment in theform of twelve batteries, yet in peace they occupy oursea-coast forts or act as infantry; then the regiental organiza-tion is both necessary and convenient.But the infantry composes the great mass of all armies, andthe true form of the regiment or nit has been the subject ofinfinite discussion; and, as I have stated, during the civil warthe regiment was a single battalin of ten companies. In oldentimes the regiment was composed of eight battalion companiesand two flank ompanies. The first and tenth companies were armed with rifles, and were styled and ued as skirmishers ;but during the war they were never used exclusively for thaspecial purpose, and in fact no distinction existed between themand the other eight companies.The ten-company organization is awkward in practice, and Iam satisfied that the infantry regiment shonild have the sameidentical organization as exists for the cavalry and artillery, viz.,twelve companies, so as to be susceptible of division in tbattalions of four companies each.These companies should habitually be about one hundred
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men strong, giving twelve hundred to a regiment, which inpractice would settle down to about one thousand men.Three such regiments wild compose a brigade, threegad a division, and three divisions a corps. Then, by allowiingto an infantry corps a brigade of cavalry and six batteries ofeld-artillerywewould have an efficient cos rm of thirtythousand men, whose organization would be simple and mosteficient, and whose strength should never be allowed to fallbelow twenty-five thousand men.The corps is the true unit for grand campaigns and battle,should have a full and perfect staff, and every thing requi-site for separate action, ready at all times to be detached andsent of for any ature of servie. The general in commandshould have the rank of 1ieutenant-general, and should be, byexperience and education, equal to any thing in war. Habituallywith us he was a major-general, specially selected and assignedto the conuand by an order of the President, constituting, infact, a separate grade.The divisin is the unit of administration, and is the legiti-mate command of a major-general.The brigade is the next subdivision, and is comimandd by abrigadier-general.The reginent is the family. The colonel, as the father,should have a personal acquaintance with every officer and man,and should instill a feeling of pride and affection for himself, sothat his officers and men would naturally look to him for per-sonal advice and instruction. In war the regiment should neverbe subdivided, bit should always be maintained entire: Inpeace this s impossible.The company is the true unit of disipline, and the captainis the company. A good captain makes a good company, andhe should have the power to reward as well as punish. The factthat soldiers would naturally like to have a good fellow for theircaptain is the best reason why he should be appointed by thecolonel, orby some superior authority, instead of being electedby the men.In the tUited States the people are the sovereign," all51
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power originally proceeds from them, and therefore the eletionof offcers by the men is the common rule. This is wrong, be-cause an arny is not a popular organization, but an animatedmacine, an instrument in the hands of the Executive for en-the w, and maintaining the honor and dignity of thenation; and the President, as the constitutional commander-in-chief of the army and navy, should exercise the power of ap-pointment (subject to the confirmation of the Senate) of theofficers of volunteers," as well as of regulars"No army can be eficient unless it be a unit for action; andthe power must come from above, not from below : the Presi-dent usually delegates his power to the commander-inchief,and he to the next, and so on down to the 1bwest actual con-mander of troops, however small the detachment. No matterhow troops come together, when once united, the highest offcerin rank is held responsible, and should be consequently armedwith the fullest power of the Executive,subject only to law andexisting orders. The more simple the principle, the greater thelikelihood of determined action; and the less a commandingofficer is circumscribed by bounds or by precedent, the greateris the probability that he will make the best use of his commandand achieve the best results.The Regular Army and the Military Academy at West Pointhave in the past provided, and doubtless will in the future pro-vide an ample supply of good officers for future wars; but, shouldtheir numbers be insufficient, we can always safely rely on thegreat number of young men of education and force of characterthroughout the country, to supplement them. At the close ofour civil war, lasting four years, some of our best corps anddivision generals, as well as staffefficers, were from civil life;but I cannot recall any of the most successful who did not ex-press a regret that he had not received in earlv life instruction in the elementary principles of the art of war, instead of beingforced to acquire this knowledge in the dangerous and expensiveschool of actual war.But the real diffculty was, and will be again, to obtam anadequate number of good soldiers. We tried almost overy sys
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1861-'65.] ILTARY .LESSNS UOF THE WAR,. 3Stem known to modern nations, all with more or less success-voluntary enlistments, the draft, and bought substitutes-an Ithink that all oicers of experience will confirm my assertionthat th men who voluntarily enlisted at the outbreak of thewar were the best, better than the conscript, and far better thanthe bought substitute. When a regiment is once organized in aState, and mustered into the service of the United States, theofficers and men become subject to the same laws of disciplineand government as the regular troops. They are in no sensemilitia," but compose a part of the Army of the UnitedStates, only retain their State title for convenience, and yetmay be principally recruited from the neighborhood of theiroriginal organization. Once organized, the regiment should bekept full by recruits, and when it becomes difficult to obtainmore recruits the pay should be raised by Congress, instead oftempting new men by exaggerated bounties. I believe it would'ave been more economical to have raised the pay of the soldierto thirty or even fifty dollars a month than to have held out thepromise of three hundred and even six hundred dollars in theform of bounty. Toward the close of the war, I have often heard the soldiers complain that the "stay-at-home" men gotbetter pay, bounties, and food, than they who were exposed toall the dangers and vicissitudes of the battles and marches atthe front. The feeling of the soldier should be that, in everyevent, the sympathy and preference of his goverunment is forhim who fights, rather than for him who is on provost or guardduty to the rear, and, like most men, he measures this by theamount of pay. Of course, the soldier must be trained to obedience, and should be content with his wages;" but whoeverhas commanded an army in the 'field knows the difference be-tween a willing, contented mass of men, and one that feels acause of grievance. There is a soul to an army as well as to theindividual man, and no general can accomplish the full work ofhis army unless he commands the soul of his men, as well astheir bodies and legs.The greatest mistake made in our civil war was in the modeof recruitment and promotion. When a regiment became re-
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898 MILITARY LESSONS OF'TIE WAR. [1861-'65.duced by the necessaryI wear and tear of service, instead of be-ing filled up at the bottom, and the vacancies among theofficers filled from the best non-conmissioned officers and ren,the habit was to raise new regiments, with new colons, capI me ileavingtheoldand experienced battalions todwindle away into mere skeleton organizations. I believe withthe volunteers this matter was left to the States exclusively, andI remember that Wisconsin kept her regiments filled with re-its, whereas other tates generally filled their quotas by newregiments, and the result was that we estimated a Wisconsin re-giment equal to an ordinary brigade. I believe that five hun-dred new men added to an old and experienced regiment weremore valuable than a thousand men in the form of a new regi-ment, for the former by association with good, experienced cap-tains, lieutenants,..and non-commissioned officers, soon becameveterans, whereas the latter were generally unavailable for ayear. The German method of recruitment is simply perfect.and there is no good reason why we shuld not follow it substantially.On a road, marching by the ank,it would be considered" good order" to have five thousand men to a mile, so that afull corps of thirty thousand men would extend six miles, butith the average trains and batteries of artillery the probabili-ties are that it would draw out to ten miles. On a long andregular march the divisions and brigades should alternate in thelead, the leading division should be on the road by the earliestdawn, and march at the rate of about two miles, or, at most, two and a half miles an hour, so as to reach camp by noon. Eventhen the rear divisions and trains will hardly reach camp much before night. Theoretically, a marching column should preservesuch order that by simply halting and facing to the right or left,it would be n line of battle; but this is rarely the case, andgenerally deployments are made "forward," by conducting eachbrigade by the flank obliquely to the rigt or left to itsmate position in line of battle, and there deployed. In such aline of battle, a brigade of three thousad infantry would oc-cupy a mile of "front;" but for a strong line of battlefive
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1861-'.] MILITARY LESSONS OF THE WAR. 3Sthousand men with two batteries should be allowed to each mile,or a division would habitually constitute a double line withskirmishers and reserve on a mile of "front."The "feeding" of an army is a matter of the most vital -portanceanddeands the earliest attention of the general in-trusted with a campaign. To be strong, healthy, and capable ofthe largest measure of physical effort, the soldier needs aboutthree pounds gross of food per day, and the horse or mule abouttwenty pounds. When a general frst estimates the quantity offood and forage needed for an army of fifty or one hundredthousand men, he is apt to be dismayed and here a good staff isindispensable, though the general annot throw off on them theresponsibility. He must give the subject his personal attention,for the army reposes in him alone, iand should never doubt thefact that their existence overrides in importace all other con-siderations Once satisfied of this, and that all has been donethat can be, the soldiers are always willing to bear the largestmeasure of privation. Probably no army ever had a morevaried experience in this regard than the one I commanded in1804-'65.Our base of supply was at Nashville, supplied by railwaysand the Cumberland River, thence by rail to Chattanooga, a"secondary base," and thence forward a single-track railroad.The tores came forward daily, but I endeavored to have onhand a full supply for twenty days in advance. These stores were habitually in the wagon-trains, distributed to corps, dvi-sions, and regiments, in charge of experienced quartermastersand commissaries, and became subject to the orders of the gen-erals commanding these bodies. They were generally issued onprovision returns, but these had to obe closely scrutinized, fortoo often the colonels would make requisitions for provisionsfor more men than they reported for battle. Of course, thereare always a good many non-combatants with an army, but, aftercareful study, Ilimited their amount to twenty-five per cent. ofthe "ffective strength," and that was found to be liberal. Anordinary army-wagon drawn by six mules may be counted on tocarry three thousand pounds net, equal to the food of a full... l
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0 MILITARY LESSONS OF THE WAR. [1861-'60.regiment for one day, but, by driving along beef-cattle, a com-missary may safely count the contents of
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1861-'65.] MILITARY LESSONS OF THE WAR. 391Where an army is near one of our many large navigableplied witI the full army ration, which is by far the best fur-nished t any army in America or Europe;. but when it iscompelled to operate awayfrom such a base, and is dependenton its own train of wagons, the commanding officer must exer-cise a wise discretin in the selection of his stores. n myopinion there is no better food for man than beef-cattle drivenon the hoof, issued liberally, with salt, bacon, and read. Coffeehas also become almost indispensable, though many substituteswere found for it, such as Indian-con, roasted, ground, andboiled as colffee; the sweet-potato, and the seed of the okraplant prepared in the same way. All these were used by thepeople of the South, who for years could procure no coffee, butI noticed that the women always begged of us some rcal coffee,which seems to satisfy a natural yearning or craving morepowerful than can be accounted for on the theory of habit.Therefore I would always advise that the coffee and sugar ra-tion be carried along, even at the expense of bread, for whichthere are many substitutes. Of these, Indian-corn is the bestand most abundant. Parched in a frying-pan, it is excellentfood, or if ground, or pounded and boiled with meat of anysort, it makes a most nutritious meal. The potato, both Irisha sweet, fons an excellent substitute for bread, and at Savan-nah we found the rice also suitable, both for men and animals.For the former it should be cleaned of its husk in a hominyblock, easily prepared out of a log, and sifted with a coarse corn-bag; but for horses it should be fed in the straw. During theAtlanta campaign we were supplied by our regular commissa-ries with all sorts of patent compounds, such as desiccated vege-tables, and concentrated milk, meat-biscuit, and sausages, butsomehow the men preferred the simpler and more familiarforms of food, and usually styled these "desecrated vegetablesand consecrated milk." We were also supplied liberally withlime-juice, sauerkraut, and pickles, as an antidote to scurvy, andI now recall the extreme anxiety of my medical director, Dr.Kittoe, about the scurvy, which he reported at one time as spread
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392 MILITARY LESSONS OF THE WAR. [1s61-'65.ing and imperiling the army. This occurred at a crisis aboutKenesaw, when the railroad was taxed to its utmost capacity toprovide the necessary anmnnition, food, and forage, and couldnot possibly bring us an adequate supply of potatoes and cab-e the usual antiscorbutics, when providentially the black-ripencd and proved an admirable antidote, and I haveknown the skirmish-line, without orders, to fight a respectablebattle for the possession of some old fieles that were full ofblackberries. Soon, thereafter, the green carn or roasting-earcamie into season, and I heard no more of the scurvy. Ourcountry abounds with plants which can be utilized for a preven-tion to the scurvy; besides the above are the persinuon, thesassafras root and bud, the wild-mustard, the agave," turnip-tops, the dandelion cooked as greens, and a decotion of the ordi-nary pineleaf.For the more delicate and costly articles of food for the sickwe relied mostly on he agents f the anitary Co ission. Idonot wish to doubt the value of these organizations, which gainedso much applause during our civil war, for no one can questionthe motives of these charitable and generous people; but to behonest I must record an opinion that the Sanitary Commissionshould limit its operations to the hospitals at the rear, and shouldnever appear at the front. They were generally local in feel-ing, aimed to furnish their personal friends and neighbors witha better class of food than the Government supplied, and theconsequence was, that one regiment of a brigade would receive potatoes and fruit which would be denied another regiment closeby. Jealousy would be the inevitable result, and in an army allparts should be equal; there should be no partiality, favor, oraffection." The Government shod supply all ssential wants,and in the hospitals to the rear will be found abundant oppor-tunities for the exercise of all possible charity and generosity.During the war I several times gained-the ill-will of the agents ofthe Sanitary Commission because I forbade their coming to thefront unless they would consent to distribute their stores equallyamong all, regardless of the parties who had contrited them.The sick, wounded, and dead of an army are the subjects of4ll ii ii ii i iiiiiiiiiiii~i+@ i+ +d!iiii + +i~+ + i i siiiiiiiiiiii i~ ~n ~ a L iii~i~ ii iii 3 ~~iiiiiiiiiiiiii!ii~~ii~iiiiii~ iiiii! iiii~iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii, .................................................. ..... .............. .. ....,, + + +
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the greatest possible anxiety, and add an immense amount oflabor to the well men. Each regiment in an active campaignshould have a surgeon d two assistants always close at hand,and each brigade and division should have an experienced sur-geon as a medical director. The great majority of wounds andof sickness should be treated by the regimental surgeon, on thegroundundertheeye of the colonel As few should be sentto the brigade or iviion hospital s possibe, for the men alwaysreceive better are with their own regiment than with strangers,and as a rule the cure is more ertain; but when men receivedisabling wounds, or have sickness likely to become permanent,the sooner they go far to the rear the better for all. The tentor the shelter of a tree is a better hospital than a house, whosewalls absorb fetid and poisonous emanations, and then give them:ack to the atmosphere. To men accustomed to the open air,who live on the plainest food, wounds seem to give less pain,and are attended with less danger to life than to ordinary sol-diers in barracks.Wounds which, in 18G1, would have sent a man to the hos-pital for months, in 1865 were regarded as mere scratches, ratherthe subject of a joke than of sorrow. To new soldiers the sightof blood and death always has a sickening efect, but soon menbecome accustomed to it, and I have heard them exclaim on see-ing a deadcorade borne to the rear, Well, ill has turned uphis toes to the daisies." Of course, during a skirmnnish or battle,armed men shuld never leave thir ranks to attend a dead orwounded comrade-this should be seen to in advance by the coo-el, who should esignate his musicians or company cooks ashopital attendants, with a white rag on their arm to indicatetheir ofe. A wounded man should go himself (if able) to thesurgeon near at hand, or, if he need help, he should receive itfrom one of the attendants and not a omrade. It is wonderfulhow soon the n accustom themselves to these simple rules.In great battles these matters casll for a more enlarged attention,and then it becoes the duty of the division general to see thatproper stretchers and field-hospitals are ready for the wounded,and trenches are dug for the dead. There should be no real+ ~ g
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394 MILITARY LESSONS OF THE W'AR R [1861-be were living in a good house at home.The rgimental caplin, if an, usually attends the burithe hpital, should make notes and communicate detato t captain of the company, and to the family at hoe.course it is usually impossible to mark the grave with namein our national cemeteries equal about one-half of aU the deadVery few of the battles in which I have participated wefought as described in European text-books, viz., in great massein perfect order, manouvring by corps, divisions, and brigadWe wore generally in a wooded country, and, though our linwere deployed according to tactics, the men generally foughtstrong skirmish-lines, taking advantage of the shape of grounand of every cover. We were generally the assailants, andwooded and broken countries the "defensive" had a positiadvantage over us, for they were always ready, had cover, analways knew the ground to their immediate front; whereastheir assailants, had to grope our way over unknown grounand generally found a leared field or prepared entangents thatheld us for a time under a close and withering firRarely did the opposing lines in compact order come into actucontact, but when, as at Peach-Tree Creek and Atlanta, the lindid become commingled, the men fought individually in evepossible style, more frequently with the musket clubbed thawith the bayonet, and in some instances the men clinched liwrestlers, and went to the ground together. Europeans frequenly criticised our war, because we did not always take full advantage of a victory; the true reason was, that habitually the woodserved as a screen, and we often did not realize the fact that orenemy had retreated till he was already miles away and wagain intrenched, having left a mere shirmish-line to cover thmovement, in turn to fall back to the new position.Our war was fought with the muzzle-l0ading rifle. Towarthe close I had oe brigade (Walcutt's) armed with breech-10acing "Spencer's;" the cavalry generally had breach loading cm
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1861-'6u] MILITARY LESSUNS UHI E 'WAR. 395ines, Spencers and "Sharp's, oth of which were goodThe only change that breh-loadigarmswill probably makein the art and practice of war will be to increase the amountof-ammunition to be expnded, and necessarily to be carriedalong; to still further thin out the lines of attack, and to re-duce battles to short, quick, decisive conflicts. It does not inthe least affect the grand strategy, or the necessity for perfectorganization, drill, ad discipline. The companies and battalions.will be more dispersed, and the men will be less under the in-mediate eye of their officers, and therefore a higher order ofintelligence and courage on the part of the individual soldierwill be an element of strength. When a regiment is deployed as sirmishers, and crosses anopen field or woods, under heavy fire, if each man runs forwardfrom tree to tree, or stump to stump, and yet preserves a goodgeneral alignment, it gives great confidence to the men them-selves, for they always keep their eyes well to the right and left,and watch their comrades; but when some few hold back, sticktoo close or too long to a comfortable log, it often stops theline and defeats the whole object. Therefore, the more weimprove the fire-ar the moe will be the necessity for goodorganization, good discipline and intelligence on the part of theindividual soldier and officer. There is, of course, such a thingas individual courage, which has a value in war, but familiaritywith danger, experience in war nd its common attendants, andpersonal habit, are equally valuable traits, and these are the quali-ties with which we usualiy have to deal in war. All men naturally shrink from pain and danger, and only incur their risk fromsome higher motive, or from habit; so that I would define truecourage to be a perfect sensibility of the measure of danger,and a mental wllingness to incur it, rather than that ilsensi-bilty to danger of which I have heard far more than I haveseen. The most courageous men are generally unconscious ofpossessing the quality; therefore, when one professes it tooopenly, by words or bearing, there is reason to mistrust it. I~wold further ilstrate my meaning by describing a man of4:""" <4 ..'~
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true courage to be one who possesses all his faculties and sensesperfectly when serious danger is actually present.Modern wars have not materially changed the relative valuesor proportions of the several arms of serv infantry, artillery,alr, and engineers. If any thing, the infantry has been in-creased in value. The danger of cavalry attempting to chargeinfantry armed with breech-l0ading rifles was fully illustratedat Sedan, and with us very frequently. So improbable assuch a thing become that we have mitted the infantry-squarefrom our recent tactics. Still, cavalry against cavalry, and asauxiliary to infantry, will always be valuable, while all greatwars will, as heretofore depend chiefly on the infanty. Artil-lery is more valuable with new and inexperienced troops thanwith veterans. In the early stages of the war the field-gsoften bore the proportion of six to a thousand men; but towardthe close of the war one gun, or at most twoto a thousand men,was deemed enough. Sieges, such as characterized the wars ofthe last century, re too slow for this period of the world, and the Prussians recently almost ignored hem atogether, pentrated France between the fors, and leftaobservation," to watch the garrison and accept its surrenderwhen the greater events of the war ahead made further resist-ance useless; but earth-forts, and especially field-works, willhereafter play an important part in wars, becase they enable aminor force to hold a superior one in chek for a time, andtime is a most valuable element in all wars. It was one ofProf. 1aban's maxims that the spade was as useful in war astlh musket, and to this I will add the axe. The habit of in-trenching certainly does have the eflet of making new troopstimid. When a line of battle is once covered by a good para-pet, made by the engieers or y'the labor of the men themselves,it does require an effort to make themleave it in the face ofdanger; but when the enemy is intrenched, it becomes abso-lutely neeessary to permit each brigade and division of thetroops immediately opposed to throw up a corresponding trenchfor their own protection in case of a sudden sally. We invaria-bly did this in all our recent campaigns, and it id no ill effect,
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1861-'61: OFu TEHiE WAR. 397though sometimes our troops were a little too slow in leavingtheir well-covered lines to assail the enemy in positioen or on re-treat. Even our skirnmishers were in the habit of rolling logstogether, or of making a lunett of rails, with dirt in front, tocover their bodies; and, though it revealedatheir position, I can-not say that it worked a bad effet so that, as a rule, it maysafely be ft to the men themselves. On the "defensive,"there is no doubt of the propriety of fortifying; but in the as-sailing army the general must watch closely to see that his mendo not neglect an opportunity to drop his precautionary de-fenes, a act promptly on the "offensive" at every chance.I have many time crept forward to the kirish-ne toavail mslf of the cover of the pikets' "little fort," to observemore closely some expected result; and always talked famil-iarly with the men and was atonished to see howwell theycomprehended the general object, and how accurately they wereinforred of the state of facts existing miles away from theirparticular corps. Soldiers are very quick to atch the generaldrift and purpose of a campaign, and are always sensible whenthey are well commanded or well cared for. Once impressedwith this fact, and that they are making progress, they bearcheerfully any amount of labor and privation.In camp, and especially in the presence of an active enemy,it is much easier to maintain discipline than in barrais in timeof peace. Crime and breaches of discipline are much less fre-quent, and the necessity for courts-martial far less. The cap-tain can usually inflict all the punishment necessary, and thecolonel should lways. The field-officerscourt is the best formfor war, viz., one of the feld-officers-the lieutenant-colonel ormajor-can examine the case and report his verdict, and thecolonel should execute it. Of course, thercare statutory of-fenses which demand a general court-martial, and these must beordered by the division or corps commander; but the presence of one of our regular civilian judge-advocates in an anny in thefield would be a frst-class nuisance, for technical courts alwaswork mischief. Too any courts-martial in any command arepline and inefficient officers.
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398 MILITARY LESSONS OF THE WAR. [1861-'For the rapid transmission of orders in an army covering alarge space of ground, the magnetic telegraph is by far the best,though habitually he paper and pencil, with good mounted or-derlies, answer every purpose. I have little faith in the signal-frvice ly fags and torches, though we always used them; be-ause, almost invariably when they were most needed, the viewwas cut off by intervening trees, or by mists and fogs. Therewas one notable instance in my experience, when the signal-flags carried a message of vital importance over the heads ofHood's army, which had interposed between me and Allatoona,and had broken the telegraph-wires-as recorded in ChapterXI.; but the value of the magnetic telegraph in war can-not be exaggerated, as was illustrated by the perfect concertof action betweenthe armies in Virginia and Georgia duri14. Hardly a day intervened when General Grant did notknow the exact state of facts with me, more than fifteen hundredwire may be run on improvised stakes or from tree to tree forsix or more miles in a couple of hours, and I have seen operatorsso killful, that by cutting the wire hey would receive a mes-ag with thei tongues from a distant station. As a matter ofcourse, the ordinary commercial wires along the railways formthe usual telegraph-lines for an army, and these are easily re-paired and extended as the army advances, but each army andwing hoAuld have a small party of skilled men to put up thefield-wire, and take it down when done. This is far better thanthe signal-flags and torches. Our commercial telegraph-lineswill always supply for war enough skillful operators.The value of railways is also fully recognized in war quite asmuch as, if not more so than, in peace. The Atlanta apaignwould simply have been impossible without the use of the rail-roads from Louisville to Nashville-one hundred and eighty-fivemiles-from Nashville to Chattanooga-one hundred and fifty-one miles-and from Chattanooga to Atlanta-one hundred andthirty-seven miles. Every mile of this single track was sodelicate, that one man could in a minute have broken or moveda rail, but our trains usually carried along the tools and means
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1861-'65.] MILITARY LESSONS UF THE WAR. 399to repair such a break. We had, however, to maintain strongguards and garrisos at each imortt bridge or trestle-thedestruction of which would have necessitated time for rebuild-ing. For the protection of a bridge, one or two log block-houses, two stories high, with a piece of ordnance and a smallinfantry guard, usually sufficed. The block-house had a smallparapt and ditch about it, and the roof was made shot-proof byarth piled on. These points could usually be reached only bya dash of the enemy's cavalry, and vmany of these block-housessuccessfully resisted serious attacks by both cavalry and artillery.The only block-bouse that was actually captured on the mainwas the one described near Allatoona.Our trains from Nashville forward were operated under iili-tary res, and ran about ten miles an hour in gangs of four trainsof ten cars each. Four such groups of trains daily made onehundred and sixty ears, of ten tons each, carrying sixteen hun-dred tons, which exceeded the absolute necessity of the army,and allowed for the accidents that were common and inevitable.But, as I have recorded, that single stem of railroad, four hun-dred and seventy-three miles long, supplied an army of one hun-dred thousand men and thirty-five thousand animals for the pe-riod of one hundred and ninety-six days, viz., from May 1 to No-vember 12, 1864. To have delivered regularly that amount of simple impossibility in roads such as then existed in that regionof country. Therefore, I reiterate that the Atlanta campaignwas an impossibility without these railroads ; and only then, be-cause we ad the men and means to maintain and defend them,in addition to what were necessary to overcome the enemy. Ifa-bitually, a passenger-car will carry fifty men with their necessarybaggage. Box-cars, and even platfo -cars, answer the purposwell enough, but they should always have rough board-seats.For sick and wounded men, box-cars filled with straw or busheswere usually empyed. Personally, I saw but little of thepractical working of the railroads, for I only turned back once" s
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as far as Resaca; but I had daily reports from the engineer incharge, and officers who came from the rear often exphained tome the whole thing,with a description of the wrecked trains allthe way from Nashvile to Atlanta. I am convinced that theSto oe tohe engineers and men on that railroad fullyuaed that on the kirmishine, called for as high an orderof courage, and fully equaled it in importance. Still, I doubtif there be any necessity in time of peace to organize a corpsspecially to work the military ra becausein peace these same men gain all the necessary experience, pos-sess all the daring and courage of soldiers, and only need theoccasional protection and assistance of the necessary train-guard,which may be composed of the furloughed men coming andgoing, or of details made from the local garrisons to the rear.For the transfer of large armies by rail, from one theatre ofaction to another by the rear-the cases of the transfer of theEleventh and Twelfth Corps-General Hooker, twenty-threethousand men-from the East to Chattanooga, eleven hundredand ninety-two miles in seven days, in the of 1863; andthat of the Army of the Ohio-General Schofield, fiftn thou-sand men-from the valley.of the Tennessee to Washington,fourteen hundred miles in eleven days, en route to North Caro-lina in January, 1865, are the best examples of which I haveany knowledge, and reference to these is made in the reportof the Secretary of War, Mfr. Stanton, dated November 22,1865.Engineer troops attached to an army are habitually em-ployed in supervising the construction of forts or field worksof a nature more permanent than the lines used by the troopsin motion, and in repairing roads and making bridges. I hadseveral regiments of this kind that were most useful, but as arule we used the infantry, or employed parties of freedmen,who worked on the trenches at night while the soldiers slept,and these in turn rested by day. Habitually the repair oftherailroad and its bridges was committed to hired laborers, likethe English navvies, under the supervision of Colonel W. W.Wright, a railroad-engineer, who was in the military service at
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1861-'65.1 MMHAR1 IJESSONS OF THE WAR. 401he time, an d hissue ss a were frequently referred tcFor the passeof rivers, each army corps had a pontoon-train with a dtahment of engineers, and, on reaching a river,the leading infantry division was charged with the labor of put-ting it down. Generally the single pontoon-train could pro,near the place. The pontoons in general use were skeletonframes, made with a hinge, so as to fold back and constitute awagon-body. In this same wagon were carried the cotton canvascover, the anchor and ehains, and a due proportion of the balks,chesses, and lashings. All the troops became very familiar withtheir nechanism and use, and we were rarely delayed by reasonof a river, however broad. I saw, rcently, in Aldershot, Eng-4land, a very complete pontoontrain; the boats were sheathedwith wood and felt, made very light; but I think these weremore liable to chaing and damage in rough handling thanwere our less expensive and rougher boats. On the whole, Iwould prefer the skeleton frame and canvas cover to any styleof pontoon that I have ever seen.In relation to guards, pickets, and vedettes, I doubt if anydiscoveries or improvements were made during our war, or inany of the modern wars in Europe. These precautions varywith the nature of the country and the situation of each army.When advancing or reating in line of battle, the usual skir-mish-line constitutes the picket-line, and may have "reserves,"but usually the main line of battle constitutes the reserve; andin this conection I will state that the recent innovation intro-duced ito tnewinfantry tcticsbyGneral Upton is adi-rableforbyit each regiment, brigade, and division deployed,sends forward as skirmishers the one man of each set of fours, to cover its own front, and these can tbe recalled or ren-For ank-guards and rar-geards, one or more companies52 i i i i
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402 MILITARY LESSONS OF THE WAR. [iito existing army regulations; and all thecomes into contact with the troops, the more useful anable it becomes. The aost entire separation of the stwith which some of our earlier generals began the wasimply ridiculous. I don't believe in a chief of staff atiiilia staff-officer who professes to know more than his chief, istthe addition of a couple of young aides-de-camp, hal selected from the subalterns of the brigade, who should briders, and intelligent enough to give and explain the ortheir general.The same staff will answer for a division. The gncommand of a separate army, and of a corps d'armeshave the same professional assistance, with two or moreengineers, and his adjutant-general should exercise all thetions usually ascribed to a chief of staf, viz., he should pthe ability to comprehend the scope of operations, and toverbally and in writing all the orders and details necesscarry into efect the viewsof his general, as well as toreturns and records of events for the information of thhigher authority, and for history. A bulky staff implies asion of responsibility, slowness of action, and indecision, wa small staff implie activity and concentration of purpose.smallness of General Grant's staf throughout the civiforms the best model for future imitation. So of tent
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toe division hospital. Ofcers should be content with a tent, improvising poles and shelter out of bushes. The tenteb oshelte-tnt, carried by the soldier himself, is all-suffilent. Officers should never seek for houses, but share the con-A recent message (July 18, 1874) made to the French As-, submits a projet de loi, with a report prepared by a board ofrenh generals on army administration," which is full offormation, and is as applicable to us as to the French. I quotef1870 have demonstrated the inferiority of our systemn. .wo separate organizations existed with parallel functions-thegeneral' more occupied in giving direction to his troops thanSproviding for their material wants, which he regarded as the>ecial province of the staff, and the intendant' (staff) often orking at random, taking on his shoulders a crushing burdenfunctions and duties, exhausting himself with useless efforts,d aiming to accomplish an insufficient service, to the disap-intment of everybody. This separation of the administra-on and command, this coexistence of two wills, each inde-ndent of the other, which paralyzed both and annulled theualism," was condemned. It was decided by the board thaton of the "nw law," which is describd to be a radicalhange from the old one on the same subject. While concedingo the Minister of War in Paris the general control and super-ision of the entire military establishment primarily, especiallyf the annual estimates or budget, and the great depots of supply,tdistributes to the coimanders of the corps d'armie in timef peace, and to all ary co anders generally in time of war,e absolute co and of the money, provisions, and stores,i iiiiii ii iiii~ ~~";""""";BIiii i i iii i ii iiiiiiiii
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with the necessary staffofeers to receive, issue, and afor the. I quote further : The object of this law isfr on the commander of troops whatever liberty of acte ands. 1e has the powet even to go beyond thei:: circumstances of urgency and pressing ne .The extraordinary measures he may take on these ocmay require their execution without delay. The stafihas but one duty before obeying, and that is to subtWith this formality his responsibility ceases, and the regives the order. The ofcers and agents charged with sistroops, that is, they are obliged both in war and peace to(obey,with the single quliti on above named, of first mainwhat may be the emergency, the commanding general inThe commanding general-though intrusted with the lihis soldiers and with the safety of a frontier in a conditproperty, and that is declared to be the law! Every onthe old anny reineners how, in 1861, we were hamperedThis Frinch report is well worth the study of our arncers, of all grades and classes, and I will only refer againally, to another part, wherein it discusses the subject of m= % H H HH HHH = H==H == :: = H H
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whether he ould be required to carry on his correspoudencethrough his eneral, so that th latter coudd promptly forwardthe co unication, indorsed with his own remarks and opin-rule, because 1 the general should never be ignorant of any thingIn this country, as in rance, Congress controls the greatquestions of war and peace, makes all laws for the creation andgovernment of armies, and votes the necessary supplies, leavingto the President to excute and apply these laws, especiallythe harder task of limiting the penditure of public money tothe amount of the annual appropriatios. The executive oweris further subdivided into the seven great departments, and tothe Secretary of War is coded the genera care of the militaryestablishmentandhis powers are futher subdivided into tenThe chiefs of these bureaus are under the immediate ordersof the Secretary of War, who, thrugh them, in fact commandsthe army from "is ofe," but cannot do so "in the field"-anabsurdity in military if not civil law.The subordinates of these staff-corps and departments areseted and chosn from the army itself, or fresh from WestPoint, and to commonly construe themselves into the 4lie, asmade of tteir clay than the common soldier. Thus they sepa-rate themselves more and more from their comrades of the line,and in process of t realize the condition of that old officer ofartillery who thought the army world be a delightful place fora entleman itw not for the -soldier; or, better still,the conclusion of the young lord in "Henry IV.," who toldIHarry Percy (Hotspur) that "but for these vile guns he wouldhimself have bn a soldier." This is all wrong utterly at vari-ance with our democratic foirm of government and of universalexperience; and now that the French, from whom we hadcopied the system, have utterly "proscribed it, I hope that ourCongress will follow suit. I adit, in its fullest force, thestrength the axi that the civil law shouldbesuperior to
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406 AM TfARY LESSUNS OF THE WAR. [181-65the military in time of peace ; that the army should beataltimes subject to the direct control of Congress; and I asrthat, from the formation of our Government to the presenReular Army has set the highest example of obedieand authority; but, for the very reason that our acompamatively so very small, I hold that it should be thebspossible, organized and governed on true military princilsand that in time of peace we should preserve the "habiusages of war," so that, when war does come, we may notbe compelled to suffer the disgrace, confusion, and disordro1861.The commanding officers of divisions, departmentsposts, should have the amplest powers, not only to contheir troops, but all the stores designed for their use, aofflcersofthestaff necessary to administer the, within tof their command; and then with fairness they could bto the most perfect responsibility. The President andtary of War can command the army quite as well throughgenerals as through the subordinate staff-officers. Of < the Secretary would, as now, distribute the funds accordthe appropriation bills, and reserve to himself the absoluttrol and supervision of the larger arsenals and depots of sThe error lies in the law, or in the judicial interpretationof, and no code of army regulations can be made that metcase, until Congress, like the French Chrps Idgisltf, uannihilates and "proseribes" the old law and tho systemhas grown up under it.It is related of Napoleon that his last words were,d'arm !" Doubtless, as the shadow of death obscurmemory, the last thought that remained for speech was 0sevent when he was directing an important "head of colI believe that overy general who has handled armies inmust recall from his own experience the intensity of thousome similar occasion, when by a single command he hadthe finishing stroke to some complicated action; but to mcurs another thought that is worthy of record, and ma
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courage others who are to fllow us in or pofession I neversaw the rear of an army engaged in battle but I feared thatsom calamity had happened at the front-the apparent confu-sical, broken wagons, crippled horses, men lying about dead andmained, parties hastening to and fro in seeming disorder, anda general apprehension of something dreadful about to ensue;all these signs, however, lessened as I neared the front, andthere the contrast was complete-perfect order, men and horsesfull of confidence, and it was not unusual for general hilarity,laughing, and cheering. Although cannon might be firing,the musketry clattering, and the enemy's shot hitting close,there reigned a general feeling of strength and security thatbore a marked contrst to the bloody signs that ad drifted rp-idly to the rear; therefore, for comfort and safety, I surelywould rather be at the front than the rear line of battle. Soalso on the march, the head of a column moves on steadily, while the rear is alternately halting and then rushing forwardto close up the gap; and all sorts of runmors, especially theworst, float back to the rear. Old troops invariably deem it aspecial privilege to be in the front-to be at the "head of col-umn"-because experience has taught them that it is the easiestand most comfortable place, and danger only adds zest and stim-ulus to this fact.The hardest task in war is to lie in support of some positionor battery, under fire without the privilege of returning it; orto guard some train left in the rear, within hearing but out ofdanger; or to provide for the wounded and dead of some corpswhich is too busy ahead to care for its own.To be at the ead of a strong column of troops, in the exe-cution of some task that requires brain, is the highest pleasureof war-a grim one and terrible, but which leaves on the mind and memory the strongest mark; to detect the weak point of allenemy's line; to break through with vehemence and thus leadto victory; or to discover some key-point and hold it withtenacity; or to do some other distinct act which is afterwardreognized as the real cause of suc
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ters that are never forgotten. Other great diculties, expe-rienced by every general, are to measure truly the thousad-and-one reports that come to him in the midst of confli; to'csre a clear and well-defined purpose at every instant oftine, and to cause all efforts to converge to that end.To do these things he must know perfectly the strength andquality of each part of his own army, as well as that of his oppo-nent, and must be where he can personally see and observe withhis own eyes, and judge with his own mind. No man can proper-ly command an army from the rear, he must be "at its front;" andwhen a detachment is made, the commander thereof should beinformed of the object to be accomplished, and left as free aspossible to execute it in his own way; and when an army isdivided up into several parts, the superior should always attendthat one which he regards as most important. So me n thinkthat modern armies may be so regulated that a general can sitin an office and play on his several columns as on the keys ofa piano; this is a fearful mistake. The directing mind must beat the very head of the army-mst be seen thereandtheeffect of his mind and personal energy must be felt by everyofficer and man present with it, to secure the best results. Every attempt to make war easy and safe will result in humiliation and disaster.Lastly, mail facilities should be kept up with an army if pos-sible, that officers and men may receive and send letters to theirfriends, thus maintaining the home influence of infinite assist-ance to discipline. Newspaper correspondents with an army,as a rule, are mischievous. They are the world's gossips, pickup and retail the camp scandal, and gradually drift to theheadquarters of some gederal, who finds it easier to make repu-tation at home than with his own corps or division. Th arealso tempted to prophesy events and state facts which, to anenemy, reveal a purpose in time to guard against it. Moreover,they are always bound to see facts colored by the partisan or polit-ical character of their own patrons, and thus bring army officersinto the political controversies of the day, which are always mis
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181-GS O THE 'WAR. 40cvous and wrong. Yet, so greedy are the people at large forSnews, that it is dobtful whether any army commander cande all reporters, without bringing down on himself a clamormay imperil his own safety. Time and moderation mustga just solution to this modern difficulty.THE END.4H 1
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II.~li~ IFiHR JONONEsiAI;t~i" rlKiFULLY KEVIiiEi B!i ,.-G N""~.' O.OHo A, U .Asi
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CHAPTER XXVII.THE DUTIES OF PEACE.AIING THE PACIFIC RAILROAD-A FooL's ERRAND TO MEXICO-POLITICALINTRIGUES AT WASHINGTON-THE TENURE OF OFFICE AFFAIR-WORKAMONG THE INDIANS-A TRIP To EUROPE-THE BELKNAP SCANDAL-sEMAN's SPEECH ON MILITARY HONOR-TRAVELS IN THE NORTH-WEST-ELLOWSTONE PARK-WRITING HIS MEMOIRmS-LIFE IN NEWYORK-DEATH OF MRS. SHERMAN.Soon after the Grand Review" and his farewell to hisfaithful followers, Sherman went with his family to Chicago,to assist at a large fair held for the benefit of impoverishedsoldiers' families; thence to Lancaster, Louisville and Nash-ville, visiting old friends. He was then, on June 27, 1865,put in command of the Military Division of the Missis-sippi, afterward changed to the Missouri, with headquartersat St. Louis. Immediately his attention was turned to thePacific Railroad, then in course of construction. Manyyears before, when that great enterprise was scarcelydreamed of as a possibility, he had written of it to hisbrother, urging that such a road should be built, for theunification of the country, and saying that he would gladlygive his life to see it successfully carried through. It waswith much satisfaction that he witnessed the opening of thefirst division of sixteen and a half miles of the UnionPacific, westward from Omaha. He admired the energywith hich the road was pushed forward, and looked upon411
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412 LIEUTENANT GENERAL.completion, on July 15, 1869, as "one of the greatestand most beneficent achievements of the human race. Itwas to facilitate the building of the road by protecting itfrom the Indians that Sherman persuaded the President, inMarch, I866, to establish the new Military Department ofthe Platte and to place strong bodies of troops at variouspoints along the line.As the mustering out of the army proceeded, manychanges in organization occurred. The most notable wasthat of July 25, 1866, when Grant was made a full Generaland Sherman was made Lieutenant General. At the sametime political feeling was running high at Washington.President Johnson had virtually left the Republican, party,and was at loggerheads with the majority of Congress.Grant was looked to as the coming President, and accord-'ingly many of Johnson's friends manifested much jealousyand hostility toward him. Sherman was in the west and sokept aloof from these controversies and intrigues, for whichhe had no love. But he -maintained his old friendship withGrant, and inclined toward his side of every disputed ques-tion.While travelling on duty in New Mexico, in September,1866, he was summoned to Washington, in haste. Goingthither, he reported to Grant, who told him he did not know why the President had sent for him, unless in connectionwith Mexican affairs. Maximilian, supported by Frenchtroops, still held the imperial crown of that country, butwas steadily being driven to the wall by the Republicans,who had elected Juarez President. The United States wasabout to send the Hon. Lewis Campbell thither as Minister,accredited to Juarez as the rightful head of the State, andPresident Johnson had ordered Grant to accompany him asan escort, Grant told Sherman that he would decline to
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THE TENURE OF OFFICE AFFAIR. 413obey is order as an illegal one, on the ground that thePresident had no right to send him out of the country on adiplomatic errand unaccompanied by troops; he believed it/was a trick of Johnson's, to get rid of him.Then Sherman went to the President, who was very gladto see him. Said Johnson : I am sending General Grantto Mexico, and I want you to command the army here inhis absence." But," said Sherman, Grant will not go!"That startled Johnson, and he began arguing to show theneed there was of Grant's going. Sherman repeated thepositive statement that Grant would not go, and added thathe did not think the President in that matter could affordto quarrel with the General. The upshot of the matterwas, that Johnson decided to send Sherman instead ofGrant, and Sherman consented to go, believing that thushe was preventing an open rupture between Grant and theAdministration.Sherman and Campbell went to Mexico, and spent someweeks in trying to find Juarez, who was said to be with his army in the field. Not succeeding in their quest, theyreturned to New Orleans, and by Christmas Sherman wasback at St. Louis, convinced that he had been sent as aruse, on that idle errand. The President, he believed,simply wanted to send Grant somewhere to get him out ofthe way of his own political ambition.Now came on the famous "Tenure of Office affair.Congress enacted, in March, 1867, a law providing that nocivil officer appointed for a definite term, by and with theadvice and consent of the Senate, should be removed beforethe expiration of that term except with the consent of theSenate. On August 5, following, the President demandedStanton's resignation} as Secretary of War. Stanton, underthe above named law, refused it. A week later thePresident26
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414 INDIAN PEACE COMMISSIONsuspended him and appointed Grant to act in his stead.Things remained in this state until January 13, 868; when the Senate disapproved the President's action. Grantimmediately gave up the Secretaryship, handed the key ofthe office to Sherman, and went back to army headquarters.Sherman took the key to Stanton and gave it to him.Sherman was anxious to make peace, and strogly urgedthe President to appoint General J. D. Cox, then Governorof Ohio, to succeed Stanton, thinking he wouldbe acceptedby the Senate. This the President would not do, andthestorm increased. At the beginning of February Shermanreturned to St. Louis, glad to get away from the politicalintrigues of Washington, and steadfastly refused to returnunless ordered, though the President himself requested himto do so. Then, determined to bring him back, the Presidentassigned him to the command ofthe Division ofthe Atlantic.Sherman tried to avoid this appointment, and threatenedto resign rather than return East. Had the President'splans been carried out there would have been at Washingtonthese officers: The President, commander in chief of thArmy under the Constitution; the Secretary of War,commander in chief under the recognition of Congress; theGeneral of the Army; the Lieutenant General ofthe Army;the General commanding the Department of Washington;and the commander of the post at Washington. And thegarrison of Washington consisted of an infantry brigadeand a battery of artillery! Sherman protested so vigorouslyagainst such an arrangementthat the President finally agreedto let him stay at St. Louis, and then appointed LorenzoThomas Secretary of War ad interim. And soon thefamous impeachment trial came.Sherman was appointed, in July, 1867, a member of thecommission to establish peace with certain Indian tribes.R18~~
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A TRIP TO EUROPE. 415In that capacity he travelled widely through the Indian country and had many conferences with the chiefs. Heproposed that the great Indian reservations should be or-ganized under regular territorial governments, but the planwas not approved at Washington.So the time passed until March 4, 1869, when Grant wasinaugurated as President. Sherman was then made Gen-eral, and Sheridan Lieutenant-General. Under this ar-rangement Sherman of course had to return to Washing-ton, and there he renewed his old association with GeorgeH. Thomas, whom, however, he presently assigned, atThomas's request, to the command at San Francisco.There the hero of Chickamauga and Nashville soon died,and Sherman thought his end was hastened by supposedingratitude. Congress ought, in Sherman's opinion, tohave made Meade, Sheridan and Thomas all Lieutenant-Generals, dating their commissions respectively with"Gettysburg," "Winchester," and "Nashville."On the death of General Rawlins, in the fall of 1869,Sherman was called upon to act for a time as Secretary ofWar. The experience did not please him. There was toomuch red tape, and too much division of authority, and hewas glad to be relieved by General Belknap. In August,1871, Rear-Admiral Alden asked him to go to Europewith him, in the frigate Wabash, and Sherman joyouslyaccepted the invitation, as he had long wished to go abroadbut had never yet done so. They sailed on November I I,and Sherman did not return until September 22 of the nextyear, He visited almost every part of Europe and Egypt,and had an opportunity of observing European methods inthe great German army which had just been overrunningFrance.Life at Washington, with Belknap's assumptions, was now
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416 THE HONOR OF THE ARMfY.increasingly distasteful to him, and he obtained permissionfrom the President to remove the army headquarters to St.iouis. Thither he went in the Ifall of 1874, and once morewas contented and happy. In the spring of 1876, however,he was recalled to Washington, on account of the Belknapscandal. General Belknap, Secretary of War, was chargedwith corrupt practices, and resigned, to avoid impeachment.Sherman was much shocked, for he had always esteemedBelknap highly. Referring to the case in a speech at apublic banquet at St. Louis, before returning to Washing-ton, he said:"The army of 1776 was the refuge of all who loved lib-erty for liberty's sake, and who were willing to test theirsincerity by the fire of battle; and we claim that the armyof 1876 is the best friend of liberty, good order, and Gov-ernment, and submits to any test that may be imposed. Ourancestors never said the soldier was not worthy of his hire;that the army was a leech on the body politic; that a stand-ing army of 20,000 men endangered the liberties of 40,-ooo,ooo of people. These are modern inventions, modernparty-cries to scare and confuse the ignorant. We are notof those who subscribe so easily to the modern doctrine ofevolution, that teaches that each succeeding generation isnecessarily better than that which went before, but eachtree must be tested by its own fruit, and we can point withpride to our Sheridan, Hancock, Schofield, McDowell, anda long array of Brigadier-Generals, Colonels, Captains andLieutenants, who, for intelligence, honor, integrity and self-denial, will compare favorably with those of any formerepoch. We point with pride to our army, scattered throughthe South, along our Atlantic, Gulf and Lake forts, and inthe great West, and claim that in all the qualities of goodsoldiers they are second to none. I see that some of you
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CAUSES 4F CORRUPTION. 417shake your heads and whisper Belknap. Why? What washis relation to the army? He was a Cabinet Minister, a civil officer, did not hold a commission in the army at all.We contend that when he was an ofier he was an honor-able man and rendered good service, and that this entitleshim to charitable consideration. 'Lead us not into temp-tation' is a prayer some of us seem to have forgotten, andwe of the army can truthfully say that this offence, be itwhat it may, is not chargeable to the army, for he was notsubject to military law or jurisdiction."At this moment the air is full of calumny, and it issickening to observe that men usually charitable and just,are made to believe that all honesty and virtue have takentheir flight from earth; that our National Capital is reekingwith corruption; that fraud and peculation are the rule, andhonesty and fidelity to trust the exception. I do not be-lieve it, and I think we should resist the torrent. OurPresident has surely done enough to entitle him to absoluteconfidence, and can have no motive to screen the wickedor guilty. At no time in the history of the country, haveour courts of law, from the Supreme Court at Washingtondown to the District Courts, been entitled to more respectfor their learning and purity; and Congress is now, as ithas ever been and must be from its composition, a representative body, sharing with the people its feelings andthoughts, its virtues and vices. If corruption exist, it iswith the people at large, and they can correct the evil bytheir own volition. If they have grown avaricious andmade money their God, they must not be surprised iftheir representatives and servants share their sin. Whatare the actual facts? We have recently passed through along civil war, entailing on one moiety of the country deso-lation and run,-on all a fearful debt,-States, counties,
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418 PATRONAGE.and cities follow the fashion, until the whole land becamedeeply in debt. The debts are now due, and bear heavilyl the shape of taxes on our homes, on propery, and busi-ness. "Again, the war called millions to arms, who droppedtheir professions and business, and found themselves withoutemployment when the war was over. These naturallyturned to the National Government for help; and the pres-sure for office, at all times great became simply iThe power to appoint to these offices is called 'patronage,'and is common to all Governments. Then, again, arose avast number of claims for damages for seizures and loss ofproperty by acts of war. These all involved large sums ofmoney, and money now is, as it always has been, the causeof a life-struggle-of corruption. Yes, money is thecause of corruption to-day as always. Men will toil for it,murder for it, steal for it, die for it. Though officers andsoldiers are simply men subject to all tempations and vicesof men, we of the army feel, or rather think we feel, morein the spirit of Burns:For gold the merchant plows the main,The farmer plows the manor;But glory is the soldier's prize,The soldier's wealth is honor.'"Sherman set out in July, 1877, for a tour through the Indian country and the far Northwest. He was absentfrom home I15 days, and travelled nearly lo,ooo miles.After visiting Tongue River and the Big Horn, he waent tothe Yellowstone National Park. In relating the story ofhis adventures, he said:"Descending Mount Washburn, by a trail throughwoods, one emerges into the meadows or springs out of
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IN YELLOWSTONE PARK. 419which Cascade Creek takes its water, and, following it tonear its mouth, you camp and walk to the great falls andthe head of the Yellowstone canyon. In grandeur, majesty, and coloring, these, probably, equal any on earth. Thepainting by Moran in the Capitol is good, but painting andwords are unequal to the subject. They must be seen tobe appreciated and felt. Gen. Poe and I found a jutting rock, about a mile belowthe Seron Falls, from which a perfect view is had of theSeron Falls canyon. The upper falls are given at 125 feetand the lower at 350. The canyon is described as 2,000 feet.It is not 2,c00 immediately below the Seron Falls, but maybe lower down, for this canyon is thirty miles long, andwhere it breaks through the range abreast of Washburnmay be 2,oo0 feet. Just below the Seron Falls, I thinki,ooo feet would be nearer the exact measurement; but itforms an actual canyon, the sides being almost vertical, and no one venturing to attempt a descent. It is not so muchthe form of this canyon, though fantastic in the extreme,that elicited my admiration, but the coloring. The soft rocks through which the waters have cut a way are of themost delicate colors,-buff, gray, and red,-all so perfectlyblended as to make a picture of exquisite finish. The fallsand canyon of the Yellowstone will remain to the end oftime objects of natural beauty and grandeur to attract theattention of the living."Up to this time we had seen no geysers or hot springs,but the next day, eight miles up from the falls, we came toSulphur Mountain, a bare, naked, repulsive hill, not of largeextent, at the base of which were hot, bubbling springs,with all the pond crisp with sulphur, and six miles fromthere up, or south, close to the Yellowstone, we reached andcamped at Mud Springs. These also are hot, most of them
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AI420 THE HOT SPRINGS.muddy. Water slushed around as in a bolingpot. Somewere muddy water and others thick mud, puffing up justlike a vast pot of mush. Below the falls f the Yellowstoneis a rapid, bold current of water, so full of real speckledtrout, weighing from six ounces to four nd a half pounds,that, in the language of a settler, it is 'no trick at all to catch them.' They will bite at an artificial fly, or, better,at a live grasshopper, which abound here; but above thefalls the river is quiet, flowing between low, grassy banks,and finally ending, or rather beginning, in the YellowstoneLake, also alive with real speckled trout. Blow the fallsthese trout are splendid eating, but above, y reason of thehot water, some of the fish are wormy and gobnoxious by reason thereof, though men pretend to dis-tinguish the good from the bad by the color of the spots.I have no hesitation in pronouncing the Yellowstone, fromthe Big Horn to the sourcehe e finest trout-fishing streamon earth." From the Mud Springs the trail is due west, and crossesthe mountain range which separates the Yellowstone fromthe Madison, both tributaries to the Missouri, descends thistributary to the West Fork of the Madison, and here is theLower Geyser Basin. It would require a volume to de-scribe these geysers in detail. It must suffice now for meto say that the Lower Geyser Basin presents a series of hotsprings or basins of water coming up from below hotenough to scald your hand, boil a ham, eggs, or anythingelse, clear as crystal, with basins of every conceivable shape,from the size of a quill to actual lakes ioo yards across. Inwalking among and around these one feels that in amoment he may break through and be lost in a species ofhell."Six miles higher up the West Madison is the Upper
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Geyser Basin, the spouting geysers, the real object and aimof our visit. To describe these in detail would surpass myability or the compass of a letter. They have been de-scribed by Lieutenants Duane, Hayden, Strong, Lord Dun-raven,and many others. The maps by Major Ludlow, of the Engineers, locate several geysers accurately. We reachedthe Upper Geyser Basin at 12 M. one day and remainedthere till 4 P. M. of the next. During that time we sawthe old' Faithful' perform at intervals varying from sixty-two minutes to eighty minutes. The intervals vary, butthe performance only varies with the wind and sun. Thecone, or hill, is of soft, decaying lime, but immediatelyabout the hole, which is irregular, about six feet across,the incrustation is handsome, so that one can look in safetywhen the geyser is at rest."Returning to Fort Ellis, they next rode to Helena, theCapital of Montana Territory, Io6 miles in one day, by arelay of stages. They visited old Fort Benton, establishedlong ago by the American Fur Company, also Fort Shaw,and then striking over the country to Fort Missoula, andthen across the Bitter Root Mountains through Idaho andacross Washington Territory to the Pacific coast.Sherman devoted much time in his later years to literarywork, chiefly in the form of magazine articles, about thewar, early days in California, and other topics of historicand general public interest. In 1875 he published his" Memoirs," a large volume recording his military career.Its appearance caused a great sensation, as no other prom-inent army officer had, at that time, done such a thing as towrite a history of his own career. The book was writtenin Sherman's characteristic style, breezy, vigorous, frank,fearless. Many of its statements of fact and opinion borehardly upon others and provoked contradiction. Sherman~,;;~g~l~~t i~r ~s~a t I ~VI gle ~ats~l~~~gA
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422 LITERARY PURSUITStook all criticisms upon it kindly, and in subsequent editionsprinted them, together with many other messages of praise, )pendix to the book. Moreover, there were, ashucrnian himself acknowledged, many errors in the book,originating in faults of memory and otherwise. As fast asthese were pointed out and proved, Sherman corrected them. Referring one day, in conversation, to the criticisms of his"Memoirs," he said:"They amuse me, make me laugh, and frequently, I amglad to say, serve me a good purpose by calling attention toreal defects and errors which in time will be corrected. Ihave here a copy of my book with each error, so far dis-covered, marked and carefully annotated. When the workof correcting is completely finished, they will be madepublic, either during my lifetime or when I am gone. These'Memoirs' have been the subject of much misconceptionin the public mind. I do not intend them as history. Ioffered them as my testimony, simply. I endeavored todescribe accurately the stirring events therein referred to asI saw them. I do not pretend to say that everything occurred as I say it does, but as it occurred to me. Othermen may have seen things differently. None of us seethings exactly alike. But the records upon which my bookis based are open to all. They consisted of my correspond-ence and official reports, making forty volumes of manu-script letters pasted in letter-books. These forty volumesare in the War Department at Washington. I had a duplicate copy. One day I sat down to glance at these letters,and conceived the idea of reducing their contents to narra-tive form, but not for publication. I did not inten that thepublic should ever read them, except as my posthumouspapers. After I had made some progress in the work, Ishowed the first sheets to a few friends. I was urgent
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ARMY PREJUDICES. 423advised to complete the labor I had begun, and submit it tothe blic in the shape of Memoirs.' I took the adviceand so published the book, expected severe criticism, andgot it. I had sense and foresight enough to know thateverybody would not agree with me. No writer ever getsjustice from his cotemporaries, and, outside of this, I knew I was liable to err, and only pretended to give things asthey looked through my glasses."Now,therewere a good many little prejudices among thesoldiers and the armies of the West which the public, atthis day, do not appreciate. For instance, there were threegrand Western armies-the Army of the Tennessee, Armyof the Cumberland and Army of the Ohio. There wereunavoidable jealousies between these armies and their com-manders. Their respective triumphs and defeats were thesubjects of undue taunts, ridicule or criticism. My particu-lar army was that of Tennessee, and it is more than pos-sible, and quite probable, that I have colored things highlyin its favor. Doubtless I was much prejudiced in its favor,just as you would be in favor of an old acquaintance as op-posed to a comparative stranger. I knew every brigade andregimental commander in this army, and was familiar withthe fighting capacity of each corps. I knew exactly what division to hold in reserve, and'those to storm a breastwork.Besides I had this army so organized that I had only to give an order and it was executed. No red tape nor circumlo-cution was necessary. If I wanted one of Buell's corps Ilad to issue a command, and that had to be repeated, per-haps in writing, from corps to division, and from division tobrigade and regiment, and thus would take two hours to geta body of troops in motion when time was precious and im-petuous action was needed. 1My army was one of wildhers, never so well pleased as when driving the enemy
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424 THE POLITICAL GENERALS.before them. Buell had a splendid army, but it was slowand conservative, composed of as brave and stubbornfighters as any other command, and yet not accustomed tobrilliant and quick movements."The attack made on me about the 'political Generals'was unfair. I never used such a term. My sole intentionwas to mention, in a spirit of fair criticism, certain circum-stances that in a measure defeated my efforts to have aconstantly efficient army. For instance, we would have abig fight and come out victorious. We would go into campfor an indefinite period, and with no prospect of a earlycampaign. At such periods I noticed that my subordinatecommanders who had previously had political aspirationswould strike out for home to see the 'people.' They wouldmake a few speeches, and as the fighting seasn approachedthey would rejoin their commands. In the meantime, ifwanted to find out anything about the exact condition ~feach division, the transportation, or the commissary orquartermaster affairs, I could find no responsible head togive me official information. Such things tended to destroy the discipline, and consequently the efficiency of the army,and it was a matter to which I had good reason to object.I wanted commanders who would stay with their com-mands, and not those who cherished ambitious political projects, and who were continually running off to see thepeople at home."General Sherman in 1884 requested to be put on theretired list of the army, in order that Sheridan might bepromoted to the full rank of General; and this was doneon February 8 of that year. A couple of years later heremoved to New York and for the remainder of his life madehis home in that city. He was one of the most conspicuous figures in society there, a welcome and honored guest
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LIFE IN NEW YORK. 425everywhere. After living for a couple of years in a hotel,he bought a house, at No. 75 West 71st St., and thereg d his family about him. In the basement he fittedup a room which he called his office, and here he receivedvisitors and answered correspondence. In the hours whichlie devoted to these duties he presented a picture whichstrikingly impressed itself on the memories of all who sawit. His desk was in the middle of the room, and there hesat, amid piles of books, records and papers, and surroundedby old war maps and mementoes. He wore an easy officecoat or a dressing gown, and for aids to his eyesight he hada huge pair of round-glassed, tortoise-shell-rimmed spec-tacles. Wielding his paper knife and taking up his penoccasionally, he would keep busy and at the same timewould sustain conversation with a caller, on whom everynow and then, as he addressed him, he would bend his keen,direct gaze, raising his brows and looking over the tops ofhis spectacles. The walls of this room, too, have often rungwith laughter, responsive to the kindly joke, the ready jest, the queer reminiscence of old times, inimitably told, withwhich he made the time pleasant for groups of his intimatefriends, especially his old comrades of the Army. When areporter visited him he would get a cordial enough welcometo the General's nook, but presently old "Tecumseh"wouldlook up and say something like this:"Oh, what's the use of bothering with an old fellow likeme? Haven't I had enough publicity? Umph! Morethan I wanted. Now, my dear fellow, I like you and yourpaper, but you mustn't print anything about me; youreally mustn't."ie soon acquired a reputation as a ready and brilliant after-dinner speaker, and in that capacity figured at many p banquets. His first New York speech, after he made
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426 AFTER-DINNER SPE4AKING.that city his home, was delivered at the dinner of the NewEngland Society, on December 22, 1886. At this dinnerH Inry W. Grady made his memorable address on TheNew South." General Sherman directly preceded Mr.Grady in the order of speech-making, and when he arosehe got a tremendously enthusiastic greeting, which visibly affected him."Many and many a time," he said, have I been welcomedamong you. I came from a bloody civil war to New Yorkin years gone by-twenty or tenty-one, maybe,-and acommittee came to me in my room an dragged me unwil-lingly before the then New England Society of New York,and they received me with such hearty applause and suchkindly greetings that my heart goes outto you now to-nightas their representatives. God knows, I wish you, one andall, all the blessings of life and enjoyment of the good hingsyou now possess and others yet in store for you, youngmen."With this introduction, he told them that he had beencelebrating the same event the night before in Brooklyn,that about two or three o'clock in the morning he "sawthis hall filled with lovely ladies, waltzing," and he added,"here I am to-night."" I have no toast," he remarked, I am a loafer. I canchoose to say what I may-not tied by any text or formula.Then he said that they called him "Old General Sherman,"but that he was pretty young yet, not all the devil out ofme," and that he hoped to share with them many a festiveoccasion.And he was with the New Englanders and with manyother societies and clubs and parties n "many a festiveoccasion." His speeches were always brisk, spicy andenlivened by anecdote and reminiscence. Chauncey M.s i
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A GREAT THEATRE-GOER 427Depew regarded him as the readiest and most originaltalker in the United States," and Mr. Depew had manyopportunities to study him in this character, for the twomen frequently sat at the same table and divided theoratorical honors of the evening.General Sherman was a frequent patron of the drama, andwas usually to be seen in important first night audiences.Among his personal friends were many of the foremostactors and actresses of the day, and he did many deeds ofkindness to struggling but worthy members of the profes-sion. He was one of the first members of the Players'Club, and made a notable speech at a supper given in honor of Edwin Booth.At reunions of army men he was, of course, a mostpopular figure, and he greatly enjoyed such gatherings,where he could renew old acquaintances and refresh hismemories of the great campaigns of the past. Sometimes he was called upon to preside at some army meeting, anda rare treat it was to see him. For parliamentary law hehad no regard, but he ran things" according to his ownwill, with charming indifference to points of order and pro-cedure. A reporter has given this verbatim record of sucha scene. Sherman took the chair and began thus:"The meeting will come to order. Ah, yes! (Noddingto an officer about to rise.) General Hickenlooper moves theappointment of a Committee on Credentials (taking a paperfrom his left vest pocket.) The committee will consist ofGeneral Hickenlooper, Colonel A. and Major B. We mustbe speedy, gentlemen, in arranging these details."General Smith-Did I see General Smith rise ?" (Avoice: He's gone out for a moment.") "Well, nevermind; it's all the same. General Smith moves the appoint-ment of a committee on Resolutions, and it will consist of
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428 THE LAST "IITERVIEW."(taking a list from his right vest pocket) General So-and-So,'Looks blank.) That's not the committee, either. Thisit I just read is another committee, and it will be moved later. Here's the right one. (Reads it.) You see, gen-tlemen, we get our young staff officers who have nothingelse to do to fix up these things in advance."A voice: Move to adjourn." The Chair: Oh, no useputting that motion. We must fix these preliminariesfirst. I have three more committees prepared here."And so on for an hour longer. But no one ever resentedthe old warrior's genial bossism."Sherman's last interview" with a newspaper reporter occurred at his New York home less than a fortnight beforehis death. When the reporter entered the General was seated at asquare table in the middle of the room, and in a despairingsort of way was trying to find out from a directory whereDr. John Hall's church is situated. He wore a very extra-ordinary pair of spectacles-each lens like a jeweler's mag-nifying glass. When he had got the information he wanted,he pushed his spectacles up on his forehead, shook handsand asked what was wanted."By the way," he said, suddenly, "I have seen youbefore.""Yes; at the Garfield memorial exercises in Cleveland.""I remember now," General Sherman continued; "sitdown. What can I do for you ? I have very little time; I am going to a wedding at 12 o'clock."He was asked to talk about Lincoln and old war-times." No; no," he said, shaking his head; I have said all Ihave to say and written all I have to write on that subjectand all others. I shall not write any more nor talk forpublication.
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FIRST BEREA VEMENT. 429Then he stood up and walked slowly about the room.After a bit he pointed to a shelf of the book-case, wherethe bulky volumes of the Nicolay-Hay memoirs stood. "There," he remarked, "in those ten volumes you'll findall the Lincoln literature you want; I have made manyspeeches on Lincoln, but I don't remember where they arenow-I don't remember."Sherman's first family bereavement was the death of hisson Willie, from typhoid fever, at Memphis, October 3,1863. The boy had shown great fondness for military life,and had been playfully adopted as a sergeant by the bat-talion that formed his father's headquarters guard. Healways turned out at drills and guard-mountings with a zealthat both amused and delighted the general, and he was agreat favorite with all the soldiers who knew him. Whenhe died, the battalion gave him a military funeral, and theheart-broken father thereupon wrote to its commandingofficer, Captain C. C. Smith, as follows:" MY DEAR FRIEND: I cannot sleep to-night till I recordan expression of the deep feelings of my heart to you andto the officers and soldiers of the battalion for their kindbehavior to my poor child. I realize that you all feel formy family the attachment of kindred, and I assure you of'full reciprocity." Consistent with a sense of duty to my profession andoffice, I could not leave my post, and sent for the family tocome to me in this fatal climate and in that sickly period ofthe year, and behold the result. The child that bore myname and in whose future I reposed with more confidencethan I did in my own plan of life now lies a mere corpse,seeking a grave in a distant land, with a weeping mother,brother and sisters clustered about him. For myself I askno sympathy. On, on I must go to meet a soldier's fate or27
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430 WILLIE SHERMAN .live to see our country rise superior to all factions, till itsflag is adored and respected by ourselves and by all thepowers of the earth."But Willie was, or thought he was, a sergeant in the Thirteenth. I have seen his eye brighten, his heart beat, ashe beheld the battalion under arms, and asked me if theywere not real soldiers. Child as he was, he had theenthusiasm, the pure love of truth, honor and love ofcountry which should animate all soldiers."God only knows why he should die thus young. Heis dead, but will not be forgotten till those who knew himin life have followed him to that same mysterious end."Please convey to the battalion my heartfelt thanks andassure each and all that if in after years they call on me ormine and mention that they were of the Thirteenth Regu-lars when Willie was a sergeant they will have a key to theaffections of my family that will open all it has; that wewill share with them our last blanket, our last crust."Willie Sherman's remains were afterward removed fromMemphis and interred at St. Louis, in Calvary Cemetery,by the side of another son, Charles, who died in infancy,in 1864. In the same plot the body of Mrs. Sherman wasplaced at her death, to be followed soon by the dust of the great soldier himself.Mrs. Sherman died in New York on November 28, 1888,after a long illness. After her burial at St. Louis, GeneralSherman wrote a brief note to the editor of The New YorkTribune, saying:"I and family are now returned from St. Louis, havingdeposited the coffined body of Mrs. Sherman near 'OutWillie,' at the very spot chosen by ourselves in 1866, reaffirmed in 1883, and often spoken of as a matter of coursebetween us. We have followed in the minutest particular
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DEATH OF MRS. SHERMAN. 431her every wish. Every member of my own family andhers, the Ewings,' are content, for no mortal was everbetter prepared to 'put on immortality' than Mrs. GeneralSherman. Of course, being the older and subjected toharder strains, I expected to precede her; but it is ordainedotherwise. In due time I will resume my place by herside, and I want my friends, especially my old soldierfriends, to know that they shall not be taxed one cent, forI have made, or will make, every provision. I havereceived by telegraph, mail, card and every possible way,hundreds of kind, sympathetic messages, all of which havebeen read by myself and children. To make suitable re-plies to all is simply impossible, and I offer the above as ageneral answer."There were left to him six children: The Rev. ThomasE: Sherman, a priest of the Roman Catholic Church; P.Tecumseh Sherman, a lawyer in New York; Mrs. A. M.Thackara, of Rosemont, Penn.; Mrs. T. W. Fitch, of Pitts-burg; Miss Rachel Sherman, and Miss Lizzie Sherman.Messrs. Thackara and Fitch, to whom the two elderdaughters were married, were army officers.
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CHAPTER XXIX.DEATH AND BURIALA FATAL COLD-LINGERING BETWEEN HOPE AND FEAR-THE LASIRALLY-THE END OF LIFE'S CAMPAIGN-A SON'S SAD HOME-COMING-PREPARATIONS FOR THE FUNERAL-PUBLIC TRIBUTES OF RsPECT-THE MILITARy PARADE IN NEW YORK-PROGRESS OF THE FUNERALTRAIN ACROSS TIE COUNTRY-CEREMONIE SAT ST. Louis-THE WAR-RIOR' LAST ENCAMPMENT BY THE SIDE OF His LovED ONES.All roads lead to Rome, and end there. Many men whohave acquired greatness by their arduous achievements invarious parts of the country, toward the close of life havegravitated to New York and ended their days there. Such was the case with Sherman's great comrade and com-mander, Grant, and such was the case with Shermanhimself. When he came to New York to make his homehe intended that it should be his last in the earthly life.And so it was. His declining years were spent in peaceand comfort, surrounded by the love of kin and friends, andby the admiration of the great Metropolis; and when theend came, after so much marching and fighting, and somany bitter controversies, it came at home and in profoundpeace.General Sherman's last illness was of little more than aweek's duration. Following a taste, natural and cultivated, which he loved to gratify, he attended the performance of"Poor Jonathan," at the New York Casino, on Wednesday432
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HEAD OF PROCESSION COMING DOWN BROADWAY, NEW YORK CITY.
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in ; :l -Il xi ;I E I ii ii I
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THE FATAL COLD. 433night, February 4, 1891. It was, in fact, a special perform-ance. Invitations had been sent to the military officers ofthe city, and General Sherman occupied one of the pros-cenium boxes with a party of friends. He seemed to bein the best of health and spirits, and gave every evidence ofkeen enjoyment of the opera.He returned to his home immediately after the perform-ance, and, although the weather was clear and bright, insome way he caught a severe cold. Its first effects werenoticed on the following morning. His condition, however,did not prevent his attendance at the wedding of MissShepard, daughter of Colonel Elliott F. Shepard, on thatafternoon. He coughed a little and complained of the coldwhile in the church. On Friday morning his condition hadbecome more uncomfortable, but excited no alarm. Histhroat, however, had become affected in the meantime, and he was obliged to give up a dinner with Lawrence Barrettthat evening at the Union League Club. On Saturday morning when he began to show signs of facial erysipelas,accompanied by fever, he felt some anxiety, and sent forDr. C. J. Alexander, a surgeon of the army, who had beenhis family physician for a number of years. On Sundaythe disease began to get a firm hold upon the old warrior.His face and neck became much swollen and inflamed, andconversation became difficult and painful. His conditionwas such that Dr. Alexander sent for Dr. Janeway, for thepurpose of holding a consultation. The General was thenconfined to his bed, and it was found that the ordinary treatment applied in cases of erysipelas would not answerthe purpose, in part owing to the General's advanced age.Sunday, by the way, was the seventieth anniversary of hisbirth.The disease had developed to such an extent on MondayKlillik
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436 HOPE ABANDONED.even then. I doubt if he has recognized me in the last twodays."" Yet he talks to them ? He does not talk much. The tongue is much swollenand the jaw is stiff, and he can speak only with difficulty.""Does he realize the serious character of the disease ?" It is hard to say. He has given no evidence of uneasi-ness, except when he called for 'Cump' (P. T. Sherman, his son), on Thursday. It then occurred to me that hewanted to say a last word to the young man. But I mayhave been mistaken. At any rate, when Cump' went tohim he was unable to tell him what was on his mind."The illustrious patient grew weak again at midnight, andat an early hour Saturday morning, February 14, it wasknown that his death was only a question of a few hours.At four o'clock his family was all summoned to his roomand never left it, except for a few minutes, until the end.The alarming attack which seized the patient soon after sixo'clock precipitated death. The doctors hurriedly heldanother consultation, did what they could to relieve hisdistress and then decided that hope must be abandoned.The chloroform plasters which had been placed onSherman's chest, failed to help. The police officers thencleared the sidewalk and streets of all passengers, andpeople began to wait for the end. At 8.35 o'clock Dr.Janeway left the house, to which he did not again return.His face and his few words told plainly that he had nohope.About half an hour before the General's death the watchers discerned signs of approaching dissolution. Firstthe old soldier's fingers began to grow cold, then the fatalcoldness crept slowly up his arms, and over his body. Asthe end approached, the General's head, which had been
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THE END. 437resting on a large pillow, was lowered gradually in the hopethat he might be enabled to breathe easier. Although hedied from suffocation, caused by the mucus from his in-flamed throat filling his lungs, there were no longer indications of suffering on his part. Those who were nearesthis head say that they heard a gentle sigh escape his lipsand then all was over. It was just I.5o o'clock when thefamous soldier expired. There was no clergyman of anydenomination in the house during the day.Within a minute or two after General Sherman's deathone of his men-servants stepped outside of the front doorand said: "It is all over."Kneeling at the bedside, as the soldier's spirit left itsearthly tenement, were the General's son, P. T. Sherman,his four daughters, the Misses Rachel and Lizzie Sherman,Mrs. Fitch and Mrs Thackara; his brother, Senator JohnSherman; his sons-in-law, Lieutenants Fitch and Thackara;his brother-in-law, General Thomas Ewing; his physician,Dr. Alexander, U. S. A., and his nurse, Miss ElizabethPrice, of the New York Hospital. The other son, the Rev. Thomas E. Sherman, was on the ocean, hastening home-ward, but too late. Generals Slocum and Howard werethen in the room below.General Sherman seems to have had a presentiment ofhis fate some weeks before it actually befell him. One dayhe said to General C. H. T. Collis, who mentioned Grant'sbirthday-April 27:"Oh, well, Collis, I'll be dead and buried before then.""I tried hard to cheer him," said General Collis, "andpretended to believe he was joking, but he became serious and added after awhile: I feel it coming sometimes when I get home from an entertainment or banquet, especiallythese winter nights. I feel death reaching out for me, as itIIIWll
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438 PREPARING FOR BURIAL.were. I suppose I'll take cold some night and go to bed,never to get up again.' The words were prophetic."In accordance with General Sherman's often expressed desire, the body did not lie in state; and the public so re-spected the grief of the family as not to besiege the houseto gaze upon the remains of the hero. General Howardsent over a guard from the army post on Governor's Island, and with General Slocum, by invitation of the family, tookcharge of the arrangements for the funeral obsequies. Thebody of the deceased General was placed in a coffin exactlylike that in which Mrs. Sherman was buried. The Generalchose her's himself, and gave express orders that his ownshould be like it. It was of oak, lined with cream-coloredsatin, and had silver handles. On a silver plate was thefollowing inscription:WILLIAM TECUMSEH SHERMAN,GENERAL, U. S. A.Born February 8, 182o.Died February 14, 1891.This coffin was inclosed for the journey to St. Louis in an outer coffin of chestnut wood, brass bound, with a brassplate bearing the same inscription as the inner. The Gen-eral's body was dressed in the full uniform of his rank.The following "Special Order No. 5 was issued fromthe headquarters of the Grand Army of the Republic, atRutland, Vt." Grand Army of the Republic posts on the route of thefuneral train of General Sherman from New York to St. Louis will form at their respective railroad stations andsalute remains as train passes."The President and his Cabinet were invited by GeneralHoward to attend the funeral exercises in New York.
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THE LOYAL LEGION. 439Committees from both Houses of Congress were appointedto pay their tribute of respect. From the Senate cameMessrs. Evarts, Hawley, Manderson, Pierce, Cockrell and WaIthall. From the House Speaker Reed appointedMessrs. Cutcheon, Spinola, Cogswell, Cummings, Grosvenor, Kinsey, Tarsney, Henderson, of Illinois, and Outh-waite.A sorrowful meeting of the Military Order of the LoyalLegion was held on Monday, February 16, at which theseresolutions were adopted:" In common with the entire country we lament the lossof a great military chieftain whose loyal spirit rightlyplaced the love of country higher than all earthly obliga-tions, and who was individually a distinct and gloriouselement in the triumphant struggle of that country for itsown survival and for the rights of man."As once his fellow soldiers we morn universally for thedead commander, whose great heart made us all his ownand made his own virtues seem to us like personal benefac-tions." As members of this Military Order we deplore the lossof a companion whose honors added to the value of thoseties which his fellowship helped to endear, and whose fre-quent and cordial visits to the New York Commandery willbe cherished in our memories as so many occasions to beoften and affectionately recalled." To his children and relatives, to whom his great renown,his honors and his tenderness do but enhance their loss, we tender all that sympathy may, and trust that a place inour regard henceforth may be accepted by them as a littleheritage from him."General Howard made a brief address, in the course of
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440 "MY BODY WILL DIE."which his emotion was strong and interrupted his utter-General Sherman," he said, had more personal friendsand could call more men by name probably than any otherman in the country."A few days ago, Sherman and Slocum and I met inBrooklyn and the conversation turned on death. Some oneremarked that he hoped it would not come to Sherman formany years. I exclaimed, on the impulse of the moment'General, you will never die.' He answered, sharplyand strongly, My body will die.' God bless GeneralSherman," was the peroration of General Howard'sspeech.General Slocum followed with a warm panegyric on themarch to the sea. Sherman was to me something morethan a companion," he said. "He gave me his confidencein war and his friendship in peace. He opened to me whatis dear to every soldier, an opportunity to link my namewith his." In the coming time there will be no dispute about hiscareer. It may be in the future that some man will saythat he furnished the idea of the march to the sea to Sher-man. That man must have been with him at the time, orsubsequent, when Sherman captured Atlanta, for when hedid so he had no idea of cutting aloof from his base of sup-plies. When he got back from the battle of Jonesboro hetook down a map and said, I will make Atlanta my baseof supplies.' He went so far as to throw up intrenchments.That was before Hood pushed up toward the Tennessee andNashville; and then he changed his mind."After Sherman had taken Savannah certain persons atWashington urged him to take his troops to City Point by
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THE FUNERAL ORDERS.sea. Had he been a timid man he would have been con-tent to rest upon his laurels, knowing that he had alreadywon an imperishable fame, but he said: 'No; I will takemy chances in South Carolina,' and he did so, and every-thing went like clockwork, and success again crowned hisefforts."At the same time a meeting of representative citizens ofSt. Louis was held in that city to make arrangements forthe final services there ; and every city and town along the route prepared to salute the funeral train with demonstra-tions of sympathy and honor. The orders for the proces-sion in New York were issued on February I8, as follows:HEADQUARTERS OF THE ATLANTIC,GOvERNOR'S ISLAND, NEW YORK.The arrangements for the funeral of the late illustriousGeneral of the Army, William Tecumseh Sherman, havingbeen entrusted by his children and other relatives to thecare of the undersigned, they have agreed upon the detailsso far as they relate to the ceremony in New York, whichare now furnished for the information and guidance of allwho may participate therein:The regulation escort, under command of Loomis L.Langdon, 1st Artillery, will consist of one regiment ofUnited States marines, four companies of United Statesengineers, and six companies foot batteries of artillery; ofa battalion of light artillery from the Army and theNational Guard of New York, and of two troops of cavalryfrom the National Guard of New York.The remains will be received by the escort at the lateresidence of the General, No. 75 West Seventy-first street,at 2 o'clock, P. M., on Thursday next, the 19th inst. Thebody will be borne on a caisson, preceded by the following-ate .. p;
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442 THE FUNERAL ORDERS.named pall-bearers in carriages: Major-General J. M.Schofield, Major-General O. .Howard, Rear-AdmiralD. L. Braine, Rear-Admiral J. A. Greer, Professor H. L.Kendrick, Major-General H. W. Slocum, General JosephE. Johnston, Major-General D. E. Sickles, Major-GeneralG. M. Dodge, Major-General J. M. Corse, Major-GeneralWager Swayne, Major-General Stewart L.Woodford, Briga-dier-General Jno. Moore, Brigadier-General H. G. WrightThese pall-bearers will accompany the remains as far as thetrain at Jersey City. Six sergeants will proceed to St.Louis. The special escort of honor from the Grand Army,Lafayette Post, will form on the right and left of thecaisson.The order of column following the family and relatives will be as follows:(I) The President and Vice-President of the UnitedStates.(2) The members of the Cabinet.(3) Ex-Presidents of the United States.(4) Committees of the Senate and House of Representa-tives.(5) The Governor of the State and the Mayor of theCity of New York.These officers will follow the family and relatives as rep-resentative mourners.(6) The Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the UnitedStates, and officers of the Army and Navy(7) The Grand Army of the Republic.(8) The Corps of Cadets, United States Military Academy, Lieutenant-Colonel Hawkins commanding.(9) The National Guard, under Brigadier-General LouisFitzgerald.Delegates and representatives from veterans, s of A&L 1
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THE FUNERAL ORDERS. 443veterans and other organizations unassigned, under chargeof General David Morrison.The line of march will be as follows: Eighth avenue toFifty-ninth street, to Fifth avenue, to Broadway, to Fifty-seventh street, to Fifth avenue, to Washington Square:there the column, excepting the regulation military escort,will be dismissed.This escort will continue its march by Waverley Place toMacdougal street, to King street, to Hudson street, toWatts street, at corner of Canal, through Watts street tojunction with West street. Veteran organizations not moving with column will formacross West st. from Watts st. to the ferry landing, foot ofDesbrosses st. The carriages in the procession will berestricted to the pall-bearers, family and relatives, andinvited guests.The column will be commanded by Major-General O. O.Howard, United States Army.Major-General Daniel Butterfield is designated as senioraide to the General Commanding and as marshal.The following aides are announced : General Horace Por-ter, to accompany the President of the United States; Gen-eral M. D. Leggett, to accompany the Cabinet; the Hon.Joseph H. Choate, to accompany ex-President Hayes; theHon. Chauncey M. Depew, to accompany ex-PresidentCleveland; General Floyd Clarkson, in charge of the GrandArmy; Major-General H. A. Barnum, to accompany theSuperintendent of the Military Academy; General Robert Nugent, formerly of General Sherman s regiment, to takecharge of the veterans at Desbrosses st. David Morrison, 79th Veterans, in charge of veteran organizations in columnsother than the rand Army; Mr. Kiliaen Van Rensselaer,to accompany carriages of relatives.
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444 A SAD HOME-COMINGMr. Loyall Farragut.Captain H. P. Kingsbury, 6th Cavalry.Captain A. M. Wetherill, 6th Infntry.First Lieutenant L A. Craig, 6th Cavalry.First Lieutenant Guy Howard, 12th Infantry, Aide-dcCamp.First Lieutenant Harry C. Benson, 4th Cavaly.First Lieutenant Charles G. Treat, th Artillery, Aide-deCamp.First Lieutenant W. W. Forsyth, 6th Cavalry; SecondLieutenant Samuel Rodman, st Artillery,Aides-de-Camp.The churches of New York City are requested to ihavetheir bells tolled at half-minute intervals during the move-ment of the columns, from 2 until 4P. M; and the churchesof Jersey City are requested to toll their bells in like man-ner from 5 to 6 P. M., on Thursday.The headquarters of the General commanding thecolumn and the Marshal, will be announced to-morrow.The details of the formation in line of the respective di-visions will be communicated to the commander or chiefsfrom headquarters. H. W. SLtOM.OLIVER O. HOWARD.Late on Wednesday night the steamship Majesticarrived at New York, with the Rev. Thomas E. Shermanamong its passengers. When the pilot boarded her, Mr.Sherman eagerly asked him about the General." I'm unable to say," replied the pilot, adding that heonly knew of General Sherman's sickness, as he had beenout at sea for some days.When the mail steamer came alongside, Mr. Shermanrepeated his anxious inquiry. The answer came back,"General Sherman's fieral takes place to-morrow."
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THE PUBLIC TRIBUTE. 445The day before the funeral the house was opened for afew hours, and the public were allowed to enter and viewthe face of the dead. Thousands availed themselves of theprivilege. It was an interesting crowd of people. Therewere white-haired veterans of the war; there were peoplein the clothing of luxury, people clad like beggars, andmothers with babies in their arms leading children by thehand. There were schoolboys come to look at the manabout whom their histories tell them, come to see if theface they had seen in the pictures was indeed the face ofthe great General. There were young girls there, andyoung men also. It was a crowd representative of thewhole American people. Hebrews came out of the depthsof the east side and Germans came from Hoboken. Allpassed in review before the man who will review armies nomore. Their uncovered heads were bowed. Some of thevery old women who had given their sons to this leaderfor their country's sake sobbed as they passed on."It was on a glorious winter day, February 19, that the dust of the great soldier was carried from his former hometo make the journey to its final resting place at St. Louis.As the funeral procession started, bells of the City weretolled; buildings everywhere displayed tokens of honorand signs of mourning; the streets were thronged withsympathetic spectators; and thirty thousand men marchedwith measured tread behind the coffin that contained theearthly remains of their loved and honored leader. Con-spicuous in the company were General Schofield, the head of the army; General Howard and General Slocum, Sher-man's lieutenants on the march through Georgia; GeneralCorse, of Kenesaw fame; General Johnston, Sherman's oldantagonist; and Professor Kendrick, one of those whotaught Sherman the art of war. The President, the Vice-28
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446 THE FUNERAL CORTEGE.President, the two living ex-Presidents, and the members ofe Cainet were also in the company.The: was a large contingent from the regular army, withGeneral Howard in command. Then came the MilitaryOrder of the Loyal Legion; long columns of the Grandorganizations, and the municipal government.The long procession wound its way through the streetsof New York to the Jersey City ferry. There the cofand its immediate escort were taken across the river andplaced on the funeral train. General Sherman's horse,which with empty saddle had followed the funeral caisson,was led up to the train and the saddle and boots were placedby the coffin in the funeral car. The train consisted of anengine and eight cars. Generals Howard and Slocu, andSurgeon Alexander, besides six sergeants of the regulararmy, acted as a guard of honor. The Governor of NewJersey through his staff acted s an escort through JerseyCity; and the Governor of Pennsylvania and his staff in aspecial car went through to Harrisburg.It was early in the evening when the train left JerseyCity. At almost every station that it passed vast throngsassembled and bands of music played solemn dirges. It was midnight when it reached Harrisburg, Pennsylvania,yet a multitude stood in the darkness in the open air to doit honor. In the morning it passed through Pittsburg inthe midst of a heavy rain storm. Later in the day the skywas clear and the sun shone brilliantly. At Steubenville,Ohio, seventy-five veterans of the army stood on the platform as the train went by nearly all them old comradeof Sherman. At Columbus, Ohio, the train paused for afew minutes while Grand Army veterans were allowed to
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THE LAST SAD RITES. 447gaze upon th casket. At Indiaapolis another stop wasmade while many distiguished people paid their tribute ofIt was Saturday morning when the train reached St.Louis. For several days the weather there had beenstormy, but this morning the skies were clear and thesunshine bright. Thousands of people thronged about thestation, waiting there for hours before the arrival of the train.t last, at a little before nine o'clock, the funeral cars slowlyrolled into the station, the engine bell solemnly tolling. Elaborate preparations had been made at St. Louis for amilitary funeral befitting the great soldier whose dust wasto be returned to the dust from which it came. Two hoursafter the arrival of the train the procession was formed,under the lead of General Wesley Merritt, and it solemnlywound its way through the city which for many years wasShermani s favorite home, to Calvary Cemetery. The firstdivision consisted of detachments of the Regular Army,escorting the casket, which was borne on a caisson drawnby four black horses and covered with the stars and stripes. Ransom Post, No. 131, Department of Missouri, G. A. R.,acted as the immediate guard of "onor. Following closelywere the members of the President's Cabinet and the com-mittees from the two houses of Congress. The seconddivision was made up of the Loyal Legion and the Societyof the Army of the Tennessee. In it were ex-PresidentHayes, Judge Gresham and General Lew Wallace. Thethird division was composed of Posts of the Grand Armyof the Republic and Sons of Veterans. In the fourthdivision were militia regiments from various States andmany civil officials. Civic societies made up the fifthdivision, and various city delegations and the generalpublic the sixth and last division.
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448 THE LAST SAD RITES.As the long procession wound its way up the slope toary Cemetery it presented a view of solemn but inspir-ing splendor. The arms of the troops flashed in the sun-light, a multitude of flags fluttered on the breeze, and thesubdued strains of funeral music made the air tremulous.At last, six miles from the railroad station, the plot wasreached where were the graves of the wife and two childrenof the departed hero. The flag covered casket was borneupon the shoulders of eight sturdy soldiers to the opengrave. Then came the command, Pr esent Andevery soldier stood motionless as a graven statue. Then theRev. Thomas E. Sherman, clad in slight vestments, steppedforward and began the service for the dead over his father'sdust, standing, as he did so, in the shadow of his mother'smonument. He repeated the words of the Litany, translat-ing prayer and scripture into English, in a clear, manly voice,and offered a touching extemporaneous prayer. After the last solemn words a company of troops stepped forward.Three times were given the commands, "Load!" Ready!""Aim!" "Fire!" and three times the rifles spoketheirloudfarewell salute. Then the artillery posted nearbythunderedforth their echoing responses. When the last reverberationsdied away a solitary trumpeter stepped forward to the footof the soldier's grave and sounded "Taps."Thus ended the last impressive scene.In his life Sherman had left with his friends full instruc-tions concerning his 4aeral, his grave and his monument.He directed that the only inscription above his dust shouldbe his name, his rank, the date of his birth, the date of hisdeath, and the simple words, "True and Honest." A fittingepitaph for one who was truly, as was written of anothergreat soldier, "In his simplicity sublime."
